Lord Sassoon
Main Page: Lord Sassoon (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Sassoon's debates with the HM Treasury
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in most cases the legislation places duties, powers and obligations on the Bank as an institution. The Court of Directors is responsible for managing the Bank’s affairs. In practice, the Court of Directors, in a similar way to other governing bodies, delegates the vast majority of the Bank’s day-to-day decisions to the executive, with the court itself taking only the most important strategic decisions. There are, however, some instances in the legislation where the duties, powers and obligations are placed directly on the court. For example, the court is responsible for determining the Bank’s strategy, including its financial stability strategy, and it also has the power to delegate additional functions to the FPC.
On Report, the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and I discussed whether the court would take the decision whether or not to withhold from publication a report of the oversight committee. I stated clearly that I would expect a decision of this importance to be taken by the court rather than to be delegated to the executive. However, in the light of that debate, I asked my officials to look right through the Bill again to see whether there were other key decisions for which responsibility should lie unequivocally with the court. This group of amendments is the result.
Amendments 4, 5, 6 and 7 confirm that the court will decide whether oversight committee reviews should be withheld from publication in order to protect the public interest.
Amendments 1, 12 and 26 to 31 make the same change to confer a number of other responsibilities directly on the court. These are the power to delegate additional functions to the oversight committee, responsibility for being consulted on the PRA’s strategy, and the power to appoint non-executive members to the PRA board.
Amendment 25 puts beyond all doubt that the court may not delegate any functions that are explicitly given to it in legislation. I should make it clear that this does not mean that all functions that the legislation confers on the Bank will automatically be undertaken by the executive. The court will of course retain discretion either to delegate these roles to the executive or to reserve those decisions for itself. However, I believe that these amendments provide important clarity by identifying those roles within the legislation that will be the responsibility of the court in all cases. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord for having clarified some obscurities in the Bill that arose from the use of the generic term “the Bank” to refer sometimes to the court and sometimes to the executive. However, the noble Lord has just said something which has disturbed me. He said that, for clarification, when the term “Bank” is used, this does not necessarily mean the executive; it may mean the court. It seemed to me that he was acknowledging that an uncertainty remained. Perhaps I misheard. I should be very happy if I did, because the sort of clarification that he has set out is very welcome.
My Lords, there is one area in this territory on which I would appreciate some clarity. The principle of returning the oversight of banks to the central Bank, which I think has been widely supported, has, to my mind, always been about the concept that the central Bank ought to be in regular contact with banks, that it ought to know what is going on and that it ought to be able to head off practices that are clearly potentially damaging to the banking system. However, I am not clear how the staff of the Bank and the staff of the PRA will interact. One would have thought that quite often it would be the staff of the Bank who were having regular dialogue with banks and learning what was going on and what might be going wrong, but it is the PRA—to some extent a sort of cuckoo plopped into the middle of the Bank of England—that essentially has the legal tasks. Therefore, we have clarification of the definitions of “Bank” and “court” but below what I call the executive level I am still not entirely clear where the staff of the Bank or the staff of the PRA will be carrying out supervisory activities.
My Lords, in response to the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, as I said at the beginning of my remarks, the Court of Directors is the governing body of the Bank, so ultimately it is for the court to decide who takes what decisions and which decisions should be for the Bank. In the legislation, “the Bank” certainly does not mean the Bank executive; it means the Bank of England. Therefore, it is always for the Court of Directors, just as it is for the governing body of any corporate institution, to decide who takes what decisions and, if the governing body does not delegate them, it takes them itself. We are making clear through these amendments that there is a certain small category of decisions—one of which was identified by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell—that is of such importance that it is appropriate to put down for the avoidance of doubt in the legislation that it is the court not the executive that takes those decisions. That is what those amendments do.
Just for clarity, the noble Lord said that it is the responsibility of the directors—that is, the court—to decide who takes the various decisions. I presume what he has said does not apply to the Monetary Policy Committee?
Indeed. I should say that it is subject to what is laid down in statute about the Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee and so on. If they are decisions of the Monetary Policy Committee, then they are the decisions of the Monetary Policy Committee. If they are the decisions of the Bank, the court will decide how they are taken. As for the question from my noble friend Lord Flight, of course it will be the PRA staff who will supervise and lead on the direct relationships with the banks or insurance companies, for example, that are being supervised. Technically, the PRA staff will be seconded from the Bank. There will be a close working relationship, which is part of the benefit of bringing it all together under the one umbrella.
I hope I did not misunderstand, but the Minister seemed to say that all decisions of the Bank are made by the court. Does that mean that when the Governor of the Bank of England makes a policy decision, it is not his decision, but a decision of the court?
No, my Lords, that is not what I said. I said that the court is the governing body of the Bank. So unless specified in some other way, it is ultimately the decision of the court as to whether it takes a decision or delegates it. When it comes to policy decisions of the sort that the noble Lord is describing, they are of course delegated ones. All we are trying to do in this amendment is make it clear what decisions should be taken by the court and only by the court.
My Lords, I support some of the sentiments, but not the amendment, of the noble Lords, Lord Barnett and Lord Peston. Like them, I believe it would be a good thing if Mr Carney were to appear before the Lords Economic Affairs Committee as well as the Commons Treasury Committee. Mr Carney is entirely used to dealing with bicameral legislatures with separate committees. On 30 October this year, he appeared before the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance to discuss the October monetary policy report. The following day, he appeared before the Canadian Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade, and Commerce to discuss the same report.
However, since this is a suggestion from the noble Lords, Lord Barnett and Lord Peston, I know they would prefer me to use the word “must” rather than “may”, but it may be better to suggest to the Minister not that Mr Carney must appear before our Economic Affairs Committee but that he may want to appear. The Minister may want to suggest this to him.
My Lords, I will make sure that the suggestion to Mr Carney is passed on, but of course it is breaking radical new ground that a prospective governor should appear before the Treasury Select Committee, and I do not know whether we want to be too radical at this juncture, but the point is taken.
Turning to the matter in hand, first, I have to admire the persistence, consistency and eternal optimism of the noble Lords, Lord Barnett and Lord Peston, on this matter. I am sorry to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Peston, but on this occasion the Treasury’s word processor did not slip a few words. There is a very important issue here, which is why the two noble Lords raise this matter on a regular basis. We debated very similar amendments to this one in Committee and on Report, although I recall that on Report the amendment was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, on behalf of the noble Lords, with, let us say, a degree of enthusiasm.
The House will be unsurprised to learn that my position on this point is unchanged on the back of what I have heard this afternoon. The FPC’s primary objective must be financial stability. Financial stability is the FPC’s reason for being, its primary purpose. The aim of the committee will be to secure a safe and stable financial system, which will help create the conditions necessary for stable and sustainable economic growth. I should not rise to every bit of bait but I have to say that my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer has done an outstanding job in extremely difficult economic circumstances, as we will discuss later this afternoon. While he is always grateful for any additional advice, we should have the FPC stick to its main task as its primary objective.
The legislation makes clear that, subject to achieving its primary objective for financial stability, the FPC should act to support the Government’s economic objectives. This structure strikes the right balance, by giving the FPC a clear and positive mandate to support economic growth, but without prejudicing its primary responsibility to protect and enhance financial stability. It is clear already, from the way that the shadow FPC is operating, that it has this mandate well on board.
The primary flaw with the structure proposed in Amendment 10—namely, to give the FPC dual, equally weighted objectives—is that this would allow the FPC to take action that would damage financial stability with the aim of encouraging growth. This would take the FPC outside its remit and expertise, and directly frustrate its primary purpose, which is financial stability. I simply do not believe that the model proposed by the noble Lords is appropriate or workable and I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 11 responds directly to a request made by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, on Report. On hearing my noble friend Lord Sassoon’s explanation of the underlying purpose of the FPC’s reviews of its live actions—namely, to consider whether they are still necessary and whether they should be removed or revoked—the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, responded,
“if that is what the new section meant, why did it not say so?”.—[Official Report, 6/11/12; col. 978.]
I believe that the purpose of the reviews could have been derived implicitly from the clause as it was originally drafted. However, I accept that this could be made more explicit in the clause, and Amendment 11 seeks to do exactly that. This is a straightforward amendment, which responds directly to concerns raised in this House about the clarity of the drafting. I hope that noble Lords can support it. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Government for having taken on board the fact that there was some infelicity in the drafting at this point. I am delighted to support the amendment.
My Lords, on Report I committed to bring forward a government amendment to give the FCA an effective power to make rules capping the cost and the duration of a regulated credit agreement. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, for raising this on Report and to noble Lords on all sides of the House who spoke in support of the need for action against sharp practices in the payday lending industry. The Government warmly welcome the cross-party consensus that emerged on this important issue.
As I said on Report last week, the Government were fully in agreement with the intent behind the noble Lord’s amendment but felt that there were weaknesses in the way it was framed. We have made use of the time between Report and tabling this amendment at Third Reading to get this power right and ensure that it is watertight. Moreover, I also committed to going further than the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, proposed, by making additional consumer protections integral to the power.
The Government’s amendment spells out in detail the kind of rules that the FCA may make to prevent lenders from imposing excessive interest rates or associated charges on borrowers, and clarifies that the FCA would be able to specify the level of the cap in rules and also to define which charges, in addition to interest, should be captured. The amendment also allows the FCA to impose limits on the duration of the agreement, and to specify the detail of the cap and other restrictions in its rules.
Those who have compared the Government’s amendment tabled yesterday with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, will have noted that the Government’s version is significantly longer and more comprehensive in its detail. I said last week that we would take care to frame the power to prevent unscrupulous firms exploiting loopholes and to ensure that consumers were properly protected. The Government specifically ensured that this power covers associated charges to avoid unscrupulous firms “gaming” the restrictions by, for example, reducing the interest rate but introducing exorbitant fees for related services such as setting up the loan. It also specifically captures the practice of rollovers, which we have seen abused by some players in the payday loans industry. Under the amendment the FCA will have a specific power to impose a limit on the overall duration of the rolled-over agreement and a limit on the number of rollovers that are permitted.
The government amendment has also built in robust protections for consumers who fall victim to lenders’ excessive charges. First, the FCA can provide that the lender cannot enforce the agreement and the borrower is not obliged to repay the loan. Secondly, it can provide that any money or property transferred under the agreement—an item that has been pawned, say—must be returned. Thirdly, it can provide that compensation must be paid to the consumer.
Before moving on I will address briefly one provision in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, that we omitted in tabling the Government’s version: namely, a specific reference to consumer detriment or consumer protection. That is because the FCA will already be prompted to respond when it detects consumer detriment. Under Section 137A of FiSMA the FCA may make general rules only for the purposes of advancing one or more of its operational objectives. These are: securing protection for consumers, protecting and enhancing the integrity of the financial system, and promoting effective competition. As such the consumer protection objective will provide the strong underpinning mandate for the FCA to make rules under the new power that we are discussing. It is not therefore necessary to spell it out further in the Bill.
While I am confident that our amendment clarifies the FCA’s role in this important area, we must be careful not to regard this power as a silver bullet that will fix all the problems in the payday lending sector. As the OFT’s recent report into the high-cost credit market showed, it is clear that regulation of the payday lending market as a whole needs to improve. Compared to the current regulatory regime under the OFT, the FCA will have a broader and more effective toolkit to monitor and tackle developments in the market and supervise practice among firms.
Capping the cost of credit and the number of times that the loan can be rolled over is a major market intervention, and I expect the FCA to contemplate the use of this power in a responsible and measured way. I discussed the mixed picture from international evidence on Report. We must avoid at all costs any such cap resulting in catastrophically unintended consequences, such as driving vulnerable consumers to illegal loan sharks. However, as I said on Report, we need to ensure that the FCA grasps the nettle when it comes to payday lending. This amendment grants the FCA the powers to deliver effectively on its consumer-protection objective and tackle consumer detriment. It is a power that I hope all sides of the House will wish to support. I beg to move.
My Lords, never in my wildest dreams did I ever expect that I would be standing here at the opposition Dispatch Box with my name on an amendment alongside a government Treasury Minister. It is some achievement and could occur only in your Lordships' House and not in the other place. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Sassoon and Lord Newby, for the very constructive way in which they responded to the amendment we put forward. They listened to what we had to say, took our comments away and came back with an amendment that is entirely acceptable to us. However, I would not like them to think that this is a complete love fest—normal service will resume at some other time.
It is worth recounting that the Government told us in Committee that the points which we wanted were already in the Bill. We tried hard to find the location of those points—and no doubt they are buried somewhere. However, with an issue like this one, which is so important, it is dangerous to have implied rules which have to be inferred. Many of these payday loan companies have very successful lawyers and access to some of the best brains in the country in this area. The provision would have been a complete dog's breakfast, to be honest.
We tried again at Report, and I admit that I came in here today ready for battle. However, I was astonished and delighted at the complete turnaround that the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, has offered. He promised us a better amendment and that is what we have been given. The new amendment is stronger, tighter and more effective, and most of all, it offers complete clarity. I would not be human if I did not savour the moment just a jot. It probably will not happen again, but it is good that it has happened today.
I have been asked why the Government conceded and no doubt at some stage, over a gin and tonic, I will find out. However, I feel that it was due to two reasons —the political argument, and the moral argument. As for the political basis, the Government knew that they would be defeated last Wednesday on Report. It had been a bad couple of weeks for the Government and another defeat was something that they could do without. The moral argument, however, was more important. I was fortunate because the noble Baronesses, Lady Howe of Idlicote and Lady Grey-Thompson, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham added a non-political independent gravitas to what we were trying to do. I thank them from the bottom of my heart. I also thank all noble Lords who contributed to the debate.
The media also took up this cause with a vengeance. Every article and television programme that I read or saw seemed to back our position. They were against the payday lending companies. Indeed, I am sure that the man in the street in this country was also in favour of regulation. Everybody seemed to be in favour of it except for the payday loan companies themselves—and I was nobbled in the most unlikely of locations by them or their representatives telling me how wrong we were. However, the Government conceded because the political and moral arguments were absolutely against them. They did concede and I am grateful to them for the positive way in which they have dealt with this issue.
I had two questions to ask about consumer detriment and time and duration but the Minister has addressed them in his speech. He said that there was no silver bullet for this and I absolutely agree. As we go forward perhaps we should look at what is happening in other countries. I spoke at Report about the experience in Florida, which has had an amazing result. I repeat that anyone who takes out a payday loan in that state has to register it as a charge. They have to pay for it and it goes on to a database. It is known that they have a payday loan. That absolutely prevents any individual having more than one payday loan on any one occasion. That is something that we should look at for the future.
This provision will go forward and become a new law but I believe that it will also become a statement of intent. This amendment is simple, symbolic and now stands alone. This industry is going to be controlled. For many people out there, the world is now a slightly better place.
My Lords, I had not intended to say anything today, because I was pleased with the amendment. The more I listened to the explanation, however, the more enthusiastic I became about it. So I wanted to add my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, for all that he has done here, as well as to the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, and everybody else who has been involved in the redrafting. I am sure it will not solve all the problems. I would also like to ask when it will come into force; I imagine that it will not be all that far ahead. Nevertheless, as has been said, it is an extremely important and valuable step in the right direction.
My Lords, I am grateful for all those contributions. I will briefly respond to some of the specific questions. First, the noble Lord, Lord Peston, asked whether this means that the FCA has to go into this field. Absolutely it does; it would have to anyway. Putting all this in the Bill will concentrate the FCA’s mind wonderfully. However, as the noble Lord knows, it is an enabling power; the FCA may make these rules, but this does not say that it must make them.
On the noble Lord’s other questions about whether consumers know what they are letting themselves in for, this is one of the other areas that clearly needs attention, as I indicated in my opening remarks. Whether this is addressed under the consumer credit directive or the consumer protection regulations, it is another parallel area. I stress again that we are getting to the heart of the issue in this amendment, but this is not the sum total of it.
There were also questions about when the rules might come in. The rules will come in when the FCA gets round to making them. There is nothing to stop the OFT moving ahead. The next thing we are expecting is the academic report, which refers in some detail to the international evidence about the pros and cons of caps. That will be part of the evidence base that will be used, building up to any rules that may or may not be put in place. However, I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, that there is no question of secondary legislation here. We are giving the FCA a clear rule-making power; its rule-making procedures will then go for consultation, but this does not need to come back through the channel of secondary legislation.
Lastly, I turn to the questions from the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith. In parenthesis, I would argue that there have certainly been financial innovations that have been beneficial, but perhaps we will leave that debate for another day. The noble Lord asked whether all costs and charges would be covered. Yes, they will—all of them. He asked when this comes into force. This specific power comes into force in April 2014, when credit becomes a regulated activity under the FCA. Of course, that will not stop the Government and the OFT looking at what may need to be done before then, but we are talking about a Bill that relates in this instance to the powers of the FCA when they are transferred over. As far as what the cap should be, that will be a matter for the FCA. It is a very difficult question that will need careful thought. As I have already indicated, the Bristol study, which is coming out very soon, will be an important contribution to that thinking. We are putting an important building block in place today, but it is not the only building block in this area.
My Lords, I do not want to push my luck too much with the Minister, but he says that the rules will come in as and when the FCA decides, and that is 2014. We have a bit of time before then. Given that there is urgency regarding the adoption of this clause and all-party agreement about it, it would be good if he could elaborate on those comments so that he sends a message from here today to the industry and the regulators that this is a matter of urgency and that Parliament wishes to see early action on this matter. We do not want to wait until mid-2014. Just to add icing to the cake, will he please elaborate?
My Lords, I am sure that the industry has got the message loud and clear from this House that more needs to be done. Of course, it need not wait until April 2014; there are plenty of other things that can be done in the mean time if appropriate.
My Lords, Amendments 33 and 34 concern the new power provided for by this Bill for the regulators to disclose the fact that a disciplinary warning notice has been issued. We have of course already discussed this new power and the safeguards to which it should be subject in quite some detail. I am speaking to these two amendments again only because, as a result of being erroneously assigned on the day’s Order Paper, they were not moved on Report on 26 November. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, for being the first to spot this. So to be absolutely clear, these are simply Amendments 97ZA and 97ZB—as they were—retabled from the Report stage.
To remind your Lordships briefly, Amendment 33 brings the decision to disclose the fact that a disciplinary warning notice has been issued into the list of matters subject to the procedures set out in Section 395 of FiSMA. Amendment 34 sets out the criteria with which the process for deciding to disclose a warning notice must comply, noting that the decision must be taken either by a person other than the person by whom the decision was first proposed, or by two or more persons not including the person by whom the decision was first proposed.
The amendments secure the involvement of the Regulatory Decisions Committee, or an equivalent body for decisions, to disclose the fact that warning notices have been issued. It is a proposal that the House supported and endorsed when we debated it last week.
This group of amendments may be the penultimate time that I will speak on the Bill during its passage through this House. With this in mind, perhaps noble Lords will permit me to conclude this debate by reflecting a little on the past months since our lively Second Reading debate on 11 June. It was so long ago that the England football team was still in the European Championship and preparing to play France as we were kicking off our consideration of the Bill. Of one thing we can be certain: the performance of this House on this Bill was rather better, I regret to say, than the performance of the England football team.
I believe that the Bill that we are sending back to another place is greatly improved from the Bill that we debated at Second Reading in June. That is due to the very constructive contributions and engagement from noble Lords right across the House, not least from the Bishops’ Benches, and I pay tribute to all who have contributed to those debates. No other legislative house in the world could have brought to bear such expertise in financial services and their regulation as this House has on this Financial Services Bill.
As I need to keep my closing remarks brief, I can only apologise for not naming individually the many noble Lords who have made important contributions to our debates. However, I would like to thank the opposition Front Bench—too many of them to name—led so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town. They have shown real tenacity and skill in their contributions. We have not always agreed with the points that they have made, but I have always valued those points and would like to thank them for their constructive and thoughtful approach throughout.
I thank, too, my noble friends Lord Newby and Lord De Mauley for the support they have given me, not least in calming down the House when it seems to have got rather excited by some of my contributions. This has been a long Bill, and it would not have been possible to provide the level of response that the House has rightly demanded without the able assistance of my noble friends.
I should also mention and thank the Bill team, which has worked continuously to provide support to the House throughout the stages of this Bill. It has done an outstanding job, which has been widely and rightly acknowledged. The excellent work of the parliamentary counsel in drafting the Bill and the subsequent many amendments to it deserves special praise.
I believe that we have significantly improved this important Bill in key areas. We have enhanced the governance of the Bank of England; given economic growth a higher priority in the new regime, for the FPC, FCA and PRA; significantly improved the robustness of the UK financial system by bringing investment firms, recognised clearing houses and holding companies within the special resolution regime; responded to industry concerns, in particular over the new warning notice power; offered consumers better protection, particularly in relation to payday loans; and, in the LIBOR clauses, moved swiftly to tackle the shameful behaviour of some in the industry.
The Government have listened carefully to the views of noble Lords and the amended Bill reflects many of the concerns of this House. The Bill will be an important addition to the statute book, and one that has been greatly improved thanks to your Lordships’ expertise. I beg to move.
My Lords, I rise not with respect to the amendment but to reflect on the latter comments of the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon. As he said, the Bill began its somewhat laborious journey with its First Reading back in May. The process has been extraordinarily laborious considering that it was a politically non-contentious Bill. We should perhaps learn some lessons from this. The main lesson is that, if there is pre-legislative scrutiny, a valuable process that we introduced, more notice should be taken of the conclusions of that scrutiny than is evident in the Bill before us. I refer particularly to the advice from the Treasury Select Committee that a new Bill be drafted rather than that we rely on the complex structure of amendments to prior legislation that we have had to wade through over the past several months.
Given the weighty nature of the work that we have had to deal with, it is appropriate to thank those who have been involved with the Bill. I add my thanks to those of the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, to my noble friends Lady Hayter, Lord Davies, Lord Stevenson and Lord Tunnicliffe. I also thank Mr Whiting and the Bill team, who have been helpful and courteous throughout, and the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, for dealing with often complex matters and, occasionally, defending the indefensible with his usual good humour. Finally, in thanking individuals, I must thank Miss Jessica Levy, our talented and all-knowing researcher.
Effective regulation at the macro and micro level of systemic risks and the risks associated with individual firms is in the interests of households and industry and is essential for the success of the UK financial services industry. Therefore, we on this side wish this Bill well. I hope that the measures over which we have laboured will prove a success.