Elections Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Thursday 17th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Balfe (Con)]

I suggest to my friend the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, that he stops making a fool of himself. This was not a paid post; it was an elected post within the European Parliament, known colloquially as “shop steward”—I see the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, nodding—that attracted no pay but you got some staff, a big office and the ability to actually get things done for the members. By definition, it was a non-political post. It had no politics attached to it, which made what happened even more odd. I will bring the noble Lord the letter; I will get it out of the LSE archives.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

Could the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, just help us with something? Having gone down this road, we need to complete the journey. I think I understand why he was removed from the Labour Party, and why he presumably accepted the post, but I would like to know what it was he found particularly attractive about the Conservatives. It is one thing to leave the Labour Party, but to join the Tories, I mean—

[Lord Balfe (Con)]

From my position in the trade union movement, I knew there were quite a lot of right-wing people in AUEW/TASS. We were not all bleeding-heart liberals; we were actually toughies. I had no difficulty in joining the Conservative Party because I felt that it reflected many of my values.

Elections Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 17th March 2022 Lords Chamber

My only disagreement with the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, is that they seek an assessment of the impact on council finances within six months. Councils need and deserve the level of expenditure that they will be required to fund—and know that it will be fulfilled—before this Bill is enacted. Of course, my wish is that these elements of the Bill are never enacted. With those words, I support her amendments.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, would it not have been nice if, when the noble Lord, Lord Woolley, finished, we could have all said, “Game, set, match and tournament. Let us do the Government a favour, save them £190 million in these straitened times, scrap Part 1 of the Bill and all go for a cup of tea and save ourselves a few hours’ unnecessary work”? There is nothing else to say after that, but I will still say one or two things.

It was so compelling and convincing. I just wonder how the noble Lord, Lord True, whom I have known for a very good while, will react. He knows a lot about elections; he has fought a lot himself. He must know that, when this new system comes into operation—assuming that it does—it will involve a high level of expenditure, not least for explaining to the public what they will now have to do in an election which they did not have to do previously. It will be an expensive operation and will take national newspaper adverts. If it is in the name of public information, so be it.

I wonder what the noble Lord’s view is of the integrity of our elections. Two years ago, his party won an election with a majority of 80. I did not like that result one little bit but, sadly, I thought that the election was conducted in my constituency perfectly fairly. It was free and fair. The result was unchallengeable; we did not do a Donald Trump in the constituency. I have been on the wrong end of several election results in my varied career in politics, but I have never doubted the integrity of the election. However, presumably the noble Lord’s position is this: we should have quite significant doubts about this 80-seat majority that his party enjoys at present. There must have been voter fraud all over the place, and we have to spend a lot of money to get this right.

We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Woolley, that there has been the sum total of one prosecution. This whole Part 1 is much ado about nothing—sadly, it is about something, because it will reduce turnout, as we know. However, the problem it is trying to solve does not exist. We will have to go over and over the same argument. I can make so many detailed points about it.

One that struck me is that polling stations can be quite awkward at times if people forget to take their poll cards and think, “I can’t vote now, but I am going to vote; I’ve lived here 60 years”, and all the rest of it. I do not fancy being a poor old poll clerk under the new regime, telling large numbers of people, as I guess they will have to, “Sorry, you cannot vote. You haven’t got your ID”. “But I’ve lived here for 50 years; I don’t need ID. The wife and I come down and vote, have a drink on the way back and it’s a nice little evening out.” “Yes, but you need your voter ID”.

In the best circumstances, there may be an amiable exchange of views because, in local polling stations, people tend to know each other. However, I can see it turning nasty. I do not fancy being the poll clerk who says, “Sorry, you can’t vote.” This is just one specific example. You certainly need to train the poll clerk and warn them of the difficulties which will arise.

I really would like a straightforward answer from the Minister to my question which was so brilliantly dealt with in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Woolley. Does the Minister think that his Government, with their 80-seat majority, was a result of a free and fair election, or not? If the answer is, “Yes, it was a free and fair election, and I am pleased with my 80-seat majority”, why on earth is he going through all this nonsense to solve a problem which does not exist?

[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, in a previous debate on this Bill, I heard my noble friend say that he would not have wanted to be an election agent. I have now heard him say that he would not want to be a poll clerk. So perhaps I should begin by saying that I have been both in my lifetime. Being an election agent was quite a big responsibility, and the law has changed and become more complicated since then.

The noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, very clearly laid out some of the questions that have been raised. Like my noble friend Lord Grocott, I will wait to hear what the Minister thinks.

I would like now to send a message, if I may, to the noble Lord, Lord Woolley. We have never met. First, I thank him for coming from Cambridge today. Secondly, when the noble Lord goes back to Cambridge, can he please tell his students that it was well worth his while coming here to make his speech? I am a new Member and, shortly before Christmas, I went to visit a secondary school in west London to talk to some politics students about politics. I had a very interesting time, and they raised many interesting questions—not least about this place. Of course, I asked them whether they were interested in politics. Some of them looked fairly vague. I said, “I think you are interested in politics. You just don’t realise it.” I asked them a few more questions, including whether they were on the register, because it is essential.

As an election agent, I remember a general election in which I was quite pleased that I had persuaded someone to come with me to the polling station—which was very close by—in order to exercise their vote. From just a single individual, I saw the devasting effect on someone who gets to the polling station and realises that they were not on the register and could not vote. What we are talking about, and what the noble Lord was talking about, was this situation being replicated thousands of times. It is a terrible thing. I am not saying that I made much progress with the students at that west London school, many of whom, unlike me —I am white—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I have listened to what the noble Lord said and will check the detail of the manifesto. I will ensure that we write to all noble Lords to make that clear—

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

I will not intervene again, but I asked the noble Lord, Lord True, whether he could rely on the integrity of the electoral system and the mechanisms that returned an 80-seat majority. Can the noble Baroness answer that specific question? Is she happy that it was a free and fair election? If she is, why is she bothered about voter ID?

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, I am sure that any good electoral system can always be improved and that is exactly what we are doing.

Many countries are doing this; we are not the only one. Italy, France, Spain and Norway—all our European friends, which I am sure the Liberal Democrats will be very pleased about—already have voter identification. Canada, which is not in the EU, also does. But as many noble Lords have mentioned—

Elections Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Tuesday 15th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stunell (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to ask some questions very much in parallel with those the noble Lord, Lord Collins, posed to the Minister. The word “encourage” is difficult to define in the legal sense. Is he prepared to share the advice that he has received from counsel about how a court might interpret “encourage” if an offence came before it? The noble Lord, Lord Collins, has illustrated that “encourage” is one thing and “ignorance of” another, but there is a tremendous zone in between, which will be an interesting legal minefield.

I would have thought that, in introducing this proposition in the Bill and to the Committee, the Minister would have in mind creating certainty, not a minefield through which agents, candidates and, for that matter, national parties have to step lightly to make sure that they do not offend and offend again. Speaking as a former candidate and a former agent, I never had any doubt about the distinction between things given to me by my party or anybody else for use in the election, and things that happened as a result of circumstances. Of course, we will come to third-party spending as a separate item later.

Although it has not been clearly expressed as such in the debate on this group of amendments, the specific reason for this clause being here at all is a legal case, which, from the perspective of the Conservative Party, went wrong. The party is seeking to change things so this does not go wrong next time; we will address the sense, or not, of that when we get to the next item for debate. However, even granted that it is a sensible inclusion in the Bill, would it not be rather more sensible to have an inclusion that does not lead to further ambiguity, doubt and difficulty, which will simply tie up agents, candidates and national party agents in trying to work out what “encourage” means or where the boundary of “encourage” lies?

I find it quite hard to understand the situation whereby a coach of activists can turn up and help you for a week and you could not be said to have encouraged it to happen. You may not have ordered them to come—but was any evidence presented that the local party officials at the time rejected it, but the national party insisted that these people came over their dead bodies? Where does “encourage” take us with that? Does “encourage” have a legal definition? We are familiar with other terms, which are used in perhaps somewhat similar circumstances, such as “facilitating”. Clearly, that is one way of looking at it. If they say, “Mrs Buggins will put somebody up for the night”, is that facilitating or encouraging?

There are many difficulties in the wording of this provision, quite apart from the outstanding difficulties with the clause as a whole, which we shall come to in a few minutes’ time. I hope the Minister will share with us the advice that he has had from legal counsel about how courts would interpret “encourage”. I am sure that the courts will come to a common-sense view, based on their understanding of UK language and legislation and any kind of previous case that they can draw into it, but a common-sense understanding of what “encourage” means may not be sufficient. At this point, I want to hear how the Minister imagines it will be interpreted by the courts when the inevitable cases come, via the Electoral Commission, the police or whatever mechanism is going to be permitted under this Bill for any offences to be prosecuted—we have dealt with that subject already. Assuming that cases will be taken forward, how does the Minister expect the courts to interpret “encourage”? What kind of evidence would show that encouragement took place or, alternatively, what kind of evidence could a candidate or an agent produce to show that they did not encourage? Would they have to produce some emails, perhaps, to show that they pleaded with headquarters not to send the money, help, leaflets or a coachload of young people?

The Minister can get the drift of the question that the noble Lord, Lord Collins, is asking, and which is important to understand, so that we get some measure of what this provision might achieve and what it might very well not achieve, despite the Minister’s intentions.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree very much with what has been said by both my noble friend Lord Collins and the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, who bring a tremendous amount of experience to this matter. I cannot quite match the noble Lord’s experience. I have fought sundry elections at parish, district, county and parliamentary level over the years, but by a bit of fancy footwork I have always avoided becoming an election agent. It has always struck me as the most frightening job in connection with elections.

That brings me to my observation on these amendments —that above all else one needs clarity and simplicity in this area to make the job of being an election agent less onerous and forbidding than it is at present. When we have these kinds of discussions, I often think that there is an assumption somewhere, although I cannot locate where it comes from, that there is a queue of people with tremendous experience who are dead keen to become election agents. My experience is the opposite: as a candidate you pretty well have to beg some friend of long standing to take on the responsibility, because it is a huge responsibility.

It is incumbent on us, as legislators, to make any law in this area as simple, straightforward and unambiguous as possible. That seems to be the objective behind what my noble friend is proposing. I share his concern and anxiety, particularly about the word “encouraged”, which has been developed by the noble Lord, Lord Stunell. There is nothing I would add to that, other than to say: for goodness’ sake, keep the poor election agent in mind throughout this kind of discussion, because—my word—they have a heavy burden to carry.

--- Later in debate ---

This clause may well be defective and fail in its intentions anyway, but what it proposes to do is to smash those limits whenever a rich, well-funded national party wants to do so. Of course, it could well be that such a rich, well-funded party, having gained a substantial majority in Parliament, would then decide that it could easily afford the small political cost of ditching any search for cross-party consensus in bringing forward an election Bill and simply press ahead with fundamental change without even blinking. Clause 18 has to go.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, a kind of fiction has prevailed over a very long period of election history that, somehow or other, the crucial electoral battleground is each individual constituency. It has long been recognised that there is a need for strict limits on expenditure by individual candidates in individual constituencies. On the other level, however, there is the national campaign, where limits on expenditure are so much looser.

I was very alarmed, as I had not heard it before, by the information from the noble Lord, Lord Rennard—he is usually reliable on these issues—that there is possibly a huge increase planned in the maximum expenditure allowed at the national level. This may not be a popular thing to say to candidates—I may be talking to myself—but it is clear to me that, although both levels of campaigning expenditure are clearly important, if you had to label the one that is the most important in determining the overall outcome of modern elections, it would be the national expenditure and national campaign. All candidates believe profoundly that it is what they do in their individual constituencies that is of crucial importance.

I have also noticed that all candidates—I have been one of them—tend to think that, when they win their local campaign, it is down to a particular level of skill and expertise in their campaign, and when they lose, it is generally someone else’s fault. The truth at general elections is that, for all the variance you can get in 650 different constituencies, the broad truth prevails: when the tide is out for your party, the tide is likely to be out everywhere, and vice versa. This whole issue of the balance between control over national expenditure and control over local expenditure is fundamental.

Of course, the irony is that, for years and years, there was control over local expenditure. It has long been recognised that there must be limits locally. However, it is relatively recently in our parliamentary history that we have seen the need for national limits; as we have said, they are so loose now as to be barely limits at all—certainly for one party in particular. This is a crucial area of debate and discussion but, most of all, the one headline I want to get out of this—perhaps the Minister will address it when he replies because he is on the inside track and we are not—is whether there really is a proposal that there should be a colossal increase in the level of expenditure allowed at the national level by political parties. If the Minister has any inside information on this, I would love him to share it with the Committee.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, one of the things on which there was consensus from all the various reports that fed into this Bill was that what we need most of all is a simplification of electoral law. This clause is a classic example of making things more complicated. I think we all recognise that this is the Conservative response to the Thanet case. The case for having this in the clause is extremely weak.

I was interested to hear the noble Lord, Lord Collins, talk about the 1970 election campaign. I am older than him. I worked at party headquarters during the 1966 campaign. Looking back, it was incredibly amateur. The Conservative campaign was not that much more professional than ours at the national level. Then, the largest department in the Conservative headquarters, as I remember it, was the research department. We did not have phone canvassing, of course. We did not use opinion polls much. At the time, I was otherwise working as a research assistant to Dr David Butler on the first major survey of electoral opinion in Britain. We were using punch cards to get at our data; it was such a slow process that you could not analyse during the campaign at speed. We did not have any digital campaigning, of course. In those days, the Conservative Party had a couple of million members and raised a lot of its money and did most of its activity at the local level.

We have shifted a long way since then, soo I want to talk about some of the principles; I hope that the Minister still recognises that they are important. They cover this clause and Part 4. The first principle is that we should retain a clear distinction between constituency campaigning and national campaigning. After all, it is one of the most tried and tested aspects of our democracy that Parliament consists of people who represent local communities in constituencies. They have not always been individual constituencies as there used to be multiple-member constituencies; the noble Lord will go back far enough, but never mind.

That is the principle. It has already been weakened by the tightening of limits between constituencies, which means that the new constituencies that are about to be redrawn will represent recognisable local communities much less than they have done so far. We hear people—Jacob Rees-Mogg, for example—say, “We have already moved from a parliamentary system to a presidential system. That is how our elections now go”. I regret that. As it happens, I am in favour of multiple-member constituencies and a much more open voting system, but that is part of the argument we should be having about the quality of our democracy. To erode the distinction between the constituency—that is, the election of an individual MP—and the national campaign would be a fundamental shift in our democracy larger than changing the nature of our voting system. I hope that the Minister recognises that.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

I agree so much about the importance of the close connection between individual candidates and individual constituencies but I am sure that the noble Lord would agree with me that that is much weakened under a system of proportional representation.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

We need not discuss the various alternative forms of voter registration. “Not necessarily” is the easy answer.

The second principle I want to focus on, mentioned by my noble friend Lord Stunell, is that there should as far as possible be a level playing field. We have seen what happened as that disappeared with the lifting of funding restrictions in the United States. The quality of American campaigning and the level of trust in American democracy have gone down, and that is partly because of the sheer weight of money that now deforms American politics. We have it here. I read in the Sunday Times the weekend before last that in the last three months of 2019, Ben Elliot, the chairman of the Conservative Party, raised just over £37 million for the Conservative Party, more than it was able to spend legally in the course of the campaign, and that it represented two-thirds of the money raised by all registered parties in that period. That takes the whole idea of a level playing field for democracy into deep and difficult trouble, and it strengthens the case for making sure that the regulation of expenditure, which is what Part 4 is about, is kept tight, clear and simple.

The third principle that I hope the Minister will agree on is that funding and expenditure should be as transparent as possible, both by registered parties and, as we shall come on to, by third parties, and that this clause does not help in that regard.

Clause 18 weakens regulation. It complicates and confuses it. I think we have seen from Second Reading and from our first day in Committee that noble Lords throughout the House generally agree on the need to strengthen regulation and the Electoral Commission. For these reasons, I suggest to the Minister that the clause as drafted and as intended does not match the Bill.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

3rd reading
Thursday 24th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I join in thanking everybody. I have two points, one serious and one less so. One is an entirely private thought, so nobody is listening to me saying this: I hope the Commons has enough time to look at the issues that arise in relation to this Bill. The other is of particular thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, who is not in his place, for reminding me of a lesson I learned when I did English language grammar—gosh, does that still exist? I was taught the auxiliary verbs “shall”, “should”, “will”, “would”, “may”, “can”, “must” and “do” and to appreciate the difference between “shall” and “must.”

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I have just a small observation on the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord True, that we were somehow telling the Commons to alter its procedures or advising it on its procedures in relation to this Bill. What we have done is say to the House of Commons that we are an unelected House, but we want it to think again whether it is wise for it, the elected House, to say, “No, we don’t want these powers of Dissolution at all. We think it is important they are carried out by the monarch.” I think that is a development without precedent anywhere in the world—the legislature saying it does not want these powers and wants to give them back to the monarch. That does put a slightly different construct on what we are asking the Commons to consider.

Elections Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 23rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I happily add my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Moore, for a splendid opening speech. I thank him most of all for making us laugh—I think that might be the last laugh we get with this Bill.

I had hoped that any attempt by this Government to make important changes to our constitution would be conducted with extreme caution and with humility. I say this because, during this parliamentary Session, under this Conservative Government, we have spent a good deal of time repairing the constitutional damage inflicted by the Conservative Government that was in power 10 years ago.

I refer, first, to the cynical moves in the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011, when at a stroke the Government planned to reduce the number of MPs from 650 to 60.

[Noble Lords]

600.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

Sorry, to 600. I am sure they would have done the former if they had had the chance. Needless to say, the calculations were that the changes would damage the Labour Party more than the Conservatives. Then, as we know, at the last general election, the Conservatives gained a number of so-called “red wall” seats, and lo and behold the calculations changed: the proposed reduction to 600 would have damaged the Conservatives, and the Government had a Damascus road conversion back to 650 seats.

Then we had the friendless Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, the malign effects of which included the shambles at the end of the 2017 Parliament. Thankfully, we are well on the way to getting rid of that Act with the Third Reading of the dissolution Bill tomorrow.

I draw two lessons from this little history lesson. First, major constitutional Bills really must have pre-legislative scrutiny; and, secondly, beware a Government bearing constitutional gifts. The chances are that, whatever the wrapping, the contents will include—somewhere—an electoral bonus for the Government.

So far as the current Bill is concerned, if we had had proper scrutiny, we would have had witnesses being examined such as—as has been mentioned—the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Its extensive research with a representative panel of 6,000 people concluded that the voter ID requirements of the Bill risked disenfranchising around 1.7 million low-income voters.

We know that many people do not have any form of photo identification—a figure of 3.5 million has been estimated. What is known about the demography of this group: their gender, age, social class, income and housing? Given the Government’s form on the politics of constitutional change, what do we know about the likely voting intentions of this section of the population? I say to the Minister: please do not tell me that this has not been considered—that really would be a novelty.

Another hugely controversial part of the Bill, which was dealt with brilliantly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, concerns the independence of the Electoral Commission. We really should not need to be debating whether or not a body with responsibility for overseeing elections and their integrity is to have its strategy and policy document written by the Government—or, to put it more precisely, written by the winning party at the most recent general election. Elections, by definition, are competitive. To allow the winning party to give instructions to the Electoral Commission is comparable to a game between Arsenal and Manchester United in which, prior to kick-off, the Arsenal manager gives instructions to the referee—although some people may feel that happens already.

That brings me to the evidence, or lack of it, for the change of voting rights for people living overseas. The fundamental principle of the franchise in our country is that your entitlement to vote comes from your residence and registration on the electoral roll of a specific parliamentary constituency. We quite rightly make an exception to this for UK citizens who, for various reasons at various times in their lives, live or work abroad, usually with the intention of coming back to the UK, and many of whom will have kept a house to which they will return. The time limit for this is a sensible 15 years.

Now the Government intend to extend this to a vote for life. This surely raises important issues. First, there is the practical problem that the longer someone is away from the UK the harder it is to verify their former UK address. But is there not also an issue of fairness? People who have not lived here for decades and for whom the clear probability is that they will never return are to have the same right to vote in the constituency in which they last lived as the current residents. There may be a major local issue—a hospital closure, fracking, motorway construction, flooding—which is of crucial importance to people living there, who will have to live with the consequences. But someone who has not lived there for decades, and has no intention of doing so again, has the potential to determine the election’s outcome. I do not think that enhances our democracy.

The noble Lord, Lord Rennard, asked, “Why don’t they have their own constituency?” Well, the figure I have is that some 2 million people would be enfranchised by this. I am not sure how many parliamentary constituencies that would require.

So let us get some facts from the Minister. Just how many more people are estimated to be eligible to vote under the “votes for life” provision? I have seen, as I said, estimates of up to 2.5 million. So I ask the Minister: how are we going to verify all these overseas people and, when they are added to the electoral roll in individual constituencies, will their numbers be included in calculating the size of constituencies in future parliamentary boundary reviews?

I had better leave out the next bit of my speech as I am out of time. I was just warming up, really.

This Bill about elections and their integrity. No other subject could be more fundamental to our democracy. The Bill is based not on the judgment of neutral, objective observers but on the judgment of a political party that has won an election. That of course is the case with all legislation but, for constitutional Bills, the case for detailed scrutiny, consensus if possible, and as much objectivity as possible, is overwhelming. Sadly, with this Bill, the Government have failed to learn lessons from the serious mistakes they made in the past.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 9th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I have signed once more on Report this amendment, along with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and I entirely agree with what he just said to the House. That is partly in the light of the debate in Committee, which compellingly reinforced the need to send this issue back to the other place to be reconsidered, and for it to make the final decision, as the noble and learned Lord says.

I say to colleagues, not least on this side of the House, that the Conservative Party’s manifesto in 2019, which we are implementing, said:

“We will get rid of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act.”


This legislation, including Amendment 1, will do that. So the Conservative manifesto commitment will be met. The question, of course, is what we put in its place.

My noble friend on the Front Bench will have his chance to say so, but he has said that the purpose of the Bill is to restore the prerogative power, or the status quo ante. I have to say that it still feels like generals fighting the last war—they are fixed on the events of the autumn of 2019, and, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has amply illustrated, we are not in the situation of the end of 2019 and we may never be again. If one looks at the events of the autumn of 2019, one sees that three times the Prime Minister sought a general election and failed to secure a two-thirds majority but in each case secured a simple majority. The proposition, which seems to be at the heart of the Government’s approach, is that this Bill prevents gridlock, but in my view a simple majority of the House of Commons would, in almost all circumstances, also prevent such gridlock.

More to the point, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, is the question that the other place has to answer: should this once again be an executive decision of the Prime Minister of the day, regardless of the view of the House of Commons? I will not go on at length, but I repeat my view that the Prime Minister exercises the responsibility to request a Dissolution by virtue of the fact that he or she commands a majority in the House of Commons. If a Prime Minister loses the confidence of the House of Commons, by what right do they go to the palace and seek a Dissolution? In the circumstances in which a Prime Minister loses the confidence of his or her own party, and of the House of Commons by extension, there may be, and often has been in the past, an opportunity for a new Administration to be formed who enjoy the command of a majority in the House of Commons. Under those circumstances, it seems to me that it would not be right to seek a Dissolution.

The noble and learned Lord referred to what Mr Rees-Mogg said. I am a former Leader of the House of Commons and I believe that the job of the Leader of the House of Commons is to explain the Government’s thinking to the House and explain the House’s thinking to the Government. On this occasion, the latter did not happen. The House was not in a mind to have a Dissolution and an election and I do not think that the Leader of the House was reflecting any view in the House of Commons to that effect. It was, therefore, a threat—an unconstitutional threat, since the Fixed-term Parliaments Act currently applies and such a threat could not be given effect unless and until this legislation passes into law.

My point is that we should give an opportunity not to restore the prerogative in the form in which it existed in the past but to qualify it by reference to what is the reality of our constitution—that sovereignty rests in the sovereign in Parliament, that that must be reflected by a majority in the House of Commons and that therefore a request for an election should be backed by a simple majority in the House of Commons. Anything other than those circumstances would be an illegitimate request and contrary to the view of Parliament.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I mentioned in Committee and I mention again to the House now that I have always been a strong critic of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act and I was pleased when the Government decided to do away with it. But I find myself in a strange position now of being pleased that they have introduced the Bill but disappointed with it, because it is a messy and—for the reasons that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said—counterintuitive solution, in that it is moving power back to the monarch. It is a messy solution to a problem that was particular, in most respects, to the 2017-19 Parliament and which, as the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said, we are now trying to repair or prevent from happening again.

My message is simply that the shenanigans of the 2017-19 Parliament were a result, more than anything else, of the 2011 Fixed-term Parliaments Act, which this Bill will repeal. We need not worry about that kind of problem again because it is incredibly unlikely—impossible, I would say—that we will see those sets of circumstances recurring. Of course, the main reason why the Government could not get a majority for a general election—a facility that I strongly believe should be available to a Government—was the requirement for a two-thirds majority. On each occasion when Boris Johnson went to Parliament and asked for a majority, it gave him one, but not a two-thirds majority.

The solution being offered by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is beautiful in its simplicity. It solves all the problems with one mighty bound. The main problems of this Bill—or rather, the problems that it does not resolve—are the possible interference by the judiciary, the possible politicisation of the role of the monarch and the argument that we can all have about what the Dissolution principles should be, which a lot of the debate in the Joint Committee was about. With one mighty bound we are free, if we say that you need a majority in the House of Commons. It prevents—for ever—any possibility of the monarch again being involved in this most political of decisions and of saying to a democratically elected Prime Minister, “No, sorry, I’m the monarch; you think you should go to the people, but I’m telling you that you can’t.” It is inconceivable that that could happen and, if it did, it would be a constitutional crisis of a magnitude that we have not so far seen. You get rid of all that area of debate and problem. You also get rid of this ugly ouster clause, to which we will come in a moment. The courts are kept out of it because no court is going to challenge a majority verdict of the House of Commons. With a simple majority in the House of Commons, it is job done. The courts and the monarch are out of it.

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[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

Because our Government need decision. If you have a situation in which you have paralysis in the House of Commons, it is in the national interest that this should be resolved. The way in which it has traditionally been resolved and would now be resolved again if this Bill were passed would be by the Prime Minister asking Her Majesty, the monarch, to exercise the prerogative to provide a general election, which would resolve that paralysis.

I will say one more thing on Clause 3, because I do not want to trouble your Lordships again. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said that the ouster clause was completely unnecessary because no court would ever challenge the decision of a majority of the House of Commons. Had the noble Lord been present on Monday, he would have heard your Lordships’ House debate a number of occasions in which the courts had challenged legislation passed by a majority of the House of Commons. I am afraid that the noble Lord’s reliance on the reticence of the courts in these matters is considerably misplaced, particularly having regard to their decision on Prorogation. For that reason, Clause 3 is absolutely essential.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

We are talking about a resolution of the House of Commons. Can he give any circumstance —we are not talking about legislation; we are talking about resolution—where a resolution of the Commons was overturned by the courts or was even regarded as being justiciable by the courts?

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

The noble Lord talks about a resolution, but what he previously said was that the courts could not be imagined challenging any decision that obtained a majority in the House of Commons. It was to that observation that I replied. There are many examples and I refer him to the Hansard of Monday’s debate.

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[Lord True (Con)]

I fear I must say to the noble Lord, who I greatly respect and admire, that I simply stated a feature of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act that the party opposite wishes to retain: that there should be a Commons veto on Dissolution. That is what I said, and that is a fact. If the party opposite votes for this amendment, it will be voting for a House of Commons veto potentially on its own Dissolution—it is written there in the book.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

If the Minister is going to give us a history lesson on how people have acted and voted, could he remind us how he and his colleagues voted on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act?

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I wish to underline what other noble Lords have said about whether or not this is a precedent. If this ended up on the statute book, it would, in a technical sense, be a precedent for a future parliamentary draftsman to put into a draft Bill. But that is all parliamentary draftsmen do: they draft something into a Bill, they do not make it law. Parliament makes laws, and it will be for Parliament to ensure that there was not an inappropriate use of ouster clauses. I do not think that it has ever been asserted that ouster clauses are unconstitutional; they are certainly permitted in specific circumstances where justified and should be justified on their merits in each case. In this case, Clause 3 is there to ensure that we can go back to the prior understanding in relation to this one specific example of the royal prerogative.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, as a layman and an unashamed politician, I want to make a couple of layman’s/politician’s observations in what has been a largely legal argument.

Much of this discussion—in fact, the whole of this Report stage—has been considered with the ghost of the 2017-19 Parliament at its back; the cloud over us, one could say. It was a very unfortunate Parliament—in the past I have called it poisonous—and we need to be careful about drawing all sorts of long-term constitutional conclusions from that period. This relates to my observation on the debate about the ouster clause: it is, as others have said, trying to solve the problem of Miller 2.

To me, as a layman, Miller 2 did present some problems. One is unarguable—and I am cautious about saying that—in that it did massively involve the courts in an intensely political situation. I know it tried to give disclaimers in its judgment, and all the rest of it, but I can tell you, as a politician, it is hard to imagine a more intense, political, biting debate than the one that existed in relation to Britain’s membership of the European Union, and the courts went slam dunk right into the middle of that debate. In my view this is not a good precedent.

I would also say—and I am sure I will be stopped if I trespass here—that it involved the courts in arguments which I know are legal arguments, doubtless very good legal arguments, but they do not make much sense to the layman. Part of the Miller 2 judgment was to say that the Prorogation had not happened. Although I understand the lawyers’ argument for saying so, it does not make much common sense to an observer. It is like saying that the sun comes up in the morning, and it is up there now, but the law says that the sun has not risen. I say, “Look, it is up there now,” but the law says it is still where it was before. That kind of ugly language and reasoning is—at least to me—something that we do not want to see employed too often. It is employed in the Bill itself; it is as though the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 had never happened, but both those things—the Act and, unfortunately, the Prorogation —had happened.

I simply make the following observation. If I am right that we want to make things intelligible to both lawyers and non-lawyers, if I am right that 2017-19 was a really bad patch, and if I am right in saying that we really do not want the courts—however exceptional it might be—telling the people when they can and cannot have a general election, then I have offered a solution. I am sorry I keep coming back—actually I am not going to apologise at all, because it is right—to the amendment by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. If only the House of Commons would apply its mind to the arguments that have been deployed in this House during the consideration of previous amendments, that would solve all the problems. If there were a resolution of Parliament then the courts would not intervene, the monarch would not have decisions to make and there would be no need for the ouster clause.

Let us lift up our eyes and hope that the Commons weighs the merits of the amendment that we have sent back to them, recognises those merits, votes not on a purely partisan basis but on the basis of the strength of the arguments, and retains the change that we have already made to the Bill.

[Lord Howard of Rising (Con)]

My Lords, I must also apologise for not being here in Committee, although I have followed your Lordships’ arguments with great interest.

One point is abundantly clear to me: the idea of not using the royal prerogative to call for an election is, at its very best, curious. The concept that a Government should limp on without the confidence of the Commons, when that Government no longer have the wish, or possibly the ability, to conduct the affairs of the nation, can do only harm to the well-being of this country. I have listened to a lot of erudite and hypothetical—indeed very hypothetical—arguments today. We cannot get away from the fact that, if a Government feel that they no longer wish to govern, then it is not only pointless to keep them in place but potentially very damaging.

In line with what my noble friend Lord Bridges said, restricting people from voting is anti-democratic. There should be no impediment to the freedom to allow the electorate to express their opinion at any time at the ballot box. Allowing the courts to interfere with that and to have a say may have unknown effects and cause serious harm, as the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey, and others have pointed out. After all, the courts can produce some very weird results.

My only other thought, standing here among so many noble and learned Lords, is that I wonder what the collective noun for lawyers is. Do your Lordships think it is “a bear pit” of lawyers?

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th January 2022 Lords Chamber

Debate on whether Clause 1 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I very much support Clause 1 being part of the Bill, but I want briefly to record how big a decision this is. Just 11 years after the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 was put on to the statute book, with much criticism and objection to it at the time—it was done in the shortest period of time and, as we know from other sources, was decided in a very short period by the coalition partners—we are saying that it should now be repealed. This must be the shortest existence of any major constitutional Act.

I mention that so that we learn, I hope, at least one lesson from it: that major constitutional Bills should not be introduced in anything like the way this one was. At the very least, there should be some attempt to achieve consensus on them if they are to endure. Of course, normally, there should surely be pre-legislative scrutiny. The Act has no friends, as evidenced by the fact that there are no amendments to Clause 1. Clause 1 is terrific; I thought that we should start on a happy note.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

My Lords, Evelyn Waugh once said that the problem with the Tory party is that it

“never put the clock back by a single second.”

Is it not rather wonderful that it is now putting the clock back by 11 whole years?

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[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the House is indebted to the noble Lord for elucidating this issue and tabling the amendment. In the Joint Committee, it was worrying that the Government did not initially seem to understand the distinction between requesting a Dissolution and advising a Dissolution, advice that would be binding on the sovereign. I entirely exempt the ministerial reply today from that criticism—the Minister is indeed a former member of the Constitution Committee, which also considered this—but we certainly considered it necessary to explore a little more fully and to criticise the wording of the Dissolution Principles document, the one-page analysis of the issue that made the specific mistake to which the noble Lord made reference.

The refusal of a Dissolution is the only remaining restraint on the ability of a Prime Minister to foreshorten a Parliament in circumstances that might be either entirely appropriate or, in some cases, at least questionable. Subsequent government writing, such as appears in their response to the Joint Committee, indicates that the Government recognise that there are circumstances in which it might be inappropriate to grant a Dissolution, such as a Prime Minister seeking a rerun of an election that has not quite gone according to plan and has not delivered the overall majority that was sought.

Another possibility is the 1974 situation, which I remember vividly because I was elected first in October 1973 and then in February 1974. Ted Heath was unable to establish a coalition, because we did not want to form a coalition with him, so Harold Wilson became Prime Minister. Was he advised that it would be premature to go to the palace and seek an immediate Dissolution? I have no idea, but he did not do so. He took the rather shrewder step of spending about nine months trying to demonstrate that you could have a sanitised Labour Government who did not do any of the things that people worry about Labour Governments doing, and was therefore able to go to the country in a slightly stronger position in October that year. Thankfully, I was re-elected but with a majority of only 70-odd, if I remember rightly; I survived to tell the tale another day. There are circumstances like that in which the issue is a questionable one, and that is why it is important to defend the personal prerogative power.

There are ways of addressing this issue but they do not seem likely to find their way into the legislation as it will eventually be passed. We will discuss Motions of the House of Commons later. They would provide some restraint on a Prime Minister but not very much. Considering that this might not find its way into the final legislation, it is even more important that we protect the ability of the sovereign to decline to give a Dissolution in exceptional circumstances.

Of course, a power like that is more important for what happens behind the scenes than for any possibility that it would be fully exercised and the sovereign would actually have to do it. We are talking about a situation in which the Prime Minister would be advised that it would be unhelpful, inappropriate and potentially damaging to the position of the monarchy to raise the issue at this precise point and, if it was going to be raised, it would be much better to raise it later or at a better moment. Those are the kinds of conversations that surround the few personal prerogative powers that still exist.

The system depends on something that is sadly lacking at the moment, which is a great deal of trust. The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee in the Commons said that

“some mix of statute and convention is the best way for this area to be governed, but this requires the actors involved to act in ways which engender trust.”

That has not been happening very much lately, so we should look at this with some care.

The noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, has done the right thing by tabling the amendment. I am not entirely persuaded that it makes a difference because my view is that it is a personal prerogative and, unless Parliament legislates it away, it is still there. However, first, it is highly desirable that it becomes clear that the Government understand the position that it is a request, not advice; and, secondly, if there is a general feeling in the House that it needs to be included in the Bill, we can do so. If not, we simply recognise that this is the position and that it has not been changed if we revert to the status quo ante.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said and with the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Norton. I am not sure it is hugely important but, because the issue of “advice” as opposed to “request” has reared its head as early as this, I want to make what seems to me to be a self-evident unarguable point, although I have been unable to persuade everyone that it is. Although the assumption prior to 2011 was that the Prime Minister went to the monarch with a request—in other words, it gave the monarch the decision as to whether or not to accept the request for Dissolution—the overwhelming evidence in my lifetime, and that of others of similar age in this Committee today, is that in practice it is inconceivable that an elected Prime Minister could go to the monarch and say, “I think we should go to the country” and the monarch would say no. Incidentally, that is hardly a disastrous request; the notion sometimes seems to come out in these discussions that asking for a general election is somehow an affront to democracy.

It is inconceivable to me that the monarch would say no, and historically, at least in modern times, it has just never happened. There may have been chats behind the scenes but there is no doubt that it would be a constitutional crisis of enormous magnitude if the Prime Minister of the day went to the monarch and said, “Please can I have a general election?”—or, to put it more accurately, “Please can the people resolve this difficulty that Parliament is in?”—and the hereditary monarch, who we must at all costs keep out of politics, said no. That is about the most politically contentious decision that any monarch could make.

It has always been an assumption of most people in these debates that at all costs we must protect the monarch from making those kinds of decisions. To me, it is a slam-dunk case that the monarch in modern times has had advice from the Prime Minister because in practice it has been inconceivable that the monarch would ever say no.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, we are very much indebted to the noble Lord for his background in this matter. It is important to remember that there are Dissolution principles to be settled before this situation arises. From time to time they have been revised, but I do not think they have been revised for some time now, and obviously it is appropriate that they should be before a further action is required.

It seems there is an academic argument about whether, once the prerogative powers are stopped as they were by the original Act, they can be revived—and this academic discussion occupies quite a lot of pages. So far as I am concerned, if Parliament says, “You go back to where you were before we did this”, that seems perfectly possible and should be followed. I therefore agree with my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth that it is desirable to put that in the Bill. I do not think it is at all likely that anything of the sort that the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, has mentioned is likely to arise, because the Dissolution principles make that very plain. It is in the form of a request because of its importance, but it will be taken in accordance with principles that are well settled. I very much support this proposal and the basis on which it rests.

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with all those who have said that my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth has done us a very considerable service. He reminded us of the formidable words of Alan Lascelles, private secretary to George VI in 1950. We should, at all times, keep those Lascelles words in mind:

“It is surely indisputable (and common sense) that a Prime Minister may ask—not demand—that his Sovereign will grant him a dissolution of Parliament; and that the Sovereign, if he”—


or, we should add, she—

“so chooses, may refuse to grant this request.”

It is the existence of this power that has ensured, and will continue to ensure, that no Prime Minister has asked improperly for a dissolution in our history.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

May I just ask, what would be an improper dissolution?

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

I do not think I could make a list of the possibilities. One can conceive of them, but we trust to the existence of this power and the wisdom of the monarch to ensure that no improper dissolution is likely ever to be brought forward.

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[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I feel part of an endangered species: a Cross-Bencher who fully supports this government Bill. I would also like to go back to where we were before the ill-starred and ill-judged Fixed-term Parliaments Act.

I am against giving the Commons a veto, as proposed in Amendment 3 by my noble and learned friend Lord Judge, who is normally so sagacious but who is wrong on this occasion. This could lead to the same chaos, stasis and problem of September 2019, which the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has just outlined, when we subjected our Prime Minister—whatever you thought of him then or think of him now—to the humiliation of having to go cap in hand to Brussels to plead for an extension of time to achieve a policy flatly contrary to the one that he wished to put to the country. He could not get a two-thirds majority, and one seriously doubts whether he would have got a simple majority.

The Joint Committee that examined this legislation and reported in March 2021 made plain that, although a minority supported the view outlined by my noble and learned friend Lord Judge and the noble Lords, Lord Lansley and Lord Beith, the majority recognised the danger, which we should avoid at all costs, I respectfully contend.

As to the prerogative power, one can hardly overstress the difference between Prorogation and Dissolution. Prorogation—let one remind oneself—affects the cessation of Parliament and is anti-democratic in the sense that it thwarts the power of Parliament. Our governing, imperative, fundamental constitutional principle is the sovereignty of Parliament; Prorogation thwarts it and leaves the Executive for the duration in uncontrolled power. Dissolution—at the opposite end of the spectrum—is explicitly designed to give the electorate the opportunity to decide who should control our Executive. My noble and learned friend Lord Judge speaks of Dissolution eradicating the decision of the electorate last time around, ditching the democratic vote. Well, of course, in one sense you are getting rid of an existing Parliament, but you are inviting more up-to-date views on what the public—who, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said, really should be controlling all our processes—want and whether they approve the particular policies in the particular circumstances in which Dissolution is sought.

Of course, if you put the Commons in control, although you run into the sort of difficulties that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, rightly identified, you get rid of the problems that others seem to suggest arise under Clause 3 here. There is no question then, obviously, of the courts’ supervisory jurisdiction. But—and we will come to this point of debate later—I suggest you really do not need to introduce the chaos of a Commons vote in support of Dissolution in order to avoid the risk of introducing the courts into the whole business.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, before I comment specifically on the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, I think that both the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, have misread what happened in 2019. What happened then would have happened had this amendment been passed, which was that a clear majority in Parliament voted for a general election—fact. On three occasions, they voted for a general election. A general election would have occurred under the terms of this amendment.

If I may say so, the politics of it are fairly obvious. If a Motion comes from a Prime Minister that there should be a general election, which is what this amendment suggests, the Government may not even have a majority, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, suggested; there may be people opposed to the Government’s policies generally on their own Benches, and they may not get a majority of their own people, necessarily. But it is almost impossible for an Opposition to vote against a general election. It kills the whole point of being an Opposition. What is an Opposition for if not for saying, “We’ve got a rotten Government, and it is time the people turned them out”? The Labour Opposition at that time sat on its hands, but politically, though I cannot go into all the legal ramifications, it is impossible to imagine a Prime Minister with a majority in Parliament—and he or she would not be the Prime Minister if that were not the case—calling for a simple parliamentary majority, which is all that is required, in order to hold a general election and Parliament throwing it out. That is for the birds; it really is. It would be politics turned upside down.

I think the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, just nails it. I agree with it absolutely, partly because, when in doubt, you should opt for the simple solution, and there is nothing simpler than a simple majority. We get into all sorts of trouble, as other Members have said, when we require a two-thirds majority or an artificial majority. The public know what a majority is and, let us face it, the real fact of life is that a majority in Parliament—this is as close to Dicey as anyone could be—is power in the land, apart from on the day the general election is held. If Parliament tries to do things that do not have majority support, the majority has all sorts of ways of asserting its support.

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[Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury (Con)]

My Lords, I am very puzzled by this debate. There have been words used such as “inappropriate”, “exceptional” and “misuse of power” to suggest that the Prime Minister of the day, when he or she asks the electorate to choose the Government, and where he puts his or her own tenure in No. 10 at risk, is somehow abusing his or her position. I do not understand what those likely positions might be where the Prime Minister of the day can be accused of abusing his or her power to go to the electorate. Nobody has yet produced an example of that. We know when the Prime Minister might want to do that—because they have no majority and want a majority, because they have a very small majority or because they want a mandate for a new policy, possibly—but none of those is an abuse of their power.

If I had read the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and instead of reading “election” and “Dissolution” had read “Prorogation”, I would completely understand. Of course, it would be an abuse of power to give the Prime Minister of the day the power to extend the life of Parliament, but I do not understand in what situation a Prime Minister can be accused, in these words, of inappropriate or exceptional misuse, by asking the electorate to choose the Government they want, and to put his or her own tenure at No. 10 at risk. I would be grateful if somebody could provide me with some examples.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

I am glad to assist, but I would like to ask the noble Lord a question. I have already explained how a Prime Minister who wanted an election could get one, so the power remains with the Prime Minister.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

The noble Lord is masked.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

I am sorry. God, I will be glad when we get rid of those for good.

The noble Lord, Lord Sherbourne, said that, somehow or other, there is a suggestion that the argument on this side or around the House is that a Prime Minister calling for a general election is bad, undemocratic or inappropriate. We are not saying that at all. We are saying that a Prime Minister would not be a Prime Minister unless he had a majority in the House of Commons, and the Prime Minister would get what he wanted. I apologise for the length of the intervention, but the question I want to ask the noble Lord is: if he feels this passionately about, as I understood it, the Prime Minister alone being able to make that decision, how could it possibly be the case, in his argument, that a monarch—unelected—could say no to the Prime Minister making a request of that sort?

[Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury (Con)]

I am very pleased that the noble Lord asked that question, because the debates this evening have said that we do not think the monarch could conceivably refuse a request for a Dissolution, as the noble Lord has already said. Other speakers have said that the House of Commons would never refuse a Dissolution; that was the thrust of the noble Lord’s speech and the speeches of other noble Lords. We are being asked to put in a brake on the power of the Prime Minister, but we are told that the brake will never be exercised. What is the point of that? I come back to my question: what are the most inappropriate examples of a Prime Minister abusing their power by calling an election? I can think of only two. First, they might, for party-political reasons, seek the advantage of going early because they think they can get a bigger majority. We know that the electorate are not stupid. There are, throughout the whole country, Brendas from Bristol who will react to that—we found this in February 1974 and in 2017.

The other reason which I thought might be in the minds of noble Lords is if the Prime Minister of the day wanted to go to the country with what they thought would be a sole populist or undemocratic programme, and they were worried that the electorate might vote for it. That poses two problems. First, it is denying the public the right to choose the Government and policy they want. If you really want to exercise an effective brake for that sort of reason, you need a different Bill, because this Bill is designed to end the Fixed-term Parliaments Act and go back to the status quo ante. I believe, as my noble friend the Minister said, that this clause to give the House of Commons a veto—otherwise there is no point in giving the provision to it—drives a coach and horses through this Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

A vote in the House of Commons, by hindering the ability of the Prime Minister to call and to request an election at the time of his judgment, could mean that a Government are held hostage and lame duck Parliaments limp on. We have seen it. We have heard many fanciful scenarios in this debate, including the one of the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell—which I thought very fanciful—but this has happened and could happen again.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lord, if the Minister is going down the path of history, can he please address the specific point? On three occasions, the Prime Minister in—I agree with him—that dreadful Parliament, obtained a majority for a general election. That is not a theoretical speculation—it is fact.

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I am coming on to that, as I just said to the House I would. You can look at those circumstances in different ways, I would submit. Perhaps I will deal with that and then go on to the other point.

The Government had effectively lost the confidence of the Commons on the central purpose of its being, which was to deliver the referendum result on a key European policy. As the noble Lord opposite says, they tried to call an election three times, and three times the Commons refused to grant one. Why did the other place refuse to grant one? I cannot remember which noble Lord it was who said in the debate that it was because the leader of the Opposition sat on his hands and decided to prevent an election taking place. The noble Lord said he would not have done, but he did—three times.

The votes for dissolution were 298 on 4 September, 293 on 9 September, and 299 on 28 October. On every occasion they fell short of a majority. The Labour Party cast its vote to secure what it manifestly wished to do, which was to prevent the Prime Minister going to the country. Three times Mr Corbyn was presented—like Caesar on the Lupercal—with the crown of the election that he could have had the following day, on 4 September, 9 September and 28 October, and he declined.

The noble Lord suggests that of course if they had known there would be an election, the Opposition would never have sought to vote against it. By sitting on their hands, the Opposition defied the people and did not have an election.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

I find it hard to imagine a situation in which the power of Dissolution would be used in the way that the power of Prorogation was used in 2019, so I do not think it likely that the case would arise. That is my instant opinion.

The radical dimension of this is that it disturbs the balance between the judiciary and the rule of law, and Parliament and the checks that Parliament has on executive power and the Government. The conclusion of The Independent Review of Administrative Law says, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, will remember:

“The Panel consider that the independence of our judiciary and the high reputation in which it is held internationally should cause the government to think long and hard before seeking to curtail its powers … It is inevitable that the relationship between the judiciary, the executive and Parliament will from time to time give rise to tensions … a degree of conflict shows that the checks and balances in our constitution are working well.”


I strongly agree with those sentiments. It is part of the proper process of constitutional democracy that each of those elements of our constitution should have a degree of tension with each other and hold each other in balance.

That is why I am in favour of amending this Bill to provide the simpler process of powers of Dissolution that Clause 2 provides—thus making Clause 3 unnecessary —and supplementing the desire for clarity of conventions by revising the Cabinet Manual to have a more fluent definition of Dissolution principles. If we do all three of those, we will substantially improve the constitutional value of this Bill.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I would like to think that the Minister will find this argument conclusive. If he had accepted the amendment on Clause 2 that so many noble Lords thought was valuable—to have parliamentary resolution for a general election—we would not have needed this debate on the ouster clause and could have got home much earlier. But he has rejected it and that brings us to the debate about the ouster clause itself.

In normal circumstances, when eminent lawyers pronounce on issues of law and legality, those of us who are not lawyers intervene with some trepidation. I am relaxed on this issue, however, because the ghost in the room is the debate on Prorogation, not Dissolution, and that it went to the Supreme Court. We all know the debates surrounding that and those of us who are not lawyers are emboldened by the defence that the Divisional Court thought 100% in one direction and the Supreme Court thought 100% in the other. Whichever argument you pick, you will have a few top lawyers on your side.

In my view, that whole episode relates to that dreadful Parliament I keep referring to between 2017 and 2019. All that debate, which went to the Supreme Court, derived from the background of a dysfunctional Parliament—a bad case, if you like. So much of the debate we are having now is with that and the judgments that were made hanging over us. The list of dysfunctionalities of that Parliament knows no bounds. I mention one obvious point: there was a Speaker who, on the biggest debate of the day—the referendum result and its consequences—was highly partisan on one side of the argument. In those circumstances, all sorts of other undesirable things follow.

I, for one, very much regret that the Supreme Court decided to get involved in politics at the highest level. I know there are all sorts of disclaimers that it was not doing that, but that is precisely what happened. It is difficult to imagine a more dramatic, higher-profile political issue than that of leaving or not leaving the EU, and the Supreme Court came down decisively on one side of the argument, in practical terms. As soon as the courts are involved in these kinds of highly charged political areas, we are in trouble.

I can certainly see the need for this ouster clause, but I regret the need for it because we should have dealt with this in the simple way of a parliamentary majority. We keep hearing about the three pillars of the constitution: the judiciary, the Executive and the legislature. In my book, and perhaps I am biased, one of those is greater than the other two—a first among equals—and that is Parliament, which is answerable to the public in a way the other two are not.

House of Lords: Appointments

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Monday 24th January 2022 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Grocott]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the balance in the House of Lords between members taking the Government whip and members taking the whip of the Official Opposition as a factor when considering future recommendations for appointments to the House.

[The Minister of State, Cabinet Office (Lord True) (Con)]

My Lords, the Prime Minister makes nominations in response to the needs of the House for expert and specialist knowledge and experience and to maintain its political balance. This ensures that the Lords continues to fulfil its role in scrutinising and revising legislation while respecting the primacy of the Commons and the conventions between the two Houses.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

Can the Minister confirm that, when Labour left office in 2010, the number of Labour Peers exceeded the Tory Opposition by 26 and that, under this Government, the number of Tory Peers exceeds the Labour Opposition by 89? Can he also confirm that Tory Peers now constitute a third of the Members of this House and 50% of those taking the party whip—far higher than in any recent Administration? Is the scale of Tory appointments in recent years not at best a disregard of normal conventions and at worst a clear abuse of prime ministerial power?

[Lord True (Con)]

No, my Lords, I do not agree with that. Obviously, it depends what base you take for your statistics. The noble Lord opposite referred to the political House, which is now 32.1% Labour; the Labour vote share at the last general election was 32.1%.

Retained European Union Law

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Thursday 16th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Frost (Con)]

My Lords, I would be very happy to publish such an organogram—I think we will need an A2 or maybe an A1 piece of paper to get it all on. But it is still a lot less complicated than it was when we were a member of the European Union, and the arrangements still fit within the norms of a trade agreement. I appreciate that they are complex, and I am happy to try to make that as clear as we can in public.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

On the crucial issue of democratic accountability and proper scrutiny of legislation and the legislative process, which I am sure we all want to see enhanced, will the Minister, with his experience, care to compare the degree of scrutiny and democratic accountability that exists in respect of laws that were made in Brussels and the degree of scrutiny and democratic accountability that exists in respect of legislative processes in this Parliament?

[Lord Frost (Con)]

The noble Lord makes an extremely good point. It is obviously possible and has been the case for a regulation with direct effect to be agreed in Brussels, perhaps despite us having voted against it, and for that regulation then to become the law of this country without further ado, despite the best efforts of the scrutiny committees in both this House and the other place. There is no ability to amend such rules. It is right in a democracy that Parliament should be able to set the rules by which we live, and that is a principle that we will try to take forward.

Covid-19: National Memorial

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Wednesday 8th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord is an indefatigable—I am not sure that I can say that word with the current state of my voice—advocate of the national risk register, and I accept where he is coming from. Obviously, there are certain unknown unknowns that are difficult to know, but I absolutely accept the spirit behind his question.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, which are the unknown unknowns that are easy to know?

[Lord True (Con)]

I will bow to the superior ingenuity of the noble Lord opposite on that question.