Lord Sassoon
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Financial Services Bill
Lord Sassoon Excerpts(12 years ago)
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Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Whitty. He has clearly hit on something that is very real in the development of consumer financial services today and is very beneficial to the expansion of competition in the provision of financial services. It seems peculiar that, in the drafting of this clause, the Government both include the condition, in subsection (4), and then say, a few lines later, “We may leave this condition out”. Surely there is already enough evidence of the importance of non-financial parent institutions developing financial services. Why, then, as my noble friend has so clearly described, do we not recognise it now?
The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)
My Lords, new Part 12A of FiSMA, as inserted by Clause 26, extends and strengthens the regulatory framework by giving the regulators powers to act in relation to a parent entity, which is itself not regulated, but controls and exerts influence over a regulated entity. As we have heard, Amendments 90 and 91 seek to make significant changes to the scope of the powers over parent undertakings. We have not heard new arguments this afternoon, and regret that I probably will not advance any significantly new ones either—as is often the case. However, let me go through the argument as clearly as I can.
The Government are extending and strengthening the regulatory framework, so it is important that these new powers, which are untried and untested in the UK, have safeguards in place to ensure that they are used in a targeted and proportionate manner. I stress the new powers; they are not powers that previous Governments have sought to put in place, so we will put an important additional series of safeguards in place. However, their untried and untested nature is principally why the Government have proposed limiting the power to financial institutions of a kind prescribed by the Treasury in order to keep it within reasonable bounds.
As has already been identified today and on other occasions, if your main business is owning or managing authorised persons, you are caught, but if your main business is making or selling bread, then you are not. That is what the Government intend at this stage. We do not wish, at this stage, to give the financial services regulators powers of direction in relation to parent undertakings whose main business is not related to financial services. However, the Government are very much alive to the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, which is why we propose to take a power to remove the limitation to financial institutions. We accept that it may be appropriate to widen the scope of Part 12A powers to catch a wider range of parent undertakings but the Government remain unconvinced that now is the appropriate time for these new powers to apply to parent undertakings which are not themselves financial institutions. It is a developing area of financial services industry practice. We need to watch it closely and the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, is right to remind us of that. The provision future-proofs the powers and ensures that the Treasury has the flexibility to respond if circumstances change and firm structures evolve, such that parent undertakings are no longer captured within the scope of the power.
I know that in both Houses there has been interest in strengthening the application of the powers over unregulated parent undertakings. Government Amendments 91A to 91E seek therefore to improve the usability of the powers. Amendments 91A, 91B and 91C lower the trigger for use of the power against parent undertakings and make the power more usable. Amendments 91A and 91B clarify that the regulators can give a direction if it is considered desirable in order to advance the FCA’s operational objectives or any of the PRA’s objectives, or if the giving of the direction is desirable for the purpose of the effective consolidated supervision of the group. Amendment 91C is a related consequential amendment.
As a result of these amendments, the FCA and PRA, would no longer have to demonstrate that,
“the acts or omissions of the … parent … are having or may have a material adverse effect on the regulation … of one or more … authorised persons … or the effectiveness of consolidated supervision”.
After reviewing the powers in light of statements made in this House about the imperative need for the regulators to have effective powers over the parent undertakings of authorised persons and consulting with the authorities, the Government consider the previous threshold was set too high, which would have made the power difficult to use in practice. The high threshold may also have hindered and sometimes prevented the regulators properly supervising complex financial groups.
These amendments will mean that the powers can be used effectively by the regulators to address difficulties within the group as a whole. That will better fulfil the Government’s objective of ensuring that the regulators have the tools they need to conduct suitably robust supervision of unregulated holding companies.
Amendment 91E would make similar changes to the power of direction that the Bank of England has in relation to the parent undertaking of a recognised clearing house. Amendment 91D would remove the requirement that a direction must specify the period during which each requirement remains in force. This ensures that, in appropriate cases, the regulator can give a direction of an indefinite duration. It better aligns the new Part 12A powers with the provisions in new Sections 55L and 55M to be inserted into FiSMA, which provide for the imposition of requirements on authorised persons by the FCA and PRA of an indefinite duration.
While we think that directions in relation to unregulated parent undertakings should generally be of limited duration, we can conceive of cases—for example, in connection with structural reform of the kind envisaged by the Banking Reform Bill—where it would be appropriate for a direction to have an indefinite duration. Amendment 91D therefore provides the regulator with the flexibility to give a direction of an indefinite duration.
Viscount Trenchard
Will my noble friend explain more about government Amendment 91A? I do not understand why the reference to the FCA is different from that to the PRA. As regards the FCA, the amendment refers to,
“one or more of its operational objectives”.
I am not quite sure which of its objectives is non-operational. As regards the PRA, the amendment refers to, “any of its objectives”. I think that “any” means one only. Why is the drafting different between the two?
Lord Sassoon
I do not think that there is any material significance, other than that it tracks the wording of the different form of objectives which relate to the two bodies. It now escapes me because it is a few hours since we discussed the form of the objectives but I do not believe that there is any substantive point that relates to what we are doing here to change the power over holding companies. If it is all right with my noble friend, I will write to him to confirm why this links into the slight different wording used.
Lord Sassoon
“(2) The general condition is that the appropriate regulator considers that it is desirable to give the direction in order to advance—
(a) in the case of the FCA, one or more of its operational objectives;(b) in the case of the PRA, any of its objectives.”
Lord Sassoon
“(a) the general condition in subsection (2) were that the Bank considers that it is desirable to give the direction for the purpose of the effective regulation of one or more recognised clearing houses in the group of the qualifying parent undertaking,”
Lord Flight
My Lords, Amendment 93A to some extent overlaps with Amendments 92B and 92C, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Cohen. However, its thrust is slightly different. It has the support of ICE Clear Europe, which I believe has raised its concerns directly with the Minister. The starting point is that, given the systemic importance of clearing houses, it is self-evidently appropriate for the Bank to have powers to direct them in certain circumstances.
The powers granted to the Bank of England by Section 296A of FiSMA are extremely wide and broad—arguably too wide and broad—and could be counterproductive to achieving financial stability. My case is that Section 296A should be subject to specific, transparent and predictable trigger conditions. My amendment seeks to address the issue by setting out the trigger conditions and scope for action and intervention by the Bank of England under Section 296A. Other amendments have been tabled that address the issue in a different way. Amendments 92B and 92C in particular are there to achieve clarity and certainty, with less concern about the absolute extent of the Bank of England’s powers.
The key principle of the trigger conditions and scope that my amendment proposes is that Section 296A should be used only in the event that without such direction the clearing house would fail or would be likely to fail. Secondly, a particular concern is that the Bank of England could use the broad powers granted by Section 296A to direct a viable clearing house to take on business that could be severely damaging to its interests. Section 296A should not be used in this way. Directions should relate only to the existing business of a clearing house. Finally, Section 296A should be used only in consultation with relevant bodies, including the clearing house itself. The noble Baroness, Lady Cohen, made the same point.
If the principles set out in Amendment 93A were adopted, they would allow the Government’s objective to be achieved. They would tailor the regime to circumstances in which the Bank of England would need to intervene in the market to maintain financial stability, and they would reflect the appropriate interests of the clearing houses.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, the Government note the concerns expressed about the additional powers of direction to be conferred on the Bank of England. Some of these concerns are reflected in Amendments 92B and 92C, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Cohen of Pimlico. These amendments seek to impose more stringent conditions on the Bank of England’s ability to exercise the Section 296A power. I will say at the outset that in response, the Government are minded to bring forward amendments at Third Reading to address some of the concerns raised by the industry.
Before bringing forward amendments at Third Reading, I will reflect further on the debate we have had today. However, I am happy to confirm that the Government are considering amendments to raise the threshold of the trigger for the power of direction to a “necessary” rather than a “desirable” test; to more clearly set out how the power is to be used, including specifying procedures with which the Bank should comply prior to issuing a direction, whether on a routine or an expedited basis; and, finally, to set out in statute the assurance that I have already given the House that the additional power of direction cannot be used to compel a clearing house to accept the business of a competitor.
I will now address the amendments in this group. Amendment 92A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Sharkey, seeks to introduce a requirement for clearing houses to draw up and maintain recovery plans. The appropriate place for a requirement for clearing houses to prepare recovery plans would be in Part III of the recognition requirement regulations made under Section 286 of FiSMA, not in primary legislation.
The Government have already outlined their intention to build on the positive developments around loss allocation arrangements that are being introduced by some clearing houses of their own volition, and will also consult on proposals to make changes to the recognition requirement regulations, which are the operating conditions under which clearing houses are licensed to operate in the UK. The changes would have the effect of requiring all UK clearing houses to have in place loss allocation rules. As part of the consultation exercise, the Government will also seek views on proposals to change the recognition requirement regulations to make mandatory the preparation and maintenance of recovery plans by clearing houses. We are on the case and certainly are not waiting for EU legislation. However, we believe that the recognition requirement regulations are the appropriate place for these conditions, and we will take action to that end.
Amendment 93A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Flight, would impose further preconditions on the exercise of the power, would limit the scope of any direction given under the power and would apply various provisions of the special resolution regime provided for in Part 1 of the Banking Act 2009 to any direction given. It would not be appropriate for the Bank of England to wait until the financial position of a clearing house had deteriorated to the extent that it posed a serious threat to financial stability or failed to meet its recognition requirements before exercising the additional power of direction. The additional power of direction is a supervisory power, not a resolution power. It will allow the Bank of England to manage the considerable risks that may be posed by the actions of a clearing house which do not constitute a breach of its recognition requirements or its obligations under FiSMA 2000. If Amendment 93A were agreed, the Bank of England might be unable to give a direction that would safeguard the solvency of a clearing house, forcing the use of resolution powers as a last resort in order to minimise the impact of the failure of the clearing house on wider financial stability.
It would also be inappropriate to limit the scope of any direction that the Bank of England might give in the way suggested by Amendment 93A. The additional power of direction is intentionally wide-ranging. The Government feel that this is essential in order to build in sufficient flexibility to enable the Bank to manage and respond to new and unusual risks that may require regulatory action that goes beyond the purposes specified in Amendment 93A. The Government also believe that requiring a court order to be obtained before any direction could be given by the Bank could undermine successful regulatory intervention in instances where there was a need to act with alacrity in the event of a crisis. The court may not necessarily be well placed to make judgments on whether action is necessary having regard to the relevant public interest criteria.
Finally, it would not be feasible to apply the provisions of the special resolution regime provided for in Part 1 of the Banking Act 2009 to this power of direction. The additional supervisory power of direction provided for by Section 296A is separate and distinct from the stabilisation powers, exercisable in respect of UK clearing houses, provided for by Amendment 193G. In contrast to the power of direction, which is a supervisory tool, the stabilisation powers are resolution tools that would be deployed to minimise the impact of the failure of a clearing house on wider financial stability. Given that alternative, specific resolution powers exist, it would be unreasonable for the Bank of England to use the power of direction to effect “partial property transfers”. Such an action would be contrary to the constraints under which the Bank operates as a public authority.
With those explanations and assurances about what we intend to come forward with at Third Reading, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Sharkey
My Lords, I seem to have put my amendment in the wrong place, but I think I heard the Minister say that recovery plans would be made mandatory in any case but by other means. Given the risks involved, it would be nice to have some sense of when that may actually happen, but in the mean time I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sassoon
Lord Sassoon
“(a) after the definition of “applicant” insert—““central counterparty clearing services” has the same meaning as in section 155 of the Companies Act 1989 (see subsection (3A) of that section);”, and
(b) ”
Lord Sassoon
“(2) If the Treasury consider that it is in the public interest to do so, the Treasury may by order—
(a) amend section 391 of FSMA 2000 by substituting for subsections (1) to (1ZB) the following—“(1) Neither the regulator giving a warning notice nor a person to whom it is given or copied may publish the notice or any details concerning it.”, and(b) repeal section 395(1)(d) and (2)(b) and (c) of that Act.”
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, we return now to the issue of warning notices and procedures for decision-making within our regulators. We have had lengthy debates on these issues in Committee, and rightly so as they concern important matters relating to fairness and natural justice. I shall return to Amendments 97A and 97ZZA when my noble friend Lord Flight and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, have spoken. For now, I shall focus on the group of government amendments concerning warning notices.
The new power for the regulators to disclose the fact that a disciplinary warning notice has been issued constitutes a real departure from the regulatory regime up to this point and a bold move towards more transparent, effective and open regulation. The power has been welcomed by many, including of course by the noble Baroness on behalf of the Opposition. However, concerns have been raised by members from all sides of the House. These concerns fall broadly into two categories: first, that the power will be used irresponsibly; and secondly, that there should be a greater degree of independence involved in reaching a decision to disclose the fact that a warning notice has been issued. The Government have tabled amendments that I hope will address both these issues.
Amendment 94A provides for a power for the Treasury to repeal the warning notices power,
“If the Treasury consider that it is in the public interest to do so”.
As I noted in Committee, this provision is intended as a useful backstop against irresponsible use of the power. The Treasury would expect to use its power to repeal if it felt that the way in which the power was being used did not serve the wider public interests. I hope that noble Lords are reassured that this will pose a substantial and clear check on the power being used in a way that is damaging or irresponsible.
In Committee on 15 October, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, quite rightly noted that the power to repeal is a substantial one and that such a decision should involve parliamentary scrutiny. I fully agree with her and that is why Amendment 117A makes the use of this power subject to affirmative procedure. I hope that the noble Baroness is reassured by that.
Amendments 97ZA and 97ZB are intended to address some of the concerns expressed by a number of Members of this House, including my noble friends Lord Flight, Lord Deben and Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town. This is about the process by which a decision is taken to disclose the fact that a warning notice has been issued.
The concern expressed was that there was a lack of independence in the decision to disclose, with the effect that the regulator would be judge, jury and executioner when it came to a decision to disclose that a warning notice had been issued. Amendments 97ZA and 97ZB bring the decision to disclose that a disciplinary warning notice has been issued into the list of matters subject to the procedures set out in Section 395 of FiSMA. The amendments set out the criteria with which the process for deciding to disclose a warning notice must comply, noting that the decision must be taken either by a person other than the person by whom the decision to disclose was first proposed, or by two or more persons not including the person by whom the decision to disclose was first proposed. This is intended to deliver a degree of independence in the decision-making process and mirrors the conditions set out in relation to the decision to issue a warning notice or decision notice. I hope that this addresses some of the concerns expressed in our debates in Committee on the issue.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these amendments and I hope I am right in understanding that the backstop power is for the whole thing and not for individual cases. I see that the Minister is nodding in agreement that I have the interpretation right. I thank him for that now being an affirmative order if it was to be changed. I am confident that the public interest will not bring it back to this House, so I am quite relaxed about it.
The other amendments aside from the first one relating to the backstop power are about ensuring some independence on the issue of warning notices, or in the case of Amendment 97ZA in the name of my noble friend Lord Eatwell and myself, on the whole disciplinary process. This amendment would ensure that a properly constituted and independent determinations panel would be responsible for dealing with all cases presented by the FCA or indeed by the PRA. As I explained in Committee, that is in effect the procedure introduced for the Pensions Regulator in 2004. It is seen as robust and independent, and it has indeed turned down some of the cases that have been taken to it. I would have to say, of course, since I was a member of it, that it was effective. It has been a useful way of ensuring that there is confidence that when cases are brought by staff, they are well scrutinised.
As the Minister has said, the government amendments in this group other than the first one on the backstop go some way to answering our concerns. However, I do not think that they go quite far enough, although I guess that we should be grateful for some movement. They introduce a degree of independence to the consideration of a case brought by FCA or PRA staff, but they fail to ensure the continuance of the RDC to give its statutory backing. We hear what the Minister says about the statement of the current FSA on what the future FCA will voluntarily choose to do, but I hope that the Government do not at some point in the future rue the day that they failed to protect the RDC’s existence and independence. For the moment, however, perhaps the noble Lord could confirm the Government’s commitment, not just that of the FCA, to the continuance of the RDC.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I think that I can probably be briefer than I had intended in responding to these amendments. I will confirm again that the backstop power is, as my noble friend has characterised it even though it may not be what he would like to see, a “gone for ever” backstop. However, I hope it will give comfort that we will keep under review the way this important new power is operated.
On Amendment 97A, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Flight for saying in terms that he is reassured by the effect of Amendments 97ZA and 97ZB, to which I spoke at some length, so I will not go over that ground again. The issue about the difference between the FCA and the PRA here is a simple one. We see the FCA as being the regulator that would issue these types of warning notice and to which the new power applies, and we do not actually see the PRA doing it. That is why we have constructed things as they are and we can rely on the approach of the RDC continuing as we have discussed. But if the PRA were to get into the warning notices business, which we do not anticipate, there are provisions in the Bill that would cause it to look at how it would construct an independent process that might take it down an RDC-type route.
I am not sure whether the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, was expecting me to say more about Amendment 97ZZA because we have agreed that we went over this ground on 15 October. I am grateful to her for what she said about the government amendments, so unless she would like me to go on at some length, I think that we have probably done it justice. However, I am grateful for this short debate.
Lord Sassoon
“(4) For subsection (2) substitute—
“(2) A contravention within subsection (1) or (1A)—
(a) does not, except as provided by section 23(1A), make a person guilty of an offence,(b) does not, except as provided by section 26A, make any transaction void or unenforceable, and(c) does not, except as provided by subsection (3), give rise to any right of action for breach of statutory duty.””
Lord Sassoon
“30A In section 400 (offences by a body corporate etc) after subsection (6) insert—
“(6A) References in this section to an offence under this Act include a reference to an offence under Part 6A of the Financial Services Act 2012 (offences relating to financial services).””
Lord Sassoon
“( ) In subsection (2)—
(a) in paragraph (a), for “or 397” substitute “or under Part 6A of the Financial Services Act 2012”, and(b) after paragraph (b) insert—“(ba) an authorised person may have contravened section 20 in relation to a credit-related regulated activity;”.”
Lord Sassoon
Lord Sassoon
“1A In Part 22 (auditors and actuaries), before section 340 (and the italic heading immediately before it) insert—
“General duties of PRA339A General duties of PRA in relation to auditors
(1) The arrangements maintained by the PRA under section 2K (supervision of PRA-authorised persons) must include arrangements for—
(a) the sharing with auditors of PRA-authorised persons of information that the PRA is not prevented from disclosing, and(b) the exchange of opinions with auditors of PRA-authorised persons.(2) The PRA must issue and maintain a code of practice describing how it will comply with subsection (1).
(3) The PRA may at any time alter or replace a code issued under this section.
(4) If a code is altered or replaced, the PRA must issue the altered or replacement code.
(5) When the PRA issues a code under this section the PRA must—
(a) give a copy of the code to the Treasury, and(b) publish the code in such manner as the PRA thinks fit.(6) The Treasury must lay before Parliament a copy of the code.
(7) “Auditor” means an auditor appointed under or as a result of a statutory provision.””
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, the government amendments in this group place new duties on the PRA to engage with auditors of PRA-authorised persons.
We had a useful debate in Committee on the role of auditors in the financial crisis. In particular, I welcomed the insightful and constructive comments made by my noble friends Lady Wheatcroft and Lord Lawson of Blaby. I committed to consider their points further and to bring back an amendment designed to address their concerns. Before I come to the detail of the amendments, I will set out briefly the work that is being done across the board to strengthen audit—and not just of banks.
First, there is the work of the Financial Reporting Council. On 28 September the FRC amended its code to require boards to state that their annual reports and accounts as a whole are fair, balanced and understandable. It also requires audit committee reports that set out the key judgments taken, and requires auditors to ensure appropriate communication between the audit committee and the board, reporting if they have evidence that the board’s overall assessment is inappropriate.
The FRC will be consulting on implementing the Sharman report recommendations, which, among other things, would require boards to report the risk and uncertainties that would affect the entity as a going concern, and would require auditors to comment if the disclosure was inconsistent with their understanding.
As noble Lords may already be aware, BIS has recently published a draft of new narrative reporting regulations that would replace the existing business review with a concise, stand-alone report focused on strategy and the organisation’s business model. This will mean that shareholders can easily find out about a company’s strategy, the risks it faces, how it is performing and the direction in which it is heading. The auditors would have to opine on the consistency of that report with the accounts.
These are all positive developments, directly addressing concerns about ensuring that audited accounts give a more complete view of the position of the firm, and what we are proposing needs to be seen against that background. As has been pointed out, there are particular issues with financial services firms. For PRA-authorised persons, questions of risk are often complex, and coming to judgments about the proper valuation of financial assets is a specialised task. In the Government’s view, the right way into this is to ensure that there is a flow of information between the auditor and the regulator to ensure that each can be informed by the judgments of the other. One example, noted in the recent PRA approach document, is that the PRA,
“will share relevant information, for example where it views a firm’s valuations of less liquid assets or its approach to provisioning to be significantly out of line with peers”.
Amendment 105A inserts a new Section 339A into FiSMA. The new section will require the PRA, as part of the arrangements it must maintain under Section 2K for supervising PRA-authorised persons, to have arrangements for sharing information and opinions,
“with auditors of PRA-authorised persons”.
The PRA must make a code of practice setting out how it will comply with this duty; it must publish the code and give a copy of the code to the Treasury, which must lay the code before Parliament. To ensure that this is a reciprocal arrangement, Amendment 105B will require the PRA to make,
“rules imposing duties on auditors of PRA-authorised persons”
in relation to co-operation with the PRA in its supervision of those persons.
The government amendments would mean that there will be an expectation, set out in law, that the PRA’s judgments about firms will be shared with the auditors. Coupled with the reforms that are being put in place by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the FRC, the Government believe that this is a useful step forward.
I stress to my noble friend that while the FSA should and could have been doing these things, the PRA approach document goes further in setting out a new level of intent, and enshrining what could and should have been best practice into the code of practice to be published and laid before Parliament puts a very helpful spotlight on this issue, which I am very grateful to her for drawing to the attention of the House. This now means that those responsible, particularly on the PRA side, cannot shirk their duty. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes
My Lords, unfortunately I was not able to be present when my noble friend’s amendment was debated in Committee, but I read Hansard and noted that my noble friend had undertaken to take the issue away and bring an amendment back. I was surprised when I looked at the amendment and saw what it was trying to deliver. It seems to me, as my noble friend has just pointed out, that there are already provisions in FiSMA, which covers the relationship between auditors and financial institutions. In addition, the Minister said that these are things that could and should have been done—but they are being done.
I have a copy of the code of practice for the relationship between the external auditor and the supervisor. This was refreshed after the financial crisis and is dated May 2011. It sets out a number of principles. Principle one states:
“Supervisors and auditors shall seek an open, cooperative and constructive relationship”.
Principle two is that they should “engage in regular dialogue”. Principle three states:
“Supervisors and auditors shall share all information relevant to carrying out their respective statutory duties and in a timely fashion”.
That code is already in existence and governing the dialogue between the FSA and auditors. Under the current legislative framework there is no reason for this not to continue when the PRA takes over its functions. I am struggling to see what it is that adds any substance to the current arrangements. The Government have brought forward an amendment, which is—and I hate to use this term—window dressing.
Lord Sassoon
My Lords, I assure you that it is not window dressing. I am not sure how much I can add for the benefit of my noble friend other than what I have said already. It is important to think about these amendments in the context of what the FRC and BIS are doing, and also to recognise that hardwiring the code of conduct into legislation in the way that I have described does considerably more than window dressing. Over time, we will be able to prove the scepticism of my noble friends to have been misplaced. I agree that this is a matter that will not go away, and we should and will, as Treasury and Government, keep these matters high on our list of things to be watched.
Lord Sassoon
“(4) For subsection (3) substitute—
“(3A) The PRA—
(a) must make rules imposing on auditors of PRA-authorised persons such duties as may be specified in relation to co-operation with the PRA in connection with the supervision by the PRA of PRA-authorised persons, and(b) may make rules—(i) imposing such other duties on auditors of PRA-authorised persons as may be specified, and(ii) imposing such duties on actuaries acting for PRA-authorised persons as may be specified.(3B) The FCA may make rules imposing on auditors of, or actuaries acting for, authorised persons other than PRA-authorised persons such duties as may be specified.””