European Union Bill

Lord Lamont of Lerwick Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

We are in Committee and I do not think that I even have to say, “Before the noble Lord sits down”. I was going to thank the noble Lord for the compliment that he paid my noble friend and me, but is he aware of one of the very few jokes about the European Union that is going about in Eurosceptic circles? I ask this given that he extolled the virtues of democracy which the EU brings to its new members. The joke is that if the EU were to apply to itself to join the EU it would fail on the grounds of its total lack of democracy, its bureaucracy with its monopoly on proposing new legislation—what body that pretends to be vaguely democratic can do that?—and, as we know, the secret process with COREPER, the Council and so on. How can he extol the virtues of the EU’s democracy, given that background?

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, I frequently agree with some, but not all, the views put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart. However, on this occasion I agree more with some of the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Radice and Lord Richard. I agree that enlargement has been a positive development. Indeed, if you have an organisation called the European Union, it is unthinkable that you should exclude from it countries that before the advent of communism in Europe were part of the European family of nations, many of which had living standards and political systems similar to those in western Europe.

Some years ago I took part in a debate on the European Union with my noble friend Lord Brittan, who I am pleased to see sitting beside me. I think that the debate took place in 1993 or 1994, and I remember that my noble friend attacked me because I had not said a single positive thing about the European Union in my speech. I could not think of a single positive thing to say about the European Union at that time. However, if I took part in another such debate with my noble friend, I would say that enlargement is a considerable development that has been advantageous to the countries that have joined and to Europe generally.

If I may say so, the noble Lord, Lord Richard, made a good point that slightly bothered me. I support the Bill, but he said that within the logic of what he called this “crazy Bill” there surely ought to be a referendum on enlargement, given that we might have a referendum on altering the procedures for the appointment of a public prosecutor and other matters that the noble Lord regards as rather marginal. I was bothered about that question, and I have been sitting here for 20 minutes trying to think of an answer. It is that in those areas where they say there should be a referendum—including matters such as altering the procedures or powers on the appointment of a public prosecutor—the Government do not actually intend there to be a referendum, because they do not intend that such propositions should advance further at all. The Government are trying to put a lock on the issue and to stop it happening. They are drawing a red line on legislation for the immediate future, whereas they are in favour of enlargement, and that is why they have not applied the lock or the referendum provision to enlargement.

[Lord Richard]

My Lords, I am terribly sorry that I gave the noble Lord 20 minutes’ thought. Nevertheless, may I put a question to him? If the Government have no intention of using these powers—which is what he is saying—why on earth are they in the Bill? What is the point?

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

It is not a question of not using the powers; they are there to serve a purpose. The Government have indicated that they will not move further forward in any of these areas and they are enshrining in legislation obstacles to this ever happening in the future. Given the competence creep and the way in which power has seeped directly and indirectly, openly and less openly, to Brussels, I totally support the Government’s objective, and I have given the best answer that I can think of to the noble Lord.

[Lord Taverne]

If my noble friend is saying that the present Government are not going to use these powers, the conclusion is surely that the Bill is intended to affect not the present Parliament but a future Parliament. Is that not totally unprecedented?

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I do not accept that. I agree that it is designed to have an impact on the future and to prevent the creep of powers to Brussels. That is wholly right, because we have seen again and again how power has gone to Brussels, sometimes by indirect means and sometimes by means that some of us regard as questionable. We have seen again and again how referenda results have sometimes been rejected, and questions have been put again and again to the people of other countries until we had the right answer. This Bill is trying to say that we should not have a further transfer of powers, that we have had enough of those transfers, that there are plenty of powers to deal with problems that arise, and that we do not need any more powers as all the tasks of the European Union can be addressed through existing powers. We are therefore drawing a line in the sand, as long as there is a Conservative Government or a Conservative-Liberal Government. Future Governments can, of course, choose to repeal this legislation if they want to. That is their prerogative. We will, no doubt, address the sunset clauses later, but I do not go along with them. It is perfectly legitimate to state, “We are passing this legislation now and we intend it to remain”.

[Lord Tomlinson]

My Lords—

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I am anxious to sit down, but I will give way to the noble Lord.

[Lord Tomlinson]

Perhaps the noble Lord can help me. He explained that in a number of areas power had gone to Brussels by what he described as fairly dubious means. I have not had the benefit of 20 minutes’ thought about that, but I cannot, offhand, think of any such example. Can he give me a couple of examples of what is worrying him about the dubious means?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

The noble Lord is speaking from the Gangway and is therefore not in order.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I would say that the setting up of the European financial stability mechanism using Article 122 of the TFEU is extremely questionable. I am deeply puzzled how that can be regarded as in accordance with the treaty, but I am sure that that matter will be raised at some point later during our proceedings.

[Lord Dykes]

My Lords, I suggest that my noble friend Lord Lamont was doing himself down when he referred to 1998 and possibly earlier periods when on the debates that were always going on about Europe he had not given any illustration of being in favour of much to do with the European Union. I remember that in the 1970s, he, like others of us, was an enthusiastic European. I cannot remember the exact years, but I believe that that was the case. He was doing himself down, because I vividly remember—I stand to be corrected, but I believe that my memory is pretty safe on this and I am happy to look at the Hansard reference as soon as I have the chance—that in the early 1990s, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, at one stage he said, “Of course, when you are a member of a club, you have occasionally to do what the other members want as well”. I thought that that was a rather impressive way of saying that he was in favour of some aspects of not only international co-operation in general, but the international co-operation that comes from the mechanisms—the integrated parts of the structure and the sovereign government parts of the structure—of what was then the European Community and is now the European Union, enlarged and with Lisbon as its basic fundament.

That is a phenomenon that we witness in the case of the present Foreign Secretary and others who were viciously anti-European in all sorts of aspects. We remember the role of William Hague when he was leader of the Conservative Party in opposition: his “10 days to save the pound” campaign and his attitudes then. Inevitably, in government, his attitudes have become more modulated as a result of both the basic requirement of working with colleagues, partners, fellow Ministers from other countries in all the European Union mechanisms and the logic and common sense of always garnering general support from the public. The idea that there is huge anxiety in this country about competence creep, mission creep, the European Union taking over too much or the Commission becoming overmighty is to my mind grossly exaggerated. There is very little evidence of that. As we said on Second Reading, it is a campaign that has been got up in the press and by a small number of very anti-European politicians of all kinds, mainly in the Conservative Party and UKIP, but also politicians outside Parliament. We think of the BNP and other rather dubious organisations in that context as well.

If we could gauge the attitude of the public, it is one of general acceptance of all these matters. This debate has been going on for some time both in the Commons and here, and it is interesting to note that there has been no public reaction of support for the Government. I do not think that Ministers could cite messages that they have received from the public saying, “Thank you very much. You’ve done a wonderful job. We are so glad that you are resisting the encroachments of the Commission”. I do not want to upset the Minister by going too much into Second Reading points, because this point was made then by several speakers, but can we get away from that canard?

The Commission remains in number of both officials and senior officials a very modest sized body, despite enlargement. It gets the general support of the European Council and the Council of Ministers, because it does a very good job with all the difficulties built in of blending 27 national cultures of public finance and administration. That is a complicated task and it takes time to get habits to coalesce in joint working. None the less, there is no sense that the Commission is exceeding its powers or has done too much in any way with either the connivance or the resistance of the member Governments. Indeed, apart from its own delegated powers, which are either from the treaty or from the exhortations and requests of the various ministerial Councils, the Commission is a modest part of the total.

The main panoply and structure of the European Union remains the sovereign member Governments in the European Council and the Council of Ministers making their sovereign decisions collectively, enhancing both the individual sovereignty of every member state participating automatically and the general sovereignty of the European Union itself. That is why common sense among the public accepts that as a natural process.

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[Lord Liddle]

We can have academic debates about these questions in other places, and I do not want to delay the Committee. However, on the facts, there has been no great swing of British public opinion against the European Union over the past 15 years or so. It has fluctuated with circumstances over time. The Eurosceptic press was not created by the previous Government; unfortunately, it has been with us for a lot longer than that.

We on this side fundamentally object to the idea that plebiscitary democracy is the way to restore public trust. I am surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is going along with this. I do not know what the noble Lord’s views are on the current referendum campaign, but there does not seem to be a high quality of public debate on referenda, given the way in which some of the people involved in the referendum campaign have argued that we are missing out by not having these issues decided in Parliament, where there would at least be a more balanced consideration of them.

I will, of course, withdraw this amendment. However, we on this side have moved several amendments on these lines, and we see no give whatever on the Government’s part. On subsequent Committee days I will refer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, to which the Government must face up: namely, if they think that something has to be done in the national interest, would it still require a referendum, and what would be their position on that? That question is highly relevant.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

What sort of policy proposals would the noble Lord want the emergency brake lifted for? Given that the emergency brake is there purely as a defensive mechanism, to be used rarely on occasions of national interest as a negative power, what circumstances can he envisage in which he would want to get rid of it? In all the areas that he has mentioned on which there might be co-operation, we can agree to co-operate anyway.

[Lord Liddle]

The noble Lord is right, of course, but it seems to me that on judicial co-operation, for instance, we had established the confidence that the former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw talked about and that Europe was important and effective in these areas. We might wish at some stage—I am not saying that we would but we might—to see some change in the processes. After all, it might be not only us who want to apply the emergency brake. Other member states might wish to do so, and that might be detrimental to the possibility of getting agreement on these questions. If we look back to Maastricht, we see that justice and home affairs were included in the European treaties for the first time on the basis of unanimity. However, by the time we got round to Lisbon there was an overwhelming consensus among member states that these matters should not be in a separate pillar but should be part of the main business of the Community, and that in the vast majority of cases there should be majority voting. Opinions change in the light of circumstances. Therefore, why should we tie ourselves up in referenda?

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[Lord Waddington]

That is nothing to do with the case that I have raised. I am saying that the Bill deals with all sorts of situations where it is said that there is a transfer of competence, and that there should therefore be a referendum. I am pointing out that, in this clause, what is dressed up as a mere codification can often be a transfer of competence and the conversion of an agreement between members states that could be altered at the drop of a hat into binding treaty law. That is what I am talking about. I beg to move.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My noble friend Lord Waddington is to be congratulated on and thanked for raising an extremely important point on which I should like the Minister’s reassurance. I should like him to address the points made by my noble friend.

Of course I understand that the Bill deals only with future treaty change, not the existing provisions of the treaty. If a power of competence has already been conceded to the EU from the UK, the decision obviously cannot be reversed by the Bill. Under it, codification does not require a referendum in any case, including a codified transfer of power or competence. Why? I know that the Government’s argument is that if codification takes place by the granting of a formal treaty base for an action, the transfer of power has already taken place, either under the treaties or through a different general article, such as Article 352.

However, the point that the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, raised is important. I know that some members of the Committee dislike the phrase “competence creep”, but a transfer of powers could happen through codification and the interpretation of existing treaties. I return to the point to which I referred previously, when challenged by the noble Lord, Lord Tomlinson, about an example of competence creep. I cited the use made of Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to set up the European financial stability mechanism. That article, as many Members of the Committee are aware, states that financial assistance can be granted to a member state where the state is,

“in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control”.

It is very difficult to argue that the case of the financial difficulties which Portugal got into were a natural disaster or entirely beyond its control. At the very least, it seems to me that there was a significant failure of regulation, and, other people would argue, of budgetary and other policies as well.

I do not want to go into that but, to many people, that seemed a bizarre interpretation of Article 122(2). It is that sort of thing that gives rise to the anxiety that the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, articulated. Of course I understand that there is a case for codification and that it will be necessary. Perhaps a significance test could be allied with that when assessing whether codification could be misused in that way. What the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, said, is not a fantasy or an imagined danger—it is very real when one looks at how legislation has happened in the past.

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[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, I appreciate the question. With respect, I think that the noble Baroness is conflating the first amendment in this group, which concerns the efficiency of the operation of the single market, with the second, which I will come to in a moment and which concerns the strengthening of financial regulation. The issues that have just been raised may be more relevant to that.

I hope I have made the point about the steps that might be needed in order to ensure that proper competitive arrangements are in place in a business environment that changes rapidly and in which the potential for monopolistic behaviour is considerable.

I turn to Amendment 23F, which concerns the strengthening of financial regulation. I accept the point made about the time that would be taken. However, we also know about the speed at which the degradation of financial institutions took place, not just in Europe but in the United States and elsewhere; and that the aim of most of the major policy-makers in a period that was both extremely troubled and extremely complex was to intervene where they felt that they could as rapidly as possible and not necessarily against an 18-month to two-year timeframe. There was a very early consideration of whether the role of the central bank in Europe should be considered. Many nations in Europe urged each other—but not very effectively—to look at the balance sheets of the banks across Europe; at the consequences for one another of the weaknesses in their balance sheets; at the issues that have since arisen from the ridiculous ways in which a great deal of interbank lending took place; at the collapse of liquidity when it could no longer take place; and at the fact that many of the institutions were deeply indebted to each other for toxic derivative products that they traded largely among themselves, and which had in many instances destroyed their balance sheets.

I would like to think that almost everybody in this House, had they been in a position to take a view, would have said that that way lay lunacy and ruin. Almost all of us would not have gone there. Therefore, while it is true that some arrangements would take a good deal of time and some states would pore over them exactly as the noble Lord, Lord Howell, said, some emergency arrangements could have assisted in circumstances of severe financial meltdown, had they been in place.

In those circumstances somebody may very legitimately say, “This is not only a European problem—it is a worldwide problem. You would have had to engage many others as well”. Of course I accept and understand that international canvas. However, it would most certainly have helped had Europe and the European nations with considerable financial power been able to go to the original G20 conferences and make points in a very much better, co-ordinated way. You do not need treaty change to make a point in a co-ordinated way—of course you do not—but it is certainly true that had they gone and urged that they wished to use powers which were perhaps a little beyond the set of powers they had, that might have had a significant effect in the G20. From those who were at the G20, I believe that that is empirically true as well.

Finally, to sweep up this group of amendments, I turn to Amendment 23H, which addresses,

“provisions that advance the prospects of international agreement to a new global trade round”.

I promise that I will say only a little about this. However, I think that everyone has seen the enormous difficulties in achieving any successful outcomes from the Doha round and the huge difficulties in co-ordinating a European position let alone a world position. Yet everybody has believed that the success of the Doha round would be one of the fundamental drivers of a huge amount of international growth and, just as important, the elimination of a great deal of poverty around the world.

There is another case, where you can imagine small arrangements at the edge—which some will say are a codification of existing arrangements and you can bet that some will say are not—which might have made a real difference and enabled us to move faster, or may in the future enable us to move faster.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I agree with every word that the noble Lord has said about trade and the importance of getting a world trade agreement, although those have proved extremely elusive. However, given that trade is an exclusive—exclusive—EU competence, what is the effect of his amendment?

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, the intention of the amendment is to provide the scope for further adjustments to the trade arrangements and the powers of the Commissioner dealing with trade arrangements, given that Commissioners who have dealt with trade arrangements have expressed their anxiety about the limitations that have been placed on them during the negotiations in these trade rounds. It is entirely possible—it may be part of the noble Lord’s point—that these powers exist in any case and can be handled in any case. However, the experience of the difficulty in making progress leads me to believe that there may on occasions be adjustments that would make the process easier, more helpful and capable of moving faster.

My point is not that these are all world-shattering changes—they may be small changes. The scope to make those changes, to respond to circumstances, seems to me to be a power that would strengthen the people of the United Kingdom and strengthen the EU rather than weaken the people of the United Kingdom.