European Union Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Kerr of Kinlochard
Main Page: Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Kerr of Kinlochard's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to speak to the question of whether Clause 7 should stand part principally to draw attention to a common feature of this clause and succeeding clauses, which was also a feature of Clauses 2 and 3 and to which the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, has drawn attention on a number of occasions. The question concerns the acceptability of the language in Clause 7(3):
“A Minister of the Crown may not vote in favour of or otherwise support a decision to which this subsection applies”.
This is the chicken-and-egg problem, as explained by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay. It would be normal before a decision is reached in Brussels that there should be preliminary discussion, the preparation of a text and textual negotiation, and that various rounds should be gone through before there is a decision. I am in no way disagreeing with what Clause 7(3) says about the Minister being banned from voting in favour of the decision. My worry—like the worry of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, about previous clauses—is simply about the language “or otherwise support”.
One can envisage a situation in which the United Kingdom representative might be keen to say, “My Government would live with this”, or “My Government would like this”, but it must be understood that under UK law, under this Bill, it would require an Act of Parliament and a referendum—or, in this case, will require an Act of Parliament. That could be construed as supporting the measure, though explaining that there were steps that had to be gone through before the UK could vote for it. I am nervous about our being unable to say anything in respect of decisions that we favour. That seems to me the effect of this language. The risk is that the negotiator would be accused of having broken the law by supporting the idea or a particular form of the draft decision.
Reflections on the words as they appear here will be bound to have cross-reading repercussions. I will put it like that: that is what I am saying that I will seek to do.
I turn now to Article 333(1) of the TFEU, on enhanced co-operation. The pat answer that the Bill gives if you stare it in the face is that if a sensitive veto listed in Schedule 1 is removed, there will be primary legislation for the removal of other vetoes. That is something that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, questioned. He cited the German example to which the noble Lord, Lord Empey, also referred. That is stretching it a bit. I cannot see that the pattern in Germany—for which there may well be good reasons, such as anxiety not to offend the Länder—arises here. I trust that it does not sound too austere to say that it would not be our way to go through that kind of action in the hope that people would understand that we really wanted to do the reverse. Nevertheless, it is a complex point and I have more to say about it.
This is to do with whether we maintain or surrender a veto in these areas. We are not talking about action in those areas: I am sure that that is perfectly obvious to noble Lords. Enhanced co-operation decisions will not be agreed overnight: they will be agreed as a matter of last resort in areas of sensitivity for some member states. A move to set up enhanced co-operation has happened only once, and is being proposed now in the context of the European patent.
I had hoped that the Minister would score another boundary: he was starting splendidly with his exegesis on Germany, with which I entirely agreed. Does it not say in Clause 7(4)(e) and (f) that we are talking about a particular enhanced co-operation? We are not talking about the general rules for enhanced co-operation. I accept the first point that the Minister made about precedent. It seems to me—and, I think, to him—to be an insufficient answer, but it was a sort of answer. The point that he is making now surely does not apply, because paragraphs (e) and (f) state that the decision will relate to a specific reinforced co-operation in which we will be a participant.
That is precisely the point that I am making. I mentioned the European patent, which is a good example. A decision to move to qualified majority voting would not be something that we would agree overnight. It would be much more likely to be subject to negotiation over a lengthy period, not least because it would result in one or more member states being outvoted. I simply do not accept that the provision would hold up the taking of a specific decision. I am afraid that my mind may not be meeting that of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. I cannot see what his concern is. This is to do with removing the veto, not taking that decision. That is the best explanation that I can give: I think that it meets his concern, which he put forward in a very valuable and experienced way.
If we are talking about a specific enhanced co-operation, and the Minister accepts that we are, we have something going on out in the field—this is Article 333 on common foreign security policy. A particular kind of external activity is taking place and we do not know what it is. Those who are taking part in it have to make rapid decisions. They have to decide what we do tomorrow about situation x. The treaty says that if they unanimously so decide, they may take implementing decisions by qualified majority in relation to that specific deployment, or whatever it is. They are not changing the treaty or the general rules but are dealing with the problem that has arisen now. I do not understand the different scenario that is being presented when the Minister says that this will be prepared over time and that there will be a lot of consideration. This is about implementation. It is about people in the field. That is why I think it is rather inappropriate. Is the Minister quite sure that it is appropriate to make this a matter on which the UK would need to pass primary legislation?
I am not sure I agree with the picture of decisions having to be taken instantly. On the contrary, it seems to me to be much more likely that there would be all kinds of negotiation, not least because it would result in one or more member states being outvoted. I do not think these are. This is a very complex matter, and I have sought to try to explain as best I can how we see it working but, of course, I will write to the noble Lord in more detail about his precise concerns. I am not sure that he has really satisfied me about the cutting edge of his amendment, and I have clearly not satisfied him. We will just go on boxing and coxing while other noble Lords have to listened, so I think it is better if I write to him and try to clarify the Government’s understanding of the reasoning and the reason why primary legislation would be justified against his clearly very strongly held view that it would not be justified and might hold things up.
Yes, of course I will.
I want now to turn to the next point that the noble Lord raised, which is to do with Article 64(3) of the TFEU on the reverse of liberalisation of capital movements to or from third countries. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, indicated he did not fully understand what the Bill means. He interpreted it as allowing a move back from QMV to unanimity. Article 64(3) allows for unanimity for the adoption of,
“measures which constitute a step backwards in Union law as regards the liberalisation of the movement of capital to or from third countries”.
I do not know where this phrase “step back” originally emerged from. I do not know whether it was way back in the original draft of the European constitution. It may have been. It is used to do that which we believe should be subject to an Act of Parliament. Once again, I will obviously look at it very closely, but that is why we believe it is in the Bill in the form that it is and why we think an Act of Parliament is the right way forward.
Those are the detailed points that were raised. As I said about the phraseology that comes down to us from legislation under a previous Government, there is matter for further reflection. I fully accept that just because it was there before does not automatically mean that it is the right way forward now, although the previous Government undoubtedly thought that there were good reasons for it, otherwise they would not have put it there.
Clause 7 covers four categories of passerelles—I do not want to detain the Committee by listing them all now—that cover a wide range of different passerelle devices with which we are concerned. I like to think that Clause 7 represents a clear step, which in principle although maybe not in detail has the support of noble Lords generally, towards enhancing parliamentary control over the Government’s participation in a range of important passerelle decisions at EU level. The result ought to be—indeed, the coalition Government believe it will be—an increase in Parliament’s, and ultimately the British public’s, sense of ownership of and engagement with the future direction of the EU.
Of course, in the highly sensitive areas listed in Schedule 1, as we know and have debated endlessly in Committee, the referendum lock would apply on top of parliamentary approval. However, an Act of Parliament is required in the other areas listed in the clause, which surely can only be a bonus for the public trust and accountability that we are all working towards in this legislation and in our work on the European Union generally.
I thank the noble Lord warmly for his reply, particularly for what he said about looking again at the wording “or otherwise support”. Whatever its origins, I am sure the Government can do better and that the change would solve a lot of problems not just in Brussels but here. How would the Government advance the case for the Act of Parliament that would be necessary if the law prevented them supporting it? We are slightly in Alice in Wonderland here, and plenty of adjustments to the wording would solve our problem.
The noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, asked me a question that I do not quite understand. My objection to Clause 7(3) is based purely on its wording “or otherwise support”. My objection to Clause 7 as a whole applies in addition to the list in Clause 7(4), which, as the Minister understands, I think is a little too long. I have no objection to Clause 7(2), but I am puzzled by Clause 7(4)(c), (e) and (f). I am very grateful to the Minister for saying that he will reflect on Clause 7(3). I echo the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, in talking about the locus classicus for “or otherwise support”. The phrase is most likely to cause us major problems at the start of Clause 6, which deals with bigger issues than those that we are looking at in Clause 7.
I am grateful to the Minister for saying that he will reflect on the matter and that he will write to me about Clause 7(4)(e) and (f). I hope that he might also write to me about Clause 7(4)(c), if only to explain to someone ignorant like me exactly what the relevant passage of the treaty is all about, and why the Government would object to a move back to unanimity, which seems to me to be slightly inconsistent with their overall stance on decisions.
I do not wish for the moment to protract the discussion on whether Clause 7 should stand part.
I have nothing to say except to point to the words “or otherwise support”. I will say no more than that. Those words are there in the first line, and I hope that the next time we look they will have vanished.
My Lords, I should hate to delay the Committee, bearing in mind that this clause stand part debate has been introduced so briefly. I have not spoken in these proceedings since Second Reading when I expressed my concern about certain aspects of the Bill, which I have to say remains. As chairman of the Justice and Institutions Sub-Committee of the European Committee—although I am not speaking for the sub-committee—I am concerned as to the effect that the provisions will have on matters relating to judicial and police co-operation. I fear that our ability to act flexibly will be compromised.
I have a question for my noble friends on the Front Bench, of which I have given notice to my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire. This sub-committee has just had before it a proposal for a Council regulation under Article 352, the subject of this clause. It is about a matter as mundane as the publication of the Official Journal, which noble Lords will know is the source of the authentic versions of EU legislation and other documents. At the moment, Article 297 provides that the authentic version is the published and printed version. The proposal for this regulation is that the electronic version should become the authentic version.
I am advised that if this regulation does not become law before the passing of this Bill—if that is what should happen—an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament will be required to implement it. I have read very carefully Clause 8 and the various proposals and clauses with which this clause would comply. One such is the Act of Parliament and the other is if it is a matter of urgency, which would probably be stretching a point—my noble friends would be accused of stretching a point if they were to say that—or an exempt purpose. I do not read it as an exempt purpose, although I am open to be corrected. Do we really propose to have an Act of Parliament to implement matters as mundane as this?
This is getting hackneyed, but the magic words are there in the first line of the clause and in subsection (2). I have one small point of substance to make in addition in relation to Clause 10, where we have got down to reasonably light procedures—parliamentary approval by a Motion in both Houses. Therefore, my concerns are much reduced compared with my concerns about the appropriateness of the heavy provisions in some of the previous clauses. Indeed, my concerns about Clause 7 and the scope of Clause 7(4) would be more than met if the Government would consider moving some of the less significant items in Clause 7 to the procedures that we are now looking at in Clause 10. A Motion of both Houses rather than an Act of Parliament is much more likely to be right in relation to the fairly inconsequential and urgent matters that I was talking about under enhanced co-operation.
The point of substance that I want to raise comes under Clause 10(1)(c), where a procedure is laid down for the approval of decisions under Article 252 of the TFEU permitting an increase in the number of Advocates- General. There are eight Advocates-General assisting 27 Justices of the European Court of Justice. Ten years ago there were eight assisting 15, so clearly the ratio has worsened and should be corrected. The Advocates-General provide a useful element assisting the Court of Justice.
I was a member of the sub-committee of the splendid European Union Committee chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Roper. The sub-committee was chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bowness. A month ago, we recommended that an increase in the number of Advocates-General should be made as soon as possible, because that comparatively straightforward reform would assist the Court in increasing the speed with which cases could be dealt with while improving the quality of decision-making. We pointed out that there was provision in the treaty for an increase in the number of Advocates-General serving the Court and we recommended that the Court of Justice submit a request for an increase to the Council. I do not pretend that it is a very big deal that there would have to be a Motion in both Houses before we could agree. I take this opportunity to say that I hope the Government will agree and will be ready when the right moment comes to see the increase in the number of Advocates-General, which the Court clearly needs and which the UK legal profession believes it needs and is asking for.