Royal Yacht
Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts(8 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My Lords, in that case, would the Government be interested in manning the royal yacht and what objections would there be to not having the Royal Navy do it?
British Servicemen: Vexatious Law Suits
Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts(8 years, 8 months ago)
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Earl Howe
My Lords, there is no contradiction. As the noble Lord rightly said, the vast majority of service personnel deployed on operations overseas have acted in accordance with the law and their training. However, where credible criminal allegations are made, we must investigate in accordance with our legal obligations. What we need to do is strip out the vexatious claims. That is why we are taking a range of measures, as I am sure the noble Lord is aware.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My Lords, what combat immunity or other legal protection have the Government arranged for Armed Forces personnel currently engaged in armed conflict in the air or on the ground, in the light of the views expressed by the Prime Minister?
Earl Howe
As regards combat immunity, the Government have previously made it clear that we will not rule out legislating, which is being considered among a range of options. It has been suggested that we should simply reinstate Section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act; that is one of the options we are looking at, but it would be possible only under certain specific circumstances. No plans are in train for any immediate change on that front.
RAF Red Arrows
Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts(8 years, 10 months ago)
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Earl Howe
I am grateful to the noble Lord. If one looks at the map of Farnborough and the surrounding area, it is easy to see how densely populated it now is. It simply is not possible to conduct a Red Arrows display without significant overflight of Farnborough, Camberley and Fleet. As I have explained, the decision has been taken by the Chief of the Air Staff that the potential risk to life from display flying over those areas, which I am afraid is inevitable given the extreme air manoeuvres that the Red Arrows undertake, could not be tolerated.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My Lords, the decision about Farnborough whereby it is allowed to show formation flypasts but not formation aerobatics, would indicate that perhaps formation aerobatics carry some measure of risk. Can the noble Earl confirm that in making any decision about flights by the Red Arrows, there is never any question that there is a risk in their performance? If it is necessary to make a decision not to participate, would it not be better if the Red Arrows did not appear? It seems to me that an aerobatic team which does not perform aerobatics is of little use to the RAF or to the country.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I would not wish to give the House the impression that the decision taken in relation to Farnborough will apply to every other air show because each event is assessed on a case-by-case basis. There will be many shows and other events where the Red Arrows will continue to perform with an acceptable degree of risk, but that risk always exists and safety must remain the paramount consideration at all times. I am afraid that I cannot agree with the noble and gallant Lord about the Red Arrows remaining at Farnborough and performing a flypast. I think that the flypast was appreciated, as was the static display on the ground.
Iraq Inquiry
Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts(9 years ago)
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Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My Lords, this long-awaited report has done a thorough and commendable job. I wish to comment on two particular issues: the way the inquiry has sought to apportion responsibility for things that did not go right in the period from 2002 to 2009, and some of the lessons that should be drawn from what happened.
By and large, the report’s criticisms are directed at either Ministers or senior service personnel. I do not intend to attempt to second-guess any of those criticisms, other than to make the perhaps obvious point that what is clear with the benefits of mature reflection and 20/20 hindsight may not have been known to, or so apparent to, those concerned at the time. It is certainly my recollection that the prevailing view at the time, post-conflict, was very much optimistic. One enduring issue—not, it appears, so explicitly dealt with in the inquiry—which I am aware of from my own experience with the first Gulf War in 1991, is how to apportion the responsibility shared between Ministers and the military for shortfalls. For example, there were shortfalls in preparations for operations and their subsequent periods, or in the conduct of operations.
If, for instance, Ministers wish to commit forces to an operation, how far should they or their predecessors in office be held blameworthy because of gaps or shortages in capability recommended by the operational requirement process but judged to be less important or unaffordable at the time? With the timescales for major equipment programmes, it is indeed unlikely that the Ministers involved in procurement decisions will still be in office.
The military can-do reaction to ministerial demands—as commended by Chilcot—is of course laudable, and with £35 billion or so of annual budgets, blunt refusals are unrealistic. But pressures to delay or shorten preparation for deployment times lie uneasily with the reasonable Chilcot view that military timetables should not dictate diplomatic ones. At heart are matters of risk, not just the major risk of a failure of a mission, but also the risk of casualties, and that is never easy to predict in a fight. Another risk, as highlighted in the inquiry, was that the UK feared being excluded from US plans unless they were offering ground forces. Taking such risks, while important to consider, cannot realistically be blamed individually, if they occur. A decision to commit forces beyond planning assumptions sounds unwise, unless national interests are under serious attack, when the decision to fight has to be with what you have, or to surrender. The commitment of forces to an expeditionary operation would seem to lend itself to a judgment about how far, and at what risk, to go. But as in so much else to do with such operations, the unfolding of events and the macrostrategic issues are most likely the dominant drivers, rather than putative risks, in reaching decisions.
The separation of responsibility between Ministers and senior commanders in operations is now also very different in the days of instant communication. I am reminded of an apocryphal story. An admiral at sea in the days of sail, seeking ministerial direction, would hand his quill-written request to the captain of his fastest frigate. Sails set, he would make all speed to bear the message to their Lordships in London, catching a tide up the Thames some three weeks later. Immediately —and to catch the falling tide—he would have their Lordships’ response. This would be with the admiral some six weeks after he had sent it. Today, the commander at sea, or in the field, can of course instantaneously signal the Ministry of Defence. The response will also reach him instantaneously, maybe some six weeks later.
Modern communications though, have also led to the explicit involvement of Ministers in live operations; for instance, giving approval to aerial attacks on a target. The scale and pace of recent operations make such involvement practical, and politically it may be essential for Ministers, who have the responsibility to describe and defend operations in public. Faced with a more aggressive foe, however, leading to the loss of ships or aircraft, such minute-to-minute involvement could become unmanageable. If things do not go as planned, who then is to blame?
Finally, I endorse strongly Chilcot’s views on the importance of news management. In the first Gulf War, when dealing, for example, with the loss of aircraft, comment would be sought almost simultaneously in the 24-hour news cycle from spokesmen in Riyadh, London and maybe Washington. Getting consistency in responses—when the veracity of the original claim had perhaps not been fully established—called for constant interaction and preparation against possible events or calamities. News management—I do not mean that in a pejorative sense—was difficult then. Social media have compounded the difficulties, but the success or failure of public support for an operation may depend on how the facts are reported and commented on. Chilcot is right to give this vital lesson renewed prominence.
Armed Forces Bill
Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts(9 years, 2 months ago)
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Baroness Jolly (LD)
My Lords, from these Benches I also want to pay tribute to our Armed Forces. It has been a small and not quite perfectly formed Bill, but a very interesting Bill on which to work and I thank the Minister and his team for being ready to talk to us and to listen to our proposals and our views. I also thank the Opposition for a certain amount of joint working and collaboration on some issues. Indeed, it has been a very good-spirited and incredibly well-informed Bill. There will be another Armed Forces Bill in five years, but in this one we looked at the usual government tidying-up, the issue of child soldiers, the issues of courts martial and justice, mental health and sexual offences. The Government resisted the amendments very effectively, but I rather feel that they will be revisited in five years’ time and I look forward to discussing them in future with the noble Earl. In the mean time, we on these Benches are more than happy to support the Bill.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My Lords, I join in commending the noble Earl the Minister for the way he has handled the Bill, and the Bill team for supporting him. I have one regret, as I am sure he understands, in that there has been no dealing yet with the problem of the impact of the Human Rights Act on operations. We have had assurances from the noble Earl and from other members of the Government that this is being actively pursued. I hope that it continues to be pursued and that we do not have to wait for the next Armed Forces Bill in five years’ time. I hope that whatever is introduced, by a Bill of Rights or in another way, will be as an amendment to the Armed Forces Act and not standing within its own Act, because the problem we have faced is that the Armed Forces Acts and the Human Rights Act are incompatible. This would have been avoided if we had not treated the problems of the Armed Forces and human rights in the way they have been treated in the past.
Lord Empey (UUP)
My Lords, this Bill is on a much smaller scale than the one introduced five years ago, which dealt with the whole concept of the covenant and included very complicated and very necessary commitments. I am very pleased that even this week the Minister has pursued those issues by engaging with the House and making us aware of developments in that area. Frequently, pieces of legislation are rushed through and their implementation sometimes leaves much to be desired. So while the provisions in this Bill are not on the same scale as those of the previous Act, nevertheless they are significant.
As I understand it—perhaps the Minister can clarify this—as well as provision every five years in an Act of Parliament, the actual Armed Forces also need to be renewed on a regular basis. That seems rather a peculiarity because it is very difficult to envisage circumstances where we would not need them. I do not know whether a more permanent mechanism is required in a future Bill so that that provision does not have to be renewed.
I place on record my thanks to the Minister for the manner in which he engaged with noble Lords, dealt with our concerns and gave us an opportunity to participate fully and follow up our queries, some of which may have been better informed than others. Nevertheless, I am happy to see the Bill pass.
Armed Forces Bill
Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts(9 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Craig of Radley
“Limitation on prosecutions of members of the armed forces
No member of the armed forces may be prosecuted for any offence alleged to have taken place more than 20 years ago while the member of the armed forces was engaged in military operations outside the United Kingdom.”
Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My Lords, this is clearly a probing amendment. It flies in the face of the norm that there is, in general, no time limit on investigating or bringing a charge for alleged criminal behaviour. My reason for tabling such an amendment is to encourage debate and a reasoned response from the Government. I shall not repeat my arguments, given at Second Reading, for bringing this to the Committee now. Noble Lords are well aware of the industrial growth in historical cases of alleged criminal behaviour of service personnel, going back over time not just years but decades. The Bill clearly indicates that it is acceptable for the Armed Forces to be treated differently in legislation where there is a military operational reason for so doing. An amendment on these lines, not necessarily using my precise words, would fit that purpose.
The growth in the number of historical claims now being dealt with by the MoD has been the topic of recent media coverage, which has quoted the irritation of Ministers and even the concern of the Prime Minister. Therefore, I hope to hear not only that the MoD is well aware of the growing problem but that it has specific plans in mind to tackle it. If it is to be by some form of inclusion in the Bill of Rights that we have recently heard about in the Chamber, I urge that it should be in the form of an amendment to the Bill before the Committee today. Better still, as I have already proposed—although I do not do so now with great hope—why not include the relevant part in the Bill before the Committee?
Wherever possible, legislation that applies to the discipline and behaviour of our Armed Forces should be contained in one Act. Not only will this alleviate the problem of potential conflicts between Acts, as has been happening with the Human Rights Act, it will make it easier for the Armed Forces themselves to be aware of and to be dealt with by their own specific legislation. I look forward to the Minister’s response on that point. I hope he will be as forthcoming as possible about the Government’s intentions in this area so that the opportunity to debate and help form acceptable legislation is not missed. This should not be in any way a party matter and I hope the debate will avoid any such approach. The Armed Forces are ultimately responsible to the Government of the day, regardless of which party may be in power. I look forward to the noble Earl’s response. I beg to move.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
I just want to make one or two short points. It is interesting that although the noble and gallant Lord is perfectly correct that it is not the practice in the United Kingdom for there to be any statutory limitation on prosecution for crimes other than summary crimes, it is quite commonplace in the civil law countries for there to be limitations. So our allies in France or Germany, for example, would, I suspect, be protected by a limitation of the kind proposed. I am not suggesting that we should adopt that philosophy, which is quite contrary to our practice, as we can see in cases of historical child abuse. I wonder, however, whether the wiser course, rather than going into the area of limitation, which is so difficult and would be seen as an invitation to start doing this for other crimes, would be simply to have a blanket immunity for our servicemen when engaged in military operations, of the kind that I think used to be the case—I stand to be corrected—before the law was changed some years ago by the previous Armed Forces Act. This is certainly an important point to consider, but I favour doing so not by way of limitation but by way of exclusion entirely for acts of that kind while engaged on military operations, while making it quite clear that we are not dealing with cases of one serviceman on another—let us say of one serviceman assaulting another, stealing from him or things like that.
Lord Craig of Radley
My Lords, first, I thank all those who have spoken in this short debate. I made it very clear that my amendment was meant to be no more than a probing one, and I certainly did not expect the Minister to accept it as it was written or even close to what was written. But I am particularly grateful for the support that I have had for the thought behind what I was trying to get at, and I hope that the Ministry of Defence and the rest of the Government will continue to give this very close attention and not just park it as too difficult to deal with. It really does need to be dealt with. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Armed Forces Bill
Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts(9 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Thomas of Gresford
My Lords, I would like to say something about attitudes towards mental health. I remember in the 1970s appearing on behalf of a person who had been blown up rescuing a pilot from a plane in the Western Desert during the war some 30 years before. It was extremely difficult in those days to persuade the ministry—the War Department, I think it was—that he was entitled to a war pension. We succeeded in the Divisional Court, but in the next election when I was a candidate he stood up and told the people there that if they voted for anyone, it should not be that Liberal candidate as he had problems.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My Lords, I support the thrust of this probing amendment. Clearly there are enormous differences between trying to deal with people who are still in the services and may be suffering from mental illness and those who have become veterans and, maybe many years later, develop or show symptoms of mental illness. How does that get related to their time in service? There are a number of other practical points that I think have been very well made. I would like to put on the record that I am for this in principle but I can see that there are many difficulties. No doubt the Minister will have a chance to tell us about them.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I add my support for Amendment 14 and apologise for my very croaky voice. I do not normally engage in these discussions, but I have a very strong interest in mental health. As other noble Lords have said, with so much focus on mental health now, it really has gone up the agenda. We have had a succession of extremely important reports, most recently the mental health task force report. Parity of esteem between mental health and physical health runs right the way through that report and all the thinking behind it. If we accept that report—certainly in the debates that I have recently taken part in on this subject, the Government have shown their strong support for the reports and the principles behind them, and that is welcome—it is absolutely vital that parity of esteem between physical and mental health is applied equally to members of our Armed Forces, who do the very difficult jobs that they are asked to take on, as it is to the rest of the civilian population. I simply add my support.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
This applies only to the injury or death of those serving in the military on behalf of the British Crown. As the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, pointed out to me just before we came in, operations nowadays may not be on behalf of only the British Crown. They may be carried out, for example, in combination with the Americans, the French or some other nation. That is a further complication which did not arise in the case of Smith. The same principles could possibly apply in that situation. However, it does not deal at all with actions against, for example, Iraqis or any other people among whom our Armed Forces might be serving. The jurisdiction applies, in this particular case, to the injury or death of those serving. There would be implications of other kinds, not dealt with in Smith, so far as people who are not members of the Armed Forces are affected by actions of the Armed Forces.
Lord Craig of Radley
My Lords, it was a privilege to put my name to the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. I have looked upon it very much as a probing amendment to give the Government an opportunity to indicate how their thinking is going. We have a problem with the Human Rights Act and Armed Forces legislation. Indeed, when the Human Rights Act was debated here in 1998 I drew attention to the potential problems that might arise. My concerns were dismissed then by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor. I quote what he said then:
“I urge your Lordships to be of the view that the convention is a flexible instrument. It poses no threat to the effectiveness of the Armed Forces”.—[Official Report, 5/2/98; col. 768.]
Whatever flexibilities the noble and learned Lord had in mind, they have I fear proved to be valueless and ephemeral. Cases against the MoD and individual service personnel affecting our forces on operations overseas have proliferated. Some were settled out of court. Others made the prolonged and tortuous passage up through the courts, with the MoD appealing a couple to the Supreme Court in 2013. The Committee has had a good exposition of what happened in the Supreme Court. It was a thorough and nuanced finding but there was a 4/3 split and they did not really resolve the issue.
Later that year, in a debate led very admirably by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, I suggested that the Armed Forces Bill before the Committee today would be a suitable vehicle for legislating to ease the problems faced by the MoD and the Armed Forces on operational activity overseas. So, as I made quite clear at Second Reading, I was dismayed to find that no attempt has been made to tackle the problem in this Bill. The Government have had the better part of three years since the Supreme Court judgment to consider what form legislation should take. I have pointed out in debates on this issue that it was not going to go away —it had legs—and that it would be a failure of political leadership not to tackle it.
In recent weeks, the much-heralded Bill of Rights has been mentioned as shortly to be published. Indeed the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, indicated as much in his response to the second Oral Question this afternoon. I thought that the noble Lord also confirmed that it will incorporate legislation to help to resolve the problems created for the Armed Forces by the incompatible legislation that affects them. If so, I very much hope that whatever detailed form the legislation takes, it will introduce further amendment to this Armed Forces Bill when it is enacted. It would be preferable to contain any new legislation within the principal Armed Forces Act, rather than once again having two separate pieces of legislation about the behavioural discipline of the Armed Forces. Indeed, in the debates on the then Human Rights Bill in 1998, I suggested that while the Armed Forces were of course a public body, it was acceptable that they were, and indeed should be, treated separately in legislation. I suggested that any aspects of human rights that were to apply to the Armed Forces should be incorporated into that Armed Forces legislation. If this approach had been adopted then, we might not be facing the present difficulties.
The comments of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, on the second Oral Question this afternoon seemed to imply that the clauses affecting the Armed Forces were already drafted. If so, surely the Bill before the Committee this afternoon could be an appropriate vehicle for getting this legislation enacted, particularly if the Bill of Rights is to be delayed, and may, as a whole, have some considerable difficulty in reaching the statute book. Has this been considered? If so, can we expect government amendments to this Bill on Report?
Lord West of Spithead
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, for laying out so clearly exactly where this stands, although I have to say that the result does not leave things particularly clear for a number of reasons which he has explained. I will not reiterate what I said in my speech at Second Reading, where I went into the detail of this complex issue, but suffice it to say that the decision by the Supreme Court in the case of Smith and others v Ministry of Defence has, without doubt, raised the spectre of military personnel who take a decision in the heat of action being taken to court to face a claim under the Human Rights Act. As I say, it has raised that spectre. That is clearly wrong and I do not believe that it is what was intended. Indeed, mention has been made of how the case is not against those involved, but the result is that the spectre has arisen. I feel very strongly about this. I have been in action and have taken decisions that resulted in men dying. I believe that I took the right decisions, but it would be wrong for one then to have to go through the courts to explain all of that.
Of course these issues are highly complex, and that is part of the problem. The cases that were being considered looked at a number of different scenarios concerning things like the definition of combat operations, peacekeeping operations within Iraq, the issue of procurement, issues around the tanks and Snatch Land Rovers operating in a different context and being hit by IEDs. The sheer complexity has caused part of the problem. It has been said that some of these matters need to be investigated by the civil courts. That has dragged in the possibility of people fully in action being taken to the courts later for decisions they took, which I do not believe should be looked at in civilian courts. They should be covered by combat immunity.
I shall reiterate what I said before. It is a nonsense that one can use human rights legislation to drag military leaders through the courts for decisions made in war because, in combat, men and women kill and are killed on a regular basis fighting for their country. One has to wonder what exactly the right to life is when you are fighting. You have to make people stand up and do things where you know they are likely to be killed. I have done that. What is the right to life in those circumstances? It is very difficult, and I do not believe that the judgment was making that point, but that could be the result of what has been done.
As has been said, this is a probing amendment. I love it because it is nice and simple. Being a simple sailor, I love a simple amendment, but the complexity is far too great and I know that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, appreciates that. He has tabled it to probe the Government and find out. We need to know how the Government are going to take this forward. How will we clarify and resolve this position, because it really does need to be resolved? There is certainly concern in the military about this, and it spreads far and wide. There is also, I have to say, concern at times about fighting to win if you feel that some sort of legislative action is going to be taken against you. It would be a dreadful thing if our Armed Forces were to feel constrained.
What I would say to the noble Earl is this: we need an answer as to how this is going to be taken forward. Will it be done in the context of this Bill, as was mentioned by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, or will we do it in other legislation that is going through? How can we take it forward, because I do not believe that it can be left as it is? There is too much uncertainty. I know that it was not what the judgment aimed to do, but the uncertainty is there, and that is wrong. We have to clarify this.
Armed Forces Bill
Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts(9 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My Lords, the main purpose of the Bill has been fully outlined by the Minister. It is well understood that the Bill is an essential prerequisite for maintaining Armed Forces at the disposal of the Government of the day. However, this Bill follows the practice of the 2011 renewal of the new-look 2006 Act, and indeed of the quinquennial renewals of the single service Acts of the 1950s, before their displacement by the tri-service 2006 Act.
The Bill is, in effect, a Marshalled List of amendments to the 2006 Act and, on occasion, amendments to the amendments introduced by the 2011 Act. I complained five years ago, as we dealt with the 2011 Bill, that this did not make it that easy to understand and follow what the House was being invited to enact. Whether this endless approach of “marshalled amendments” to the 2006 Act is to proceed unchanged every five years into the distant future needs to be considered. For those steeped in legislative minutiae—the Bill team and the parliamentary counsel—it no doubt seems tidy and straightforward. But for the rest of us, whether versed in the ways of the military or not, I do not consider it to be that satisfactory.
As the noble Earl, Lord Howe, stressed, the Bill is of profound constitutional importance. It has to be right. When considering defence requirements we think of new equipment coming into service five, 10 and 15 years hence, and of the size and shape of the Armed Forces being varied over decades, but none of that is viable or in any way realistic without the timely passage of the Bill before us. If it were not to be passed, the Government would not have disciplined Armed Forces at their disposal to man all that equipment or to fight their wars. I hope that the Lib Dem Benches, with their recent predilection for unmandated and vainglorious challenges to the convention norms of your Lordships’ House, will not be tempted to try to hold the Government to account by refusing to pass the Bill after scrutiny.
I, for one, would prefer the Government to have tabled a Bill that incorporates their amendments to the earlier legislation—in other words, to produce the Bill in a format that can be read without repeated cross-referencing. Would it be that much more difficult for the Minister to guide the House through this rewrite of the 2006 Act, drawing attention to the changes and improvements to the earlier Acts that it incorporates? Is the approach merely a matter of convention? Perhaps the Minister can advise the House.
I have no particular points to raise on the list of marshalled amendments contained in the Bill, but there is for me a glaring omission in what lies before the House, to which the noble Lord, Lord West, has just drawn its attention. It totally lacks any approach to the difficulties that have arisen from the application of human rights legislation to activities during or close to combat, or to the increasingly vexatious problem of prolonged and historic litigation affecting or potentially affecting the operations of the Armed Forces and the lives of veterans long discharged.
Noble Lords will recall the growing media coverage of the latter issue in recent weeks. Defence Ministers have been reported as expressing anger and outrage. Indeed the Prime Minister himself has expressed his concerns, and presumably told the MoD to get a grip. In June and November 2013, when debating issues arising from the Supreme Court judgment on two particular cases which the noble Lord, Lord West, has just mentioned, I urged the Government then to be more proactive, although I accepted that precise steps would need to follow resolution of the particular cases before the courts.
Indeed, in a debate that November led by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, I encouraged the Government to consider legislation to rule out from legal challenge under human rights legislation the behaviour of service personnel in the heat of battle or on dangerous patrols and similar operational activities. The European Convention on Human Rights was surely a safeguard for peacetime behaviour. I said that there was every likelihood that the situation would deteriorate further and that it would be a failure of moral courage and leadership not to tackle it. I also said that I hoped that the Armed Forces Bill due in 2016 could be a vehicle for legislating to ease these problems.
Nearly three years after the Supreme Court finding, and a protracted period for active consideration and staffing, there is nothing about this in the Bill—no sign of a proactive response. I remind the Minister what his party’s manifesto said, which he repeated in the Queen’s Speech debate only last May:
“We will ensure our Armed Forces overseas are not subject to persistent human rights claims that undermine their ability to do their job”.
The possibility of using a new Bill of Rights has been floated, but that Bill has yet to see the light of day. The Government should be ashamed of their lack of real progress.
What do I propose? There are two issues to consider. The first is the application of human rights law in conflict situations. I hope that the Minister will be able to report that, even at this late stage, the Government are preparing to consider adding to the Bill before us and honouring his party’s manifesto commitment. Surely that is a reasonable request.
The second issue, which would seem to cry out for a proactive government response, is the industrial-scale growth in cases alleging maltreatment, or worse, of enemy combatants by our own forces. Numerous recent cases going back not just years but decades are costing large sums and causing great stress and anxiety for those involved. Yet after prolonged and tendentious investigations, few or no plausible cases for full trial, let alone conviction, have yet been found. Surely the opportunity presented by having an Armed Forces Bill before Parliament must be used to introduce legal safeguards. The first step should be to introduce a statutory time limit for new cases against personnel on live operations.
It seems objectionable and unrealistic to attempt to bring something to trial, let alone have a hearing, when it depends on recall by witnesses and the accused of traumatic events of many years or even decades ago. I speak from personal experience. In 1991, the IRA launched a missile from a van parked in the road outside Banqueting House. The War Cabinet, of which I was a member, was in session in Downing Street. Fortunately, the missile blew up in the garden outside, severely rattling the windows and, to varying degrees, those of us sitting around the Cabinet table. But vivid as such an event was at the time, 25 years later I doubt whether the recollections of those of us who were there would produce a common, accurate description of what occurred in that room on that day.
Is it not time to introduce a statute of limitation specific to military activity before these no-win no-fee charlatan lawyers start roaming the streets of Buenos Aires in search of some so-called victims of abuse by the Armed Forces on the Falkland Islands in 1982, or in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991? I recognise this to be a big ask, since there is no general statutory limit in the UK for criminal cases. Nevertheless, the Armed Forces can be and are treated differently in law. I hope that one or more of my noble and learned colleagues might assist me in drafting a probing amendment or two to allow the Government to set out their thinking on these vexed topics.
Mental Health Services: Serving Military Personnel
Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts(9 years, 5 months ago)
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Earl Howe
My Lords, there is no point in duplicating a service that already works very well. We work in close partnership with Combat Stress, which provides an extremely effective service, and, if necessary, signposts the individual to the right service according to need. There are helplines available for veterans as well, which we run on a 24-hour basis, but we do not see the need and there is no evidence that we should be looking at duplicating that service.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My Lords, do the Government accept that, as a result of operations over the last decade and more, there are many more potential and actual mental health problems among serving personnel? The Minister suggests that this can be helped by charities, but what information is given to serving personnel that these charities are available? It seems to me that there is not enough information available to serving personnel on this issue.
Earl Howe
The noble and gallant Lord raises a very important issue. I do not believe that there is any shortage of information available. Personnel are given briefings and advice on whom to contact if they think they need help. These are reinforced by publicity material such as posters and leaflets in all unit primary care centres. Information is also available online on the MoD’s area of the GOV.UK website. Similar guidance can be found on the NHS Choices pages. I believe that there has been a significant improvement in the provision of this kind of information in recent years.
The Role and Capabilities of the UK Armed Forces, in the Light of Global and Domestic Threats to Stability and Security
Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts(9 years, 9 months ago)
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Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for arranging this debate. I would like to follow on from the tour d’horizon of the noble Lord, Lord King, on one particular point—the number of platforms. I have expressed my concern on a number of previous occasions about the paucity of the number of platforms; by which I mean the airframes, ships and fighting vehicles that now form the front-line fighting strength of the three services.
I readily acknowledge that the striking power of individual platforms with modern, smart weapons provides a step change in hitting power and accuracy compared with previous generations. But that makes no allowance for the vulnerability of platforms themselves, nor of aircrew or other key sectors of manpower or logistics that support their use in combat. They are vulnerable to a variety of risks and not just those posed by an opponent. For example, there could be a hangar fire at an operational airfield that destroys a number of airframes; a loss of key components such as engines in a flood disaster; a damaging and fatal explosion in a crowded briefing room or on board a major warship; or a cyberattack on key intelligence or on equipment distribution. There could even be a tornado or other extreme weather event that causes physical damage. Any one of those risks and many more could deplete our already very limited front-line numerical striking strength, suddenly and unexpectedly. It is too easily forgotten that a freak hailstorm in Afghanistan in 2013 did more damage to front-line aircraft than the Taliban managed in the whole of the decade-long campaign in Helmand province. Is it a sensible policy that pays little or no heed to such potentially serious risks to combat capability?
Our complete mastery of the airspace in recent conflicts may also lure some into thinking that future operations will be just as loss-free from enemy action. But a better-resourced and capable opponent could in some future conflict readily inflict operational losses. Even against the less well-trained and equipped Argentinian forces in 1982, we lost half a dozen fighting ships with as many badly damaged, more than a third of our deployed fighter aircraft and numerous helicopters to Argentinian attacks. But we had sufficient strength in numbers to ride out those considerable setbacks. That strength had been procured many years previously and was operationally capable. Today, even small losses could greatly diminish our total combat ORBAT, which so lacks the numerical strength of earlier generations.
As has been mentioned, we pride ourselves that we punch above our weight, but the opposition, too, will doubtless mount some form of counterpunch. To succeed, we must have the resilience and firepower to overcome any form of counterpunch no matter how much damage or destruction it might inflict to our own front-line numbers. Let me say it again: we no longer have such resilience. That could be a critical factor between success and abject failure in future operations.
Even more critical so far as numerical platform strength is concerned is the vital contribution that conventional kinetic power has to play in sustaining and underwriting the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Previous generations of the deterrent were procured when front-line conventional strength was orders of magnitude greater than what is available today, or likely on present plans to be available in the foreseeable future. Thus, it would have been possible, if faced with some gross threat to national survival, to mount a strong or even sustained conventional response, along with other non-military responses, to the aggressor. This would indicate national resolve and serve to underwrite the determination, if national survival were at stake, and ultimately, after all else had failed to deter or defeat the aggressor, to rely on the threat of a devastating nuclear strike. I fear today that the Government’s determination to remain a nuclear power, which I still support in principle, lacks adequate conventional muscle to underwrite and give a sure credibility to a nuclear deterrent strategy.
What in-depth analysis has been made of a minimum force mix—conventional force mix—that might be necessary to provide the Government of the day with the ability to indicate with strength their resolve to resist an aggressor? Otherwise, due to a paucity of conventional combat power, the Prime Minister could be faced with a most dreadful dilemma: a choice of the very starkest nature. It would be a choice between almost immediate use of a failed deterrent or surrender to the opponent. Does the Minister accept that current levels of conventional hitting power are not yet sufficient to give the deterrent truly believable credibility? Will this aspect of the renewal plan for the four new submarines be given the consideration that it merits in the SDSR work now in hand?
Finally, I return briefly to another issue that I raised, so far without success, in your Lordships’ House. Surely, it is time for the Armed Forces, so much reduced in numbers, to expect and look for some reduction in the number of Ministers with direct responsibility in the Ministry of Defence. I am not singling out personalities: all six of them are most diligent and hard-working, most notably the noble Earl himself. But it should be possible to reapportion responsibilities to have at most five rather than six Ministers on the payroll. Such a discipline has been applied repeatedly over many years within all three services. It would be an important signal to the forces. They have faced redundancies and other cuts. It is time that their Ministers shared in that downsizing burden, allowing the costs saved to be applied elsewhere in the defence budget. It is a reasonable reduction and it is long overdue.