(7 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in the unavoidable absence of my noble friend Lady Blower, and at her request, I beg to move Amendment 30, which is intended to add to paragraph 6 of the schedule.
The paragraph, which we discussed in Committee last week, permits a decision-maker to take into account whether the decision might put the UK in breach of its obligations under international law. In the last debate, we discussed the nature of the international law obligations comprehended in this paragraph and the question of who determines whether there has been a breach of them. I do not seek to reopen that debate; this amendment is not dependent on the outcome of it.
The amendment would make it clear that the decision-maker will be permitted to take into consideration and reject a tender or an investment that the decision-maker reasonably considers might put the UK in breach of its obligations under the genocide convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or any UN Security Council resolutions supported by the United Kingdom. The amendment would still stand and have force, whether or not the Government accept amendments along the lines suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, identifying what entity appropriately determines what amounts to a UK breach of international law. Amendment 30 merely clarifies that the conventions and resolutions mentioned in it are to be regarded as UK obligations.
I find it impossible to see what conceivable objection there could be to identifying matters of such grave importance to a law-abiding nation. The rationale is so obvious that I cannot think of anything more to say in support of my noble friend Lady Blower’s amendment, and I look forward to hearing that the Minister will support it.
I will now speak to Amendment 32. Paragraph 8 of the Schedule permits the potential decision-maker on procurement to take into consideration certain forms of “labour-related misconduct”. The problem is that that is a very limited list. We touched on that in Committee last week. In the last debate, the Minister asked me to provide further details on whether the violations of core labour standards would be covered by the provisions of paragraph 8. I looked at that matter again and did not take up her kind invitation to write to her, because Amendment 32, which was not before us last week, makes clear the distinction between the core labour standards identified in the amendment and the standards set out in paragraph 8.
I will explain. Paragraph 8 is confined only to conduct that would amount to a criminal offence in relation to slavery or human trafficking orders, failure to pay the national minimum wage and labour market orders under the Immigration Act. That list does not currently permit those making procurement and investment decisions to have regard to the fundamental labour standards binding on all countries by virtue of their membership of the ILO. As a matter of convenience, we can take those standards from Articles 399(2) and 399(6) of the trade and co-operation agreement—the Brexit deal—signed by our then Prime Minister in 2020, where they are conveniently summarised.
The provisions commit the UK to respect, promote and effectively implement the ILO Constitution, which includes the Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944, the
“ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up, adopted at Geneva on 18 June 1998 … the ILO Decent Work Agenda as set out in the 2008 ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization”,
and the fundamental ILO conventions. The fundamental ILO conventions are those identified in those provisions of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement and in the amendment. They protect freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation; decent working conditions for all with regard to, inter alia, wages and earnings, working hours, maternity leave and other conditions of work; health and safety at work, including the prevention of occupational injury or illness and compensation in cases of such injury or illness; and, finally, non-discrimination in respect of working conditions, including for migrant workers.
The only point in that list which is included in paragraph 8 of the Schedule is the second point that I mentioned: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour. That is the only point at which my amendment and paragraph 8 coincide, because paragraph 8 of the Schedule deals with slavery and trafficking. However, all the other elements of the fundamental labour standards are outside paragraph 8, even though they are binding on every country which is a member of the ILO by virtue of its membership and, regardless of whether they have ratified these conventions, they are matters of customary international law. These are vitally important standards, as the UK government representatives will doubtless reiterate at the International Labour Conference of the ILO, which takes place in June.
Plainly, paragraph 8 does not go far enough. International labour standards are important for ameliorating the conditions of workers in less developed and authoritarian regimes, and, from a more self-interested perspective, for diminishing the extent to which UK manufacturers and UK suppliers of services and works are undercut by competitors seeking to, as I put it on the last occasion,
“exploit cheap labour, poor conditions, inadequate standards, lack of enforcement, and powerless trade unions”.—[Official Report, 7/5/24; cols. 23-24.]
I refer to the examples I gave on the last occasion, but I will not repeat them.
Reverting to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, on the last occasion, identification of whether there has been a breach of a fundamental ILO convention is not here left to the lay opinion of the decision-maker in the public entity. The ILO has extensive and long-established machinery for determining whether each state is in conformity with each of the fundamental conventions and each of the conventions that state has ratified. The UK fully participates in that machinery and those determinations. Why, then, I ask rhetorically, should the minimum standards of the fundamental international labour conventions, which are all ratified by the UK, not be included in the list of legitimate labour-related misconduct which procurement decision-makers can take into account under the Bill? I wait with anticipation to see whether the Minister will seek to justify their exclusion.
My Lords, when we debated paragraph 6 of the Schedule in an earlier group, I argued that it was inappropriate to include an international law exception in the Bill. Therefore, it will not surprise the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, to find that I do not support the extension to paragraph 6 that his Amendment 30 seeks to achieve.
The briefing sent by the Palestine Solidarity Campaign asserted that without this amendment, the Bill could compel public bodies to contravene the genocide convention. This extraordinary statement was explained in the context of the much-publicised opinion of a number of UK lawyers, including the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, that the International Court of Justice had ruled that there was a plausible case that Israel has committed genocide. As the then President of the ICJ subsequently made clear, this is a complete misinterpretation of the ICJ’s judgment. Judge Joan Donoghue, the then President of the ICJ, has stated that the court decided that the Palestinians had a plausible right to be protected from genocide and that South Africa had the right to present that claim in court. However, to correct something that is often said in the media, the court did not decide that the claim of genocide was plausible. So the items of international law referred to in the amendment, including the genocide convention, basically have the name “Israel” etched on them. Whether by design or otherwise, this amendment would simply make it easier for public authorities to find excuses to boycott Israel and it would be very damaging if this amendment were accepted into this Bill.
Amendment 32, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, raises rather different issues. I am conscious that I am in dangerous territory because of the acknowledged expertise in labour law of the noble Lord compared with my ignorance of labour law. However, it is my understanding that the ILO conventions do not have direct effect in the UK. I thought that we achieved compliance through our domestic legislation. The noble Lord spoke about ILO matters on the last Committee day and, while he made the point that the UK is bound by the ILO conventions, I do not think that he claimed that they had any direct effect in UK law.
If I am correct, this amendment is a very unwelcome addition to the Bill because it seems to give full legal effect to the ILO conventions directly. These conventions are not drafted as stand-alone laws but in rather broad terms. They lack a lot of definitions and the language is often rather vague. That is why national Governments have to adopt them using their own legislation. I am not speaking against the ILO conventions; I have no views one way or the other on the conventions. My point is that we comply with these conventions through our national law and that law is the foundation of labour-related misconduct, which is covered in paragraph 8. It seems to me that paragraph 8 means that we can hold overseas suppliers to the same standards to which we hold UK suppliers. In particular, it aligns with the provisions of the Procurement Act which was passed last year. That is a wholly proper basis for this Act, rather than some broader concept of principles that cannot be read directly into our law.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who contributed to the debate, and to the Minister for his reply. I shall be very brief.
In relation to Amendment 30, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, argued as to whether or not Israel is in breach of the genocide convention. That is really not the issue. What is proposed is that a decision-maker should take into account whether any country is in breach of the genocide convention. The question of the State of Israel is not raised here. Of course, this matter is before the ICJ and I for one would hesitate to say anything about that until the ICJ has reached a decision.
The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, made the point that the various conventions and provisions in the amendment are already included in international law. I take that point. I accept that. However, I think the purpose of my noble friend’s amendment to make it clear that those elements were included in international law. If they do not add anything, they do not detract from the original proposition either.
Finally on Amendment 30, the Minister raised whether it is for the Government or a public authority to decide whether there is a breach. This amendment does not touch on that subject. Whoever makes the decision is permitted to take into account the various conventions listed in the amendment.
So far as Amendment 32 is concerned, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made the point that the conventions of the ILO do not have direct effect. Of course, that is absolutely right, but she said that passing the amendment would in fact give direct effect to the ILO conventions. My response to that is: not at all. It does not implement the ILO conventions in UK law; it simply gives permission to decision-makers to take into account whether the proposed supplier or territory is in breach of ILO conventions. The problem is the narrow confines of paragraph 8, which the amendment is intended to expand.
The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, said that the amendment is directed to countries—forgive me; I am not doing justice to the elegance of his language. He pointed out that the conventions are directed to countries whereas paragraph 8 is directed to companies, to particular suppliers. That is true, but paragraph 8 begins with a disapplication of Section 1, stating:
“Section 1 does not prevent regard to a consideration so far as it relates to labour-related misconduct”.
Section 1 is on the basis of territorial considerations, not company considerations. As I understand it, the Bill would not prevent a public entity discriminating against a particular company as long as it did not discriminate against a country. It is for that reason that it appears to be entirely logical and justifiable to extend paragraph 8 to territorial considerations, which are inherent in the ILO conventions. Nevertheless, if the noble Lord is able to offer me any help in clarifying my amendment, it would be gratefully received.
Finally, the Minister said that he is satisfied that the grounds of exclusion offer sufficient protection for labour rights. With the greatest respect, I disagree. I think these additional protections are necessary. He underestimates the fundamental nature of the ILO conventions that are called into account. Nevertheless, on behalf of my noble friend Lady Blower, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I have never been a member of the Constitution Committee—I am certainly not a current member—so I simply cannot answer that question. I do not know why it has reached the conclusions that it has, but I believe that they are not in accordance with the impact of Clause 4 as drafted.
When dealing with stopping people doing things and making judgments about whether doing so is right, a balance always needs to be struck. In this case, the Government have tilted the scales in favour of social cohesion. People may think that that is the wrong decision and that allowing elected officials to speak on behalf of an authority in the way that they want to is a price worth paying. I believe that, because of the limited nature of Clause 4 as drafted, it strikes the right sort of balance in this case.
We must remember that this Bill does not stop elected officials speaking in their own capacity, nor does it stop bishops doing so—not that that would ever be an easy thing to do. Individuals in public life can have a big impact on social cohesion, but they are not debarred by this Bill from giving their own views on BDS activities, even though they would have such an impact. In that sense, this Bill is a modest change to the status quo on public statements. It is certainly not as far reaching as people have tried to make out. I would like to get a little balance in this debate.
My Lords, the noble Baroness asserted that Clause 4 does not apply to individuals but only to entities. Clause 4 says:
“A person who is subject to section 1 must not publish”,
and so on. In law, a “person” could be a corporation or an individual, but Clause 1 is quite clear in referring to a “decision-maker”, which can clearly be an individual. One can easily visualise a public entity where the decision is made by one person who has had authority delegated to them, a committee or group of people who have the power to make such a decision or the full council, body or whatever it may be. Clearly, Clause 4 is capable of being directed at individuals.
I hear what the noble Lord is saying. Clause 1 affects persons who are decision-makers. Decision-makers are defined in Clause 2, which uses the definition of public authority. As I said earlier, there are a very small number of cases where individuals can be decision-makers. It is not a question of people taking delegated authority to be decision-makers; if I were in a council and delegated to the chief executive, they would not thereby become the decision-maker. The decision-maker remains the public authority under the terms of Clause 2.
(7 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have Amendment 28 in this group and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for adding his name. I should first say that I am in complete agreement with the thoughts that lie behind Amendments 18 and 29, to which the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, has spoken so eloquently.
My Amendment 28 is simply a more direct way of dealing with the same problem. It deletes paragraph 6 of the schedule in its entirety, so that public authorities cannot use international law considerations as a means of avoiding the effect of Section 1 of the Bill. Public authorities are not experts in international law but might well seek to use ill-founded concerns about the UK’s adherence to international law as a smokescreen behind which they believe that they can hide their boycott activities. Put simply, it creates a huge loophole in the Bill.
I tried to compare the Bill with last year’s Procurement Act to see whether the exclusions in the schedule to this Bill are the same as the mandatory and discretionary grounds for exclusion in the Procurement Act. This was not easy, because it is clear that two completely different sets of draftsmen have been involved in the two Bills. However, the one thing that I am pretty sure of is that the Procurement Act did not have an international law exclusion ground, so the inclusion of paragraph 6 in the schedule to this Bill is somewhat puzzling.
I shall comment briefly on Amendment 31 in this group, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, because that would extend the range of things that public authorities could look at to breaches of international law outside the UK. Not only is this way beyond the Procurement Act exclusions as well, but it adds yet another loophole, making the loophole as big as it could possibly be in order to allow public authorities to justify boycotts. For that reason, I cannot support it. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s rationale for the inclusion of paragraph 6 in the schedule.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 31 in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Blower. I have no observations on the amendments that have just been spoken to.
Paragraph 6 of Schedule 1 disapplies the bar in Clause 1 of the Bill on a public entity, for want of a more precise definition, from taking into account political or moral disapproval of a foreign state’s conduct in making procurement or investment decisions in one particular situation. A procurement decision is defined in Clause 2(2) as
“a decision about a contract for the supply of goods, services or works to the decision-maker”.
Paragraph 6 applies where the decision-maker reasonably considers that its political or moral disapproval of a foreign state’s conduct is relevant to whether the procurement or investment decision would place the UK in breach of its international law obligations. I have no problem with that at all.
(10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we live in a globalised world of goods and services where capital seeks the cheapest raw material and the cheapest labour. If—and I hope it still is “if”—Port Talbot steelworks closes, 3,000 men and women in South Wales will lose their jobs. But the needs of Britain for the same consumption of steel will continue; it is simply that 3,000 workers somewhere else in the world, probably on cheaper wages and with worse conditions, less health and safety protection and fewer trade union rights, will produce that steel.
There is no way to equalise wages in our global supply chains, of course, but conditions—minimum conditions, at least—can be equalised. We have the legal tools to do that through international labour standards. I refer to the International Labour Organization’s 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, and its 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalisation. Of course, I refer also to the fundamental ILO conventions, which this country was one of the first to ratify: Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise; Convention 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining; Convention 100 on Equal Remuneration; convention 111 on discrimination; Convention 155 on Occupational Safety and Health; and Convention 187 on the Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health.
The UK ratified them all and was happy to reaffirm them in the Brexit trade deal: the trade and co-operation agreement. Democracy requires that these standards be enforced to defend the conditions of workers both here and abroad. All persons and bodies buying goods and services on the global market should be entitled to take into account adherence to international labour standards. I object to the deprivation of the power of devolved Governments and public bodies—and, indeed, private bodies with public functions—to select their providers of goods and services on the basis of, among other things, conformity to these international laws.
Paragraph 6 of Part 2 of the Schedule, about which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, have spoken, is insufficient protection. So is paragraph 8. They are so narrowly drawn for these purposes that that they fail effectively to exempt such requirements of conformity to international labour standards. Paragraph 6 permits exemption only for conduct that places the UK in breach of its international law obligations. My concern, however, is breaches of international law by Governments in the supply chains to the United Kingdom. Paragraph 8 applies only to conduct that would amount to a criminal offence in relation to slavery, trafficking orders and labour market orders under the Immigration Act. It does not protect against infractions of the right to health and safety at work, the right to strike, the right to bargain collectively, the right to organise and so on.
I learn from the TUC briefing that the International Trade Union Confederation’s Global Rights Index has ascertained that breaches of workers’ rights reached record highs in 2023. It lists Bangladesh, Belarus, Ecuador, Egypt, Eswatini, Guatemala, Myanmar, Tunisia, the Philippines and Turkey as the 10 worst countries for working people, with 73% of the countries surveyed impeding the registration of unions or banning them, including Belarus, Central African Republic and Guatemala, while 80% of the countries surveyed violated the right to strike. Why should public bodies not take such matters into consideration?
As many noble Lords have said, there are exemptions in Clause 3(7) for Israel and the Occupied Territories. Considering Israel’s many breaches of international law in relation to its conduct, including that in Gaza now, what justification can there be for excusing that state from all breaches of international labour standards in so far as public bodies must not take them into account?
I would like the Minister’s help in explaining why international labour standards that are binding on the UK and all nations of the world should not be an appropriate factor for decisions on procurement by public bodies, and why a state that bans trade unions or strikes and imposes penalties on those who participate in them should not be subject to a decision by a public body that it will not buy goods or services from it. I hope the Minister will say she will accept an amendment to allow such matters to be taken into consideration.
I made it clear that it is compliant. I will write a letter setting that out in the coming days.
As many noble Lords have said, there has been a rising problem of anti-Semitism since 7 October. I believe we now need this Bill all the more and that it is important to protect community cohesion.
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for his kind remarks and his helpful discussion on his concerns with the exception to the ban for considerations that a public body deems relevant to international law. This exception is necessary to ensure that public authorities are not forced to make a decision which could put the UK in breach of its obligations under international law. Public authorities cannot have their own subjective views on what constitutes a breach of international law. They must reasonably consider the decision relevant to the UK’s obligations under international law.
I now turn to China, as the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, and the noble Baroness, Lady Janke, raised the matter. The Procurement Act, which we worked on together, will further strengthen our approach to exclude suppliers where there is clear evidence of the involvement of forced labour or other modern slavery practices. This Bill will not prevent public bodies conducting due diligence and considering the location of suppliers when assessing modern slavery risk and will not prevent public bodies adhering to modern slavery guidelines. We will continue to keep our policy response under review. The Bill’s power to exempt a particular country or territory from its provisions will allow the scope of the Bill to evolve in line with the UK Government’s foreign policy.
Additionally, concerns have been raised around how the Bill will impact the ability of public authorities to protect against human rights abuses. It is the Government’s view that allowing for blanket exclusions of suppliers because they are based in a particular country, for an undisclosed period, is disproportionate and unfair on suppliers from those countries which operate fairly and ethically. However, I can assure Members of the House that the Bill will not prevent public authorities disregarding suppliers involved in human rights abuses on a non-country specific basis. Public bodies should not be pursuing country-specific campaigns.
Can the Minister explain how that works? If a public authority decided that it would not trade with any supplier which banned trade unions or the right to strike, and, subsequently, a tender came in from China, could it or could it not, under the Bill, decide not to accept such a tender?
I do not entirely understand the question, but I am happy to research that and come back. The basic point is that public bodies should not be pursuing country-specific campaigns, as foreign policy is a matter for the UK Government alone—but obviously we need to understand the details in the supply chain.
Additionally, the Bill contains an exception to the ban for various considerations where the Government have assessed it appropriate for public authorities to make territorial considerations influenced by moral or political disapproval of foreign state conduct, including considerations relevant to labour market misconduct, which was a concern of the noble Lord.
Bodies that administer the Local Government Pension Scheme are captured by the definition of “public authorities” in Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and it is therefore appropriate for that decision to be captured. For example, a UN special rapporteur wrote to the LGPS in November 2021 demanding divestment from a number of Israeli companies, and the demand cited its ability to play a “transformational role”. I think we can agree that the role of local authorities is to manage the assets to deliver benefits to members.
The noble Baroness, Lady Young of Old Scone, asked whether the pension fund Nest and the PPF are in scope of the Bill. The only pension funds the Bill will apply to are those in the Local Government Pension Scheme, so they are not within scope.
There was a long conversation about the application of the Bill—which bodies it applies to. It will apply to public authorities, as defined in Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. This definition has been in statute for 25 years and sets the scope for the application of fundamental legislation.
Indicative factors that were relevant to judges’ previous decisions on the issue include the body receiving a significant amount of public funding, the body carrying out acts in exercise of statutory powers and the body providing a public service. I encourage any institution that is unsure whether it is bound by Section 6 of the HRA to seek independent advice, but I have noted various questions on scope that we may come back to in Committee, because there were some useful contributions on that, including from the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson.
I clarify that the Bill’s Short Title provides a general indication of its subject matter, and it is clear that it applies only to public authorities, as defined in Section 6 of the Human Rights Act.
This legislation delivers an important manifesto commitment. It will ensure that the UK has a consistent foreign policy approach and speaks with one voice internationally. I have not had time to answer every point, but I have been listening carefully. I look forward to working with noble Lords throughout the passage of the Bill to deliver this important legislation and to continue to engage on the various knotty and important issues that have been raised today. I commend the Bill to the House.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will not detain the House too long. In this amendment we have tried to reflect the structure that we have just agreed in relation to the environment. This is not about blocking change. The Minister said that we are in danger of creating immutable legislation. That is not the case. We are in a unique situation here in terms of regulations that are going to be changed in a way that does not have the same sort of parliamentary scrutiny as primary legislation. That is the difference. It is unique, and therefore it needs a proper, unique response to it in terms of the three elements on which the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, focused.
The first of course is non-regression. We should understand the ambitions of this Government in relation to workers’ rights. I have heard from Ministers throughout this Bill and also in other debates that they are committed to defend and extend workers’ rights. I think we need that ambition to be translated into proper processes and procedures in relation to the unique circumstances where regulations can be removed, revoked or revised simply by Ministers producing statutory instruments.
The other element, which again the noble Lord, Lord Krebs pointed out in relation to the environment, is proper consultation. If changes are envisaged, how do we consult the appropriate bodies? We have a government agency that has huge experience in terms of regulations and codes of practice that ought to be properly consulted in relation to any changes, and of course we have stakeholders in terms of employers and unions. And by the way, this is not a debate about whether one should support workers or employers. Everyone wants proper standards. Employers themselves want proper standards. When we come to the international agreements that this Government have signed up to, in particular trade agreements, that level playing field is going to be a really important element in maintaining those agreements and extending them, so there is a very strong economic case for supporting this amendment.
We also need to ensure that trust and confidence are put back into the system. We hear Ministers suggesting that somehow regulations are a burden on employers, but sometimes those burdens are the thing that can provide and guarantee the level playing field that we have argued for and supported.
We talk about the ambition of this Government but we are still waiting for the long-awaited employment Bill, which I hope at some stage we will see brought forward. This is about ensuring that we do not turn the clock back—that we maintain the proper standards. As a shadow spokesman for foreign affairs, I work with government Ministers in defending and advancing the rights of workers across the globe. We are the strongest advocate of that, so the one thing that we should not do is turn our backs on workers at this moment in time. If Brexit is to mean anything, it should be about putting rights back into this Parliament and making sure that workers are not at the end of the queue but very much at the front. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support Amendment 50, as well as Amendment 51, which bears my name. Amendment 51 is an elaboration of Amendment 50, so I will speak only to Amendment 50. I endorse everything that my noble friend Lord Collins has said. The object of Amendment 50 is, as it states in proposed new subsection (1)(a), to prevent the reduction of
“the level of protection for workers”.
As my noble friend said, this is not simply to protect workers but to protect good employers from being undercut by bad employers. It speaks of the level of protection for workers, in respect not just of employment rights but of health and safety at work rights.
In spite of the warm words of the Government and the promises of an employment Bill over the last three or four years, there is a suspicion that the Government will try to take advantage of Brexit to undermine and water down workers’ rights. That fear is not helped by the fact that, last week, on 10 May, as I mentioned earlier today, the Department for Business and Trade published its booklet, Smarter Regulation to Grow the Economy. This contains no less than four proposals to water down the Working Time Regulations and Section 188 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, which guarantees the right of workers to be consulted when collective redundancies are proposed.
The proposals to water down those rights are not contained in the Bill, as they could have been among the 928 proposals in the schedule. They are yet to come, in the form of statutory instruments that we have not seen, cannot examine and, when it comes to it—notwithstanding the excellent amendments from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, earlier on—may have difficulty in seeking to amend. The purpose of Amendment 50, and indeed Amendment 51, is to ensure that workers’ rights are not watered down and that the obligations contained in Articles 387(2) and 399(5) of the trade and co-operation agreement, against regression, are honoured.
My Lords, my name is on both of these amendments and I am happy to support them both. The proposers will be pleased to know that I do not intend to speak for long, because I have heard two excellent speeches that set out the reasons why supporting these amendments is important.
The noble Lord, Lord Hendy, talked about the danger of back-door watering down of legislation. It may not be this Government; once this is in statute, it could be any Government going forward. We do not necessarily have to distrust the people we see before us—I personally do not—but we do not know who in future will be able to use these measures.
If the Government want to water down workers’ conditions, that should be done through primary legislation, straight up, and negotiated and scrutinised properly. It should not be put through the backdoor, which could happen here. Throughout the process of the Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, has said over and over again that it is not the Government’s intention to water down workers’ rights. By supporting Amendment 50, the Government can make sure that they are absolutely as good as their word.
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have Amendment 164 in this group, to which my noble friend Lord Moylan has added his name. Before turning to that, I echo what other noble Lords have said in thanking my noble friend the Minister for her amendments on SMEs. I am very glad that she has taken into the Cabinet Office the evident passion she demonstrated for the cause of SMEs when she took part in Committee on the Bill. Of course, there is no one silver bullet that is going to solve all the problems of SMEs engaging in public procurement, but I believe that most of the amendments before us here will contribute to an important advance in that area.
I have a concern about Amendment 134, which is one of my noble friend’s amendments. It keeps the new Clause 11 duty out of the enforcement clause, Clause 92. That is a pity, because it means that SMEs, which think that that duty is not being complied with, will have to fall back on judicial review—and, as we know, judicial review is not a practical remedy available to SMEs. I regret that. I similarly regret Amendment 140 in relation to procurement oversight recommendations, and I hope that the Government will have an opportunity to think again about both those areas when the Bill moves to the other place.
My Amendment 164 is aimed at the same target as Amendment 163 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, who was not in her place when the debate started earlier this evening. I was expecting the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, to explain the amendment, and then I was going to come in behind it. They are both sourced from an amendment suggested by the Local Government Association. It concerns Section 17 of the Local Government Act 1988 and the exclusion of non-commercial interests that is required by that section. Clause 107 allows regulations under this Bill to disapply that duty for below-threshold contracts. The issue raised by the Local Government Association was that that should not be just permissive but should be an absolute requirement.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, tabled an amendment in the form originally suggested by the Local Government Association. I have been around a little longer than the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and have debated may/must amendments in relation to whether regulations should be obligatory or permissive. It is a good technique for discussing issues in Committee, but when we get to the sharp end of the business of legislation, the Government always resist a regulation-making power being obligatory—and for good reason, because it ties the hands of today’s Government and any future Governments. I accept that, and I am sure that the Opposition Benches who may want one day to be making legislation of their own would accept that as well. So I retabled the concept of the amendment by inserting below-threshold contracts into the list of things that could be done with this power, in the hope not that my noble friend would accept the amendment but that she would give a clear commitment at the Dispatch Box today to use the regulation-making power at the appropriate time to ensure that below-threshold contracts are excluded from the ambit of Section 17, as I mentioned. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 162A, which rather neatly follows the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, because it deals with Section 17 of the Local Government Act 1988. Its intention is to remove the prohibition in that provision which prevents local authorities taking into account the terms and conditions of the staff of the supplier, or their legal status. The thought behind this is that public authorities should take into account the terms and conditions and the legal status of those who carry out the work under these public contracts. The restriction applies to local government only and not to other public authorities.
My Lords, I rise to speak on Amendment 73 as my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones is detained in Grand Committee. This amendment requires direct-award contracts included in a framework agreement to be retendered 18 months after the award. This amendment takes a different route from the one we discussed in Committee, but the aim is the same: to prevent direct contracts being used within framework agreements to restrict competition from British SMEs and reinforce the dominance of certain key foreign players in the market. The Minister will remember that we used cloud computing as a major example of where the system has gone off the rails. The SME share of the market has fallen from more than 50% to just 20% in the past five years. In this respect, there is little sign that the Procurement Bill is in reality designed to provide new opportunities to prevent this slide towards—shall we call it “oligopoly”, to coin a phrase that was used by the noble Lord, Lord Maude, in a different context?
Rather than preventing such awards, as we attempted last time, we have instead put down an amendment to time-limit the awards. This would introduce a duty to retender, after 18 months, direct contracts awarded as part of a framework agreement under Clauses 38 and 41. This would provide the opportunity to redress the balance and help support UK SMEs. In Grand Committee, the Minister said that my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones had made a lot of points that she was not aware of and promised to study in relation to the important areas of cloud computing and UK businesses. She also emphasised some of the advantages of framework agreements. We are not arguing with that, but that is not the point. This is about detriment to SMEs through the use of direct contracts which are hidden within framework agreements. The problem can be cured. The Minister also said in relation to these agreements that it makes sense for them to be time-limited. I hope she has studied the words of my noble friend and has something to offer that limits the duration of direct contracts that are made within framework agreements.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 89 in my name. I feel that the time pressure has lifted, so perhaps I can make a nice long speech to your Lordships now. Amendment 89 is intended to allow Ministers and contracting authorities to exclude businesses from procurement where there is evidence of financial and economic criminal activity, such as fraud, money laundering, bribery or sanctions evasions, but there has not yet been a conviction by a court.
This follows the debate we had in Grand Committee on Amendment 320, when the Minister made some cogent points about the problems of excluding organisations that had not been convicted—that point was understood. However, given the length of time involved in carrying out investigations and then securing the resulting enforcement action, we remain concerned that there is a real possibility that unsuitable suppliers may be awarded procurement contracts while they are awaiting the full length of the process.
It was therefore with some interest that my attention was drawn to the Government’s Review into the Risks of Fraud and Corruption in Local Government Procurement. This review looked into the risks of fraud and corruption in local government procurement—not surprising; that is what it was supposed to do—and made the recommendation that the exclusions regime for public procurement should be examined to see
“if more could be done to allow procurers to exclude bidders from the process (with reasonable cause and without the requirement to disclose), for example when there are known concerns with law enforcement that have not yet resulted in a prosecution”.
We believe that the Bill provides an opportunity for the Government to fulfil this recommendation, and suggest that the process of studying how to do that, recommended in that report, could happen. I should be grateful if the Minister would bring forward some sort of government process to have that assessment. If this is not the Government’s intention, she needs to explain to your Lordships’ House why she is prepared to recommend one process for local authorities through a report that had ministerial backing while ignoring the actual issue in the appropriate legislation, which is the Bill. This was the subject of a letter that I wrote to the Minister many days ago and I am still waiting for the reply.
It is in everyone’s interest to ensure that the contracting authority can act when it has evidence of financial or economic offences, but formal conviction is outstanding. We understand the problems, but the Government themselves have identified this as an issue with local authorities. The exclusion regime is not just a deterrent for bad actors; it is also supposed to prevent them getting the contracts in the first place.
My Lords, my Amendment 91A follows the theme of my earlier Amendment 162A. The thrust of this amendment is that in determining whether to let a public contract to a bidder, a public authority should have the power to take into consideration the conduct of the potential supplier vis-à-vis its staff.
The Government are to be praised for accepting that public procurement is a useful tool to maintain and raise standards, hence the emphasis on public good, even without the benefit of Amendment 46. Clause 29, for example, excludes those guilty of improper behaviour of various kinds. Schedule 6 provides that there are mandatory exclusions, among other things, for suppliers who have been convicted of various offences: corporate manslaughter, homicide, terrorism, theft, fraud, bribery, organised crime, tax offences, and cartel offences.
(2 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a constant theme of Conservative economic policy that the rich are incentivised to be more productive by increasing their incomes whereas the poor are incentivised by threats to reduce theirs. The growth plan is full of examples, such as, at paragraph 3.22, the removal of the higher rate of tax from those earning more than £150,000, which has now of course been abandoned and, at paragraph 4.9, removing the limit on bankers’ bonuses. On the other hand, paragraph 3.24 proposes more conditions on eligibility for universal credit: “intensive conditionality”, the Chancellor calls it. It is specifically aimed at
“claimants who are in work and on low earnings”.
We know that most claimants are, in fact, in work. Universal credit is, in fact, a subsidy for employers who pay the lowest wages.
Average wages are rising by 5.2% per annum, while the consumer prices index rose by 9.9% in the year to August. The value of earnings from wages is therefore falling by an average of nearly 5% per annum. That is a huge hit to the living standards of working people. Consequently, demand in the economy is shrinking. That cannot be redressed by giving a few thousand high earners more money, but, if the incomes of ordinary working people rise, that money will be spent and demand will increase.
The differential between earnings and prices has another impact. Notwithstanding the Government’s energy price cap at twice last year’s rate, working people are becoming desperate. That is why there is a wave of strikes, with overwhelming ballot mandates. But rather than address the catastrophe facing working-class people this winter, the Government propose further restrictions on the only leverage that working people have to protect their standard of living when persuasion fails—industrial action. Not content with the most restrictive laws on trade unions in the western world, the additional restrictions of the Trade Union Act 2016, raising this year the limit on damages payable by trade unions, and enabling agency strike-breakers, also this year, the Government now propose yet further restrictions on the right to strike in paragraph 3.28 of the Growth Plan: minimum service levels for transport services, and every employer’s offer to be put to a ballot of employees.
The objection is not just one of principle—these restrictions are in breach of the conventions of the ILO and the European Social Charter, from which the Government undertook not to regress in Article 399 of the trade and co-operation agreement at the end of 2020; there are also problems with practicalities. If the minimum service requirement is, say, 10% of train services, who will select the train services to run and on what basis? How are those who are to staff them to be selected and forced to work? Ten per cent of train services will require near 100% of signallers and most of the station staff. Are they to be denied the right to strike?
In relation to balloted offers, must there be a ballot for an offer of a penny extra an hour when the members have voted unanimously for an extra £5? If they reject the offer, can the employer then further postpone the strike by offering another penny, and so on until the statutory duration of six months for a strike ballot is exhausted? How are the workers to be balloted? Presumably, as for strike ballots—and unlike the ballot for the Prime Minister—by post only, not online. That takes weeks. Who will pay for it?
Instead of attacking workers trying to defend their standards of living, I commend to the Government the restoration of the system of sectoral collective bargaining that was a feature of our economy when it was successful. It is a feature of the successful economies of Europe and is currently the subject of legislation in New Zealand and the fast food industry in California. It gained support only last week—
The noble Lord has exceeded the advisory speaking time by some margin.
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I should start by apologising for not being able to be present for Second Reading, but I hope that we can have an interesting niche debate about the importance of good work and good work in respect of government procurement. There are five amendments in my name in this group, and I am delighted that I was joined by my noble friends Lord Hendy and Lady Hayman and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. I am grateful to them for their support. Also in this group are some important amendments from my noble friend Lord Hendy.
There are two aspects of regulation as I see it. One is about putting some minimum standards in place, which is what my noble friend’s important amendments are about, and the other is about commissioning better practice and better performance, and that is where my amendments sit.
I should also remind your Lordships that I am the co-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on the Future of Work, along with David Davis in the other place. We have been working with the Institute for the Future of Work on this good work agenda and have found from the evidence around good work that the more you can increase the quantity of good work in the economy and society, the better the prospects are for people and the communities in which they live. We therefore remind the Minister and the Committee of the importance of this agenda in terms of levelling up, in particular, but also building security, prosperity and self-respect—there is a virtuous circle in play.
We are also trying to tackle particular problems that the Institute for the Future of Work, for example, uncovered in its report The Amazonian Era. It looks at the supply chain in the logistics sector that starts with the Amazon warehouses and the problems of algorithmic management where people are being managed by machines and are suffering in terms of their mental health, self-respect, security and prosperity as a result. The Committee may be interested to know that President Biden in the United States is currently instigating a whole swathe of work around supply chains for procurement in order to look at this very topic.
In one of the amendments, we define what good work is, but it is important to remember how good work aligns social, economic and health interests. Taking health, for example, the institute’s good work monitor shows a really strong correlation between health outcomes and higher-quality work, especially regarding chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, heart disease, some cancers, liver disease, drug use and self-harm. All those can be improved by people being able to work in a better environment. This was underscored by the Deaton review for the Institute for Fiscal Studies in May 2019.
There is also a correlation between the pay and benefits that workers receive and the productivity they then generate—hence this is also good for employers. The Resolution Foundation today has published a report showing that UK households are, on average, £8,800 worse off than their equivalents in France and Germany, in large part because of low productivity. This is a British disease that we need to tackle. I suggest that tackling, and incentivising through procurement, a better quality of work is at the heart of what we might want to do. I can also tell the Committee that this is not at the expense of unemployment. There is a very useful correlation showing that good work creates good and higher levels of employment.
I will not run through the principles of good work, as they are set out in one of my amendments. However, in terms of the requirement that we want to put on those entering the process to secure government procurement, there are plenty of indicators to help them demonstrate the quality of the work that they are offering and engaged in. The amendments would essentially ensure that the impacts on access to work and the conditions and quality of work are evaluated at a prequalification stage in procurement. They would thereby deliver strong public benefits. I listened carefully to what the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord True, said in response to the last group of amendments around public benefit. The essential argument was, I think, that it applies differently to different projects, and he therefore wants to keep it loose and flexible.
I say to him that I worry, first, about the possibility of companies that are successful in procurement off-setting one social or public benefit against another. I really do not want to see anyone off-setting the quality of the work against some other social good or public benefit. Secondly, my understanding of how good, successful capitalism works is that business and employers demonstrate four types of value: value to the shareholder; value to the customer, in this case the public purse; value to society, namely public benefit; and employee benefit and value. That is the value mix we are looking to incentivise and get right. In this context and this group of amendments, we are arguing—there is really good evidence to support this—that you can deliver really strong employee benefit and in doing so deliver extremely successful social and public benefit along the way. I seek to get this written into the Bill through these amendments. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 186, 292, 297, 315, 319 and 519. I express my gratitude to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and my noble friends Lord Hain and Lord Monks for adding their names. Of course, I support the amendments moved by my noble friend Lord Knight, for the reasons he advanced.
All the amendments in this group are designed to utilise the tremendous power of public procurement to improve the lot of Britain’s 32 million-strong workforce. As the Minister reminded us at Second Reading, £300 billion of public contracts is involved, some 13% of GDP. Public contracts involve tens of thousands of employers and hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of workers in their execution.
At Second Reading, I tried to make the case for the Bill to restore the fair wages resolution of the House of Commons, which subsisted to protect terms and conditions from 1891 through to 1983. The response of the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord True, was:
“To impose your political objectives on a nation, you have to win an election and form a Government.”—[Official Report, 25/5/22; col. 925.]
He made that point earlier this afternoon in different words. It was a powerful point, but we do not think it is sufficiently powerful to answer the amendments proposed.
There are two reasons for this, one ethical and the other legal. I will deal with the ethical issue first. As we know, Clause 11(1) of the Bill includes “maximising public benefit” as one of four objectives to which the contracting bodies must have regard in letting public contracts. Clearly, one way of maximising benefit is to improve or maintain the condition of the working lives of both the workers engaged on public contracts and the many more millions whose employers will be influenced by the terms and conditions set on public contracts.
The other side of that coin is the public benefit in preventing bad employers undercutting good ones in the obtaining of public contracts. Bad employers such as P&O Ferries, which deployed employment practices which the Prime Minister and other Ministers condemned as abominable, should not on any basis be the beneficiaries of public contracts, as I am sure the Minister will agree. Schedules 6 and 7 of the Bill already specify various mandatory and discretionary grounds for excluding potential bidders from public contracts, among which are various forms of abuse of workers. So the principle is established, but the exclusions do not go far enough.
Amendments 186 and 319—one is mandatory and the other discretionary, if your Lordships do not like the idea of mandatory exclusion on this basis—would provide for the possible exclusion of bidders on the basis that the bidder has been found by an employment tribunal or court to have significantly breached the rights of an employee or worker, or that it has admitted that it significantly breached those rights, or that it has made a payment to an employee or worker in respect of a significant breach of their rights. That would catch the P&O Ferries-type employer. Of course, it is necessary to include, as the previous legislation did, a mechanism for self-cleansing so that bidders that are genuinely remorseful and have changed their practice can be included.
Why would breaches of ILO conventions not apply to bidders in this country if they apply to bidders from outside this country?
As that is a legal question, I shall get a legal answer for the noble Lord, and I will certainly write. I thought I had answered him, but I will make sure that that is clearly written legally.
On the TCA, with respect to Articles 387 and 399 of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, procurement law does not grant rights to workers and, as such, the exclusion grounds are not inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under those articles. The rights protected by these provisions are provided elsewhere in national laws, none of which are affected by the Bill. The exclusion grounds are not intended as a means of enforcing labour rights; rather, exclusion is a mechanism to ensure that contracting authorities do not award contracts to suppliers that pose a risk.
I am confident this will enable contracting authorities effectively to protect the rights of workers delivering public contracts, especially when combined with other changes we are making to strengthen the exclusions regime, such as the inclusion of serious labour misconduct in the absence of a conviction as a discretionary ground for exclusion; requiring assessment of whether the exclusion grounds apply to subsidiaries of the supplier; and extending the current time limit for discretionary exclusion grounds from three years to five years.
Amendments 292 and 297, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Hendy, Lord Hain, Lord Monks and Lord Woodley, remove the requirement for contracting authorities to consider the risk of the circumstances giving rise to an exclusion ground recurring in applying the exclusions regime. Exclusion is not a punishment for past misconduct; that is for the courts to decide. Exclusion is a risk-based measure and, as such, suppliers should be encouraged to clean up their act and given the right to make the case that they have addressed the risk of the misconduct or other issues occurring again. This might be through better training, stronger compliance controls or dismissing the staff involved in any misconduct. It is for contracting authorities to decide whether the evidence they have seen is sufficient to reassure themselves that the issues in question are unlikely to occur again.
Amendment 519, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, proposes to use Clause 104 of the Bill to omit Section 17(5)(a) and (b) from the Local Government Act 1988. It would remove the prohibition on relevant authorities, as detailed in Section 17(5)(a) and (b) of the 1988 Act, to consider in relation to public supply or works contracts the terms and conditions of a contractor’s workers and the employment status of their subcontractors.
The Bill provides for a range of labour violations to be considered as part of the grounds for exclusion, which must be considered for every supplier wishing to participate in each procurement within the scope of the Bill. These matters will be subject to further debate, possibly later today, when the Committee considers the exclusions and debarment regime in the Bill. I am sure my noble friend Lord True will have more to say on that.
The purpose of Clause 104 in the Bill is, first, to ensure that authorities to which Section 17 of the Local Government Act 1988 applies are not prevented by that section from complying with their duties under this Bill; and, secondly, to enable a Minister of the Crown or the Welsh Ministers to make regulations to disapply, when required, a duty under Section 17. The clause ensures that authorities covered by the 1988 Act can take advantage of domestic procurement policies that may be implemented during the life of the Bill.
Clause 104(1), which amends Section 17(11) of the Local Government Act 1988, directly achieves this. However, it amends Section 17 only to the extent necessary to ensure that the relevant authorities are not prevented by virtue of the section from complying with the Bill. It would not be appropriate to use the Bill as a vehicle to make further amendments to the 1988 Act, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy.
Amendment 535, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Knight and Lord Hendy, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman and Lady Bennett, creates the concept of “good work”, relied upon by the other amendments in this group. In the light of my responses on substantive amendments, there is little I can usefully add on this amendment. I therefore respectfully ask that noble Lords do not pursue these amendments.
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. I will not speak about the bus shelters of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, or my brother, but I support what was said by my noble friends Lady Hayman and Lady Young, the noble Baronesses, Lady Parminter and Lady Bennett, and others about the use of public procurement as an instrument to advance environmental objectives.
Public procurement is also a very efficient way by which government and public authorities can require high standards from, and provide a good example to, employers. This is an important aspect of fulfilling the second objective in Clause 11(1)—“maximising public benefit”—because, of course, every public contract to which the Bill will apply requires workers to execute it. The United Kingdom has long recognised public procurement as a particularly apt tool to protect and enhance wages and working conditions. The fair wages resolutions of the House of Commons date back to 1891. Their final form was the fair wages resolution of 1946, introduced by Labour and supported by the Conservatives. In his speech in support, Harold Macmillan said of the Government:
“in placing their buying power—and this is the story behind this Resolution—they should see that they do so only with the best employers and that they do not use their contracting power to do down the better employer and to get better prices from the bad employer.”—[Official Report, Commons, 14/10/1946; col. 632.]
At that stage, the fair wages resolution had been elaborated from 1891 so that, in 1946, it had two main components. First, government contractors and subcontractors were required, as a condition of their contracts, to observe those terms and conditions of employment that had been established for the trade or industry in the relevant district by joint negotiating machinery or by arbitration. Secondly, in the absence of such established terms, contractors had to observe terms no less favourable than the general level observed by other employers whose general circumstances in the relevant trade or industry were similar. Questions arising under the resolution were first referred to the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service for conciliation and, if unsuccessful, to the Central Arbitration Committee for decision. These provisions were generally duplicated by public authorities, public bodies and the nationalised industries. In this way, wages, terms and conditions were driven up and good employers were not undercut by bad employers.
The resolution was rescinded by the Thatcher Government in 1983. To do so, it was first necessary for the United Kingdom to denounce, in 1982, International Labour Organization Convention 94, the Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention 1949, which had adopted much of its text from the fair wages resolution.
Industrial relations have of course changed a great deal since 1983. Then, over 80% of British workers still had terms and conditions of employment set by collective agreements negotiated between employers and trade unions. Most of that coverage was by national agreements in various sectors. So the abolition of the fair wages resolution did not immediately have a great impact, but the policy and legislation of successive Governments have now reduced collective bargaining coverage to something below 25% of the workforce. Indeed, less than 13% of workers in the private sector, where public contracts will be placed, have the benefit of collectively agreed terms and conditions.
Consequently, today, the vast majority of the workforce are at the mercy of the labour market and employer diktat to set the terms and conditions on which they have to work. The national minimum wage is intended to protect the lowest hourly rate, but it cannot, of course, create the “high-wage, high-productivity economy” to which this Government aspire. So, reversion to negotiated terms and conditions, as elsewhere in western Europe, and as advocated by both the ILO and the OECD—see successive employment outlooks from 2017 onwards—and, as proposed by the fair wages Bill now before the New Zealand Parliament, might well redress the falling value of real wages in this country, wages which are already lower in value now than they were 12 years ago, particularly in the lowest three quarters of the wage distribution, with the exception of the very lowest paid.
This Bill presents the opportunity to revert to the 1891 and 1946 precedents as a simple and powerful mechanism to drive up wages, terms and conditions and to prevent bad employers from undercutting good ones. I will propose an amendment to that effect, if the Government are unwilling to move their own, and would be happy to consider with colleagues how these principles might apply to overseas suppliers, which we have heard about this evening. The Bill also provides the opportunity to deal with any number of other workplace abuses. Here is the chance to make public contracts dependent on not behaving as P&O Ferries did, as my noble friend Lord Whitty pointed out. Here is a chance to put an end to the noxious practice of “fire and rehire”, at least by public bodies. If it be thought that public bodies do not resort to such tactics, Richmond upon Thames College is an example of such a body, which has threatened 127 lecturers with that very ploy. Again, if the Government do not move such amendments, and in the absence of an employment Bill, I would wish to do so.
There are a number of other good practices to encourage and bad practices to discourage which this Bill could achieve by way of conditionality for the grant of public contracts, but I will not take time now to go through them. I have just one further point. The public procurement regulations which are to be displaced by the current Bill do not do any of the things that I have mentioned. But one thing that those regulations did do—in Regulation 56(2) of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015, for example—was allow public authority contractors to refuse tenderers which failed to comply with the various environmental, social and labour law provisions listed in Annex X to the EU public contracts directive of 2014. Amongst other things, that annexe lists ILO Convention 87 on the right to organise and ILO Convention 98 on the right to bargain collectively. These provisions have been excised from the current Bill. Schedule 7 does not include such international standards as grounds for discretionary exclusion of tenderers, and the list of international agreements in Schedule 9 does not include any ILO conventions or, indeed, any human rights instruments at all.
The UK was the first country to ratify Conventions 87 and 98, in 1948 and 1949 respectively. They became the most fundamental and are now the most ratified of all the conventions of the ILO. The present Government might harbour the desire to denounce those conventions, as they did 40 years ago with Convention 94, given that the UK has been found to be continuously in breach of them since at least 1989. However, they cannot denounce them because they have recently committed to
“respecting, promoting and effectively implementing the internationally recognised core labour standards, as defined in the fundamental ILO Conventions, which are: … (a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining”—
I will not read the rest, but I am quoting from Article 399 of the EU-UK trade and co-operation agreement of last year. That article also reiterates that the Government
“commits to implementing all the ILO Conventions that the United Kingdom and the Member States have respectively ratified”.
In light of that, I ask the Minister: how can the exclusion in this Bill of references to ILO Conventions 87 and 98 as a potential basis of refusing tenderers be justified?
In conclusion, I wonder if the Minister would be prepared to meet to discuss whether and to what extent labour standards might be made conditions for public contracts.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, for the reasons explained by my noble friends Lord Collins and Lord Woodley, Clause 27 poses an unjustified, unnecessary but serious threat to trade unions. I say so for three legal reasons: the threat is to three particular rights. The first is the trade union right to autonomy—that is, the right of a union to determine its own constitution and how it will spend its own money. That is a right protected by Article 11 of the European convention, as vouchsafed in the case ASLEF v United Kingdom in 2002. Secondly, it interferes with the right of a trade union to campaign. That, too, is an aspect of freedom of association and the right to be a trade union member protected by Article 11 of the convention. Thirdly, it interferes with the right of trade unions to express themselves—freedom of expression—protected by Article 10. As I said earlier today, to justify such incursions on to those convention rights requires a demonstration that the restrictions are necessary in a democratic society.
As my noble friend Lord Woodley pointed out, this and other provisions in the Bill form part of a long line of legislative restrictions on the capacity of trade unions to improve and maintain the condition of the lives of working people, to coin the web’s phrase. I will not go back to the restrictions on political expenditure first imposed on unions in the Trade Union Act 1913 and preserved today, but I will refer to the legislation of the 1980s, which Tony Blair, as he then was, described in an article in the Times—which I am afraid is for ever embedded in my memory—on 31 March 1997. He described the legislative situation then to be inherited by the incoming Labour Government as
“the most restrictive on trade unions in the Western world”.
Of course, Tony Blair’s Governments chose not to repeal that legislation, and unsurprisingly, the Governments formed from the Benches opposite have not repealed it either. Indeed, they have extended it. In place of the promised employment Bill, which it was said would extend the rights of workers, we have had further restrictions on trade unions. I refer to the Trade Union Act 2016 and, as my noble friend Lord Woodley has mentioned, the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, which further restricts the right to picket in many specified industrial sectors. Last week we had the statutory instrument on the trade union levy in respect of the certification officer, which imposes a tax on trade unions and gives further powers to the CO—and now we have the Elections Bill.
When all these things are seen together, it is clear that Clause 27 is part of a pattern. I accept that, as my noble friend Lord Collins said—and as the Minister said this morning—these clauses have implications for other democratic bodies too. But Clause 27 is unjustified. To cite the test of the convention, it is not necessary in a democratic society.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the intention to oppose Clause 25 standing part of the Bill, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace. In so doing, I also support Amendments 41 and 42, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury.
Clause 25 introduces significant delegation of powers in relation to Clause 24, as the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, has indicated. We understood from the Minister last week that the purpose of Clause 24 is to protect the country from electioneering by overseas organisations. I am quite happy to support the Government in that purpose. However, the Minister was unable to assure the Committee last week that non-charitable civil society organisations in this country would remain outside the scope of Clause 24 and therefore also, importantly, of Clause 25. I hope that the Minister can clarify this significant point in his summing up.
I do not want to repeat my concerns about Clauses 24 and 25, which I expressed last Thursday, so will focus solely on the delegated powers in Clause 25, and in so doing declare my interest as a member of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.
It is concerning that, in Clause 25, the Government have provided wide-ranging powers for Ministers to amend Section 88 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 to which Clause 24 applies. In a sense, it feels a little unnatural to be talking about Clause 25 when these two clauses are so very closely aligned and intertwined. The Government need a very good reason to introduce Henry VIII powers under which a Minister can amend an Act of Parliament.
I want to focus on Clause 25(1)(b) in that respect. I am sure that the Minister is aware that the DPRRC has particular concerns about this paragraph, which relates to the list of third-party organisations that can exceed the spending limits contained in Section 94 of PPERA. He may also be aware that, in its memorandum to the DPRRC, the department admits that preventing other categories of third party being able to campaign has the potential to impinge on freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR and the right to enjoy a free election under Article 3 of the first protocol of the convention. The department has argued that it is important that, if a legitimate category of third party emerges, it can be added quickly to the legitimate categories to ensure that these restrictions on campaigning remain proportionate and no more extensive than is necessary to meet the aim of preventing campaigning by those with no genuine stake in the UK. As I said, I understand that objective, but this clause seems to go much wider and, with the delegated powers in Clause 25, we have no idea where it may go. The DPRRC is clear that the Minister needs to explain the need for Ministers to have Henry VIII powers to remove third parties. If Ministers are unable to provide a satisfactory explanation, these powers are inappropriate. That is the view of the DPRRC, not my view—I am simply a member.
I have brought this issue to the Floor of the Committee because if the Minister can explain the need for these Henry VIII powers in Clause 25 it may help noble Lords when deciding whether to bring back this issue on Report. I hope the Minister will be able to assure us that organisations based in the UK and which are not controlled from overseas will be clearly excluded by the Bill from Clauses 24 and Clause 25, thus taking fully into account the concerns of the DPRRC.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. I too am a member of the Delegated Powers Committee and I support everything she said about the delegated powers provisions we are considering. I declare my interests as set out in the register. I support the amendments proposed by my noble friends Lord Collins and Lady Hayman.
There are 6.56 million trade union members in this country, which is one in 10 of the population, from babes in arms to our oldest citizens. Trade unions were defined by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in The History of Trade Unionism, in 1894, as
“a continuous association of wage earners for the purpose of maintaining and improving the condition of their working lives.”
They achieve this in two ways: first, by seeking to regulate relations between workers and employers, a purpose which is captured by Section 1 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, and, secondly, by campaigning for changes in the law. They have a glorious history in that respect, from the “Ten Hours Act”, factory and mines legislation, and, after they had formed the Labour Party, the Trade Disputes Act 1906 and many other pieces of legislation through the 20th century.
That campaigning function is a legitimate activity, protected by Articles 10 and 11 of the European convention. Article 11 protects freedom of association and specifically the right to be a member of a trade union for the protection of one’s interests, and Article 10 protects freedom of expression. Only restrictions which are
“necessary in a democratic society”
are permitted on those two guaranteed rights.
My Lords, the Minister is now going to consider safeguards under Clause 25. I invite him to bear in mind that, in order to avert the danger under Clause 25(1)(9)(b) of
“removing a description of third party from that list”,
if the possibility remains of trade unions being excluded or put in that category, it will have to be justified, by reference to the convention, as necessary in a democratic society. That is a high hurdle.