(1 day, 13 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the amendment is legally coherent and that is very much in its favour. It contains a tacit acknowledgment of the dualist system that we have in this country. That means that we are bound by domestic law and bound by international law only in so far as it has it has been incorporated in domestic law. The noble Baroness is right that there are references to the refugee convention in domestic law—for example, Section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993.
The main provision of the refugee convention that attracts attention is Article 33, the non-refoulement provision. Does membership of the refugee convention require a particular response from the courts of this country? There is reference to it in the Supreme Court decision on the Rwanda policy, although it was not entirely clear, to me at least, what effect it had on the outcome of the case. The much greater part of the judgment was taken up with the review of the relevant articles of the ECHR, which are incorporated into our law by the Human Rights Act.
What is quite clear is that it is always open to Parliament to exclude references to international law from domestic legislation. In which case, any obligations that this country has under the refugee convention exist only as a matter of international law. I say that without meaning to diminish the importance of international law; we should comply with international obligations as far as possible. However, there is an increasingly recognised view that the 1951 convention was of its time and that it is necessary to look again at its application in the light of the challenges that immigration now presents not just to this country but to other European countries and to countries such as Australia that have signed up to the convention.
If the leaked memo reported in Saturday’s Times is correct, the Attorney-General himself acknowledges that the time may have come to look again at the convention and its application to the immigration and asylum system. It is important to stress that no body or institution is empowered to determine authoritatively what the convention means. This distinguishes it from the ECHR, where the European Court of Human Rights performs that task.
My view is that it would be best to remain a member of the refugee convention but to remove any references to it from domestic legislation, so that Parliament can determine the proper policy in relation to immigration and asylum without fearing interpretation of that legislation by reference to the convention. This amendment does precisely the opposite of that, which is the reason that I oppose it, despite its legal coherence. I anticipate that the Government may not altogether be inclined to accept the amendment either, because to do so would hard-wire the convention, with all its imprecision, into our domestic law. This would create just the sort of difficulties that we have had with the European Convention on Human Rights and the obligation, under Section 2 of the Human Rights Act, to take it into account.
It should be possible to remain signed up to the refugee convention without unduly or unnecessarily hampering our obligations. Australia has managed this, as I said. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, in his 188-page analysis of the various issues that are thrown up by the convention. He is right that we may have to think again, even without this amendment, if our courts interpret domestic law in a way that appears to incorporate international law. Important though it is, it confuses the issue. Parliament ought to be sovereign in these matters and to decide the correct policy.
My Lords, I really support the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who very articulately and with legal adeptness explained some of my reservations. I will raise just a few other points.
I am particularly opposed to Amendment 184, because it would further institutionalise—this is even its title—the primacy of the refugee convention. I think that emphasising that primacy undermines democracy.
I listened carefully to the expansive debate on refugee family reunion in the first group. One of the most insightful comments came in the very moving contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, about her family’s experience of refugees fleeing Nazi antisemitism. It was a reminder of that historic period, but also of the importance of historic specificity. This matters today—which is such a joyous day, by the way, with the return home of the hostages; I spent most of the morning crying, but with joy in this instance. Jew hatred is alive today—it is still happening—but it is not the Nazis or the Second World War. This is a completely different version; something else is happening.
That issue of history is one of the reasons why I wanted to speak on this group. I have long argued that the refugee convention is long past its historic sell-by date and that it is time for us to consider leaving it or maybe amending it in some way, as has been discussed. So I am glad that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has given us a chance to consider the issue.
Of course, when the refugee convention was established in 1951, it had noble aims. It was designed for a world coming to terms with the aftermath of a world war and mass displacement. But if you think about the way that the term “refugee” is used today, you will find that it has become so expansive and flexible that it has been used recently to describe a trans-identifying burglar from Algeria and a Zimbabwean paedophile, both of whom say that they are entitled to the same protection as women and children fleeing a war zone.
Earlier today the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said that language and words matter, and I agree. In this instance, “refugee” has become completely corrupted and confused. So we urgently need to review terms such as “refugee”, as interpreted by today’s reading of the refugee convention, because these stoke resentment among the public and actually harm the interests of those who might legitimately be refugees in need of protection. It bundles up a whole lot of things.
The history of the convention means that it is not the rule of law—an act of God that cannot be challenged at any time—because it has an interesting history. Established in 1951, as I say, it was a practical solution to the existence of hundreds of thousands of people in Europe who had still not been resettled after the Second World War. It is interesting that, when it was introduced, the convention applied only to refugees in Europe, and only in respect of those who had acquired that status due to the events that happened before 1951. The convention has therefore changed because it did not assist with refugees who fled Hungary in 1956. That did not mean that people were not humane in 1956; the convention was not something that could be used—as is regularly done—just to say, “Where’s your humanity? Don’t you care about refugees?” It was very specific.
It was only in 1967 that the regional and temporal limits of the refugee convention were lifted to give rights to refugees around the world. That was motivated, as many historians have noted, by the Cold War. It was used to say that all refugees are welcome in the West and to show the superiority of democracy over communism. Actually, rather a small number of refugees came on that basis.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the refugee convention seemed to lose its raison d’être. It is interesting that, in 2004, Tony Blair, no less, noted how the convention,
“first introduced in 1951, at a time when the cold war and lack of cheap air travel made long-range migration far more difficult than it has become today, has started to show its age”.
Following Blair’s lead, in the 2005 general election the Conservative Party had a manifesto commitment to withdraw from the convention. There have been discussions about whether it is showing its age. I would say that the refugee convention is not just showing its age but has outlived its usefulness and shackles democracy.
My concern about this amendment is that it tries to do something that is already a problem. We spend all our time in this Chamber scrutinising pieces of law. If we are then told, “No, you can’t do that because of the refugee convention”—or if we pass laws and they are usurped by the refugee convention through the courts—what is the point of democracy and the decision-making here if they are so undermined by international treaties? The refugee convention therefore betrays democracy and the public.
If we in this place get frustrated that laws are made and conventions are then used to undermine those laws, can noble Lords imagine what it is like to be a voter? I know it has been a while for a lot of us, but it is worth remembering that voters’ frustration is even more palpable. This does not help refugees; it is a way of bypassing democratic accountability and is a hindrance, rather than a help, to refugees and the British public.
(1 day, 13 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as foreshadowed by my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower, I have two amendments in this group that seek to amend the Front Bench disapplication provision for the Human Rights Act. Of course, disapplication feels rather “yesterday”; the Overton window on the question of human rights law is now clearly swinging in favour of repeal of the Human Rights Act, following the excellent report produced by my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and the announcement of the party’s new policy. Be that as it may, for the purposes of this Bill, the correct approach, which I suggest the Minister should grasp with both hands, is to disapply the effect of the convention and the operation of the Act in the sphere of immigration decisions.
Disapplying the Human Rights Act from this area is not unprecedented. As the Minister will recall, this provision was incorporated, in a slightly different form, in the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act, and it was clearly a matter that passed both Houses of Parliament. It is both a precedented and a necessary step.
I turn briefly to the context for my amendment. The amendment itself would add two further provisions to the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Davies: that is, to include in the operation Section 4 of the Human Rights Act, which is the court power to make a declaration of incompatibility, and Section 10, which is a power to remedy any incompatibility by means of a statutory instrument. As Policy Exchange observed in its paper on the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act in December 2023, that disapplication provision did not mention Sections 4 and 10 and was the worse for it, because the experience has been that, where a court can make a declaration of incompatibility, those matters are taken almost automatically by the Government as warranting some sort of remedial step.
No Government so far have ignored a declaration of incompatibility, to my knowledge. For example, in the recent case where the Northern Irish High Court found an incompatibility in the legacy Act, the decision of the Government was to bring forward a remedial order to have the effect of suspending the operation of the provisions of that Act without waiting for primary legislation, itself a controversial move. To avoid that situation recurring, I have tabled these amendments to exclude from any potential challenge to immigration-related decisions a decision by a court to make a declaration of incompatibility, or a decision by a Government to attempt to remedy it by making a remedial order under Section 10 of the Human Rights Act.
It is clearly time that we took back control of the United Kingdom’s borders. This Government, and particularly this Home Office, know the difficulties that trying to operate within the constraints of the Human Rights Act has generated as it has evolved. I encourage the Minister to accept a provision similar to this so that he can implement the policies of his Government.
My Lords, when the Government first came into power last year, great emphasis was placed by the Prime Minister and his Attorney-General on the importance of the rule of law and in particular respect for international law. We were told that there was no way the Government would revisit the Human Rights Act or seek to amend the ECHR. Attitudes appear to have changed.
The previous home secretary, Yvette Cooper, said that the Government would bring in
“a clear framework set out by parliament that then can be much easier for the courts to interpret”.
I am not quite sure what that means, but she was talking about the application of human rights guarantees to various claims for asylum, in particular in relation to Article 8. It may have been a coincidence that this statement followed quite shortly after Reform had announced its policy on asylum claims.
I am grateful, as ever, for the opportunity to have this discussion. I have to say straight away to the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Murray of Blidworth, that we are not really going to find common cause this evening on this issue. I suspect that we will have to reflect on this on Report and that we will have a Division in the House. I suspect that we will be on opposite sides in that Division, because this Government are committed to ensuring that we comply with our international law and protect our human rights.
We are committed to the European Convention on Human Rights, which underpins international agreements that we have with partners, including the Good Friday agreement and the France returns agreement. We recognise the importance of an independent and impartial judiciary, going to the points that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, mentioned, in determining its applications. That does not mean that, at the end of the day, we cannot examine some issues, on which I hope I will satisfy the noble Lord in a moment, in dealing with these matters before us.
I say straightaway to the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Murray, that we will not agree on this. That is where we are. We do not have to withdraw from the ECHR or disapply the Human Rights Act to create what I would call meaningful reforms of our current system and processes. The Government have set out plans to reform the immigration system in the immigration White Paper. We will reform the framework for family migration, including strengthening the public interest test, to take back control—to use the phrase that the noble Lord, Lord Murray, used—over who comes to and stays in the United Kingdom.
I hope to assure the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that we will legislate to reform our approach to the application of Article 8 in the immigration system so that fewer cases are treated as exceptional. We will set out how and when someone can make a claim. We are also reviewing the application of Article 3—
I know that the Minister is in some difficulty because he has not been given clear riding instructions, but this is a fundamental point for the British public. They need to know the general direction of travel. The Minister has been good enough to be clear that there is no way the ECHR will be deviated from and that there will be no amendment to the Human Rights Act, so how will the legislation be framed so that it changes the courts’ approach, given the Minister’s correct acknowledgement of the importance of the independence of the judiciary?
Again, this may or may not satisfy the noble Lord—I apologise if it does not do so—but work is under way to review the application of Articles 3 and 8 in immigration cases. We will bring forward legislation on how Article 8 of the European convention is implemented in immigration cases to give courts the further clarity that they need so that our Immigration Rules are respected. As we have always said on migration, we will secure our borders and, if we need to go further, we will. In a sense, I am trying to give the noble Lord clarity by saying that we will reform Article 8 approaches and review the application of Article 3, but that will be in legislation brought before both Houses, which will then be considered and accepted, amended or rejected by both Houses.
The point is that this is where the water—I am not sure whether we should call it blue or red water—between the Government on this side of the Chamber and His Majesty’s Official Opposition exists. I do not see a situation whereby withdrawal from the ECHR or human rights legislation is tenable or desirable or will assist in the processes that noble Lords opposite seek. The agreements that we have with France, the Good Friday agreement and other agreements are dependent on that co-operation on international regulation, supplied and backed up by that legislation.
That may or may not assist the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, but I say to him that the direction of travel is clear: further examination and potential legislation to assess that down stream versus the commitment to maintain our human rights as we have them under the current legislative framework, which noble Lords are trying to disapply with their amendments.
I would be grateful for one final intervention; I hope that the Minister will forgive me, as I appreciate that it is late. The Labour Party had 14 years in opposition to disagree with the policies of the coalition and the Conservative Party, yet now, more than a year later, there is nothing in the border security Bill before us—and there has been nothing in any manifesto—about rewriting Articles 8 or 3. Why has it taken so long?
We are identifying challenges that the Government have responsibilities to identify and work on. The challenges that we are identifying exist for some of the reasons mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. Issues to do with applications of Articles 3 and 8 are causing some challenges.
That does not mean we have to withdraw from human rights or ECHR legislation. We can either work with further UK amendments, to support changes to that legislation while retaining the spirit of the law that we apply, or—I was going to go on to say this before taking the intervention—actively engage with our European partners and the Council of Europe to consider what international reforms could restore the right balance between individual rights and wider public interest in controlling migration. As the noble Lord will know, this is a shared challenge. The basic rights set out in the ECHR and Human Rights Act are still valid today, but this does not mean that it is a static, permanent document that cannot be looked at in certain areas. As I have said, work is under way on reviewing the application of Articles 3 and 8 in immigration cases.
My Lords, Amendments 203F and 203G deal with the publication of tribunal decisions. First, I thank my supporters in this amendment, the noble Lords, Lord Faulks, Lord Jackson of Peterborough and Lord Alton of Liverpool. These amendments deal with an important issue and I should outline what the current position is in relation to the publication of judgments.
In the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), decisions of the judges are not routinely published. In the Upper Tribunal, which hears appeals from the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), decisions are published, although not all decisions may be reported. Bearing that in mind, I then invite the Committee to note that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, sitting judicially in the case of Cape Intermediate Holdings v Dring, 2019, United Kingdom Supreme Court 38, found that the purpose of the open justice principle was twofold.
The first purpose is to enable public scrutiny of the way in which courts decide cases, to hold judges to account for the decisions they make and to enable the public to have confidence that judges are doing their job properly. The second is to enable the public to understand how the justice system works and why decisions are taken. The First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) is one of the largest of the seven chambers of the First-tier Tribunal. Of the other chambers, the Tax Chamber, the Property Chamber, formerly the Lands Tribunal, and the General Regulatory Chamber, which deals with Information Commissioner matters, among other things, all routinely publish their decisions on the website. Furthermore, the Employment Tribunal, which, although not part of the First-tier Tribunal, is a tribunal of even jurisdiction, also publishes all its decisions on the website. But the First-tier Tribunal does not do that. Its decisions are made behind what is effectively a curtain of secrecy.
This is no small number of cases. In 2020-21, the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) disposed of 20,000 appeals. In 2021-22, it disposed of 41,000 appeals. In 2022-23, it disposed of 38,000 appeals and in the last year we have numbers for, 2023-24, it was 39,000 appeals. It will come as no surprise that it is plainly in the public interest to have openness and transparency of decision-making. There should be public scrutiny of the decision-making of the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber). There is no basis for there not being transparency and publication of judgments of the First-tier Tribunal.
It is of course open to litigants in the First-tier Tribunal to apply to the tribunal for an order that the identity of everybody in the case be anonymised in the decision, so no risk to anyone participating in the case would be occasioned by the publication of the decision. The Supreme Court, in the case of Kambadzi in 2011, made it clear that, while anonymity needed to be justified in each case, there is now an expectation that in asylum cases there are frequently anonymity orders. So there is no argument that the non-publication of First-tier Tribunal decisions is to protect the people participating in the cases. There is, in fact, absolutely no coherent basis for not publishing these decisions, and this is made all the worse because there is very significant public interest in this decision-making.
I venture to suggest that the judges of the First-tier Tribunal would welcome the additional openness and transparency. We hear cases reported in the press: for example, the famous “Case of Theresa’s cat”, as it was called in the Daily Mail, and the “Chicken Nuggets Case”. We can all think of cases which have been reported by reason of matters which are identified as amounting to a breach of Article 8 or Article 3 of the convention. If the decisions were published in an accessible way on the internet, like all the other decisions in the other tribunals I listed, the press could immediately go to the decision and see whether that particular feature was, in fact, decisive in the decision-making.
And it cuts both ways. Not only would it be open to a journalist or researcher to analyse the methods by which decisions are taken by the judges of the First-tier Tribunal; they could analyse it by reference to the individual judge. Allegations of bias may be rebutted, or indeed it may be found that particular judges are refusing all cases. It does not favour one side of the argument or the other; it is simply fair and appropriate that these judgments be published.
The only reason which I can discern that these decisions are not published at present is that it has been the practice hitherto. Since 2007, on the formulation of the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum) chamber, there has been a practice direction. There is nothing in statute, and the judges one speaks to can see no good reason why those decisions are not published. We know the tribunal service can manage it, because it manages it in the tax chamber, the property chamber, the general regulatory chamber and in the employment tribunal; it is the same tribunal service. Furthermore, it has all the judgments electronically in any event, so there is no cost argument and no process argument.
This is an amendment whose time has come. The Government should accept it at this stage and appreciate that this is something that warrants careful consideration. I beg to move.
My Lords, it is not obvious how there could be any sensible objection to this group of amendments. They are all concerned with open justice. There are many well-known judicial utterances about the importance of this, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Murray, quoting the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale. I like a recent one from a Scottish judge, Lord Carloway, who said this:
“Open justice has two key elements. The first is that proceedings are heard and determined in public. The second is that the public should have access to judicial decisions, including any reasons given for them and the identity of the parties. As a proxy for the wider public, the media have an important role. Reporting on court and tribunal cases is vital to ensuring public confidence in the justice system and the rule of law. The public would lose confidence in the courts if they could not understand what decision had been reached and why it had been reached”.
The 188-page report from the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, has already been mentioned on more than one occasion. Referring to these decisions, in paragraph 48 he said this:
“A further difficulty in this area is that many of these decisions are not reported, making accountability difficult, and often these only come to light on appeal to the Upper Tribunal”.
There, he is referring to the First-tier Tribunal. In paragraph 50 of the same report, he said
“there may well be low-quality decision making going on in the initial stages, much of which is never corrected”.
In whose interests can it be to keep these decisions out of the public domain? For those who defend the decisions, they can illustrate the point; for those who attack them, they will have much better evidence. It cannot seriously be doubted that the decisions at the moment are of particular importance. Please can the public know what is being decided and why?
My Lords, I have a short intervention. If the First-tier Tribunal is open, as I understand from my noble friend Lord Murray it is, I see no reason for not allowing publication in the interests of confidence in our tribunal system.
I remind noble Lords that, in April 2022, the National Archives and the Ministry of Justice launched Find Case Law, which is an online service allowing everybody to access freely accessible court judgments and tribunal decisions.
It remains the case—I suppose it ill behoves me to point this out, but this is something that the Opposition Front Bench is a sudden convert to—that, in various passages of immigration law that the previous Government put through your Lordships’ House, Members opposite could have made this proposal. It is convenient that they have now decided that this is a worthy thing to do.
I do not think it is unfair to suggest that people with an interest in accessing judgments can make the application. Those persons are most likely to be interested journalists or other legal practitioners. I am sure that it is the case that, despite some of the other tribunals that the noble Lord, Lord Murray, enumerated for us, such as the land tribunal, just because it is openly accessible that does not mean that everybody is regularly searching through it.
We see no reason to change the status quo; it is for the judiciary for decide whether to publish decisions. This suited the previous Government, and this suits us as well. That is why I ask the noble Lord, Lord Murray, to withdraw his amendment.
The noble Lord said that it “suits us”. What does that mean? Is he happy with a situation where the general public do not know, because the previous Government apparently did not make much of a fuss about this? Is that what he is saying?
No, I am simply saying that cases in the Upper Tribunal are regularly published, which are the cases that present the most case law which is actually of use to legal practitioners and of interest to the media and the public. We should protect the independence of the judiciary in being able to make its own decisions about it.
I have one further question, if I may. We understand from the Minister’s colleague that there is likely to be legislation coming telling tribunals how they should make these decisions and how, in particular, they should perhaps be changing their approach to Article 8 and Article 3. In order to inform themselves as to how this is going, in terms of the First-tier Tribunal, would it not be rather useful if the Government at least knew what they were deciding on a regular basis?
It would probably ill behove me to predicate my answer on legislation that I have yet to see. As and when we get to the passage of that legislation, we can perhaps revisit this conversation, and he might want to bring back my words to haunt me, but as it currently stands, I cannot talk about legislation that, frankly, I have not seen.
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 107, 108 and 111 standing in my name. They are all linked to the amendments in the previous group and once again are aimed at understanding exactly why the Government are repealing each of these clauses.
First and foremost, Amendment 106 rightly acknowledges the unique vulnerability of unaccompanied children. Unlike adults, these children do not have the benefit of parental guidance, support or protection, which fundamentally changes the context in which any immigration or removal decision should be made. The exemption from removal under proposed new subsection (1) reflects the humane principle that children, especially those who arrive without guardians, require special consideration. At the same time, the amendment incorporates a balanced discretion for the Secretary of State to make exceptions, but, crucially, only in narrowly defined and principled circumstances. This discretion is limited to cases of family reunion or removal to a safe state to which the child has a clear connection, such as nationality or passport holding. This would ensure that the state maintains the ability to act in the best interests of the child and public policy without resorting to indiscriminate removals.
Amendment 107 would bring much-needed clarity and accountability to the handling of European Court of Human Rights interim measures, in relation to the duty to remove under Amendment 105. Interim measures, often issued to prevent irreparable harm while a full hearing is pending, are a critical tool in safeguarding human rights. However, this amendment rightly recognises that these measures must be balanced with national sovereignty and the Government’s responsibility to manage immigration effectively. First, the amendment would establish that the decision to give effect to a European Court of Human Rights interim measure is the discretionary personal responsibility of a Minister of the Crown. This personal involvement emphasises the gravity of the decision, ensuring that it is not delegated lightly or handled bureaucratically. Such a provision would enhance political accountability, requiring Ministers to engage directly with complex legal and humanitarian issues rather than allowing automatic suspension of removal without sovereign consideration.
Furthermore, by restricting the obligation of immigration officials, courts and tribunals to give effect to the interim measure where a Minister has chosen not to recognise it, the amendment would prevent conflicting mandates within the system. This avoids a confusing legal limbo where different authorities might take contradictory positions regarding removal actions that undermine coherence and efficiency in immigration enforcement. This provision strikes a pragmatic balance between respecting international human rights obligations and preserving the Government’s capacity to maintain effective border control. It avoids rigid, automatic enforcement of interim measures that could paralyse immigration functions while still providing a structured framework to engage with the European court’s decisions.
Amendment 108 is a crucial step towards ensuring the duty in Amendment 105 is not needlessly hobbled, and that anyone who enters illegally is removed no matter who they are. It would tackle head-on abuse of asylum and human rights claims, a process that can delay removals and undermine the integrity of the immigration system. The amendment would make it clear that, for individuals meeting the statutory conditions for removal, any protection claim, human rights claim, trafficking or slavery victim claim or application for judicial review cannot be used to delay or frustrate the removal process.
This is vital. Currently, the system is frequently exploited through repeated and sometimes frivolous claims, causing prolonged uncertainty, administrative backlog and resource drain on the Home Office and courts. Declaring claims inadmissible at the outset when conditions for removal are met would significantly reduce abuse. It sends a strong message that these legal routes are not loopholes for indefinite delay. This also enables faster removal decisions, preserving our ability to control our borders effectively.
We have also included a judicial ouster clause in this amendment to prevent courts from setting aside inadmissibility declarations, promoting legal certainty and finality in removal proceedings. This avoids protracted litigation and vexatious legal challenges, which often tie up judicial resources without improving outcomes for genuine claimants.
Finally, Amendment 111 addresses the question of what support, if any, is available to individuals whose asylum or related claims are declared inadmissible under these amendments. By amending the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and related legislation, the proposed clause ensures that the withdrawal or withholding of support aligns consistently with the inadmissibility framework. This is essential for legal clarity and operational coherence. Without these amendments, there would be a disconnect between the removal of rights to remain and the removal of support, potentially creating gaps or confusion in how support is administered. The amendment ensures that, when a person’s claim is declared inadmissible under the new rules, the support framework adjusts accordingly, reflecting that the individual is no longer entitled to certain forms of state assistance. It also protects the integrity of the asylum support system by preventing those whose claims do not meet the admissibility criteria from accessing support intended for genuine asylum seekers. I beg to move.
My Lords, I know that the Government vigorously opposed the Rwanda Bill, and indeed the Prime Minister described it as a gimmick, or words to that effect. I understand that that is the Government’s position, and I do not expect them to change their mind. But the point worth making is that, although the Rwanda scheme as a whole may not have found favour with the Government, it does not follow that some of the provisions in that Act are not appropriate to whatever policy the Government ultimately may think is appropriate. I know that this is something of a moving picture, as the Minister acknowledged.
I will not repeat what I said in the wrong group in relation to Amendment 107, but I place particular emphasis on that amendment because that issue was a pretty obvious excess of jurisdiction on the part of the European Court of Human Rights. This Government, whatever the final form their policy takes in statutory terms, may find that they have an interim ruling from the European Court of Human Rights that offends natural justice. The fact that—as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, quite rightly said—it needs a Minister before a decision is taken to reject it is an important safeguard. It is not a question of casting it aside and ignoring it; it is considered at an appropriate level, having regard to the unsatisfactory nature of the interim order that the court made under Rule 39. It is important that that provision should be inserted, whatever form the policy takes.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for the amendment. As I have said previously, the Government are trying to ensure that we have a properly functioning immigration system. The Illegal Migration Act 2023 included provisions that, in my view, prevented asylum decision-making, increased the backlog of asylum cases awaiting an outcome and put impossible pressure on asylum accommodation, with significant costs to the taxpayer, which we have discussed on other groups.
The Act has largely not been commenced, and it is this Government’s policy—I confirm this to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks—that we will not commence the Act, as we have accordingly stated in our manifesto and elsewhere. Therefore, Clause 38 repeals the majority of the measures contained in the Illegal Migration Act 2023, including Section 2 on the duty to remove and associated provisions. However, it is not a blanket approach to repealing the Act. The six measures that the Government intend to retain include provisions that are in force and that have been identified as having operational utility and benefit. The Government see all these powers as important tools to allow for the proper operation of the immigration system and to achieve our wider priorities, along with the other measures that we brought forward.
Amendment 106 seeks to retain Section 4 of the Illegal Migration Act. I believe this measure to be unnecessary. The new clause would, for example, preserve the power to remove unaccompanied children under 18 in specific circumstances when the duty to remove applies.
Section 55, which the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, referred to and which Amendment 107 seeks to retain, would provide for a Minister of the Crown to disregard an interim measure of the European Court of Human Rights where the duty to remove applies. I have heard what the noble Lord said. We have made a judgment that we do not need that provision, and therefore this is part of our proposals on the repeal of the Act.
Section 5 of the Illegal Migration Act, which Amendment 108 seeks to retain, would have meant that an asylum claim and/or human rights claim would be declared inadmissible and would not have been substantively considered in the UK where the person had entered or arrived illegally and had not come directly from a country in which their life or liberty were threatened. It would also have meant that an asylum claim and/or human rights claim would have been declared inadmissible if the person was from a country of origin considered generally safe.
Section 9 of the Illegal Migration Act, which Amendment 111 seeks to retain, would ensure that individuals whose claims are disregarded as a result of being subject to the duty to remove and disregard of certain claims provisions—these are a result of amendments we have considered earlier, such as Amendment 105, and now Amendments 108 and 109—are entitled to support only under Section 4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. This would align their entitlement to support to others declared inadmissible under Sections 80A or 80B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, akin to that of failed asylum seekers. This clause is also unnecessary.
The sections included in this group of amendments were designed to operate alongside Section 2 of the IMA Act, which imposed the duty to remove. As we are now repealing Section 2, this group of amendments has no legal or practical effect. Leaving them in place would simply create confusion. Repealing these sections is a necessary step to ensure the law reflects the Government’s policy direction and avoids ambiguity. Again, I appreciate the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Faulkes, and the Front Bench, but, on the basis of the comments I have made, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Davies, to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, for his introduction to Amendments 120 and 110, which respectively seek to retain the Schedule 1 list of countries to which a person subject to the duty to remove under the Illegal Migration Act could be removed, and the power to amend that list of countries. If noble Lords examine the amendment in detail, they will see that it is reliant on Amendment 105, which we discussed in a previous group and which seeks to retain the duty to remove from the IMA, and a number of other amendments that we have already debated that hinge on these attempts to reinstate the IMA. In a sense, without Amendment 105, which has been withdrawn by the noble Lord, this cannot be implemented. Of course, we have had the debate and I will still answer the points raised.
The Bill does not take a blanket approach to the repeal of the IMA, and the Government intend to retain provisions that have been identified as having operational utility and benefit. However, these amendments do not do that—particularly now that Amendment 105 has been withdrawn. They would have no effect without retention of the duty to remove and associated provisions. Those provisions were introduced for the purposes of the previous Government’s failed Rwanda scheme and, as we have said in the manifesto and beyond, we intend to remove the Rwanda scheme as a whole.
I note the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton; they made extremely valid points about the country list and the mechanism for that list. It backs up the provisions that we have mentioned from the Government’s perspective as to why we are not going to progress Amendments 120 and 110. Self-evidently, the previous Government tried and failed to implement those provisions, so even without Amendment 105 it is quite challenging for us to agree to pick up the torch and carry on when the previous Government could not do that themselves. Those policies also brought the system to a standstill. There were thousands of asylum claims put on hold, an increase in the backlog, incredible pressure on the asylum accommodation system and significant cost to the taxpayer. Those are some of the challenges that, even now, the 13 month-old Government are trying to pick up.
Therefore, I cannot support the amendments that seek to reintroduce those measures from the IMA. Through Clause 38, which we have considered already, this Government seek to repeal the majority of the measures contained in the IMA, including the provisions that these amendments seek to retain.
It is also worth noting that this list is, in effect, more restrictive as to where we could remove an individual who has come to the UK unlawfully under well-established powers to remove that we already have in place. Under existing inadmissibility provisions, an asylum claim may be treated as inadmissible if the claimant has previously been present in, or has a connection to, a safe third country where it is considered reasonable to expect them to have sought protection. Under existing powers, we can remove people to a country or territory to which there is reason to believe a person will be admitted.
Therefore, for the reasons given in relation to Amendment 105 and with a strong—I hope—listening message to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, I invite the noble Lord not to press these amendments.
Before the Minister sits down, I understand exactly what he said about the list, but how does a tribunal determine in an individual case whether a country is safe?
I have said to the Committee previously that that has to be examined on an individual basis. The examples that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has given, where a country may be safe but a small region of that country or a protected characteristic of the individual may not be, are judgments that are made based on the evidence put before a tribunal. We will of course examine those issues in detail, but the blanket approach we have here is not appropriate.
I am sorry to pursue the point, but it seems to be quite important. Therefore, does an individual court have to make an assessment without any guidance from Parliament as to whether, for that individual, with their particular characteristics, a particular country is safe?
It is fair and reasonable for a tribunal to look at those representations accordingly. In this legislation, we are trying to remove the effective provisions which meant that the Rwanda offer was in place under legislation. As we have done through the immigration White Paper and other statements, we are continually monitoring how the practice is going to be implemented once this has been completed. I will certainly reflect on the points that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has made, but the principle before the Committee today is that the list of countries without the provisions we have already agreed are being repealed or the amendment which has already been withdrawn is superfluous. Backed up by the comments of the noble Lord, it also means that what is deemed to be a safe country may not be a safe country. There are elements that can be examined and representations that can be made to ensure that people who either have a characteristic or are from a particular region in a country can make the case to the tribunal that their individual circumstances demand a decision not to be removed.
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberI am inclined to agree with the noble Lord, but that does not lead me to have any sympathy at all for Amendment 203J.
The noble Lord says that it would be “Trumpian” to take the course that is being suggested. Supposing that in the Supreme Court, the majority and the minority had been the other way round—and it may be that the majority was taking the correct view—there would be a decision of the Supreme Court which would be at odds with his interpretation and general understanding of the refugee convention. Why is that Trumpian? When we have a dualist system in this country, where we are capable of legislating for our own interests, why is it Trumpian to say that we cannot do that?
I am very interested in the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. He always makes a very pertinent point, but this is surely wrong in common sense. I do not speak as a lawyer, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, did, but this is common sense. Surely, as my noble friend Lord Murray said, the refugee convention as it stands would want someone from Afghanistan to be accepted in a country near Afghanistan, and they would probably prefer that. But that person is given four or five alternatives. He need not stop in one country or another country. Surely it is designed to discourage “asylum tourism”, whereby you decide which countries suit your purpose.
That is surely something we shall consider. It is not necessarily the case that someone coming from Afghanistan will be sent back to Afghanistan. They may come from France, in which case they may stay in France, where they are in no danger. If they go via Italy, they are in no danger there, either. Surely this is the logic of the situation, which ordinary people cannot understand. Why do we have to accept these people who come through multiple countries when there is a refugee convention which accepts that they need not be accepted if they have come through more than one country?
My Lords, I am conscious that this has been a long group already, and I know that the Government Whips will be staring at me with glaring eyes. I did not intend to speak in this debate; this is my first raising of my head into the fray of the Bill. I was listening to what my noble friend and others have said. As some will recall, I was answering from the Dispatch Box on behalf of the Home Office at the tail end of the last Government, and I confess to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that, I am sorry to say, I was involved in the drafting of the then Rwanda deal in No. 10 when one of the previous Prime Ministers was there. It was good then; it is good now.
The noble Lord says that it was good. There was a provision in the Rwanda Bill which said that, notwithstanding deeming that Rwanda was safe, it might not be safe for the individual, so the Bill would not even have worked.
I suppose that was a slight defect of the Bill, but that ship has sailed. The crucial point, which I will come back to—and I respect the noble Lord enormously—is that the Rwanda deal had a deterrent, and that is what we are lacking. It may have been only for small numbers, not anywhere near the numbers we wanted, but it was a deterrent. It was one part of a series of steps that we should have taken, but, as I say, that ship has sailed.
I am backing the amendments from my noble friend Lord Murray and my noble friends on my Front Bench, certainly not because I have been asked or told to, and, as my noble friend Lord Jackson said, this is not about pulling out of the ECHR or the refugee convention, nor—as I think the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, was saying—about saying that we do not want to accept any refugees, but because it is about tackling illegal migration and the crossings we have had.
We have seen one so-called spectre raise its head today in the form of the elected President of the United States. There is another spectre on the horizon that we have not yet heard about, but I am sure we will at some stage: Reform UK and Farage. It is certainly not a view that I share, nor is it that of Reform voters. I am not saying that the Ministers do not know this, but I echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Empey, said: outside this hallowed hall there is a genuine, deep, growing sense of unease, anger and frustration, which is building. I know that it is not unique to this Government, as it has been growing for some time, but it has grown exponentially of late because of this sense of injustice and lack of control.
As I think the Government have said—which the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, alluded to—crucially, we need a deterrent to tackle the crossings. We have to grip this; we have to tackle the numbers and, as I think my noble friend Lord Goschen was saying, we have to tackle the pull factor. There is no deterrent in the Bill as it currently stands. That is why I wholeheartedly support my noble friend, and the two amendments from my Front Bench.
My Lords, this has been a very wide-ranging debate that has departed in many ways from the list in the group that we are debating. But it has been a worthwhile and fascinating debate and, as my noble friend Lord Gascoigne said, the context for it has to be what he termed the growing sense of injustice on the part of many people in this country about the direction of our immigration system. That should be borne in mind by us all as we debate not just this group but the Bill in general.
Returning to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, which attempts to remove Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act from the statute book, I suggest that the principle of that section is straightforward and hard to disagree with. That principle is: if an individual is a national of a country where there is no general risk of persecution, where human rights are respected and where there is access to justice and democratic accountability, is it not right that their claim be considered inadmissible unless there are exceptional grounds? Is it not right that, instead, we focus our finite resources and time on those fleeing regimes where oppression, conflict and state violence are real and present dangers?
The practical benefits of Section 59 are significant. It reduces administrative and clerical delay, streamlines caseworking, ensures that officials can focus on the most serious and urgent claims, and establishes a clear statutory list of safe states, with the ability to amend that list through accountable parliamentary procedure. That list is not set in stone; it can change, and it creates both clarity and flexibility.
By failing to adopt this section, we risk achieving the opposite. We risk a system clogged with vexatious or unfounded claims by legal gamesmanship—I say that as a lawyer—and by delay, which comes at a cost not only to the taxpayer but, more importantly, to those who truly do need our help: the victims of torture, persecution, war and trafficking, whom we have a moral duty to protect. I suggest to the Committee that Section 59 helps to ensure that that duty is fulfilled, not diluted, and that it prioritises principle, preserves the fairness of the system and promotes justice. For all those reasons, and despite my long-standing respect for the noble Lord, I am unable to support his amendment.
Amendment 192, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower, does not target genuine refugees or close the door to those in real and urgent need who use safe and legal routes to come to the UK. It ensures that the law applies equally to all and that those who enter this country legally or who make claims from safe third countries are not placed at a disadvantage compared to those who enter clandestinely or via criminal routes. We cannot have a two-tier legal system: one for citizens and legal migrants and another for those who deliberately breach our laws and then ask for protection. We need to remember that this is not just damaging for us and our legal system; it is damaging and dangerous for the migrants themselves. It hands power to the criminal or gangs; it encourages risky and dangerous unlawful crossings; and it ensures that vulnerable people are drawn into a system that is harder, not easier, to navigate.
That ties in with Amendment 203J, tabled by my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth and spoken to by him with his customary lucidity and compelling arguments. I note that it was supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, at least tentatively, and he prayed in aid Lord Rodger of Earlsferry in the court case that he mentioned—two of Scotland’s most eminent jurists of the last 25 years. My noble friends Lord Murray and Lord Jackson of Peterborough and many others made excellent points about that amendment, which has a simple and sensible underlying premise: genuine asylum seekers should claim asylum when they get to a safe country. Travelling through multiple safe countries and then attempting to cross the channel to claim asylum in the UK is an abuse of that system, and I therefore support that amendment.
What is the noble Lord’s answer to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that we have no business interpreting the refugee convention on a domestic level and that it is a matter for the wide world that considers the convention?
I am grateful to the noble Lord. My answer is that it is our business and that we can devise an asylum and immigration system for this country—and that entitles us to make the points that not only my noble friend Lord Murray but the Conservative Party Front Bench have made throughout the Bill: that this is about achieving a system that deters illegal migration and yet allows those who are in real need to use safe and legal routes to come to the UK.
I am grateful to noble Lords for what has been a very wide discussion, wider than I anticipated. I sense that at the end of the debate I probably will not have satisfied many noble Lords in the Chamber today, but such is the nature of government responsibilities.
I was not intending to say this, but given the comments from the noble Viscount, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, the noble Lords, Lord Gascoigne and Lord Empey, and others, I think it is worth setting out that the Government have taken this issue extremely seriously in their manifesto and in their actions, not just in this Bill but in the immigration White Paper that we have published and in the unilateral actions that we have taken independently without requiring legislation. The issues of illegal entry, defining our asylum system and tackling an effective immigration system are extremely important. I do not wish to rehearse all the arguments, but it is worth placing on the record again that this Government have spent time talking to their allies in France and agreed the treaty looking at an exchange. It is a pilot that will be looked at in detail. We are working with the Calais Group of Belgium, France and Holland on international action to stop smuggling. We are working downstream with the German Government to tackle issues to do with boat manufacture and transfers. We have signed agreements with Iraq. We have put powers in this Bill to establish the Border Security Command and to make some activities criminal, which we discussed earlier today. We have a commitment to end hotel use by the end of this Parliament and we have saved £1 billion-worth of expenditure over the past 12 months by reducing the number of hotels being used but also by maximising the use of those hotels. We have put a lot of energy into cracking down on illegal working to try to stop some of the pull factors that make people think they can come to this country, disappear into the system and work illegally. We are trying to crack down on that and we have increased the number of arrests and prosecutions. We have speeded up the asylum claims system, because at the heart of this is determining who has a right to stay in this country and removing those who do not. We have speeded up the processing of asylum claims and removed 9,000-plus people in the past 12 months who have no right to be in the UK.
A number of Members have said that the Bill seems to have been frozen in time and things have moved on. I can assure the noble Baroness that we will have a debate about how lily-livered she is—we can discuss that in due course in a friendly, competitive way—but we are continually looking at these issues. The measures that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has brought forward this week are based on the assessment that she has made of the situation, which is ongoing. To give the example of this week, if we find that family reunion applications have increased by over 100% in the past two years and there is a big issue in terms of people coming to the country through that route, it is right to suspend that family reunion route to review it, as we will do very shortly. That is what Governments do. We look at the problems and challenges and we review it.
We have set out measures in this Bill to establish a fairer, stronger system. We have done the same in the immigration White Paper and we have taken actions accordingly elsewhere to have a purpose. I do not want to see the type of concerns, distrust and disorder that there are around hotel use and people who are here while their asylum claims are assessed. I want to understand those concerns. I am not making this a party-political issue. The concerns that have arisen over the past nine years are driven by small boat crossings. The noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, stood at this Dispatch Box while I had my interregnum from both Houses of Parliament and made cases for the Rwanda scheme, which he has admitted today had some flaws and which we have taken a decision to repeal in full. I think that we have a shared understanding from all sides of this Committee that this is an issue that needs to be challenged and tackled, which is why we are setting out the measures today.
There are a number of amendments before us, and I shall try to talk to them as a whole, starting with the Opposition Front Bench, because they are the Opposition and they are the Front Bench, so it is fair to start with them. I shall return to my noble friend Lord Browne in due course.
The two amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Cameron and Lord Davies, Amendments 192 and 193, seek to widen the current inadmissibility provisions. Currently, individuals can be removed to a safe third country if their asylum claims are declared inadmissible. That includes illegal entrants as well as other claimants whose asylum claims are liable to inadmissibility. The inadmissibility process is intended to support the safety of asylum seekers and the integrity of the border, as well as the fairness of the asylum system, by encouraging asylum seekers to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach, deterring them from making unnecessary and dangerous onward journeys to the UK.
For a claim to be declared inadmissible and not substantively considered by the UK, the individual has to have been present previously in, or have a connection to, a safe third country where they could claim asylum or could reasonably be expected to have done so. Under Amendment 192, anyone who arrives illegally must have their asylum claim declared inadmissible. With due respect to the noble Lord, that amendment would mean in practice that all asylum seekers who entered the UK illegally would have their claims declared inadmissible, with no regard for whether there is a safe third country for them to return to. Such an approach would, in my view, mean a rapidly growing number of people whose claims would be inadmissible, which in turn would mean that we could not establish whether they qualify for refugee status. In that scenario, those individuals would be in a holding position, unable to be removed, including those with genuine claims who would have their claims assessed now under the system, where 60%-plus of people who make a claim have it approved. That is a difficult challenge. It is with integrity that the noble Lord has moved the amendment, but it is difficult, and it would not have the objective that he seeks.
Similarly, with Amendment 193, the noble Lord also seeks to ensure that individuals will have their asylum claims declared inadmissible when they fail to register an asylum claim within 12 months. Again, there is a motive behind that which has an integrity, but it is one that I cannot share. Some people do lodge asylum claims in an opportunistic manner, sometimes to extend the time that they can remain in the UK, but this amendment would not deal with that particular issue. It would simply extend indefinitely the time in which those individuals would be able to remain in the UK because, without an ability to examine their claims, we cannot determine whether they qualify for refugee status.
The amendment also fails to take account of sur place refugees, which would mean that anyone lawfully in the UK from a country in which the circumstances have changed—and we have had much discussion around that today—in a significant and detrimental way, for example if there has been an armed conflict in the 12 months they have been here, would be unable to avail themselves of the protection of the UK.
In contrast to that, we have the amendment from my noble friend Lord Browne, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and the noble and learned Lord Hope, have spoken in support of it. That amendment would repeal Section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act, which amends Section 80A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which itself provides that asylum claims from EU nationals must be declared inadmissible to the UK’s asylum system, other than where exceptional circumstances apply. Inadmissibility procedures in this section allow a state to declare an asylum claim inadmissible when the claim is made by nationals of countries that are declared generally safe. It is an important, long-standing process that can help prevent asylum claims from nationals of countries that are safe absorbing the limited resources that we have.
I understand the motivation behind the amendment from my noble friend, but I remind the Committee that Section 59 is not yet fully commenced. Indeed, the only part of Section 59 that has been commenced is the power to add or remove countries from that list of safe countries. However, and this goes to the question posed to me by the noble Lord, Lord German, the Government believe that it is important and the right approach to retain the flexibility to expand the use of inadmissibility in the event that we see asylum claims from individuals from countries that we would generally consider safe. That addresses the point that my noble friend made.
Amendment 203J has had support from a number of noble Lords, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox of Buckley and Lady Lawlor, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and the noble Lord, Lord Murray, who proposed this system. We have had some discussion around ECHR Article 8 and the French treaty from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. Let me just say again, for clarity and for this Committee, that the Government believe in the ECHR and are committed to our international obligations, for a whole range of reasons that I have outlined on a number of occasions, but that does not mean that we cannot look at things.
The Article 8 provisions that we have trailed that we will look at, which again goes to other points that have been made by other noble Lords, are issues that we will return to in the coming months that we want to consult on, including consulting colleagues in the judiciary to ensure that we have an understanding of the interpretation of Article 8 and whether it needs to be tightened to ensure that the country is not taken for a ride by individuals using that premise under circumstances where effectively they are using it as a last resort, in a way in which we all really think is inadmissible, to use a word that we have used a lot today. I do not think that that is appropriate. That Article 8 review is ongoing. The French treaty that we have established is in pilot form and we will review it during this month. We hope to extend it further and I shall report back to the House on the numbers involved. There are other tools that we are working on to ensure that we help put some energy into tackling this important problem.
I am grateful to the Minister for taking this intervention and grateful to him as well for explaining in general terms what the Government are thinking about. I understand why at the moment he cannot be more specific. He says that the consideration is to Article 8, but should it not also embrace Article 3, which is very often used in circumstances where many people would raise a question as to how appropriate it is?
I am happy to examine that. We have said publicly that Article 8 is the focus for our examination, discussion and wider review. However, that does not mean—and this is the key, important point—that we will ditch the ECHR. Although it is 75 to 80 years old and was established in 1950, as a number of noble Lords, including Lord Kerr, have mentioned, it establishes a number of basic rights, which are important to me and to the people we represent and the people in our communities. They set a basic framework, but that does not mean that we cannot look at how those interpretations are made. That is why we are trying to do that.
To come back to Amendment 203J from the noble Lord, Lord Murray, this would impose a legal obligation to refuse all asylum claims made by illegal or other irregular migrants who travel from safe countries. The stated intention of the measure is to deter such people from using dangerous and illegal methods to enter the UK. I am with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, on this: the amendment would not achieve that aim. Refusing a person’s asylum claim and proposing removal to their country of origin without consideration of the merits of their claim would put the UK in breach of its obligations under the refugee convention. We may not want to be in the refugee convention, but we are in it and we cannot in my view unilaterally breach those obligations accordingly. Even if a person’s asylum claim could be refused on account of this measure, the humanitarian protection claim would still need to be properly considered on its merits.
The intervention that I took invited me to examine that issue. I have said I will examine it, but, as I said in response to that question, the focus of the Government as a whole is on Article 8. We anticipate energising the review of Article 8 to ensure that we examine how it is currently interpreted, what actions are taken as a result of the article, and whether further guidance needs to be issued about those matters. In response to the intervention as to whether I would look at Article 3, I have said that I will look at the point that was made then. The focus of the Government is Article 8.
To clarify the position, I was not suggesting derogating from Article 8. The possibility of giving guidance to judges is, I believe, under consideration and it may be that, in resolving issues under both Articles 8 and 3, it might be necessary for the Government to think again as to what guidance to give to courts.
I thought that was what I said. I hope we can agree, at the end of this group of amendments that was livelier than I initially anticipated, that the Committee can support the Government’s direction of travel. However, I hope the amendment before the Committee today will be withdrawn.
My Lords, it is an honour to follow the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who eloquently set out some of the history of the most recent slew of immigration Acts.
I have a slightly more practical question for both the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the Minister, which relates to the various lists of safe countries. The Opposition will discuss their Amendment 120 later. In Amendment 109, proposed new subsection (5) states:
“P may be removed to a country or territory … only if it is listed in”
their proposed new schedule. That schedule is in Amendment 120, where, for many of the countries listed, it states “in respect of men”—in other words, men will be regarded as safe to go back to that country. However, many of those countries already have severe discrimination against LGBT people, including men. In some countries, it is punishable by death and, in others, by imprisonment—but, much more importantly, society feels at liberty to attack and kill gay men. I ask both the Minister and the Opposition spokesperson: what happens to an individual in that position, where the country is regarded to be safe in general but for one group of people it is clearly not?
My Lords, I am sure the Minister will answer that question in due course.
The noble and learned Baroness suggested that the Government should not even be asked to respond to these amendments. With very great respect, I do not agree. The previous Government’s Bill that eventually fell away—the Rwanda Bill—was intended to provide a deterrent. I think it is common ground that a deterrent is necessary. The nature of that deterrent may be very much in dispute. Government thinking is still forming on the best way to deal with this very real problem.
The Government need to come up with a response. They had quite a lot of time in opposition in which to generate what they thought was an appropriate deterrent. They have now been in power for a year, and it appears that there is more thinking going on in recognition of the very real problem that they face. In my respectful view, the Government have a case to answer as to what precisely the deterrent will be. What will prevent what we see in our papers and on our screens every day?
My second point is about Amendment 107 and the interim measures of the European Court of Human Rights. I think it was during the Minister’s interregnum that there was a great deal of debate about the interim order made by the European Court of Human Rights. Even the most fervent defender of the European Court of Human Rights would be hard pushed to defend the order it made, which rejected a decision by our courts. It was made by an unnamed judge, it did not give the Government an opportunity to make representations and it did not have a return date by which, in accordance with normal practice, a Government or any other party would have a chance to answer the original order. This was a flagrant breach of natural justice, as was more or less accepted.
Whatever form the Government’s policy finally takes, they would be well advised to bear in mind what is in Amendment 107. It would give the Government the chance to consider the appropriateness of the interim measure—it is a very carefully drawn amendment because it gives that responsibility to a Minister of the Crown. There were many debates about whether the European Court of Human Rights even had the jurisdiction to make these interim measures. I respectfully suggest that, whatever else the Government think about these amendments, Amendment 107 ought to be very carefully considered.
My Lords, I will just ask for two things. First, I hope that the Government will take and answer these amendments seriously. Secondly, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, will accept that it is not proper for the previous Government, who failed to answer this problem, constantly to suggest that this Government are also failing.
None of us has an answer to what is a very real problem. We do not help it by saying, “Yah boo, we thought we should do this”, particularly when, we may have thought we should do it, but it would be very difficult to argue that the previous Government were terribly successful at stopping the boats. I plead that we have these debates in a form which says that we want to find an answer to what is a very difficult issue. Both sides have to accept that. The noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, who is not in his place now, was a Minister and did not solve the problem. I do not blame him for that, because it is an almost impossible problem to solve, due to the whole range of issues that we have talked about.
I hope that the Committee will talk about this issue in a way where we are all trying to solve it, rather than sides trying to suggest that they are better at solving it. We know perfectly well that, at the moment, the Government have not shown themselves able to solve it and the Opposition have to admit that, in all the years of being in power, we did not solve it. Can we start off with a bit of humility on this side and a bit of acceptance of vulnerability on the other?
(3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I make just one technical point. We are here to discuss whether or not these amendments are going to work if they are passed.
Amendment 35, for example, deals with the defence of reasonable excuse by reference to a number of international conventions. I am a bit concerned as to how a court is going to direct a jury in respect to that. Certainly, it is arguable that they should reflect those conventions. As the amendment is currently framed, that is going to be legally very difficult. It is not normally the way these things are done. There should perhaps be some definition which embodies what is contained in those conventions, rather than simply reciting them as a list, because I do not think a court is going to find that very easy to interpret.
Incidentally, I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that the insertion of the word “reckless” does not help in terms of clarity. It is one of the most difficult words in the legal context. Courts of all levels have struggled to find any clarity with the word “reckless”.
My Lords, the debate has obviously spanned beyond the amendments before us, but it is worth stating at the outset that the focus of these amendments is to determine that the provisions are aimed at the particular people who are breaking the law—the smugglers. The focus has to be that it helps law enforcement and the judiciary to focus their resources on the people that the Government really want to apprehend in order to tackle the criminal gangs. There are words—which I will come to in a moment—on which I agree a different definition might be more helpful, but it is worth while repeating the words of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, about the international regulations and rules that guide us and we put around ourselves and the importance of those.
I am reluctant to go into this field of the reinterpretation of the ECHR, but one mistake relates to the fact that some countries signed an unaddressed letter which gave no indication whatever of what changes to the ECHR they were looking for. The person who was supposed to receive it read about it in the newspapers. I contrast that arrangement, where nothing could be made of the letter because it gave no sense of what was to be changed, to the approach of the British Secretary of State for Justice, who approached the matter in a proper manner and spoke to the people concerned, the right Committee of Ministers, who are responsible for any review of the ECHR. There is already a set of motions in place to enable that discussion to occur. It would be worth while trying to understand what people in other countries want to do and what they need to happen in order to change, but those discussions are under way because, essentially, this is a living document that needs to be changed, interpreted and looked at as time goes by, and that is happening at present.
We should be clear that these amendments would simply treat the people who are coming here with a deal of compassion. I absolutely agree that we have to separate genuine asylum seekers from the rest. We cannot do that by our own legislation until they arrive here. There are no routes by which people can arrive here, apart from the few which would not affect the people from the countries who are most affected in this matter. What makes sense with these amendments—maybe not entirely in the words they use—is that they are trying to distinguish who we are going for and who we are gunning at, as it were.
Amendment 33 seeks to ensure that the scope of the offences in Clauses 13 and 14 apply only to the smugglers. The amendments seek to link the offences to financial and material gain. If there is another way of explaining the financial and material gain as being the method by which you determine a smuggler, then obviously it would be worth noting.
In that respect, I took note of what the noble Lord, Lord Harper, said about how to deal effectively with the migrants situation. Fortunately, I went to visit the site of the Jungle in Calais two weeks ago. It is now fields; there is nothing there but fields, grass and animals grazing, and that is because the French authorities dealt with groups of people to make sure that they fit with the strategy they are adopting. They had no complaints about the way that was working at the present time. Maybe times have changed, and maybe people need to be thinking differently.
Amendment 35 proposes that the defence excuse in Clause 13 should ensure the protection of
“refugees, smuggled persons, and victims of trafficking, in certain circumstances”—
and that is the question. In mentioning “certain circumstances”, one needs to define what those circumstances are; otherwise, the courts would not be able to make the appropriate case work.
Amendment 38 suggests that the scope of offence of Clause 14 should include for financial or material gain. That is the distinguishing factor between those who are smuggled and those who are not.
Amendment 44 suggests that the defence excuse in Clause 14 should ensure protection of
“refugees, smuggled persons, and victims of trafficking, in certain circumstances”.
Again, one has to define the words “certain circumstances”, because otherwise it becomes too general.
Amendment 57 suggests that the reasonable excuse defence in Clause 16 should ensure the protection of
“refugees, smuggled persons, and victims of trafficking, in certain circumstances”.
Again, that wording needs to be tightened up.
Finally, Amendment 203 would provide
“a statutory defence for refugees in certain circumstances”
for the offences in Clauses 13, 14 and 16. Obviously, there is a need for tightening up in this matter to ensure that we can separate out the people for whom the Bill is intended to deal with: those who are causing the misery, those who are trafficking and those who are smuggling and those who are spread around Europe to make sure that these schemes work. These are the people whom the Bill should be aimed at and is aimed at. All these amendments would do is make sure that we entirely focus our efforts on those people who are causing these criminal acts.
Therefore, I suggest that these amendments have a right sense of direction in what they intend. They enshrine the international regulations which we sit within. It is not just one convention; it is quite clear from the opening speech of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, that there are a raft of international conventions, laws and rules that we sit behind. We are part of that international way of dealing with matters, and if we lose that way of dealing with it and do not follow it through, we will never be able to solve something which is so international in its nature.
(10 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberI do not know whether it is fashionable to say this, but I do not know the answer to the question about the death penalty in Iraq. I will certainly find out and write to the noble Baroness accordingly.
Where they have been deported to is a range of countries, which again is too long to list. The noble Baroness will be aware that there are lots of countries where those transfers are taking place, including Zimbabwe, Iraq, Senegal, Gambia and Algeria. If she wishes to know about the 9,400, that is like asking whether one can name the crew of a particular ship. I cannot, but I can find someone who can.
My Lords, I welcome the prospect of a returns agreement with Iraq, but some of those who come across from Iraq on boats may not be anxious to return, for one reason or another. They may, of course, get rid of their passports and conceal where they came from. Do the Government have any idea how to deal with that problem?
The Government are obviously continually trying to look at that very issue, and that is a fact of life. Since 5 July, four flights have taken place and they are the four biggest return flights in the United Kingdom’s history, with 852 people leaving on them. It is an objective of this Government to remove those people who are identified as not having the right to live in the United Kingdom. We have started doing that with nearly 1,000 people—852 on four flights. We will continue to do that with the 9,400 we have mentioned. That number will only rise and will continue to do so.
(11 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberAs with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, brings great experience to this matter. He has made a suggestion that is worth reflecting upon, but I do not wish to give consideration to it today. There are areas that we are looking at in this whole process that I will discuss with this House in due course, but today I would rather reflect on the fact that we have confidence in our police to do the job, that the jury and the CPS came to a conclusion in the trial yesterday that respects the rule of law, and that the jury has been unanimous in its decision. We will reflect on how we approach the situation post today, if the noble Lord will allow it.
The Minister said that the jury was wholly unaware of the recent evidence that we have now been given in relation to the victim and various activities that he had been involved in. But, of course, the police will have been aware of all those matters; equally, the prosecution authorities will have been aware of those matters when deciding whether or not it was appropriate to charge and try the defendant. Is the Minister happy that, with all that information, it was nevertheless considered appropriate to bring this matter to trial?
It is for the Home Office to make decisions on a range of issues. Rightly, I am not eligible to become the Crown Prosecution Service and determine what information it presents to a jury; nor am I in a position to be the jury in the trial because I have not been party to the information that was presented to it. It is for the CPS to charge and the jury to determine, and then—if a conviction takes place, which in this case it did not—for the judge to pass sentence and for the criminal justice system to manage that sentence in an effective and appropriate way. I hope the noble Lord will accept that his points are interesting but not for me.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Government have stuck with the Rwanda scheme despite the Rule 39 decision in Strasbourg in June 2022 and despite the decision of the Supreme Court, which concluded that Rwanda was not safe.
The Strasbourg court’s interim ruling has been described as a ruling by a foreign court delivered by a judge in pyjamas. I do not think that is a helpful way of characterising it. All courts need to have the ability to make interim orders, sometimes at inconvenient times of day, and the court is not foreign to us as long as we remain members.
However, the decision was based on the Strasbourg court’s own rules rather than on what is in the European convention. It was made by a still-anonymous judge. No reasons were given and there was no chance for the Government to come back on a return date. This breaks just about every rule of natural justice and procedural fairness that normally applies in applications for interim relief.
As to the Supreme Court’s decision, it said that Parliament should not legislate to reverse the decision of what is the final court of appeal in this country. But Parliament has done precisely that in relation to three decisions, to my certain knowledge, in the last two years. I was chairman of the Independent Review of Administrative Law and the panel considered carefully whether it was appropriate for Parliament to reverse decisions of the Supreme Court. We concluded that Parliament should think long and hard before doing so, but that it was perfectly orthodox for it to take such a course. Indeed, the submissions we received from all senior judges did not suggest otherwise.
I thank the noble Lord for giving way. Is there not a difference here—a difference between disagreeing with a view and disagreeing with a finding of fact?
I am grateful to the noble Lord; I am coming on to that point. There were certain unusual aspects of the decision of the Supreme Court, which is normally concerned with points of law of general public importance rather than findings of fact. It might be better to describe the decision as rather more of a risk assessment based on the evidence before it rather than a finding of fact but, in any event, the Government have since responded to the court’s concerns, as your Lordships have heard.
I ask the question rhetorically: if the matter were before the Supreme Court today, would the judges come to a different conclusion? One should bear in mind that, even before the new steps taken by our Government and that of Rwanda, this case was finely balanced. The Court of Appeal was not unanimous on the matter and the Divisional Court found in favour of the Government. I also note Lord Sumption’s evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights acknowledging the Government’s response to the Supreme Court.
The Bill tackles some really big legal issues. In the view of the lawyers for the Government, it has gone as far as it can go without infringing international law. We know that there remain opportunities for litigation—lawyers have already announced their intention to take them—but the arguments on the law will have to wait until Committee.
At this stage, it is important to consider what the alternatives to the Rwanda scheme are, and so I turn to Labour’s position, and here I would like to mention Sir Keir Starmer. He has been criticised as being a “lefty lawyer”. I have had the privilege of being against him in court and, if he is a lefty lawyer, he is certainly a good one. I think it inappropriate to criticise him for the fact that some of his clients would not necessarily feature high on everybody’s desired guest list for a dinner party. What is his policy vis-à-vis the boats? There has been some talk of better relationships with France and better safe routes, but at the absolute centre of what is said to be the strategy is apparently Sir Keir himself. He reminds us regularly that he was DPP from 2008 to 2013. He was not in charge of Border Force or the National Crime Agency; he was supervising prosecutions at a very macro level—which is why I am reluctant to blame him for shortcomings in relation to the prosecution of, say, Jimmy Savile, or even the poor victims of the Horizon scandal. But he cannot have it both ways. Is it really suggested that, on the very arrival of Sir Keir, a former DPP, at No. 10, the smugglers will simply roll up their rubber dinghies and give up their promising and profitable business model? Is Labour’s alternative deterrent none other than Sir Keir himself? I am afraid I am unconvinced by that.
It comes to this: Rwanda is, at the moment, the only game in town. We all agree that we must stop the boats. The Government have made progress but need to go further. This Bill will enable the scheme to take effect—courts here and in Strasbourg permitting—and I admit it may deter those who sustain the people smugglers’ business. Other European countries face the same challenges and are actively considering similar schemes. Of course your Lordships’ House will scrutinise this Bill carefully, but we should retain some constitutional modesty. The elected House has passed the Bill. Many people in this country consider that their Government should be able to control our borders against illegal migration, and we should not ignore them. In the absence of any cogent alternative, while we should strive to improve the Bill, we should not wreck it.
(1 year, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberIf one wants to learn anything from the speeches made in the House of Commons, I suggest that my noble friends on the Front Bench— and other noble Lords if they have a moment—read those of Sir Robert Buckland and Sir Jeremy Wright, two former law officers. They agree with my remarks of 11 September and find it puzzling that their own Government, a Government who are in favour of producing cogent and cohesive criminal law, have come up with this dog’s dinner.
I have done my best to be accommodating. It is not an accusation that is often levelled at me, but on this occasion, I think that it can be, justly. I have done my best to meet some of the Government’s less organised thinking. As I said at the outset, as a matter of principle. I cannot understand why there should be an exemption for anyone from the proposed criminal law, just as there is not under the Bribery Act and the Criminal Finances Act. However, to make life easier for the Government, on the last occasion I suggested that microbusinesses should be exempted from the failure to prevent fraud offences provision. I abandoned my provisions relating to the failure to prevent money laundering. The Government did not find that attractive, even though I tried to explain my abandoning of the principle on the basis that just as we have an age limit for criminal responsibility—10—we could perhaps also, by a rather clumsy analogy, exempt microbusinesses from criminal responsibility under the failure to prevent provision. That did not seem to go down very well with the Government—certainly not with Mr Kit Malthouse.
I have now moved a little further towards the Government. You may say, “Well, that’s a bit wet. If you’ve got any principles, why not stick to them?” Well, okay, accuse me of being wet, but I am doing my best to help the Government get out of an unnecessarily sticky hole. I have amended my proposal so that rather than microbusinesses being exempted, “small” businesses should be exempted—I define a small business on page 5 of the amendment paper, which states that, for the purposes of this provision,
“a relevant body is a ‘small organisation’ only if the body satisfied two or more of the following conditions in the financial year of the body … that precedes the year of the fraud offence”.
Those conditions are that the turnover of the business should be
“Not more than £10.2 million”,
the balance sheet should be
“Not more than £5.1 million”
and the number of employees should be “Not more than 50”.
In speaking against my own case, I rather wish that I had not put that down, but I have because I am trying to assist my noble friend on the Front Bench in getting his Bill enacted before the end of this Session.
I repeat that the criminal law should be uniform. Defences to the criminal law should be uniform. We should not have exemptions based on the size of the business. The Theft Act applies to all suspects—I am seeing whether my noble friend still enjoys my old joke about the six feet six burglar—regardless of whether they are six feet six or five feet six. We do not exempt people on the basis that they are small people or do not fit a particular height, so why are we doing it here? I have yet to find out. I am afraid that unless the Government move a little closer to me, I will invite your Lordships to join me in the Division Lobby.
My Lords, I shall speak to my Motion B1, as an amendment to Motion B, which is being debated within this group. It would
“leave out from ‘House’ to end and insert ‘do insist on its disagreement with the Commons in their Amendment 161A, do not insist on its Amendment 161B, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 161C, and do propose Amendment 161D in lieu’”.
That is very clear.
We return to what has been described as a cost-capping amendment. Since this is not the first time that we have had the debate, I will try to be brief. This Bill has been a welcome, if late, addition to the government agencies in their fight to combat fraud. The scrutiny of the Bill through your Lordships’ House has been thorough and constructive. It has also been non-party political. I do not think that either the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, or I would consider ourselves to be natural rebels.
All noble Lords have participated in this debate—and I very much include the Ministers in this—with a common purpose: to make this legislation as effective as it can be. Two themes emerged during the many debates. The first was the scale of the problem. The Government estimate, for example, that £100 billion was laundered through the United Kingdom last year, and yet under the Proceeds of Crime Act assets of only £345 million were recovered: that is 0.3%. The second theme was the frequent imbalance that exists between the resources available to enforcement agencies and those of the fraudsters, who may well employ expensive lawyers and have significant resources to enable them to do so. This modest amendment tries to do a little to restore that balance. I would have liked the enforcement agencies to have had complete protection against costs orders in the event that they lost a recovery claim, but in the course of ping-pong I have had to compromise somewhat, hence the form of the current amendment before your Lordships’ House.
The amendment does not prevent a judge from doing what is fair on costs in any particular case, but it is a nudge towards him or her to take into account the reasonableness of the agency bringing proceedings at all and the potential impact on its ability to carry out its functions if left with a substantial costs order. I struggle to understand the Government’s objection to this amendment and its predecessors; they seem, with respect, to be adopting a somewhat tender approach to fraudsters.
There is a clear precedent for this sort of amendment: when your Lordships’ House introduced a provision concerning the much-underused unexplained wealth orders. If it loses a case, the enforcement authority will have to pay costs only if it has acted unreasonably. As to the objection that it offends the “loser pays” principle, that is a misconceived argument. Judges regularly, in ordinary cases, make orders that each side bear their own costs, or make issue-based costs orders, or other orders which reflect the justice of the individual case. Parliament has legislated in ways that depart from this so-called principle: for example, QOCS—that is Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting—in personal injury litigation; or by Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act; or in relation to unexplained wealth orders. This amendment is intended to reduce the possibility of an agency saying to itself, “We cannot afford the risk to the budget if we lose a case, even when we’ve got good evidence to bring it”.
Spotlight on Corruption suggests that a number of cases are in the pipeline which bear costs risks. These are said to include over 60 cases being reviewed by one agency, and close to £1 billion in assets frozen by an enforcement body.
Another advantage to this amendment is that those defendants or respondents to an application who defend these cases will know that, even if their legal strategy prevails, they may not recover their costs. This may mean that they are keener to reach a compromise.
The amendment has the support of all those bodies that are concerned with anti-corruption. Incidentally, it also has the support of Bill Browder, who regards it as one of the most significant potential improvements to the Bill. Let us please not kick this into touch and have yet another report, which is the Government’s suggestion. If necessary, I will move Motion B1 and test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I support both Motion A1 and Motion B1. I turn first to my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier’s Motion and offer three reasons why I believe the Minister is completely wrong.
First, the smallest SMEs include some of the most unscrupulous enablers. Take estate agents, for example: they are a conduit of bad money into this country from all over the world. The gaps that the Minister is proposing to leave in the Bill will ensure that this continues. I have seen one case, for which I had to sign an NDA, of an individual who spent £150 million buying property but is apparently allowed to take only $12,000 a year out of the country. How did he manage that? That is a perfectly good example and no doubt we will hear more like it.
Secondly, on this set of rules, I offer the Minister an example. We do not say to the manufacturers of small cars that they do not need seat belts and that for some reason they are exempted. That would be an absolute nonsense and the same applies here. He mentioned costs—£300 million and £40 million—but they are entirely specious. We have seen no proper analysis of these figures; they are just waved around as a convenient excuse not to do something.
My last reason is that these smaller businesses need to be most alert to fraud. A failure to prevent helps them to make sure that their own systems are able to face these risks. We know that 40% of crime in this country is economic crime, but we deploy less than 1% of our resources on dealing with it. Surely smaller businesses should be equipped to know when they are dealing with crooks. I will have to support my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier if the matter is put to a vote.
In relation to the Motion in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, we again pursued this relentlessly for six months. Bill Browder said to me on several occasions that, if this Bill is to go through, we must make sure that we have some cost capping in it. It is a war of very unequal proportions. We know that the agencies have small budgets and that they have to go cap in hand to the Treasury if they need more money, which is never given. They even have to return the costs they recover to the Treasury. All this is doing is sending a message to these bad actors that, if they take on this kind of behaviour, they will have significant risks. We have amended this on several occasions to give more discretion to the courts to ensure that, if an agency overreacts and behaves rapaciously or capriciously against individuals, those individuals are not penalised.
If we are serious about dealing with the tidal wave of economic crime that is coming to this country, the Minister will give us the assurance that this is being dealt with. If not, I will have to support the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, in his Division.
Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its disagreement with the Commons in their Amendment 161A, do not insist on its Amendment 161B, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 161C, and do propose Amendment 161D in lieu—
My Lords, I will not amplify what has already been said. I am grateful to all noble Lords, including the Minister, for engaging in this debate. He said that it was not a bad amendment, which was kind of him; I would say that it is an amendment that this House, for the reasons that I have already given, should welcome. It is an improvement to the Bill and I beg to test the opinion of the House.
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Minister will know well that one of the themes that emerged during our debates on the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill was the inequality of bargaining power that often existed between the agencies that have to pursue fraudsters and those fraudsters, who were often heavily lawyered-up to enable them to resist any applications. One of the initiatives brought forward by this Government under the Criminal Finances Act was unexplained wealth orders. Can the Minister explain why they have been used on so few occasions? Is it because of lack of resources? Is it because of the risk on costs? What other explanation is there for such a powerful potential weapon not being utilised?
The noble Lord will be aware, from other conversations that we have been having around the various aspects of the Bill that will go through the House this afternoon, that the agencies tell us they are appropriately resourced. I cannot account for the small number of UWOs that have been issued, but I will continue to keep it under review and report to the noble Lord.