Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Lord Evans of Weardale Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 23rd January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, I was not intending to speak in this debate, but it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Anderson. I will make two brief observations.

First, I support the suggestion that airing this question of conflict of interest is important. I remember from when I was in the service considering with colleagues —purely theoretically, I hasten to add—what one would do if one had serious national security concerns about a Prime Minister. You would certainly go to the Cabinet Secretary. Would you go to the Palace? I see that the noble Lord, Lord Young of Old Windsor, is in his place. How would you resolve this issue? It was unresolved—it is not an easy issue to resolve, and it may well not be an issue to be resolved in the margins of a separate Bill. But it is worth at least airing these issues, rather than merely considering them in private. I welcome the opportunity to put these issues into the public domain, since it is not impossible to conceive that they might become real issues at some future point.

Secondly, I support Amendment 41 from the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, and particularly the second proposed new subsection, which says that any individual designated as one of the five individuals to whom the Prime Minister can delegate powers under the triple lock should be an experienced Minister who is used to signing warrants. I have had experience myself of trying to explain to inexperienced Ministers for whom this was unfamiliar territory what on earth they were being asked to do. The occasional look of either panic or horror when it was revealed what they were being asked to do stick in the mind. It is really important that, if these powers are to be delegated, they should be delegated to Ministers who are experienced and understand the judgments of proportionality and necessity that are made in these important decisions relating to authorisation of intrusion. Therefore, I strongly support in particular that aspect of the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord West.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Lord Evans of Weardale Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 20th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

Not at all.

My Lords, I do not intend to make a long speech. This Bill proposes an important but, I suggest, relatively modest updating of the existing authorisation regime for the use of surveillance powers. It is also based on the excellent and clear review undertaken by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who has been thanked many times already and to whom I also give my thanks. His expertise and good judgment in these areas is widely acknowledged, not least within the police and intelligence agencies themselves.

The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 was significant in that it brought the authorisation of surveillance powers into the modern, digital age. Before the 2016 Act, the legal justification for surveillance was achieved by stretching and interpreting laws from an earlier era to cope with new conditions. The 2016 Act addressed modern needs directly with an unprecedented degree of frankness about what was actually possible and necessary. The Act also recognised the highly intrusive nature of investigatory powers that were being authorised and therefore matched those intrusive powers with strong and independent oversight mechanisms.

I respectfully disagree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans: I do not believe the Bill vastly expands the powers of the intelligence agencies. In some areas, it introduces more controls, but it is also very careful to balance any powers with independent oversight. The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, helpfully drew our attention to the effectiveness of independent oversight where problems have arisen, and he demonstrated that the agencies are drawing attention to areas of failure and that the oversight mechanisms are making the appropriate decisions as to what needs to be done about it. I reassure the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans that, certainly in my experience, the agencies are extremely conscious of the ethical dimension of their work. In terms of both their external relationship with oversight bodies and their internal discussions, ethical factors are strongly considered and taken seriously.

We are all aware of the speed with which data capabilities, new platforms and artificial intelligence as a whole are developing. It is important that the law should be updated from time to time to keep up with the art of the possible. Data is at least as important as interception when it comes to preventing the very real security threats that we face from causing damage. If we do not update the law, one of two things will happen: either security will be put at risk, or those using the powers will rely on an increasingly creative and elaborate interpretation of the law to keep up with a new situation. We cannot operate within old legislation; neither of those alternatives is desirable, so a new Act is needed.

The key proposals in the Bill seem to be the new regime for bulk datasets and the arrangements for bulk datasets held by third parties but to which the intelligence agencies have access. Neither of these proposals involves a significant increase of intrusion into individual privacy, and in each case, tough oversight controls remain in place. On bulk personal datasets, the 2016 Act created what, in retrospect, appears to be a rather odd situation where the intelligence agencies are not able to use completely open data—such as Wikipedia data—without quite stringent authorisation, but which any member of the public can access without permission. A police force can also access that data without restriction. Our close intelligence allies can do so too, but our own security and intelligence agencies cannot. The same constraints apply for historical or open datasets of the sort that are needed to train artificial intelligence systems to operate effectively.

I cannot think of any good reason why these constraints are needed in their current form, and they have a negative impact on the speed and flexibility with which the agencies can respond to threats. I am therefore glad to see that the Government’s proposals for a less restrictive approach to datasets where there is no or low expectation of privacy have been included. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner will continue to police the low/no boundary so that there is no risk that the less stringent regime will be misapplied or that there will be any form of mission creep. I therefore support the Government’s proposals.

On third-party datasets, the situation appears to some extent to have been reversed, in that access to sensitive data held by third parties is currently not covered by as stringent a regime. This appears to be a small loophole in the 2016 regime, and it is right that access to such datasets should be brought within the authorisation regime, as the Bill proposes. Events since the 2016 Act, including the war in Ukraine, increased state threats and political interference and recent terrible events in the Middle East all mean that the security threats that we face and from which the intelligence agencies help to protect us are at least as acute today as they were seven years ago. At the same time, the technical environment within which the agencies work has changed very fast, and it is right that we should update the legislation that enables them to succeed in their work. I therefore support the proposals in the Bill.

National Crime Agency Investigation: Javad Marandi

Lord Evans of Weardale Excerpts

Wednesday 17th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord will not be surprised to know that I was not aware of the Scottish dimension to this subject, so I will refrain from further comment.

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as the chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, and I am grateful to the Minister for his reference to the report made by my predecessors in 1998. I draw the Minister’s attention to a 2021 report, made by that same committee, which looked at electoral finance. The Minister may remember that the committee made a number of recommendations for reinforcing the provisions to ensure that improper funds were not coming into the electoral system, and it is a cause of great regret to myself and the committee that the Government decided not to take forward any of those recommendations. In the light of the most recent suggestions that there are problems, might the Government wish to revisit that decision and take into consideration more positively the recommendations of the independent and cross-party Committee on Standards in Public Life?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the Government responded to the report published by the noble Lord’s committee, Regulating Election Finance, in September 2021, and the Elections Act 2022, to which I have already referred, contains measures which closely link to recommendations made in the report; for example, the new requirement on political parties to declare their assets and liabilities over £500 on registration, and a restriction of third-party campaigning to UK-based or otherwise eligible campaigners. The Government have stated that the recommendations in the report deserve full consideration, electoral law is complex, and more work is required to consider the implications and practicalities.

National Security Bill

Lord Evans of Weardale Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 7th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lords, Lord Polak and Lord Leigh, as well as my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. He is indeed a friend, but I disagree with the conclusion he reached today. I want to support the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, if he puts the amendment to a vote in the House. I salute the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for the work he has done on both the IRGC and the Wagner Group; like him, I have seen the consequences of their actions in many parts of the world. I think that proscription is the right thing to do in some circumstances, and I believe that it is right in these circumstances.

Just before the debate on this amendment, I was at a committee meeting upstairs in Committee Room 9, where a young Iranian woman was speaking, during this special week celebrating the rights of women, about the slogan which has been used so often in the protests: “Freedom, Life and Women”. This young woman described atrocities that had occurred to her friends and her own personal experiences. She asked what we were doing about the IRGC and why the television broadcaster Iran International has had to leave this country and go to the United States because it is not safe to operate in west London. How can that be? How can it be that BBC Persian service personnel are constantly harassed as a result of doing their job, even though Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the freedom to transmit ideas and opinions? That freedom is not permitted by the theocracy in Iran.

As the noble Lord, Lord Polak, said, he and I have been sanctioned, along with Tom Tugendhat MP, to whom the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred. This is trivial in comparison to the things that happen to Iranian people and to what we have seen happening to people in the protests in Iran, which are truly shocking. It is trivial when you think about the export of drones from Iran to Russia that are now pouring down on the people of Ukraine. If we fail to take this kind of action—indeed the noble Lord, Lord Polak, and I asked this question in your Lordships’ House back on 18 January, after Alireza Akbari, a British citizen, was executed—what has to happen before they are proscribed? We asked it again on 23 February, in the Moses Room during a Question for Short Debate I tabled about relations between Iran and the United Kingdom. We specifically asked about the division between the Foreign Office and the Home Office and about what was impeding a decision being taken on this matter.

I know the Minister quite well now, and I admire and respect him. I do not expect him to give us a lot of cant from the Dispatch Box, but I hope that he will take back to the Government the feelings of so many of us in this House today who want to support the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for the reasons he expressed so well.

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, it is an honour to follow the noble Lord, Lord Alton. I have considerable sympathy for what he says in view of the appalling behaviour of the IRGC. However, this amendment, as I understand it, would open the door to the proscription of state organisations, with proscription having originally been envisaged as a mechanism principally to bear down on non-state organisations.

I wonder therefore whether the Minister, when he responds, could clarify whether the proscription of state organisations brings with it unintended consequences that would be potentially quite difficult. For instance, will we say that anybody who is a member of a hostile intelligence service—which might be proscribed—is, by definition, committing an offence? What will that do, for instance, to intelligence liaison with people who are hostile to us, which sometimes happens? Does it create problems which would not be created for a non-state organisation, because these organs will be part of a very considerably bigger state entity with which we may have to engage at some level?

I am neither in favour with nor against the amendment. I am not quite sure exactly how it would work, and I would be very grateful if the Minister could clarify those aspects.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this very brief debate.

I think it would be helpful to give a brief overview of the concept of proscription as outlined in Part 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Put simply, proscription can play an important role in degrading the ability of terrorist organisations to operate effectively, and it sends a strong message that the UK is a hostile operating environment for such groups. The Terrorism Act 2000 gives the Home Secretary the power to proscribe a group if she has a reasonable belief that it is currently concerned in terrorism and it is proportionate to do so. The amendment seeks to replicate this within an explicit state threats context and requires that the Government develop and publish appropriate draft legislation.

The Home Secretary’s decisions on proscription can be legally challenged. As such, those decisions are supported by a comprehensive, evidence-led process which involves close consultation with other government departments and partners. This House will fully appreciate that developing a state threats proscription power will need to be considered fully.

Before I go on, I will refer to the IRGC, as it has come up in all contributions. I remind the House that the United Kingdom already sanctions the IRGC in its entirety. The separate list of proscribed terrorist organisations is kept under very careful review, but we do not routinely comment on whether an organisation is or is not under consideration for proscription.

In response to the illustrative points from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on whether there is a legislative gap in this area, I say that the National Security Bill creates a wide range of offences, tools and powers to counter state threats activity. In many respects, they cover very similar ground to a proscription-like power. For example, any person materially assisting a foreign intelligence service in their UK-related activities would commit an offence under Clause 3. Under the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme in Part 3, the Government could require the registration of all activities being conducted with those specified under the scheme. The Government will, with the agreement of Parliament, be able to specify a foreign power, part of a foreign power or an entity controlled by a foreign power. That means that those who are in arrangements with such organisations must register their activities or risk prosecution. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to my right honourable friend in the other place, the Security Minister, and I know that he is reassured by this.

However, as the Government have previously set out, we see the Bill as forming a new baseline for state threats legislation from which the statute will inevitably build over time as the threat evolves and diversifies. I am therefore grateful to the noble Lord for raising the issue and giving us the opportunity to debate it. I reassure him that I understand the reasons behind the amendment and the concern about the activities of state groups such as the IRGC. The Government of course share the noble Lord’s concerns, as was made clear in the Government’s statements on Iran International —to which the noble Lord, Lord Alton, also referred—which highlighted the potentially lethal operations of the IRGC taking place in the UK.

The amendment raises an important question of whether more needs to be done in this space, and I can reassure all noble Lords that this is a question that the Government are already considering carefully. The Government are committed to tackling all forms of state threats and to ensuring that our police and security services have the right powers to keep the UK safe.

Given, as I have said, that the measures in the Bill already have a similar effect in the state threats context to that achieved through the proscription for terrorism, we need to fully consider, alongside our operational partners, whether and how additional tools such as a state threats proscription power would add to the offences and measures in the Bill. We are committed to ensuring that any future legislation we pursue in this area has maximum effect.

Returning to the amendment itself, while it does not seek to set the ultimate scope of any legislative provision, I am afraid I am unable to accept an amendment that too tightly constrains our thinking in this important area. Linking proscription to hostile activity as defined in Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 would need careful consideration. I very much take on board the points of the noble Lord, Lord Evans, on this and on the scope. While that definition was considered suitable for that legislation, a different approach was taken in the National Security Bill, reflecting the differing nature of the tools and powers it contains. I would not want to pre-empt what might work best in the context of a potential proscription-like power. Furthermore, it is possible that to deliver an operational benefit, the tool may need to be created in a different way, and as such proposing a link to existing proscription processes may be unhelpful.

For these reasons, the Government cannot accept this amendment as drafted. I am also going to have disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Purvis: I am unable to comment on the Wagner Group; I am not qualified to do so. I hope the noble Lord is reassured that the Government are already looking carefully at this area and will therefore consider withdrawing his amendment.

National Security Bill

Lord Evans of Weardale Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 1st March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I recognise the Government’s argument that these spying offences need to be broad enough to capture the wide range of illicit activities that foreign powers may undertake to harm the UK. However, if that is so, equally broad defences are needed to protect innocent people who may become ensnared in the broad definition of the offences. Amendment 79 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, is absolutely vital; it must be in the Bill.

I want to respond to the Minister’s comments in our debate on the previous group. I heard his reassurances about journalistic freedom, which I am sure were very sincere, but promises can be broken. Ministers move on. Governments move on. Commitments can be forgotten. I just do not think that, if it is not in the Bill, it can be held to be the law.

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, I acknowledge the changes that have been made to Amendment 79 since it was introduced in Committee, but I still do not feel that it would be appropriate and right for us to accept it. The noble Lord, Lord West, has pointed out a number of the reasons why, but I emphasise that we are being invited to introduce a public interest defence for what is, straightforwardly, espionage on behalf of a foreign service. I do not believe that we need to provide a public interest defence when an individual obtains and provides protected information on behalf of a foreign power while recognising that this is prejudicial to the safety of the United Kingdom.

I also recognise that the amendment extends to the Official Secrets Act 1989 but, again in support of the noble Lord, Lord West, I say that, if we are to change that, we must do so in a careful and deliberate fashion and bring forward legislation to do so. The 1989 Act does not deal with espionage on behalf of a foreign intelligence service. It is drawn up for different purposes. Therefore, it is separate from the issues that we are considering regarding the Bill. More broadly, it remains extremely dangerous to encourage or to lead individuals to believe that there is a public interest defence to the disclosure of highly sensitive information. Any one individual is unlikely to be able to make an accurate assessment themselves of whether their declaration and their disclosure is damaging to national security. That must be considered carefully, and it is not something for an individual official, however senior, to take on themselves. Therefore, any legislation and any amendment that might encourage them to do so is misguided.

Also, once a disclosure has been made, it cannot be withdrawn. Even though there may be benefit in prosecuting an individual for having done it, that does not stop the damage that has already been done. Therefore, we must have care not to lead people into believing they will be able to defend themselves having already made a disclosure, because the damage will have occurred.

Finally, on the question of evidencing damage, I recognise that the change in the burden of proof is a significant change to the amendment. Nevertheless, we are then faced with a situation where a person who has been accused of this offence will be trying to argue that they did not cause damage. In so doing, they are likely to adduce more evidence and more contextual material which might itself be damaging. It is not clear that this makes it easier in terms of the evidence or that it makes the prospect of prosecuting people for harmful activity any easier. For these reasons, I do not support this amendment. I hope that the House agrees.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I have a question on a point of clarification. I understand the point that the noble Lord makes regarding those offences which may be at the direction of a foreign power, as in espionage. However, the Bill contains offences that are not necessarily at the direction of a foreign power. His point would mean that my noble friend’s amendment would offer no public interest defence for those offences in this Bill which are not under the direction of a foreign power—as in, not espionage offences.

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

If I am being invited to comment on whether I would support a different amendment, I say that might well be the case. However, I do not support the amendment that is before us.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, throughout the passage of the Bill, concerns have been raised that legitimate acts in the public interest could lead to prosecution under the Bill. The Government have insisted that a public interest defence could legalise instances of espionage or sabotage. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, has said that he will press his amendment to establish a public interest defence. While we in the Labour Party support this in principle, we believe that the amendment is too broad and that it could in effect legalise espionage. We believe that there need to be appropriate safeguards built into any future legislation.

Further to this, we believe that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, fails to implement the Law Commission’s recommendations; that was a point made by my noble friend Lord West. I will instead press Amendment 18A, in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker, to a vote; that is for a consultation on the introduction of a public interest offence, which we believe can establish some mechanism for addressing the concerns of the House. We believe that the amendment is a tighter and more focused approach than the alternative of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. To address wider concerns on whistleblowing, we have also tabled Amendment 79A to establish an independent statutory commissioner, although we will not press it to a vote in due course.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, the all-Peers letter which the Minister sent to us on 28 February states clearly and strongly that what we need is in this Bill is

“transparency on which foreign powers are influencing our politics”,

which it states

“is vital to defending our democracy”.

This reasonable amendment fills one of the loopholes left in the Bill. We are all concerned about the integrity of our elections. We are conscious that foreign donations are part of what can undermine that integrity.

The Minister may have had drawn to his attention a letter in yesterday’s Financial Times which points out that the new proposals for a football regulator include among its duties the need to ensure stronger due diligence and checks on the sources of wealth of those who wish to buy or own football clubs. It is anomalous, to say the least, that we should have stronger checks on people who wish to buy British football clubs than on people who wish to give sometimes very large sums of money to British political parties. I remind the Minister that the question of Arron Banks’s very large donation to the Vote Leave campaign is still being litigated in the British courts. We still have no assurance as to the origins of that donation, since he has refused to give one.

I support what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has said, by reminding the Minister that there are now 100,000 British citizens living in the United Arab Emirates—some of whom already donate to British political parties. It would be quite easy for some of those to become intermediaries for the sovereign powers concerned. Other wealthy British expatriates live in Thailand, Singapore or Hong Kong. Their business depends heavily on the Chinese economy and state.

It is entirely desirable, reasonable and appropriate to ensure that British political parties play their part in mitigating the risks of foreign interference in British elections by being required to show that they are conducting careful risk management in accepting donations from overseas. There have been a number of instances in recent years of which we are all aware. Some of them were touched on in the ISC report on Russia. It is clear that such management has not been in place. It ought to be. I hope that the Government will accept this amendment as a means of filling this loophole.

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as the chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life. In 2021, my committee reviewed the regulation of electoral finance. I have to tell the Minister that “stringent” was not what we concluded as to the rigour of the arrangements in place. We felt that there were a number of loopholes which could quite easily be remedied. We made recommendations to that effect. Regrettably, the Government decided that they did not wish to accept any of those recommendations; therefore, the loopholes are still there.

I have added my name to Amendment 51 because it is a modest step in the right direction. The rules that apply to the financial services industry and, as appears likely, are shortly to apply to the football industry are considerably stronger than those that apply to our elections. A modest step in this direction would not provide a high level of assurance that money from illicit sources of various sorts might not reach the electoral process, but at least it is a step in the right direction.

It is important that we should take that step because we know that the electoral system in this country and in other western democracies has been under attack. It is vital to maintain public confidence in the electoral system; it is still pretty good. The Electoral Commission publishes regular research on attitudes towards the electoral system. At the moment, we are in a reasonably good place, but it is very important for the health of our democracy that we retain that public support. This is a small step in that direction. I have been scratching my head to work out why, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, any political party would not support this for the integrity of our electoral system. It is not massively bureaucratic or intrusive. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reply.

National Security Bill

Lord Evans of Weardale Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I wish to stress the importance of how the Bill, when it becomes an Act, will relate to the Official Secrets Act. I am almost in a minority in my own family in not having signed that Act, although I note, looking at the dates, that the version my wife signed in 1979 was the 1939 version, and the version my daughter signed is rather more up to date. It is worth noting that it was 28 years from the first Official Secrets Act to the first revised Act in 1939, and 50 years from then to the second revised version, in 1989. We are now approaching 34 years since the last revision. As the Law Commission suggested, we really need to update the Official Secrets Act.

Part of the disappointment that many of us have with the Bill is that it takes the place of what might have been an effective revision of the entire Official Secrets Act. We all know what happens with legislation in this House. The time taken up for the Bill as it becomes an Act will mean that it will be another four or five years before we get round to a proper revision of the OSA.

I say this to the Minister: part of the argument for taking our time as we complete this Bill is that, for the next four or five years, this is probably it in terms of legislation dealing with this whole area of national security. So we need to make sure that it is well considered; that it addresses our current, changing threats; and that it feeds into and informs the public debate for those who need to understand these things. It should not be rushed. I hope that, in Committee, the Minister has got a real sense of the disappointment and discontent at the quality of the Bill as it now stands. I look forward to our discussions and hearing about the wider consultations that now need to take place before this Bill finishes its time in this House.

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, I must confess to being rather puzzled by some of the detail in Amendment 120 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. When I got to proposed new subsection (4), I assumed that the office was intended to be a regulatory body ensuring that the whistleblowing arrangements with regard to national security were appropriate; however, it subsequently became clear in proposed new paragraph (b) that it was intended to be the whistle- blowing channel. Those seems like slightly different roles to me.

I am also puzzled as to why there is a proposal here for a whistleblowing channel that is in fact very narrow. It relates only

“to the commission of an offence under this Act”.

I would have thought that, if there was a need for a whistleblowing channel—

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Perhaps I can help the noble Lord. Amendments must be written to be in scope; it is sometimes quite limiting.

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

I thank the noble Baroness very much for that clarification; in that case, the amendment certainly needs some amendment itself.

I am also puzzled as to the route proposed that any disclosure, particularly from one of the intelligence agencies, can go to any public authority. Again, that seems a surprising route for a whistleblowing channel for somebody in the intelligence and security agencies.

More particularly, and more importantly, I absolutely fail to recognise the culture of cover-up that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, cites. Having worked in the Security Service for 33 years, I am confident in saying that, far from there being a culture of cover-up, there was in fact a strong willingness to speak up, as far as I could see. There was strong and, at times, fairly heated internal debate on some of the ethical matters that have been cited in this debate. So I do not believe that the characterisation of the intelligence agencies we have just heard in any sense accurate. Although the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, gave the complete list of everybody to whom a member of the agencies could go, I think that almost anybody in the agencies would recognise their ability to go to the internal ethics counsellor—a role that plays an important part in actively encouraging debate of these issues—who has a direct right of access to the director-general of the day; I am sure that that would still be the case. That role has now extended from the Security Service to the other intelligence agencies. Also, it was clear and straightforward how you obtained the contact details for the external counsellor who acted as a whistleblowing channel directly outside the service. Of course, that was put in place specifically because of previous concerns that there was no such provision, and it was reflected in the legislation of the day.

I feel that the detail of this amendment is not clear —certainly not to me. The need for this amendment has not been made clear, in my view, because it is based on a rather misleading characterisation of the internal culture of the intelligence services. In my experience, there has been considerable focus on ethical matters and the ability internally to debate those.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank Members of the Committee for all their speeches. Amendment 119 seeks an assessment of how the Act relates to the Official Secrets Act 1989. As we set out in last week’s debate, the new espionage offences in Part 1 of the Bill replace and reform the existing provisions in the Official Secrets Acts from 1911 to 1939. They carry strict tests for a person to be caught within those sections. For example, the first two offences apply when a person is acting for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit a foreign power. This is distinct from the Official Secrets Act 1989, which covers unauthorised disclosures by Crown servants and government contractors. As the Committee knows, the Government are not reforming the 1989 Act through the Bill, as has been observed this evening. Under the existing law, it is possible that a person making a damaging disclosure could commit both the espionage offence in the Official Secrets Act 1911 and an offence under the Official Secrets Act 1989.

Pausing there, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, for his contribution in relation to the 1911 Act. The difference, drawn out in the fact that you could commit both an offence of espionage under the Official Secrets Act and an offence under the 1989 Act, will continue to be the case. It is possible that a person could commit an offence under two pieces of legislation simultaneously and be charged in relation to both. That is not a matter unknown in the criminal law. Any overlap between the espionage offences in the Bill and the Official Secrets Act 1989 allows us to prosecute damaging acts in the most appropriate way. Where a person commits both a 1989 Act offence and an espionage offence under the Bill, the charging decision would be taken by the Crown Prosecution Service in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors, as is always the case. CPS prosecutors select the charges that they consider are most appropriate on the facts of each case, and to reflect the nature of the wrongdoing. I hope that this explanation reassures the Committee that the Government have carefully considered the interaction between our new offences in the Bill and those in the 1989 Act.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, raised a question regarding reform of the 1989 Act, and I will address it directly. The Government’s view is that the Official Secrets Act 1989 is an essential part of our ability to protect national security and sensitive information. However, the views and concerns raised by stakeholders in response to our public consultation for the Bill, including those in favour of not reforming the Act at all, highlight the complexity of the legislation and the wide variety of interests that should properly be considered before pursuing any reform. Given its complexity, we are also concerned that reform of the Official Secrets Act 1989 at this time may distract from the Government’s package of measures in the Bill to counter state threats, and prevent us from providing law enforcement and the intelligence agencies with the tools that they need now directly to tackle these threats. Accordingly, we do not have any immediate plans to pursue reform of the Official Secrets Act 1989, but will continue to keep that position under review. The matters raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, are well considered. Issues such as whether to increase maximum sentences under the Official Secrets Act 1989 would be considered as part of potential reform proposals and would be viewed in the round with the measures of sentences in the Bill.

Amendment 120 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, proposes the establishment of a new office for the national security whistleblower. We are told that the aim of such an office would be to protect whistleblowers who make disclosures related to offences under the Bill where disclosures are considered to be in the public interest. Of course I pay tribute to her in her ongoing work and efforts to champion the important cause of whistleblowing. The Government are committed to ensuring that our whistleblowing framework is robust, and I confirm that the business department intends to carry out the promised review of the existing framework, and that further details will be set out in due course in relation to that.

National Security Bill

Lord Evans of Weardale Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 90, 91, 93, 98, 122 and 123 insert senior leaders in the police and military, the mayors of London and of combined authority areas, and police and crime commissioners to the list of postholders who, if communicated with, trigger a requirement on the person doing the communication to register under FIRS.

State actors who pose a threat can and will seek to identify and target individuals who are relied on to inform decision-making by government. These amendments will require foreign principals, and those working on behalf of foreign principals, to be transparent where they are seeking to influence decision-making and political processes through the postholders listed. Requiring registration of these activities will shed light on the scale of the attempts to carry out this type of influencing and will allow for prosecutions where such activity is not registered. It will also provide a layer of protection for these postholders by providing a deterrent to hostile states seeking to act in this way to advance their own malign agendas and allow for postholders to inform themselves of who is communicating with them and why.

The existing list of potential targets of lobbying in Clause 68(2)(a) already includes senior officials. We consider that senior military and police officials fall into a similar category to senior civil servants; they are experts who are able to provide advice to Ministers on matters relating to government decisions.

Mayors are often senior political figures within their respective political parties whose views are likely to carry significant weight with Government Ministers, including when they are making government decisions. I hope that goes some way to answering the questions related to this matter from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in an earlier group. Mayors, alongside devolved and central Governments, form an important part of the UK’s political establishment and, as such, we believe it is appropriate to capture them within a scheme focused on political influencing activity.

Similarly, in their capacity as elected officials, police and crime commissioners also form a part of the UK’s political establishment and may be identified as being in a strong position to influence contacts within Westminster regarding government decisions.

We have listened to the concerns about the breadth of the FIRS scheme, but we do not believe that adding these individuals would disproportionately expand the scheme. This is because communication with these individuals will be registerable only when it is for the purpose of influencing one of the existing persons or matters at Clause 68(3); for example, communication with a combined authority mayor for the purpose of influencing a local government decision, as opposed to a UK government decision, would not require registration.

These measures seek to tackle scenarios where postholders are being targeted by foreign principals seeking to indirectly influence government decisions and other political processes. While we consider it important to include these postholders, it is vital that the scheme remains proportionate. For this reason, we have taken the decision to limit these additions to the mayors of London and combined authority areas, as opposed to all mayors, and limit the ranks of the police and military officials included to the most senior.

These amendments also amend the power to add further to this list. Amendment 98 provides that the Secretary of State can by regulations specify a person “exercising public functions”, rather than

“persons exercising functions on behalf of the Crown”,

as in the original drafting. This reflects the fact that the list is not only of persons who are exercising functions of the Crown but includes persons carrying out wider public functions. This amendment will allow the necessary flexibility to future-proof the list of those who may be targets of political lobbying. Any regulations made under this power will be thoroughly scrutinised by Parliament through the affirmative procedure. I ask the Committee to accept these amendments. I beg to move.

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

On the extent of the schedule of those to be included, unless I have misunderstood or misread, there does not appear to be any reference to senior members of the security and intelligence services, who I do not think fall into any of the other categories. Could the Minister explain whether I have misunderstood or if that is a deliberate exclusion, and what any reasoning might be?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, it is an intriguing question. I like the idea, as a concept, that any of these organisations which plan to meet with leaders of our intelligence services have to put that on a public register. To assist in transparency, that might meet the Minister’s case. In fact, if we do that, it might mean that we do not need the whole scheme for the other 300,000 people. It is an intriguing point. My questions about who is not covered are far less exciting than whether the intelligence community comes into it.

The Minister said he responded to my point but, with respect, I do not know why the Mayor of London is included but the Lord Mayor of London is not. I do not know why The City of London Corporation would not be included. I would have thought, if this is to do with political influence on our country’s interests, the Lord Mayor and the corporation and City of London represent an absolutely prime area where political influence could be sought over policy. I do not know why that is not included.

I do not know why the mayors of Tees Valley and North of Tyne are included but the leader of Glasgow City Council is not. If it is to do with ensuring a sensible way of operating, then, with the greatest respect to the mayor of the 600,000 people in Tees Valley, to include them in this because they are susceptible to foreign influence seems a bit odd when the leader of the council in Edinburgh, the capital city of one of our four nations, is not. I do not know how long this schedule will last, since the Minister says he is thinking about it and coming back, but, in the meantime, if he can respond to that point I would be grateful.

National Security Bill

Lord Evans of Weardale Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I understand the case. The Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service Personnel does not make the distinction. It does make the distinction that there is a lack of clarity when it comes to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment. Our definitions of that may differ from those of some of our allies, or of others we are working with. For the other two areas, there is no distinction as provided for under the consolidated guidance. Indeed, the risk assessment criteria that all officers currently have to operate under—the checklist that exists within the guidance that they have to go through before entering into any of the security work with agencies—include all of these areas, including where senior personnel and legal advisers conclude that there is risk of torture or CIDT, and also lawful killing. This is in addition to what authorisations under the ISA may bring about.

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, I listened with great interest to the argument made by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed. I wonder whether I could ask the Minister, when he replies, to clarify the way in which the liabilities and immunities under this clause might impact, separately, the members of the intelligence services and the Armed Forces on the one hand, and, on the other hand, covert human intelligence sources, sometimes known as “agents” of the intelligence services, whose activities are authorised, I believe, under separate legislation. It does seem to me that it is very important that we should understand those two separate categories of action, and the way in which the proposed legislation would impact on those, because we are talking there about different legal regimes—although I speak as a lawyer and therefore I am willing to be corrected.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, that sounds right to me. Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 abolished the common-law offence of incitement and substituted three specific offences of encouraging and assisting serious crime. Schedule 4 expands the reach of Part 2 to the encouragement and assistance of crimes which are committed, or intended to be committed, abroad. Its provisions have been described by the Court of Appeal as “tortuous”. Professor David Ormerod, the former Law Commissioner, has written of its “incoherence” and “excessive breadth of liability”. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, probably has a full and comprehensive understanding of it, but few lawyers and judges do, and even fewer can explain it to juries. It has, accordingly, rarely been used.

Intelligence officials—from what they have told the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and me—share in the general bafflement. They cite the risk that they will be prosecuted for acts which are judged, in retrospect, to have been capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence by a foreign intelligence partner. They take only limited comfort from the defence of acting reasonably in Section 50, and from the public interest test applied by prosecutors. The uncertainty, they say, prompts them to act with caution so significant as to have an operational impact.

Clause 28 proposes to address the situation by granting immunity from prosecution, in transnational cases, to those who are behaving in a way that is necessary to

“the proper exercise of any function”

of MI5, MI6 or GCHQ. No clue is given in the Bill as to how this test is to be applied. Compliance with the principles relating to the passing and receipt of intelligence relating to detainees, to which reference has just been made, would doubtless provide the answer in many cases but, as has also been said, there will be others that fall outside their scope.

The same broad immunity would be granted to members of the Armed Forces, not only for activities in support of the intelligence agencies but for any activities which constitute a “proper exercise” of the functions of the Armed Forces—whatever that means. No one has so far explained to me why such a broad immunity for the Armed Forces is necessary, even in circumstances with no intelligence connection. I hope the Minister will be in a position to do so.

I understand that the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament has been invited to scrutinise the justification for the claimed special treatment. I expect that it will have been shown operational examples that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and I, during our relatively short visit, were not. I hope that, before the Bill advances further, the committee will tell us what, if anything, it has concluded and whether those conclusions are confined to the agencies or whether they extend to the Armed Forces as well. For my part, I have general sympathy with the concerns expressed to me by agency lawyers—who are, in my experience, highly conscientious people—but, like the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I would feel happier if I knew that an independent person or body, such as the Intelligence and Security Committee or the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, had examined the secret materials and pronounced confidently on whether the concerns expressed to us are justified across the full range of circumstances in which they are being advanced.

However, let us assume, at least for the purposes of this debate, that there is a real problem of unquantifiable legal risk translating into excessive caution and reduced operational efficiency. Is the solution to place the agencies and the Armed Forces above the law? The question surely needs only to be asked for the answer to be apparent. We admire our intelligence and military personnel, with very good reason, but, be they never so high, the law in a democracy must always be above them. Modern intelligence co-operation means dealing with a wide range of international partners, some of them less scrupulous than others. Let there be no doubt that the crimes that some of them are capable of committing include some of the most serious of all: torture and unlawful killing. To remove all legal accountability for assisting and encouraging such acts, in particular by the sharing of intelligence, would send an unfortunate message to any person who might be tempted to cross the line. It would also send an appalling signal to the rest of the world.

Fortunately, two off-the-shelf solutions are available, each of them more palatable than Clause 28. The first is my Amendment 64, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. This would add activities caught by Part 2 to the scheme established by Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994—sometimes known as the “James Bond clause”, which the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, described, although it is certainly no simple immunity. Subject to further study of what he said, I do not think it does the trick without our amendment. Section 7 provides that those operating abroad, and in limited circumstances within the United Kingdom, are not liable for what would otherwise be crimes under UK law, but only if the commission of such crimes falls within the scope of an authorisation issued by the Secretary of State on tightly defined statutory grounds. Those authorisations, and the agencies’ compliance with them, are carefully scrutinised by the senior judges of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—the successors of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Judge and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood—with the help of their skilled investigative teams. IPCO publishes its conclusions in its annual report, which demonstrates its exacting approach. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner, Sir Brian Leveson, would no doubt notify the Director of Public Prosecutions were it to find any illegality worthy of further investigation.

In this way, the requirements of the rule of law are maintained, and with three other advantages. First, and of some importance, IPCO scrutiny makes it more likely that any wrongdoing will actually come to light. Secondly, the agencies would not be exposed to police or prosecutorial investigations, unless, of course, they go beyond the scope of their authorisations. Thirdly, for any act within the scope of the authorisation the agencies have political cover from the Secretary of State, who would be unable to hang them out to dry. There would be some value in each of those matters, I would have thought, for the agencies themselves.

Like the existing Section 7, my solution would also apply to the Armed Forces to the extent that their actions are necessary for the proper discharge of a function of the security and intelligence agencies. Perhaps that limited application is all that the Armed Forces actually require, and I await the Minister’s comments on that.

National Security Bill

Lord Evans of Weardale Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

I had a cursory look at the register of interests for this House; a number of Members have very considerable financial interests in the Cayman Islands and the UAE. For any interaction in their business activity, by law they have to go through a process of enhanced due diligence because of the money laundering and terrorist financing controls. That is absolutely justifiable and we support it significantly. If they donate to a political party, they do not have to go through that process, but I think that they should. Therefore, at the very least, I am curious why the Government would resist enhanced due diligence for companies that operate in countries on the “at risk” schedule in the money laundering and terrorist financing regulations and which donate considerable sums to political parties. I would be grateful to hear why the Minister thinks that is not justified.

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 44 and 45A. It is striking that in the electoral finance regulations there is a great dissonance between what is required of political parties fighting a democratic election and what would, for instance, be required of not only a bank or financial institution but many charities. I find it difficult to understand why there should be any objection to ensuring that money donated to a political party in the course of a democratic election is susceptible to enhanced due diligence. It is quite reasonable to expect that the origin of those party donations should be visible. As the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, pointed out clearly, there are very considerable gaps. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, that there is a great deal more to be done regarding electoral finance.

I am the chairman of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, which, within the last two years, undertook a major report on the regulation of electoral finance. In that, we spoke not only to the political parties but to representatives of those involved in the referendum campaign and a whole variety of people who have an interest in this area. We were then able to come forward with a series of recommendations to try to close a number of the loopholes. Many of them do not relate specifically to foreign interference but there is obviously the opportunity for those who would interfere as a foreign state in our electoral procedures to exploit loopholes in the system.

Regrettably, the Government did not wish to accept our recommendations, which I feel was a missed opportunity. The Elections Act, which has now gone through, did not address a number of the areas relating to electoral finance where there are glaring inconsistencies and anomalies. This is a good opportunity—at least in respect of some of those areas, particularly where they relate to foreign interference—to introduce these amendments, which will go some way towards closing some of the very evident loopholes. From that perspective, I strongly support these amendments.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we very much welcome Clauses 13 and 14—or however they are now numbered, given the Government’s amendments—as they introduce new offences of foreign interference, given the potential impact on our democratic processes at every level. That is a further reflection of the way that the Bill takes account of the new national security environment and the changing and emerging threats that we face.

As the Minister helpfully outlined, the main effect of the Government’s amendments will be to broaden the offences to include when a person acts recklessly. It appears that that has been brought in to reflect references to “recklessness” in other offences in the Bill and following debate in the Commons. That is very welcome. Can the Minister explain why it was not part of the original Bill, and what has caused the change of thinking in the department for it to bring forward these amendments?

I will also reflect on some of the discussion from the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Purvis, and others, on what is meant by proposed new subsection (2)(e), which refers to

“causing spiritual injury to, or placing undue spiritual pressure on, a person”.

For the benefit of the Committee, it would be helpful if the Government could say more about what they intend, what that encompasses and the thinking that lies behind it. That would be helpful to the Committee in the light of the various comments made.

We also support Amendment 43 from the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Wallace. We very much support the concept of an annual report on how these clauses protect the integrity of the UK’s democratic processes. I also understand and appreciate, as I think the Committee does, the Minister’s comment about how this is about protecting the country’s democratic processes from foreign interference, not from the normal democratic and political discourse that one would expect. I am particularly grateful for that, having been accused of being a communist and a member of the Revolutionary Socialist Party—I do not know whether anyone ever came across that in my file. More recently, for the new heads of various bodies, I have been called a traitor for my views on the EU referendum. So I stand here accused of being a communist on the one hand—in my younger days, it has to be said—and then having moved to being a traitor for my views.

The serious point I am trying to make, in a humorous way, is that political discourse takes place, as do debate and argument. It is really important for us to understand the difference in the Bill’s intention that the Minister pointed out. For that to be read into the record is really important so that it is not misunderstood; it is clearly not what the Government intend.

Amendment 44, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Wallace, and of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, is really important. It was very well articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble Lord, Lord Evans, said that he supports it. There are a lot of arguments for this amendment, but my view is the same as the point the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made—a really important point, particularly at the current time when there is some disillusionment. Accepting Amendment 44 as part of the Bill would help enormously to instil public confidence, to ensure that people understand that our political parties not only are free from foreign interference through political donation but are seen to be free of it from their statements. Instilling public confidence on that is really important.

I move on to my Amendment 45, which is a probing amendment. I say to the Government that it is not necessarily intended to be added to the Bill, but it deals with an important aspect of this discussion. It is how to deal with the issue of informing the public about what we seek to do and the new threats that they face, and how we raise their awareness of them. There is also the crucial question of how this could be done in real time.

I use the example of Canada to cause us as a Committee to think. Canada has a Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, which lays out a clear and impartial process by which Canadians can be notified of a foreign threat to the integrity of an election. That includes provisions for informing candidates, organisations or election officials whether they have been the known target of an attack. It has processes which state how decisions are made, and by whom, and as to whether a public announcement should be made to alert people to the threat.

As I said, this is a probing amendment, and I am not an expert on the protocol. I am trying to understand the Government’s view. If we were to believe that foreign interference was taking place, at what point would they think it appropriate, relevant or consistent with the security of our nation for the public to be informed of that? I think the public have a right to be involved, potentially in live time.

I think this raises real difficulties. Let me create a scenario: a general election takes place—let us not use the next year or two; let us say in 10 years’ time—and the Government find that that election is being compromised by foreign interference. What happens? How does the Bill deal with that scenario? We are in Committee, which is when we look at detail. I think there is an important question for the Government about public involvement with respect to their knowledge and awareness of the potential for interference that may take place and what they have a right to know if the Government or the services come to a conclusion that there is foreign interference and that it may be compromising an election, whether it be a general election, a local election or some other part of the democratic process. I think that is an important part of this discussion. I think that, far from it being a weakness for the Government of the day, with the security services and others, to say that they are protecting the integrity of the democratic processes such is their importance, alongside that, should it be necessary for them to alert the public, they should have a system, or protocol to which they can refer, dealing with what the consequences of that would be.

This has been an interesting debate at the heart of another important series of amendments because they seek to protect our democratic processes from the foreign interference the Minister pointed out in his introduction. I look forward to his reply to not only my remarks but to the remarks of other noble Lords.

National Security Bill

Lord Evans of Weardale Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I will make some simple arguments, because there are other noble Lords who can make much more complex arguments. I say very clearly that the Bill we are debating is the National Security Bill and, therefore, it ought to be about national security. The offences should not be able to be translated to other areas. The offences are drawn so badly and broadly that they will criminalise a huge range of conduct which might only vaguely affect the interests of the UK. The wording should be changed to “security or defence”, as the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Purvis, have suggested in their amendment. It is a dangerous piece of legislation, because it is so broad that the police and security services will be able to turn it into something they can use against far too many people.

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, I have reservations about this amendment, because it seems to me that, for the reasons outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, we are talking about a grey-zone threat from foreign powers and not just the traditional threat which focused almost entirely on national security and defence in the traditional sense. If we are to have legislation which is fit for purpose for the current hybrid warfare that we face as a country, it needs to enable the intelligence and security services to take the appropriate action against not only narrowly defined national security and defence interests but the wider interests of the country—that is what the grey zone is about. While we may be talking about, for example, economic or political interests, it would be an error to focus solely on national security and defence, because, unfortunately, that is not the only area on which our opponents and enemies are focused.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I understand entirely what the noble Lord, Lord Evans, has said about the grey area, and we may need to look at that. However, because of how the clause is drafted, it goes far broader than that: as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, it allows for any interests of any Government at any period of time. What does the Minister think is the purpose of “interests”?