Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I support the lead amendment in this group in the name of my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom to exempt a new Government, for up to three years, from the labour market enforcement strategy of their predecessor for the reasons set out so ably by my noble friend Lord Hunt. I also support Amendments 274 and 278 for a new clause after Clause 140 to review the effectiveness of enforcement and compliance with relevant labour market requirements as in Part 1 of Schedule 7 before the new agency is set up and for the costing of such a new body before it is set up.

The new fair work agency proposed by the Bill to bring together existing functions of enforcement is unknown territory. Today, to enforce a limited number of employment rights, official powers are used by four different agencies: the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, the Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate, HMRC and the Health and Safety Executive. The proposed new fair work agency bundles these—and new responsibilities under the Bill—into a single, untried and untested body. In general employers are quite familiar with HMRC and HSE, which provide advice as well as having enforcement functions. At the moment, we have the benefit of experienced bodies with whom employers are familiar and an ability by each body to be precise and knowledgeable about the subject on which it is an enforcement officer. We also have the advantage of different horses for different courses. Now, the plan is to move to an unknown, inexperienced entity with all the start-up costs that entails and without the precision focus which the present bodies have, because what is proposed is a one-size-fits-all model.

The enforcement of the laws will be differently framed with different aims by the current bodies. GLAA will have a different focus to that of HMRC, although some of the functions may overlap. I therefore suggest, in the interest of the taxpayer, that there is a need for a costing of the new body before it is set up and for a review of the effectiveness of the outcomes of present arrangements for enforcement and compliance to see how they stack up. This should be done before any steps are taken to put in place a new body. For these reasons, I heartily support Amendments 274 and 278.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to speak on the issue of the labour market enforcement strategy in support of Amendment 274 to which I have appended my name and to build on the excellent remarks of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral and the specific points raised by my noble friend Lady Lawlor. For transparency, I declare that I have been a member of the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development for more than 20 years. The CIPD estimates that the People Skills HR support service which it has mooted, working with ACAS, would cost about £13 million under the new regime when this Bill becomes an Act. We already know, following on from my noble friend’s comments, that the cumulative cost of the existing bodies doing similar work, with analogous workstreams, is about £40 million.

Amendment 274 is important because in this country we have a strange anomaly. Unusually for an advanced country, we generally do not put the architecture of scrutiny and oversight in primary legislation. I want to know how this agency is going to be accountable in terms of the costs, who it employs, its policies et cetera. No doubt the Minister will say, “Well, once it becomes an Act, there will be what was the Business Select Committee, or there might be the National Audit Office, or there might be the Public Accounts Committee”. But we are being asked to sign a blank cheque for this without knowing how precisely this agency is going to operate and, most fundamentally, at what cost. We have not seen a detailed impact assessment focusing on the work of this body. On that basis, I ask the Minister specifically how he sees the process of accountability working and whether there will be any work by his department, and Ministers more generally, to work out what the costs are likely to be.

I accept at face value that this Government are committed to reducing the regulatory burden, particularly on small and medium-sized enterprises. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Leong, will bend the Minister’s ear on that, having come from the background that he came from as a champion of small businesses from the Labour side. It is therefore not unreasonable for us to ask what the cost will be and how we will be able to hold this agency to account once it is established.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 277 and 328, which I expect the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, to speak to shortly, are an interesting element. Amendment 277 talks about the review of the fair work agency. Considering that a number of questions have come up about this, that is a fair assessment, given that there is still a considerable amount of consultation to be done. Amendment 328 would basically strip out the commencement of any part of the Act until that review has been done and

“a Minister of the Crown has tabled a motion in both Houses of Parliament for debate … and the review has been approved by a resolution”—

not just regulations.

The reason I say this is that I continue to assert that some of the powers here are going to be novel. Even if the Equality Act 2006 may give powers to the EHRC, it has never used them to institute legal proceedings, only as an intervener or for judicial review, rather than taking on individual cases; I am conscious that there is a consultation there. The amendment from the Liberal Democrats is an interesting way to think about how we are looking at the details of what the new agency is going to do.

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Debate on whether Clause 95 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I will speak to the significant number of amendments in this group in my name. This is quite an interesting cornucopia of amendments, a number of which are, in essence, probing amendments. The very nature of the work we are undertaking is to look at the minutiae of the Bill and to see it through the prism of how it impacts on small businesses. It is very important, when we consider the fair work agency’s powers, that we look at the Bill’s real-world ramifications and consequences.

Although some of the amendments may seem somewhat obscure, I think they are nevertheless quite compelling and worthy of the Minister’s attention. In addition, the Clause 95 stand part notice is in my name; I will come to that shortly. I also have a more substantive amendment near the end of the group on a duty on the UK border agency and the new enforcement agency, the fair work agency, to collaborate or co-operate.

I begin by considering the clause stand part notice. I remind noble Lords that, ostensibly, Clause 95 circumscribes the powers available in respect of using a warrant to enter a dwelling. On the face of it, the clause looks pretty innocuous, but I do not think it should be in the Bill because its wording is quite loose and opaque. I have serious concerns about the use of permissive, wide-ranging powers, particularly in subsection (3)(b), which says

“that it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant access to the documents or equipment”.

Further, paragraph (d) says

“that the purpose of entry may be frustrated or seriously prejudiced unless an enforcement officer arriving at the dwelling can secure immediate entry to it”.

I would like to interrogate the Minister’s perception and interpretation of these powers. For the avoidance of doubt, I think that the question of whether this clause should stand part of the Bill is worthy of our consideration. Although, of course, it was not considered by the statutory instruments committee—the name of which escapes me—to be a particularly egregious example of permissive or Henry VIII powers, I nevertheless think that it could be misconstrued.

I will now consider the other amendments in my name. Amendment 273A would require the Secretary of State to have “an evidential basis” for believing that a labour market offence is being or has been committed in order to request an LME undertaking, as opposed to requiring merely that the Secretary of State “believes” this to be the case. This amendment is important because what I am attempting to define more clearly the limits of the powers being conferred—in other words, to make it explicit that there has to be a firm evidential basis for exercising those powers. We do not want a situation in which the Secretary of State may do as he wishes as long as he pleads that he believed an offence was being committed.

I am not a lawyer, but I make reference to powers being conferred on a Minister based on subjective jurisdictional criteria. Let us look at—I am sure that the Minister will be advised of this—Customs and Excise Commissioners v Cure & Deeley Ltd 1962, in which it was found that Parliament would never presume on courts adopting a particular approach to statutory construction, especially when it comes to the subtleties of administrative law. I think that this reasonable and rational amendment would tighten up the wording.

Moving on, Amendment 273B would mean that the Secretary of State could impose a prohibition, restriction or requirement as an LME undertaking only where they considered it “proportionate” as well as “just and reasonable”. The test of proportionality is, of course, at the heart of adjudication and the justice system; it is the bread and butter of administrative decision-making, especially in respect of our human rights regime. It is good practice to have statute clear in order to direct Ministers to undertake the kind of judgments which the legal framework will impose on them anyway, and which otherwise will have to be communicated by the production of additional guidance material. That is the basis for that amendment.

Amendment 273C would reduce the maximum period for which an LME measure can have effect from two years to one year. This is a practical amendment, because there is no obvious reason why any necessary measures cannot be imposed and changes expedited within 12 months. It is better, for one thing, that a business falling foul of standards should be made to get its house in order quickly and to be compliant with any LME measure within a reasonable space of time. We are talking not about a month but about 12 months; I think that is a reasonable reduction from two years. It is also better for the economy, public expenditure and Civil Service efficiency to have a shorter timescale.

Amendment 273 would require the Secretary of State to bring the end of the LME measures to the attention of “all” other persons likely to be interested in the matter, rather than “any” such persons, and the subject of the measures. This is clearly straightforward. If you are in a business, you will have multiple partners, directors or people with a significant interest in the business. Therefore, to avoid bureaucratic mistakes and errors, I think it is fair to involve as many people as practicable.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch)]

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt. I am trying to follow the noble Lord’s arguments, but I think Amendment 273 is in a different group.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving me the opportunity to clarify where I am: it is Amendment 273D. My apologies if I have not been clear enough.

This amendment would make a small clarifying adjustment: where the text currently says that the Secretary of State must take whatever steps she or he considers appropriate to bring the end of LME measures to the attention of

“any other persons likely to be interested in the matter”—

that is, other than the subject of the measures—it would use the words “all other persons”. It is important for business certainty, good faith and, indeed, fairness that all those who are affected or likely to be affected by a quite significant measure are kept properly informed about it. Otherwise, we may see messy episodes unfold where there is a misunderstanding or extra, hidden penalties imposed on businesses in the form of the costs of informing the other people affected by the LME measure that it has, for instance, come to an end.

Amendment 273E to Clause 119 would require notice of LMEs against a partnership to be given to “all partners”, rather than just “any partner”. This does not reflect what running a business with multiple partners is like, perhaps in multiple locations or running multiple business units as partners, whether it is an accountancy firm, solicitors or others—I know that there is a different regime for solicitors. It is not sensible to advise only one partner of a significant infraction or issue arising from an LME. If you want businesses to co-operate in ameliorating the issues identified in the LME, you would really need—I admit, at some modest cost—to advise all the partners. You need also to cultivate good faith in order to make the changes necessary arising from the LME.

Furthermore, it is possible that the courts will decide that notice has been given as a matter of law in circumstances where the one partner who was theoretically served it had not actually seen it and was not subjectively aware of it. Better, then, to require that all partners be given notice to ensure that businesses are genuinely aware of the ramifications and the LME decisions.

I am mindful of the time, so I will move with greater alacrity. Amendment 273F would increase the proposed burden of proof for court orders of LME measures from balance of probabilities to beyond reasonable doubt. There is reason to fear that a future Government will use the provision of Clause 117(3), which empowers the Secretary of State to create new kinds of LME measures by regulation, to create measures which go beyond regulation and become punitive, in which case the criminal proof standard will be appropriate. More generally, good faith between businesses and government, which aids compliance, will be better cultivated if they are required to comply with LME measures only in cases where there has been a clear violation.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords I thank noble Lords who have spoken. I am responding to the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe, Lord Hunt and Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, who have tabled amendments on the powers of the fair work agency and oppose Clauses 95 and 134.

I accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that some of his amendments are probing amendments. I will attempt to respond to each in turn. Forgive me if I repeat some points that my noble friend Lord Katz made in the previous debate, which covered similar ground. I think we covered some of this ground in debates on a previous day. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that I have no need to justify the unjustifiable in my response.

I will speak first to the fair work agency’s investigatory powers and address the opposition of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, to Clause 95. I listened to the noble Lord, but investigatory powers are common to all regulators. The fair work agency’s powers are based on those set out for existing enforcement bodies in the Employment Agencies Act 1973, the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 and the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004. Employment rights enforcement agencies have had power to enter premises used as dwellings since their inception. For example, HMRC’s minimum wage inspectors can and do regularly visit business premises used as dwellings to gather evidence. It is right that officers should be able to gather evidence from such premises. Businesses operating from premises used as dwellings is nothing new. Pubs, for example, often have flats above the public area where the business’s documentation is kept.

Today, more and more businesses operate from home. Current law makes no distinction for dwellings. This Government believe in stronger safeguards for such powers. That is why Clause 95 introduces a new requirement for a warrant to enter dwellings. Together with the additional safeguards in Clause 128 and Schedule 8, this clause strikes the right balance between protecting the privacy and rights of individuals and allowing the fair work agency to go about its job of enforcing labour market legislation. I hope that I have reassured noble Lords on this point, and that noble Lords can agree that Clause 95 should stand part of the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, also addressed his amendments to Clause 128. I recognise the intent behind these amendments, but there are already extensive safeguards around the use of investigatory powers in Part 5, including the new requirement for a warrant when entering a dwelling. Clause 128 is a sensible provision that sets out that any enforcement officer has the right to execute a warrant and, as long as the enforcement officer is present, they can be accompanied by an authorised person or persons if they deem it relevant to the investigation—for example, an IT specialist.

Turning to Amendment 271ZC from the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, enforcement of holiday pay is a key part of the fair work agency’s remit. Large numbers of workers are missing out on their statutory right to paid annual leave. The Trade Union Congress estimates that 2 million people lose around £3 billion per year by not receiving holiday pay to which they are entitled. We recognise that this disproportionately affects the lowest-paid workers. The fair work agency will not be able to meaningfully support workers to recover the holiday pay they are owed if it cannot issue notices of underpayment. This is a power that is already available in the national minimum wage enforcement regime, which has been successful in ensuring that workers receive the arrears that they are owed. Therefore, I must respectfully resist this amendment.

I turn now to the amendments to Clauses 116 to 121 inclusive, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Jackson, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, together with the amendments to Clauses 126 and 136. These pertain to the labour market enforcement undertakings and orders regime. Although these amendments touch on important aspects of the Bill, they either duplicate existing provisions and introduce unnecessary complexity, or risk undermining the careful balance that has already been struck in the drafting. The labour market enforcement regime was introduced by the 2015 to 2017 Conservative Government. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, at that time in the other place, voted in favour of this regime consistently during the passage of the Immigration Act 2016.

It is a regime that works and works well. It promotes a compliance-first approach, as employers are first encouraged to enter into voluntary undertakings to correct their behaviour. Only persistent or egregious offenders are issued with a compulsory order to stop. As of March 2024, there have been 140 labour market enforcement undertakings and just 14 labour market enforcement orders. These amendments seek to water down the regime and increase legal tests and administrative burdens for its use. By making the labour market enforcement regime more cumbersome and less effective, the fair work agency would have to resort more often to prosecution, which could be disproportionate and time-consuming for all concerned. The effects of these amendments would be to make enforcement more heavy-handed, less efficient and less focused on helping businesses to comply. This is not what businesses or workers want or need, and it is not what the fair work agency is about.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I hear what the Minister says, but surely she would agree that, if one looks at Amendment 273F, which moves from having “a balance of probabilities” to “beyond reasonable doubt”, if you are taking forward an LME infraction case beyond reasonable doubt, you are more likely to succeed, and the corollary of that is that you are not taking forward cases on which you have a paucity of evidence. So, with all due respect to the noble Baroness, I disagree. If you are bringing in proportionality and “beyond reasonable doubt”, you are going to have sharper cases that tackle the most egregious examples of infractions of the legislation and do not waste a lot of time—and consequently save the taxpayer money.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

The evidence shows that the current wording is proportionate. There has not been a huge number of cases. Maybe we could argue about whether there should be more cases, but the fact that there has not been a huge number of cases is a reflection of that. What we do not want to do is set the barrier so high that we cannot take the cases that are necessary to deliver the changes and the better worker protection that we seek to achieve.

I turn to the noble Lord’s Amendment 273N. I agree that effective sharing of information and pooling of knowledge will be crucial to the success of the fair work agency. The list of bodies that the agency will be able to share information with is limited to those with a need for access, and safeguards are provided for. However, the power to update the list is necessary to ensure that the fair work agency can respond to future changes in the wider labour market and the regulatory landscape. It means that we can keep the list of bodies under review and remove bodies where the need to share information no longer applies. This is good data information governance.

The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, asked about the Low Pay Commission being listed. The fair work agency will be able to share information with the bodies in Schedule 9 if it is for the purposes of a function of the body. This does not need to be about the enforcement functions. I also say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee expressed no concern with this power in its report on the Bill.

On the opposition of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, to Clause 134, HMRC data is critical for investigating and enforcing various employment rights, not just the national minimum wage. However, I say to the noble Baroness that much of HMRC’s data is confidential, and it is therefore prudent to require an extra level of approval before this information is shared further.

Clause 134 restricts the sharing of confidential HMRC data without authorisation from HMRC commissioners. This will ensure that the fair work agency operates in line with the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act. This is a standard safeguard which is necessary to ensure responsible data sharing between HMRC and the fair work agency.

In relation to Amendment 273PB from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, I reassure him that the Bill already gives the Secretary of State the power to share information with border authorities, such as the National Crime Agency and immigration officers. Rather than enhancing enforcement, the amendment risks introducing unnecessary complexity and diverting attention away from the fair work agency’s core task. The amendment’s intended effect can be achieved through the existing Bill drafting.

I turn to the noble Lord’s Amendment 273R to Clause 140. The ability to recover enforcement costs in relation to the time spent is a matter of fairness. Restricting the use of hourly rates would in practice force the fair work agency to adopt fixed fees. A fixed approach to cost recovery could mean that a small business ended up paying the same as a much larger organisation, regardless of the scale or complexity of the case, and that is not fair. This clause is an enabling power. Regulations made under it will be subject to the affirmative procedure. Parliament will be able to scrutinise and debate whether to adopt a fixed-fee or variable-fee regime at the point where the regime is proposed, and it is right that we afford that flexibility in design at this stage.

In conclusion, while I appreciate the intention behind the amendments, they either replicate what is already achieved by the Bill’s existing provisions or risk unsettling a framework that has already been carefully constructed. I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, not to press Amendment 271ZC.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I thank the Minister for that comprehensive canter through my amendments. I defer to the poetic licence of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral and accept that it is not a cornucopia, but my cup overfloweth nevertheless.

I appreciate the spirit in which the amendments were received. I was attempting to improve the Bill. Not for the first time, my noble friend Lord Hunt put it much more succinctly than I did in that, certainly with regard to proportionality and “beyond reasonable doubt”, notwithstanding the excellent drafting by officials, the amendments would have improved the Bill.

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[Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)]

My Lords, I support the comments made, particularly those of the noble Lord, Lord Murray. This is an extraordinary clause; I am not aware of anything else on the statute book like it.

My practical question to the Minister is: if the Secretary of State takes it upon himself or herself to go to court on a worker’s behalf, and the worker is strongly against that, what will that do to the relationship between the worker and the employer? It could absolutely devastate that relationship, because the employer will greatly resent the fact that the Secretary of State is taking proceedings on behalf of the worker, even if the worker has said that they do not want those proceedings brought. This is not good for industrial relations at all.

I really urge the Government to rethink this. What are its practical implications? How will it work in practice if the worker is against it? Will they be called as a witness by the Secretary of State, if necessary? Will they then be a hostile witness? It is all a complete and utter mess, I am afraid. I was not planning to speak on this, but this is an extraordinary clause and I urge Ministers to drop it completely.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I was happy to sign the clause stand part notice with my noble friend Lady Coffey. I am thinking of the words of Zhou Enlai, I think, who, considering the French Revolution, said, “What did they mean by that?” I look at this clause and think, “What do they mean by this?” Maybe the Minister will open the trinket box at the end of this process and let us into the secret of this bizarre, perverse clause, but I really cannot see the point of it.

I am mindful of the fact that we are surrounded by very accomplished lawyers, so I will not get too much into law, but lawyers and others will be aware that Magna Carta—1215; I know the noble Lord, Lord Katz, likes a history lesson occasionally in Committee—resiled from the arbitrary power of the state. It is an arbitrary power of the state for it to insert itself into civil litigation without any real methodological basis, any timeline or, as my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth so rightly said, any tests being met. That is very odd.

Perhaps the Minister will enlighten us as to the rationale. The clause is novel. It is completely perverse and unheard of, to be quite honest, because it will engender a disputatious regime, more litigation and more disputes in the workplace. It will have a deleterious effect on business, commerce and profitability, and on how businesses are run. What tests will the Minister use? How likely is it that these powers will be used and at what likely cost? Is there any impact assessment or opportunity cost as to the use of these powers?

Why does subsection (2) leave agricultural workers out of the process? There may be a specific sectoral reason for that, but that is a reasonable question to ask. Why are they not swept up in these powers? Why are their rights not circumscribed to not get involved in civil litigation in respect of employment?

Finally, the most bonkers part of a truly epically bonkers clause is subsection (7). It is so crazy that it could have been written by the Liberal Democrats, but it would be unkind to make such an observation. My noble friend Lady Coffey has already made the point that you do not even have to be a worker to have the Secretary of State impose themselves into your potential litigation on a matter; you can be someone seeking employment as a worker. Presumably, anyone who is of working age can be affected by this clause. Subsection (7) also states that a worker is defined more widely as an individual who is a worker for the purposes of Part 4A of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

I really do not understand the rationale for or the logic behind this clause. The Minister is clearly aware of the great disquiet that it gives rise to, and I hope she answers the specific points made, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere. It takes something for a noble Lord of his experience in the law to say that this is the most perverse and strangest clause he has seen in a piece of primary legislation. On that basis, I hope the Minister will respond to that and answer those specific points that noble Lords, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, have raised.

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friends Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Hunt of Wirral in some of the amendments in this group, and my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lord Jackson of Peterborough in their opposition to Clause 113, which I must describe—much as the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, did—as quite extraordinary. It is extraordinary because it grants the Secretary of State exceptional powers—namely, the ability to initiate proceedings before an employment tribunal on behalf of a worker without that worker’s consent or even their knowledge. How can this be right? If a worker has chosen not to pursue a claim, whatever their reasons, how can the state reasonably step in and proceed in their name? Unlike my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth, I am no lawyer, but I think this demonstrates the need for Amendment 271D.

Consent is a fundamental principle in so many aspects of law and life, yet here it appears to be disregarded. Amendment 272ZZA at the very least seeks to restore some balance by ensuring that the worker in question is given the opportunity to consent or decline. If consent is not given, the matter should go no further: all bets should be off. I find it puzzling that those on the Benches opposite consider it appropriate to have the ability to disclose personal data, whether legally privileged or not, without the written consent of the individual concerned. It is not typically something permitted in other circumstances. It is not fair, and we are about fairness in this House.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

As the noble Lord has more legal expertise than me, I am happy to write to him on that point because it is an important point that we need to clarify. Of course, these are relatively new powers that we are taking on board, and we are taking them for very good reasons. I am sorry that noble Lords opposite do not see the case for this, because, certainly, an awful lot of workers are being exploited out there. At the moment, they do not have the power to speak for themselves in the way that many others who are better informed can do.

While I respect the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, behind some of his amendments, I must state they are unnecessary. Some of the provisions of the amendments are already provided for, either within the existing drafting of the specific clauses or in other clauses of the Bill. Regarding Amendments 271D, 272ZZA and 272ZZD, as I mentioned on Monday, normal practice would be for the Secretary of State to bring proceedings with a worker’s consent and involvement. However, in the worst cases of serious exploitation and intimidation, workers may fear the repercussions that they may face from their employer should they be de-anonymised. By allowing the Secretary of State to take a case forward without consent, it would be harder for employers to attribute blame to individual employees. Therefore, limiting this power in the way that these amendments seek to do could prevent the Secretary of State pursuing serious breaches in some of the most egregious cases.

Amendment 272ZZB is an unnecessary amendment. Legally privileged material and confidential information is already protected under the Data Protection Act, as well as under usual legal rules and principles that apply to proceedings.

On Amendment 272ZZC, normal public law principles already take account of all considerations referenced in this amendment, including the best interests of a worker. This is therefore another unnecessary amendment.

Amendment 272ZZE is yet another unnecessary amendment. Clause 113(6) does not provide a blanket exclusion from all liability, and it is self-evident that the Secretary of State would be held accountable if they undertook actions that were unlawful. This is a basic principle of the rule of law.

On Amendment 272ZC, it is clearly in the interests of enforcement authorities and all parties that the most effective and proportionate means of enforcement is chosen. The Bill already provides that civil proceedings cannot be initiated where a notice of underpayment has been given. It would be inappropriate to impose hurdles on the fair work agency’s use of its powers; it should be able to decide how best it will use this and its other powers to enforce labour market legislation in each case.

On Amendment 272AA, Clause 92 already provides for the fair work agency to prepare and publish an annual report, which we would expect to cover all of its activities. It is simply not necessary to require individual reports on individual powers.

We strongly resist Amendment 272AB. Ultimately, the business of the next Parliament should be for that Parliament to decide and not for us to dictate now.

Briefly on Amendment 272AC, only officers with appropriate knowledge and training will carry out these powers. Clause 87(6) already clearly provides that a person can exercise the powers of an enforcement officer only to the extent specified in their appointment by the Secretary of State. This amendment would duplicate that existing provision.

To summarise, Clause 113, together with Clauses 114 and 115, delivers a manifesto commitment. It provides a new power that will enable fair work agency enforcement officers to bring proceedings to an employment tribunal in place of a worker. It is designed to address situations where a worker has a legal right to bring a claim but, for various reasons, including fear of retaliation, lack of awareness or language barriers, they are unable to do so. This clause enhances the state’s ability to support the most vulnerable workers in accessing justice and will be particularly valuable in cases involving labour exploitation or breaches of minimum employment standards.

It will bring broader benefits. The fair work agency will be able to bring multiple complaints simultaneously. This will save time and costs for workers and employers alike. It has the potential to reduce the burden on the employment tribunal system over current practices, where most claims are brought individually.

Importantly, the clause is tightly drawn. The fair work agency’s tribunal proceedings will follow the same process as if they were brought by workers. This includes a requirement for ACAS consultation. Additionally, the power cannot be used in cases where a notice of underpayment has been issued under Section 100. This ensures that there is no duplication of enforcement mechanisms. Both the Secretary of State and the worker can appeal a decision, recognising that both parties have a legitimate interest in the outcome. The clause includes safeguards to ensure that the Secretary of State cannot be held liable to the worker for how they exercise this power, reflecting the discretionary and strategic nature of enforcement.

This clause forms a crucial part of the fair work agency’s toolkit, enhances the effectiveness of labour market enforcement and delivers a manifesto commitment upon which Members in the other place were elected. It should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I am listening very carefully to the Minister, and she did not address either of my specific points. Given that she is saying that this rather strange clause is to defend the interests of new migrants and black and minority-ethnic folk, many of whom work in agriculture, particularly in the east of England and other parts of the UK, why is there a carve-out for agricultural workers? The Minister did not answer my question on why that happened. Secondly, can I press her on my specific point on why de facto unemployed people fall under the purview of subsection (7) of this clause, allowing the Secretary of State to insert state apparatus into their litigation, when they are not even in gainful employment?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord. My apologies; I should have answered both of those questions. On the issue of agricultural workers, I do not know the answer, so I will write to the noble Lord. On his question about why subsection (7) covers people who are not yet employed, the clause was worded in that way to capture whistleblowers and was amended to widen it to include zero-hours contract workers. I hope that answers the noble Lord’s questions.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, in this group of amendments, I have the stand part notice for Clause 114. I support the several amendments in this group in the name of my noble friend Lady Coffey, many of which are probing amendments to try to find out more about this clause. I could find no clear rationale that the Government have given for Clause 114, in the sense of providing a rationale for the state—that is to say, taxpayers—funding the legal and other costs of civil proceedings in employment matters cases.

The scope of Clause 114 is huge. Not only does it cover the whole of employment, trade union and labour relations law, but the intended recipients seem to be unlimited. My noble friend Lady Coffey referred to the use of “person”. Subsection (1) refers to

“a person who is or may become party to civil proceedings”,

which covers a huge number of persons, and there does not seem to be any clear target for this clause. Of course, as we have heard, the funding can also extend to litigation involving non-employment matters, which seems extraordinary to me. All of this adds up to Clause 114 being very wide.

We already have in the UK a system for providing support for people in legal cases. It is called legal aid. It costs the taxpayer around £2 billion a year, nearly half of which is for civil litigation. That already has rules for employment tribunal support, where there is no funding for legal representation but there may be funding for advice on preparing cases. Successive Governments have had to make hard choices about what will be funded by legal aid in order to keep the cost of it within reasonable bounds for taxpayers as a whole but, now, with Clause 114, the business department is going to undermine that completely by taking powers to fund legal cases completely outside of the structures and limits that have been created for the legal aid system. The Government are again showing that they are, at heart, a two-tier Government, with unlimited legal aid by the backdoor for some favoured employment cases but tough eligibility criteria and financial limits for everybody else.

I now turn to the costings, which my noble friend Lady Coffey mentioned briefly. I could not find out what Clause 114 is going to cost. There is a limited amount of information in the paperwork that surrounds the Bill on the estimate of the overall costs for the fair work agency but, as far as I could find, there is no reference to how much the implementation of this proposal to fund legal costs will be within that totality. So my question to the Minister is really quite simple: what are the Government’s estimates of what Clause 114 will cost?

Going beyond that into the underlying assumptions, how many cases do the Government expect to bankroll every year? Will the Government support only cases with a better than average chance of success, or will they also fund no-hopers? What is the average cost of the cases that they think they will fund using the powers under Clause 114? What are their assumptions about cost recovery? I would have expected to find all these things analysed in detail somewhere in the papers, but I could not find anything. I hope the Minister will be able to answer these specific questions, and maybe also explain the lack of analysis in the documentation that the Government have prepared surrounding the Bill so far.

As I said earlier, I support my noble friend Lady Coffey’s amendments in this group, and I will listen carefully to what the Minister says in response to those amendments and, indeed, on Clause 114 standing part overall. My view is that, in the absence of good justification and a good understanding of the costs of Clause 114, it should not stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I commend my noble friends’ excellent speeches on this clause. I press the Minister on what the Explanatory Notes say about subsection (4), because we have talked about the concept of persons and what that actually means. My noble friend spoke earlier about ministerial powers and the lack of information on costs, which should have been in a proper and more detailed impact assessment but is not. It is not in any supporting material, including the Labour Party manifesto for the general election. Presumably, the Minister will say that such information about the form and function of the clause will be developed in secondary legislation.

The sentence in the Explanatory Notes about subsection (4) is extraordinary, because it touches on what is potentially ultra vires and will certainly, I think, be subject to litigation or judicial review. Given that this is an Employment Rights Bill about labour relations and employment, it says:

“Subsection (4) makes provision for situations where proceedings relate partly to employment or trade union law … and partly to other matters”.


I just do not understand what those other matters can be. This is an employment law Bill. It is about labour relations and the relationships between employers, trade unions and a workforce. What other matters are within the bailiwick of Clause 114? I think we need to press the Minister on that, because we are being invited to give a blank cheque with taxpayers’ money to something that is very opaque, we do not understand, is not costed and is not detailed. On that basis, the Minister should address those specific issues.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lady Coffey, Lady Noakes and Lord Jackson of Peterborough for some penetrating questions about the power to provide legal assistance as set out in Clause 114. First, I would like the Minister to share with us what discussions have been held with the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Justice. A number of the points made by my noble friends relate to the fact that legal aid is already available in certain circumstances, so what is this all about and, as my noble friend Lady Coffey asked, who is this going to benefit?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I must press the Minister. I have looked at the Labour’s Plan to Make Work Pay document and it does not make reference to de facto legal aid. It says:

“We will also consider measures to provide accessible and authoritative information for people on their employment status and what rights they are owed, tackling instances where some employers can use complexity to avoid legal obligations”.


That is very different to what the Minister has outlined to your Lordships’ House.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I do not want to extend the debate too much or do too much quoting across the Dispatch Box but, to counter that, Labour’s Plan to Make Work Pay talks about establishing a single enforcement body that

“will have the powers it needs to undertake targeted and proactive enforcement work and bring civil proceedings upholding employment rights”.

To a fair-minded person that is pretty clear.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Lords Chamber

This kind of approach could be a very positive development. We could finally get a bit closer to achieving that dream made in Dagenham nearly 75 years ago, and closer to achieving equal pay for equal work. I beg to move.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly on this amendment. It is quite an ingenious and intelligent amendment that is quite superficially attractive. I know the Minister will give it proper and due consideration.

My only problem is that it draws an analogy that does not really stand up to close scrutiny. I defer to the noble Baroness’ greater legal expertise, but when you are employed, there is a personal contract between the employee and the employer that you have freely entered into. It may be that, in the course of that contract, your pay falls behind and there are societal and economic reasons why you are paid different amounts of money. We could be here all week discussing that.

However, it is not the same as the relationship you have with a nuclear power station, where you have the expectation that you will be kept safe from accidents and drastic events; with your local water authority and the expectation that you will not be flooded; or when you go on an aeroplane that, God forbid, that aeroplane will not crash. You do not have that direct contractual relationship with those bodies. In other words, you essentially defer that responsibility legally to other bodies to intercede on your behalf. Therefore, this amendment, in a circuitous way, undermines the very concept of a one-on-one contractual relationship, so I do not think it is analogous.

Having said that, I would not particularly oppose this amendment. It is ingenious and interesting but, with all due respect, I do not think the noble Baroness draws an accurate analogy between the two.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for taking the argument so seriously. Of course, I disagree with him. When you go to eat in a restaurant, go to school or buy a can of baked beans, you may well have a private, contractual relationship with the supplier of that good or service. None the less, the state has decided that it needs to intervene because these power relationships are not all equal and there is a public good in the baked beans being safe to eat, the school delivering a good service, et cetera.

So, from the moment the UK Government and the UK people took the democratic decision that there should be laws to protect school standards, food safety, health and safety and non-discrimination in pay—supported by people from all parties, including in your Lordships’ House—it is not just a matter of private contract between two parties anymore; it is actually a matter of public policy and a wider rule of law point. The non-discrimination point has been non-partisan in this country for some years.

Most equality legislation has, perhaps, been promoted by Labour Governments, but the disability rights Act is the obvious exception. There has been a bipartisan consensus that we should not discriminate against people because of their sex, including in pay. We just have not been delivering on pay as well as we have been delivering in other areas of women’s lives. Therefore, the analogy with school standards, health and safety standards and food standards works. If we want to achieve equal pay, we have to take it seriously in enforcement.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Just to come back to the noble Baroness, would she therefore extend the provisions of her amendment to all protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Yes, I would.

--- Later in debate ---

Debate on whether Clause 149 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will be very brief. I feel like the support act, really, because the substance, the meat, of this issue and this clause has been debated, although I am delighted that this is the final schedule and the final part, so we are on the final stages of the Bill. I just say very briefly, with respect, to the Minister, that we often ask the Minister to write to elucidate the remarks that she and her colleagues have made in the course of the Committee’s proceedings. We are watching that and making sure that we do get replies and, if we do not get proper replies, we will raise those issues on Report. I do hope, very gently, that the Minister is aware of that. Of course, we understand that information is not always at her disposal or her colleagues’ disposal, but we will need that information in order to make an informed decision on Report if the House divides at that juncture.

The second issue that I think it is appropriate to raise, raised several Committee days ago by my noble friend Lady Coffey, is impact assessments. The Cabinet Office guidelines say that impact assessments should be updated as the Bill goes through. To the best of my knowledge, that has not happened, and I am not sure that the Minister has satisfactorily answered the question that my noble friend asked earlier. With that in mind, I think that the rationale that the Minister used for the extension from three to six months was not even tepid and not even weak; it was just non-existent. To say that the Law Commission has done a consultation I do not think cuts the mustard. We on this side believe firmly that extending that period will bring more uncertainty to business, will be more costly, will encourage more litigation and workplace strife and will be a false economy.

I look over at the Government Benches and I see the pawprints of the trade unions in this. I do not know why they would want to do this, but, as on so much of the Bill, they are seemingly pulling the strings and I think that, in the end, it will not be in the best interests of workers for this to happen, not least because, as my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral said, the system is creaking. It is no good saying, “Oh, well, it was creaking under you”; this Government have been in power 12 months now, it is incumbent on them to fix the system with their legislation and I think that this is a retrograde step. It will not work, it will backfire, and on that basis, I think that neither Clause 149 nor Schedule 12 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, most of what I needed to say was said in the last group, so I will not labour the points, except to add a bit of colour, because my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral and I consult quite widely. We consulted this morning with a distinguished employment lawyer, who told us that, if you apply now to an employment tribunal, you will have no chance at all of getting even a preliminary hearing for 10 months. That is next April. In order to get a resolution, a case resolved, you would be looking probably at December 2027. That is nearly two and a half years away. It will take a lot more than the number of judges the noble Baroness mentioned that they have recruited so far in order to fix that particular problem. I wish her good luck and I hope she succeeds, but I really do not think that we should be doing this.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, very briefly, I support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Burns. I want to emphasise that, in a period of mass disillusion with mainstream parties, opt-in was actually a very important way of putting those parties on their guard that they had to inspire people to want to opt in. Relying on inertia, or not being in a situation where you feel you need to go out and win the support of people to opt in politically, is very dangerous, because it will create the kind of complacency that we have seen mainstream parties of all sides show over recent years.

I note that it would be dangerous—and I am sure that nobody is implying this—for the party of government, the Labour Party, to assume that it is any longer the party that represents the working class. Long gone are the days when that claim could be made, and I think that it would be better for that party to consider how it can inspire ordinary working people to support it, both at the ballot box but also in relation to something such as political funds. I had every sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Prentis of Leeds, talking about the difficulties of campaigning when you do not have enough money. Tell me about it: I have been doing it for years. I have not had a political fund to help, mind.

It all sounded very admirable, but it really did sound as though the noble Lord was discussing not so much UNISON but an activist campaign group, a particular group around particular issues. That is fine. I have no objection to that: I am involved in some of those campaigns, although not all of them. I have to go out and raise the funds in order to be able to carry on campaigning for things I believe in. I do not think it is right that trade unions use their political funds to pursue what are political issues beyond the issues of trade unionism. Trade unionism is a particular thing. It can inspire great political revolutions over the years, I agree, but it is not a hobby-horse for trade union bureaucrats to pursue the particular political issues that they enjoy or agree with.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I shall primarily speak to the amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Cash in respect of political funds, but I will say in passing that I found the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Burns, and the excellent speeches of my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lady Finn not just erudite but very compelling.

There is a challenge to try to understand what has significantly changed that has led the Government to make these epochal amendments to what has been accepted by Governments of all persuasions—including, as has been said, the Blair and Brown Governments—which will radically alter industrial relations.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th June 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough]

205: Clause 55, page 73, line 11, leave out “A worker’s” and insert “If a worker’s employer has more than 50 employees, the”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that the statement of trade union rights applies only to larger employers.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted to have the opportunity to move this amendment on behalf of my noble friend Lady Noakes, who is unable to be in her place today. I have to say that these parts of the Bill, Parts 4 and 5, will be the most contentious, but I think this is the meat and drink of what the Bill is intended to do, which is essentially to repeal most of the labour relations legislation put in place by successive Conservative Governments since 1992.

I am tempted by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady of Upper Holloway, and her hagiography of labour relations and trade union activity before 1979, as if it was a land of milk and honey, the closed shop did not exist and the trade unions had not brought the country to its knees, to the extent that a third of trade unionists in the 1979 general election voted Conservative. In fact, Conservative trade unionists were one of the most powerful and influential groups in the Conservative Party at the time.

That was the reality of the situation then: the closed shop bringing the motor industry and various other industries to their knees. Many working-class people were sick to death of the trade unions, which is why they voted Conservative. The idea that it was a dark, draconian period of the evil capitalist bosses forcing the horny-handed sons of toil into penury was nonsense. I am more than happy for the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, to disabuse me of my prejudices, but I do not think that she will. Historically, we won general elections as a party because trade unionists supported us as they knew that reform was vital. We will no doubt debate that at length as we go on.

While I am being slightly contentious, I note the Cross Benches are empty, bar the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, whom it is always a pleasure to see. In many of the Bills over the last two years, the Cross Benches deprecated the use of excessive reliance on delegated powers. They would pop up during every piece of primary legislation, every Bill, to complain about the ministerial misuse of delegated powers, which is happening in this Bill in spades. Yet where are they? They are not present to remonstrate with the Government, take issue with the Government or hold the Government to account on that. Anyway, we must proceed.

In moving Amendment 205, I will speak also to Amendments 206 to 208, and the Clause 55 stand part notice tabled by my noble friends Lord Hunt of Wirral and Lord Sharpe of Epsom. The practical and economic consequences of Clause 55 without amendment are likely to be damaging to the very workers whom the Bill claims to protect. This is against an economic background where we have growth becalmed, flat growth of GDP and a very tough labour market out there. Yet the Bill will load further incumbencies on small businesses in particular.

Amendment 207 seeks to exempt micro-employers—those with fewer than 10 employees—from the obligation in respect of access. These amendments reflect a recognition that a one-size-fits-all mandate across employers of vastly different scale is neither fair nor sustainable. Micro-businesses and SMEs are already struggling under the weight of administrative obligations. Writing in an open letter, signed by FTSE 250 firm Mitie, industry leader OCS and other employers from the £60 billion facilities sector warned that the Bill’s radical package would “discourage growth”, damaging their businesses and harming their clients and, crucially, their staff. Tina McKenzie, policy chair at the Federation of Small Businesses, put it succinctly:

“The Government also needs to think again and rework the parts of the Employment Rights Bill that will wreak havoc on hiring”.


This is a Government ostensibly focused on growth who have created—although we have never seen it written down in a comprehensive way—the so-called growth test that the Chancellor has referenced. Tina McKenzie’s concerns are far from abstract. We are facing a sustained fall in payroll employment. Small businesses, the engine of British job creation, are being hit hardest. The rise in national insurance contributions and a growing web of compliance burdens are already pushing small firms to the edge. This clause in its current form risks tipping many over.

Amendment 205 seeks to ensure that the obligation to issue this statement applies only to employers with more than 50 workers. This is a reasonable and proportionate step. Larger firms are more likely to have a human resources infrastructure to absorb such obligations. For smaller enterprises, every new administrative requirement pulls resources from service delivery and job creation. It has an impact on the bottom line, which inevitably will feed through to decisions to not employ people or to make people redundant, which we would all deprecate.

Let us not be naive: the cumulative effect of obligations like this can and will lead to reduced hiring, increased redundancies and the potential acceleration of automation. Faced with mounting costs, employers may choose software over staff. The Government must be mindful that even well-intended regulation carries a cost. In the words of the very employees this Government say they want to support:

“We are deeply concerned that some of the Bill’s provisions will have serious unintended consequences that could harm both good employers and the very employees that the Bill seeks to protect”.


My noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom referenced the British Retail Consortium survey published on 29 April. It bears repetition, because it is a pretty damning indictment of the very significant concerns that employers at the sharp end—this is a survey of HR directors—have about the Bill as it stands. Some 70% believe that the Bill

“would have a very negative or negative impact on their business”,

52% said it would result in fewer staff members in their businesses and 61% said it

“would reduce flexibility in job offerings”.

They have urged the Government to engage, and today I echo that call.

Finally, Amendment 208 seeks to probe why the requirement to issue this statement must extend beyond the point of employment commencement. Is there any compelling justification for placing employers on a continual alert to reissue the statement at “prescribed times”? What does that even mean? Why is it necessary for the Secretary of State to intervene in the minutiae of a business—in the very weeds of how a business runs to make money, make profit, provide jobs, pay taxes and deliver public services for people? Why is it important for Ministers to involve themselves in the prescribed times a statement can be given? Surely, if the goal is awareness, combining this with the statement of employment particulars under Section 1 of the 1996 Act would suffice. We should not mandate bureaucracy for its own sake.

Let us step back and consider the broader context. If the Minister did not want to listen to the British Retail Consortium, she will no doubt be aware of other surveys published recently, such as that by the Federation of Small Businesses earlier in the year, which revealed that

“92 per cent of small employers are worried about the Employment Rights Bill, with 67 per cent saying they plan to recruit fewer staff, and 32 per cent set to reduce headcount”.

The Minister will know that her ministerial colleague, the MP for Ellesmere Port and Bromborough, has been challenged in the other place on a number of occasions to name just one small business that supported the Bill, and has hitherto been unable to come up with a name. The Government have come forward with Richer Sounds—which is not a small business by any stretch of the imagination—and Centrica, which is a massive business. I know that, under the Bill, big businesses will probably soon end up as small businesses, but that is a different matter. They also mentioned the Co-op. There is a surprise: the Co-op supporting the Labour Party; “The Pope likes balconies” will be the next one. Yes, the Co-op supports the Bill.

It is important to step back and think about the Bill. In an already fragile market where businesses are battling inflation, rising taxes and regulatory fatigue, we must not view administrative obligations as cost-free, because they are not. They weigh heavily, particularly on the smallest firms. I speak from experience. A number of years ago, I was an Investors in People manager, when I used to help small and medium-sized businesses with their quality standards. They often did not want to engage, because they did not have the time and the energy as they were focused on chasing invoices, chasing new businesses and giving presentations to potential new clients. These are the burdens that small businesses face every day. They become big businesses, and they pay taxes, so I ask the Minister to give some consideration to that.

--- Later in debate ---

I appreciate that Justin Madders, who I am sure is a decent Minister, hoped this would be uncontroversial. I hope this reflects an opinion—I accept that they might not share it and think I am creating some kind of drama—that it is about the tone. It is the tone of the Government deciding the direct relationship that employers have on something that is entirely optional. It should be irrelevant to whether somebody has a job and we will get into other debates on that in other parts of the Bill. For that reason, I will encourage my Front Bench—

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Does my noble friend agree that our very serious concerns about this clause would be assuaged were the Government to have properly followed Cabinet Office protocols and updated expeditiously the impact assessments, which are normally present in Bills of this size and magnitude?

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

I agree with my noble friend. I have tried to get deposited in the Library, or sent through some other form of communication to all Peers, a response I have received from the Secretary of State on this matter. By the way, I have still not received a reply from the Cabinet Secretary, who is supposed to uphold Cabinet Office guidelines. In essence, the answer came back: “We’ll do a full impact assessment once the Bill is completed”. We know that industry is looking for that. We have no idea when these regulations will be introduced; I assume that they could already have started the consultation. It is important that the Secretary of State—I am trying to remember; I do not have a photographic memory—basically said, “We haven’t really changed that much”. That is where we are. I will continue to make the point. My noble friend is right and reminds me to chase the Cabinet Secretary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I am fully aware that it would help to see the implementation plan and, as I said, we are working at pace to get it to your Lordships as soon as we can.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who participated in this very interesting debate. I think you always know when your arguments are hitting home when you are admonished by the Front Bench about tone. It usually means that you are hitting the target. I particularly thank my noble friends for the typically erudite and forensic analysis of Clause 55 by my noble friend Lady Coffey, the excellent real-world experience articulated by my noble friends Lord Ashcombe and Lord Leigh, and, of course the passion, from real-world experience, of my noble friends Lady Lawlor and Lord Moynihan of Chelsea.

I do not want to get into a historical discussion, because the hour is late, but Margaret Thatcher was mentioned. Margaret Thatcher never won an election with the puny mandate that this Government had, because what we are seeing is a counterrevolution in favour of the trade unions based on 20% of the electorate, a turnout of 66% and a 34% poll. That is no kind of mandate. In fact, it is a post-dated cheque to the trade unions paid for by the British taxpayer and working people of this country.

There is news from Birmingham, incidentally, as Birmingham was mentioned earlier. Four hundred Unite members have just voted today to carry on striking all the way to Christmas. This is an interesting quote from Sharon Graham, the Unite general secretary, known to our collective trade union alumni. I do not know what the collective term is: union barons, perhaps. She said:

“It beggars belief that a Labour government and Labour council is treating these workers so disgracefully … Unite calls on the decision makers to let common sense prevail in upcoming negotiations”.


The reason I quote that is that I have to say very gently to the Government Benches: be careful what you wish for. The 1974 Labour Government was destroyed by the trade unions’ actions in the winter of discontent of 1978-79. If the Government proceed with this Bill unamended, they run the risk that that unintended consequence might also be the end of their Government. I would not wish that to be the case, of course, because I think that they sincerely believe they are doing the right thing. Nevertheless, it is a risk.

Let us step back from the historical discussions that we have had in what has been an interesting debate. We are being asked to vote for a clause in primary legislation with huge delegated powers in the hands of Ministers. That brings me to a very interesting quote, that

“excessive reliance on delegated powers, Henry VIII clauses, or skeleton legislation, upsets the proper balance between Parliament and the Executive. This not only strikes at the rule of law values I have already outlined but also at the cardinal principles of accessibility and legal certainty”.

That was beautifully put, by the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General in his Bingham lecture, proving that he is not always wrong about everything.

We have tabled these amendments because this clause does not give us the detail, it will have unintended consequences, and it will have a real-world impact on small businesses in particular. It is not about bashing the trade unions. I would concede, as someone who was a trade union member, that the trade unions have done a brilliant job in terms of member welfare, insurance schemes, et cetera, over the years. They are a force for good generally, but the measures in the Bill far too easily tip the balance against businesses trying to earn a living, in favour of unions, by repealing all the legislation from 1979 and 1992.

The Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Leong, are doing a difficult job and defending a sticky wicket, but I do not think that the Minister really engaged with the arguments. I hope that on Report there is an opportunity to alter this clause, to make it a little less onerous and burdensome to businesses while keeping the spirit of the legislation for workers. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 205 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Finally, that brings me to the second consideration: whether the purpose of the access could reasonably be achieved without physical entry. In many ways, the amendment does not prefer one side over another; it just provides a structured way for the central arbitration committee to make balanced, informed and context-sensitive decisions that reflect the diversity of modern workplaces and the need to accommodate both access and operational stability. I beg to move.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly to my Amendments 212 and 213. Naturally, I wholeheartedly agree with the excellent points made from our Front Bench by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, particularly on Amendments 210 and 213B.

My two amendments are probing amendments, essentially, and I think they are very sensible and reasonable. The perhaps slightly more contentious one would restrict these powers to businesses with over 250 employees. I cannot and will not rehearse the arguments my noble friend made about disruption, interference and taking resources and time away from the main job of work in the business. Interestingly, it could be “one or more” trade union officials, so it could be one but it could be 25 going into a small business. We do not know because the clause is drawn very widely and is very permissive. That is Amendment 213.

Amendment 212 is basic good manners and common sense. If you want to facilitate a good relationship between the trade union representatives—properly elected and appointed by the workforce—and the employers, you want an agenda and an objective place that you wish to reach. That might be to avoid industrial action, to look again at a pay offer, to discuss a suspension of a worker or something like that. But what is wrong with giving 24 hours’ notice? It takes the heat out of the potentially disputatious nature of the relationship that you might have between the employer and the trade union representative. I think it is just basic good manners and would make things work better. It does not diminish the role of the trade unionists and it does not undermine their integrity or their bona fides; it just says, “Let’s give 24 hours’ notice to enable a more fruitful and productive relationship to be expedited between the two sides”. For those reasons, I would like the Minister to at least consider the amendments, perhaps with a view to looking at them again on Report.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

My Lords, my Amendment 214 is designed to provide an effective remedy against an employer which defies an order of the CAC to provide trade union access. This is a situation where the trade union has applied to the employer for an agreement for access and been refused. The trade union has then gone to the CAC and succeeded in obtaining an order for access, which the employer has defied. The employer has had the opportunity to appeal to the EAT and has either declined to appeal or has had its appeal refused. In that situation, the Bill merely provides that a union can apply for a fine to be paid, not to it but to the CAC. That is no real deterrent and no incentive either for the union to enforce the CAC award, knowing that it will not result in compulsion for the employer to obey the order of the CAC. My amendment provides enforcement by way of a High Court injunction. That is an established procedure often used against trade unions for breach of their obligations in relation to industrial action. Some equivalence is surely justified here.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st May 2025 Lords Chamber

I therefore hope that we can use this legislation as a vehicle for tackling that. I think the Government will understand and, because of the Labour movement’s proud history of tackling discrimination against workers’ political views over the years, they will be sympathetic to these amendments.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I support the excellent amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Young of Acton. It is hard to adequately follow the tour de force and the passion and energy of—I will call her my noble friend— Lady Fox of Buckley. I would make the point, and it bears repetition, that free speech is worth defending on all occasions and, in many respects, transcends party- political affiliations.

As my noble friend Lady Fox alluded to, there was a time many years ago—until quite recently, historically—when people who represented labour versus capital were discriminated against for organising in the workplace. If people who worked in factories and mines, and on farms, tried to organise a trade union—which was perfectly reasonable—to improve their conditions and pay, they were politically discriminated against, suspended or fired, and their very livelihoods were put in question. That is a fact. We know that was the case.

We have made good progress. Those people who were, for instance, organising the Workers’ Educational Association classes for manual workers, in order to improve their education and their life chances, were discriminated against. That was wrong. We have gone full circle now, and those people who may support a right-of-centre position—pro-capitalism, pro-tax cuts, pro-lower regulations—are discriminated against.

The importance of this amendment is that it distinguishes what is respectable, moderate, mainstream opinion, which noble Lords may or may not agree with, from the extremes. The caveat in this amendment is very nuanced, in that it defends free speech for respectable political debate and discussion. That is very important.

The other reason why I support this amendment is that we have a very unfortunate phenomenon these days with the advent of social media: doxing. If you are a pernicious, unpleasant, vexatious, litigious person and someone on social media appears to have a view with which you disagree, you are no longer going just to take issue with them on social media and let the matter drop; you are going to identify where they live, where their children go to school and, more importantly for our purposes today, where they earn their living.

A good example—and a proud member of the Free Speech Union—is Mr Ben Woods, who was employed by Waitrose at Henley as a wine specialist. He had unfashionable views, certainly unfashionable in the Liberal Democrat citadel of Henley-on-Thames, being against immigration. But actually, he represented the majority of people in that he was gender critical and believed that women are biological women and men are biological men, and he put that on his social media. Maybe he was a bit exuberant in his opinions, but someone decided to contact John Lewis Partnership and Waitrose to dox him. He was suspended, investigated and lost his job, and that is now going to an employment tribunal.

That is a good example of a very regrettable modern phenomenon. This amendment would seek to protect people like this, who have perfectly respectable views and are entitled to earn a living and to try to get on with their fellow workers in their place of work—who may disagree with them—but not lose their job unfairly. On that basis, this is an excellent amendment. I certainly urge the Minister to give it some consideration, because it would not detract from the Bill. Above all, it is a fair amendment, and I believe she should support it.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I would join with anyone who wants to speed up employment tribunals and cut the costs of going to them. I hope that is an agenda the Government will take on rapidly. We heard an unfortunate case of someone who is waiting until 2027; some people are waiting four years. I hope the Government will address that issue, but I cannot see that it is central to this Bill.

I am not a legal expert, and many of the cases quoted are not ones that I know—I do not know any of them intimately. In my experience, at least with employment tribunal judgments, it is very unsatisfactory to sum them up in a single sentence. They usually have within them a great deal of complexity and a fair amount of nuance. Without going through those, I am in no position to assess the evidence that has been put before us today.

I remain somewhat sceptical. I hope that we can get reassurance that people are genuinely protected because of their political views. I do not think anyone in this Committee would think it was right for someone to lose their job because they belong to one particular affiliation or another. I will look for the Minister to make that case and to explain the legal situation in far more depth than I can. I do not feel qualified to be more than somewhat sceptical.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Jackson of Peterborough Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th May 2025 Lords Chamber

Fourthly, more broadly, does the Minister believe that this Bill is in alignment with the conclusions reached during the passage of the Worker Protection (Amendment of Equality Act 2010) Act 2023, or are the Government now reversing course? Finally, and crucially, will the Government please commit to carrying out a comprehensive and transparent impact assessment? I beg to move.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment ably and comprehensively moved by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, which would, as he explained, insert a new clause. It is an eminently sensible amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, described the arguments put by this side in the previous debate as straw man arguments. He was like Don Quixote tilting at windmills, because his claim that they were straw man arguments was comprehensively eviscerated by my noble friend Lord Young of Acton. They were substantive arguments and substantive concerns, notwithstanding the noble Lord’s comments and those of noble Lords on the Government’s side.

Clause 20 could be described as a hologram or a chimaera because it does not provide very much in the way of detail about the practical ramifications and impacts of this clause on businesses, particularly smaller businesses. The amendment is very sensible. In section 10 of the cost-benefit analysis in the Employment Rights Bill: Economic Analysis that the Government published last October, one is hard pressed to see any detailed empirical evidence from reputable economists or other academics which would sustain the likely costings that the Government have prayed in aid in favour of this part of the Bill. We are told that the universal cost of the Bill to business will be a very speculative £5 billion, but the source of that figure is not very clear; in fact, it is quite opaque. I do not believe that figure. For a number of reasons, the data is suspect, which is why we need the proper impact assessment so persuasively argued for by my noble friend on the Front Bench. We have not had a proper analysis of the detail in a risk assessment of section 10 of the cost-benefit analysis.

We also have not had a proper consultation process on the Bill. We have not had the opportunity to look at the likely impacts that flow from this clause. I say at the outset that, like my noble friend Lord Young of Acton, I am a proud member of the Free Speech Union, which has made a similar case about consultation.

We also do not know anything about the opportunity cost. Not everyone is an economist, but opportunity cost is what may have happened if this Bill had not come along. I suspect that employers, including smaller employers, would have taken on more staff, had there not been the encumbrances in this clause. In other words, they will be risk averse: they will not wish to run the risk of taking people on, given the litigation and vexatious claims which may well arise from this clause.

The figure the Government have put forward for the number of employment tribunals does not stand up to scrutiny, given the pressure that this will put on the tribunals themselves, as well as the other courts that will be responsible for adjudicating on this litigation. Indeed, as my noble friend said, this will exacerbate the already very significant problem of backlogs in the employment tribunals.

I turn to the kernel of this amendment. If I take the Minister and, indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, who supported her from the government Benches, at their word, I do not know why they would not wish to support the free speech caveat in this amendment. Although they have not properly identified what harassment is—they have not defined it—they are going after people who are committing acts of harassment. They are not seeking to stifle or curtail free speech.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. I would suggest that the so-called “free speech caveat” is Section 6 of the Human Rights Act, which requires all public authorities, including courts and tribunals, to interpret all other legislation in a way that is compatible with convention rights, including—for the purposes of the present debate, as I understand the noble Lord’s concerns—Article 10 of the convention on human rights.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I defer to the noble Baroness’s expertise on human rights legislation, but we are considering this specific, bespoke legislation. There will not necessarily be a read-across between that and—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

There will.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Well, the noble Baroness will not be present at every employment tribunal and hear and adjudicate every case. As my noble friend Lord Young of Acton has said, there is a significant threat of inadvertent issues arising from this legislation, which, as my noble friend Lady Cash has said, is very poorly drafted. As subsection 2(a) of the proposed new clause sets out, it is important to look through the prism of free speech at Clauses 19 to 22.

It is also important to look at the likely costs to employers. This is the central point of my remarks: we do not know what those costs will be. It is certainly appropriate that Ministers be required to tell Parliament what the ramifications are in terms of cost. This is a Government who are committed to growth and to supporting businesses in all their endeavours. Therefore, it would be sensible to consider a review of how these issues impact on businesses.

On proposals for mitigations, there have been no ideas, no protocols, no concordats, and no policies put in place to give any guidance to smaller businesses—I am not necessarily referring to the smallest micro-businesses—to cope with the problems deliberately arising because this Labour Government have chosen to put these encumbrances and burdens on businesses. They are not giving any support to businesses to help cope with this. The costs will fall on the shareholders, on the businesses, and ultimately on the workforce—and it will cost jobs. For that reason, I support the amendment. It does not detract from the important commitment to protect ordinary working people, who deserve to be able to go to work without being bullied, harassed or treated unfairly or egregiously. We all agree with that, on which there is a consensus. It would not detract from that to make an amendment that would provide extra protections against people who are vexatious or malicious, or who cause difficulties in the long run, for no apparent reason. It is a sensible amendment that would protect business and would also protect the workforce.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

Can the noble Lord indicate what he thinks the value of an impact assessment is that does not weigh the benefits that ensue from the legislation but only the costs?

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I think that is a slightly odd question coming from the supporter of a Government who are not coming forward with either intangible or tangible benefits in monetisable ways. Were that in the impact assessment or the economic analysis of the Bill, I would defer to the noble Lord’s argument, but neither of them are there. Frankly, it is difficult for us to make a value judgment on the balance of obligations and responsibilities between the workforce and the employer when the data is not provided. I think the noble Lord has probably made my case. With that, I support the amendment from my noble friend on the Front Bench.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friends Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Hunt of Wirral in proposing this impact assessment and thank my noble friend Lord Hunt for making the case so persuasively from the Front Bench. I shall simply pick up on a few points that were made in the amendment and his speech. The amendment asks for an impact assessment on free speech. Proposed new subsection (1) asks for an assessment of Sections 19 to 22 of this Act on employers. Proposed new subsection (2) says:

“The assessment must report on … the impact of sections 19 to 22 on free speech”


and include

“an assessment of the likely costs to employers”

of these sections, which must include types of occupations at risk and proposals for mitigations.

I want to comment on this amendment in the context of universities. I spoke earlier in Committee about the mitigations a university might take in its rules and in the checklist that it hands out to potential candidates for a place who want to come to that university to study and who are asked to abide by certain arrangements or rules. These rules will, if the employer and the university follow what they are required as trustees of a charity to follow, protect the costs: whatever endowment of funds the university has, it will have to follow caution. I have no doubt that undergraduates or graduate students coming in for postgraduate work will be asked to promise not to complain, or be overheard doing so, or speak ill of lecturer A, whose lectures they may not approve of, may think are no good or whatever, as happens in normal intercourse in a university.

One of the standard things you will hear as undergraduates leave the room is, “What a rotten lecture that was” or “Isn’t it interesting that such a subject didn’t touch on the kernel of the matter?” or whatever they think is important. This is the sort of education we want to impart. We want students to question and challenge. We want them to make the case against what they have heard and to think about it. To make an employer liable for a student doing what a university education should encourage—we encourage it at school too—seems to me silly. We should have an impact assessment of what will happen and what sort of steps a university will take to curtail that freedom to argue or to criticise an employee of the university. We should ask for an impact assessment. It would not be very difficult to consult universities and find out exactly how they would get around this potential liability as employers.

The same goes for mitigation and the costs which will be incurred. For example, take the costs to an institution such as a university of fighting a claim in an employment tribunal. The member of staff concerned, against whom the criticism has been made, will be on tenterhooks all the time. They may be distracted, may have to continue to give evidence to the employer, and so on, with a lot of back and forth. As for the employers, think of the staff costs, counsel charges, legal charges, administrative costs and committee costs they will incur, and the time that will be spent on that rather than on running their universities to do what they ought to do—to educate undergraduates and do research. This is the most moderate request for an impact assessment that I have heard. Noble Lords would be well advised to agree that we need an impact assessment, both on free speech and the likely costs—particularly the costs of going to a tribunal and waiting for all that period.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for reminding me of this; we covered it last week. The RPC did not question the policy of the Bill. It just questioned the evidence—and I will go further on this Bill.

These assessments are based on the best available evidence of the potential impact on businesses, workers and the wider economy. We plan to further define this analysis in the future, working with a range of stakeholders including businesses, trade unions, academics, think tanks and the Regulatory Policy Committee to do so.

The Government are steadfast in their commitment to tackle all forms of harassment in the workplace. We know that harassment at work can have a huge impact on affected individuals, as well as broader economic impacts. The burden of holding perpetrators to account and of driving change is too great to be shouldered by employees alone. These measures send a clear signal to all employers that they must take steps to protect their employees from harassment, including from third parties, to encourage a cultural change.

We know that the vast majority of employers agree that harassment is unacceptable and are working to ensure that their employees are treated with respect. We will work in partnership with them towards this shared goal and will support them with these changes. We will publish an enactment impact assessment once the Bill receives Royal Assent, in line with the Better Regulation Framework. This will account for amendments made to primary legislation during the Bill’s passage through Parliament that would significantly change the impact of the policy on business. This impact assessment will be published alongside the enacted legislation. Additionally, we will publish further analysis, alongside carrying out further consultation with stake-holders, ahead of any secondary legislation, to meet our Better Regulation requirements.

According to our best estimates, across all our harassment measures the monetary cost to businesses will not be significant. Other than the initial one-off familiarisation cost, repeatable costs to businesses are very low. All three measures will also bring benefits to businesses in avoiding the harassment of staff.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I hear what the Minister says, but even the economic analysis says there will be a 15% increase in individual enforcement cases in employment tribunals arising from litigation because of the Bill. The analysis says:

“The exact impact on the enforcement system is difficult to predict because the number of cases that enter the system each year fluctuates”,


and that

“final policy decisions taken at secondary legislation will alter the number of workers in scope of protections and likelihood of a worker making a claim. These decisions are still subject to consultation and further policy development and therefore cannot be assessed with confidence”.

Later it says that the

“initial analysis on the impact of the Bill on enforcement is subject to change as policy development continues”.

The Minister is asking us to wave this clause through on the basis of information that has not been presented to this House.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

No, I was not saying that. What I said is that we are carrying out consultation and we will conduct further impact assessments. We are not saying that we are finished with it and that this is it. We have already assessed the impact of provisions about third-party harassment on SMEs in our impact assessment on third-party harassment. In all our impact assessments we assess the impact on SMEs, and the Bill is not expected to have a disproportionate impact on SMEs.