European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock Excerpts

Tuesday 11th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I commend the noble Lord upon his exercise in statutory interpretation, which would undoubtedly attract an A-. The position at present is that in keeping with the spirit of the Act the Government will ensure that the matter is brought back to the Commons before 21 January.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

My Lords, we are all obliged to the Minister for his explanation. Will he now confirm that what the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has been saying again and again has now been confirmed by the European Court of Justice, that we can unilaterally agree to withdraw our Article 50 withdrawal and remain part of the European Union now that we know the consequences of leaving? Is that not something that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has said on a number of occasions would be the sensible thing for Parliament to do and get on with running this country?

Prisons: Women

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am confident that the sentencing guidelines, and judicial guidelines in general, are sufficient to inform all levels of the judiciary as to the appropriate way in which to treat sentencing provision. Indeed, there is further guidance on this in England and Wales, which the noble Lord at the back may not be familiar with.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

The right reverend Prelate is also shaking her head.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Looking in this direction, I can only see the noble Lord’s head shaking. However, it might not be in disagreement; maybe it is an affliction, and I apologise. With regard to sentencing, there are clear guidelines, which include guidelines from the Court of Appeal over sentencing where there is an impact on children and other dependants.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock Excerpts

Report: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 2nd May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Patten, introduced the debate with his customary excellence and good humour. However, while I took the points he made very well, I felt concerned about the direction of travel and the linkage between some of the points we were trying to debate. The amendment has a number of issues that concern me, the most obvious one, picked up by the noble Lord, Lord King, being the last line. With so much reference to the Belfast agreement, the four Members currently in the Chamber involved in that negotiation—I am one of them—will know that it is so sensitive because it challenges the fundamental principles of consent, which is one of the reasons why the referendum in 1998 was successful. We actually achieved that point. If we take a power that is currently exercisable only by the Government of the United Kingdom and share it with the Republic of Ireland, that will change the dynamics of the whole situation. Effectively, it would create a form of joint authority.

I have other issues with the amendment. It refers to:

“Continuation of North-South co-operation and the prevention of new border arrangements”.


Perhaps we will need new border arrangements to avoid the pitfalls we have all drawn attention to during the debate. I also feel we are in a unique situation. Everybody agrees with the ultimate objective. Therefore, it should be not a source of division in this House but something on which we can come together to send a clear message not only to the Government, but to our colleagues in the European Union and in the Republic.

During his visit to Northern Ireland and the Republic this week—which, incidentally, was announced to us through the press release of a Sinn Féin MP, not even a Sinn Féin MEP—Michel Barnier, according to Sam Coates in the Times, did the following:

“During a visit to Ireland, Michel Barnier urged Theresa May to reconsider introducing a border in the Irish Sea”.


We assume that that matter is resolved; I fear that it is not. Within the document agreed on 8 December and the subsequent agreement referred to by my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley there is a fundamental conflict. We are saying on the one hand that we want regulatory alignment for Northern Ireland as this backstop and on the other that we do not want any difficulties between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. Unless Brexit does not take place and we reverse our decision to leave the European Union, those two things will be mutually exclusive. We have to get our heads around that.

We have talked about the principles and the bigger picture. I worry about linking the Belfast agreement so closely with the discussions we have now because, quite frankly, there are risks attached to that. I will try to put into context the scale of the problem we face.

I believe that the solution lies with the United Kingdom Government, the Irish Government and Michel Barnier and his team sitting down at a table to deal with the details. The Benches opposite are filled with many people with trade union backgrounds. They will know, as everybody else knows from their own experience, that the only way to settle these things is to sit down and talk about them, however embarrassing and difficult it may be. Even if we are dealing with people with whom we would normally have no truck, the fact is that we have learnt that lesson and learnt it very hard; we have to sit down, to talk and to negotiate. We must also remember that we cannot successfully negotiate if the person with whom we are negotiating is flat on the canvas at the end of the negotiations, so it cannot be a 10-0 win; there has to be compromise and movement.

We use the term “the all-Ireland economy”. There is no all-Ireland economy. If we take the figures for the period 2005 to 2015 given to us by the Irish Government in their document on Brexit, which sets out clearly the relationship and the scale of it, we see that of the total exports of the Irish Republic to the rest of the world 1.6% currently goes to Northern Ireland. That has dropped in the period from 2005. It means that 98.4% of the Irish Republic’s goods go elsewhere. Most of them travel via the United Kingdom, because the border is not simply on the island; it is between Dublin and Holyhead and Rosslare and Fishguard—that is where most of the goods are going. Mainland Britain is the land bridge so the Republic can get its goods to the continent and the rest of the world.

Let us take imports to the Irish Republic from the whole of the world. From Northern Ireland, they have dropped in the period from 2005 to 2015 from 2.2% again to 1.6%. So the actual trade on the island is relatively modest. We are talking primarily about goods in transit, going to and from ports in Northern Ireland to and from Scotland and the north-west of England. So the trading relationship on the island is 1.6% of the Republic’s exports and 1.6% of its imports. That is the scale of the trade. It includes live animals and agricultural produce.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, said in an earlier debate that he believed that one part of the solution could be a new treaty between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland which would be recognised by the European Union. Part of the solution could lie in the north-south bodies that we set up under a treaty which have certain specific functions. There is no reason why those bodies cannot change and vary over time. One of them, the SEUPB, which looks after special European programmes, will have to be dissolved. We may need to look at the functions that some of those bodies perform and whether the United Kingdom Government and Parliament might devolve to them specific matters where they could negotiate on details, particularly around agriculture, animal health and other issues, and where regulations—because we are one land mass—are better, on the same scale or equivalent. If we are looking at the way ahead, we have to look at solutions. That is one possibility, but the idea of a new treaty is something that we should look at.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

Come on. You are better than this.

[Lord Empey]

If the noble Lord is such an expert on the Belfast agreement, why is he not prepared to listen to somebody who lives there and was negotiating it? I can assure him that I have been used to dealing with fairly tough customers and I will have a say.

We are looking here at a problem which has been grossly exaggerated and at some risk, because we should concentrate on solutions. The best way to achieve that is for the parties to sit down together and negotiate.

I conclude where I started: with the comments made by Michel Barnier on Tuesday this week, where he said that he wanted the Prime Minister to reconsider a border up the Irish Sea for Northern Ireland. If that is his position when our Government go in to negotiate, the difficulty created by this amendment is that it would move the emphasis away from negotiating a settlement, removing one lever from the hands of the Government and placing it in the hands of those with whom we are negotiating. We should be united as a House in trying to get the right solution. It is a shame that we would be divided on something where the objective we all seek is the same. It is so unusual to get that—where two Governments and the European Union are all committed to the same thing. We are confusing the two arguments. This is a matter for detailed negotiation, as has happened before. There is no reason why it cannot be done. We can look for help. If we need unique solutions—we are good at those—let us have one; that is what a treaty could facilitate.

When the Minister replies, I hope that he will address some of those points and indicate that the United Kingdom Government are prepared to sit down to negotiate, to re-emphasise that and to reissue the invitation, which sadly has been refused so far. Let us remember also that we are dealing with politics. Ireland is on the verge of a general election at any point. Sinn Féin, which was always an anti-European party, has got on to the bandwagon and now pretends to be a great pro-European party. It could have huge influence on the Irish Government if an election takes place. We have all these moving plates, but we must keep our eye on the detail and on the long-term objective, which is the preservation of as free a border as it is possible to achieve and the preservation of the institutions that were passed by referendum on both sides of the border. They should be used as part of the solution and not become part of the problem.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock Excerpts

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, this is the first amendment in a very much larger group, not all of which is composed of amendments in my name. Although the matter is lengthy and rather complicated, I can deal with it comparatively briefly and, I hope, in a way that is intelligible to your Lordships and in particular to the Minister.

Amendments 274 and 275 are related to paragraphs 9 and 10 in part 1 of Schedule 2, the former dealing with Scotland and the latter with Wales. I am concerned about the provision which states:

“A provision is within the devolved competence of the Scottish Ministers for the purposes of this Part if … (a) it would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament if it were contained in an Act of that Parliament (ignoring section 29(2)(d) of the Scotland Act 1998 so far as relating to EU law and retained EU law)”.


As I understand that provision, it excludes from competence provisions relating to retained EU law. That is a theme that runs through most of the amendments in this group. It is exactly the same point as we have been discussing in the earlier groups, the question being whether it can possibly be right that the devolved institutions should be prohibited from dealing with retained EU law when they work through the exercises with which part 1 of Schedule 2 is concerned. All the amendments in this group that are in my name raise that issue, except Amendment 363, which I will come back to in a moment. Some of them will require to be superseded in light of the Government’s amended version of Clause 11. I would have thought it was a fairly simple exercise for the Minister and her team to go through these various amendments, which I need not enumerate, just to be sure that the various passages to which I have drawn attention are corrected in light of the revised version of Clause 11.

Amendment 363 relates to the right of the Advocate-General to take part as a party in criminal proceedings so far as they relate to an issue as to whether legislation or an act of a Scottish Minister is incompatible with convention rights or EU law. Of course, the interest of the Advocate-General, if he wishes to enter the proceedings, is to ensure that the devolved institutions act within their competence in relation to these matters. What we have in paragraph 18 is a simple substitution of a reference to “retained EU law” for the reference that is in the statute at the moment to “EU law”. The competence restriction on EU law will of course be removed when we leave the EU, but once again I make the point that simply to substitute a reference to “retained EU law” is not the right thing to do: it is not a mirror image of EU law. Indeed, the fetter that applied to EU law should not apply to retained EU law. The amendment is simply designed to delete from the relevant section of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, which would no longer have any relevance. I leave that point with the Minister to look at along with all the others.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

I have been listening very carefully. Can the noble and learned Lord explain again, in simple terms, why retained EU law on a particular area, such as agricultural support, is different from current EU law? I do not understand why he says it is different.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

In a sense, retained EU law is simply repeating what is to be found in EU law. The point is that the treatment of it, from the point of view of the competence of the Parliament and the Ministers, is different. Under the Scotland Act as it is, Ministers have no power to legislate or deal with EU law, because that is subject to the restriction in Section 29 of the Scotland Act, and also in Section 53, so far as Ministers are concerned. My point is that that restriction disappears because we are no longer bound by the treaty arrangements that gave rise to the restriction in the first place. I think the noble Lord is pointing out that much of retained EU law is already part of our law because it has already been built in to our legal system. The point is that I am suggesting that the Parliament and the Ministers should be able to deal with retained EU law in the same way as they can deal with any other domestic law, as long as it is not reserved.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

I understand that—these debates are very useful. However, I am getting worried: as the noble and learned Lord knows, I am a strong devolutionist and a former Member of the Scottish Parliament, but in the last hour I have come to understand and sympathise with what the UK Government are arguing, which is a bit worrying.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

No, it is a serious matter. Surely there are areas that are dealt with now by the European Union because we have all thought that it was right to have standards for the European Union Common Market. Are the UK Government not arguing that if we have a UK common market—which we will in certain areas—it is sensible to have the same standards throughout the United Kingdom? Is that not a valid argument?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

If the noble Lord will forgive me, I was suggesting that we deal with that issue when we look at Clause 11 and the government amendments. The noble Lord raises a very important point, but it does not really relate to my amendments. I think it is much more fundamental and we will need to discuss it in light of the discussion of the reform of Clause 11. I hope I have answered the noble Lord’s question. There is a basic difference between the competence arrangements relating to EU law, which does not apply once we leave the Union, and retained EU law, either domestic or direct, as it comes in under Clauses 2 or 3.

Having digressed somewhat in my reply, I again thank the Minister for her helpful reply. I will be happy to withdraw the amendment in due course; however, there are others in the group that others may wish to speak to.

--- Later in debate ---

I wholeheartedly agree that common frameworks are appropriate in some cases, given the current role of EU law in regulating action in all parts of the UK—

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Hear, hear.

[Lord Wigley]

Indeed—the very point that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, was making earlier; I agree. Given the current role of EU law regulating action in all parts of the UK in such subjects, partly to facilitate a single market with a level playing field—the point that the noble Lord was making—and partly to ensure that in matters which by their nature cannot be constrained by political borders, there is a coherent common approach. I accept this. Indeed, last week I proposed an amendment to provide a framework agreement for environmental policy—which, quite amazingly, the Government rejected. However, if there are to be such frameworks, the devolved Administrations and the devolved legislatures, whose legislative competence is being constrained by such frameworks, must surely agree the proposed steps jointly with the UK Government. I have tabled an amendment to an amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, providing a mechanism to this end. That will be debated later so I will not anticipate that debate now.

Let us be clear: unless there is agreement between Westminster and the devolved Governments on these matters, the continuity Bill will be enacted by the Assembly and will take precedence in Wales. Surely it is time for the UK Government to reconsider what is seen as an obdurate stance and agree a sensible, balanced and respectful way forward.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I cannot allow the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, to continue with his heresy that the Government are right in what they are doing. I noticed the shock that passed over the face of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth. What I think the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, does not appreciate is that the proposal of the Government is to introduce frame- works into this country to save the internal market of the UK, whether or not the devolved Administrations consent. All they are prepared to do, as the noble Baroness the Minister said in response to something earlier, is to consult—they are not necessarily seeking agreement. That is where he has it wrong.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

No, I have it absolutely right. I know that that is precisely what it is. I have said that on previous occasions. But, with respect, it was the couple of speeches that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, made earlier on that moved me in the Government’s direction.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions at this stage of the debate. I appreciate, as do other Members of the House, that when I move the government amendment to Clause 11, we will embrace a debate about the consequences of that amended clause and the significant change it makes to the way in which we are going to deal with, among other things, devolved competences. But as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, observed, his amendments are consequential in a sense on what is going to happen with regard to Clause 11. In that context, I point out that we had already indicated our intention to move the amendment to Clause 11 and then withdraw it, in order that the consequences for the schedules to the Bill can be addressed more properly when we reach Report. However, there is a more fundamental issue underlying this, which has been highlighted by the use of the terms “consult” and “consent”. It is really rather fundamental. Because these are probing amendments, I will just outline the Government’s thinking with regard to this area of the Bill and how it will work. I am sorry if I am going to appear somewhat repetitive about some matters of history that have been touched upon already, but perhaps your Lordships could bear with me, if but for a moment.

In 1972, the UK Parliament of course transferred certain competences to the EU. Having done so, it limited its competence to legislate for the United Kingdom. When it came to the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 2006, that Brussels competence, as I will term it, had already gone. When it came to considering the scope of the divorce settlement, the matter of the powers held by the European Union in Brussels was not in scope for consideration as part of devolution. They had gone, by virtue of an international treaty implemented in domestic law pursuant to the ECA 1972. The devolved settlement was determined by reference to the competence that remained in Westminster in 1998 and in 2006.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

To the contrary, Not Content.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Not Content. As we are all here, we might as well get on with it.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

I think I will put the Question again. The Question is that the House be resumed. As many as are of that opinion will say Content.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

To the contrary, Not Content.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Not Content.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

I think the Contents have it.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, perhaps I may explain. An Urgent Question has to be repeated at about 6 pm. Rather than have that at a ridiculously late hour, we will adjourn the House until 6 pm. That will provide an opportunity for noble Lords to get refreshment and then we will be able to deal with the next group in toto and without interruption. I think that is the right way to go about it. I have discussed it around the Chamber, as the noble Lord will know.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My point is that we are all here. We have been taking part in a debate. Everyone who wants to take part in the next group is here and it seems sensible to continue. I do not understand.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

The Chief Whip did not discuss the matter with me but I support the position he is taking because it is very obvious that, once we get into Clause 11, we will be discussing it for some considerable time. I would have thought that the sensible thing would be to break now and to come back and deal with it in one go, rather than break up the debate, which we will be forced to do otherwise.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock Excerpts

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendments 318B, 318C, 318D and 318E, which, it does not take a lot of working out, follow on from Amendments 318 and 318A. In fact, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said, it is interesting that what I suggest in three of those amendments in many ways corresponds exactly with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, suggested—as amended by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. Yet we came to the conclusion separately. We may have been inspired by the same people, the same thinking and the same ideas, but we came to draft them separately, which is interesting.

It is also really helpful that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has said quite clearly that the Government are willing to look at these amendments and at some way of getting out of the impasse in which they find themselves. That is a really helpful way forward. However, the Government are the architects of their own misfortune. As my noble friend Lord Griffiths of Burry Port said, the Joint Ministerial Committee should have met more frequently and earlier. We were sent just the other day details of the fifth ministerial committee—on 16 October. It is extraordinary that we had only four ministerial committees dealing with this issue before then. It really is a dereliction of duty by the Government, which I think comes from the fact that, within Whitehall—as I found when I was a Minister—there is no understanding about devolution and what it involves. The Minister responsible was perhaps Oliver Letwin or Chris Grayling, so you can understand why they did not understand—but what worries me is that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has been the Advocate-General for some time, and he should have alerted the people around Whitehall and others to this problem a lot earlier. Indeed, the Secretary of State, David Mundell, who I will concede is a very nice man—

[Lord Hain]

In spite of being a Tory.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

In spite of being a Tory; that is right. He has been constrained by Whitehall in getting decisions. I remember well sending notes around every Whitehall department to try to get some agreement. It is very difficult. However, I would have hoped he would have flexed his muscles a little earlier.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My Lords, the noble Lord is clearly very expert on this process and when these meetings were held. Could he tell us how many of those meetings were cancelled by the Scottish Government?

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

I have no idea; maybe the Government can help. What I can tell the noble Lord is that when I was Minister of State for Scotland we had a number of meetings. As my noble friend Lord McConnell can confirm, there were a lot of bilateral meetings between the Scotland Office and Ministers in the Scottish Government. That is the kind of thing that should have been happening but has not been.

I am not known for praising the Government, as Members who have heard me from time to time, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, know only too well. However, we should acknowledge— I say this as a strong devolutionist and a former MSP who really believes in devolution and argued for it for years, long before other people in Scotland were arguing the case—that the UK Government have moved on this. We have to concede that, under pressure and looking at the argument, they have moved.

We also have to be realistic. I say this to some of my Labour colleagues from England and, with respect, from Wales: the SNP has a clear agenda. It is concerned with only one thing, and we have to remember that. If it sees that it is to its advantage to concede then it will, and it may be able to make it to its advantage, but let us not be naive about what the SNP is up to—and let us hope that Welsh Labour is not naive about that either.

There is an advantage in the UK single market having the same kind of regulations on some of these issues, some of which the Minister has mentioned, and we ought to recognise that. We have an institutional and constitutional problem in the UK in that our devolution is asymmetrical. I have said on a number of occasions that this creates problems in a range of areas, and we can see that it does here. This Parliament has to speak for England as well as the UK and that creates structural, philosophical and other problems. Some of us believe in a federal UK—the Liberal Democrats certainly do, as do a number of Labour people such as myself—and in the longer term I hope we will deal with that. In the meantime, though, we have to recognise that it is a dilemma for the Government to be able to look after the interests of England. The Minister pointed out, and this is something that we have to take account of, that decisions made by the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly can have an impact on England. We have to accept that and look after the interests of England as well as the whole of the UK. The Minister has said there is an advantage in a number of aspects being uniform throughout the whole of the UK, and I concede that. I was going to mention some more examples but I am conscious of the time.

I turn to the amendments. Serious thought needs to be given to the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and I have tabled. We need some form of mediation and that is what we are suggesting in these amendments—certainly in my first three. I am suggesting something similar to what is suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay: a ministerial council that would deal with that. Then, as a fallback if it could not come to an agreement, I have suggested an advisory panel, and have suggested that it should be the Speakers and the Presiding Officers who would set it up so we would get to a very similar conclusion. Some Members opposite will be pleased to hear that I do not refer to the Supreme Court.

For once, I am in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. I suggest in Amendment 318E that there should be a sunset clause. He and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, have suggested two years and I have suggested five, and that is open for debate, but it would be very good to have such a clause so that all sides would know that it had to be resolved by a particular time.

I hope, and I think the Minister indicated this at the start, that the Government consider these to be positive suggestions. If I can recognise that the Government have moved after all the awful things I have said about them over the last few days, months and years, I hope others will recognise that as well and give them at least just a little credit.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lang of Monkton]

I agree that progress has to be made, but progress is not made by constantly agreeing to give legislative consent on so many different issues, as so many amendments that we have debated in the last few days suggest. That is not progress; that goes towards unsettling the existence of the devolution within the United Kingdom parliamentary structure. We have to be realistic about these matters.

The Government’s approach of endless patience and consultation did not work. In the end, the supremacy of the union must come first. So I support the government amendment. By protecting the sovereignty of this Parliament we are best able to deliver the overall outcome, both for the devolved Administrations and for the United Kingdom to which they belong.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, I am slightly confused. He said that he supports the government amendment, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said that he would not press his amendment; he is going to withdraw it and look at some of the other proposals. Does the noble Lord not agree with his Front Bench?

--- Later in debate ---

I turn to what happened at lunch in Edinburgh. There we were entertained by the Presiding Officer, and the conversation came around to whether or not the Edinburgh Parliament should have a second Chamber so that it could look in detail at legislation. Again, the conversation was about resource shortages and the lack of ability of the Scottish Parliament to properly exercise the powers that it had been given.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

The noble Earl may know that the Scottish Parliament rejected my suggestion that it should have a house of lairds.

[The Earl of Kinnoull]

I did. I will send my job application in.

I feel that we must have regard to that issue. I have been through the document pretty carefully, and I feel—this is why my support for the government amendments is so strong—that a good balance has been struck in those amendments regarding the point that I have just made. There is a chance that the devolved assemblies can exercise those powers properly, but if we tip too many in then I feel we will be letting down the citizens of Wales and Scotland.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

49: Clause 6, page 3, line 33, after “cannot” insert “, subject to paragraph (c),”

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 49 I shall speak also to Amendment 52. I read the other day that the two most disbelieved statements are, “The cheque is in the post” and, “I am from the Government and I am here to help you”. Here is another one: this amendment is designed to be helpful to the Government, and I hope they will genuinely believe that. It seeks to formalise the agreement reached in December 2017 in the UK/EU joint report in relation to EU citizens and their ability to refer cases to the CJEU.

Clause 6(1)(b) states that, “A court or tribunal”,

“cannot refer any matter to the European Court on or after exit day”.

However, paragraph 38 of the joint report agreed by the UK Government last December states:

“This Part of the Agreement establishes rights for citizens following on from those established in Union law during the UK’s membership of the European Union; the CJEU is the ultimate arbiter of the interpretation of Union law. In the context of the application or interpretation of those rights, UK courts shall therefore have due regard to relevant decisions of the CJEU after the specified date. The Agreement should also establish a mechanism enabling UK courts or tribunals to decide, having had due regard to whether relevant case-law exists, to ask the CJEU questions of interpretation of those rights where they consider that a CJEU ruling on the question is necessary for the UK court or tribunal to be able to give judgment in a case before it. This mechanism should be available for UK courts or tribunals for litigation brought within 8 years from the date of application of the citizens’ rights Part”.


We are not taking away any powers from the courts or tribunals. They decide whether to seek advice, and when they get it they then decide whether to take account of it. It does not in any way undermine the principles the Government have adduced for withdrawal. I hope, therefore, that this is helpful. All I am suggesting is that the joint agreement the UK Government have put their name to should be incorporated into the Bill, and I have helpfully provided an amendment to enable them to do that.

I also draw the Minister’s attention to the draft withdrawal agreement presented on 28 February by Michel Barnier to the Brexit Steering Group. I refer specifically to Article 83, which states:

“Where in a case before a court or tribunal in the United Kingdom a question is raised concerning the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity or interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union relating to facts that occurred before the end of the transition period and where that court or tribunal considers that a decision on that question is necessary to enable it to give judgment in that case, it may request the Court of Justice of the European Union to give a preliminary ruling on that question in accordance with the procedural requirements laid down in Article 267 TFEU. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on such requests”.


Do Her Majesty’s Government agree to that proposal by Monsieur Barnier in the draft withdrawal agreement and do they plan to amend the Bill accordingly?

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

How would the noble Lord’s proposed new provision work in the event of there being no agreement and is he not anticipating the terms of an agreement?

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

As I understand it, all that we include depends on there being an agreement. It is not just my amendment; it is the whole legislation. I beg to move.

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

My Lords, I fully support my noble friend’s decision to raise these questions, which are very important. I suspect the Minister will say that the Government have given a commitment that, when the withdrawal agreement is concluded, it will become before this House an Act of Parliament and we will therefore have the opportunity to debate it then. However, there are two powerful reasons why citizens’ rights should be incorporated in this Bill now.

The first is the high level of anxiety that EU citizens have about their position. I am sure there is relief that, in principle, an agreement was reached in December, but there could still be many a slip between cup and lip in its ratification. Those citizens’ rights should be guaranteed now to provide reassurance.

Secondly, I listened hard to an earlier contribution from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, in which he said that the main utility of this Bill is to make sure there is legal certainty if we crash out of the EU—because, assuming that negotiations work, there will be a transition period during which EU citizens’ rights will not be affected. The problem we are dealing with particularly in this Bill is the risk of a crash-out. Of course, the Government will say to us, “Well, we’re very determined there won’t be a crash-out”, but they will not exclude that possibility. It was clear from the intervention at the end of my noble friend Lord Foulkes’ speech that the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, actually relishes the possibility of a crash-out because he thinks, wrongly, that this is some bargaining leverage we have over the EU.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I want to make two short points. The first is that the precedent of giving rights in other countries when there is a separation is set up very well by the arrangements between ourselves and the Republic of Ireland in relation to Irish citizens and their rights in our country, which are guaranteed by statute in a number of cases.

Secondly, on the idea that we have to refer all these matters to the European court, anyone who reads the judgments of our courts from day to day will realise that the fairness they exhibit towards foreign citizens is of the highest possible standard. I know of no country in the world and no court in the world that succeeds in getting a higher standard; there are others that have an equally high standard, but I know of none that has a higher one. It would be a most retrograde step for this House to do anything that suggested to people in Europe that they could not get justice from the courts of this country.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Just to clarify, my amendment does not suggest that—quite the reverse. It would be the British court or the British tribunal that took the decision whether or not to refer such matters to the CJEU. It would still be the decision of a UK court.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I think that is meant to be an intervention, because I have not quite finished. The situation is that the British courts, the Supreme Court in particular, have discretion to look at any judgment that they wish, and to raise any question they wish in these judgments. There is nothing in the present Bill that impedes that, except in respect of questions of European law, because the courts themselves, and the members of the Supreme Court, have been anxious that if they paid too much attention to the European court after Brexit, they might be accused of being involved in politics. They have sought a direction from Parliament on this matter, and that has been attempted, and I hope it is successful.

I personally do not share the animosity that exists in some quarters towards the European Court of Justice. It is over 30 years now since I often appeared before them, and I have nothing but praise for the way in which they do things. They do things very differently to us. There are far fewer oral hearings—at least, there were when I did it, which was a long time ago. There is much less oral pleading than there is in our courts. Actually, our courts have moved slightly in that direction in recent years, since I was last involved with them—and in some cases quite far in that direction.

The respect I have for the European Court is of the highest order, but I do think there is a difficulty because, after Brexit, no judges or advocates-general of the British Bar will be members of the court or advocates-general in the court. That is an important factor to be taken into account in the arrangements. I am not part of the negotiations—I have nothing to do with them—but I do believe that that point has to be taken into account. There is a usual rule that the people administering justice are the people who are in accordance with the arrangements between states. International courts, for example, may not have representatives from all the states that appear before them, but there is a question to be considered in that connection, because the Court of Justice referred to in the amendment will not be the Court of Justice as it is now.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased to be able—I use that term advisedly—to respond to the issues raised in the context of these amendments. Given the scope of the contributions, I will perhaps begin by touching on one or two points that have been made by noble Lords in the debate.

The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, referred to the content of the joint report and quoted, among other things, the phrase,

“the Agreement should also establish”.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, did likewise, and referred to the passage about the bestowal of rights that will come with the conclusion of the withdrawal agreement. The noble Lord, Lord Haskel, referred to Michel Barnier’s recent draft—quite accurately, if I may say so. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, pointed out that the European Parliament will have to agree to the terms of any withdrawal agreement. That is self-evident.

In other words, these matters are prospective. Why are they prospective? I do not want to be overly technical, and I do not believe that I will be, but we begin with the duality principle of our law. That means that we enter into international obligations at the level of international law and they have no direct impact on our domestic law. For example, the withdrawal agreement will be an international treaty entered into by the Executive. We then implement or bring the rights and obligations of that international treaty into domestic law by way of domestic legislation of this Parliament. That is the duality principle: you have international law and you have domestic law, and you can only have the domestic law once you have the international treaty, because it is from the international treaty rights and obligations that you allow the domestic rights and obligations to be brought into our domestic law. What we have at the present time is a joint report from December of last year. We acknowledge that.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

It is not a treaty.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is not yet a treaty, if I can anticipate the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, because the position of the EU has been, quite rightly, that there is no agreement until everything is agreed. This has been a staged process. We believe that it is important that we were able to achieve the first stage and that we were able to achieve consensus. It is perhaps better to use the word “consensus” here rather than “agreement”, which can be confusing and sometimes misleading. We have achieved consensus in a number of important areas and, as we carry that forward, we proceed into the negotiation of what will be an international treaty.

As we have said before, once we have that international treaty, we can then draw down from the rights and obligations of that international treaty into domestic law by virtue of the fact that we will bring forward a withdrawal agreement Bill for scrutiny by this Parliament.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

No, my Lords, there will not be two classes of citizens. Let us take a simple example. If I hold USA citizenship and UK citizenship, I can pass between the UK and the USA because I am a citizen of both countries. If I am a citizen of the UK and a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, I can pass between the two countries because I am a citizen of each state. It is not a case of classification; it is simply a matter of status.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Will the noble and learned Lord clarify a point raised earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley? What is the position of citizens in Gibraltar?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Gibraltar is an overseas territory whose people hold UK citizenship. However, if they do not retain citizenship of another EU country after Brexit, they will not be EU citizens.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

As I understand it, they can get a Spanish passport if they so wish, although I do not think that many of them do. Will they continue to be citizens of the United Kingdom and will they be eligible also to get EU citizenship?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

This seems to confuse a number of different issues because the parallels are the same as those in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. If you are a UK citizen in Gibraltar and you are also entitled to apply for and be granted citizenship of Spain, you will then hold dual nationality or dual citizenship, and as a citizen of Spain, for as long as it remains a member state of the EU, you will enjoy the right to EU citizenship. It is no different from the position in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In the same way, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford—perhaps referring to something she may have read in the Daily Mail—talked about people applying for citizenship of Malta in order to ensure they can maintain EU citizenship. This is how it happens, but the fundamental point is that you cannot be a citizen of the EU unless you are a citizen of a member state. That is written into the treaties.

It may appear—and it will almost certainly appear to the Chief Whip—that I have digressed slightly from some of the amendments; he will be watching. I just seek to touch on some of them. I hope I covered in my opening remarks some of the points made. Amendments 160 and 170 were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, and Amendment 202 by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham. Unfortunately, she was not here to speak to it, but it was referred to. As I have indicated, at the end of the day, we will have to conclude the negotiations in respect of the withdrawal agreement treaty and then draw it down into our domestic law. Tying Clause 9 to a particular outcome is not going to assist that.

The noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, moved Amendment 210. Again, I hope I have set out the Government’s position on this. We appreciate what we have achieved by way of the joint report, and we go on to the detailed negotiations in the hope it will effectively mean that we can confirm in domestic law not only the rights of EU citizens in the United Kingdom, but the right of UK citizens in the EU.

The noble Lord, Lord Haskel, moved Amendment 211, which details a requirement to keep equivalence with the EU on rights and protections. Again, this is prospective. We are addressing it in the course of negotiations and we hope to achieve it in many respects. In my view and in the view of the Government, it would not be appropriate to bring this into our domestic law.

Finally, we have Amendments 49 and 52, which I hope I have gone some way to addressing so far. The Bill aims to provide a stable and certain domestic statute book on exit day. That is its point, irrespective of the result of the negotiations and of any final agreement with the EU. Of course, once we achieve a final agreement, we fully appreciate that we are going to have to draw it down into our domestic law. Parliament will have an opportunity to scrutinise it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My Lords, one of my comrades, if I may use that word in this place, commented that I was unduly brief in my introduction—or perhaps it was unusually brief; it was one or the other. That was because I stuck precisely to the terms of my amendment. The debate, however, has gone much wider than that. We have heard some powerful, passionate pleas on behalf of the rights of European Union citizens. We have heard them from colleagues on all sides of the House, and it is important to note that it is not just the opposition parties arguing this: support has come from the Cross Benches and from the Conservative Benches.

One of the ironies is that if European Union citizens has been given the right to vote in the referendum—they are taxpayers: “no taxation without representation”—as they were in the Scottish referendum, we would not now be going through this tortuous procedure. We would be getting on with running the country, looking after education, health, justice and all the things we should be doing as the sovereign Parliament.

My noble friend Lady Prosser put it very well: the reputation of the United Kingdom is at stake in all the matters that we are looking at today. The arguments put forward by my colleagues on behalf of all the amendments in the group were very powerful.

[Lord Bilimoria (CB)]

I thank the noble Lord for giving way. Could he add that European Union citizens will be allowed to vote in the forthcoming council elections in May?

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Indeed, and as I understand it, if I read the Evening Standard right, they are going to send a very strong message as far as London is concerned about what they think of this Government.

I conclude by saying that I wish I was learned as well as noble, like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, because I would then be able to understand some of the detail rather more precisely.

[Lord Adonis]

Before my noble friend concludes, does he share my concern about what the Minister said about the difference between “consensus” and “agreement”? Does he agree that that is quite a significant statement on the part of the Government in the course of this debate? The only point in making the distinction, as I understand it, is that the Government do not regard themselves as fully committed to the terms of the “agreement” of last December.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is unusual for me to intervene, but I feel that if the noble Lord is going to make statements, he should make them accurately. If he is going to represent what a Minister has said, he should do so accurately. The distinction I drew was between an agreement that was now binding in international law and an agreement that was not now binding in international law. I hope the noble Lord’s recollection coincides with mine. If it does not, could he perhaps consult Hansard?

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

It is a very interesting point, and the noble Lord, Lord Patten, highlighted it in his intervention. I wish that while he was speaking I had been able to translate “consensus” and “agreement” into Spanish, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Welsh and so on to see whether there is a coincidence between one and the other. No doubt that is something that we can return to.

The Minister finished by saying that there is a time and a place, and that this is not the right time and not the right place for these amendments. There will be many more times and this will be the right place, and I look forward to speaking to the rights of European—

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

Does the noble Lord agree that although on the legalities we have heard an extremely lucid explanation that in my view nobody could disagree with, delivered with all the noble and learned Lord’s customary charm, what we have not heard is any indication that anybody is aware of the reality in the outside world: that these people are choosing to go home? The people we need are going back because the Government are not giving them an assurance. These people believe that we agreed something in November. What we are seeing now in this intellectually fascinating legal debate is a total betrayal of their belief that we had agreed something. The pace at which people move away from this country—people who we need—will speed up if we do not get this right.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, for pointing out that although the Minister has all the legality behind him, perhaps his argument is lacking in humanity. It is humanity that the European Union citizens deserve, not the legality that we have heard.

I was about to conclude by saying that this may not be the right time but it is certainly the right place. I look forward to returning to this, and I know that many noble Lords who have spoken do also, to argue and to fight for the rights of not just UK citizens on the continent, who matter as well, but the European Union citizens who have given so much to this country over the years and continue to do so.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

It is worth pointing out that these citizens have existing rights by law in this country, and that will remain the case until these provisions are repealed, if and when they are.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

The noble and learned Lord is a distinguished lawyer and had great distinction as the Lord Chancellor. Perhaps he can explain to the European Union citizens in Scotland, where he and I both live, why they were allowed to vote in the Scottish referendum but not in the European Union referendum. Many of them have asked me but I do not have the intellect or ability to answer them; perhaps the noble and learned Lord can.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

That does not appear to be entirely relevant to the present debate and it is a bit late anyway. I had very little to do with the formulation of the franchise.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

I think now it would be appropriate for me to beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 49 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the two amendments in this group address the important question of the weight, if any, to be given to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union which are delivered after exit day. Amendment 55 is in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock and Lord Adonis. Amendment 56 is in my name and those of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Goldsmith and Lord Wallace of Tankerness, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham.

Amendment 56 would implement the recommendation of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee at paragraph 142 of our report on the Bill. After exit day, there is no dispute that our courts will make their own judgments on retained EU law. They will not be bound by judgments given by the court of justice after exit day. While judgments given before exit day will bind our courts up to the level of the Supreme Court, those given after exit day will not be binding. But our judges will wish to look at the judgments of the court of justice in Luxembourg delivered after exit day. That is not just because our judges are always interested, and rightly so, in seeing how courts in other jurisdictions address the same or similar issues. The connection here is much stronger. The retained EU law, which our courts will be interpreting, owes its origins to the institutions of the EU and there may be very good reasons for our courts looking carefully at how the court of justice has interpreted after exit day the same or a similar provision.

There are three problems with Clause 6(2) as currently drafted. First, it begins in a negative way by stating that a domestic court “need not have regard” to judgments delivered by the court of justice after exit day. That default position is unhelpful because it may be understood to suggest that our judges should not normally have any regard to post-exit day judgments of the court of justice.

Secondly, the end of Clause 6(2) allows the courts here to have regard to post-exit day judgments of the European court only if our courts consider it “appropriate to do so”. But judges do not look at foreign judgments because it is appropriate to do so; they look abroad for assistance because the foreign judgment is relevant to the issue that they are deciding. The terminology matters here. The use of “appropriate” wrongly suggests that our court will be making a policy choice to have regard to a post-exit day judgment from Luxembourg. Senior members of the judiciary have understandably expressed concern that if Clause 6(2) is left in its current form, the courts will inevitably be criticised for making a policy choice in this context.

I should make it clear that of course I do not speak for the judiciary, but I do speak to them. I can tell the Committee that many senior judges are very concerned about the content of Clause 6(2). Paragraphs 134 and 135 of the report of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee record the evidence that was given by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, the President of the Supreme Court, and her predecessor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, who I am pleased to see in his place today. The concern of the senior judiciary is not that judges should be shielded from criticism or that they are not tough enough to withstand it. The point is that confidence in the rule of law is undermined if judges are seen to be taking sensitive policy decisions that are for Parliament to make. Clause 6 therefore needs to make it much clearer that although our judges are certainly not going to be bound by Luxembourg judgments handed down after exit day, Parliament does intend our judges to have regard to judgments of that court given after exit day where they consider that those judgments are relevant to the issues before our courts.

The third defect of Clause 6(2) as currently drafted is that it suggests that the same principles apply to decisions of “another EU entity or the EU” itself. I am doubtful that there is any need to mention other EU entities or the EU itself, or certainly to compare them with the European court itself.

Amendment 56 seeks to address the issues in a manner which gives much clearer guidance to our courts. It would make it clear that our judges must have regard to a post-exit day judgment of the European court if the domestic court considers it relevant to do so. It would also add that in deciding the significance of any such post-exit day European court judgment, the domestic court should have regard to the terms of any agreement that is reached between the UK and the EU which it considers to be relevant. The terms of the withdrawal agreement, if and when approved by Parliament, will identify the relationship between the UK and the EU post exit day, and that will give considerable guidance to the courts.

I emphasise, however, that at all times under Amendment 56 and indeed under Amendment 55, it will be for the domestic court to decide on the significance, if any, of the Luxembourg judgment. There is no dispute over the fact that our judges will remain in charge in relation to post-exit day judgments. However, Amendment 56 would provide the guidance that they are seeking and which, I suggest, they are entitled to expect. I beg to move.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My Lords, there is little to add to the excellent introduction made to these amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, except to say that decisions of the other courts which currently have persuasive authority include those of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, decisions of higher-level foreign courts, especially in the Commonwealth and other similar jurisdictions, and one that I have a particular interest in, being a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; namely, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, which under the Human Rights Act 1998 must be taken into account by UK courts. It is right that the European Court of Justice should have a similar role and persuasive powers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

No, this is analysis. Let me explain what I would like to do.

I quite like the words of Clause 6(2) as it stands:

“A court or tribunal need not have regard to”,


a judgment or decision given by the European Court on or after the exit day because that fits very well with the way we are looking at the position before exit day. It is certainly true that it is a negative way of putting it, but I regard it as a helpful transition to the new situation. However, I do not like the remainder of Clause 6(2) for the very reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, explained. That is where I would like to bring in the passages from the latter part of his formula, which are that a court or tribunal may have regard to such judgments or decisions where it considers them relevant for the proper interpretation of retained EU law.

I would take out “appropriate” from Clause 6(2), for reasons that have been referred to already, and would leave out the early part of proposed new subsection (2A) in Amendment 56 where “must” is used. I would prefer “may” to “must”, leaving it to the court to make its own decision regarding whether the matter is relevant.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Would Amendment 55 tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Adonis not deal with the noble and learned Lord’s points?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord and I apologise for not having paid due regard to that formula because the wording is exactly what I am looking for, but I am trying to fit it into the opening words of Clause 6(2). However, it is certainly right; I respectfully suggest that “may” is the right word to use. It is better to add in the bit about,

“where it considers it relevant”,

which is what comes from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. So one is putting together bits and pieces of thought from various attempts to produce a formula.

Perhaps I may read out again for Hansard’s benefit how I suggest the provision might run: “A court or tribunal need not have regard to a judgment or decision given by the European Court on or after exit day, but it may have regard to it where it considers this relevant for the proper interpretation of retained EU law”. If “may” is used—although the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will correct me—proposed new subsection (2C) in Amendment 56 will no longer be relevant. I say nothing about subsection (2B) which may have force and value if the court requires guidance as to what to do with the agreement between the United Kingdom and the EU.

I hope that that contribution will give the Minister something else to think about. I think that we all hope that on Report he may be able to come back with a formula which we can all endorse.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Adonis]

The word “relevant” does not, in any normal meaning of the word, mean legally relevant, any more than the word “appropriate” means legally inappropriate.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My Lords, can I make a confession before we go further? I cannot claim credit for the wording of this amendment. The credit must go to Michael Clancy of the Law Society of Scotland—that is why it is better than I would have done. The Law Society of Scotland says that,

“‘persuasive authority’ is a recognised aspect of the doctrine of stare decisis or precedent. Persuasive decisions are not technically binding but the courts can pay special attention to them”.

I mentioned the three courts earlier: the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Court of Human Rights and the supreme courts of Commonwealth countries. It seems to me to be a very good amendment, but I do not want to take credit for it, as that must go to someone else.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Morris of Bolton) (Con)]

My Lords, if Amendment 31 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 32 for reasons of pre-emption.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

My Lords, when I first heard of a Pannick amendment, I thought it was something like an emergency resolution. I now realise that it is an elegantly drafted and eloquently spoken to amendment. In the light of what we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, there will be no need for me to move Amendment 32.

[Lord Dykes (CB)]

My Lords, I begin by very quickly thanking the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, for his comments—with which I agree entirely—and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his very comprehensive explanation.

In general, Clause 5 is very problematic as drafted. I am grateful for the suggestions that have been made so far. Other colleagues who have spoken on other occasions about this danger in Clause 5 have expressed real concern about it suggesting leaving out the main subsections. Even if Section 1 is not separately debated today, they all come together in a cohesive generality.

The Bill converts existing EU direct law—as has been said, mainly regulations but also directives and sometimes decisions—into UK law as it applies on the actual exit date. I fear that Her Majesty’s Government, who have already shown massive incompetence in handling the whole wretched process of Brexit, underestimate the huge volume of SIs that would need to cascade through the system if enacted as they stand. I feel very strongly that it would not be seemly and proper to incorporate the words of the so-called supremacy of EU law as is written down now, even if there was a laid-down definitional basis. Even the qualified tone in subsections (2) and (3) does not reassure me. Unless the text is improved appropriately, I envisage endless scenes of parties arguing in UK courts over the underlying meanings—arguments for some length of time and at notable expense, of course.

Many outside expert observers of these matters—including, I recall, the Law Society—have flagged up these possible consequences. There have also been suggestions of them in various quarters, not least in our House’s Constitution Committee. The principle of the famous Clause 2 in the original 1972 EU membership Bill should be invoked to decide on the solutions—albeit for the reverse objective and in the reverse direction—to mitigate these dangers and provide the cover-all effect needed to avoid unnecessary litigation and post-Brexit wrangling.

I conclude by emphasising that taking part in these irritating and, dare I say, excessively bureaucratic legislative procedures in no way implies my support for the Government’s foolish, relentless, drive for a nightmare Brexit that fewer and fewer people in the UK now want. That is why I support the symbolic resistance of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, to all the clauses standing part, including Clause 5.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to lend my support to this group of amendments on children’s rights and to briefly say one or two words on Amendments 37 and 69, to which my name is attached. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, I want to talk about this group because my fundamental feeling is that the voices of children and young people are simply not being heard in the Brexit process. Frankly, that is ironic when we consider that they are the population group who will be most affected by this—and for the longest time.

The Government’s plan not to retain the European Charter of Fundamental Rights through the EU withdrawal Bill is a real concern to me, particularly in relation to children. As we have heard, the charter enhances rights for children that already exist in the European Convention on Human Rights, such as the right to education. It also includes key rights enshrined in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, such as the rights to care and protection, to express views freely in accordance with their age and maturity—the principle of best interests being a primary consideration—and the right to know both parents. I know that others have said this, but I make the point that these are not small, trifling matters or marginal extras; they are fundamental things we should be very concerned about.

The charter contains certain provisions of great importance to children and young people that are not protected in domestic law at constitutional level. Children’s rights enshrined in the charter have been translated into practice through EU legislation, policy and case law. This includes legislation on child-friendly justice systems, and the charter has strongly influenced the development of EU regulations relating to cross-border family law. We heard an awful lot about this earlier in our debate on family law and I certainly do not intend to repeat that because we heard it in great detail. I simply make one point, which was my key point in that debate. It is crucial that children, including children born to families where one parent is from the UK and the other is from an EU member state, feel that their voice is heard in this process and that their wishes and feelings can be expressed, so that they feel that a fair decision is being made about what happens to them regarding these crucial decisions in their lives, particularly if they are to be returned to a parent in another country.

Finally, the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, is not in his place to talk in more detail about Amendment 69, to which I added my name because I felt it very important that a government body or right in statute exist somewhere to ensure that children’s physical and psychological needs are being met and considered, particularly when they are a victim of any form of neglect, exploitation or abuse. As many in the Chamber will know, no group of children has suffered more neglect, exploitation and abuse than children in care. That is why this amendment, which I know was tabled as a probing amendment, is so important.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

My Lords, I have one brief question that I would like the Minister to answer. Most of the debate has been about children, apart from the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross. I will talk about the elderly. I need to declare an interest—although we would all need to declare that interest. I am chair of Age Scotland. Like the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, as he mentioned, my noble friend Lady Massey who moved the amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Russell, who will speak, and the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, who is in his place, I am a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. How will Council of Europe recommendations be incorporated into United Kingdom law if we leave the European Union? I ask this because an excellent report has been approved by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe entitled Human Rights of Older Persons, and their Comprehensive Care.

[A noble Lord]

Author!

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

The author is the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. This was approved unanimously by the appropriate committee and by the parliamentary assembly. It recommends a whole range of things, including an adequate income for the elderly, appropriate housing, action on elder abuse, intergenerational provision, which is very important, the integration of health and social care—I am glad to see that the Government are doing that at a national level, but it needs to be done at a local level as well—and many more. These are very important recommendations, although I say so myself, immodestly. They are things that everyone is agreed on, but what strength, power and influence will they have? Will they just be advisory to the British Government, or will they take them as being more than that and as clear indications of the kind of action they propose to take? Would the recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Council of Europe itself have greater influence if we were to leave the European Union? If the Minister is not able to answer that question today, because I know that it has come out of the blue, I would be willing to receive a letter from him in due course.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not sure I agree with that proposition. But of course, at the end of the day, pursuant to Clause 7, it will be necessary to bring forward regulations which address amendments that are required in regards to retained EU law. At that point of course, those regulations will be the subject of scrutiny to ensure that they are limited to those aspects which are EU-derived law and therefore EU retained law. I do not believe that that is necessarily a problem, but I hear what the noble Baroness has said. We will of course take into consideration any difficulties that could arise in that context.

I wish to add one further point that I meant to make at the outset in response to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. He referred to me as the Advocate-General. I am not appearing here as a law officer, and nothing I say should be construed as law officer advice. I am appearing here as a Minister in respect of the Bill. I would not want there to be any misunderstanding in the light of his reference.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

I am really interested in what the noble and learned Lord has just said. Could he explain what the difference is if he says something as a law officer or as a Minister? What import does that have? What difference does it make in the context of this House and in the legal context?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord. I would never say anything in this House as a law officer. It is my role to give advice to the Government in my role as a law officer, but I do not speak in this Chamber in that role. I just wanted to make that clear. The other difference can be found in the list of ministerial salaries.

Clause 2 is not broadly drawn for the reason that all this legislation needs saving—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with reference to Clause 14(6). It is broadly drawn for two important reasons. First, any deficiencies that might arise within this domestic legislation upon our withdrawal can be corrected by the Bill powers under Clause 7. I appreciate that there are noble Lords who will want to address the scope of those powers under Clause 7 when we come to it, but that is the purpose of drawing Clause 2 in this way. During the period in which we have been an EU member state, we have brought into our domestic law a great deal of EU law, and not just expressed as EU-derived law in the form of the implementation of directives or the direct effect of regulations. We have already had reference to the scope of, for example, the Equalities Act; there is also the health and safety at work legislation. These are areas in which we know we find EU-derived legislation. It is therefore important that we bring all that together in order that it can be subject to the regulatory processes in Clause 7, subject of course to the debate that will take place with regard to the scope of the powers in that clause.

The second, rather more important, reason for treating all this legislation as part of retained EU law—I emphasise the connection between EU-derived legislation and what is defined as “retained EU law” for the purposes of the Bill—is that we have to ensure that retained EU law will continue to be interpreted consistently by our courts under Clause 6 of the Bill. This, I apprehend, is why the Bingham Centre, for example, said, while addressing the question of the scope of Clause 2, “If you’re going to narrow the scope, then you’re going to have to amend other parts of the Bill, in particular Clause 6”. That might be a different road to the same goal. All I would say at this stage is that the road we would take is to address this in the context of Clause 2 and the scope of that clause. In a sense, if Clause 2 were narrower, the powers under Clause 7 would be much broader. If we did not bring all of this into the definition of EU-derived legislation but wanted to be able to operate by way of regulations pursuant to Clause 7, there would be virtually no boundaries for the Clause 7 powers, whereas they are circumscribed by the definition that is brought into Clause 2 in the present form.

In my respectful submission, it would be odd if we were to take these categories out of Clause 2 and therefore find ourselves in a situation in which the construction of that law now differed from what it would have been while it remained to be interpreted by reference to the canons of construction that presently apply while we are a member of the EU. It is important that it should be part of retained EU law in order that we have consistency of interpretation. I do not take issue with the suggestion that an alternative route might be to narrow Clause 2 and then completely amend Clause 6, but that is simply not the route that the Government are taking here. I have sought to explain why we are taking this particular route at this time.

I hope that I have reassured noble Lords that Clause 2 is wide in its scope, but for a legitimate purpose. As I said, we will come in due course to address the question of whether and to what extent Clause 7 should complement those provisions with regard to retained EU law. In those circumstances, and emphasising again that we are listening to various considerations about how Clause 2 is formulated, I hope that noble Lords will see fit not to press their amendments. I am obliged.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, the amendment stands in my name and that of the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes, Lord Adonis and Lord Dykes. This is very much a probing amendment and I do not intend to detain the Committee long, as the issues are quite clear.

Clause 2 refers to EU-derived domestic legislation that has,

“effect in domestic law on and after exit day”,

and then goes on to explain what EU-derived domestic legislation means. If we then fast forward to Clause 14, we see that an enactment,

“means an enactment whenever passed or made”.

We are trying to get some certainty into what is meant by that—and I shall come on more specifically to enactments of the Scottish Parliament.

We are seeking to probe what is intended by this. For example, if an enactment has been made but the commencement of a particular provision is not until a date post exit day, what is the status of that? Is it intended to refer only to those enactments when an Act has been made but there has been a commencement before exit day?

Let us look specifically at Acts of the Scottish Parliament—Acts of the Welsh Assembly may well come into a similar category. Paragraph 100 of the Explanatory Notes, which refers to similar phraseology in Clause 5, states that,

“an Act is passed when it receives Royal Assent”.

The Scotland Act 1998, Section 28(2) states:

“Proposed Acts of the Scottish Parliament shall be known as Bills; and a Bill shall become an Act of the Scottish Parliament when it has been passed by the Parliament and has received Royal Assent”.


So there are two stages—passed by the Parliament and then receiving Royal Assent. Amendment 342, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, seeks to give clarity that this will be an enactment when it has received Royal Assent.

There is an argument that it should be an enactment when it is passed by the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly. I took the view that it was preferable to make it after Royal Assent because there are some reasons why between being passed by the Scottish Parliament and receiving Royal Assent it could be derailed. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, as Advocate-General for Scotland will know only too well, in whichever capacity he is appearing at the Dispatch Box, he has powers under Section 33 of the Scotland Act to refer to the Supreme Court a Bill or any provision of a Bill which he believes may not be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. He has to do that within four weeks of a Bill being passed by the Scottish Parliament, and then it would be a matter for the Supreme Court as to how long it took. So you may have an enactment, or a piece of legislation—let us put it neutrally like that— which has actually been passed but may go to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court may strike it down, so it may never actually become law. That is why I took the view that, in trying to determine when an enactment becomes an enactment, it should be in the case of Acts of the Scottish Parliament when it receives Royal Assent.

To some extent this is academic. If you were to challenge me and ask me to give an example, I probably could not—but I am sufficiently acquainted over many years with the laws of unintended consequences to know that something will happen. You can bet your life that this issue could well come up and, rather than have the matter taken through the courts, it would be preferable, for certainty purposes, to put in the Bill when an enactment of the Scottish Parliament actually becomes an Act. The preference would be for when it receives Royal Assent.

This is a probing amendment but, if it is the noble and learned Lord who replies, I hope that he will accept that there is an issue here. The wording of our amendments may not be the ones that the Government would prefer, but perhaps he will accept that there is an issue here and the Government will bring forward their own amendment to clarify the point so that, at some future date, we do not have a situation where our learned friends at the Scottish Bar make lots of money out of disputing this, and we can resolve this. It is not a major point but it is one that merits clarity, and I hope that we can get a positive response to these amendments. I beg to move.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My Lords, I am really grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, himself a former Advocate-General, for moving this amendment. In the light of what he said, all I can say is that I agree with his every word.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord not only for explaining the amendment but for their endorsement of it.

In responding to Amendments 16, 17 and 342, I start by reaffirming our view that Clause 2 is an essential provision for providing certainty and continuity regarding our law after exit day. I think that that is plain to all noble Lords. I shall then say a little more about why Clause 2 must stand part of the Bill. This clause, along with Clauses 3 and 4, delivers one of the core purposes of this Bill: maximising certainty for individuals and businesses when we leave the EU by ensuring that, so far as is practical, the laws that we have now will continue to apply. In that respect, Clause 2 preserves the domestic law that we have made to implement our EU obligations; we have touched on that already.

More particularly, on the point raised by the noble and learned Lord in this regard, Amendment 342 seeks to clarify that Acts of the Scottish Parliament are included within the clause only if they have received Royal Assent before exit day. I suspect that Amendment 16 also seeks to provide clarity on that same point. I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify any uncertainty that there may be here. Clause 2(2) states that,

“‘EU-derived domestic legislation’ means any enactment”

that is described in that subsection. Clause 14 defines the term “enactment” to include an enactment contained in an Act of the Scottish Parliament. An Act of the Scottish Parliament must have received Royal Assent; until that time, it is a Bill. Section 28(2) of the Scotland Act 1998 provides for this. So an Act of the Scottish Parliament that has only been passed and not received Royal Assent does not fall within this definition, and would not be categorised as EU-derived domestic legislation for the purposes of this Bill. I believe that the noble and learned Lord rather suspected that this might be the case; his concern seemed to be one of certainty as regards the drafting.

The same applies in relation to Acts of the UK Parliament. The reference to “passed” in Clause 2(2)(b) is therefore a reference to the purpose for which the enactment was passed, not whether it was passed. In that context, I venture to suggest that Amendments 16 and 342 are unnecessary.

Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016 (Consequential Provisions) Order 2017

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock Excerpts

Wednesday 10th January 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

At end to insert “but that this House regrets that the draft Order includes provisions relating to the British Transport Police; and calls upon Her Majesty’s Government to review the operation of those provisions in the light of concerns that incorporating British Transport Police into Police Scotland will reduce operational effectiveness.”

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure for me to move this amendment. When the Minister said that the merger was,

“dangerous, reckless and ought to be stopped”,

I thought he was going to make my speech for me, which would have been unusual—and unusually kind as well. He rightly said on the actual specifics of the order that, if we were to vote against it, it would not necessarily achieve what I want to achieve. What I want to achieve can be achieved using this debate as a lever, and an opportunity to put pressure on the Minister. I shall come to that in a moment. It is a really important and urgent issue, which is why I welcome debating it on the Floor of the House.

What I am urging is not, as the Scottish Transport Minister has mischievously been claiming, that the devolution of the British Transport Police should be reversed totally. What I want to argue and press is that there should be an agreement between the Scottish Government and the UK Government on the form that devolution should take. There is great and growing concern, as the Minister and others have acknowledged, about the plan to integrate the British Transport Police in Scotland into Police Scotland. It would be only the Scottish part of the British Transport Police that is integrated into another force. It obviously would not happen in England.

Quite apart from the current operational problems at Police Scotland, which no doubt others will touch on, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary has said that no business case has been made for the merger. The Association of Retired British Transport Police Officers has written to me expressing concern about the pension implications. Those noble Lords who have had the opportunity to read the Scotsman will have seen that around two-thirds of British Transport Police officers have said that they are unsure whether they will transfer to Police Scotland if the merger goes ahead. That would undermine the whole position and really create problems.

In the consultation on the proposed merger carried out by the Scottish Government, a large majority of respondents opposed it. But that has been totally ignored by the Scottish Government. When the Scottish Parliament Justice Committee considered this last year, both the Labour and Tory Members—there were no Liberal Democrat Members on the Committee—opposed the amalgamation, but it was pushed through by the SNP majority. When it came to the Scottish Parliament itself, Labour, Tory and Liberal Democrat opposed it but, again, with their friends the Greens the SNP Government pushed it through.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

To be clear, in this instance, the Smith commission and the rules that it contained devolved to the Scottish Parliament the right to take this matter forward. The Scottish Parliament has determined how it shall do so. Today’s discussion is about how it has interpreted the clauses. At present, it is anticipated that we must make sure that the ongoing British Transport Police continues to function. I will come to the points raised in a manner that will, I hope, satisfy noble Lords—

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

I want to pick up on what the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, said, because he has cottoned on to something important. The Minister said, I think, that one of the orders would relate to the transfer of property, which I mentioned. I hope that order will not be laid until such time as any action that he proposes to take as a result of this debate is concluded.

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

Again, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, has anticipated what I will say shortly. Perhaps noble Lords will allow me to make some progress on the broader position.

I emphasise again that whatever reservations noble Lords may have about this approach, we must recognise and respect the agenda of the Scottish Parliament. That is part of the ongoing Smith agreement. However, let me turn to the matter that has most exercised the noble Lords here today—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

The noble Lord, once again, puts his finger on the issue. Our purpose will be to ensure that the answers which come from the board are satisfactory. If they are not satisfactory, then opportunities will be provided for this House and others to move forward in a different way. Oh, I heard someone say, “What does that mean?”, which is a helpful remark. I was trying to be cryptic in one sense. I am basically saying that this is not the end of the story. I hope that we will receive satisfactory answers at the programme board which will allow us the clarity to establish that we are satisfied that policing on our railways is not affected to the point of detriment.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

I think I understand what the Minister is saying and I agree with him. The Minister or the representative to the programme board is going to go to the board, express the points of view that have been made here—which have come from the unionists, the Conservatives, the Cross Benches, the Liberal Democrats and Labour—and report back to us. If we are not happy about the outcome, then there are two more orders which may or may not be laid and which we may or may not pray or move against. That will give us the opportunity after the programme board to know whether we are happy and whether or not the House and the Minister want to go ahead with those two further orders.

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

The noble Lord may well say that but I stress again that the important thing is that the salient points raised by noble Lords today are considered in all seriousness by the programme board. I hope there will be an opportunity for that board to respond and to satisfy all the questions raised today. I have noted them down. To put them in context, we need to know that terrorism and security issues are addressed head on—there can be no diminution in these. We must recognise that this involves real police officers and that there can be no impact upon their well-being, their morale or their situation, and that they must be treated with respect throughout this process. We must be cognisant of the no-detriment principle. Where there are costs, we must understand how those costs will be allocated fairly and appropriately. We must also recognise that they should not be unfairly or inappropriately placed elsewhere.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

Yes, I am very happy to do that. We have a note of the questions and I have several responses in handwriting that I cannot quite read. That is one of the reasons I have not been as fluent as I might have been on some of the points. Where noble Lords have not received an adequate response, I will do my utmost to ensure that the answers are conveyed to them.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My Lords, first I thank the Minister for his courtesy and sympathy in the run-up to this debate. He has been really helpful. I should also thank my noble friend Lord McAvoy for turning the screw on him on our behalf. My understanding is that he is mindful of the very great strength of feeling on all sides of the House and in every party and that that will be conveyed to the programme board. He is going to report back to us and that report will come before any further orders might be put forward in relation to the British Transport Police. I can assure him that we will remain vigilant and look carefully at what progress, if any, is made by the programme board, although we hope that it will be. We will keep an eye on it and we may return to these issues at a later stage. Meanwhile, in the light of what he has said in his response, I do not wish to press my amendment to the Motion to a vote.

Amendment withdrawn.