Financial Services Bill
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Eatwell
Lord Flight
I think that I was interrupted right the way through, as a matter of fact.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, the government Front Bench should calm down and allow us to conduct this discussion broadly under Report mechanisms but in a way which takes us forward on what, as my noble friend has said, is an enormously complicated Bill.
I am afraid that I think the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, is unfortunate and I cannot support it. It is unreasonable to provide this sort of protection to financial advisers, who should take full and appropriate care in the advice that they give. If they have taken full and appropriate care, they will be able to defend themselves at a later stage against the problem that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, raised a few minutes ago, but I think it inappropriate that they should not be sensitive to potential comeback for advice which is inappropriate and misconceived.
Lord Newby
My Lords, when we debated this issue in Committee, my noble friend Lord Sassoon made it clear that this was an important issue for the regulator to review. The FSA has now committed to consider whether to investigate the case for a longstop as part of its business planning for 2014-15.
The amendment deals with the Limitation Act. It is important to be clear about both the nature of the issue and why I do not think that requiring the regulators to apply the Limitation Act when making rules provides the solution.
First, it is important to be clear that time limits apply for consumers bringing complaints to the FOS. These are: six years from the event that the consumer is complaining about, or, if later, three years after the consumer became aware, or ought to have become reasonably aware, that they had cause for complaint. The question which we are now debating is whether there should be a further absolute or overriding limit, possibly of 15 years. This is an extremely important question for the regulator to review and it is clear that it needs to take into account the particular features of financial services and financial service products in doing so.
When the FSA considered the issue previously, it noted that the long-term nature of some financial services products means that it can take many years for consumers to be made aware that they may have suffered detriment. An example from recent years includes inappropriate pension advice to switch from one investment or one type of pension to another. Consumers did not necessarily realise that this advice was inappropriate until many years later and as they approached retirement. This kind of advice was the subject of the FSA’s pensions review covering the period 1988 to 1994, and concerns about advice given in this period came to light only some years later. Advice from this period is still the subject of consumer complaints now.
It is important to realise that many of the matters that the FCA or PRA, or indeed the FOS, which is also relevant here, will be dealing with will not be subject to the Limitation Act at all. The Act applies to certain causes of action in private law, such as actions for breach of contract or negligence, but the FOS is required to determine cases by reference to what is,
“fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case”.
In some cases, there will be no private law course of action and so nothing for the Limitation Act to apply to.
It is also worth remembering that the Limitation Act is very context-specific legislation. Time limits vary considerably according to the nature of the claim; for example, the time limit for libel is one year whereas for negligence it is six years. The time limit also varies on the facts of the case. For example, it is extended in certain cases involving fraud or where the claimant has a disability. Even the 15-year, longstop period that applies in cases of negligence has exceptions—for example, for claims involving personal injury. Therefore, it would be particularly inappropriate as a guide for the FCA in its rule-making powers. It would be next to impossible for the FCA to know how the Limitation Act would apply to all the cases that could be subject to any proposed rule. Far from bringing the financial services into line with other sectors, we would, in our view, be failing to acknowledge that in financial services, as in other sectors, there are many claims to which the Limitation Act does not apply.
Having said that, the regulator will look again at the case for a longstop. In view of my arguments and this commitment by the regulator, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Financial Services Bill
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Whitty. He has clearly hit on something that is very real in the development of consumer financial services today and is very beneficial to the expansion of competition in the provision of financial services. It seems peculiar that, in the drafting of this clause, the Government both include the condition, in subsection (4), and then say, a few lines later, “We may leave this condition out”. Surely there is already enough evidence of the importance of non-financial parent institutions developing financial services. Why, then, as my noble friend has so clearly described, do we not recognise it now?
The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)
My Lords, new Part 12A of FiSMA, as inserted by Clause 26, extends and strengthens the regulatory framework by giving the regulators powers to act in relation to a parent entity, which is itself not regulated, but controls and exerts influence over a regulated entity. As we have heard, Amendments 90 and 91 seek to make significant changes to the scope of the powers over parent undertakings. We have not heard new arguments this afternoon, and regret that I probably will not advance any significantly new ones either—as is often the case. However, let me go through the argument as clearly as I can.
The Government are extending and strengthening the regulatory framework, so it is important that these new powers, which are untried and untested in the UK, have safeguards in place to ensure that they are used in a targeted and proportionate manner. I stress the new powers; they are not powers that previous Governments have sought to put in place, so we will put an important additional series of safeguards in place. However, their untried and untested nature is principally why the Government have proposed limiting the power to financial institutions of a kind prescribed by the Treasury in order to keep it within reasonable bounds.
As has already been identified today and on other occasions, if your main business is owning or managing authorised persons, you are caught, but if your main business is making or selling bread, then you are not. That is what the Government intend at this stage. We do not wish, at this stage, to give the financial services regulators powers of direction in relation to parent undertakings whose main business is not related to financial services. However, the Government are very much alive to the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, which is why we propose to take a power to remove the limitation to financial institutions. We accept that it may be appropriate to widen the scope of Part 12A powers to catch a wider range of parent undertakings but the Government remain unconvinced that now is the appropriate time for these new powers to apply to parent undertakings which are not themselves financial institutions. It is a developing area of financial services industry practice. We need to watch it closely and the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, is right to remind us of that. The provision future-proofs the powers and ensures that the Treasury has the flexibility to respond if circumstances change and firm structures evolve, such that parent undertakings are no longer captured within the scope of the power.
I know that in both Houses there has been interest in strengthening the application of the powers over unregulated parent undertakings. Government Amendments 91A to 91E seek therefore to improve the usability of the powers. Amendments 91A, 91B and 91C lower the trigger for use of the power against parent undertakings and make the power more usable. Amendments 91A and 91B clarify that the regulators can give a direction if it is considered desirable in order to advance the FCA’s operational objectives or any of the PRA’s objectives, or if the giving of the direction is desirable for the purpose of the effective consolidated supervision of the group. Amendment 91C is a related consequential amendment.
As a result of these amendments, the FCA and PRA, would no longer have to demonstrate that,
“the acts or omissions of the … parent … are having or may have a material adverse effect on the regulation … of one or more … authorised persons … or the effectiveness of consolidated supervision”.
After reviewing the powers in light of statements made in this House about the imperative need for the regulators to have effective powers over the parent undertakings of authorised persons and consulting with the authorities, the Government consider the previous threshold was set too high, which would have made the power difficult to use in practice. The high threshold may also have hindered and sometimes prevented the regulators properly supervising complex financial groups.
These amendments will mean that the powers can be used effectively by the regulators to address difficulties within the group as a whole. That will better fulfil the Government’s objective of ensuring that the regulators have the tools they need to conduct suitably robust supervision of unregulated holding companies.
Amendment 91E would make similar changes to the power of direction that the Bank of England has in relation to the parent undertaking of a recognised clearing house. Amendment 91D would remove the requirement that a direction must specify the period during which each requirement remains in force. This ensures that, in appropriate cases, the regulator can give a direction of an indefinite duration. It better aligns the new Part 12A powers with the provisions in new Sections 55L and 55M to be inserted into FiSMA, which provide for the imposition of requirements on authorised persons by the FCA and PRA of an indefinite duration.
While we think that directions in relation to unregulated parent undertakings should generally be of limited duration, we can conceive of cases—for example, in connection with structural reform of the kind envisaged by the Banking Reform Bill—where it would be appropriate for a direction to have an indefinite duration. Amendment 91D therefore provides the regulator with the flexibility to give a direction of an indefinite duration.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I support my noble friend’s very sensible amendment. I loved his last line: that “may” may be what is required in this respect. The amendment does two things. First, it is future-proofing—something on which the Treasury is usually very keen. Secondly, in an area where we know—and the Government have acknowledged—that abuses are taking place, it preserves the potential for self-regulation but is a shot across the bows, which should make those who are behaving improperly take much greater care. It preserves a spirit of self-regulation, if self-regulation is seen to work effectively. Given that the Treasury or the Secretary of State may by order amend Schedule 17 in the manner set out by my noble friend, I would like to commend this amendment to the Government.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
I rise briefly to support these amendments. They seem extremely sensible. I do not want to repeat what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has just said. I like the idea of “may”; I like the idea of self-regulation; and I like the chance for the industry to be able to put its house in order. That is clearly very sensible. The only point I would add is that we now have a situation where a substantial proportion of claims coming forward are fraudulent, semi-fraudulent or unjustified. In each case, the firm about whom the complaint is made must pay £850 to have the case investigated. That is a staggering sum of money and it ends up being paid by the consumers. We really need to find a way to short-circuit that, so that where the claims are fraudulent, something can be done to ensure that the claims management companies, rather than the firm, end up with some of the costs—and, indeed, to ensure that the costs are not passed on to the rest of us. There is a good idea here. I hope that the Government will give the amendments a sympathetic hearing.
Financial Services Bill
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, we on this side of the House broadly support the conclusions of the Wheatley report and commend Mr Wheatley and his team for the prompt delivery of such a comprehensive document. I say “broadly” because there are a number of details that we believe are not quite right and which require careful consideration in these—let us call them—quasi-Committee proceedings.
The grouping of all the amendments relating to LIBOR into a single group is exceedingly unwieldy and not conducive to constructive scrutiny. After all, as the noble Lord himself pointed out, there are three distinct elements within this group: first, the amendments designed to bring the setting of benchmarks within the compass of regulated activities under FiSMA; secondly, the rules requiring participation in the process of establishing the benchmark; and, thirdly, the establishment of criminal penalties for abuses of the process of setting a benchmark. Each of these three elements merits separate discussion. Rolling them all into one group just because they carry the label “LIBOR” is, to put the matter politely, extremely unhelpful.
For the purposes of this debate, at least, let us degroup the cumbersome group 1 into group 1A, definition of a benchmark; group 1B, establishing the benchmark; and group 1C, criminal offences. Group 1A encompasses Amendments 70 and 71. Amendment 72 is simply consequential. Amendment 70, which incorporates benchmarks into the order-making process, requires some clarification in that, as far as I can read through the existing FiSMA, an affirmative resolution of both Houses will be required for that order to be made. I think I heard the noble Lord say that in his speech, but he said so many other things as well that I hope he can confirm that incorporating any new benchmark into this process will require an affirmative resolution of both Houses.
Moving on to Amendment 71, which is the definition of a benchmark chosen by the Treasury, I disagree with what the noble Lord said. He asserted that this proposed new subsection would also cover commodity benchmarks and he was probably thinking of the recent scandals in the gas market and the accusations levelled at Barclays by the US authorities over the manipulation of the electricity market in California. These particular benchmarks were not specifically involved with investment, but would really come under the heading of trading. Amendment 71 refers to “relating to investments”. All the qualifications are in proposed new subsection (6)(c). Proposed new subsection (6)(c)(i) refers to,
“the interest payable, or other sums due, under loan agreements or under other contracts relating to investments”.
Proposed new subsection (6)(c)(ii) refers to,
“the price at which investments may be bought or sold”.
Proposed new subsection (6)(c)(iii) measures “the performance of investments”.
The scandal in the gas market was to do with trading, not investment. Similarly, I believe the problems in the Californian electricity market are to do with trading, not investment. Unless the noble Lord is extending the meaning of the word “investment” to include all trading activities, which, I suggest, is an abuse of language, then the commodity benchmarks are not included, as he asserted, in Amendment 71. Moreover, if this were true and what the noble Lord says is correct, why did the Financial Secretary to the Treasury make the following statement? He declared:
“The recommendation to consider the use of benchmarks in other financial and commodities markets will be taken forward through the relevant international bodies”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/10//12; col. 25WS.]
If commodities markets were already included, why did the Financial Secretary say that there was to be a process to take them forward through international bodies? Given the rather lackadaisical attitude displayed by the Financial Secretary, which was quite out of tune with the repeated arguments for the necessity of speed that peppered the noble Lord’s remarks, why are the Government, with respect to these other benchmarks, taking the long, slow route through the international institutions when the revelations about commodity benchmark manipulation have been made over the past few weeks? After all, commodity market trading manipulation has just the same scale of impact, if not a greater impact, on ordinary households, as does the manipulation of LIBOR. Perhaps I may suggest to the noble Lord that if we look for clarity instead of the abuse of language, it would be worthwhile for the Government at Third Reading to extend the scope of the new subsection put forward in Amendment 71 to include trading as well as investment.
Group 1B, as I call it, comprises Amendment 70 moved by the Government and Amendments 80A to 80C, 80CA and 80D tabled by my noble friend Lady Hayter and me. Amendment 80 is the key to the Government’s approach to setting out the rules requiring participation in the benchmark. That participation involves two distinct types of legal person: first, those providing information for the setting of the benchmark and, secondly, the legal person charged with setting the benchmark. A peculiarity of this legislation is that it has an enormous amount to say about the former and virtually nothing to say about the latter.
Proposed new Section 137DA, as inserted by government Amendment 80, refers to,
“the setting by a specified person of a specified benchmark”.
But as regards who this specified person might be or even what might be the process by which they are specified, who has the responsibility for specifying them and with what characteristics they are endowed, on all these matters the Bill and the government amendments are entirely silent. Mystified, our team asked the Bill team for the answers to those questions. Following a long and what we interpreted to be a somewhat embarrassed silence, the answer was that all this was to be left to later. That is not good enough.
Mr Wheatley’s report suggests that the responsibility for LIBOR be taken from the BBA, which anyway does not want it any more, and given to another body determined by tender. Here we part company with Mr Wheatley. It is not clear that a private organisation that has the experience and the expertise to set a benchmark will not also have serious conflicts of interest. It is especially not clear because the Government have so far failed to publish the criteria which they believe any successful tender should fulfil. All we know is that a committee has been established under the noble Baroness, Lady Hogg, to define the criteria and to establish the tender process. Before examining the tender process, will the Minister tell us why the Government did not consider establishing an independent body to set LIBOR? After all, one of the most important benchmarks in this country was for many years set by such a body, the Retail Prices Index Advisory Committee. Why was that model not followed in this case? Why is there this putting out to tender?
Turning to the route chosen by the Treasury, why, given the continually professed urgency of LIBOR legislation, does the committee to be chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Hogg, still have no membership other than the noble Baroness herself? What brief is the noble Baroness working to, what criteria is she expected to work to in establishing a tender process and what characteristics is she expected to seek in the specified person? Why is the Bill totally silent on these matters?
The fact that these serious matters are, to quote the email we received, being left for later not only suggests complacency on the part of the Government—they are putting on a show of doing something rather about the LIBOR scandal than actually doing something—but it also places a number of serious question marks over the legislation as drafted.
The amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hayter in group 1B address some of these deficiencies, though I confess that more time and more careful scrutiny would probably not only allow us to prepare more focused amendments but would also reveal other deficiencies in the current drafting.
Amendment 80A refers to the,
“code or other document published by the person responsible for the setting of the benchmark”.
The responsibility for setting the code, like so much in the LIBOR amendments, is rather amorphous. We suggest that the Financial Reporting Council might be included as a possible institution for setting and regulating the code. The reason is obvious to anyone who has worked with the FRC or studied its activities. The FRC is the only body in the UK that has general oversight over such codes of conduct in the financial services industry. For example, the FRC oversees the codes produced by the professional bodies—the Institute of Actuaries, the Institute of Chartered Accountants and so on—ensuring that their codes are appropriate to the needs of the organisation. It oversees supervision in enforcement.
Of probably even greater importance, though, the FRC includes independent persons in its council. This means that it is not just the actuaries who agree their code or the accountants who agree their code. So we have introduced the FRC into the Bill at this point—remarkably, the only point in the entire Bill at which it might be mentioned—in order to stimulate the Minister to say that, in setting a code to control behaviour of those participating in the setting of the benchmark, the responsibility will not be given to insiders—to the bankers—to establish their own code. There must be the same sort of external oversight as that practised by the FRC to ensure that the code is objective, effective and enforced. How will the Treasury ensure that that is the case?
Amendment 80B, which the Minister has already referred to, tabled by my noble friend Lady Hayter, would clear up a drafting error in the Government’s amendment, establishing consistency in references to the code. I asked my noble friend what would happen if she decided not to move it, and I think the answer is that the Government would be embarrassed—but there we go.
Amendment 80C addresses a serious deficiency in what we believe is the Government’s proposal with respect to the specified person responsible for setting the benchmark. We understand that the committee—as yet not established under the chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Hogg—will devise procedures and rules for a tender process to select the specified person.
First, what if that person does not perform satisfactorily? What if there is another scandal with LIBOR or some other specified benchmark? Who then steps in to clean up the mess? At the moment it has been the Treasury and the FSA/FCA, but this is in circumstances in which the BBA wishes to give up its role. What if the specified person is underperforming but does not wish to give up the role? Moreover, it is not clear at the moment whether the award of a tender is to be time-limited or whether it might be subject to some sort of review. We need to be clear. Who is responsible on an ongoing basis for awarding and revoking the tender?
Secondly, what happens if there is an interregnum? There might be a delay in awarding the contract, or it may be that the specified person runs into difficulties—goes bankrupt, for example, or simply wishes to resign. Who picks up the reins then?
The purpose of Amendment 80C is to ensure that the credibility of the benchmark is sustained by its continuity. The FCA, in our amendment, has that fallback responsibility. The amendment is suitably general so that the FCA may decide to deal with the difficulties in the way “it deems necessary”, but at least the amendment ensures that someone is ultimately responsible, not simply for regulating the setting of the benchmark but for ensuring that one is actually in place.
Lord Sassoon
I tried to make that clear in my opening remarks, but let me have another go. We have a serious LIBOR problem which needs dealing with. These clauses put in place a framework within which the Wheatley recommendations for dealing with the LIBOR problem can be dealt with. Many of the issues I have set out and will come back to will be dealt with in secondary legislation, which I can confirm will be by draft affirmative order. The consultation on the secondary legislation will start very shortly, as I said, with a view to that secondary legislation being laid as early in the new year as the parliamentary timetable permits. So, on LIBOR, we will have a framework and secondary legislation to bolt down much of the detail in the normal way.
There are a considerable number of other benchmarks out there. It is entirely possible that, because of the way in which the framework within these amendments has been constructed, other benchmarks, through affirmative orders and secondary legislation, could at some point in the future be included. My noble friend Lady Kramer asked for clarification in this area but I crave her indulgence for a couple of weeks or so until the consultation document comes out so that, rather than receiving a half-hearted letter from me, the consultation document will deal with the issue. The LIBOR problem needs to be addressed immediately. There are other benchmarks that people may, now or in the future, wish to be covered and the framework is sufficiently flexible and future-proof in this respect. If and when a case is made for other benchmarks to be treated in the same way as LIBOR, this framework will allow for that. However, it will have to come through the appropriate secondary legislation.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I was waiting to deal with the scope of Amendment 71. I entirely understand that the particular benchmarks to be included will be determined by subsequent order—and that is fine—but Amendment 71 confines the category of benchmarks to an index, rate or price that has something to do with investments. Can the Minister explain?
Lord Sassoon
The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, asked the question very clearly earlier. If he would give me another minute or two I will get to his important point. He asked a lot of questions, as did other noble Lords, but it is the next point that I shall come to.
The noble Lord identified something that is consciously in the drafting: it sets a line between purely physical commodity markets where there are other provisions in place which cover price setting. In energy markets, if we are talking about a purely physical commodity price setting, Ofgem is the regulator and has the investigative and enforcement powers for the manipulation of physical markets under the so-called remit legislation. I appreciate that the line drawn raises the questions that the noble Lord has quite rightly asked. With pure commodities that are consciously dealt with in other legislation, Ofgem would be the principal regulator. However, gas, oil and other commodity benchmarks may well be referenced by derivatives or other financial instruments, in which case they are included in this definition. So, pure commodities are not included, but if they are referenced by derivatives or other financial instruments, that is covered in this definition of investment.
Lord Eatwell
That is very helpful. But I still think that the language is not clear. A derivative instrument may essentially be a traded instrument and there is no reason to define it as an investment. An investment is something on which one expects to receive a return either in terms of capital gain or a coupon. But you could easily conceive of a derivative instrument that is simply used as a hedge in a trading operation, which is not then an investment. This is a misuse of the word. I think that it is entirely appropriate that such instruments should be included under the broad definition that could be incorporated into subsequent law by order, but the Government should achieve clarity on this matter by specifying with greater precision exactly what they are doing.
I understand that precision can be a trap—you risk leaving so many things out when you are trying to be too precise. I understand that. But there is a bit of special pleading here, particularly because the Financial Secretary to the Treasury said that financial and other commodities markets were going to be referred to other international bodies and were not in the Government’s acceptance of the Wheatley report. So what did the Financial Secretary mean about referring this on to discussions with international organisations?
I want to press the Minister for clarity here. Take the manipulation of the gas market revealed last week. Would that benchmark be included in consideration under Amendment 71? Would it be accessible to an order made under Amendment 71 or not? Would the benchmark of the manipulation of the California electricity market also be susceptible to being included under an order expressed under Amendment 71?
Lord Sassoon
Again, to an extent the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, pre-empts what I was going to say. First, let me deal with this question about the international situation, which I believe I addressed in my opening remarks. We have identified a clear problem with a critical benchmark, LIBOR. We intend to fix it. Work is going on in the international arena to look at questions of benchmarks more generally. As and when there is a conclusion, that will then be factored in as to whether within this framework there is more to be done to regulate other benchmarks. Of course, if through applicable international rules there were some change to the framework required, which we do not anticipate, we could also change the framework through primary legislation.
In the mean time, having identified LIBOR, we will have a consultation. That will be an opportunity to people to give their views about what other benchmarks, if any, should be regulated. I do not see any contradiction in my remarks with my right honourable friend the Financial Secretary’s remarks at all. We will see what the international community comes up with as IOSCO and the FSB look at these matters.
The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, is of course right that the definition here is one of the more difficult ones. I will have a look again to see whether anything of the sort that he suggests might be missed out is not covered. Although clear understanding is that the word “investment” as taken sometimes in a common- sense way does not necessarily fit with some of the examples that he gave, I will take it away and have a look at it again to make sure that it does cover everything.
On the series of petroleum-related examples that the noble Lord gave, I am not going to say whether the manipulation of the Californian electricity market would fit within the regulations because that is beyond the scope of what we are talking about, but let me talk about the gas market. I do not want to pre-empt the specifics of the gas market review, but I am quite clear that, between the provisions that we are putting in place in this Bill, and those to which I have already drawn attention and the powers of Ofgem, we will be covered.
Also in this definitional area, one or two questions were asked about GDP and RPI. In particular, the noble Lord, Lord Peston, asked about references to the GDP deflator. Since the GDP deflator is not set by reference to the state of a market but is wholly different, I do not see that coming within the scope of what we are looking at here. GDP is clearly a matter for the ONS; it is not derived from the markets in the sense that we are talking about here.
Lord Sassoon
As I said in response to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, I will look again. I believe that, as I have set it out, everything that is intended to be covered is covered. I am grateful to my noble friend for pointing out that,
“‘Investment’ includes any asset, right or interest”,
for this purpose. That points to the wide scope of the definition. I will take away these points and make sure that it all knits together in the way intended. If it does not, I will write and seek to put matters right at Third Reading.
Let me move on to some other questions that have been asked. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Peston, that this group of amendments does what Mr Wheatley intended and that he and, on his behalf, his FSA team have rightly crawled all over it. I just want to be clear that it does not go beyond Wheatley except in the sense that we are future-proofing it for other possible benchmarks, which is entirely consistent with what Mr Wheatley wanted. While I am dealing with one or two of these questions, I can also confirm to my noble friend Lady Noakes that the definition of financial crime catches the new offences. The definition in proposed new Section 1H(3) provides that,
“‘Financial crime’ includes any offence”,
and the list of offences is not exhaustive, so the answer to my noble friend is yes.
I see the noble Baroness, Lady Hogg, in her place. It is good to see her here. There were various questions about the process for appointing the administrator. I can assure noble Lords that the noble Baroness, to whom I am very grateful for taking on this responsibility, will be taking this forward in a measured way, as your Lordships would expect. That process will take place over the next few months. My understanding is that considerable interest has already been shown in the opportunity to be the administrator. It would have been inappropriate to have an independent body setting LIBOR. As we know, it has been set by the BBA. That has presented all sorts of difficulties and conflicts of interest. Independence was weak. The BBA is handing over to the new administrator but, critically, the oversight of that new administrator will be the responsibility of the FCA. The behaviour of the new administrator will be regulated, not just the behaviour of the banks supplying the information.
Lord Eatwell
As we are in Committee, it might be helpful to take questions as we go along. It would be enormously helpful to the House to understand how the specified person who will be the administrator will act and what sort of person they might be. Given that there has been considerable interest in the position, perhaps the noble Lord could give us a flavour of the sort of organisations that might be interested—not by naming any names, which I am not suggesting at all. That would help us understand how the system might work.
The Minister said that an independent body is not appropriate. Why not? I referred to the previous advisory committee on the retail prices index, which was entirely independent. It included a number of users of the index, a number of professional statisticians and academics, and representatives of the CBI and the TUC. It was an independent committee which looked at the whole structure of the index. That was a crucial benchmark in British public life. After all, it affects uprating of benefits and all sorts of things, although it is now being superseded by CPI. There was an independent body which did the job and was highly respected. Why, in the Minister’s words, would such a body be inappropriate?
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, we risk comparing two totally different sorts of animal here. The measurement of prices, which of course now comes under the Office for National Statistics and is clearly wholly independent of government or anybody else, is an index that is currently under significant review. It relates wholly to UK activity, whereas, as we have seen, the LIBOR index does not. The LIBOR index relates to daily movements in markets, whereas RPI is a different sort of exercise that measures the monthly movement in prices. In comparing a market index such as LIBOR, however important, with the key measurement of retail prices which, under the framework that all countries buy into, should be independently set by a national statistics agency, we are talking about two different animals.
The draft criteria for the administrator of LIBOR were outlined in the Wheatley review. When the committee moves to the next stage of tendering for the role of administrator, it will be for it to set out the detailed criteria. If the noble Lord wants to see the outline criteria, they are set out in the Wheatley review. He can draw his own conclusions as to whether it would be accountants or others who might be interested in doing it. I am not privy to the specific names, nor do I need to be aware of who the people are. However, I have made inquiries, because it is relevant to one of the amendments that I will come to that there has been considerable interest, even at this early stage, before the full rules of the competition have been set out. There will be details of all that to follow.
Lord Eatwell
That is very helpful and I am grateful to the Minister. What would happen then when the administrator is not performing adequately and the FCA decides that it will take it away? Let me give another example so that I do not have to ask two questions; we can roll these in together. The second example is that the administrator goes bankrupt and is therefore unable to continue the activity. What happens then?
Lord Sassoon
If I ever get to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, we will get to that point because it is raised by one of them. It is completely clear that the FCA will have the power to act as the administrator of the benchmark in question, if necessary. That is in the FCA’s general powers. It does not need to be written into these amendments, but I will address that when I talk about the noble Lord’s amendments. Within the FCA’s general powers it is absolutely clear that it has the vires to step in and act as the administrator, if that is necessary in a market context.
I should address the scope of the offences. The first question was whether LIBOR should be limited to the UK. What is proposed in these amendments reflects the current approach in Section 397 of FiSMA. It surely must be right that UK authorities can act only where misconduct has some connection with the UK. We have a very clear approach to extraterritoriality in our legislative framework. The amendments take a broad approach within the UK’s normal approach to these matters. There has to be a connection, which may be any of a statement made in or from the UK, a person at whom the statement was targeted being in the UK or a relevant agreement being entered into in the UK. Within the normal constraints about extraterritoriality, in which we would expect certain offences of the sort that the noble Lord postulates to be prosecuted by the US authorities, we have nevertheless drawn the connection with the UK widely as it is currently drawn in Section 397.
The noble Lord, Lord Barnett, is perhaps suggesting that he does not want the offences to be retrospective. I think that raises slightly wider questions, even in the case of LIBOR. We do not need to go into the human rights basics. I am glad if, on reflection, the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, accepts that.
Lord Sassoon
I would never accuse any noble Lord, least of all my noble friend, of ever getting muddled, other than accusing myself. The basic construct is that we do not as a general principle take the same approach to extraterritoriality as the US does. The US takes a unique approach to extraterritoriality and that has raised a number of extremely difficult cases in recent years where Members of Parliament in both Houses have raised questions about whether the UK should acquiesce to the US approach. I certainly do not think that we should be using this discussion as a way of opening up the question of whether the UK should take a different approach to extraterritoriality. The fact is that the US takes a different approach, and that is how it is.
What we are doing for this benchmark issue is to draw the offence and the connection to the UK in precisely the way in which it is done for the generality of offences under FiSMA, which by UK standards is a pretty broad definition. I shall not read them out again, but I read out the three different conditions that could apply and that is on the record. I suggest that the House would not want to put some special definition of territoriality and extraterritoriality into this offence as opposed to all the other criminal offences within the financial services arena. I hope my noble friend will accept that general principle. For the moment, I think she does.
Lord Eatwell
Before the Minister leaves the issue of offences, I asked a question about the exemptions around price stabilisation rules.
Lord Sassoon
I have some understanding, but I am a non-lawyer and it was a long time ago so it is only slight. Price stabilisation rules go back to pre-1991. They are very specific rules that allow things to be done in markets in very prescribed circumstances that would run against what might be perceived to be the free flow of markets. As the noble Lord knows, they were introduced in the context of ensuring a safe and stable aftermarket following a large share issue. I think they were first used in this country by the Government in the second sale of British Telecom shares, and they relate to that regime. If there is something else going on there, I will write to the noble Lord, but they are not intended to be some carve-out that could be used to get people off a charge of manipulating LIBOR.
Lord Eatwell
I thank the Minister; that is very clear and helpful. My only question arising from that is whether the noble Lord is confident that the FCA would have the appropriate range of skills, the intellectual property, to perform the task of administration. Is there going to be a shadow specified person within the FCA, ready to take over? As he pointed out, this may be very unlikely, but if it occurred it would be catastrophic. If there is a collapse or other form of demise of the specified person through inappropriate behaviour, inadequacy or some other reason, is he confident that the FCA would have the appropriate skills to do the job straight away?
Lord Sassoon
Yes, my Lords, I am confident that the FCA, on the risk approach that it takes to preparing itself for a huge range of potential eventualities, will prepare appropriately to step in. I have said, however, that those are a very low-probability set of circumstances.
The last thing that I was going to do, because I think that noble Lords are probably sick of hearing my voice for the moment—
Lord Sassoon
They will have another opportunity very shortly because I am afraid I will be introducing the next group as well, so I am encouraged by that reaction. I was going to go on to Amendment 80D, which is all about the Treasury Select Committee being involved, but I am not sure that the noble Lord said very much about that, so—
Lord Sassoon
It has suddenly come back to me; it was just a momentary lapse. The noble Lord spoke about the merits of the Treasury Select Committee being involved in the process of selecting the person responsible for setting the benchmark. There may be a slight misinterpretation of the process for selecting a successor to the BBA and administrating LIBOR, which was outlined in a government Statement on 17 October. As I have already mentioned, the successor to the BBA will be nominated by an independently chaired committee, convened by Martin Wheatley and the Treasury and at the commission of the British Bankers’ Association, which has publicly relinquished the nomination of a successor to the committee.
Those involved in the process can be called to account by the Treasury Committee. However, the transfer of responsibility for administering LIBOR from the BBA to a successor body is not a legislative matter. I do not think it would be appropriate for Parliament or the Treasury Committee to be directly involved in what is ultimately a process between private sector commercial bodies. For that rather technical reason—but nevertheless constitutionally rather important —I am unable to accept the noble Lord’s proposed amendment. I stress that those involved in the process can and may be called to account—I do not know—by the Treasury Committee.
Lord Eatwell
The noble Lord has completely misinterpreted what I said and apparently has not read Amendment 80D. One of the main points I made was that currently we have this particular conjuncture where the BBA has said that it does not want to continue doing the job. Quite rightly, the Treasury and the FCA have stepped in and set up an entirely appropriate procedure, as far as we can tell. I am sure that it will be appropriate, given that it will be under the chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Hogg.
However, this is not the only potential benchmark covered by this legislation. There may be other specified persons to be appointed with respect to other benchmarks. To achieve the transparency to which the noble Lord said the Government aspire, the rules for determining the identification of a specified person—the objectives and the characteristics that the specified person might have—should be agreed in broad terms with the consent of the Treasury Select Committee. We then would have a procedure which everyone has looked at and has agreed upon. It can be used not as a reactive measure after a crisis but would be in place, ready to be used, at any time the Government deem it appropriate that, by order, a new benchmark is specified, and that there is a need to search for a new specified person to manage and to be responsible for setting that specified benchmark. I hope that the amendment is now clear.
Lord Sassoon
I may not have expressed myself clearly but I was entirely clear that that is the purpose of the amendment. I illustrate the situation by reference to LIBOR but the same considerations would apply in relation to any other benchmark where the process of the transfer would be very dependent on the private sector current administrator of the benchmark. It would be very specific to the nature of the market and the benchmark about which we were talking. I just do not see this as a class of activity that normally ever would be set down in some sort of framework of rules that would be agreed with the consent of the Treasury Select Committee. It is not territory into which that committee gets in terms of setting rules.
However, the noble Lord does not say that: Amendment 80D states:
“The rules determining the identification of the specified person responsible for setting a specified benchmark must be agreed with the consent of the Treasury Select Committee”.
It gets the Treasury Select Committee into vetting rules of a sort which I am not aware that the committee gets anywhere near, particularly because there will be secondary legislation, which case by case needs to deal with what benchmarks come in. The Treasury Select Committee at all stages can call people in to discuss the process. I entirely stand by my remarks on the amendment. This does not work with the nature of the transfers about which we are talking, with the flexibility we need to have, or with the way in which the Treasury Select Committee operates. However, what works very effectively is the committee calling people to account, which it may well do in this area.
The final amendment I wish to cover is Amendment 80CA, which requires that 12 months after Royal Assent,
“the Treasury shall report to Parliament on the progress of the extension of”,
the regulatory regime to cover benchmark activities. Given that the extension of the regulatory perimeter into a new type of activity may well have significant consequences, I agree that there is merit in making an assessment of the efficiency and operation of this new area of regulation.
I can confirm that it is the intention of the Financial Conduct Authority to conduct a thematic review into the system and control procedures of LIBOR-submitting firms and the LIBOR administrator in the first year of the implementation of the LIBOR supervisory regime. The FCA will be accountable to Parliament through the usual procedures, which we have debated at length.
I believe that the suggestion of a review is good but a review by the regulator itself is likely to be far more fruitful than a review by the Treasury. It is the regulator rather than the Treasury which will be best placed to modify and fine tune the regulatory regime to accommodate lessons learnt from the review. Of course, should the review suggest that there are difficulties with matters for which the Treasury is responsible, such as the scope of regulation, the Treasury stands ready to consider and, where appropriate, implement the recommendations made by the review. The underlying point is very good and the FCA will take it on board but I cannot accept the amendment.
I hope that, at some length, I have dealt with as many of the points raised as I could.
Lord Eatwell
“( ) The regulators must co-ordinate their procedures for, and provide clear and detailed guidance on, the processes for applying for, varying and cancelling permission that are applicable to authorised persons regulated by both PRA and the FCA.”
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, Amendment 73B reflects a concern that we have expressed at numerous stages in the discussion of the Bill about the process by which entry is possible within the financial services industry and the processes by which permissions are varied and are cancelled.
Our prime objective is to stimulate greater competition within the financial services industry. Entry is notoriously difficult, particularly in the banking sector, and it has been made more difficult since the financial crisis as the stable door has been banged firmly shut. The shutting of the stable door, of course, has not implied any extra sanction on those banks or other institutions which already exist but has made it much more complicated for new banks to be established or new firms to enter other major parts of the financial services industry.
From an examination of the provisions of the Bill on the issue of permissions, it seems clear that there will be firms that are regulated by both the PRA and the FCA and, indeed, that there will be firms that are regulated by one of these organisations but the process of granting permissions, variations and so on will require reference to the other organisation. Given the way in which permissions are dealt with at the moment, it seems likely that this will introduce further bureaucratic steps inhibiting entry. Those bureaucratic steps will be entirely unnecessary if the regulators have a statutory requirement to co-ordinate their procedures. If, on the other hand, as we suspect, the PRA and the FCA develop different procedures relative to their differing objectives, the possibility that processes will become excessively complex, slow and expensive increases significantly.
The objective of the amendment is simply to require the PRA and the FCA to,
“co-ordinate their procedures for, and provide clear and detailed guidance on, the processes for applying for, varying and cancelling permission”,
in order to facilitate competition and ease of entry into, particularly, the banking sector and into financial services in general. I beg to move.
Lord Newby
My Lords, as I said in Committee when we debated this issue, we are extremely sympathetic to what the noble Lord is seeking to achieve. However, as I also pointed out, the PRA and the FCA are already required by proposed new Section 3D in Clause 6 to co-ordinate their regulatory processes, including the authorisation process, so this element of the amendment would have no effect.
On the publication of detailed guidance, I point out that in order for the regulators to carry out authorisation, they will need to give instructions to firms about how to engage with the process. That is what the FSA does now, and what the PRA and the FCA will have to do in the future. Firms need to be authorised before they can enter the market and the Government agree that it is extremely important to encourage new entrants. The noble Lord talked about the shutting of the stable door in respect of new banks. The truth is that the stable door has been shut for many decades and there have been no new banks. We have to try to change the culture, in terms both of the regulators and of the regulated, that has been in place for many decades, and we are very keen to do it. That is why we had brought forward an amendment requiring the PRA to have regard to the need to minimise the adverse effect on competition that arises from its actions. One of the effects will be to ensure that the PRA works to remove unnecessary obstacles to new entrants; for example, by ensuring that the authorisation process runs as smoothly as possible.
The Government agree that it is important that the regulators explain how they will co-ordinate their regulatory activities. That is why there is a statutory duty to co-ordinate and to set out in an MoU how that co-ordination will operate in practice. The process for applying for permission is one of the things that proposed new Section 3E specifically envisages being in the MoU.
The Government entirely agree with the thinking behind the amendment but we do not believe that anything further is needed to implement what it seeks to achieve.
Lord Eatwell
That is rather complacent. If the noble Lord thinks that the FSA provides clear guidance at the moment, he has not tried to establish a bank. I can assure him that it does not. There is a reason for that. Given that most business plans are rather different and the guidance has to be specific, the FSA has expressed a reluctance to get involved in specific cases.
General guidance is of general use but is seldom useful in the establishment of a given institution. That is why the amendment calls for the provision of,
“clear and detailed guidance”.
That is not available elsewhere in the Bill. The Government are being seriously remiss by discouraging the competitive process as regards this aspect. I know that they want to increase competition but it is a mistake to do it in this way. It is not an intentional discouragement and so it would be enormously helpful if the amendment were to be accepted or some version of it were to be considered at Third Reading. I admit that it may well be belt and braces, but the amendment derives from experience of dealing with the FSA on these matters. It is in this area that the Government do not live up to the picture of assistance and guidance that the noble Lord has painted. However, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Economy: Quantitative Easing
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, what the Bank of England has been doing through the quantitative easing programme has been targeted at 2% inflation but it has been completely clear about the other effects of the policy on the economy, GDP, inflation and equity prices—it says that that was a large but uncertain impact, estimated within the range that the right reverend Prelate gave. It is wrong to see that as a one-off windfall. In that case, was it a one-off disastrous fall in asset prices caused by the banking crisis that preceded it? It is difficult to say what was the one-off windfall.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, the Treasury announced on Friday that it is to take over part of the Bank of England’s profits from the quantitative easing programme to offset the fiscal deficit. What provision is to be made in the national accounts for those funds to be returned when, as the Governor anticipates in his letter to the Chancellor, interest rate differentials are reversed?
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, these were never the profits of the Bank of England, so I am afraid that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has got it wrong. They were always profits that would fall to the Treasury—to the taxpayer. All that has been done by the announcement on Friday is very sensible, prudent cash management to make sure that £11 billion—in total, £35 billion—of taxpayers’ cash is not sitting idle at the Bank of England but is used to pay the Government’s bills. That is prudent cash management.
Financial Services Bill
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Newby
These amendments relate to the matter raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham, during earlier discussions of the FCA’s objectives. At the time, the noble Lord made the point that it seemed odd that the new section in this Bill setting out a number of indicative and non-exhaustive matters that may be considered to fall within the definition of financial crime should not include a matter of grave concern; namely, the financing of terrorism. My noble friend Lord Sassoon wholeheartedly agreed at the time that this was an odd state of affairs and promised to return to the matter on Report. That is why I am today tabling these two amendments, which have the effect of adding the financing of terrorism to subsection (3) of new Section 1H in Clause 6. This brings the provision very much into the 21st century and reflects the reality that we need our regulators to be ever more vigilant and do what they can to reduce the extent to which the financial system and firms within it can be used to finance terrorism.
I should stress that the list describing what may be considered to constitute financial crime is indicative and non-exhaustive and that there is no question that the FSA at present does not have the mandate to act in this space. It absolutely does. However, I agree with the noble Lord that this is very much a change worth making. I beg to move.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I am amazed at the inability of the Treasury to get this one right. My noble friend Lord Davies of Oldham pointed out that the definitions, even in this indicative list of financial crimes, do not accord with our international obligations to the Financial Action Task Force. The FATF defines the crucial area of international financial crime as money laundering, the financing of terrorism, with which the Government have now caught up, and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Why are the Government not following the definition given in our international obligations? Why do they not consider including the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—one of our key international obligations—as appropriate in the indicative list?
Lord Newby
My Lords, it is an indicative list. We have added to it on the basis of comments by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Oldham. It is a non-exhaustive list and the question of weapons of mass destruction is already covered by the powers that we have. There can be no question but that the authorities will be bearing down very heavily if they think there is any question of the financing of weapons of mass destruction.
Financial Services Bill
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(11 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)
My Lords, this group of government amendments comprises two straightforward technical concessions, which I signalled in Committee. The first, government Amendment 20, responds to an amendment moved by my noble friend Lady Kramer in Committee. This helpfully highlighted that the legislation does not expressly prohibit the Chancellor from appointing the governor, or one of the deputy governors, of the Bank to be chair or deputy chair of court. As I assured my noble friend at the time, the policy intention—indeed long-standing practice—has always been for non-executives to play these crucial roles. However, Amendment 20 puts this beyond all doubt by explicitly prohibiting the governor and deputy governor from being appointed as chair or deputy chair of court.
The other amendments in the group deal with the terminology around the Court of Directors. In Committee, various noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Philips of Sudbury and the noble Lord, Lord Burns, commented on the oddity of the Court of Directors being comprised of directors, which refers to the non-executive members only, and the executive members, who are not classified as directors at all. I make a commitment to go away and look at options for clarifying this, and the amendments in this group are the result. The amendments would change all references to “director” to “non-executive director”. This means that all the members of court are now directors, with the legislation distinguishing clearly between non-executive and executive directors. As I have said, these are straightforward concessionary amendments, which usefully tidy up the court arrangements, and I hope that the House will support them. I beg to move.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord on the improvement to the drafting of the Bill that these amendments secure. It is worth pointing out that this is not a mere clarification. A persistent feature in the development of corporate governance in this country in the past several years has been the enhancement of the role and responsibilities of non-executive directors. Clear recognition in the Bill that these are non-executives carries with it the potential for them to play a proper role in the overall oversight of the Bank, a matter which we will come on to later when we discuss the role of the oversight committee. I support the Minister’s amendments.
Lord Eatwell
“(2A) The Directors of the Bank of England shall only be appointed if Her Majesty is satisfied that they have the relevant knowledge and experience, and that their appointment will enhance the mix of skills and experience of the Court.”
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, in Committee my noble friend Lady Hayter and I sought to ensure that the body of what we can now comfortably refer to as “non-executives” was suitably diverse to overcome the dangers of groupthink. Groupthink, combined with a persistent failure to challenge the executive, has been all too evident at the Bank of England over the past five years and, indeed, in the years preceding the economic and financial crisis.
We were criticised at the time for the imprecision of the term “diverse”, which we included in our amendment in Committee. We have taken those criticisms on board. We have gone away and thought about them. In particular, we were very struck by the words of the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, in criticising our position:
“As the Committee may be aware, the Treasury’s Select Committee report into the accountability of the Bank of England concluded:
‘The new responsibilities of the Bank will require its governing body to have an enhanced mix of skills’.—[Official Report, Commons, Financial Services Bill Committee, 21/2/12; col. 21.]
The Government agree with this conclusion and in their response to the Treasury Committee they committed to take it into consideration in relation to future appointments”.—[Official Report, 26/6/12; col. 176.]
We have decided to assist the noble Lord in taking it into consideration by using exactly those words, to which he has already agreed, in this amendment.
Let me reiterate the main point. Until now, those involved at the Bank in a non-executive capacity have not shown themselves capable of holding the executive to account. That is a serious failing in corporate governance. Until now, those involved in a non-executive committee at the Bank have been seduced by groupthink or overwhelmed by the power of the governor or deputy governors. This is again a serious failing in corporate governance. It is simply not good enough for the Government to say, “Well, we understand and we’ll do better in future”. It is simply not good enough to provide vague assurances. If we are to create a new Bank of England with new major powers and responsibilities, it should be capable of dealing with those responsibilities in a clear structured way with suitable non-executive scrutiny. That is what Amendment 2A would achieve using the words to which the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, has already agreed.
Amendment 6A, which is also in this group, makes the same point with respect to the mix of skills on the Financial Policy Committee. Of course, the skills mix will be different on the FPC from on the court. There will be a need for more technical expertise. For example, it would be a huge mistake to rely just on people with experience of working in financial services. I notice, for example, that no one appointed to the interim FPC has done any serious economic research into the phenomenon of systemic risk—not a single one. That is exactly the phenomenon on which the FPC is supposed not merely to opine but to take action. Therefore I think that a degree of diversity in the skill set of non-executive directors appointed to the FPC will greatly enhance its effectiveness and indeed its reputation.
I hope, particularly since I used his own words in my amendment, that the Minister will be happy to accept these two constructive amendments. I beg to move.
Lord Sassoon
Noble Lords may be aware that a similar amendment to Amendment 2A was tabled and debated in another place. Then, as now, and as I said in Committee, the Government do not believe that such a legislative provision is necessary or appropriate. Starting with the question of knowledge and experience, the Government have repeatedly confirmed their commitment, as I did in words quoted by the noble Lord, to ensuring the appointment of serious, knowledgeable and experienced candidates who have the appropriate qualifications and skills to carry out the functions of non-executive directors of court. These appointments are fully regulated by the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments, which ensures a fair, transparent and competitive process. The code is binding and the Treasury is responsible for ensuring its compliance, thereby ensuring that appointments to court are made openly, transparently and on the basis of merit.
Even without a prescriptive legislative obligation, in order to build an effective court the Treasury is mindful of the need to seek not only an appropriate depth but breadth of skills and experience. Ministers can and do take this into account in forming their recommendation without the need to further impose a duty on Her Majesty to form a view as to the candidate’s knowledge or experience before she makes the appointment.
I turn to the question of diversity, which I understand to mean not only of gender, geography or ethnic background but also of sectoral experience, insight and knowledge, as is suggested by Amendment 6A. Court and, in future, FPC appointments are advertised openly, and applications are welcomed from candidates from a variety of backgrounds. For example, the role profile for the most recent court vacancies sought people with substantial experience as board members, as head of function of major financial organisations and as senior managers in a relevant area of public policy, or in the voluntary sector or a trade union.
The latest iteration of the Government’s code of good practice for corporate governance in central government departments clearly states that,
“a board should have a balance of skills and experience appropriate to fulfilling its responsibilities. Moreover, it stipulates that the membership of the board should be balanced, diverse and manageable in size”.—[Official Report, Commons, Financial Services Bill Committee, 21/2/12; col. 22.]
However, given the size of the non-executive contingent on court and the number of external members of the FPC, it would simply not be possible to prescribe a set of criteria to ensure full diversity—that is, to ensure that each and every different background and characteristic is represented on the board and committee —without severely limiting the potential field of qualified applicants. It is therefore a question of judgment.
I stand by exactly what I said in Committee, which is that the Government are committed to ensuring an appropriate breadth as well as depth of skills; and this is as true of the FPC as it is of the court. While I agree entirely with the sentiments and principles behind these amendments, I do not believe that it is necessary or appropriate to legislate to achieve these aims.
I hope that I have provided sufficient reassurance to the noble Lord and that he will be able to withdraw his amendments.
Lord Eatwell
The Minister in reply says that this amendment is not necessary or appropriate. However, in attempting to substantiate those propositions, he referred to the policy of the Public Appointments Committee, which is not responsible in any way for a mix of skills but simply for the quality of the individuals who come before it. When he referred to the variety of backgrounds, he did exactly the thing that I was afraid he would do: he referred to people with senior board experience in commercial and financial organisations and not to anybody who actually understands systemic risk or how to manage it. If they did, perhaps we would not have got into the mess that we did. So I am surprised—well, I suppose that I am not surprised—but I am disappointed that he finds it neither necessary nor appropriate.
Lord Sassoon
Can I clarify that I was citing the advertisement for the most recent court appointments and not for FPC appointments?
Lord Eatwell
That is very helpful, and I thank the Minister for it, but my point on the FPC is reinforced by what he has just said. I would hope that in FPC appointments some reference would be made to the appropriate skill set, which was not that quoted, although it may be appropriate for the court. Perhaps if I could nudge the Treasury in that direction when making an advertisement, that might be a result. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 2A withdrawn.
Amendment 2B
Lord Eatwell
“(2A) Within one month of the appointment of a person under subsection (2)(a), Her Majesty’s Government must make parliamentary time available for the House of Commons to debate and express a view on that appointment.”
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, this moves us on to a rather serious matter. Everybody in the House will be aware that there is considerable and growing disquiet about the powers heaped on the Governor of the Bank of England; he or she will chair the court, the Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Policy Committee and the Prudential Regulatory Authority. On top of that, he or she is designated by the Bill to be the sole interlocutor between the Bank and the Treasury in the designated meetings with the Chancellor. On top of that, the governor must guide the Bank’s other activities in policy and research. And on top of that, the governor will continue to represent the Bank in international fora. I suppose that just occasionally he or she will sleep.
This is a ridiculous amount of power in the hands of an unelected official. Kate Barker, a former member of the Monetary Policy Committee, said, in August this year, said that the,
“steady erosion of democratic control over regulation of the financial system would accelerate under proposals by the coalition government”,
and that,
“Mervyn King’s successor will be appointed to an unduly powerful role for an unprecedented eight-year term”.
Kate Barker has great experience in this field and seems to have captured exactly the problem. As noble Lords will be aware, there has been considerable disquiet from serious financial commentators about the future position of the governor.
There is another inevitable downside to this agglomeration of powers. The post of the governor has become—and will become yet more—excessively politicised. That is very unfortunate. However, that is the inevitable consequence of the Government’s proposals. If that is the Government’s wish, they should face up to the consequences, and permit Parliament to debate the appointment, at least after the appointment is made. Even then, the prospect of such a debate will focus the mind, let us say, of the Chancellor in making a recommendation, in the knowledge that he will have to defend it before the House of Commons. I beg to move.
Lord Barnett
My Lords, I strongly agree with much of what my noble friend has said. As I have said before, I have been extremely concerned about the new governor’s huge job. As my noble friend has spelt out, we would be giving enormous powers to that new governor. That is why I have expressed my dissatisfaction, to put it mildly, with the way that this Bill has been drafted. I hope that my noble friend will accept an amendment from me to his amendment; namely, that it should be available not only to the House of Commons but to Parliament. This House has scrutinised this Bill to an enormous extent. To say now that the appointment should be deferred only to the House of Commons is something that I certainly do not like. I hope that my noble friend will rearrange his amendment to accept the word “Parliament” rather than “the House of Commons”.
We will come later to the question of “must” and “may”, but I am very pleased to see that in this amendment my noble friend has put “must” rather than “may”. It is certainly crucial that it should happen, because the appointments are extremely important. Somebody should be doing the job that the current governor is not doing, and which he is not being asked to do. Now we are asking the new governor, whoever that may be, to do such an enormous job that some potential contenders have already withdrawn from the race—and understandably, because the job that will be asked of this man or woman is enormous. I hope to have the opportunity to propose an amendment a little later to reduce some of those powers, but for now I strongly commend my noble friend’s amendment, subject to my suggested draft amendment to his amendment.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, before I turn to the detail of this amendment, I thank the Bill team for dealing with a significant hatful of amendments, this being the first, that turned up from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, rather late yesterday evening.
Lord Sassoon
I will give way in a moment. I will do my best to engage in constructive and meaningful debate. As I say, I am very grateful to the team because we did not have much notice of a number of these amendments.
Lord Eatwell
I am sure the noble Lord does not want to mislead the House. The amendments were sent to the Bill team on Friday afternoon and I had a long telephone conversation with it to discuss them. I assure the noble Lord that I had that telephone conversation. He says from a sedentary position, “not on all of them”. All the major items were discussed at that time. For him to suggest that they appeared only yesterday is inaccurate.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, Amendments 2B, 2C, 3L, 3M, 6B, 6G and 7F, among others—maybe that is the lot—appeared at the Treasury late yesterday and not all the amendments were discussed in the conversation to which the noble Lord refers. However, there are some important and some not so important matters in these amendments and I will do my best to do them justice.
As we have heard, this amendment relates to the role of Parliament in the appointment of the Governor of the Bank of England and has been the subject of much debate both here and in another place. Specifically, Amendment 2B seeks to secure a debate in another place following the appointment of the governor, something which I do not believe is necessary or appropriate. The Government are committed to maintaining an appointments process that is proportionate and attracts candidates of the highest quality. It is important to ensure the credibility of the candidate and safeguard his or her independence. If the appointment was subject to a debate in another place, I suggest that there is a significant risk of politicising the process and undermining the appointment of the new candidate. Of course, it has been argued that such a debate could enhance the credibility of the candidate but previous governors have achieved credibility without being subject to such a debate. Credibility ultimately stems from effective action to meet the Bank’s objectives. If the appointment were subject to a debate in another place, the candidate would not be present to answer questions or defend him or herself.
The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has already quoted me in the previous debate. I quote what he had to say on this matter in Committee on 26 June. He said:
“We do not want to politicise appointments to the extent that has occurred in the United States”.
The suggestion that appointments might end up being considered by the whole House made him “nervous” as it would,
“inevitably be whipped and become very political indeed”.—[Official Report, 26/6/12; col. 165.]
I very much agree with that. Therefore, the Government believe that the pre-commencement hearing held by the Treasury Committee strikes the right balance in terms of scrutiny of this executive appointment and allows for a more constructive debate with the candidate in attendance to satisfy the committee’s concerns about his or her personal integrity and professional competence. The Government welcome the Treasury Committee’s ongoing role in holding such hearings and, importantly, as my noble friend Lord Flight reminded us, holding the governor to account throughout his or her tenure. I hope I have provided sufficient reassurance and that the noble Lord feels able to withdraw this amendment.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I am not taking it for granted. I am merely quoting the fears of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, when he addressed this issue in Committee. “Inevitably be whipped and become very political indeed,” were his words, not mine. However, I agree that this is the way that these things tend to go. The concept of a congratulatory first is not one that sits easily with another place.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I am grateful for the comments that have been made—some accurate, some less so. First, with respect to the issue of being politicised, my concern is motivated primarily by the powers being translated from elected persons to an unelected person. That is what is happening in this Bill. This will inevitably make the position of the governor much more of a political focus rather than the markets and technical focus it has been very much in the past—perhaps not in the 1930s with Montagu Norman, but in recent years. That is where the politicisation has come from. We need to recognise that powers have been transferred from the elected to the unelected by giving the elected some role.
The Minister did me the honour of quoting me, although of course out of context. I was referring—as I am sure he would agree—to pre-appointment hearings as are common in the United States. This is not the intention of this amendment at all. However, a series of important issues is going to come up again and again unless the Government take very seriously the very considerable conglomeration of powers in the hands of the governor, given by this Bill, and the fact that powers are being moved from the elected to the unelected. It is vital that Parliament should consider this crucial issue. I hope that the Minister will take some of these considerations away and think very carefully about them. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
“(2A) Any persons appointed under subsection (2)(e) shall be appointed with the consent of the Treasury select committee.”
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, has made it clear today that the non-executives will play a major role in the governance of the Bank. This amendment seeks to ensure that non-executives, essentially here in the court, are appointed with the consent of the Treasury Select Committee. The point is being reiterated. Given the powers invested in the Bank, including and especially the FPC powers that have previously rested only with the Chancellor or other elected persons, it is appropriate that there should be some political oversight of the appointments. The Treasury Committee is surely the right place.
What are the major arguments against this pre-appointment scrutiny? First, that the procedure will be unduly intrusive and onerous; and, secondly, that it will be too politicised. As a result, suitable persons will not apply. I think that the arguments in the context of what is being done in this Bill are ill founded. The Government decided to politicise the position of the Bank by giving it powers previously reserved for elected persons. The Government decided to load on to the Bank virtually all regulatory functions and control of monetary and credit policy. In this context, the Government should accept that the Treasury Committee’s scrutiny is entirely appropriate. Let us remember that that committee has played a serious non-partisan role for a number of years, both when chaired by my noble friend Lord McFall and now, as chaired by Mr Tyrie. The committee does an excellent, non-partisan, technical and difficult job. In that context, it could play an important role in monitoring those persons to whom the powers previously assigned to elected persons are now to be given.
While Amendment 2C relates to the non-executive directors of the Bank, Amendment 6B in the group extends the same principle to the independent members of the Financial Policy Committee. If anything, the point is even stronger here, because these are people who will be participating in decisions that directly affect individuals’ lives. The members of that committee will be making decisions about your mortgage rate and the availability of credit in general to individuals in society. It is therefore surely right that appointments should be subject to the consent of the political part of national governance, as represented by the Treasury Select Committee, which is handing over these powers.
Sometimes, we in Britain are a bit overly sensitive about appointments procedures. I remember that university appointments used to be totally confidential to appointments committees. Now appointees have to appear before the whole faculty and the students, give lectures to demonstrate how good they would be and defend themselves.
Lord Eatwell
Yes, it is true. They have to do that prior to any form of appointment. Therefore, the sort of sensitivity I mentioned is overdone. Greater transparency and more robust procedures would serve us well. Most important of all, there must not be an abdication of powers that in the past were reserved to elected persons without some substitution of proper political oversight, as provided for in Amendments 2C and 6B. I beg to move.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I am grateful to everybody who took part in this short debate, and especially for the support of my noble friend Lord McFall, who has such experience in these areas. I always take very seriously indeed the opinions of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I quite understand her concern that accountability should be a phenomenon that is ongoing and not just on appointment. Why not on appointment, too, so to speak?
I was puzzled by the introduction with which the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, prefaced his remarks. He stated that financial regulation had been going on for a decade. It has been going on at an international level since 1974. The whole point of this legislation is that macroprudential legislation has not been done at all before. That is why the various reports such as the Turner review by the FSA, the report of the US Treasury in 2009, and the report of the high-level committee of the European Union led by Monsieur de Larosière, all identified a new role for financial regulation in dealing with macroeconomic variables, which it had never done before. This is a new area of financial regulation which is specifically the responsibility of the Financial Policy Committee.
The Minister said that there had been no transfer of responsibilities. Was not the control of credit in our economy the responsibility of the Treasury? Has it not been so since the Second World War? Did not the various Acts on the control of credit start as Treasury Bills? Now the availability of credit is predominantly the responsibility of the Financial Policy Committee. That is a transfer of powers. I wonder if the Minister would like to consider that example.
The Minister then said something truly extraordinary. He said that the non-executive members of the court were not policymakers. Perhaps I may refer him to Clause 4 on financial strategy, which states:
“The Court of Directors must … determine the Bank’s strategy in relation to the Financial Stability Objective”.
That sounds to me as if they are policymakers. They must “determine the Bank’s strategy”. Are the non-execs therefore to sit down and keep quiet?
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, will the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, concede that that is the responsibility of the Court of Directors as a whole, not of the non-executive directors as a group?
Lord Eatwell
Certainly, but that is not what the Minister said. He said that the non-executive directors were not policymakers—but they are to participate as a nine-member majority of the court, including the chair, as he pointed out. However, we now hear that they are to sit silently while the executive directors determine policy. That is nonsense and the Minister knows it. These individuals are policymakers—and rightly so; they should be. That is why we need the right sort of people, and why it is right that there should be suitable hearings preceding their appointment, as suggested by the amendment.
The Minister is getting into a muddle. He should go away and think hard about what the Financial Policy Committee is required to do, recognise that there has been a transfer of powers and that macroprudential regulation is something entirely new that has not been done before; and try to get some of the legislation right. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, this is a major amendment that I had the pleasure of discussing with the Bill team on Friday. I was going to preface my remarks by saying that there is a developing consensus that the Government are piling responsibilities on the Bank of England. But I hear that consensus is not developing on the other side of this Chamber, since the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, does not seem to recognise that the Bank and the governor are having these extra responsibilities or indeed that there has been transfer of powers.
Interestingly enough, others do recognise that. Mr Tyrie, just last week, with the oversight committee already in the Bill, referred to the Bank’s defective governance. Then, Mr Bill Winters, a former executive at JP Morgan and author of one of the very tightly constrained reviews into the Bank’s operations that was published last week, concluded that the Bank was too “centralised and hierarchical”. Then Sir John Gieve, a former deputy governor, commented on the same review saying,
“how do you bring more challenge into a hierarchical organisation?”.
That was last week, with the oversight committee in place. Those comments echo criticisms made by a number of former senior Bank of England staff and by serious commentators in the financial press. This is a serious issue.
I have already listed the major issues, but I will list them briefly in the context of this amendment because it may help the House. With respect to the powers assigned to the governor in the Bill, the power of an unelected person will be equivalent almost to that of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Indeed, it will exceed the Chancellor’s powers in that the Chancellor is under constant scrutiny from Parliament whereas the governor is under less intense and less constant scrutiny.
We have to remember that the governor will not only chair every financial policy committee in the land with the sole exception of the FCA, but will be the lone high-level interlocutor with the Chancellor. He holds these positions while having no statutory responsibility to consult or involve other senior officials at the Bank or non-execs. He may consult and he may delegate, but it is entirely up to him or her. If they do not wish to do so they can ignore them all.
In Committee, the Government took an important step by creating the oversight committee. But noble Lords will notice that within the designations of the responsibilities of the oversight committee, there is one notable oddity. There is a notable absentee. Nowhere does there appear the verb “to oversee”. We have an oversight committee that does not oversee. In fact, a careful reading of the designated activities of the oversight committee reveals that all its key responsibilities are retrospective. It must keep under review. It must monitor. It must review procedures. It must conduct performance reviews. The only thing that it must not do is oversee. This is not an oversight committee, it is a hindsight committee—a valuable role, no doubt, but hardly an activity to moderate the powers of the “Sun King” governor other than by retrospective embarrassment, and governors of the Bank of England seem to be peculiarly impervious to embarrassment.
The amendment introduces the verb “to oversee”. It gives the oversight committee the power of oversight. This will have a number of beneficial consequences. The governor and the executive will, as in all good governance systems, be accountable to the non-executives for their activities and their policies. As in all well run organisations, the non-executives will not design the strategy or tactics of the Bank—that is the job of the executive—but they will be the advisers and the arbiters. They will oversee.
Instead of being either a glorified review committee in the shape of the noble Lord’s hindsight committee, or creatures of the executive, as in the court, the quality of a person likely to be willing to devote a considerable amount of time and effort to the job of non-executive of the Bank will be significantly enhanced because they are getting a real job. The foundations will be laid for the creation of a modern governance structure within the Bank of England, appropriate to the 21st century and to the major powers now vested in the Bank.
In this group there are also Amendments 3B, 3G and 3H, which are a direct consequence of the recognition of the role of the oversight committee in overseeing the activities of the governor in particular, and of the Bank in general. If the oversight committee is to exercise this role effectively it should have the final sign-off to the policies prepared by the court and by other executive institutions. I should be clear that in all well run firms it is the task of the executive to prepare policy and to execute it, but it is the role of the non-executives—of the oversight committee—to scrutinise and sign off the executive’s proposal. The oversight committee should oversee.
Amendment 3K makes clear that the role of the oversight committee in its task of overseeing is to approve the policy prepared by the court; it is the precise role of non-executives in all well run companies. Amendment 6C makes clear that the oversight committee is not to be confined to the impotent ghetto of reviewing procedures of the FPC but can also review the FPC’s policies. After all, if it cannot review policies what will the performance review be about? If it is given the task of performance review, surely it should review policies and not simply procedures.
I quite understand that the Government have not had long to consider this core idea, although they have had a bit longer than the noble Lord earlier suggested. I give credit to the Bill Committee and I understand the pressures it is under; similar pressures are experienced in my office.
Lord Sassoon
I do not want to labour the point but would the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, accept that I did not list Amendment 3A as one that came late? I fully accept that this is not one of the hatful that I referred to as arriving late. We have indeed had longer to consider this amendment.
Lord Eatwell
Then I am sure that the noble Lord, having given the amendment such mature consideration, will be able to accept it.
I hope that, at the very least, the Government will agree to take this proposal away and think about it. After all, if we are going to have an oversight committee it should oversee; otherwise perhaps the Government should simply change the committee’s name. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes
My Lords, I am a bit puzzled by these amendments and I should say that while the Minister’s officials may have had them since last Friday, those of us who are trying to take part in this Report stage saw them only first thing this morning, which comes of when the party opposite chose to table its amendments.
The noble Lord says that there is no oversight in the new section dealing with the oversight committee. If I were to define oversight I would say it is about reviewing and monitoring; that is the very nature of what is involved. The noble Lord suggests it means some real-time involvement by the non-executives in what happens on a daily basis within the Bank. That simply cannot be—it seems to me the noble Lord misunderstands the role of non-executive directors.
This group of amendments also contains the concept of the non-executive directors, via the oversight committee, approving the strategy. The oversight committee is a sub-committee of the Court of Directors and is not there to approve what the court should be doing. This is correctly formulated in that it is the court that is preparing the strategy. The oversight committee has no role in relation to that except by virtue of the membership of the individual non-executive directors who are also members of court. I really do not understand this sequence of amendments.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I know that the custom of this House on Report is that noble Lords do not make second substantive speeches, so the noble Lord will understand if I do not respond to his points—otherwise we will not make much progress. However, I will clarify one point in answer to the question asked by my noble friend Lord Flight about the removal of the governor and the suggestion by the noble Lord, Lord Myners, that the governor cannot be removed. This is of course wrong, as I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Myners, knows. If he would like to refresh his memory of the Bank of England Act 1998, paragraph 8 of Schedule 1 sets out precisely the conditions under which the governor can be removed.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I am very grateful for the discussion which I have enjoyed very much. I have been educated and entertained by the remarks made by noble Lords all around the House. The key position that we have to start from is that the Bank of England is different. Its structure is different and the structure of responsibilities is different. When we think about corporate governance, we have to think about the way in which we can maintain a suitable degree of accountability.
In Amendment 3A, I was attempting to nudge the Government a little further on the oversight committee which, as the noble Lord made clear in contradiction to what the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said, is entirely retrospective at the moment. In those circumstances, the maintenance of accountability is not really enough, given the degree of responsibility and powers that the Bank will have.
It occurred to me that a non-executive committee often has the final say. When things really go wrong, it is the non-executive committee that has to gather together and deal with what is going wrong in a company. Here the non-executive committee, by nudging it a little further and including the word “oversee”—for an oversight committee—would actually nudge the oversight committee, as conceived by the Government, in a direction in which it could hold to account the executive of the Bank to a greater degree than is the case at the moment. I think that the Government are being excessively complacent about this. We have this massive switch of powers, and we are being told that everything will be all right and that this Committee—which, as the noble Lord says, is entirely retrospective—will somehow create an aura of accountability. I just do not see that happening.
I regret that the noble Lord has not taken a constructive view of what we were trying to achieve. I would have been quite happy to accept some recognition by him that there is a degree of a problem in this particular institution and that we need—in this House and, indeed, in Parliament in general—to address this problem if we are to move forward successfully with the structure of financial regulation and oversight in this country. The noble Lord has given no indication of any sympathy whatever. Instead, he wants to keep the oversight committee purely retrospective, with no ability to take a broad view—not on a daily basis, of course not—and he wants the non-executives to have that specific role. Given that he has shown no interest at all and no understanding of the serious issues involved, I would like to seek the opinion of the House.
Lord Eatwell
“( ) The Bank will ensure that the Oversight Committee has adequate economic, legal and research support.”
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, in the debate that we have just had we heard a lot about the values of the oversight committee and what an important job it has to do. The noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, made some comments about new Section 3C, perhaps inadvertently, while he was reflecting on the group of amendments that we have just looked at. The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that the oversight committee—or hindsight committee, as I think it should be called—has the resources to do its job.
We have to remember that the Bank of England has form in this respect. In the early days of the Monetary Policy Committee, independent members were deliberately starved of resources by the Bank in order to enhance the position of the executive members. We all hope that the Bank has learnt its lesson from the very negative publicity that that incident produced. However, we are now in different territory. The powers are greater, and the responsibilities are wider. Hence it is vital that the oversight committee should be well resourced. New Section 3C refers to the possibility of hiring people to conduct a performance review, but that is one step down the line. The committee needs its own staff to help determine exactly which performances should be reviewed, and who should be asked to do that sort of important secretarial work.
That is the purpose of the amendment before us. It can do nothing but strengthen the Bank of England, making the committee into an effective instrument of retrospective monetary and financial governance. I am sure that that is what the Government would like, so I would like to hear them accept this amendment, or at least give an undertaking to take the idea away and think about it with care. I beg to move.
Lord Peston
My Lords, I support this amendment in substance. The noble Lord will be delighted to hear that I also wish to make a couple of semantic points. My noble friend said that the committee should have its own staff. My view is that it should not only have its own staff but should appoint its own staff, thereby guaranteeing that the staff are its own, work for it and, to use the slang expression, are not “narks” of the governor. Therefore, the noble Lord ought to accept the amendment.
My two semantic points are as follows. First, I find the committee’s name most unattractive. Will the noble Lord ask the Bill team to look up the definition of “oversight” in the dictionary as it has a very definite meaning which I am sure the Government and the Minister do not wish to be associated with this committee. It may not be too late to choose a more felicitous name. I wonder whether I am the only person who has thought what a ridiculous name the committee has.
Secondly, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Eatwell on solving the problem with which, as your Lordships know, the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, and I are obsessed: that is, the “must/may problem”. My noble friend has solved it in a really interesting way. He does not use “must” or “may” but “will”. I would like the Minister to ask the Bill team whether it would consider going down the path of using “will” rather than “must” or “may”.
Lord Sassoon
If the noble Lord, Lord Peston, could persuade his noble friend to rein back to just a couple of amendments a day, I am sure that we could carve out time to look at all sorts of semantics. However, I shall stick to the substance of this amendment, which seeks to place the bank under a statutory duty to ensure that the oversight committee has,
“adequate economic, legal and research support”.
I entirely agree with the sentiment behind this amendment. As we have already discussed this afternoon, the non-executive oversight committee has a very important job to do in reviewing the Bank’s performance and will require access to the information and analytical support that it needs. That is why, for example, the legislation makes it clear that members of the oversight committee have access to the meetings and papers of the MPC and FPC and have a specific remit to commission work and reviews from external bodies and experts.
It is a well established principle that it is the responsibility of the governing body of any organisation to ensure that its members and sub-committees are properly supported. I recognise that the Bank was slow to realise that the external members of the MPC required dedicated resource and support. I am confident that the Bank has learnt its lessons on this. Both the MPC and the FPC members have access to all the analytical and secretariat support that they need. I am wholly confident that the Bank will similarly make support available to the oversight committee to make sure that it is adequately supported without the need for legislation on this point. I hope, therefore, with the further reassurance on that, the noble Lord will see fit to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Eatwell
What the noble Lord has said does not address the important issue here. He said that the oversight committee will have access to papers, be able to commission work and have access to the secretarial and research skills of the Bank. However, the point of this amendment is to give what every non-executive group really needs, which is access to independent advice. Any non-executive group of which I have been a member has always prized its access to independent advice: that is, its ability to seek advice outwith the immediate organisation of which it is a part.
The point has been made around the House this afternoon that the Bank of England is different in a series of ways with respect to its overall organisation. It is also different in terms of the sorts of powers which it will exercise. Therefore, I feel very strongly that it is important that the oversight committee, which is, after all, the committee of non-executives, has access to independent advice. It is regrettable that the Government feel that assurances are enough. I entirely accept that the noble Lord and, indeed, the officials who have looked at this question feel confident in giving their assurances but they cannot bind their successors. The point of this amendment is to ensure that successors who hold this responsibility both within the Treasury and within the Bank recognise the importance of the advice and support that the oversight committee should receive if it is to do its job. I hope that the noble Lord will take that away and think about it although I probably hope in vain. Nevertheless, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I am afraid it is me again. These amendments refer to the decision to publish performance reviews. Let me remind the House that the performance reviews referred to in the particular clauses which are to be here amended are reviews that the oversight committee has commissioned or conducted. The amendment removes the Bank’s veto over the oversight committee: a veto which the Bill gives to the Bank—otherwise known as the governor—over the publication of such reviews.
Again, the Bank has form in this respect. As Members of your Lordships’ House will be aware, the Bank of England is the only major public institution directly involved in the financial crisis that has not seen fit to conduct and publish a full assessment of its own activities, procedures and policies during the crisis and to own up to the contribution it made to the crisis. The Financial Services Authority has done that as has the Treasury. The Bank has not seen fit to do that. The three reviews published last week have been very carefully circumscribed in their terms of reference to prevent proper consideration of the Bank’s record. You only have to read the Bank’s tepid response to the reviews—it did not refer at all to the comments on the Bank’s excessively hierarchical structure—to realise there is still a deep-seated cultural failing in this respect in the Bank. Where other organisations review what they have done, think through and learn from their experiences, the Bank seems to be unwilling to do this.
In these circumstances, it would be quite wrong to give the Bank a veto over the publication of the oversight committee’s reports. If this serious committee of non-executives—a majority of the court—put together a report and decide that it should be published, then why should there be a veto over them? The oversight committee is quite capable of taking the advice of the Bank, the governor or whoever on whether the publication is against the public interest. If the Government really want effective performance reviews and not whitewash I am sure they will support these amendments.
Baroness Noakes
My Lords, I share many of the frustrations that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has exposed in relation to the reviews that were commissioned, late and inadequate, and I completely accept that the Bank’s response did not seem fulsome. However, I think we have to give the new Government’s arrangements within the Bank a chance. While the Bill says that the Bank will decide about publication, that should be the Court of Directors and, as we know, the Court of Directors has a majority of non-executives. I hope that they will be invigorated by the new context provided by the separate oversight committee. If we keep trying to make functions of the Bank be carried out by the oversight committee we will undermine the court. We need to ensure that the court is strengthened and takes its responsibilities seriously. I also sincerely hope that the Treasury Select Committee in the other place becomes more active in seeking to engage with the non-executives via the oversight committee on how things work in practice.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I am not at this point going to get sidetracked into semantics, fascinating though I find it, as noble Lords know. Let me echo again, because I had said already what a good job the Bill team was doing, that I completely agree about that. I am very sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Peston, thinks—I am sorry; I meant the noble Lord, Lord Barnett. Do forgive me. The noble Lord, Lord Peston, may think that I am doing an excellent job but I know that the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, does not. Anyway, it is entirely my fault and not the fault of my officials, as the noble Lord recognises.
Let me try to be brief on this one. This is not a question of the governor having a power to overrule the oversight committee, as other noble Lords have said. The construction in the Bill is that it is for the Bank as whole—the court of the Bank—to decide and to make an informed judgment whether damage might be caused by the publication of a report on a public interest test. I understand the starting point of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, which is some suspicion or concern that the people who commissioned the report—the oversight committee—should be the group of people who decide whether it should be published. However, it is appropriate for the Bank as a whole—that is, the court, with a majority of non-executive directors, as my noble friend has reiterated again—to take the decision.
Lord Sassoon
Perhaps the noble Lord will let me finish. It is a decision of the Bank. The Bank is better placed to make that judgment and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, makes the point that it would be only in exceptional extraordinary circumstances —I cannot remember his exact words—that one would envisage this being overturned somehow on the whim, or rather the view, of the governor, when the Court of the Bank of England looks at it.
Let me make one more point before I give way to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, because one critical part of this is that the Treasury will receive copies of all reports, regardless of their sensitivity. I would expect the Treasury to come to its own view on whether each report is genuinely unsuitable for publication. If it believes that the public interest carve-out was not justified, it would challenge that decision where appropriate, because the Treasury ultimately has an even wider perspective on the public interest. It is therefore right to remember that there is that further fallback, because the reports in all cases will go to the Treasury. Let me, as well as asking the noble Lord to consider withdrawing his amendment, give way to him.
Lord Eatwell
I just wanted to ask a question of clarification. What particularly disturbed me about subsection (3) of new Section 3D was that it refers to “the Bank”. Can the noble Lord assure me that in that subsection “Bank” means “court”? If he can, I would be happy. That is the point that I was trying to make. I think that I confused the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, slightly in that respect.
Lord Sassoon
Yes, my Lords, the court is the governing authority of the Bank, and that is, I believe, completely the right construction for this particular matter.
Lord Barnett
What the noble Lord said just now seems to provide a new reason to change the name of the oversight committee. We do not need one. He is saying that the governor and the board of the Bank will know better than the oversight committee. Why bother with an oversight committee at all? That would be a simple solution.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I must say that I am very happy and I will now read through the Bill with great care and presume that wherever the term “Bank” appears, it means “court”. If that is so, I will check all the various clauses as we go along to ensure that “Bank” means “court” at all stages. If it means “court”, the Bill should say so and be clear—and that is what it is not.
Lord Peston
My noble friend should not really accept this, because no one reading the Bill could conceivably read the word “Bank” to mean “court”. “Bank” means the Bank, and the Bank, in practice, is the governor.
Lord Eatwell
With all due respect to my noble friend, these days, where matters are in dispute about the interpretation of Bills, reference is made to Hansard. The noble Lord has effectively amended this clause in his remarks by saying that “Bank” means “court”. On that basis, we have now clarified this section of the Bill considerably. We have had a successful debate and achieved something valuable.
Given the various comments on the name of the oversight committee, I must confess that until my noble friends pointed it out I had failed to notice the double entendre in that label. I thought that “oversight” meant to oversee or supervise. I take it as meaning “oversee”, and I will not go as far as my noble friends.
I will go through the rest of the Bill, note where it refers to the Bank and either write to the noble Lord or raise in the House those points at which there is ambiguity as to what “Bank” actually means. However, now that we are absolutely clear that in new Section 3D “Bank” means court, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
Lord Eatwell
In Committee, I raised the issue referred to in the amendment and not only argued that should the Treasury be able to make recommendations to the FPC at any time—which it appears not to be able to, given that it is left out here—but proposed to make subsection (3) consistent with subsection (2) of proposed new Section 9A. The amendment would allow the Treasury to approach the FPC at any time.
After the Committee stage, the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, was good enough to write to me on this matter. I appreciated that. In his letter, he argued that there was no need for specific statutory provision because the Treasury could make recommendations at any time as it already had a common-law power to do so. This was one of those “not necessary” defences. Therefore, the common-law power was the basis for the Treasury being able to make recommendations at any time.
I have considered this matter carefully and, after long reflection, I regret that I find the noble Lord’s argument unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it is not good enough in the complexity of financial legislation to rely on the common law. There are people who will use this Bill who will not be lawyers and, even if they are, they may be lawyers who are not fully conversant with the common law. For example, many of our European Union partners are not conversant with the common law, and members of the relevant European Union regulatory bodies that will need to understand the Bill will not necessarily have familiarity with the common law that we would expect in common-law jurisdictions. Therefore, relying on the common law is not good enough in this legislation. We need real clarity about who does what to whom and we ought to include the Treasury in the provision so that everyone knows that it can intervene with the FPC at any time. The European authorities in particular, which will have a locus in this respect, would understand that point.
Secondly, a fundamental problem with the regulatory system before the crisis was the lack of communication between the Treasury and the Bank, as the noble Lord himself argued in Committee. I am sure that he will remember saying that a real problem with the tripartite structure was that the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Governor of the Bank never met. He said:
“One of the major problems leading up to the financial crisis was that the tripartite committee did not meet at principals level”.—[Official Report, 10/7/12; col. 1052.]
The amendment re-emphasises the need for regular communication and co-operation between the Treasury and the Bank in general, and the Treasury and the FPC in particular, given the FPC’s macroeconomic responsibilities.
As I said, there are two reasons for the amendment. First, we should not rely on the common law as there are lots of people who are not conversant with the common law who need to understand this relationship clearly. Secondly, we need to reiterate the importance of regular communication between the Treasury and the Bank, especially the Treasury and the FPC. I beg to move.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I find it is bizarre and slightly disappointing to see this amendment again. My noble friend Lord De Mauley explained in Committee why the FPC requires an express power in statute to make recommendations whereas the Treasury does not. As the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, recognises, I wrote to all interested noble Lords on 2 July setting out that explanation again, so I had rather hoped that the matter was resolved. I fear I should again explain the legal position, which is that the Government are clear that both the Treasury and the FPC should be closely involved in the ongoing development of the Bank’s financial stability strategy. I am happy to put that on the record. I have said a lot of other things which I am happy to be quoted on, such as comparing the practice under the old tripartite regime of people not talking to each other on a regular basis with what I now observe, which is much more regular communication. However, by amending this part of the Bill, I suggest we will not do anything more on that front. The Government are clear on that, which is why subsection (2) of new Section 9A of the Bank of England Act, as inserted by Clause 4 of the Bill, requires the court to consult both the FPC and the Treasury before determining or revising the Bank’s financial stability strategy. We do not need to overlabour the point, but it is a critically important one that the noble Lord raises and it is in there.
Moreover, the Government’s view is that neither the FPC nor the Treasury should have to wait to be formally consulted on the strategy. This should be part of the normal ongoing dialogue. If either body wishes proactively to suggest changes or amendments to the Bank’s strategy for financial stability, it should and will be able to do so. In order to ensure that this is the case, it is necessary to create an express power for the FPC to make recommendations to the court regarding the Bank’s strategy. As I have said before, this is because the FPC is a creation of statute, which means that the FPC’s main functions need to be set out in the legislation. That is why new Section 9A gives the FPC a power to make recommendations to the court on the financial stability strategy. If the provision did not exist, it would be unclear whether the FPC had the power to do so. In contrast, it is not necessary to create specific statutory provision to allow the Treasury to make recommendations. The Treasury already has a common-law power to make recommendations at any time to whoever it wishes.
Of course, the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, does not challenge that underlying basis, but he makes a huge drama out of European authorities and overseas bodies needing to understand whether the Treasury has authority to do this, that or the other. I find it very unlikely that European bodies would need to do that, but if they did, their lawyers would understand very clearly the common-law construction, which would be explained to them. If we went down the line of not relying on the common law in legislation, I hate to think how a Bill like this would grow like Topsy.
I am genuinely puzzled by all this, but I hope that the explanation of the common-law position is clear and that it can be explained in these unlikely situations that the noble Lord postulates. Of course, these European authorities will have the benefit of reading Hansard as well. It is an important point that the interaction is much better than in some respects it has been in the past. We expect that to be the case. I would like to think that perhaps we have finally put this point to rest and I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, it would be easier to withdraw the amendment if the noble Lord had actually answered the points. Essentially, all he has done is reiterate the common-law point and make the rather bold assumption that European-trained lawyers on the European Systemic Risk Board would understand the common law. However, if he is confident that that is the case and that a suitable number of British-trained lawyers, or the equivalent, can be seconded to that body, then perhaps things will work out in a satisfactory manner. I am glad to hear that he is confident that the interrelationship between the Bank, the Financial Policy Committee and the Treasury is ongoing and regular today as it was not in the past. That is a considerable improvement and I am pleased to have that assurance. However, there is an important element in financial legislation which the noble Lord overlooks. Financial legislation in a global financial market has to be really clear to all those around that market who read it. Simply saying, “We know because we are trained in the common law,” is really not good enough. I was trying not to change the relationship but to make it clearer. However, given that the Government are apparently not interested in doing that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, once again, we return to an issue that we discussed in Committee and I promised at that time to return to it on Report. I am keeping that promise. Subsection (6) of new Section 9A requires the court to review the financial stability strategy once every three years. That is far too long. Let us consider what has happened over the past three years. Since 2009 there has been a fundamental change to the overall economic environment, a radical change in government policy, and a double-dip recession. Really significant things have happened, which should be taken on board in assessing the strategy. The idea that, over that period, the court would not review the financial stability strategy in the light of events is, I believe, inconceivable. If the court really is going to review the strategy in the light of events, the markets need to know that. A regular report once a year would be a significant reassurance, even if that report says no change. Indeed, that would be a significant reassurance to the markets that the financial stability strategy is unchanged.
I quite understand that strategies are not designed to be the creatures of current events, but it is important to learn from events and not plough on regardless when the facts change. An annual review would provide the court with ongoing insights into the systemic risks associated with the financial stability strategy. That is far better than a review which is postponed, as facts change, for three years.
Let us then suppose that something really dramatic happens so that there has to be a review before the three-year time limit is up. What effect will that have on confidence? How much better to pursue the reasonable strategy of an annual review, both to ensure that the financial stability strategy is up to date and to provide appropriate confidence that the Bank’s strategy deals with matters with which the markets are concerned. I beg to move.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has taken sufficient account of the provision in proposed new Section 9A(1)(b) that allows the court to review the strategy at any time. There is reference later in the proposed new section to revision of the strategy. I would have thought that those provisions covered precisely the concern that he correctly raised.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, we are debating two things at the same time. I will refer first to my amendment dealing with the timing of reviews of the financial stability strategy. Writing into the Bill that there should be a backstop of three years is a major mistake because it creates the possibility—even probability—that a review will have to take place in a shorter timeframe, as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, pointed out. If that is done, what will be the effect on confidence? It will give the impression that the Bank is panicking and is not willing to go to its three-year period; it has suddenly had to shorten things. The reaction will be: “My gosh, something is really going wrong”. That is why the notion of an annual review has solidity and regularity. It fits in with the publication of the financial stability review, which is twice per year. So every year there would be a review, even if it endorsed a policy of no change to the financial stability strategy. Including the three-year figure is a major mistake because it will tend to excite apprehension when reviews take place more frequently.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
Is the noble Lord not assuaged by the wording of the Bill, which seems to be extraordinarily wise? It calls for a strategic review, which it later defines as coming every three years. It then states that the court of directors must,
“from time to time review, and if necessary revise, the strategy”.
Surely that is exactly what the noble Lord was talking about. If circumstances take an unexpected and dramatic turn, that stipulation is precisely germane. I do not see why the noble Lord is not satisfied with what seems to be an extremely sensible arrangement: a report every three years, but also a power of review.
Lord Eatwell
I am sorry that I did not make myself clear. I was referring to a review taking place other than at three years and the effect that that might have on the confidence of the markets. They might feel that the Bank is not sticking to its usual three-year timetable but is bringing things forward because something is going badly wrong that it knows about and perhaps the markets are not fully informed about. An annual review is embedded in so many companies. The annual away-day where everybody goes off and does the annual review is such a standard procedure that I think the three-year business is a mistake.
I want to return to the noble Lord’s revisionist comments on the position that he took on the earlier amendment when we were referring to the business of the oversight committee and the public interest notion of publication. I asked the noble Lord whether in this section Bank meant court. I think that I made clear that if it did mean court, the best option would be for it to say so. Therefore, the best option would be for him to come back at Third Reading and say, “Look, the word Bank occurs all the way through the Bill. It is used in different contexts in different places and let us be absolutely clear who is responsible. We will amend this clause at Third Reading to say ‘court’ because that is what I mean. It is not what I say; it is what I mean”. Let us now say that the noble Lord means court.
I was quite deliberately saying that if the noble Lord really wants the word Bank to mean court throughout the Bill I would read through it. I was confident that I would have no difficulty finding a number of cases where he did not want it to mean court. That is why he has now stood up, having received the advice of his officials, to correct what he said earlier.
Lord Eatwell
I am just finishing.
With respect to new Section 3D, it is important that we are clear that Bank means court there. We will take on advisement what the word Bank means elsewhere in the Bill.
Lord Sassoon
I merely wanted to say that I was not standing up to correct anything I said before: I stand exactly by everything that I said before. I wanted to head off the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, from wasting a lot of time by going through and analysing the precise meaning and the underlined way in which the powers of the Bank would be exercised situation by situation in the Bill. It is up to the court as the governing body of the Bank as to what it takes unto itself and what it delegates to the executive of the Bank. I was merely trying to make a helpful suggestion that perhaps the noble Lord would find himself doing quite a lot of wasted work if we went too literally down this path.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I am sorry to prolong this, but now we are told that the court can delegate to the executive of the Bank. Is that the case in new Section 3D, which we discussed before? I am sorry to prolong this but I thought that the noble Lord made absolutely clear that in that section, Bank meant court—not a delegation to the executive or the governor or anyone else. He actually said himself, if I recollect accurately, that the court contains the nine members of the oversight committee, they would be sitting there and therefore they would not contradict themselves. There was no notion of delegation. They had a role. It is very important that legislation, particularly in financial policy, is clear. Can we please be clear on this particular element?
Lord Sassoon
I do think that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, is trying to get into semantic games. There is an important point. I was completely clear before and I think it is understood. It would be complete nonsense if a recommendation on such an important matter of the oversight committee, which is a committee of the court of the Bank, was taken by anything other than the court itself. That is plain and completely clear. That is what I said before and that is what I stand by. It would be absurd to suggest that the court would delegate such a matter. That is what I said and that is clear. But there are plenty of other matters throughout the Bill on what the Bank does where, equally, it would be ridiculous to suggest that the court did something itself and did not delegate.
Lord Eatwell
Well I rest on the proposition that I made earlier. If that is what the noble Lord means, why does he not say so instead of leaving this ambiguity on the face of the Bill?
However, returning to the issue of three years, I think that it is unfortunate for the reasons that I have spelt out. Annual reviews are completely usual and normal in the corporate and financial worlds. Everyone knows what they are. Three years leaves too much of a gap for unfortunate and disturbing events to occur that could then be exacerbated by the Bank’s seeming need to change tack at that time.
I hope people go away and think a little about this. I know that I almost certainly hope in vain, but hope springs eternal. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Kramer
My Lords, I cannot pretend to have the expertise on boards that the previous speakers have had and I do not want to repeat the very powerful arguments they have made; I merely add two quick comments. I think that the Minister will have understood from the debate that has gone on for much of today that there is still a general uneasiness over the amount of power that flows to the Governor of the Bank of England under this new framework. Here is a sensible way to put a bit more challenge into the system. I think that we all feel that a bit more challenge would be a good way in which to make sure that the governor has to do the thing that is the greatest check on any individual: to persuade others to go along with him. That is rather more necessary in an absolutely core function, one of financial stability and economic growth.
Secondly, we have all been somewhat concerned about the role of the FCA and the kind of status that the chief executive of the FCA may have in comparison to his peers in the regulatory family that falls more directly under the Bank of England. His role becomes a little more pivotal when you look at Amendment 4 and I suspect that that is no bad thing. It also makes sure that the FCA voice is heard rather more clearly and independently than it might have been without this amendment. I hope that the Minister will take all that on board.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I have added my name, as has my noble friend Lady Hayter, to Amendment 5, which is the second-best amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. However, even in this second-best version, achieving what the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, referred to as “a bit more challenge” is an excellent and desirable objective.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, this is an interesting and important area. The balance of the FPC’s members between the Bank and non-Bank executives is an issue that has been raised a number of times in this House, in another place and in the committees that have scrutinised the Bill. My noble friends who have spoken to this issue have done so with characteristic clarity and eloquence.
There is clearly an important argument about the possibility of rebalancing the membership of the committee away from the Bank executives and towards the external members. The external members will need to provide an outside perspective and challenge function to the deliberations of the FPC and, crucially, Amendment 4 achieves the important objective of enhancing the role of the non-Bank members while avoiding creating a situation where the Bank would be in a minority on the committee, which would make it virtually impossible to hold the Bank accountable for the FPC’s actions.
I see a great deal of sense in the alternative ways of doing this, but in the Amendment 4 approach rather than the Amendment 5 approach—the second best approach, as we now know it. I could not talk in the language of cognitive limits and other good stuff but, in a practical sense, I understand why having only nine voting members, which is comparable with the MPC, is better than having 11 members with a Treasury observer. Making the FPC larger by creating additional members would risk making the group unwieldy, and I now understand—which I did not before—that the Tavistock Institute provides a theoretical underpinning to what I see as a practical argument.
On balance, the proposal put forward by my noble friends to rebalance the committee by removing a Bank member is not only preferable to the one of adding an external member but has some attractions. The tone of my noble friend Lord Deben’s remarks was to assume that of course I would dismiss all this out of hand. However, this is a serious point and the committee has come back to it. We have been here before in a number of respects and it is important.
Amendment 6 would ensure that it is the executive director with responsibility for the analysis of markets who would be removed from the FPC. Although the person in this position may have an important role in providing information relating to financial markets to the committee, it is true that this role could be achieved without that person being a voting member. The executive director who would remain as a voting member on the FPC would be the director with responsibility within the Bank for financial stability, and I agree that that executive director would seem to be the appropriate person.
The remaining amendments are consequential in nature and simply remove a later reference to the executive director with responsibility for the analysis of markets and reduce the quorum of the FPC from seven to six, reflecting its reduced size.
Lord Eatwell
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Peston, who tabled this amendment, had to leave earlier this evening, but he asked me to move it on his behalf. I do so because it is an important and valuable amendment.
In Committee, the Government conceded the arguments made by the Treasury Select Committee and by Members in the other place that the growth and employment objective should be written into the terms of reference of the Financial Policy Committee. However, they have undermined the pursuit of this objective by the way in which it has been incorporated into the Bill. The phrase “subject to that” in proposed new Section 9C(1)(b) makes the growth and employment objective secondary to the stability objective.
Perhaps the Government are over influenced by current events here. Any Government who have presided over the economic policy of the past two-and-a-half years and continually justified their own actions with reference to levels of interest rates and financial stability will undoubtedly be motivated to downplay the growth and employment objective in the Financial Policy Committee’s considerations. However, in the longer view this is surely a mistake. Under the Bill as currently constructed, the Financial Policy Committee could cite the financial stability of a persistent recession as evidence that the objective has been met—stability, but the stability of the economic grave.
How much better that the Financial Policy Committee should take a balanced and mature view of the relationship between financial stability and growth and employment? I am confident that, if we get the right people in place, the committee will be able to take that mature view and would much better serve the overall financial stability strategy of the Bank. My noble friend’s amendment would achieve this and it deserves both serious consideration and support. I beg to move.
Lord Deben
I am distressed that the Minister should feel that on the previous occasion I suggested that he would be other than magnanimous, for he is always magnanimous. I speak in his support because we have to be very careful about constantly adding all the good things that we might like to have taken into account in all circumstances. Financial stability in these circumstances is exactly what we should be saying first and we refer to the other, perfectly rightly, because it is necessary. I find it incredible that any committee, in any circumstance, would get up and say it thinks it is a frightfully good idea to have the stability of total sterility. I do not understand where the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, really thinks that anybody would come to that conclusion. This seems a totally unnecessary amendment and I hope very much that the Minister will refuse it.
Lord Eatwell
I am sorry, I will say something. The Monetary Policy Committee has had a damascene conversion. You can see it in the quantitative easing policy. Indeed, the Treasury continuously encourages the Bank to take a more aggressive monetary policy with respect to growth and employment and to ignore the high rate of inflation.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, first, this is well trodden ground for the House so I will be brief. In any case, my noble friends have all made extremely telling points, which knock this one pretty comprehensively on the head. The FPC’s primary focus must be financial stability. That is its primary purpose, in the same way that the MPC’s primary focus must be price stability. Both financial and monetary stability are necessary prerequisites for stable and sustainable growth, so both committees already contribute to growth by achieving their primary purposes. Subject to doing so, they should act to support the Government’s economic objectives. The result of giving the FPC dual, equally weighted objectives for financial stability and economic growth would be to allow the FPC to take action that would damage financial stability with the aim of encouraging growth. This would take the FPC outside its remit and expertise, and frustrate its primary purpose—which has got to be financial stability.
I do not believe that the model proposed in this amendment is appropriate or workable and I ask the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, this has been an intriguing discussion, since it appears to ignore the economic history of the last two years. I was struck by the comment from the noble Lord, Lord Deben, that nobody would possibly accept the notion that financial stability was important when growth was absent. He should come more often and listen to the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, justifying the current policies of the Government. The Minister continuously says it is vital that the policy which has produced zero growth over a year, and leaves us with a level of output about 3.5% lower than the peak in 2008, is entirely justified by the need to secure financial stability. He refers to low interest rates and financial stability all the time. If the noble Lord would like to hear someone justify that position, he can just turn up and listen to the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, justifying the Government’s policy. He will get that straightaway.
Lord Sassoon
I really do not want to prolong this too long, but the idea that somehow financial stability is the same as a sustainable fiscal position is really stretching the concepts a bit far. However, there we are.
Lord Eatwell
I was merely describing the way that the noble Lord continuously justifies the current squeeze that the Government wish to exert on the economy. The other really intriguing point is that it is the Government’s amendment that has introduced the growth and employment objective here, but he now tells us that it is outwith the committee’s expertise. So he has now introduced an amendment that is outwith the expertise of the committee that he has asked to consider it, even if as a secondary objective. I have been very struck by the debate, which has also failed to recognise, as I suggested earlier, the dramatic change in policy by the Monetary Policy Committee, urged on by the Government. This amendment simply attempted to believe, perhaps naively, that the Government might recognise what is happening in the policy-making of their institutions at the moment might give the FPC some credit for being able to make a mature and balanced judgment, given its overall responsibility for financial stability. However, I was no doubt overly naive there. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
“( ) factors likely to lead to a loss of confidence in the financial system as a whole”
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, this amendment seeks to include in the list of factors that are to be considered as systemic risks the factors likely to lead to a loss of confidence in the financial system as a whole. I am afraid that this is a significant bugbear among those of us interested in the economic foundations and problems of systemic risk. The list of elements that are included here—
“structural features … distribution of risk … unsustainable levels of leverage, debt or credit growth”—
are all essentially microeconomic. They miss the whole point about macroprudential regulation and the macroeconomics of risk, which the FSA tried to put forward in the Turner review and the US Treasury put forward in its review. They missed all that. The point is that at the macroeconomic level, there can be a transmission of risk which is not observable in the microstructures of the market, and is transmitted through a loss of confidence. Factors which can lead to a loss of confidence may not be identifiable in precise microeconomic connections.
I understand that this list is not intended to be exhaustive. That is why I composed this amendment to be a very general statement. I was not attempting to be precise, just presenting factors which can lead to a general loss of confidence. The point is to recognise that the systemic risk which we encountered in the last four or five years does not derive simply from the observable microeconomic variables listed here, but derives—most importantly, or at least, equally importantly—from the general loss of confidence which can sometimes be associated with these variables, and sometimes with others.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, again, this was an issue on which there was a comprehensive debate in Committee. As set out in subsections (1) and (2) of proposed new Section 9C of the Bank of England Act, the FPC is tasked with contributing to the Bank’s financial stability objective by identifying and monitoring systemic risks and taking action to reduce or remove those risks.
Subsection (5) defines “systemic risk” to mean,
“a risk to the stability of the UK financial system as a whole or of a significant part of that system”.
That means that any risk to UK financial stability is captured within the FPC’s remit. At the prompting of the Joint Committee that scrutinised the Bill in draft, we added subsection (6) to underline the fact that,
“it is immaterial whether the risk arises in the United Kingdom or elsewhere”.
Let me be clear: the FPC must identify and address any risk that could compromise the stability of the UK financial system regardless of its origin.
The purpose of subsection (3) is to specify certain types of systemic risk which the FPC should look for. This does not limit or restrict the FPC’s remit in any way. In other words, just because a systemic risk is not listed in subsection (3) does not mean that the FPC has any less of an obligation to identify, monitor and address it. There could perhaps be a temptation to continue adding to subsection (3) in an attempt to try to define all possible sources of systemic risk. But this would be a fruitless, and potentially counterproductive, endeavour.
Amendment 6E seeks to add,
“factors likely to lead to a loss of confidence in the financial system as a whole”,
to the list. I agree that a loss of confidence can magnify cross-sectional or structural risks captured in the financial system. But I do not believe it would be appropriate to expand subsection (3) in this way. As I have said, the list is not intended to be exhaustive, rather it is designed to highlight the broad categories of systemic risk that have been identified by academic research, something which the noble Lord is rightly keen that we should factor in. Subsection (3) as it stands already serves this purpose by describing the main categories of cross-sectional and cyclical risk. I hope that, on the basis of this explanation, the noble Lord will withdraw what I continue to see as an unnecessary amendment.
Lord Eatwell
Before the noble Lord sits down, I heard but one argument against the case that I was making, which was that it was not appropriate. Will he explain why it is not appropriate?
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I thought that was what I had done in the last three minutes. I explained that this is not an exhaustive list. Yes, the factor that the noble Lord identifies is an important consideration, but we have included the much more specific categories of systemic risk which are identified in the research. If we started putting looser considerations in there, it would be difficult to know where the list should stop. Indeed, as one extends lists like this, it risks by implication leaving out other important factors. I do believe that subsection (3) and the whole of proposed new Section 9C as drafted completely embrace the ability and the requirement for the FPC to pick up what the noble Lord is getting at, but does not run the risk of us trying to draft in some of the other things that we all might be able to think of.
Lord Sassoon
Yes, I agree with my noble friend. He makes an important point.
Lord Eatwell
Well, yes, my Lords, the logic of the noble Lord’s argument is either to accept my amendment or delete proposed new subsection (3) altogether, because one has to ask: what does it do? It says:
“Those systemic risks include, in particular”.
In particular, this is what the committee should be looking at. That is misleading in that it focuses on structural issues of the economy, which are microeconomic —on leverage and on debt, which are microeconomic, and on credit growth, which is moving into the more macroeconomic area. What it fails to do is to take in the general point of the loss of confidence which can come from other sources.
As I pointed out when I introduced this amendment, I deliberately constructed it so as not to get into the trap of attempting to produce a detailed list. It certainly does not do that. It simply alerts the committee. If the committee is to be alerted to deal with a number of factors in particular, it seems that it should also be looking in particular at those factors which might lead to a general loss of confidence in the economy as a whole.
So if the Government really wish to ask the committee to focus in particular on some things, I would like my amendment to be accepted. If, on the other hand, it is quite happy to rely on subsections (5) and (6), I suggest that subsection (3) be deleted, so as not to create this spurious concentration on a particular list of points.
However, given that the argument has made little progress, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Financial Services Bill
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(11 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Eatwell
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, noble Lords will notice that this group includes Amendments 6M and 6Q. I apologise to the House for not moving those amendments at the appropriate time, but as noble Lords may recall, there was considerable confusion between the Deputy Chairman and the clerks and everyone here. The noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, was not confused. He never is. But in the confusion I inadvertently failed to move these amendments. I also apologise that at that time I failed to support the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, when she presented her arguments for Amendment 7, which I wholeheartedly support, as indicated by the fact that I added my name to hers. With the leave of the House, I will proceed with the remaining amendments in group 19, namely Amendments 7A, 7B and 7C.
The purpose of this group of amendments is to ensure that there is regular consultation between the Treasury and the FPC over the FPC’s directions and its recommendations. Leaving aside—since the time has passed—the question of directions, even though they are more important, Amendments 7A, 7B and 7C serve to emphasise the interest that we all have in requiring that regular consultation takes place. The idea is simply that in making a recommendation the FPC would have a discussion with the Treasury about that to ensure that both sides are, if you like, singing from the same hymn sheet.
This is part of the endeavour that we have on this side of the House to ensure that the whole development of the financial stability analysis, the financial stability strategy and the financial stability actions is co-ordinated effectively between the FPC and the Bank as a whole—whether Bank means court or Bank or whatever—and the Treasury. I beg to move.
The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)
My Lords, this group of amendments seeks to require the FPC to consult with the Treasury before issuing a recommendation, directing the PRA or FCA to take action or revoking an existing direction. I am certain that not only are these amendments unnecessary, they would damage the independence of the FPC.
As I am sure noble Lords are aware, the Bill provides for a non-voting representative of the Treasury to be a member of the FPC. This Treasury representative will be able to ensure that the views of the Treasury are available to the committee if required. This renders these amendments unnecessary.
Let me explain why, more seriously, I feel that the amendments could be harmful to the work of the FPC. The Government have drafted the Bill so that the FPC will be housed within the independent Bank of England. It is paramount that macroprudential policy decisions are insulated from political considerations. The purpose of the FPC is to “take the punchbowl away” when the party is getting too raucous, something that politicians of any affiliation may be reluctant to do.
By insulating the decisions of the FPC from political considerations, it will be much easier for the committee to be a credible and effective policy-making body. The amendments would risk that credibility by requiring the FPC to consult the Treasury before it makes any policy decision. For that combination of reasons, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, the noble Lord has left me somewhat puzzled with his final point. First, as he is well aware, consultation does not necessarily mean acceptance of any argument or the idea that there should be any direct influence of the Treasury on the FPC. All we are trying to do is to ensure that there is effective communication. As I noted earlier, the Minister has in the past raised the fact that communication between the Bank and the Treasury has been very poor. There are other issues about the lack of communication which will be raised on Report.
The Minister says that somehow consultation between the Treasury and the FPC would endanger the credibility of the FPC and of the macroprudential strategy. Yet earlier it was argued that under the common law, as he put it, the Treasury may at any time make recommendations on the provisions of the Bank’s financial strategy. Is the Treasury involved or not? Surely recommendations and discussion are very valuable at all times, but that does not in any way limit independence. Perhaps the failure of the Bank and the Treasury to communicate, which the Minister has referred to in the past, arose from a mistaken idea that independence means non-communication. It does not; communication is important to the development of coherent policy. If he is saying that consultation would undermine independence, this is a very serious matter for an area of macroeconomic policy with which the financial stability strategy and the Financial Policy Committee, as its agent, will be intimately involved.
I find the Minister’s remarks very disturbing indeed. They suggest a fundamental misunderstanding of the way in which we can take forward constructive developments in this novel and important area of economic policy. It is a matter to which we may have to return but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, this amendment refers to an oddity in the drafting of new Section 9T(1)(a). The Bill requires the Financial Policy Committee to review each direction that it makes over the relevant period, which is 12 months, other than,
“a direction revoked before the end of the review period”.
I do not understand this business about leaving out directions revoked before the end of the review period. Suppose the direction has been a great success but was enforced for only 11 months. Or suppose the direction was a great failure but lasted for only 11 months. Should not these directions be reviewed? Can lessons not be drawn from them just as much as from directions which are in force for 12 months? Why would you have a direction that has been revoked from which we are not allowed to draw lessons but a direction that has been kept in place from which we are? This is too limiting in a novel area of economic policy from which we should seek to get all the information and draw as many lessons as we possibly can, whether or not a direction has been revoked within the relevant period. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes
My Lords, what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has said is entirely sensible. I cannot see the distinction between those directions which have been made and continue in force and those which have been made and revoked. This is about public communication, the directions being made and their effect. The information that we gain from a revocation must be at least as good as from the making of a direction.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, the amendment reflects a slight misunderstanding of the purpose of the reviews that we are talking about in new Section 9T of the Bank of England Act, as inserted by Clause 4. The purpose of these reviews centres around live actions and requiring the FPC regularly to look again at all live actions—in other words, at the directions and recommendations that still have effect—and to review whether or not the action is still needed. That is a rather different matter from the admittedly important question of reviewing past actions and learning lessons, which is not the subject of the clause.
The idea behind the new section is to ensure that FPC actions do not remain in place if the circumstances which originally merited them have disappeared or changed substantially. Of course, we would expect the FPC as a matter of course to keep its past actions under review and revoke them once they are no longer needed, but new Section 9T ensures that this will be the case by creating a formal requirement for the FPC to review regularly all of its live directions and recommendations.
Amendment 7D seeks to remove the wording in subsection (1)(a) which provides that the FPC need not review directions that have already been revoked. The provision is appropriate because once a direction has been revoked there is no need for the FPC to review it to determine whether it is still needed; the direction is already defunct. It is as simple as that.
The concern of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, lies clearly in the importance of the FPC evaluating the impact of its actions. I can reassure him that mechanisms already exist elsewhere in the clause to address this issue. First, new Section 9S requires the FPC to set out for each of its actions an explanation of its reasons for believing that the action is compatible with its objectives and associated “have regards”, including where practicable an estimate of the costs and benefits of the action. Secondly, subsection (4)(b) of new Section 9W requires the FPC to include in each financial stability report an assessment of how its actions have succeeded in achieving its objectives. Finally, the new oversight committee of the court has an explicit remit to oversee the FPC’s performance and can undertake or commission a more comprehensive review of the FPC’s past actions or approach where appropriate.
I am confident that the FPC’s actions are already subject to extensive mechanisms of oversight and evaluation and, as I said at the outset, that the amendment reflects, perhaps, a slight misunderstanding of what the purpose of the specific provisions in new Section 9T is all about. I hope that on the basis of that explanation the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, my immediate reaction is that if that is what the new section meant, why did it not say so? We persistently have a point where there is a lack of clarity in the Bill and, time and again, the noble Lord says, “That is what we said but it is not what we really meant”. It is truly unsatisfactory.
On the areas which he says cover the issues that I raised, proposed new Section 9S specifically refers, I think—although of course it may not mean this—to a prior explanation of specified purposes. It provides for an explanation of why the FPC is doing something, which seems to be a prior requirement, not an assessment of effect.
The Minister is on stronger ground on new Section 9W(4)(b), which refers to whether the functions of the FPC have succeeded, but it refers generally to its functions rather than to the specific issue in new Section 9T, which refers to the very sensitive and important area of directions.
There is another important point. It is quite possible that a direction would be introduced to deal with a particular set of circumstances and revoked because those circumstances have been mitigated, but then reintroduced some time later because the problem reappears. In those circumstances, all this stuff about live actions is irrelevant. We need to learn from both those actions that are contemporaneous and those that may be introduced from time to time to deal with specific circumstances. I really feel that this is a very unsatisfactory approach to the general issue of review.
I will keep talking so that the Minister can get his note and say why I have got it wrong; he has it now. The issue of keeping matters under review should include those matters that only last for a period within the relevant 12 months, as well as those that go forward. Shall I sit down? No, the Minister did not get a good reply in that note. This is an issue that I want people to think about: either the clause is badly drafted and not clear, or the amendment should be considered appropriate. However, for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
Lord Eatwell
I assure the House that this is going to stop soon. First, I draw attention to a drafting error in the amendment as tabled. It refers to the “Chairman of the PRA”, who is of course the Governor of the Bank of England, rather than the chief executive. The objective of the amendment is to widen the group who meet to assess the importance of the Financial Stability Report, a very important document that has been one of the most interesting and creative documents published by the Bank for some years, not least because of the major intellectual influence of the executive responsible for financial stability. Since the FCA and the PRA are the vehicles through which the FPC—I apologise, everything is just three letters—exercises its influence, it is important that informed discussion and assessment between the Treasury and the Bank should include the chief executives of those two bodies and not simply be between the governor and the Chancellor.
The amendments have the added advantage that, should we have a governor who wishes to delegate responsibilities in order to reduce the excessive load placed on his or her shoulders by this Bill, this would in no way reduce the value of the Bank-Treasury meeting and the quality of the assessment of the Financial Stability Report. It seems enormously valuable to have these two individuals—the chief executives of the FCA and PRA—there, because they are the people who implement the proposals of the Financial Policy Committee and will help in the general assessment of the Financial Stability Report. I beg to move.
Lord Sassoon
So it is chief executive. I am not sure whether I heard chairman or chief executive but it should have said, “Chief Executive of the PRA”.
In responding to Amendment 7E it may help if I explain the purpose of the meetings set out in new Section 9X of the 1998 Act. The success of the new regulatory structure will rely heavily on the relationship between the Treasury and the Bank of England. As has already been noted this evening, one of the major problems leading up to the financial crisis was that the tripartite committee established under the previous Government’s regime did not meet at the principals’ level for a decade. The Chancellor and the governor simply did not meet often enough to discuss financial stability. When the crisis hit—I am sorry the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, thinks this is an amusing matter. Unfortunately, this was one of the most serious issues when it came to handling the crisis.
Lord Eatwell
I agree with the Minister. It is a terribly serious matter. When he adds the phrase “for a decade”, it is such desperately bad news that some degree of amusement is the only relief to the depression that one feels at the failure of this mechanism.
Lord Sassoon
Believe you me, I was on the standing committee of deputies for three years and I saw it at first hand. There we are—we understand the difficulty. At a personal level and in terms of institutional arrangements and practices, the absence of meetings clearly has a very significant impact when it comes to handling a crisis. However, everything is now different and as it should be. The Chancellor and the governor now meet often. Indeed, under the previous Government, once the crisis hit, of course that was also the case. But it was not always the case, as I have said, and as we understand. Without the requirement in new Section 9X, there would be no guarantee that the regular meetings would happen in the future, once the individuals concerned change and memories of the current crisis have faded.
New Section 9X therefore places a legal requirement on the Chancellor and the governor, in his capacity as chair of both the FPC and the PRA, to meet formally at least twice a year, shortly after the publication of the FPC’s twice-yearly Financial Stability Report. I agree that it is a truly creative, in the best sense of the word—which I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, meant—and important document.
Of course, both the Chancellor and the governor may invite others to attend the meeting. For example, the Treasury’s Permanent Secretary or another senior official may attend. The Chancellor’s private secretary may also be in the room. On the Bank’s side, the governor may well choose to invite another deputy governor or the executive director responsible for financial stability to attend the meeting with him. However, I believe the approach taken in the Bill—for the legal requirement to meet to be on the Chancellor and governor only, leaving it up to each attendee to decide if others should be present—is the correct one. The governor will be best placed to decide, based on the content particularly of the Financial Stability Report and the wider financial stability context, which, if any, of his senior executives should attend the meeting.
If the chief executive of the PRA were required by statute to attend every meeting, surely there would be an argument for all the other senior Bank officials who had some responsibility for financial stability to also be added to the list. Equally, if the CEO of the FCA were required by legislation to attend every meeting, would there not be an equal argument for the external members of the FPC also to be required in the room? This could go off in all sorts of directions. A small, personal meeting between the Chancellor and governor could easily turn into a large committee if we were to take that approach.
This is an important opportunity to restate our common objective: to make sure that the principals meet. It should not be necessary to have such a meeting in legislation, but regrettably history has shown that it is. That is the purpose of the requirement, as a backstop for those meetings to happen, but it continues to be the Government’s view that the attendance of others should be left to the discretion of the principals. On the basis of that explanation I again ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Eatwell
Before the noble Lord sits down, perhaps we could probe the discretion of the principals a little. Supposing the governor wants to turn up alone and the Chancellor wishes the chief executive of the PRA to attend, would that be possible?
Lord Sassoon
That is not then a question of legislation but a question of common sense and how the parties get on with each other, and I am sure that common sense would prevail. For that sort of circumstance, no amount of legislation is going to get around people behaving sensibly. If we put a particular attendee or two into these meetings the same question arises about others who one side or the other might believe would be sensible to have at a particular meeting given the topics that might be under discussion. We have to rely on the good sense of the principals here.
Lord Eatwell
Yes, well, we hoped that we could rely on the good sense of the principals to run the Financial Stability Committee, but they did not meet for a decade so they were not very sensible, were they?
If I may respond to the noble Lord, I feel that his vision of the committee extending to indefinite size is really excessive. We are identifying the chairman of the Financial Policy Committee, namely the governor, and the two operational figures—the chief executive of the FCA and the chief executive of the PRA—to be in this meeting to assess the financial stability position in the light of the financial stability report. I think that would be valuable. I quite understand that others can be invited in but, as we have seen in the past, these matters are not necessarily as well handled as, in retrospect, we would like. I hope that this matter might be reconsidered in due course, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
“9ZZA Financial Stability Advisory Panel
(1) There will be a Financial Stability Advisory Panel.
(2) The membership of the Panel will be—
(a) the Deputy Governor for Financial Stability;(b) 6 members appointed by the Treasury, subject to approval by the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons; and the members appointed under paragraph (b) will be academics, members of staff of international organisations, practitioners, or others with particular skills in the analysis of systemic risk.
(3) The Financial Stability Advisory Panel will—
(a) provide written advice to the Financial Policy Committee concerning the analysis of systemic risk;(b) once a year prepare a report assessing the analysis of systemic risk by the Financial Policy Committee over the preceding 12 months (the first report to be twelve months after this section comes into force);(c) assess the effectiveness of measures prescribed under section 9K in the attainment of the financial stability objective of the Bank;(d) assess the effectiveness of directions and recommendations of the Financial Policy Committee under sections 9G and 9N in the attainment of the financial stability objective of the Bank;(e) prepare an annual report on matters referred to in section 9ZZA(3) to be presented by the Supervisory Board of the Bank, and subsequently published on the Bank website.”
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, Amendment 7F picks up an amendment that I moved in Committee and promised to return to on Report, concerning the establishment of a financial stability advisory panel.
I will not go through the whole argument of different forms of financial stability arrangements as between this country and the United States and so on, but I will deal with one central issue: we want people of very high quality advising and reflecting on financial stability issues. The appointed members of the Financial Policy Committee are crucial but there is going to be some difficulty in identifying them satisfactorily because there will be a number of conflicts of interest in the financial services industry that will be difficult to manage.
We can overcome that difficulty by creating an advisory panel that does not have powers, as such, to make decisions, but which can advise on a variety of areas, including the success of measures taken and general effectiveness, by presenting a report to the oversight committee—not the “Supervisory Board”, as mistakenly referred to in the amendment as printed on the Marshalled List. We could gather together a wider group of people who felt it to be their responsibility to follow carefully the actions of the Financial Policy Committee and to express their views even if they have significant conflicts of interest, because these could be taken into account in the assessment of their views. Of course, they are distanced from any actual decision-making, unlike the appointed members of the Financial Policy Committee, who are right at the heart of decision-making.
Given that we are dealing with an area of policy which, as I have said already this evening, is novel, we are going to encounter entirely new problems. We will probably make some mistakes. We want to be able to assess a very wide horizon of experience around the world, where the European Union, the United States and other major jurisdictions are introducing financial stability committees of one sort and another to deal with the issue of macroprudential regulation. An advisory committee could be a valuable supplement to the information and assessment to which the Bank and its committees have access. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes
My Lords, we do not need to hardwire this into legislation. If the FPC thinks that it needs some form of advice from other parties in relation to most of the matters mentioned in subsection (3) of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, it can arrange it. Similarly, if the oversight committee thinks that it needs any assistance from outside parties in relation to matters mentioned in paragraph (e) of subsection (3) of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, it can arrange it. I do not see why these matters need to be enshrined in law. If there are gaps within the resources available to the Bank, it can supplement them, or it may have them sufficiently internally. The statute does not need to deal with these matters.
Lord Eatwell
Before the noble Lord sits down, if the FPC wished to seek external advice, would it be suitably resourced to do so?
Lord Eatwell
In that case, I am far more content than I thought I would be, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I agree that these are indeed sensible measures. I have just one question. These days many actions and investigations by regulators are taken on behalf of what are truly other regulators—that is, regulators in other jurisdictions—and that exchange of information and co-operation is a hugely important activity. When the British regulators are taking very sensitive information in an area where there is a great deal of legal activity—for example, the relationship between the FSA and the regulator in Austria is a particular case—would they have immunity in that case as well?
Lord Sassoon
If the situation that the noble Lord is suggesting is one in which the FSA or a successor body was taking an action at the request of the Austrian authorities, I can confirm that in that case the immunity provisions would apply to the actions of the UK regulators.
Financial Services Bill
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(12 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I rise to raise an important issue concerning the conduct of the Committee stage of the Bill. On 3 October—last Wednesday—I wrote to the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, in these terms:
“The Wheatley study on the future of LIBOR has produced a series of conclusions with which the Labour Party is broadly in agreement. I congratulate both Martin Wheatley and his team for their achievement, and the Government for initiating this investigation.
I note from the statements of Treasury ministers, and from the Treasury website, that it is the Government’s intention to implement the Wheatley proposals by means of amendments to the Financial Services Bill. No such amendments have been tabled as of yesterday”.
That was 2 October, and indeed no amendments have been tabled as of today.
“I presume that such amendments will involve predominantly clauses that have not yet been debated (as suggested by reference to particular FSMA clauses in the Wheatley Report itself)”.
The Wheatley report refers to the first clause that we will debate today.
“However, it is possible that you will also need to introduce amendments to clauses already debated, in which case it would be entirely inappropriate to introduce such amendments at Report. Given the importance of these issues it is imperative that the House have the opportunity to debate these matters in the freedom of Committee, rather than under the constrained rules of the Report Stage.
May I therefore have your assurance that should the Government, as a consequence of the Libor scandal and of the recommendations in the Wheatley Report, plan to introduce amendments to clauses 1 to 5, or at some later stage, amendments to clauses at that time already debated, that you will re-commit the appropriate clauses, hence ensuring that the House of Lords has the scope for full debate”.
It has since become clear that the Government intend to introduce on Report all the entirely new material presaged in the Wheatley report. The noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, wrote to me on 2 October—the day before I wrote to him which was somewhat mysterious. He said:
“I do not believe that it is necessary to recommit the Bill, and see no reason why a substantive debate on the relevant clauses at Report stage would offer insufficient opportunity for scrutiny by the House.
Re-commitment would risk unnecessarily delaying the implementation of both these important reforms to LIBOR setting processes, and of the equally urgent reform of the UK’s financial regulation regime which we have been debating through the Committee sessions to date”.
The noble Lord’s reply does not take into account what I actually asked for. First, I was not asking for total recommitment. I was asking only for the clauses which deal with entirely new material from the Wheatley report to be recommitted. Secondly, I believe very strongly that with respect to financial regulation it is not an issue of quibbling about delay but of getting it right. These enormously complex matters deserve the iterative consideration which is possible only in Committee. I remind noble Lords that on Report they can speak only once. Thirdly, it is quite wrong to deny this House the opportunity to consider entirely new and complex material within a Committee setting. I would therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, to reconsider his rejection of my proposal that the relevant clauses be recommitted.
If he is unwilling to do that, perhaps I may make a constructive proposal. Either he or the Chief Whip, who unfortunately is not in her place, should give an assurance that the rules of Report will be relaxed for consideration of what might be called the “Wheatley” clauses when they are introduced.
Lord Barnett
I warmly agree with my noble friend on the Front Bench, and it gives me an opportunity to refer to the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, himself. In the Recess I read with regret that he proposes to retire at the end of this year. He and I have had a few exchanges across the Floor and I will miss them, but I look forward to continuing with those exchanges until the end of the year.
Not only do I agree with my noble friend in the points he has made about the Bill, what is even more important is that the whole Bill should be dropped for the moment. There is no hurry for it and much of it will cause great damage to financial services in this country. As the noble Lord, in his new position, is no longer going to be quite so subservient to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I certainly hope that he can tell us the truth, drop the Bill for the time being and, as my noble friend has suggested, come back to the House with a new one.
Lord Peston
My Lords, we make the obvious point that getting it right is not the same as doing it quickly. We ought always to bear that in mind in your Lordships’ House. There is a straightforward solution to this. One is my noble friend’s suggestion for Report. Since I assume, particularly given the Leader of the House’s remarks, that we are not imminently in danger of being abolished, that we are still a self-governing House, we can therefore decide, if we wish to, one of two things: either my noble friend’s proposal, with which I strongly agree, that we would simply have Committee stage rules at Report stage for what is being proposed; the alternative is not to end the Committee stage until the Government can get their tiny mind around the Wheatley proposals and come up with their amendments.
I have read the Wheatley report. The proposals do not strike me as being intellectually very demanding—nowhere near as difficult as deciding on a railway line. Therefore, the noble Lord ought to respond positively instead of adopting this negative approach and remind himself that we will get only one chance to get this right. We ought to make sure that we do not bungle it.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I should make clear that I said that the Labour Party was broadly supporting the conclusions of the Wheatley report; not the Government’s policy because we do not know what that is yet. We look forward to seeing it. Perhaps we will support it; perhaps we will not. On the substantive matter, I welcome what I saw was the noble Lord’s support for a degree of flexibility at Report, referred to also by my noble friend Lord Peston. If it could be agreed in due course by the usual channels that for the Wheatley clauses a Committee-style procedure be permitted and the House agreed to that, then I think we could proceed with due speed.
Lord Barnett
My Lords, I always like to be enlightened. I agree with my noble friend and I have a tendency to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. However on this occasion I do not. I must apologise to the Committee. This matter is no doubt explained somewhere in the huge volume of papers we received at the outset, including the two volumes of the Bill. I must have missed it. I thought I was relatively assiduous in looking at this Bill. No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, will tell us where it is. I am sure the officials with whom the Government generally agree—although not on every subject in the world, I understand, and sometimes they even prosecute or suspend them—must have explained what the noble Lord has failed to tell us. I hope either the noble Lord himself or the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, will explain it more fully. I for one do not understand it.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, although I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, that it is enormously important that we improve the flow of funding to small firms, particularly given the complete failure of the Government’s attempts to improve the funding through banks to small firms, I believe that we should approach this proposal with great care. The problem with crowd funding is that crowds can often be subject to hysteria. We have seen hysterical funding levels in what might be deemed to be fashionable or popular companies: lastminute.com comes to mind, as does the recent launch of Facebook. In both cases, excessive hysteria associated with the popularity of the particular company led to investors losing quite a lot of money.
However in the SME sector, the fundamental problem for small investors is the risk to which they are exposed. They will necessarily have significantly less information than they would from a listed company. Given that lack of information, and the high mortality rate of small and medium-sized companies—thankfully they have a high birth-rate as well—it is likely to lead to a lot of not-very-well-off people losing significant sums of money.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I will put some things to one side before I deal with the main substance of my noble friend’s argument in this short and interesting debate around crowd funding. First, for the help of the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, there is indeed no Section 417 because crowd funding has been introduced into this Bill by my noble friend Lord Sharkey. I am sure that in due course he will table a Section 417 which will make us all a lot clearer about the definition. However, for the interim benefit of the noble Lord, Lord Peston, and rather than me banging on about what crowd funding is and boring the rest of the House, I draw his attention to the FSA guidance on this topic put out in August this year. It gives a helpful short introduction to what it is all about.
Lord Eatwell
“( ) The regulators must co-ordinate their procedures for, and provide clear and detailed guidance on, the processes for applying for, varying and cancelling permission that are applicable to authorised persons regulated by both PRA and the FCA.”
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I will speak also to Amendment 149AC. Both amendments concern the process of applying to carry on regulated activities. I am sure that the Minister is aware that there is considerable disquiet at the moment about the very long delays associated with the application to carry on regulated activities. Undoubtedly this is having a deleterious effect on competition in financial services, and on what we might call the reformation of the financial services industry.
No doubt these delays are partly as a result of the fact that the legislation that will cover these organisations is in process, and therefore the appropriate officials at the FSA feel somewhat constrained in their ability to make decisions on what can sometimes be quite sensitive and contentious issues. None the less, those delays are very unfortunate. The two amendments are designed to facilitate the process of application and to ensure that it will be rather more efficient when the duties are passed over to the FCA and/or the PRA on what I have noticed is, rather unfortunately, All Fools Day.
Amendment 149AA calls for co-ordination between the FCA and the PRA when processing applications for permission to carry out regulated activities, in particular giving clear and detailed guidance—something that is not always in evidence at the moment—on applying for, varying or cancelling permission. I am particularly concerned about applying for permission.
It is important that when the responsibility is split, as it must inevitably be between the regulator responsible for risk, the PRA, and the regulator responsible for conduct of business, the FCA, the co-ordination between them when dealing with new applicants is as clear, transparent and carefully guided as possible. Amendment 149AA achieves exactly that—at least that is what it seeks to do—and if it does not achieve it, perhaps the noble Lord will tell us how he intends to achieve the same objective.
Amendment 149AC seeks to modernise and future-proof elements of the application process. The Bill does not refer to decisions previously made by the European Union regulatory authorities when referring to non-EEA firms and the weight to be attached to opinions on any non-EEA firms wishing to operate in this jurisdiction. The European Union regulatory authorities are going to be the major regulatory rule makers in this area, so leaving them out at this stage will limit and inhibit operation of the Bill in the future. We know that the European authorities will become important in this respect. Surely it is therefore imperative that some weight be given in the Bill to their opinion when non-EEA firms are likely to be offered the privilege of acting within this jurisdiction. I beg to move.
Baroness Kramer
My Lords, I want to speak very briefly to Amendment 150B in this group. As your Lordships will know, the Bill amends Section 55 of FiSMA. Section 55Q as now in the Bill refers to the,
“Exercise of power in support of overseas regulator”.
I would like the Minister to clarify the definition of “overseas regulator” because neither I nor some of those who are much more sophisticated than me in trying to understand regulation are fully certain whether that definition would include an agency or instrumentality of the European Union such as the three supervisory authorities—the ESMA, the EBA and the EIOPA—which have direct regulatory powers in their own right. All I am asking for at this point is some clarification as to whether these EU agencies or instrumentalities are encompassed in this and if they are not, why not.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Newby, to the consideration of the Bill but I suggest that he has failed to take the point of Amendment 149AA. His argument consisted of two points. First, he argued that there was sufficient requirement for the PRA and the FCA to work together in giving permissions under new Sections 55E, 55F and 55G. Secondly, he argued, extraordinarily, that it was not the task of the Bill to require either the PRA or the FCA to publish guidance on these matters. One of the great failures in the current process in giving permissions is the inadequate guidance which firms have in preparing their permissions. It is one reason why the permission process has become so extended and has so limited the development of competition in financial services which we would all like to see. In particular—
Lord Newby
What I said was that at present the FSA does make guidance available on its website. The new regulators intend to do the same. For that reason, I did not think there was a need for an express requirement in the Bill to do so.
Lord Eatwell
They may intend to do lots of things, but it would be nice if the Bill could actually require them to do so in this particular case. However, the more important point I would like the noble Lord to help me with is that Amendment 149A requires the collaborative activity of the FCA and the PRA to publish guidance for applicants, so that an applicant is not caught between two stools, continuously going backwards and forwards between one and the other in the application process. If this is already in new Sections 55E, 55F, and 55G, can the noble Lord point out to me precisely where this requirement appears?
Lord Newby
The PRA and FCA are under a duty to co-ordinate covering all their functions, including those related to authorisations. They are under a duty to set out in their MoU how that co-ordination will be delivered. Therefore, the noble Lord’s concern that there will not be adequate co-ordination, and that even if there were, it might not be readily available to regulated or would-be regulated firms, is mistaken. There is recognition that there is a potential problem, obviously, with two regulators, but the Bill and the MoU seek specifically to address those problems.
Lord Eatwell
Pushing things into the MoU is unsatisfactory, particularly when the noble Lord pleaded in aid new Sections 55E, 55F, 55G, and so on. It does seem that there is a problem with the whole current application process. Anybody who has been involved with, or been approached by, people involved in the application process knows that as it stands it is not working very well. Once we have two regulators responsible for the approval of applications, there is the possibility that it will work less well, which will not be good for the health and vitality of financial services, particularly banking, in this country. However, we will no doubt return to this matter at a later stage. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Financial Services Bill
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in the amendment that she proposes. I have added my name, as has my noble friend Lady Hayter. It is clear that there must be a satisfactory set of amendments for reviewing the effectiveness of this new regulatory structure and whether it provides value for money as conceived, particularly given the added complexity of what the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, referred to as the multiplicity of regulators now created out of this single structure.
I speak, too, to Amendments 128BB and 130AA in the name of myself and my noble friend Lady Hayter. Amendment 128BB adds to a definition of an independent person that a person appointed to review the FCA must be independent of the FCA but also of the Bank of England. We should have somebody standing outside this regulatory complexity who should be deemed to be independent. I suggest that if the person appointed is a staff member of the Bank of England, the notion of independence will be compromised, even though the FCA stands outwith the Bank of England. I hope that none the less there will be continuous regulatory dialogue between all the elements in the regulatory apparatus that we are designing here and that it will therefore be necessary, if somebody is independent, that they should stand outside that regulatory community, of which the Bank of England will be a leading part.
The point with Amendment 130AA is that the Treasury in appointing an independent person to conduct a review should inform the Treasury Select Committee of the nature and arrangements of the review, the idea being that that committee itself conducts reviews of the operations of regulatory institutions and will greatly economise on and facilitate the overall operation of a review procedure if there is no duplication and if there is clear communication and understanding between what the Treasury Select Committee and the independent person are doing. These two scrutiny agents should be co-ordinated and we should not have further segmentation; we have too much in this Bill already, and we should not have further segmentation in the procedures that we are designing.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, first, I will make some comments on Amendments 128B and 130A, and explain who can initiate reviews. One of the main points made by my noble friend was essentially about how things are different from the way they have been up until now, and who can initiate reviews. I am sure we all agree that the Treasury’s power to appoint a person to carry out a value-for-money review is important to support accountability to the Government, to Parliament and to the public, not least because those reports of reviews must be published and laid before Parliament.
However, regarding my noble friend’s particular point, in future the NAO will also be able to initiate its own VFM reviews. As she identifies, that flows as a result of the Bill making the regulators subject to the NAO audit. I hope that provides reassurance to her on that important point. Clearly our expectations should be in the right place. The NAO can only conduct a certain number of VFM reviews each year across the whole of the public accounts which they audit, but I think my noble friend explicitly said—and I agree with her—that it would not be a question of an annual review. At the same time, the Government need to be able to order a review of the FCA at any time, with the option to focus on areas of the FCA’s activities they see as a priority, and be accountable for the way they exercise this power. In practice, the Treasury is likely to choose to appoint the NAO to carry out such a review. As such I do not see what would be added by placing an obligation on the Treasury to order reviews under new Section 1S, particularly as the amendment does not specify the time period or any of the other circumstances in which a review should be held; I think my noble friend recognises that. Particularly in the light of the fact that the NAO itself will be able to initiate VFM reviews, it would be too early to say how frequently the Treasury will use its power, because it will clearly dovetail to some extent with what flows from the audit. However, in response to my noble friend’s key point—she quoted my honourable friend the Financial Secretary—I am confident that the arrangements we have proposed will deliver a step change in the FCA’s accountability to Parliament, as compared to the way it has been with the FSA, for the way in which the FCA uses its resources to achieve value for money.
Amendment 128BB seeks to amend the requirement that a person appointed by the Treasury to conduct a review must be “independent of the FCA”, by adding the requirement that they must also be independent of the Bank of England. I absolutely agree that it is important that VFM studies of the FCA are carried out by someone independent of the FCA itself. That is what is proposed in the draft of the Bill itself, not least to provide assurance that they are objective and impartial. As I have said, in practice the Treasury is likely to choose the National Audit Office to carry out such a review. However, the Treasury will have the discretion to appoint an independent expert or a commercial firm with relevant specialist expertise to conduct a review. In that context the amendment is too wide, in that it could prevent any firm or expert which had done any significant amount of work for the Bank of England from carrying out such a role. From what the noble Lord said I appreciate that that was not the intention, but ruling out that population of firms or experts would be the effect of requiring the FCA reviewer to be independent of the Bank.
Lord Eatwell
If I may say so, that is absolute nonsense. Are we actually suggesting that any independent firm or individual who has done work for a government department is thereby compromised and no longer an independent person? Are we saying that an independent person who has happened to write a few papers for the research department of the Bank of England is now no longer an independent person and is thereby compromised because he is not independent of the Bank of England? That is a misuse of language.
Lord Sassoon
First, I am not sure why the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, talks about advisers to government departments. Here, we are talking about finding firms to carry out value-for-money reviews of the FCA, and independence from the FCA would seem to be the overriding concern. We are not talking about the Bank of England itself or some part of the Bank of England’s wider group doing the review. As I am sure the noble Lord knows, with all the increasingly tough professional codes that exist, the definition of independence is becoming ever tougher. Therefore, although the noble Lord and all of us might like to go back to a sort of common-sense, gentlemanly world that once existed, I absolutely stand by what I said. The amendment—whose effect incidentally goes wider than the noble Lord indicated in speaking to it—would capture a range of firms just because of the way that professional independence has come to be defined these days. Therefore, I stand by my analysis of the amendment.
Amendment 130AA would require that when the Treasury orders a review of the economy and efficiency of the PRA, it informs the Treasury Select Committee of the nature of, and arrangements for, the review. I understand that the amendment is driving at the importance of accountability to Parliament. The Government agree that that is important, which is why there is already a large amount on this subject in the Bill, including the provision for NAO audit, which we have discussed.
Requiring the Treasury to inform the Treasury Select Committee of the nature of, and arrangements for, the review at such an early stage might have some benefits of the sort that the noble Lord identified but I fear that it is more likely to be seen as an invitation for the Treasury Select Committee to comment on or even attempt to change the remit of these important reviews. I suggest to this Committee—I would not suggest anything to the Treasury Select Committee—that adding another political hurdle could slow up the process of producing these reviews. It may even make it less likely that they will be commissioned in the first place if there has to be a negotiation of the sort that I fear.
I hope that those explanations are sufficient for my noble friend to be able to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Eatwell
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, this amendment and Amendment 128BFB seek to ask the Government to clarify their definitions of the scope of the markets in which UK financial institutions operate. We have already seen some very peculiar UK-centric views in proposed new Section 9C of the Bank of England Act 1998, which I hope we will see extensively modified on Report. In this clause, however, the Bill currently refers to having,
“any adverse effect on the stability of the UK financial system”.
This fails to recognise the global nature of UK banking, and that risks may arise anywhere in the world where UK financial institutions operate.
We want to ensure that the actions of UK financial institutions are such as to sustain the stability of the entire financial system in which they operate. Why? It is because destabilising actions in foreign markets may destabilise subsidiaries of UK financial institutions and, ultimately, the home institution. However, this could not be said to refer to the UK financial system. I will put it again: if in a foreign market a subsidiary is destabilised by actions here, that subsidiary ultimately destabilises an institution here—not the system but an institution. Can the noble Lord please explain how the current wording of the Bill deals with the fact that the balance sheets of UK financial institutions are typically written on a global scale?
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, these amendments seek to give the PRA a global financial stability remit. Instead of the PRA looking at UK financial stability, the amendment would have it looking at the financial stability of every market around the world in which any PRA-authorised person operates. The PRA would have a new responsibility for the financial stability of many markets where it has no powers, no jurisdiction and no tools. I suggest that this is plainly an absurd position. Although cross-border co-operation is vital to ensure the effective supervision of international firms, it is ultimately for each country and its regulators to ensure its own financial stability, or a single currency bloc may decide that financial stability needs to be supervised ultimately on a currency bloc basis.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I think that the noble Lord has misunderstood the amendment. If he inserts the amendment and looks at subsection (3)(a), it would refer to,
“seeking to ensure that the business of PRA-authorised persons is carried on in a way which avoids any adverse effect”,
on markets in which PRA institutions operate. The noble Lord is suggesting that the PRA would not have jurisdiction, whereas the PRA does have jurisdiction over PRA-authorised persons.
Lord Sassoon
I have read and reread these amendments and discussed them with officials on a number of occasions because I cannot believe that this was the effect that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, wanted. Actually, it is entirely the effect of his amendments to require that the PRA’s general objective is to be advanced by,
“seeking to ensure that the business of PRA-authorised persons is carried on in a way which avoids any adverse effect on the stability of the”—
if amended—
“financial markets in which UK financial institutions operate”.
They would have to regulate in a way that had regard to the financial stability of all these markets around the world, which does very directly get the PRA into the protection of financial markets way beyond its own control in the UK.
I will explain why I think the Bill adequately covers the noble Lord’s justifiable concern. What I have said so far in no way means that the PRA will ignore the stability of any financial market outside the UK that is relevant to PRA-authorised firms. The PRA will take an interest in the stability of any market that has a significant impact on the safety and soundness of one or more PRA-authorised persons. It will do this not in order to improve the stability of this market but to understand the potential or actual impact on regulated firms and to take steps so that this impact is minimised using all the powers available to it. I cannot identify anything in the Bill that limits the PRA or prevents it from taking account of all those factors. It is quite a different thing to put in wording, as suggested in these amendments, that would make the PRA in some way responsible for the effects on the stability of financial systems outside the UK. With that explanation and reassurance, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, it is very difficult to be reassured by a statement that the PRA would sit back quite happily and watch PRA firms take actions that would destabilise foreign markets. However, given that the Treasury seems to have no concern about PRA firms destabilising markets outside the UK, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
“( ) seeking to minimise, as far as possible, the costs to the FSCS or the use of public funds to support or rescue parts of the UK financial services industry”
Lord Eatwell
The amendment seeks to add to the overall objectives of the PRA the requirement that it operates efficiently, seeking to minimise costs,
“to the FSCS or the use of public funds to support or rescue parts of the UK financial services industry”.
It seems remarkable that the PRA has a series of objectives that it is required to pursue to the very best of its ability and with the application of all necessary resources, but there is no constraint on the utilisation of those resources. It seems to be able to pursue its objectives without any concerns for the costs to the public purse in these particular contexts. The amendment would provide a balance in the approach of the PRA, with the desirable objective of ensuring stability and, in doing so, minimising the costs both to the FSCS and the public purse.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, this amendment reflects a recommendation from the Joint Committee that a secondary general microprudential objective be given to the PRA. It seeks to specify a further means by which the PRA’s general objective should be achieved, by minimising the costs to the FSCS or the use of public funds to support or rescue parts of the UK financial services industry. A similar amendment to this was tabled and debated in another place.
The Government acknowledge that there are some attractions to reframing the objective in terms of the prudential outcomes that the PRA will seek to achieve, as the Joint Committee suggested. However, specifying particular desired outcomes creates difficulties. For example, whether the failure of a firm results in a call on public funds will depend to an extent on the actions of the Government of the day—for example, in taking a decision to nationalise or recapitalise a failing institution. In some circumstances, the orderly failure of a firm followed by an FSCS payout may be the best way of protecting depositors and taxpayers while maintaining market discipline. The effect of specifying such outcomes could be to encourage the PRA to take a highly aggressive and expensive approach to supervision with an end goal of ensuring that, if a firm failed, its potential costs of failure to the FSCS and public funds would be zero or negligible. To ensure this outcome, the PRA would need to intervene extensively in a firm’s day-to-day affairs, undermining the responsibility of firms’ management for running their firm. Ultimately, in an extreme case, it could turn PRA supervisors into shadow directors.
To place such a duty on the regulator would be against the Government’s intention, endorsed by the Joint Committee and confirmed in new Section 2F inserted by the Bill, that the new regulatory regime should not be a zero-failure regime. The amendment would bias the PRA towards a zero-failure regime. On balance, the Government believe that it is better to frame the objective more broadly, requiring the PRA to focus on the safety and soundness of individual firms, so as to improve financial stability. This objective gives the PRA a clear mandate to intervene to address risk-taking by firms.
I hope I have been able to make clear to the Committee why I cannot accept this amendment, and why I ask the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Lord Eatwell
The Minister has exposed some very interesting arguments here in the relationship between the degree of protection which should be provided to consumers and the public purse, balancing that against the degree of supervision of firms. The Government seem to want to err on the side of jeopardising the public purse a little rather than providing supervision that would protect the public purse. However, in the context I can see that a balance is being discussed here, and the Minister has made clear where the Government’s view of that balance lies. In that light, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, this is a probing amendment seeking clarification of the role of “the specified objective”, as it is called in the Bill. An aspect of regulation that is important is that it should be transparent and predictable. The characterisation of the specified objective is neither. Indeed, the boundaries of regulation now seem to be rather arbitrary in the sense that the Treasury can regularly, perhaps, introduce specified objectives and change the boundaries of PRA activities. This cannot but have a dampening effect on financial innovation, because financial innovation depends upon some notion of predictability. Innovation has, as a result of the crisis, a rather bad name at the moment, but there have of course been entirely beneficial innovations over the years, and regulators stifle innovation at their peril.
Of course, the problem is how to secure good innovation while discouraging bad innovation. This is where clear objectives come in, and clarity and transparency are important. This section, I am afraid, seems notably unclear in that the boundaries of regulation would not be predictable. Having such a degree of unpredictability is bound to have a dampening effect.
I understand that any order under this section will require parliamentary approval under new Section 22A, but it is not at all clear how changes will acquire a sense of being anything other than arbitrary, since no concept of consultation with those institutions which would be affected is referred to. Could the Minister please explain?
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, raises an important point here that we want to on one hand future-proof the Bill, and on the other hand make sure that the future ring-fence around regulated activities—the regulatory perimeter—is not widened on a whim. It is not an easy line to draw. If it required primary legislation—not that the noble Lord was suggesting that—to extend the PRA’s objectives to bring other activities within the regulatory perimeter, that would be a complicated 12-to-18 month process that would not allow for a timely response.
The situation that I generally envisage is one where the FPC would ask for the regulatory perimeter to be widened. That, I suggest, is sensible and necessary future-proofing that enables the authorities to react to changes in financial markets and financial risks in a pragmatic way, whether it is to allow for innovation, or for any other reason. To give a couple of examples which could come up where the FPC could recommend such an extension of the perimeter, it might relate to some or all shadow banking activities or to peer-to-peer platforms or activities, which we have discussed fairly regularly.
I am looking to see whether my noble friend Lord Lucas is here, or some of my other noble friends—the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, among them—because at some point activities like this could well be recommended by the FPC to the Treasury to be brought within the regulatory perimeter. The Treasury would then make an order to make these activities PRA-regulated ones, and if necessary apply additional objectives to these activities.
I assure the noble Lord that in this context, in accordance with convention and Cabinet Office guidance, the Treasury, as the relevant department, would of course conduct the consultation in the normal form at that point. I hope that explains why this part of the Bill is drafted in the way that it is, and that there are protections in there.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, that was very interesting because the FPC has not been mentioned at all and it is suddenly being prayed in aid in support of this section. I remain puzzled as to why the Government are willing to risk the Bill appearing to be so restrictive by not including some notion of general consultation. Of course, if the FPC were involved there would be consultation issues around which the FPC itself is hedged. But changes could appear on a whim, as the noble Lord himself put it. I would not expect the Treasury to behave on a whim, but it might appear that way to the industry.
Lord Sassoon
I am sorry, but I am pretty sure that I did not say that the Treasury would do anything on a whim: far from it. I would not like the record to say that. Of course the Treasury would not do something on a whim. I would expect recommendations to come from the FPC, which, as the noble Lord said, has its consultation procedures. It does not need a reference in the Bill to say that if the Treasury makes recommendations or an order under this clause nothing else needs to be said. Of course the Treasury will follow the normal consultation processes applicable to this form of order.
Lord Eatwell
One should hope so too. One would have hoped that new Section 22A and other relevant sections, perhaps to be added, would recognise that fact. However, having had an interesting discussion of responsibilities and whims, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sassoon
I well understand my noble friend’s argument. It is, of course, far from the case that the PRA and the Bank of England will be able to hide from direct questioning of what they do because I am sure that they will be in front of the Treasury Committee much more frequently than annually, under the full spotlight of television cameras and so on. It is not like a normal corporate situation in which the board may be able to hide away from that sort of scrutiny except annually. There will be very regular public challenge, principally through the Treasury Committee, and I can only repeat that it would have been the simple, easy answer to just put both requirements on both the successor bodies, but I come back to the underlying point: we must remember that we are creating two bodies that have to be, in very many respects, different from what we have with the FSA at the moment. If it is merely shifting the chairs around, we need not be spending the many hours that we are spending over the Bill.
Lord Sassoon
Well, that is why we are not merely shifting the chairs around; there will be a very fundamentally better structure in place for all sorts of reasons that we have debated, but as a consequence of that, some of the easy solutions of “one size fits both regulators” is not the right way to go and in this case it is essentially a disproportionate imposition of the public meeting on the PRA, for the reasons I have given.
Amendment 144B seeks to require the FCA to account in its annual report for how often the FCA used the product intervention power in Section 137C and financial promotions power in Section 137P, what the outcome of each intervention was, and how the FCA complied with the statement of policy concerning the temporary product intervention rules in Section 137N. Both powers are very important, but they are also a departure from the current regime and therefore it is important that the regulator accounts for how it uses them. As such, I fully agree with the sentiment behind this amendment, but I reassure my noble friend that it is not necessary. Paragraph 10 (1)(a) of Schedule 3 requires the FCA to report on the discharge of its functions and the FCA’s general functions include making and policing of the rules. The Government therefore fully expect the regulator to account, in this area, for how it has used these powers.
I think that I have dealt with all the amendments in the group.
Financial Services Bill
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(12 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Eatwell
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I shall address Amendment 54, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hayter. I will also speak to Amendments 55, 57, 58 and 61. I apologise to the Committee if there is some confusion over the grouping with respect to these amendments. We asked this morning for this amendment to be degrouped from the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Flight, which deals with something rather different.
I will preface my remarks by saying that over the next several groups we will examine the exceptionalism of the Financial Policy Committee. This committee is an experiment, and it has powers transferred from persons who have the authority of election behind them and are part of the executive, to an administrative function. These powers are substantial: they manage the supply of credit, and possibly, if particular measures were handed over to the FPC, they will manage the demand for credit. Hence, it will have a major impact on the overall macroperformance of the economy.
There is also the potential for the FPC to be in conflict with the Monetary Policy Committee—the MPC—which controls the price of credit. That contradiction could be a serious element in the overall operation and management of the economy. The exceptionalism of the FPC, in our view, requires exceptional scrutiny and consultation as this experiment unfolds. I call it an experiment because we do not as yet know how effective these administrative measures are going to be. We do not as yet know even what they will be in content, so a degree of extra scrutiny and consultation is required at every stage to ensure that major mistakes are not made and that we design effective procedures and secure public acceptance for the role of the Financial Policy Committee.
Amendment 54 introduces a minor element, which has wider significance than might at first appear. It simply introduces the expression “and the public” into those who must be consulted with respect to the makings of an order. The public here is a term of art, meaning those who have a direct interest in this area. It would essentially involve the industry and perhaps a few specialist academics or others who have a particular interest in the field. Amendment 54 seeks, as does Amendment 55, to introduce the possibility of that wider consultation, which I believe is vital if this experiment—and it is an experiment—is to succeed.
Amendment 57 simply adds to the requirements for consultation by providing a back-up. When there is some failure to consult, perhaps because of the urgency of a particular measure, that failure should be,
“subject to scrutiny by the Treasury Select Committee”,
in a way which has been recognised in other parts of the Bill. Amendment 61 adds to the conditions associated with urgency that there should be a statement published within 10 days of an urgent measure on which consultation has not taken place. Those four amendments provide a wider framework of consultation for this experiment than is provided in the Bill. It seems to me that they are entirely unexceptional and would be widely welcomed throughout the financial services industry, and indeed the policy community.
Amendment 58 is a little different and really should have been degrouped, but we feel we should not go too far in our enthusiasm for degrouping. Here we have a slightly different element that focuses, however, on the exceptionalism of the Financial Policy Committee because that committee has a particular responsibility for measures that are specific macroeconomic controls. I simply do not see how that responsibility can be in any way transferred to the FCA or the PRA, which do not have such a responsibility in their objectives or their specification of roles. This seems to be a major mistake in the drafting of the Bill. It is also unnecessary with respect to the directions by the FPC, since the ability of the FPC to authorise the exercise of discretion is covered in proposed new Section 9G(5). This part is therefore going too far, as the necessary role for the FPC is already covered.
This is a dangerous amendment—no, it is a dangerous position, not a dangerous amendment. It is a very beneficial amendment, which would remove a potential danger in the sense that the provision, as drafted, takes these experimental powers which we are handing to the FPC and allows them to be generalised outwith that very special framework that we are creating in the Bill. I urge the Government to accept Amendment 58. All the powers that the committee needs are covered by proposed new Section 9G(5) and this position is entirely unnecessary.
In dealing with the exceptionalism of the Financial Policy Committee, therefore, the amendments I am discussing in this group enhance the underpinning of consultation that will provide validity and acceptance to the powers of the FPC and remove what was perhaps an unwitting extension of those powers, which might undermine the entire project. I beg to move.
Lord Sassoon
I am sure that we will not have to wait for very long. I shall address what is more directly the subject of these amendments and the question about possible conflicts between the FPC and the MPC. While it is conceivable that the two committees might seemingly appear to be taking conflicting action, I do not actually believe that that is likely to be the case as each committee’s actions will be designed to address very different aspects of the economy and the financial system. That said, there are mechanisms in place to ensure that conflict does not arise. The committees will share information and briefing in order to aid co-ordination, and the Bill makes provision for joint meetings of the two policy committees if at any time that is required. The Bank has also said that it agrees with the Treasury Committee’s recommendation on this question and that the governor should consult the chairman of court if a conflict arises. It is unlikely, but the Bill makes provision through joint meetings and the consultation with the chairman of court.
I turn to the specifics of Amendments 54 and 55. These amendments seek to require the Treasury to consult the public before making any order which makes macroprudential tools available to the FPC. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, that effective consultation on macroprudential tools is essential, but this amendment is not the best way to achieve it. The practice of public consultation on important matters of policy and legislation is now well established and is engrained in good government practice. My honourable friend the Financial Secretary said in another place:
“As a matter of course and as part of the usual statutory instrument process, I expect that the Treasury will consult on macro-prudential tools”.—[Official Report, Commons, 28/2/12; col.46.]
The Government have already committed to a consultation on their proposals for the FPC’s initial toolkit and will produce a draft statutory instrument as a part of that consultation. The Bill as currently drafted does not prevent the Treasury from consulting the public. The Government have already shown their willingness to consult on macroprudential tools and demonstrated their commitment to transparency by asking the interim FPC to make public recommendations regarding its tools.
I do not quibble with the term “public”. From what the noble Lord said, I suspect that he might have been expecting me to come back and say that this is not for the public, but for consultation with the industry. I accept the context in which he uses the word “public”. That is not my objection. It is good practice to do it. We are doing it. The FPC has been asked to make public its recommendations regarding tools. However, it may not always be appropriate to consult the public, which is why this requirement should not be in the legislation. Not all macroprudential orders will make large changes to the FPC’s direction powers. It is possible that some orders will contain only minor and technical changes and in this instance a three-month public consultation would be unnecessary. The previous Government rightly recognised the risks of undertaking full public consultation in cases where it is not necessary. Their own code of consultation listed seven criteria, one of which stated:
“Keeping the burden of consultation to a minimum is essential if consultations are to be effective and if consultees’ buy-in to the process is to be obtained”.
The Government have stated that they will, in compliance with the principles of good government, consult the public when material changes to the FPC’s direction powers are proposed and in non-urgent cases. I hope that that provides reassurance which the Committee seeks.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, while we are on this point and before the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, moves on to other elements, I am grateful for his clarification on this issue of consultation. I heard that we expect the Treasury to consult and there is nothing to prevent it consulting. I was seeking that the Treasury be required to consult.
Turning to the point which the noble Lord has just raised about the consultation criteria, which is enormously helpful, would it not be appropriate to write the criteria in to the conditionality with respect to when the Treasury should consult? Then we will not have simply an expectation or a desire and we will not be saying that there is nothing to prevent consultation. We will be saying that the Treasury should consult in all circumstances other than those specified under the consultation criteria. Would that not be helpful?
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, of course that could be done, but I make the point again that it is now engrained in the principles of good government that there should normally be three months’ public consultation. There is a code of consultation that the previous Government put out. It sets it all out very clearly, including the point about burdens and so on that I read out. In its full richness, it cannot easily be drafted in legislation. Indeed, if we were going to do it in this Bill, I imagine there could be hundreds of other Bills in which it could be spelled out. I suggest that the Committee should not only take comfort from the standard governmental practice but from the fact that we have already indicated what we are going to do with the FPC toolkit. I believe we have covered it all and do not need to burden this Bill with a lot of detail any more than other Bills are burdened with it.
Amendment 57 seeks to provide that the reasons for making an order without consulting the FPC or the public be subject to scrutiny by the Treasury Select Committee. While I agree that accountability to Parliament will be important and the provisions within the Bill reflect that, I believe, as I have said on other occasions, that it is for parliamentary committees themselves to decide what they will scrutinise. I would expect the Treasury Committee to take a great interest in any circumstances where the Treasury felt it necessary to create a new macroprudential tool on an urgent and therefore possibly not-consulted basis.
I suggest to the Committee that it would be inappropriate for the Government to use primary legislation to force the Treasury Select Committee to scrutinise something. It must be a decision for the committee itself. The committee has already taken great interest in the interim FPC and I hope that this will continue. For those reasons I believe that Amendment 57 is neither appropriate nor necessary.
We then get to Amendment 58—I was going to say “the dangerous amendment”. It seeks to deal with what the noble Lord says is a potentially dangerous situation. He was entirely clear in his reasoning. The amendment seeks to remove the FPC’s ability to confer discretion on the PRA and the FCA as part of a direction.
Lord Sassoon
The noble Lord says that it is the Treasury’s ability to confer discretion. Whoever’s ability to confer discretion it is—I am just turning back to the drafting of the amendment, which really means looking at the clause as well. I will do that as I speak. I believe it is the FPC’s ability to confer discretion, but whether it is the FPC or the Treasury, the purpose of the provision is to allow the direction-making entity to take advantage of the expertise of the PRA and the FCA. Indeed, the noble Lord is completely right. I have now checked the text and it is the Treasury. However, the point is the same. We need to take advantage of the expertise of the PRA and the FCA which hold the expert knowledge relating to the supervision of individual firms. This provision allows the Treasury to take advantage of that expertise in its directions. For example, if the direction required the PRA to require firms with large exposures to hold additional capital, it would be for the PRA to decide which firms had large exposures. That would be something for the supervisor—the regulator—to do. Therefore, I believe that the amendment would unnecessarily hamper the ability of the direction to have proper effect.
Lord Eatwell
Shall we deal with it as I go along? It would be easier for the Committee if we deal with Amendment 58.
There is a mistake here. The text of the Bill says that the Treasury may make an order which,
“may confer a discretion on … the FCA or the PRA”.
In other words, the Treasury has direct macroprudential tool access to the FCA or PRA, not via the FPC. Proposed new Section 9G(5) describes the correct procedure, in that a discretion that could be given to the PRA or the FCA comes via the FPC. In other words, it comes via the macroprudential authority—the institution that is responsible for macroprudential measures. The example given by the noble Lord is particularly pertinent in this case. If there were a requirement to increase the capital that is relative, let us say, to large exposures or to other risk-weighted measures, then that must be a decision of the FPC. I do not see how the Treasury could give that macroprudential role in any shape or form directly to the FCA or the PRA.
If the provision’s wording was that an order may confer a discretion on the Financial Policy Committee, which may then be transferred to the FCA or the PRA at the will of the Financial Policy Committee, the point that the noble Lord has just made about expertise would be entirely well taken. However, if we are to maintain the integrity of this experiment, or indeed project, then we must maintain the FPC as the focus for macroprudential regulatory management. That is why I referred to this element as dangerous, in the sense that it undermines that clear structure within the Bill.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, according to these provisions, when the Treasury specifies what macroprudential measures the FPC may exercise, the Treasury may, in relation to those macroprudential measures, confer functions on the regulator. It is intended that this is likely to be used for minor matters such as definitions. For example, the Treasury could provide that the FPC may impose additional capital requirements on exposures to residential property, and that the PRA, as the microregulator, would define the meaning of “residential property”.
There is, therefore, a web of interlocking provisions here, which I fear I did not do justice to in my first attempt to cut through this. Would it help the noble Lord if I take this one away, write to him and copy it to the other Members of the Committee who are here, to try to explain how these provisions will work together? I do not believe that there is any gap here, because it is ancillary to the basic directions that will come via the macroprudentials of the FPC. But there may be some ancillary matters, particularly definitional ones, where the expertise of the PRA or the FCA would be operative and for which we need therefore to keep this element and not to close this off in the way that Amendment 58 seeks to do. I will write to try to set that out more clearly. I am grateful to the noble Lord for that.
Amendment 61 would require the FPC to publish a policy statement within 10 days of a direction being made in relation to a measure made before the FPC had been able to issue a statement of policy under new Section 9L to be inserted into the Bank of England Act 1998 under Clause 3. Again, the Government agree that transparency and openness will be vital to ensure sufficient accountability for the FPC and the use of its tools. However, I believe that this amendment is not appropriate.
The Bill already provides that a policy statement is produced and maintained for each of the Bank’s macroprudential tools. This would also apply to those measures granted using the emergency procedure. However, if a situation were urgent, it would be counterproductive to require the FPC to wait until it has drafted and published a statement of policy before it could use that tool.
We would expect the FPC to produce a statement of policy for the tool as soon as reasonably practical afterwards, assuming that the tool remains in the FPC’s toolkit. I suggest that the requirement in Amendment 61 would be excessively restrictive.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, the requirement is there for the statement to be made. Indeed, it would be the full expectation that a statement would be made. We believe that the Bill does not need any extra amendment in relation to statements that relate to macroprudential measures where they are exercised as a matter of urgency. The statement has to be made in any case.
Lord Eatwell
Perhaps I may help the noble Lord. I think that there was a slight misunderstanding in what he said in his initial answer on this amendment. He said that if there were an urgent situation, it would be inappropriate to wait for a statement to be made. That is not what this amendment says. It in no way prevents urgent measures being taken immediately. It simply says that if that is the case—as the noble Lord said, as soon as possible, and as I say, within 10 days—a statement should be produced. Surely, it is appropriate to give confidence and comfort to the markets that they can have some degree of expectation that a measure taken in urgency would be subject to a statement within a timeframe which is known to the markets and therefore provides them with appropriate comfort.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I do not believe that any additional requirement needs to be put in. The FPC already has transparency requirements at the heart of what it does. I completely agree that in certain cases, if it was an urgent matter, 10 days would not be the answer. It would make a statement based on the merits of the case either immediately, or on some other timescale. The Treasury would need to lay secondary legislation on an urgent basis to create the new tools required. Regardless of this provision, the laying of this secondary legislation would involve a public statement about the need for the tool and how it would be used. There is another backstop. If the new tool was required to be created, Parliament would immediately have a statement in front of it to back up the secondary legislation.
For a variety of reasons, Amendment 61 is redundant. On the basis of some partial explanations, and my commitment to write to him—particularly to explain in more detail how I believe the matters around Amendment 58 will operate—I ask if the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Eatwell
I am grateful to the noble Lord. Having a committee process where we go backwards and forwards on each particular amendment is helpful and removes the need for me to make a long summing-up speech. I will simply focus on Amendment 58, which has been the main matter of substance within this group which has exercised us, especially after the noble Lord clarified the issues of the consultations so well. Amendment 58 is still a serious problem, and I look forward to the noble Lord writing to me about it. Once I have his views in writing, perhaps we can consult further to find an appropriate way of sustaining the position of the FPC in the way that I have described. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
Lord Eatwell
And now, my Lords, for something completely different. One of the objects relating to the governance of the Bank of England which we discussed in the first two days in Committee, and which is now coming up again, is to increase the collegiality of decision-making within the Bank, particularly with respect to this project. It seems that the deputy governor for financial stability is going to have an important role in the development of the FPC, the development of its activities and, indeed, its overall credibility and acceptance. It therefore seems entirely appropriate in these circumstances that the deputy governor for financial stability should be given a special status within the legislation, both in respect to consultation with the Treasury when an emergency order is introduced, and with respect to the discussions with the Chancellor of the Exchequer after the publication of the Financial Stability Report.
Amendment 56 seeks to place the deputy governor for financial stability within the framework of consultation when there is an emergency order. Overall responsibility rests with the governor. However, surely the deputy governor, who has the prime responsibility, should be consulted when there is likely to be an emergency order. Moreover, when the Treasury and the Bank have their formal discussions, which are required by the Bill, following the publication of the Financial Stability Report, it is surely appropriate that the person responsible for that report—the deputy governor for financial stability is the acting element in this respect—should be part of those conversations, as we require in Amendment 79.
If the Government accepted these amendments, we would feel much more comfortable about the overall governance structure of the Bank. It would acquire a more collegial framework, which we strongly feel is very appropriate to the development of these new measures. I beg to move.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, these amendments reprise an argument that was raised by the shadow Chancellor during the Bill’s Second Reading in another place.
As the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said, Amendment 56 would require the Treasury to inform not only the governor but the deputy governor for financial stability when it considers that there is insufficient time for the FPC to be consulted on the introduction of a new macroprudential tool.
Amendment 79 would place in the Bill a requirement for the deputy governor for financial stability to attend the biannual meetings between the Chancellor and the governor following the publication of the FPC’s annual stability report.
Clearly the Bank plays a crucial role not only in relation to the management of the UK’s economy but specifically, under the Bill, in relation to macroprudential and microprudential regulation. In fulfilling these very important responsibilities, we expect the Bank to act as the serious and respected organisation that it is. This means that the senior executives of the Bank will work as a team to determine the best course of action to achieve the Bank’s objectives and comply with the legal obligations placed upon it. The governor is the leader of that team and, working closely with his senior executives, will ultimately take the key decisions within the Bank.
It is clear that the success of the new regulatory structure, which, rightly, we are spending so much time debating, relies heavily on the relationship between the Treasury and the Bank of England, and I believe that the Bill provides the necessary clarity of responsibilities. However, it also depends on the personal relationships at play here, particularly between the most senior leaders of the two bodies—the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Governor of the Bank of England. One of the major problems leading up to the financial crisis was that the tripartite committee did not meet at principals level during the previous decade.
Therefore, there are clearly things that need to be legislated for, and this is not what the noble Lord is in any way seeking to argue against, but it is important background to this discussion. The Chancellor and the governor must meet regularly to discuss financial stability. That is why the Bill and the regulatory structure that it establishes place at the heart of the matter the institutional relationship between the Treasury and the Bank, and the personal relationship between the Chancellor and the governor.
I do not see any reason to attempt to insert into that relationship a further statutory channel of communication. First, I just do not believe that it is needed. The Treasury ministerial team regularly meets the current deputy governor for financial stability and the chief executive of the FSA. There is also a constant dialogue between the deputy governor and senior Treasury officials via meetings, phone calls and e-mails. The same was true under the previous Government, as I know, since I was part of it for three years, and it was very effective at working level. That has not changed and it will not change under the new structure. In practice, the deputy governor may well attend the biannual meetings between the two principals. If the Treasury notified the governor that a new macroprudential instrument needed to be introduced on an urgent basis, the deputy governor would be well aware of that.
I will just point out one slight correction that is relevant to this, which is that the FPC is responsible for the financial stability report to the deputy governor. That is relevant to the discussion of this amendment because it shows that we should not excessively personalise the relationships or draw attention to particular individuals if that risks, as it may do in this instance, causing confusion about who is responsible for what. I agree that the relationship with the two leaders of the bodies, the Treasury and the Bank of England, should be hard-wired in, as we have done. In practice, the deputy governor is, and will be, very much involved in all the relevant discussions. Amendments 79 and 56 are not necessary and go too far.
There is a strong argument here that such a provision could be positively unhelpful by opening the door to the possibility that the Bank may be divided and encouraged to speak with more than one voice. There is a risk of recreating elements of dysfunctionality that were in the system as it used to exist. I do not want to overplay this, since the main argument is the earlier one. However, I do see a slight but secondary danger that this provision could be built on in the wrong circumstances. On the basis of the earlier explanations, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, will withdraw this amendment.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, the noble Lord’s comments have been very valuable. The Government have continuously argued that the tripartite system set out by the previous Government did not work because of its structure. He has now admitted that it did not work because the principals did not work it and did not meet. That is a very different issue. The fact that the principals did not meet, and that we now find the need for them to meet in primary legislation, illustrates that it was not the structure that was wrong but the people working in it that went wrong.
I agree with the noble Lord that the Bank should work as a team. I am very much in favour of that. However, we have to distinguish between the captain of the team and those who take the penalty kicks. We may want Martin Johnson to be the captain but we want Jonny Wilkinson to take the kicks. In those circumstances, the particular specialist role of the deputy governor for financial stability seems to be an important element in effective communication between the Treasury and the Bank. Moreover, the noble Lord expressed, in a careful way, that this might expose differences in the Bank’s position and suggested that this might create dysfunctionality. There are differences in this Committee, but this Committee is not dysfunctional. It is making progress. The differences between us are highlighting, as it is their role to highlight, some problems in the Bill that can make it a better Bill, which is our entire objective. I do not accept that differences within a reasonably run organisation necessarily lead to dysfunctionality. That seems to be Sir Humphrey rampant, determined that there is a singular position.
The whole issue of governance of the Bank is still somewhat in the air. This is one element that we wished to put in the Bill and felt would be enormously helpful. Now the noble Lord has recognised that the tripartite system did not fail because of its structure, but because of the personalities who failed to work it, I hope that he will consider the value of these amendments when we return to them on Report.
Lord Barnett
We are talking about possible serious financial crises and stability. At the end of the day, the Chancellor will be held responsible if something goes wrong with financial stability. There could be as many teams as we liked, but the Chancellor would ultimately have to accept responsibility, even if he knew nothing about it. I am sure that any Chancellor—I am looking at one now—would know everything that was going on in his team.
I am confused about what the clause or the Bill will do to help us in this matter. My noble friend’s amendment might help, although we are told by the Minister that it could “excessively personalise”. I am blessed if I know what that is supposed to mean, but no doubt the Minister will tell us. At the moment, I am more confused than ever. I thought that I understood a few things about financial matters but, listening to the exchange between my noble friend and the Minister, I am confused more than ever.
Lord Eatwell
Perhaps before I sit down I can help my noble friend. We are discussing what is perceived to be an essential failure of the previous system. The failure was that the people responsible for working it did not take advantage of the tools that were provided. Here in the Bill, as the Minister pointed out, the Government have rightly insisted that the Treasury and the Bank convey information to each other, consult each other and act collectively when necessary. That is appropriate, and I commend the Government in that respect. I simply think that they have not gone far enough.
Lord Peston
If my noble friend were to ask himself who would know most about a macroprudential measure in the Bank, surely that would be the deputy governor, because that is his job. My noble friend is saying that the Treasury should consult. I would argue that the Treasury is sensible enough to know that it should consult the one person who would know what was going on.
Lord Eatwell
Just to reinforce what I said, neither the Government nor this side have entire confidence in the consultation procedure between the Bank and Treasury as it has taken place in the past. The Government are seeking to reinforce that confidence, and I wanted to reinforce it further. But at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I, too, support the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in her amendment. I also commend the Treasury Select Committee on having done such a good job in presenting the arguments for appropriate scrutiny of elements in the Bill.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, pointed out, the measures which the Financial Policy Committee is to have in its hands are extremely powerful. Let us consider introducing a leverage ratio in British banking. That notion has not existed within the structure or organisation of British banking. It would change entirely the relationship between the liability side and the asset side of the balance sheet of British banks. It is a major measure which thereby deserves appropriate consideration of the sort set out in the amendment.
Let us consider also the other tool which the FPC is claiming as appropriate for itself: pro-cyclical provisioning. Pro-cyclical provisioning involves enormously complicated decisions, both in the banking sector and in accountancy. Accountants tend to be very hostile to the notion of provisioning since it can be used to hide profits. It is a standard procedure which was common in the Enron case. If we are going to formulate a structure of pro-cyclical provisioning which not only achieves the goals that the FPC and all of us want but satisfies the complex needs of appropriate accounting—we have seen recently how accounting can be misused in the banking sector—these measures require very careful scrutiny. As the noble Baroness said so clearly, a 90-minute debate, which is then a rubber stamp, is entirely inappropriate. The procedure set out in the amendment would not only provide that level of scrutiny but contribute to the public confidence in these procedures which is vital if we are to achieve the goals which we have set out for the FPC.
Lord Peston
My Lords, I remind the Committee by way of background that we are discussing adverse, exogenous shocks to the financial intermediation process. Those shocks are impossible to forecast and extremely hard to recognise even when they hit the system. My understanding of why we require macroprudential measures is that it improves the way in which the system works so as to be able to cope with those shocks. It is partly to protect the system of financial intermediation and partly to improve its effectiveness and efficiency—so we have no difficulty about that.
However, if we need these instruments, it follows that in a democracy—and I still include your Lordships’ House as part of our democracy—Parliament must be able to scrutinise them appropriately. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is well aware, I am not an expert on all the different kinds of orders, and she simply lost me on them, but I ask her whether the measures set out in her amendment give Parliament, including your Lordships' House, a full right to scrutinise the introduction of the macroprudential measures and—here I got a bit lost—to amend them in the sense of saying to the Government, “We think that what you are doing is right, but you can do it in a rather better way.”? If that is what the amendment says, and I see the noble Baroness nodding, the Minister has a duty to the House to say, at the very least, that he will take it away and think it through.
Lord Myners
As I listened to the Minister, it seemed to me that he was implying that there may be times when the FPC has no recommendations outstanding. Surely, however, the FPC will always have recommendations outstanding. It will always have a preferred leverage ratio or a gearing ratio or a deposit to loan or some other of the macroeconomic tools that it has to apply to the banking sector. I am not sure how keeping recommendations under review and reporting on them actually works in a situation in which there will always be recommendations in place. I cannot envisage a situation in which the FPC will say, “We have no views on anything, and therefore there is nothing that we need to be reporting and monitoring”. I may have misunderstood the point; if I have, I apologise, but I would appreciate some guidance from the Minister.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, we broadly welcome these amendments, in the sense that they are adding to the overall scrutiny and assessment of the activities of the FPC and thereby reinforcing, we believe, its general acceptability and strength of purpose. However, I want to raise a warning flag with respect to new Section 9QA(3), in which it is argued that the FPC will have to prepare,
“an estimate of the costs and an estimate of the benefits that would arise from … the direction or recommendation in question”.
These are macroeconomic measures. It is virtually impossible to provide a simple numerical estimate of the cost or benefit of a macro measure. There will be either a tendency to overestimate the costs, or a tendency to overestimate the benefit, in this particular case. Presenting an assessment in quantitative terms will give spurious precision and, indeed, spurious credibility to a particular measure. I assure the Minister that for any macro measure, I could write an entirely credible report saying that the costs exceeded the benefits and an equally credible report saying that the benefits exceeded the costs. This is simply extending the whole notion of cost-benefit analysis beyond the range in which it can effectively operate. It would be valuable to take account of an attempt to describe in broad qualitative terms the costs and benefits. However, please let us not have the spurious precision of numerical calculations of variables which, by their very nature, cannot be expressed in precise terms.
Lord De Mauley
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for those questions. The noble Lord, Lord Myners, says that effectively there will always be a recommendation that is extant. He is probably right about that. The requirement is to review regularly any recommendations that have a continuing effect, and that includes any recommendations to set or maintain any particular level of leverage or capital, as the noble Lord suggests. I broadly agree with him, actually.
The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, is right to say that a cost-benefit analysis is a difficult thing to do. That does not mean that the committee should not attempt it, so that at least interested parties have an opportunity to review it and make their comments.
Lord Eatwell
“9WA Financial Stability Advisory Panel
(1) There will be a Financial Stability Advisory Panel.
(2) The membership of the Panel will be—
(a) the Deputy Governor for Financial Stability;(b) 6 members appointed by the Treasury, subject to approval by the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons;and the members appointed under paragraph (b) will be academics, members of staff of international organisations, practitioners, or others with particular skills in the analysis of systemic risk. (3) The Financial Stability Advisory Panel will—
(a) provide written advice to the Financial Policy Committee concerning the analysis of systemic risk;(b) once a year prepare a report assessing the analysis of systemic risk by the Financial Policy Committee over the preceding 12 months (the first report to be twelve months after this section comes into force);(c) assess the effectiveness of measures prescribed under section 9K in the attainment of the financial stability objective of the Bank;(d) assess the effectiveness of directions and recommendations of the Financial Policy Committee under sections 9G and 9N in the attainment of the financial stability objective of the Bank;(e) prepare an annual report on matters referred to in section 9WA(3) to be presented by the Supervisory Board of the Bank, and subsequently published on the Bank website.”
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, the development of macroprudential regulators, the instruments for introducing macroprudential regulation, is a common theme in the UK, the European Union and the United States. Different models have been developed for the institution that is to be responsible for macroprudential regulation. In our own model, the Financial Policy Committee, we see what could be called a “central bank model”, where the alternative voices being brought to the table are to be represented by the independent members of the FPC. It will fall to them to challenge Bank of England house thinking and provide alternative perspectives. There is only a very small number of external members on the FPC and finding members with the experience and skills necessary to perform the role that we demand of them is, as has already been seen, very difficult, although at the moment we have an excellent group in the shadow FPC. An alternative model, which has been adopted by the United States Financial Stability Oversight Council, pursues a more stakeholder-oriented approach in which the appropriate voices from stakeholders actually have a direct role in the organisation of macroprudential measures within the United States.
Both the central bank model that we have pursued, which also applies to the European systemic risk board, and the stakeholder model have disadvantages. The key disadvantage of our central bank model is that we do not have enough diversity of opinion or access to new research and critical assessments of FPC measures that the stakeholder model might have. The problem with the stakeholder model is that the United States may find that its Financial Stability Oversight Council becomes mired in differences of opinion from different stakeholder interests and has difficulty in pursuing the coherent macroprudential policy that is required of it.
As we know, this whole area is, as I said earlier, an experiment—or, if the Minister prefers, a project. We are dealing with areas and matters that at present are uncertain. There is little agreed analysis or clear empirical assessment of how some of these tools will actually work. We will find out. We are going to experiment. We therefore need to harvest the widest possible spectrum of analysis. The amendment proposes that there should be a financial stability advisory panel, not a panel that is intimately involved in designing and implementing the measures. Those independent voices are provided by the independent members of the FPC but they are necessarily compromised by their role in dealing with very sensitive matters as they might have conflicts of interest if they have a wider role in the financial services industry. The financial stability advisory panel could contain individuals with such conflicts of interest because they would not have a role in actually managing the macroprudential organisation of the FPC.
The amendment suggests that we have this financial stability advisory panel providing that diversity of view from academics, perhaps from members of staff of international organisations such as the Bank for International Settlements, which is making a lot of the running in the development of macroprudential tools, and potentially from others who have particular skills in the analysis of systemic risk. It will be their responsibility to provide written advice to the FPC, prepare an annual assessment of the FPC’s performance, look at the effectiveness of individual measures and assess the effectiveness of particular directions and recommendations in the context of an annual report or assessment. This cannot do anything but good. It is simply an institutionalisation of the detailed examination, the variety of voices and the consideration of effectiveness that are so necessary in providing both coherence to the FPC and its general acceptance. A panel of this sort, given the responsibilities that are set out in the amendment, would add significantly to the effectiveness of the Financial Policy Committee. I beg to move.
Lord Stewartby
My Lords, I was interested to hear the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, on the nature of the work that will face the panel. It sounds like something that overlaps considerably with the Board of Banking Supervision in the late 1980s. Obviously that was working in different circumstances, but each of the bodies require, or required, people of an unusual stripe who combine a practical experience of banking, and the difficult areas that it brings with it, with a particular canniness in identifying areas where they think that things are not as they should be, particularly in cases where that is not always evident until later when events have already taken place.
Are the would-be members of the panel now shadowing the work that will be theirs in statutory form as a result of the Bill? It is terribly important to get the people involved carrying a great deal of weight and clout but at the same time having inquiring minds—something that will help us to ferret out areas that have been unsatisfactorily dealt with. I will not say more now, but I am pleased that some of the reasons for having a panel such as this—20 years ago or more it was called the Board of Banking Supervision, or the BoBS—have been recognised as important in today’s different but difficult circumstances.
Lord De Mauley
I will, if I may, respond on that point. The noble Lord, Lord Myners, is right, and my noble friend Lord Sassoon acknowledged earlier, that previously the Bank was slow to recognise the MPC external members’ need to have access to dedicated support. The Bank has learnt its lesson.
Lord Eatwell
Gosh, that is a bold statement. In replying to the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, I would point out that he has overlooked two crucial elements that underpin the logic of this amendment. First, there are indeed highly skilled and independent members of the Financial Policy Committee, but they are involved in making the decisions and the recommendations. They are the organised part of the organisation which will in due course be responsible for what happens. They are not in any sense an evaluative mechanism. They are adding grist to the mill of a decision-making mechanism; an evaluative mechanism is a different thing altogether.
Secondly, the noble Lord referred to the role of the new oversight committee. I would remind Members of the Committee that the oversight committee will be composed of members of the court; it will not be anybody outwith the internal structure of the Bank. I am enormously disappointed—the most disappointed I have been with anything I have done in relation to this organisation—that the Government have not taken this on board. We are trying to formalise a continuous process of debate, review and assessment by people who have high levels of skill in this area but who are not otherwise involved. That is what a truly effective advisory panel should do. I was struck by my noble friend Lord Liddle’s comments on what is happening at the European Systemic Risk Board. As the noble Lord, Lord Stewartby, said, we want people with the right sort of skills doing this sort of assessment. He is absolutely right.
I ask the Government to think again on this issue. This area can contribute significantly to the overall success of the FPC. I assure the Government that I will return to this matter at later stages, but for now I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I have an amendment in this group of a slightly different variety but I have enormous sympathy with what the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has said about the strategic objective. When I first read the Bill, my note in the margin said “vacuous”. This notion that “relevant markets … function well” really is gamma minus stuff. It is pathetic and does not mean anything at all. One immediately asks for a definition of “function well”. We find that the objectives for competition, integrity and consumer protection are all defined, but there is no definition of what “function well” might mean.
Moreover, not only is this expression vacuous but it has no separate life. Whenever the FCA’s objectives are referred to in the Bill, it is the other objectives—the consumer objective, the integrity objective, the competition objective and the operational objectives—that are referred to. This strategic objective only has coherent life in other references in the Bill in so far as it lives through these more concrete proposals. If it is to be left as it is, it adds nothing other than spurious solidity and real complexity to the structure of objectives for the FCA. I have tried to give it some life. In our Amendment 101D in this group, my noble friend Lady Hayter and I have added the phrase,
“in the best interests of society as a whole”,
to the term “functions well”. That phrase captures the concept of the social optimum as defined in classical welfare economics. One does not want the technicalities of welfare economics within the definition of the Bill, but serving the best interests of society as a whole is the sort of expression that is used by Professor Amartya Sen in his discussions of evaluations of philosophical propositions relative to the social good. By adding,
“in the best interests of society as a whole”,
I would hope to provide this previously vacuous statement with some structure that could be referred to as a mission statement. Although I take on board the objections of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, to mission statements, I must say that I tend to agree with them. A mission statement could provide some framework within which the other operational objectives could be seen. For example, on the competition objective, one would look at the objective of stimulating competition in terms of the best interests of society as a whole. There may be circumstances in which the stimulation of competition is not in the best interests of society as a whole perhaps because it causes some distortion to the operation of the market, but, more generally, we would expect the encouragement of competition to act in the best interests of society as a whole.
We have a simple binary choice. Either we must give this vacuous statement some substance or we should remove it from the Bill, as proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. What we should not do is leave this statement, which can do no good other than cause a bit of innocent amusement about how silly some clauses in the Bill might be.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I was not quick in getting to my feet because I am not sure whether Amendment 101D was moved, taken separately, or where we are.
Lord Eatwell
Will the noble Lord indulge me? What does function well mean? “Function well” for whom? Does it mean functioning well for a consumer? Does it mean functioning well for a trader? Does it mean functioning well in terms of working smoothly without any hiccups but not allocating resources terribly well? Does it mean allocating resources efficiently? All those things come under the term “function well” but contradict one another. What does it mean, and for whom?
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, in giving those four examples the noble Lord knows very well that the first and fourth of his examples very much fit the bill, and the second and third very much do not. This is all about markets that work essentially to assist the end user of those markets. It has nothing within it to do with working well for a trader or something superficial that all looks smooth on the surface but does not provide the end result of liquidity, price discovery or choice for consumers. The noble Lord knows very well that it would be impossible within the compass of such a piece of legislation to try to define the well working of a market, but the Bill spells out the main ways in which the FCA will seek to promote the well functioning of markets—those operational objectives that I touched on.
Those operational objectives give clues and pointers to the FCA. It will be for the FCA’s board to consider if and when it needs to consider these questions of well functioning markets. I believe that it will be well equipped with its expertise to consider market by market what well functioning means. I see absolutely no problem with this. However, there needs to be something that brings together the FCA’s very diverse and individual functions, roles and responsibilities.
That relates to one of the questions asked by my noble friend Lady Noakes, who asked why the FPC and the PRA do not have strategic objectives. It is precisely because they have much more narrowly focused objectives that they do not need the overall strategic objectives that the FCA needs because of the breadth of its responsibilities. I agree with my noble friend and others that we have not provided this strategic objective for the FCA on some whim. We have not put it in for the FPC and the PRA because it is not necessary. It is precisely because of the diversity and the potentially conflicting nature of the objectives of the other bodies that we believe it is right to have it in the case of the FCA.
By the same logic, the strategic objective will act as a check and balance. If, say, the FCA seeks to advance its consumer protection objective by placing detailed requirements on firms, we want it always to ask itself whether what it is doing contributes to the ultimate end goal of ensuring that markets function well. What functioning well means will be determined with some commonality across all markets, but some of it will be market-specific, particularly depending on whether it is a consumer or a wholesale market. This is no afterthought. It reflects the Government’s desire to enshrine regulation which seeks to ensure that markets can do their job.
My noble friend also asked a question about how the FCA could act in a way that was not compatible with its objectives. There are examples which we need to take into account, one of which might be a short-selling ban which is, arguably, in the interests of end-consumers but is a measure which is not normally thought to be compatible with a well functioning market.
Lord Eatwell
Before the Minister sits down, did I hear him correctly when he said that the choice of the benefit to society as a whole was not a matter for the regulator but a matter for the governor? Or did he say Government? I did not quite hear him properly.
Lord Sassoon
I said the Government. I hope he would agree that it was for the Government, not the governor. Good.