European Union Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Howell of Guildford
Main Page: Lord Howell of Guildford (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Howell of Guildford's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I welcome this amendment from my noble friend Lord Radice, whose expertise on Europe is well known in the House. Several of the speeches that have been made by Members of the Committee have reflected their own extensive knowledge of Europe and their understandable disappointment that we have been so churlish in the way that we have talked about Europe and the European project over the years. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, I take the point that there are things to criticise. However, that is scarcely a reason for the trajectory on which we have embarked.
In addressing the amendment specifically, it is clear from the beginning of Clause 2 that a referendum would be launched following matters being laid before Parliament and fully debated, a decision being taken by Parliament and a treaty approved by an Act of Parliament. Clause 3 gives essentially the same sequence: Parliament takes a fundamental view, looks at it and decides that a referendum should be held because of the conditions to hold one as set out in the Act. Under Clause 6, a Minister of the Crown must start with a draft decision approved by an Act of Parliament. The referendum condition is then triggered. In all the circumstances in which a referendum condition is triggered—were one ever to be triggered—the reality is that Parliament will have reached a conclusion. Obviously, it will not have done so in secret. It will be a decision that is well known to the public as a whole. Parliament will have decided that the point at which a referendum is required has been reached.
In those circumstances it would be inconceivable that no argument would be advanced to the people who were going to vote in the referendum to account for the decisions that Parliament had taken. It would be an extraordinary set of circumstances in which that decision did not have the visible consent of the Government. If the Government had put a proposition of that kind to Parliament and it had been defeated, it would be a significant blow to any Government. It must be the case that the arguments that had been held in that forum—or forums, taking this House into account as well—would have come to a positive outcome.
I turn to Clause 13. The Electoral Commission,
“must take whatever steps they think appropriate to promote public awareness of the referendum and how to vote in it”.
In other words, it must make sure that people know the referendum is taking place and what they need to do to take part in it. Curiously, under paragraph (b), the Electoral Commission,
“may take whatever steps they think appropriate to promote public awareness of the subject-matter of the referendum”.
In short, it must make sure that everybody knows about the referendum but it may take steps to make sure that people know what the referendum is about. I make this point because if, in those circumstances, the Government or a Minister did not take steps to deal with the policy issues under discussion, it would be the most curious discussion that there had ever been before a referendum, especially if the Electoral Commission itself did not get into the theatre of argument about the subject matter. It seems to me that it is less likely to do that than the politicians who are involved in it.
There is, therefore, a huge amount of good common sense in the amendment of my noble friend Lord Radice. If you look at the specific text of the amendment, Ministers of the Crown are asked to,
“have regard to the desirability”.
This is not a monumental hurdle to have to cross. Ministers are expected to put the argument in a way that at least conveys why Parliament has taken the decisions that it has taken, and to do so in a way that is positive. Does that disbar anybody from saying, “There are issues here. We can see the following negatives”? No, of course it does not. I have no doubt that in any referendum debate people will say what they think the downside of the argument is. However, the amendment would ensure that the upside of the argument is also presented, even in a climate where a large part of the media of this country may not be sympathetic. That is probably the only route to achieving any balance in the discussion that will take place in advance of a referendum. Therefore, I welcome this amendment. One can look back and see how it links with the other clauses, and particularly how it deals with the rather conditional “may take” provision in Clause 13. In my view it would ensure that the argument was well made.
Having made that rather narrow point about the purpose of this amendment and how it would operate against the background of a parliamentary decision, I assert that in a generally extremely sceptical climate it can do no harm whatever to argue the case for the benefits of the European Union in a positive way. No doubt some Members of your Lordships' House do not believe that there are any positive benefits, or that they are so marginal that they should not be referred to because it is a waste of breath. However, a good many more of us believe that there is a very good and strong case to be made in favour of the European Union, and that it is sensible that it is made, as this amendment would ensure.
My Lords, I was going to begin my comments by congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Radice, on the very sensible and balanced way in which he put his case, although his peroration slightly took off the ground towards the end of his remarks, but perhaps that is the nature of perorations. However, as the debate has gone on, I have begun to share the sentiment expressed by my noble friend Lady Williams that the situation is sad in a sense, although I suspect that I disagree somewhat with my noble friend on how the EU should develop in the 21st century and be made fit for purpose, where the great trends should go and how this country should reinforce them. Nevertheless, I agree with her that all the old polarities of debate have prevailed for far too long. Over the past decade or so, one has needed to see emerge a new and much more positive British presentation and role than we have seen. That is a matter of regret.
The Government have no difficulty in supporting the main sentiment behind this amendment. We are members of the European Union. If we are members of organisations such as the massive and amazing European Union, it would be absurd to do anything short of making the very creative best we could of that. Therefore, the noble Lord, Lord Radice, makes an important point about the need for the Government to be a more vocal and effective advocate of the European Union of which we are members, given the way that the world is shaping. This applies also to other great bodies in the world of which we are members. I am sure he will join me in saying that we need to do better than the efforts of previous Administrations in our approach to this vital task. Indeed, the noble Lord said as much. We should do so by explaining more clearly how good and positive EU membership is part of our overall adjustment to a totally changed world landscape in which major markets are growing up outside Europe and in which Europe and the European Union, including this nation, are going to have to compete with increasing vigour. We need to ensure that the European Union is understood to be, and is seen as, a force for good. We want people to understand that the European Union, and our membership of it, has been, and can be, a force for good. We need to improve the effectiveness—this is slightly off the brief—of the EU’s own voice. Many of us feel that sometimes in recent years that voice has not been quite so effective and focused as it should have been. We seek to present positively to the British people the benefits of these activities and our membership of the Union. The coalition is doing that. Indeed, all Governments should do so as a matter of course into the future.
I put it to the Minister that this Bill will be seen by our partners on the continent of Europe and in Ireland as an example of terrible British negativity about the European Union. That is quite the wrong spirit in which to negotiate with friends and partners to defend the national interest and to achieve successful outcomes from difficult and complex negotiations. What do the Government propose to do to try to persuade our European partners that, despite the evidence of this Bill, the British Government are positively committed to making a great success of our membership of the EU, and to continuing to build up and strengthen the institutions of the Union?
I welcome the noble Lord back to our debate although I am not sure that I welcome the spirit of his contribution. He has certainly made a very lively contribution to previous debates and we missed him earlier this evening. However, his premise is wrong. We have clear indications that there are no difficulties. Jean-Claude Piris, the former head of the Council’s legal service in Brussels, has commented that he sees no difficulties with Clause 18, and that he also has no difficulties with the thrust of the Bill. We have checked with people around the European Union and we are not getting the picture that the noble Lord talks about. Of course, it depends who you talk to. If you find people who support your views, that will reinforce your argument as you can then say, “These people support my views”. However, I assure the noble Lord that throughout Europe there is a real desire on the part of different countries, with their different models and different ways, to seek to enhance the transparency, accountability and public support for the European Union, and to do it in ways not dissimilar to ours—which is to say that this great Union has all the competences it needs and can go forward in a whole range of areas. It does not need to draw new powers from the nation states through treaty changes, competence transfers or power transfers.
All around Europe there is a strong sentiment in that direction. It is a pro-European sentiment and I do not think that it does at all what the noble Lord says. On the contrary, this spirit shows that we are trying to make the architecture—I hope an enduring architecture; and we will debate that later—for a more democratically based Europe that is soundly build on a popular consensus, instead of one that is regarded with hostility and suspicion.
This has been a good debate. We have heard a lot of views, some of which have been predictable, and others that have perhaps been less so. I should like to take up two or three points before I conclude.
The noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, said that he hoped that I was not arguing for propaganda. Of course I am not. I am arguing for the facts, and that requires a balance. Of course there is a cost in our membership but, as the Commercial Secretary to the Treasury said, the cost is considerably outweighed by the benefits. I should like that to be argued out, and to that extent I support the case for costs and benefits to be set out.
At the moment, the debate is unbalanced because there is no strong pro-European voice, and we need to restore that balance because it is not being heard. That is why, when moving the amendment, I put the accent on the positive. We were told by members of UKIP that the Government have no place in this argument. Of course the Government have a place in the argument. They are our Government. We are members of the European Union and we have been members for nearly 40 years. As the noble Lord, Lord Howell, said, it is up to members of the Government to put the case—and it is entirely right that they should do so.
I thank my noble friend Lord Triesman for making an even better case for my amendment than the case I made. He made a subtle and excellent case. I accept that this may be an obligation that should not be in statute but, frankly, I would not have put my case in the way that I did if I had not felt that we in this country faced a serious problem, whereby we are a member of a great Union that neither we nor our Government argue for. I included my own Government in my strictures.
I was pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Howell, put the case in general terms for our membership of the European Union. He rightly said that our case needs refining and developing, as does the European Union. I should like him to make a major speech on the issue, and I very much look forward to hearing it when he has finished with the Bill. I want the coalition to live up to the constructive part of its agreement on Europe. We have heard all the negative bits. Let us have some of the constructive bits. That is my message.
I intend to send a copy of this debate to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary through the noble Lord, Lord Howell, because it is important that they know what we are saying in this House—that there is a major problem and we need to do something about it. I shall closely monitor, as all of us on this side of the argument will, the performance of the Government to ensure that they stick to the coalition agreement. We have heard a lot about the coalition agreement. Let us make sure they stick to it. I shall, for the moment withdraw my amendment, but that is not because I do not think the issue is important. It is vital.
My Lords, what has come through in the debate is that it is hard to see a strong purpose for Clause 18. It is not the best drafted clause I have ever read in legislation, and I understand why—or at least I think I understand why, which I will come to in a moment. But it is also true to say that the Explanatory Notes to the Bill do the clause no favours. They do not set out why it is compelling or why any of us who think that it is obscurely drafted should feel that we can put our hand on our heart and say that we know exactly why it is written as it is. I certainly do not feel that way. I am not a lawyer. I am not learned in the law, which is the expression that has gone around the Chamber. I am a humble mathematician and I am trying hard to understand the considerable obscurities of law when compared with mathematics.
It is important to ask, as did the noble Lord, Lord Deben, only a short while ago, what the clause as it is written is for—I shall come on to the alternatives in a moment. Everybody agrees that it is declaratory in its reference to the 1972 Act. It looks as though it is attempting to balance a number of arguments which plainly have gone on in the background between those who are uncomfortable with the idea that Europe has any bearing on the way we conduct our legal lives, and may continue to do so, and those who recognise that that is a fixed reality because of the processes that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe, described in a very helpful speech. It is hard to understand the necessity of Clause 18 and it is reasonable to say that, as drafted, it is open to very wide interpretation. As a couple of noble Lords have said, that would probably make it open to judicial review.
I find myself in strong agreement—I hope that it will do her no harm—with the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, who said that the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee’s report gave not the most glowing reference which anybody has written to a piece of legislation. The report is written with the niceness that parliamentarians occasionally reserve for a description of something they think is very poor, but, none the less, it says, in terms pretty much, that it is very poor. The Government in their response almost give up the ghost after a very short period of trying to defend it, because there is no certainty, I think, even on their part, that this was the right way to do it.
I cannot see the point of the clause or that it is at all helpful. I have real sympathy with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, that parliaments cannot bind their successors. That view at least, about the character of parliamentary Government, must be common ground among us. In those circumstances, it must be common ground that Parliament is supreme, and it must be common ground that, should Parliament wish to stand down the 1972 Act, it would be within its competence to do so. It is extremely unlikely that it would, but that is neither here nor there in the terms in which the noble Lord put that proposition to the Committee. The supremacy argument is very powerful. One of the reasons that I have great difficulty with much of this legislation is that it seems to reduce the role of Parliament and the supremacy that it should enjoy. The points that have been made ad nauseam in your Lordships' House about multiple referenda do nothing for the objective of propping up the supremacy of Parliament, but the general proposition made by the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, must be right.
If the Government feel that it is essential to have in place a clause that is declaratory, it might as well have the following characteristics. First, it should be so clear that even those of us who are not learned in the law understand it. Secondly, it should be sufficiently clear that it does not give rise to frequent legal challenge. Thirdly, it should make reference to—if I may put it this way—the core code that is involved in European legislation and not gloss over that. For those reasons, Amendment 57 offers greater clarification. It may well have been written with people who are used to dealing with sovereignty issues somewhere in the background, but it is none the less a straightforward clarification. Beyond that, Amendment 59 does that by a very direct reference to what I described as the core code—to the central proposition about why the status of our relationship to Europe is as it is.
If we did not have this clause at all, which would be my preference, much of what I said in the past few moments would not be particularly relevant. But if there is to be a declaratory cause it should at least have the characteristics that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, introduced in his speech this evening. It is impossible to misinterpret or misunderstand it. That has great merit and I hope that he will not mind my saying so from the opposition Benches. It does not alter my view that, as the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, said, the clause is not really necessary, but Amendment 59 has a convincing pedigree and that is what recommends it to me.
My Lords, I will look first at Amendments 57 and 58 and then come to the vagueness charges embodied in Amendment 59. I will seek to explain why the words are in the Bill. Whether the explanation is acceptable to the Committee is another matter at the moment. I will explain that the words that are in the Bill work the other way: they add to the precision of the legislation rather than to the vagueness of it. I will come to that in a moment.
As noble Lords have recognised, Amendment 57 would include on the face of the Bill that Clause 18 does not alter the rights and obligations that the UK signed up to on becoming a member state of the European Union. It also seeks to legislate explicitly that Clause 18 does not alter the primacy of EU law. I am grateful to your Lordships for drawing attention to these two important principles: that the EU law has primacy and that the UK must honour its obligations as an EU member state. I assure the Committee and particularly the noble Lord, Lord Lea, with his Amendment 58, that the Bill supports both those principles. Indeed, the Bill has to support them. It is not a question of choice. The Bill has to support those principles because to do otherwise would put us in breach of our obligations as EU members.
I have serious concerns about Amendment 57. It does not reflect accurately the legal position regarding the UK's membership of the European Union. I say that because the UK follows the dualist constitutional model. Giving treaties effect in the UK is always a two-stage process. That did not seem to feature in the debate that we just had. The first stage—the signing of the treaty during which the UK may take on rights and obligations—is governed by public international law. The rights and obligations assumed by the UK on becoming an EU member state are governed by public, international law rather than domestic law. Those rights and obligations are binding on the United Kingdom under international law irrespective of the existence of the European Communities Act or any other Act of Parliament and will continue to be so as long as the UK continues to be a member state of the European Union. It follows that the EU Bill does not and cannot change the rights and obligations assumed by the United Kingdom on becoming a member of the European Union. It would be misleading to suggest in this or in any Bill that any Act of Parliament could do this. Such a change could only be done by the UK renegotiating the terms of its membership of the European Union.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, that Governments can of course seek to bind future Governments. Most Governments whom I know, and whom many of your Lordships know, have sought to bring in great legislation. Let us take, for instance, some of the privatisation provisions under the earlier Thatcher Government. Our hope was that those would endure. We hoped that a future Government would feel bound by privatisation visions, not renationalise the whole of the then privatised sector—indeed, our hopes were in fact borne out. However, a Parliament cannot bind a future Parliament; that is a completely different proposition. It is of course possible that a future Parliament could repeal the 1972 Act although, interestingly, that would not remove the United Kingdom from the European Union. It could only be done by negotiation through Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union but those things are possible. Parliament can do anything and is supreme.
Noble Lords have asked what the point of Clause 18 is and why it is in the Bill. It confirms that the second stage of the dualist system, whereby the rights and obligations taken on by the UK are given effect in UK law and can therefore be enforced through the UK courts, must always be done by an Act of Parliament. Any suggestion that EU law constitutes a new, higher autonomous legal order and has or can develop into part of the UK’s legal system independent of statute are thereby refuted. That is very important indeed. Noble Lords may say: “So what? That is what the courts have always upheld”. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, acutely observed, it has been challenged. I think that the prosecution in the metric martyrs case tried to float the idea in the counter case that EU law had some autonomous existence independent of our own statute law. It has been raised and to say that it is not in question is simply factually wrong when people have questioned it.
It is therefore the view of the coalition that it is right and valuable that this declaratory clause should be in the Bill. Even if it can be said that the courts have so far upheld that position, as my noble and learned friend Lord Howe is well aware—having been, as he said, the father, godfather and grandfather of the 1972 Act and much of the legislation that flows from it—and as I know and we all know, these matters are challenged. They are, from time to time, challenged by learned legal minds and there is dispute about them. Far from this clause being unnecessary, as the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, ventured to argue with great clarity, I maintain that on the basis of our own experience—what we hear, read and see in the public debate—it is necessary that it should be in place. That is my view on Clause 57 but I will obviously think hard about the views that were put forward by extremely acute and expert minds on this matter. However, I said that I would set out how the Government see the matter and that is how we see it.
Amendment 59 was a very important part of the argument put forward by a number of noble Lords, including my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. Let me explain why we have in there “an Act of Parliament” rather than “by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972”. I reassure my noble and learned friend that we have thought about this very carefully because it is a complex balance of issues and we wanted very much to get it right.
The Government accept that Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act is commonly identified as the primary way in which EU law takes effect in the UK, but unfortunately that is not quite right. There are other Acts which can be interpreted as giving effect to EU law within the UK; for example, there are some provisions of the Scotland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 2006, the Northern Ireland Act 1998—and I believe there were other earlier Northern Ireland Acts as well, as I remember taking part in some myself. Then there are the Enterprise Act 2002 and the Equality Act 2006. They all put Ministers under an obligation to act in accordance with EU law without reference to the European Communities Act—and there may be other such Acts in future. Who knows? We have to prepare for these things. It was to address this concern and those facts that Clause 18 was deliberately drafted to refer to Acts in the plural, or an Act of Parliament, rather than solely referring to Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972.
I reassure my noble friends that having carefully thought about it and come down on that side of the argument, which we believe to be the comprehensive and effective one, there was no sinister purpose. It was simply a design to ensure that all the means by which directly effective or applicable EU law could be given an effect in the UK legal order are addressed. That is the raison d’etre and the underlying argument why the clause is there, why it is necessary and why it is so worded.
I would like to say a final word, or semi-final word—or penultimate word—about the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, at Second Reading, which he touched on again today. He queried what on earth paragraph 113 was doing in the Explanatory Notes, which refers to the,
“UK subordinate legislation … and … Acts and Measures of the devolved legislatures”.
The answer is that EU law can be given effect in the UK legal order, not only directly through primary legislation but through means of delegated legislation adopted under primary legislation. The obvious example of this is the secondary legislation giving effect to EU measures adopted under Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act, and the reference in Clause 18 to,
“by virtue of an Act of Parliament”,
covers that aspect.
I said that was my penultimate comment. My noble and extremely learned friend Lord Howe did that dangerous thing of mentioning the Commonwealth, which has not really come into this Bill at all. I cannot resist making the point that if we are to promote the interests of this nation as a positive member of the European Union, and to do so fit in to this extraordinary new world in which all the wealth and accumulated savings and first the economic and now the political power have shifted to a degree away from the Atlantic nations and the West to the new emerging worlds of Asia, Africa and Latin America, these are the new networks in which we must also involve ourselves. We must work to ensure that our European membership enables us to take our full part in these things to reinforce each other.
I had to get that in, only because my noble and learned friend tempted me. It has very little to do with the amendment, but I think that I have explained why the two points raised by noble Lords with great learning and authority fit in to the fact that the clause is necessary; it may be declaratory but it does a job, and that is why it is there, and it is drafted as an Act of Parliament rather than the European Communities Act 1972 but deliberately and carefully.
I think I said a word about the amendment intended to help proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Lea. I assure him that there is no way in which Clause 18 alters the commitment or position of the primacy of European Union law, which in turn rests as it always must on the will and Act of Parliament supported by the courts. That is why I would ask noble Lords and the noble and learned Lords to consider what they have put forward and withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I would like to spend a little time ruminating on something that the Minister said. He said that if this Parliament repealed the 1972 Act and the relevant parts of the other Acts that he mentioned, we would still be bound by Article 50 of the Lisbon treaty. Article 50 is of course the laborious and expensive process that Lisbon allows for a member state to leave the European Union over a period of some two years. Why is that so? Surely if we have repealed the 1972 Act, have we not repealed everything that flows from it, including Article 50. Could we not then get out much quicker and rather more cheaply?
I am proceeding on this subject on the close advice of lawyers. I am advised that even if we repealed the Act, under international law we would remain a member of the European Union until such time as we negotiated our way out of it under Article 50. That is the point that I was making.
I will say something on this, prompted by the Minister’s speech, just to oppose that Clause 18 should stand part of the Bill. We have had an excellent discussion—civilised, expert, well argued and showing the real quality of the House of Lords. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, at the end did his best to explain why the Government think that the inclusion of this clause is necessary. I am no lawyer—one comes to these matters as a bird of little brain—but we will have to give what he said in his speech a lot of thought over the Recess. I am glad that we have the Recess to think about it.
The fundamental question at the back of my mind on this clause—and at the back of the minds of many Members who have moved amendments to it—which the Government have failed to answer, is: why is this clause required now? We have been members of the European Union satisfactorily for nearly 40 years. Why do we need to introduce this clause at this stage? How will it improve our relationship with the EU? I have not come across a good, objective answer to that question. I am sorry to lower the tone and talk about crude politics but I think the reason why this clause is included is because it is intended to satisfy and appease some of the worst elements—from our point of view—of feeling about Europe in this country.
I have always believed in something that I call the Dora Gaitskell principle of politics. This is based on the story that when Hugh Gaitskell made his great “thousand years of British history” speech at the Labour conference in 1962, and it was a tremendous success and the hall rose—the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, was probably there—Dora turned to Hugh and said, “But Hugh, all the wrong people are cheering”. I wonder who is cheering this sovereignty clause. Why are the Government doing this? The whole idea of introducing some sort of sovereignty clause goes back a long way. I was not at the Labour conference in 1962 but I had to listen to the comments of the Common Market Safeguards Campaign and the Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee in the 1970s. I remember Peter Shore, for whom I had the greatest respect as an individual, strongly putting forward the argument that we should renege on Section 2 of the European Communities Act. For the past 20 years we have had the redoubtable and indefatigable William Cash making these kind of arguments in the other place.
The Government have to explain to us why, after 40 years of membership, we need this clause now. My fear is that anything we do in this area will be misinterpreted and will be an invitation to the courts to change what has been a relatively clear position up to now. That is why we must come back to this issue with all seriousness on Report. With that, I withdraw my opposition at this stage to Clause 18 standing part of the Bill.
My Lords, the noble Lord has touched on a number of the issues that we have already covered. He asks yet again why the clause is there. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, slightly mocks the coalition, and mocks me, by suggesting that this all turns on the prosecution’s line in a particular case. It does not, of course; it turns on a very wide number of views. I do not know whether he has studied all the academic views submitted to the scrutiny committee in the other place, but they were substantial. They reflect a substantial body of thought which asserts that EU law is autonomous and independent. This measure is in line with the practice of other member states. Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, ruled in 1993 in the case of Brunner v the European Union Treaty—this was in the Common Market Law Reports 57—that Community law applies in Germany only because laws passed by the German Parliament say that it does. Therefore, although the noble Lord, Lord Lea of Crondall, put it extremely kindly when he said that we are raising the bar above others, I am not sure that that is so. In some cases, we are actually catching up with others. We are simply moving to a position of declaring that the will of Parliament is supreme in all our laws in this kingdom, but that Parliament has willed that EU law should have supremacy. That is and has been the position since we passed the 1972 Act all those long nights and years ago, as my noble and learned friend Lord Howe reminded us.
There it is. I have clearly listened carefully to this excellent and learned debate. I owed it to the House and to your Lordships to explain why the coalition reached the view that a clause of this kind, after careful consideration, should be worded in this way. That is particularly important because I hope that the clause now carries a little more support from my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, and others. I tried to explain the position as clearly as possible. We have a good and valuable case that reinforces our stance vis-à-vis Europe, which is, as I said, positive and constructive in the dangerous and fluid world where new and positive thoughts are urgently required.