European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Dykes Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

My Lords, when I first heard of a Pannick amendment, I thought it was something like an emergency resolution. I now realise that it is an elegantly drafted and eloquently spoken to amendment. In the light of what we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, there will be no need for me to move Amendment 32.

[Lord Dykes (CB)]

My Lords, I begin by very quickly thanking the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, for his comments—with which I agree entirely—and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his very comprehensive explanation.

In general, Clause 5 is very problematic as drafted. I am grateful for the suggestions that have been made so far. Other colleagues who have spoken on other occasions about this danger in Clause 5 have expressed real concern about it suggesting leaving out the main subsections. Even if Section 1 is not separately debated today, they all come together in a cohesive generality.

The Bill converts existing EU direct law—as has been said, mainly regulations but also directives and sometimes decisions—into UK law as it applies on the actual exit date. I fear that Her Majesty’s Government, who have already shown massive incompetence in handling the whole wretched process of Brexit, underestimate the huge volume of SIs that would need to cascade through the system if enacted as they stand. I feel very strongly that it would not be seemly and proper to incorporate the words of the so-called supremacy of EU law as is written down now, even if there was a laid-down definitional basis. Even the qualified tone in subsections (2) and (3) does not reassure me. Unless the text is improved appropriately, I envisage endless scenes of parties arguing in UK courts over the underlying meanings—arguments for some length of time and at notable expense, of course.

Many outside expert observers of these matters—including, I recall, the Law Society—have flagged up these possible consequences. There have also been suggestions of them in various quarters, not least in our House’s Constitution Committee. The principle of the famous Clause 2 in the original 1972 EU membership Bill should be invoked to decide on the solutions—albeit for the reverse objective and in the reverse direction—to mitigate these dangers and provide the cover-all effect needed to avoid unnecessary litigation and post-Brexit wrangling.

I conclude by emphasising that taking part in these irritating and, dare I say, excessively bureaucratic legislative procedures in no way implies my support for the Government’s foolish, relentless, drive for a nightmare Brexit that fewer and fewer people in the UK now want. That is why I support the symbolic resistance of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, to all the clauses standing part, including Clause 5.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, we are now looking again at the principle of supremacy and status. I agree with a great deal—in fact, almost all—of what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said. However, in the various amendments I have sprinkled around, I differ with him on one fundamental point: I always wish to preserve the rights of individuals and businesses to have legislation struck down. That is their current position in that they can have EU law struck down. I put forward my alternative plan in Amendment 32A; I will explain how I got to it.

Broadly speaking, there are three baskets of EU laws. In basket 1, there are the treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which have to be followed by the European court. They are not revocable, as I am sure noble Lords know, and it is a big procedure to change them. In basket 2, I put legislative acts, meaning regulations and directives that set policy. To be precise, they can be identified by the article of the procedure in the treaty that they were made under. In the Lisbon treaty—the TFEU—it would be Article 289. The important point for noble Lords to hold in their minds is that these regulations and directives set policy. Basket 2 legislation can also be struck down by the European court—including on an action from individuals and businesses—for being incompatible with the treaty or the charter. A recent example is the data retention regulation that was ruled disproportionate in cases brought by Digital Rights Ireland and others. In basket 3, I put the implementation of Acts and delegated Acts and their predecessors. In the Lisbon treaty, that comes under Articles 290 and 291. These can be struck down by the European court for being incompatible with the treaty or the charter, as well as for being incompatible with the powers and instructions that were delegated to it in the legislation on which it depends.

If we take rights as our guide—by which I mean the right of an individual or business to challenge the validity of a bad law—then we get to the categorisation that the EU gives to law: that it is all secondary, except for the treaties and the charter. It is quite easy to accept that retained EU general principles—corresponding to basket 1, as I called it—should have primary status. Once converted under Clause 7, it would be wrong if they were changed or revoked other than by an Act of Parliament.

Basket 3 regulations are very close to statutory instruments in the way that they are made based on delegated powers, including an all-or-nothing single vote in the Council or Parliament to turn the whole lot down. There is also similarity in the ways they can be invalidated in court. That is quite easy to map on to our statutory instrument. Basket 2 is harder. The policy content and procedure of making the law look a lot like the making of an Act of Parliament; that leads some—I think Professor Craig was one of them—to conclude that it should map on to primary legislation. But then, if primary, it cannot be quashed under the general principles, so the rights of individuals and businesses are lost. Of course, if noble Lords look at Schedule 1—as we will later today—it can be seen that the Government’s intention is that there is no right of action on a failure to comply with the general principles of EU law. That is wrong. Treating legislation as primary carries the same cost that the Constitution Committee accepts. As it says in paragraph 48 of its report:

“Treating retained direct EU law as primary legislation for all—including”,


Human Rights Act,

“purposes is not without constitutional costs”.

I consider that cost to be too high because I give more weight to maintaining status quo rights and the reasonable expectations of individuals and businesses than making judgments easier or fewer.

We have to address that question several times in the Bill. Each time, I come down on the side of the people’s rights. No manifestos have ever said, “We want to take back control, including your right to challenge bad law”. However, the secondary legislation nature of basket 2 may require some further protection from overly easy change and revocation by statutory instruments, especially once things are no longer pinned in place because we are not part of the EU. In the EU, this was not made by a statutory instrument-type process, nor is it amendable in that way, so basket 2—although of secondary legislation status—could be deemed amendable in life after Clause 7 only by an Act of Parliament. This idea is similar to the one we debated regarding Amendment 21 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. Such treatment means that there is a special category for these laws, but we are in an unusual situation. The fact is that basket 2 is an intermediate, piggy-in-the-middle category. It is secondary legislation-plus, or primary legislation-minus. It could be replicated more or less by secondary legislation plus amendment protection, or the other way round as primary legislation but challengeable as to validity, although that is a bit more controversial.

The piggy-in-the-middle nature shows up in other ways. Basket 2 legislation actually contains within the individual documents a great deal of detail that in the UK domestic system would be done in delegated secondary legislation. It is the same with directives: a greater level of detail is there than in the lean and mean UK Acts of Parliament. That is even more the case after implementation for the secondary legislation made under the European Communities Act. For example, look at the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill, which recently received its Third Reading in this House. The money laundering regulations 2017, based on the fourth anti-money laundering directive, are some 112 pages plus a glossary. They were replaced in the Bill by one clause of 28 lines, including the headings and a three-and-a-half-page schedule listing delegated powers. It has been much amended and improved, but the contrast in content is much the same. If we made secondary legislation transposing directives into primary legislation, there would be a great deal of detail on which I would not wish to say I gave the sovereignty of Parliament a totally unchallengeable status.

There are three parts to my amendment. The first would reword the supremacy principle. I intend it to do the same thing and I am not precious about the wording. In fact, I just modified the Constitution Committee’s idea and stole the idea that you allocate precedence as if it were primary legislation, but in my plan the only bit of primary legislation it gets is the precedence. The second part would allocate secondary status to basket 2 retained legislation, and indeed to basket 3—everything except for Acts, because where we have Acts they already are and look like Acts. I then allocate primary status to EU general principles. As I have indicated, for life after Clause 7, basket 2 could be made so as to require amendment by primary legislation. Possibly that belongs in Clause 7 or somewhere else.