National Security Bill

Lord Evans of Weardale Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 6th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome the introduction of this Bill. It has been very clear for many years that our official secrets legislation is extremely elderly and was set up to counter threats that have changed and developed a great deal. It is right that we should be revisiting it. I hope that, in due course, the Government will seek an opportunity to revisit the Official Secrets Act 1989, which is also in need of reform, in my view.

For most of the last 20 years, the principal threat to national security we have faced in this country has been terrorism. While the terrorist threat continues to be very significant, throughout that period we have also faced state threats and foreign interference in this country’s activities. From time to time, that has become evident—for instance, with the Litvinenko killing or the Salisbury attacks—but much of what was going on was not visible. Indeed, many people, including some in public life, did their best to turn a blind eye to foreign interference activities throughout that period. That has been much harder to do since February and the atrocious invasion of Ukraine by the Russians. However, it is important to recognise that the threat of foreign interference does not come from just one country. We have seen a variety of foreign threats from several countries over that period, including a number of countries one would have viewed as a friend or ally in any other circumstances. Therefore, we need to have the ability to push back against foreign interference that is a threat to us, from whichever country it originates. In that regard, I think the Bill gets the balance correct.

The Bill also learns from a number of the legal measures that have been put in place to counter terrorism over the last generation. The introduction of prevention and investigation measures in respect of foreign interference seems to me an appropriate measure. We have been very careful in this country to apply the terrorist PIMs carefully, proportionately and in very small numbers, and I think we will learn from that in the way we apply the same mechanism to foreign interference threats.

I welcome the introduction of a foreign interests registration system; we have had a gap in our armoury on this for some time. It has worked well in the United States and Australia, and we need now to introduce similar legislation here. I have some sympathy for some of the concerns expressed about the definition of foreign interference, and I hope that, in Committee, we will be able to refine the definition and make sure that it bears heavily on those who cause a real threat but not on those acting legitimately. There are areas of concern here.

I welcome the proposals to introduce an offence relating to interference in elections, but I do not think that it goes far enough. I declare an interest as chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life. In 2021, the committee produced a report on the regulation of election finance, which made a number of recommendations to tighten up the electoral system against the risk of foreign money and inappropriate finance coming in. I regret to say that the Government accepted almost none of the recommendations made at that point, but I wonder whether there might be a greater openness to such changes post Ukraine. I note that the Electoral Commission itself—in the briefing note it prepared on this legislation—made recommendations for tightening our election finance system which were broadly similar to some of the recommendations made by the Committee on Standards in Public Life.

The proposals in the Bill are worth while, but they do not go far enough. They still leave a wide opportunity for, for instance, companies to donate into the electoral system even though they have not earned the money from which the donation would come in this country. Where has that money come from? It has come from abroad.

The provisions in the Bill do not make any changes to, for instance, associations—I cannot think of the word, but there is a particular phrase which basically means any group of people who want to get together and donate money but do not want to be accountable as to who they are. That model of donation seems to me to be extremely open to abuse, not just domestically but internationally. So there is some progress here, but we have not gone far enough.

There are a number of areas of controversy in the Bill, as has already been stated, in particular the question as to whether there needs to be a public interest defence. I have some reservations on that proposal. I cannot think of any disclosures in recent years, even those that have been extremely damaging to national security, when the person making the disclosure has not claimed to be acting in the public interest. Edward Snowden is a good example of that; happily, he has just got his Russian citizenship, on which I am sure we wish to congratulate him.

The problem here is not that action needs to be taken against people who are genuinely acting in the public interest; it is the evidential problems of demonstrating whether the public interest has been engaged. That is a really big problem when you are talking about intelligence and the intelligence investigations that may lie behind that. We do not want to compound the damage by having to argue against a public interest defence. A similar issue appears in the Official Secrets Act 1989 with the definition of harm.

On Clause 28, I have complete sympathy with anything which provides protection for individual officers in the intelligence agencies or the military who are undertaking difficult and complex operations overseas. They need our support and protection. It is also extremely important that we retain the confidence of our allies, because so much of our national security is tied up with the strong alliances that we are part of.

Nevertheless, I recognise that we do not want to put ourselves in a position where it appears that we are endorsing illegal action which would be contrary to our values overseas. I use the word “appear” advisedly. I have no doubt that the agencies operate to high ethical standards and go to great lengths to ensure that they behave in an ethical and appropriate way in their operations, whether in this country or overseas, but we do not want to be easily accused of opening the door to unethical practice. I hope it will be possible in Committee to find a way of closing the gap between those who feel there needs to be protection and the concerns as to whether that protection is too broadly cast.

Finally, the timeliness of this legislation is extremely attractive. It is nice that we are in a good position to push back against foreign interference today, given the evidence that Russia is doing everything it can not just to destabilise Ukraine but to push back against the strong international co-operation and common disgust at what has been going on in that country. From that perspective, this is timely legislation and I welcome it.

Corruption in the United Kingdom

Lord Evans of Weardale Excerpts

Thursday 13th October 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, on allowing us to talk about this important topic. I declare an interest as chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, although I speak in my own capacity this afternoon.

I do not share the apocalyptic vision of corruption that some have put forward. In comparison with some countries, we are fortunate not to have high levels of visible corruption in the UK. We have a respectable but not outstanding position in the Transparency International perceived corruption index but that does not necessarily tell us the whole story. The trouble with corruption is that it is an insidious threat. It can creep up on us a step at a time, and once it has taken root it is extremely difficult to get rid of. We would therefore be wise to take steps to head off any further deterioration in our position in this country. While the UK does not have the blatant corruption that you see in some countries, we have clearly, as a matter of policy, turned a blind eye to the perpetrators of corruption overseas using London for business or leisure purposes, and this introduces a risk to the integrity of our institutions and our national life.

I will focus on two areas in my brief remarks. First, corruption is about the misuse of entrusted power. Therefore, those of us who have the most power in our society, including those in political life, must be seen to be beyond reproach where corruption or potential corruption is concerned. We have a patchwork of arrangements in this country to protect public standards, not all as strong as they need to be and some under considerable pressure. The Committee on Standards in Public Life made a series of recommendations last year to strengthen these arrangements, and I hope that the Minister can give us an update on when the Government are likely to be able to respond to that report. So far, the response has been very patchy.

Similarly, corruption thrives where there is a lack of accountability, openness and due process, so the reluctance of some in public life to give an open and honest account of their actions and the failure of some departments to meet their freedom of information and transparency release obligations is a matter of considerable concern because it opens a door to corruption. Again, I hope the Minister can give us some reassurance that those undertakings will be met in future. Once again, Lord Nolan’s seven principles of public life, which include honesty, integrity, openness and accountability, demonstrate their continuing value and relevance.

The second point I want to touch on is investigation. The UK, with a few exceptions, has a pretty good suite of laws and regulations relating to money laundering and financial crime, as a result of which FATF, the international money laundering body, gives us good points and good scores. In my view, the problem is that we lack the well-resourced and proactive investigation capability for breaches of those regulations, which is what gives the regulations their teeth. By comparison, the United States does not have quite such a comprehensive array of regulations but has a much stronger system for investigating those who fall short, and that determined and aggressive investigation ensures that the rules are actually followed more often because of the deterrent effect.

However, in the UK, what measures are in place, for instance, to ensure that accurate details are provided in Companies House records? Why are ultimate beneficial owner rules so easy to avoid and why does government appear to have been reluctant to implement them? Given the vast number of suspicious activity reports made by banks and other institutions to the National Crime Agency, why does the National Crime Agency have so few resources to follow these up and to investigate the suspicious activity that has been reported to it? That leads to considerable frustration in the banks, for instance, that they report activity but they very rarely get any feedback. Why does the UK Treasury not have the determined and aggressive investigative posture of the US Treasury, which has an impact internationally? Without investigation and enforcement, regulations are a dead letter.

I received an email last year from a British businessman, who wrote the following:

“I’ve run a software company whose role is to provide tools to those battling against fraud and financial crime. I therefore sadly have a ringside seat to the explosive growth of fraud and crime in our country in the last decade. Encouraged by tolerance of sleaze, the growth of unimpeded criminality has accelerated in the last two years. The UK is now the undisputed world capital of financial crimes of all kinds. Law enforcement is splintered into myriad organisations which all have no real mandate and no funding. Tax payer funded organisations like Companies House or Action Fraud are put at the disposal of criminals to assist their activities or prevent law enforcement. Known criminals directly purchase influence in political parties without any fear.”


I leave it to noble Lords to judge whether that is a fair assessment of our current situation, but it is absolutely clear that the UK has questions to answer. We are vulnerable to corruption, especially as we host so many corrupt individuals and organisations.

A useful first step would be the appointment of an anti-corruption champion to take forward the work previously done by John Penrose MP. Can the Minister update us on the prospects for that appointment being made? We could be doing much more to avoid sliding down the international ratings. If we fail to act, we will find it very difficult to reverse our decline.

Beyond Brexit: Policing, Law Enforcement and Security (EUC Report)

Lord Evans of Weardale Excerpts

Friday 11th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, I congratulate the committee on a very insightful and positive report. I also give credit to the Government for the trade and co-operation agreement, which has avoided some of the most acute risks that came about to information sharing through the departure from the European Union. In particular, I cite the European arrest warrant, which was one of the most important of the measures for international co-operation, and certainly had national security benefits, as well as routine policing benefits. The new arrangements at least ensure some hope that that sort of arrangement can continue.

I also give a lot of credit to the outcome with regard to PNR data, given that, in my view, the EU has always had a rather disproportionate focus on data protection issues in comparison with the many other national and public goods that need to be considered.

Nevertheless, it is quite hard to see an upside in the overall arrangements as they now exist in comparison with the ones that were previously in place. For instance, I note the creation of the national contact point for policing liaison internationally, which has a strange similarity to the arrangements that were in place before 2009 when Europol was fully integrated into the EU structures.

The report does not address national security co-operation and information sharing at the intelligence level for the clear and straightforward reason that intelligence sharing is not a Community area of competence. Again, I give credit to successive Governments for ensuring that intelligence co-operation stayed outside the European Community’s competence. There were pressures in the other direction, but successive Governments were robust in ensuring that we maintained control of our national security; for a variety of reasons, that has turned out to be exactly the right decision. The UK therefore remains within the non-EU intelligence-sharing arrangements in Europe. I am sure that this goes a long way to ensuring that relevant national security information that is important to us but also important to our European friends will continue to flow. The UK has always been an active and influential participant in those structures; I am sure that that continues to be the case.

The area that continues to concern me is that we are no longer a voice in policy development in Europe. For instance, if you look at the PNR arrangements, the lobbying of the UK some years ago was an influential part of those structures and agreements being implemented. There is therefore a heavy responsibility on the Government to ensure that we continue to make the case as effectively as we can; that we are forward-leaning in our engagement with the European structures; and that we use the TCA as a foundation on which we can continue to build because there is no question but that our security in the United Kingdom is heavily dependent on our secure environment and neighbourhood, and that we need to ensure that our security, allied to that of our European neighbours, is as well integrated as it can possibly be.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Evans of Weardale Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, as a former head of MI5 and a member of the RUSI panel that reported to the Government last year, I am pleased to welcome the Bill. We in this country have had statutory powers of interception for about 30 years and actual powers of interception for 400 years at least. Overall the statutory arrangements, which have been updated from time to time, have stood us in good stead. They have been a cornerstone of the work that the intelligence agencies have done since that time. It is largely as a result of that set of powers that the agencies have been able to keep our citizens safe from terrorism and other threats, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, for the data that he provided to that end earlier in the debate.

They have also helped the police to prosecute many crimes, and that has been undertaken on a lawful and accountable basis. It was encouraging, for example, that the various inquiries that followed the revelations made by Edward Snowden, now in Russia, did not uncover any illegal activities by the British agencies. This appeared to be a surprise to some commentators, and in some cases a disappointment, but it should not have been because anyone who has worked in or with the agencies will realise that they set great store by operating on the basis of law.

Technology and public expectations move on, though, and the Bill will therefore propose a number of changes that I believe we should welcome. I suspect we will not need to make significant changes in the light of the referendum result last week. In particular, the Government have recognised the need to lay out more clearly the way in which various powers are actually used; I suspect there was a sharp intake of breath when that was decided, but in fact I think it was the right decision. As David Anderson rightly pointed out, the previous arrangements, though lawful, were, to say the least, opaque.

The powers in the Bill are necessary if the people in this country are to be able to live their lives in security, and I take as an example the use of bulk personal datasets. The use of such datasets has been the most striking development in investigative methodology that we have seen in the past 15 years, and as digital activity and life on the internet has become absolutely normalised, the use of bulk datasets has become a vital capability in enabling the agencies to make sense of the movements, associations and activities of potential terrorists and separate out the truly threatening from the background noise. It is right to make this capability and its existence clear and to ensure that the datasets are accessed on an accountable basis. There is nothing improper or alarming in using data for these ends, but it is better if we all know what is going on.

I also welcome the double lock authorisation model, which was one of the proposals made originally by the RUSI panel. It is important to keep Ministers in the authorisation loop, since the use of these powers is a matter of public concern and often of national security, which is a responsibility of government. But the judicial role can give assurance, if any is required, that Ministers are not abusing their powers. I may say that having been involved in the process of applying for warrants for 30 years at various levels within the security service, I am not aware of any case where Ministers tried to abuse their authority, but at least we will have that assurance.

Finally, it is important that in scrutinising this legislation we bear in mind that it must provide a framework to support fast-moving, complex and sometimes intensive live operations. Those using the powers on our behalf have to be able to move as fast as those who are planning a terrorist attack, importing a drugs shipment or procuring the online abuse of a child. This process cannot be mulled over at great length as operational requirements arise. I can remember in the period after the 21 July attacks in 2005, which was probably the most intensive period of warranted activity that the security service had then experienced, that all authorisations had to go through the deputy director-general for operations, who at that stage was myself. This meant that I was rung at all hours of day and night, 24 hours a day for several days in a row. I am glad to say that that exact procedure has subsequently been amended, but the principle that we are able to respond in real time to events and not to be held up by processes which are intellectually attractive but practically applicable is very important.

Bureaucracy and accountability are not the same thing. There needs to be clear and effective authorisation and oversight of these powers, but it needs to be done in such a way that the powers can still be used quickly and without unduly burdensome process. Thematic warrants may well fall into the category of activities that are needed for this purpose. One of the strengths of the British approach to these issues in the past, which has not always been achieved in other jurisdictions, has been to keep operational realities in mind and to create processes that provide oversight but do not bog the agencies or the police down in unending paperwork.

As we update the legislation governing the use of investigative powers, we should not lose that vital balance between accountability on the one hand and operational realities on the other. I look forward to taking part in the further scrutiny of this legislation in your Lordships’ House.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Evans of Weardale Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Condon (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the four noble Lords who have put their names to these amendments for renewing and re-energising the parliamentary debate about these issues. I will be relatively brief.

I think everyone agrees that there is a gap in the legislation that needs to be filled. I do not disagree with any of those who have spoken so far, not because I am vacillating but because they are all right in what they are trying to say and in their ambitions. We desperately need a clear legislative road map that leads to filling the gaps that are putting our country at risk. Ideally, that road map would lead to legislation before the general election, and that is the spirit of the amendments before us. However, I accept the reservations put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and his committee.

The fight against terrorism and serious crime is not a police and agency fight but a whole-country fight and an international fight, and in the context of our own country we need a critical mass of public and communications industry support for new legislation. The legislation cannot be too far ahead of the wide feeling of support and that they are the right measures at the right time for what we need. I hope that the Minister in his response will be able to give us a sense of how this road map might be laid out. As I say, that would ideally be before the general election, but I suspect that more realistically it will have to be after it. We will therefore be looking to the major parties to set out just what they are prepared to do in this field.

What is absolutely certain is that there is a horrendous gap that gets bigger each day and prevents the agencies that we task with keeping our country safe from doing their best in this field. So I thank again those who brought forward these amendments. This is a vital time for our country to get this matter right.

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a non-executive director of the National Crime Agency. Unfortunately, I can neither confirm nor deny the contents of the shopping lists of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, but he is quite right in saying that we are not here talking about what would amount to a snoopers’ charter.

I have some considerable sympathy for the purpose behind the amendment. It seems to me that there has been a failure in the system to provide the appropriate powers alongside the appropriate controls that will enable the agencies and the police to continue their jobs of keeping us safe from terrorism, as well as, importantly, from serious and organised crime. It was always my view as regards the draft Communications Data Bill that it was at least as important for law enforcement as it was for the intelligence agencies, because the evidence provided by communications data is enormously important and is used again and again in the courts. This is not just an intelligence issue; this is an evidential issue to ensure that justice is properly done in the courts.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord West of Spithead]

It is important to note that it does fill part of the gap. I know, having been a Minister for three years, that in the security world the agencies always say we need so-and-so and then they say, actually we need this and we need that. Yes, we do need to do these things with the various servers and providers abroad, but this is also an important part.

[Lord Evans of Weardale]

I accept that this is a very important element, but it is not the answer to everything.

My second note of caution is that we need to maintain public confidence as we go down this route. That is as important for law enforcement as it is for counterterrorism. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, referred to the masses who are concerned about the snoopers’ charter. I have to say that the polling evidence I have seen does not necessarily demonstrate that the masses are enormously concerned about this issue. On the whole, the masses seem to be more concerned about their security than about the human rights issues that some people focus on. Nevertheless, there is an issue of public confidence and I do not wish to diminish that.

Despite those notes of caution, I support the amendment. I support it because it is, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, a restricted measure, not a blanket measure. I support it because it is drafted with a sunset clause, so that we are filling, as it were, a legislative gap until the totality of the issues can be properly considered in the light of the subsequent publication of various reviews that are under way. I think that it will fill a gap for that period. It seems to me to be a useful, rather than a hugely expansive measure, and one which has appropriate safeguards, so I support it.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I am not speaking here on a party-political, but on a personal basis. I want to tell noble Lords, first, about my personal experience of terrorism. It is not first-hand, either in terms of being a member of Special Branch or the security services, or having seen the aftermath of what took place directly. However, part of my role in the Metropolitan Police following the 7 July bombings was to talk to officers who had had to go down on to the tracks where terrorists had exploded these bombs and bring out the victims of those terrible atrocities. I know what we are talking about here in terms of terrorism and I use the Underground system every day.

In our earlier discussion on Amendment 75 and internal exile, as some put it, noble and learned Lords, in particular, as well as other noble Lords, emphasised the need for legitimacy. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, talked about the European Convention on Human Rights and the right to a private and family life. My concern is that the introduction of these amendments in this way may not be seen as legitimate by many people outside this place. A process has been set in motion. There is a process for reviewing RIPA, for example, and the whole landscape of the intelligence services. That process is in place.

The other issue that noble Lords—and, indeed, two who tabled this amendment—talked about in relation to internal exile is the danger of alienation and resentment. This follows the comments by my noble friend Lady Warsi in yesterday’s Observer about how engagement is essential. We need to engage with communities, not create alienation and resentment. My fear is that the way in which these amendments are drafted is likely to cause exactly that negative effect. My noble friend Lord King, in his opening remarks, said that we are facing a very serious situation. That is common ground. As I have said, I know from personal experience the sorts of dangers that we are facing. However, there is no common ground, I suggest, about the best way to deal with that serious issue.

There has been a lot of talk this afternoon about events in Paris. My understanding is that the information and intelligence that security services got was through mobile telephone communication between the two groups of terrorists which co-ordinated their attacks by that means. There is nothing in these amendments that would give the security services or the police the powers to identify that sort of communication. It exists already. Every day, not only the police and the security services, but other agencies specified in the amendments also have the power, as we speak, to identify who called who on a mobile phone, where and when. So despite all this talk about Paris and how the attacks could have been prevented, these amendments would not appear, on the facts as I know them, to make any difference to the situation.

Terrorists may be adept at using technology, as my noble friend Lord King said, but my understanding is that a lot of terrorists, particular the sort responsible for recent attacks—whether we are talking about the tragic death of Lee Rigby or about Paris—are using very old technology. The problem, as my noble friend Lord King rightly said, is getting good intelligence. That is about developing links with the Muslim community and with communities where the extreme right wing operates, and gaining their trust and confidence in order to get that intelligence.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Evans of Weardale Excerpts

Tuesday 13th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB) (Maiden Speech)]

My Lords, it is an honour to join your Lordships’ House. It was also a considerable surprise to be invited to do so, but it has turned out to be a very agreeable surprise. I am very grateful for the welcome and good wishes that I have received from your Lordships and the staff. I am also grateful to my two sponsors, the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, in whose footsteps I have found myself treading on several occasions over the years, and the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield, whose knowledge of the ways of government—even its secret ways—is unparalleled.

I had thought that I might make my maiden speech on a subject other than security in order not to play to type. Since leaving MI5, I have built a portfolio of interests spanning banking, education, the church and even motoring journalism, and I thought that I might look for an opportunity to speak on one of those. However, circumstances have presented this Bill before your Lordships’ House. Unfortunately, I will not be able to be present for the Committee stage as a result of travel commitments that I had taken on before joining your Lordships’ House, so it would seem perverse not to use this debate as an opportunity to make a maiden speech.

When I left MI5 in 2013, I felt cautiously optimistic that we were over the worst as far as al-Qaeda and Islamist terrorist attacks in this country were concerned. It seemed to me that we were making significant progress. Regrettably, subsequent events have proved that judgment to be wrong. The atrocious killing of Fusilier Rigby in May 2013 demonstrated the reality of the threat that we face in this country, and the brutal murders in Paris last week demonstrate that this is a European and international problem and not one that we face alone.

It is, of course, developments principally in Syria and Iraq that have led to the jolt of energy that has gone through the extremist networks in this country. That was becoming evident before I left MI5. We have now seen at least 600 people from this country going as would-be jihadists to fight in Syria and Iraq. That is, of course, a dynamic number. I have no doubt at all that if we were to revisit this in a few months’ time, we would find that that number had significantly increased. When they arrive, they will join many hundreds of other jihadists travelling from other western countries and the Arab world. This puts me in mind of the circumstances that we saw in the period before 9/11 in Afghanistan, where there were many al-Qaeda training camps which drew would-be jihadists from across the globe. On their return, many of them were even more radical than they had been when they departed. They had experience of combat, had been trained in violence and had an international network of support on which they could draw. Those circumstances led to a series of international attacks over a long period. I fear that we may be facing the same situation as we go forward from today. Indeed, we are starting to see that, as the comments made by Andrew Parker, the current director-general of the Security Service, made clear last week.

At the same time the revelations made by Edward Snowden, whatever you think of what he did, have clearly led to a reduction in the ability of the security agencies here and overseas to access and read the communications of terrorists internationally, with the result that as the threat from terrorism has gone up in the past two years the ability of the security agencies to counter those threats has gone down. The result of this can be only that the overall risk of a successful terrorist attack in this country has risen.

Before I turn to the Bill, I would like to make some more general comments on the development of counterterrorism measures in the country over the past 15 years. It is sometimes suggested that there is a zero-sum game between security on the one hand, and civil liberties and human rights on the other—that this is some kind of see-saw and that if one end goes up the other will inevitably go down. That seems to me to be fundamentally mistaken. I believe that a country that has a strong basis of civil liberties and human rights is likely then to be able to draw on that as a form of resilience in the face of extremism and violence; in that sense our civil liberties and human rights are a very important moral component in the struggle against extremism. Conversely, inadequate security will breed vulnerability and fear, and that in turn will tend to limit people’s ability to contribute to civil society, will provoke vigilantism and will diminish people’s ability to exercise the very civil liberties and human rights that we wish to sustain. It is true to state that, when rightly created, appropriate security and civil liberties and human rights are mutually supportive.

The Bill provides in general for some fairly modest, practical and useful measures that will help the security agencies and the police to keep us safer, without unduly undermining civil liberties. That is particularly the case if we see additional safeguards introduced in respect of the temporary exclusion orders. For example, we currently lack any power to seize travel documents temporarily in order to stop a terrorist or would-be jihadist travelling overseas at short notice. One of the strategies that we have employed over many years is to try to break that cycle of movement between the domestic space and areas of jihad, which tends to breed extremism and violence. The Bill plugs the gap, but only permits the passport to be held for a limited period and subject to proper review. This means that the security authorities will have the time to consider whether more permanent steps, such as the cancellation of the passport, are needed. Given that it is often impossible to know in advance that an actual or would-be terrorist might be intending to travel overseas until they turn up at the port, it is a necessary and proportionate power.

Equally, the proposal to introduce temporary exclusion orders—I have considerable sympathy for those who suggest they would be better called “managed return orders”—requires the returnee to meet obligations such as returning at a specified time, attendance at appointments and notifying the police of their place of residence. That does not seem particularly draconian and is certainly very much less than would be the case under many TPIMs. Similarly, the power to require the subject of a TPIM to relocate is, from my perspective, a useful reintroduction of a power that was used to good effect with control orders. Control orders were used only in a sparing and careful way—the same is clearly evident with the number of TPIMs that have been used—but relocation was certainly valuable. I can recall one or two cases where an individual, relocated and taken out of the extremist milieu in which he was living, started to realise that perhaps he had made a mistake in adopting extremism and readopted a more moderate view of his religion. There was a deradicalising effect after taking people out of particular extremist environments, which is surely a positive outcome for all concerned.

In my experience, the part of the UK’s counterterrorist strategy that is at the same time the most important in the long term, and the most difficult to design and implement, is the Prevent programme, which aims to prevent and counter the radicalisation that may lead to terrorism. In my view, this is made all the harder by the hesitancy of many in government, the media and wider secular society to acknowledge or engage with the religious dimension of the threat that we face. The measures in the Bill require any public authorities that have been slow to get involved in this process to step up to the plate, but I have some uncertainty first as to whether going down a legislative path to require this is necessary; it is not yet clear to me that that is the case. Secondly, until we have seen the guidance in its final version it is quite difficult to decide how effective this would be. I therefore have to declare myself an agnostic when it comes to Part 5 of the Bill.

After the recent events in France there is no need to persuade anyone of the reality of the threat that we face from Islamist terrorism. The struggle to protect our country against this threat is likely to last for many years, and involves both long-term and short-term measures. The current Bill appears to propose some practical steps that will help those who protect us from those threats and in general therefore I support it. It does, however, leave a considerable amount of unfinished business, in respect of access to communications data and the interception of communications that are absolutely central to our counterterrorism efforts. No doubt we will return to that here in due course.

I look forward to contributing to your Lordships’ consideration of these issues in future debates and also, I hope, to other matters that come before the House.