Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Wednesday 11th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I address my comments to the Government Benches, particularly the Government Front Bench.

If one looks at Commons Hansard from yesterday, from the last round of ping-pong, several things stand out. First, although we have been through many rounds of ping-pong, yesterday was the first time ever in ping-pong that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, was named and acknowledged. This is the same noble Baroness who was accused by a spokesman for the department of trying to bully the Government because she is an activist. This was the first time that the Front Bench mentioned the noble Baroness’s name, which I find extraordinary and slightly disrespectful.

Secondly, yesterday, Sir Chris Bryant, who was obviously on fine form, managed to annoy no fewer than three chairs of Commons Select Committees. He managed to annoy Dame Meg Hillier, who is the chair of the Treasury Select Committee and the Liaison Committee, by the lastminute.com manner in which the department suddenly landed the culture and science Select Committees with this idea of a parliamentary liaison group with no prior warning whatever—they and the House more broadly knew absolutely nothing about it until an email went out early on Saturday morning.

This is not the way to manage this issue. Certain Back-Benchers on the Government side have spoken during the course of ping-pong to make clear their discomfort and the uncomfortable position they are put in between their loyalty to their party and Government and their clear concern about the manner in which the Ministers involved are currently managing this process.

I would just like to encourage all members of the governing party to try—and if anything I have said or that we have heard here rings a bell with them—to please find a way of getting the message through so they understand that it is not simply we who are not members of the governing party who are concerned, but that noble Lords and Members of another place are also deeply concerned. Frankly, we want and expect a change of attitude and pace, much greater focus and a much clearer demonstration to all these people who are so concerned about their future and their livelihood that the Government are on their side, are on the case, and will defend them in any way they can.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as the chair of the Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society. We should all be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, for the very gracious way he introduced his amendment, particularly given the history of this inter-House discussion.

Whether it is betrayal, disrespect, negligence, bloody-mindedness, a bad dream or tone-deafness, whatever the reality, we find ourselves once again in this Chamber debating an issue that should have been settled long ago. I share the profound anger and frustration expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and admire her unwavering determination, even if she, for very honourable reasons, will not be voting today. As she pointed out, the Prime Minister, who entertained the tech industry at Chequers and Downing Street, is complicit in the situation we are in today.

We are here today because the Government have point-blank refused to move, repeatedly presenting the same proposition on three occasions while this House, by contrast, has put forward a series of genuine solutions in an attempt to find a way forward, as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, pointed out. The only new element seems to be a promise of a cross-party parliamentary working party, but what is so enticing about merely more talking when action is desperately needed?

Amendment 49U, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, and designed to amend the 1988 copyright Act, is a reasoned compromise. It requires identifying the copyrighted works and the means by which they were accessed, unless the developer has obtained a licence. That seems to be a fair trade-off. The noble Lord also pointed out that Minister Bryant has rather inadvertently made it clear that today’s amendment does not invoke financial privilege on this occasion. The Government argue that legislating piecemeal would be problematic, but the historical precedent of the Napster clause in the Digital Economy Act 2010 demonstrates that Parliament can and should take powers to act when a sector is facing an existential threat. There is an exact parallel with where we are today.

This is not about picking a side between AI and creativity, as we have heard across the House today. It is about ensuring that both can thrive through fair collaboration based on consent and compensation. We must ensure that the incentive remains for the next generation of creators and innovators. Given how Ministers have behaved in the face of the strength of feeling of the creative industries, how can anyone in those industries trust this Government and these Ministers ever again? Will they trust their instincts to appease big tech? I suspect not. I do not regard the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, as personally liable in this respect, but I hope she feels ashamed of her colleagues in the Commons, of the behaviour of her department and of her Government. In this House we will not forget.

There is still time for the Government to listen, to act and to secure a future where human creativity is not plundered but valued and protected. If the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, chooses to put this to a vote, on these Benches we will support him to the hilt. I urge all noble Lords from all Benches, if he does put it to a vote, to support the UK creative industries once again.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, as everybody has said, it is deeply disappointing that we once again find ourselves in this position. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has brought the concerns of copyright owners to the attention of the Government time and again. Throughout the progress of the Bill, the Government have declined to respond to the substance of those concerns and to engage with them properly. As I said in the previous round of ping-pong—I am starting to lose count—the uncertainty of the continued delay to this Bill is hurting all sides. Even businesses that are in industries far removed from concerns about AI and copyright are waiting for the data Bill. It has been delayed because of the Government’s frankly stubborn mismanagement of the Bill.

I understand completely why the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, feels sufficiently strongly about how the Government have acted to move his very inventive amendment. It strikes at the heart of how this Government should be treating your Lordships’ House. If Ministers hope to get their business through your Lordships’ House in good order, they will rely on this House trusting them and collaborating with them. I know that these decisions are often made by the Secretary of State. I have the highest respect for the Minister, but this is a situation of the Government’s making. I note in passing that it was very disappointing to read that the Government’s planned AI Bill will now be delayed by at least a year.

All that said, as the Official Opposition we have maintained our position, as ping-pong has progressed, that protracted rounds of disagreement between the other place and your Lordships’ House should be avoided. This situation could have been avoided if the Government had acted in good faith and sought compromise.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th June 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

148: After Clause 34, insert the following new Clause—
“Definition of AI System(1) For the purposes of this Act, “AI System” means an engineered or machine-based system that, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as content, predictions, forecasts, recommendations, or decisions influencing real or virtual environments. (2) AI systems may operate with varying degrees of autonomy and include use of algorithmic techniques such as natural language processing, large language models, multi-modal models, machine learning, speech or image recognition, neural networks, deep learning, or decision trees.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the definition of an AI System within the context of employment rights as an engineered system generating outputs from inputs using algorithmic techniques.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, first of all, I must make my apologies that this is my first contribution to the Bill. I have waited until day 7—I am not quite sure that that is entirely my fault—but it is a pleasure to speak in this group, particularly as I know that the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, is on the same page, even if he has put forward a different set of amendments.

In moving Amendment 148, I will also speak to Amendments 149 and 150. I hope that these amendments are of interest to the Committee; they are certainly close to my heart. They address the profound and rapidly evolving impact of artificial intelligence systems on the modern workplace. Reports by the Institute for the Future of Work and the All-Party Group on the Future of Work paint a clear picture: the wide spread of AI at work is transforming lives and livelihoods in ways that have plainly outpaced or avoid the existing regimes per regulation. The impact of AI will be profound and, although there are potential benefits, there are also significant risks or impacts on employment rights and conditions in the workplace. We must make sure that AI benefits are realised but also that the detriment is avoided.

As the All-Party Group on the Future of Work found, there is an urgent need to bring forward robust proposals to protect people and safeguard our fundamental values in the workplace. Existing regulatory frameworks are strained. Technical approaches commonly deployed before deployment of algorithmic systems are often inadequate. That is why a systematic framework for accountability is urgently required.

The workplace AI risk and impact assessments—WAIRIAs, as we have coined them—proposed by these amendments, are intended to provide such a framework. As the Institute for the Future of Work and others have argued, mandating such regimes of impact assessment is a practical response to a deficit of responsible foresight.

It is important for WAIRIAs to be made a legal requirement and for accompanying guidance to be issued to outline a framework. Amendment 148 defines what constitutes an “AI System” in this context as:

“an engineered system generating outputs from inputs using algorithmic techniques”.

That very clear definition ensures we are all addressing the same technology when discussing its regulation.

Amendment 149 introduces the cornerstone requirement for workplace AI risk and impact assessments. This amendment mandates that:

“Before implementing or developing an AI system which may have significant risks or impacts on employment rights and conditions in the workplace, an employer must conduct a workplace AI risk and impact assessment”.


The rationale for this is crucial. AI systems can have a potential significant risk or impact on areas vital to workers, including:

“the identification or exercise of rights … work access or allocation … remuneration or benefits … contractual status, terms or conditions …”

and even

“mental, physical or psychosocial health”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister. That is probably the most comprehensive statement about the Government’s intentions on AI regulation that I have heard in this Parliament, so I thank her and her officials for taking the time and trouble to set out their approach.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, talked about gap analysis. I am very much in favour of that. I do not want to see duplication of regulation; I want to see effective regulation. The noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, set out the challenge: will the Government address the new challenges? That seems to be absolutely at the heart of this.

I thank the Minister for her assurance that there will be an imminent consultation. I think all of us with an interest in this will very much want to take part in that. I hope that this mini-debate has started the ball rolling in getting people’s thoughts about what we can do. What the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, said was crucial; the illustrations she gave were exactly why we are concerned about these issues.

Talking of gap analysis, this morning I helped to launch the ICO’s new AI and biometrics strategy. We are all a bit nervous about this because we do not think the current ICO regime covers all the issues relating to AI use, particularly in the workplace. We are subject to exactly the issues that the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, put his finger on. The Government have no appetite for cross-sectoral regulation, but what does that mean? Does it mean having to pick off individual sectors, sector by sector, only to be told on individual Bills, “I’m sorry, it’s not appropriate to start legislating about AI in our particular bit of legislation”?

Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Wednesday 4th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

My Lords, I do not want to detain the House for long. I have sat through every stage of the Bill and not uttered a word. I have been absorbing the debate, and I am still puzzled as to why the Government are not willing to reach agreement with some of the wonderful statements being made.

I have two issues to reflect on. The first is that the creative arts have had a fantastic campaign, but it would be a mistake to think that this is only about the creative arts; it is to do with any property right where copyright is involved. The first to fall would probably be the creative arts, but anybody who is protected by copyright will be affected by AI in one way or another, unless you follow the wonderful wisdom of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron.

The second point is one for the Government to reflect on. They need to remember the words of Francis Pym, the first Foreign Secretary in Mrs Thatcher’s Government. They had a very big majority, and he dared to suggest to the Iron Lady that big majorities never make for good government. Why? Because you can rely on even those who do not listen to the debate to turn up and vote for your side. You know what happened to Francis Pym? He lost his job. How much will the Labour Government reflect on the experience of Francis Pym?

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I once again declare an interest as chair of the Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society, and once again give the staunch support of these Benches to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on her Motion A1. She made an incontestable case once again with her clarion call.

I follow the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and others in saying that we are not in new territory. I have a treasured cartoon on my wall at home that relates to the passage of the Health and Social Care Bill as long ago as 2001, showing Secretary of State Alan Milburn recoiling from ping-pong balls. Guess who was hurling the ping-pong balls? The noble Earl, Lord Howe, that notable revolutionary, and I were engaging in rounds of parliamentary ping-pong—three, I think. Eventually, compromises were reached and the Bill received Royal Assent in April 2001.

What we have done today and what we are going to do today as a House is not unprecedented. There is strong precedent for all Benches to work together on ping-pong to rather good effect. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, says, what we are proposing today will not, in the words of the Minister, “collapse” the Bill: it will be the Government’s choice what to do when the Bill goes back to the Commons. I hugely respect the noble Lord, Lord Knight, but I am afraid that he is wrong. It was not a manifesto commitment; there is no Salisbury convention that can be invoked on this occasion. It has nothing at all to do with data adequacy except that the Government feel that they have to get the Bill through in order to get the EU Commission to start its work. If anything, the Bill makes data adequacy more difficult. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, that I agree with almost everything he said: everything he said was an argument for the noble Baroness’s amendment. Once again, as ever, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, as I so often do on these occasions. I regard him as the voice of reason, and I very much hope that the Government will listen to what he has to say.

Compromise is entirely within the gift of the Government. The Secretary of State should take a leaf out of Alan Milburn’s book. He did compromise on an important Bill in key areas and saw his Bill go through. I am afraid to say that the letter that Peers have received from the Minister is simply a repeat of her speech on Monday, which was echoed by Minister Bryant in the Commons yesterday. The Government have tabled these new amendments, which reflect the contents of that letter. Despite those amendments, however, the Government have not offered a concession to legislate for mandated transparency provisions within the Bill, which has been the core demand of the Lords amendments championed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for the reasons set out in the speeches we have heard today.

In the view of these Benches, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, other Members of this House, and countless creatives have made the absolutely convincing case for a transparency duty which would not prejudge the outcome of the AI and copyright consultation. We have heard the chilling points made by the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Pannick, about US policy in this area and about the attitude of the big tech companies towards copyright. We are at a vital crossroads in how we ensure the future of our creative industries. In the face of the development of AI and how it is being trained, we must take the right road, and I urge the Government to settle now.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, given where we are, I will speak very briefly, but I will make just two points. First, I think it is worth saying that the uncertainty surrounding where we are with AI and copyright is itself damaging, not just to the creative sector, not just to AI labs and big tech in general, but to all those who will themselves be impacted by the Bill’s many other provisions. Overall, I think it is worth reminding ourselves that this is an important Bill whose original conception did not even address AI and copyright. It carried very important and valuable provisions—as the Minister pointed out in her opening remarks—on digital verification services, smart data schemes, the national underground asset register and others. These can genuinely drive national productivity. Indeed, that is why my party proposed them when we were in government. It is, therefore, deeply frustrating that the Government have not yet found a way forward on this, and I am afraid that I very much agree with the noble Lord, Lord Knight. The way the Government have gone about this has been reprehensible: I think that is the word I would use.

Ofcom: Protection of Children Codes

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Monday 2nd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

The noble Viscount has raised an important issue. Ofcom has recognised that live-streaming can pose specific risks to children and will consult on proposals to reduce these risks, alongside a number of other measures. It will publish this consultation before the Summer Recess. The Act and Ofcom’s codes are clear: services are required to use highly effective age assurance to prevent children encountering primary priority content, including pornography. That will extend to live-streaming services that allow pornography.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I declare my ombudsman interest as set out in the register. The SLSC questioned, quite rightly, how practical it is for children to complain about harmful content and noted that it was unclear what further action children could take if a complaint was rejected by a service provider. How will Ofcom and the Government ensure that complaint mechanisms are truly practical, accessible and designed with a children-first approach? What independent recourse will children have if their complaints about harmful content are rejected by service providers?

Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Monday 2nd June 2025 Lords Chamber

Secondly, the Secretary of State is very anxious to find a compromise and a way forward that protects the creative industries—

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord is very selectively quoting from what the Secretary of State had to say. The Secretary of State did change his position and acknowledged that existing copyright law is very certain. However, he went on to say that the law was not fit for purpose. That is an absolute giveaway in the circumstances. Whose agenda is he pursuing, in that case? Big tech’s?

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

It seems obvious that we have a technological revolution under way, and we have to consider how best we can protect the creative industries in that situation. It is a completely different world that we are now moving into. Peter Kyle is saying that AI copyright needs properly considered and enforceable legislation, drafted with the inclusion, involvement and experience of both creatives and technologists. That is what he intends to do in the coming months.

Therefore, I think the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has won on this point and we should now gracefully withdraw from further ping-pong.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Roberts of Belgravia (Con)]

My Lords, may I also trespass on your patience? I, like my noble friend Lord Dobbs, live on my royalties. The AI companies have—very irritatingly—bought only one of my 20 books; they paid about £3,000, and so, as you can imagine, I am very keen that they should buy the other 19.

It strikes me that it cannot be beyond the wit of man to organise a register system or licence system—it has only just happened in the United States, with regard to Amazon buying out New York Times back copies—whereby there is no threat or danger of republication but all that is happening is the information is mined by these companies. Such a system surely can and should happen.

The reason I am supporting the Motion tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, is that at the very least it will embarrass future Secretaries of State when they have to come to the House and essentially admit they have undermined one of the great British inventions. For 300 years, the law of copyright has been helping and driving creativity in this country.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of the Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society. I offer the unequivocal and steadfast support from the Liberal Democrat Benches for Motion A1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, which introduces Amendment 49F in lieu of Amendment 49D.

It is absolutely clear that the noble Baroness’s speeches become better and more convincing the more we go on. Indeed, the arguments being made today for these amendments become better and more convincing as time goes on. I believe we should stand firm, as the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, said.

Time and time again, we all have had to address the narrative stated in the consultation paper and repeated by Ministers suggesting there is uncertainty or a lack of clarity in existing UK copyright law regarding AI training. We have heard that the Secretary of State has just recently acknowledged that the existing copyright law is “very certain”, but as I said to the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, he has also stated that

“it is not fit for purpose”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1234.]

That makes the narrative even worse than saying that copyright law is uncertain.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has rightly asserted, we do not need to change copyright law. It is the view of many that existing law is clear and applies to the commercial use of copyrighted works for AI training. The issue is not a deficient law but rather the ability to enforce it in the current AI landscape. As the noble Baroness has also profoundly put it—I have got a number of speeches to draw on, as you can see—what you cannot see, you cannot enforce. The core problem is a lack of transparency from AI developers: without knowing what copyrighted material has been used to train models and how it was accessed, creators and rights holders are unable to identify potential infringements and pursue appropriate licensing or legal action.

In striking down previous Lords amendments, the Government have suggested that this House was at fault for using the wrong Bill. They have repeatedly claimed that it is too soon for transparency and too late to prevent stealing, and they have asserted that accepting the Lords transparency amendment would prioritise one sector over another. But that is exactly what the Government are doing. They have suggested an expert working group, an economic impact assessment, a report on the use of copyright, and then, I think, a report on progress in what the noble Baroness the Minister had to say. But, as many noble Lords have said today, none of that gives us the legislative assurance —the certainty, as the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, put it—that we need in these circumstances.

The Government have objected to being asked to introduce regulations because of financial privilege, and now, it seems—I can anticipate what the noble Baroness the Minister is going to say—are objecting to the requirement to bring forward a draft Bill with this amendment. But the Government are perfectly at liberty to bring forward their own amendment allowing for transparency via regulations, a much more expeditious and effective route that the House has already overwhelmingly supported. Transparency is the necessary foundation for a functioning licensing market, promotes trust between the AI sector and the creative industries, and allows creators to be fairly compensated when their work contributes value to AI models.

The Government have asked for a degree of trust for their plans. This amendment, while perhaps less than creators deserve—I think the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, described it as the bare minimum—is a step that would help earn that trust. It is this Government who can do that, and I urge them to heed the words of their own Back-Benchers: the noble Lords, Lord Cashman, Lord Rooker and Lord Brennan, all asked the Government to find a compromise.

I urge all noble Lords, in the face of a lack of compromise by the Government, to support Motion A1.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, as this is the third round of ping-pong, as many noble Lords have observed, I will speak very briefly. If the noble Baroness the Minister has not by now understood how strongly noble Lords on all sides of the House feel about this issue, it may be too late anyway.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has made an increasingly powerful case for the Government to act in defence of the rights of copyright owners, and we continue to call on the Government to listen. We have of course discussed this at great length. The noble Baroness has tabled a new Motion which would require Ministers to make a Statement and bring forward a draft Bill. Given that the Minister has expressed her sympathy for the concerns of your Lordships’ House previously, surely this new Motion would be acceptable to the Government as a pathway toward resolving the problem, and we again urge the Government to accept it.

However, whatever choice the Government make—I do not think anyone could claim that any part of this is an easy problem, as my noble friend Lord Vaizey pointed out—many of us are frustrated by the absence of agility, boldness and imagination in their approach. That said, speaking at least from the Front Bench of a responsible Opposition, we take the view that we cannot engage further in protracted ping-pong. We are a revising Chamber, and, although it is right to ask the Government to think again when we believe they have got it wrong, we feel we must ultimately respect the will of the elected Chamber.

Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Monday 19th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her engagement and for defining what genuine scientific research is. I hope very much that the AI companies, when using this extraordinary exemption, will listen to the Government, and that the Government will ensure that the policy is enforced. The trust of the people of this country would be lost if they felt that their data was being reused by AI companies simply for product enrichment and profit, rather than for genuine scientific research. I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their parties’ support.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for her introduction to the three Motions in this group.

On these Benches, we welcome the Supreme Court’s judgment on the meaning of “sex” in the Equality Act 2010. However, as Ministers have stressed—and we agree—it is paramount that we work through the implications of this judgment carefully and sensitively. As we have previously discussed, the EHRC is currently updating its statutory guidance.

Ministers have previously given assurances that they are engaged in appropriate and balanced work on data standards and data accuracy, and we accept those assurances. They have given a further assurance today about how the digital verification services framework will operate. We rely on those ministerial assurances. In summary, we believe that the previously proposed amendments were premature in the light of the EHRC guidance and that they risk undermining existing data standards work. On that basis, we support the Minister in her Motions A and D.

Turning to Motion B, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, will not press his Amendment 43B at this stage, as he intends to accept the assurances given by Ministers. We have consistently supported the noble Viscount’s efforts to ensure that scientific research benefiting from the Bill’s provisions for data reuse is conducted according to appropriate ethical, legal and professional frameworks. The Government have given significant assurances in this area. We understand that their position is that the Bill does not alter the existing legal definition or threshold for what constitutes scientific research under UK GDPR. The Bill does not grant any new or expanded permissions for the reuse of data for scientific research purposes, and, specifically, it does not provide blanket approval for using personal data for training AI models under the guise of scientific research. The use of personal data for scientific research remains subject to the comprehensive safeguards of UK GDPR, including the requirement for a lawful basis, the adherence to data protection principles and the application of the reasonableness test, which requires an objective assessment.

The collection of assurances given during several stages of the Bill provides reassurance against the risk that commercial activities, such as training AI models purely for private gain, could improperly benefit from exemptions intended for genuine scientific research serving the public good. I very much hope that the Minister can reaffirm these specific points and repeat those assurances.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions. I reassure your Lordships’ House that the Government are progressing workstreams focused on the accuracy and reliability of sex data in public authority datasets in a holistic and measured manner, as I have described in previous debates. We welcome the Supreme Court ruling, and are now working hard to consider those findings and the upcoming guidance from the equalities regulator, which will help.

I reiterate that the trust framework requires DVS providers to comply with data protection legislation, including the data accuracy principle, where they use and share personal data. That includes the creation of reusable digital identities, as well as one-off checks. If they fail to comply with these requirements, they could lose their certification. This means that the sex information listed on a passport—which, as we all know, could be a combination of biological sex, legal sex under the Gender Recognition Act and gender identity—cannot be used to verify biological sex.

The noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, asked whether a person can have different genders appearing on different documents. Yes, you could have both genders appearing on different documents, but they could not be used to prove biological sex.

I should say to noble Lords that there is a requirement for all this information to be recreated, reused and rechecked each time. In response to noble Lords who asked about historic data, the data will be renewed and checked under the new information that is now available.

In the majority of cases where DVS are used, there will not be a need to verify biological sex, as we have noted before, because many DVS requirements do not ask that question. Data sharing under the power created in Clause 45 will involve new processing of data, which must be in compliance with the data accuracy principle: that is, it must be accurate for the purpose for which the information will be used. Of particular relevance, given that public authorities will be sharing data for verification purposes, is the fact that data accuracy principles require that the personal data must not be misleading.

With regard to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, about supplementary codes of practice, I can confirm that the trust framework already includes requirements on data accuracy for DVS providers. That framework will, of course, be updated from time to time.

On scientific research, let me repeat my thanks to the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, for his contribution on this issue. I am glad that he was reassured by my remarks that we have been able to come to an agreeable resolution. I very much concur with the comments of the noble Lord Clement-Jones, that there has to be an ethical basis to those standards, and that point is absolutely well made.

On that basis, I hope I have reassured noble Lords. I commend the Motion to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of the Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society.

I express the extremely strong support of all on these Benches for Motion C1, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I agree with every speech that we have heard so far in today’s debate—I did not hear a single dissenting voice to the noble Baroness’s Motion. Once again, I pay tribute to her; she has fought a tireless campaign for the cause of creators and the creative industries throughout the passage of the Bill.

I will be extremely brief, given that we want to move to a vote as soon as possible. The House has already sent a clear message by supporting previous amendments put forward by the noble Baroness, and I hope that the House will be as decisive today. As we have heard this afternoon, transparency is crucial. This would enable the dynamic licensing market that is needed, as we have also heard. How AI is developed and who it benefits are two of the most important questions of our time—and the Government must get the answer right. As so many noble Lords have said, the Government must listen and must think again.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, it is probably redundant to pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her tenacity and determination to get to a workable solution on this, because it speaks for itself. It has been equally compelling to hear such strong arguments from all sides of the House and all Benches—including the Government Benches—that we need to find a solution to this complex but critical issue.

Noble Lords will recall that, on these Benches, we have consistently argued for a pragmatic, technology-based solution to this complex problem, having made the case for digital watermarking both in Committee and on Report. When we considered the Commons amendments last week, we worked closely with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, to find a wording for her amendment which we could support, and were pleased to be able to do so and to vote with her.

It is important that the Government listen and take action to protect the rights of creatives in the UK. We will not stop making the case for our flourishing and important creative sector. We have put that case to Ministers, both in your Lordships’ House and at meetings throughout the passage of the Bill. As a responsible Opposition, though, it is our view that we must be careful about our approach to amendments made by the elected House. We have, I hope, made a clear case to the Government here in your Lordships’ House and the Government have, I deeply regret to say, intransigently refused to act. I am afraid that they will regret their failure to take this opportunity to protect our creative industries. Sadly, there comes a point where we have to accept that His Majesty’s Government must be carried on and the Government will get their Bill.

Before concluding, I make two final pleas to the Minister. First, as others have asked, can she listen with great care to the many artists, musicians, news organisations, publishers and performers who have called on the Government to help them more to protect their intellectual property?

Secondly, can she find ways to create regulatory clarity faster? The process that the Government envisage to resolve this issue is long—too long. Actors on all sides of the debate will be challenged by such a long period of uncertainty. I understand that the Minister is working at pace to find a solution, but not necessarily with agility. I echo the brilliant point made by my noble friend Lady Harding that agility and delivering parts of the solution are so important to pick up the pace of this, because perfect is the enemy of good in this instance. When she gets up to speak, I hope that the Minister will tell us more about the timeline that she envisages, particularly for the collaboration of DSIT and DCMS.

This is a serious problem. It continues to grow and is not going away. Ministers must grip it with urgency and agility.

Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Monday 12th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tarassenko (CB)]

My Lords, I am authorised to speak on Motion 43A, as someone with regular day-to-day experience of scientific research. Since I started my PhD in 1981, I have had the privilege of spending more than half my working life doing scientific research in the UK—the last 20 years working with very sensitive patient data. Most of that research has been carried out in an academic setting, but some of it has been in collaboration with medtech, AI and pharmaceutical companies.

This research has required me to become familiar with many three-letter and four-letter acronyms. Noble Lords will know about DBS, but they might not know about RSO, TRO, HRA, LREC, MREC, CAG, and IRAS, to name just a few. I have spent hundreds of hours working with clinical colleagues to fill in integrated research application system—IRAS—forms. IRAS is used to apply for Health Research Authority—HRA—approval for research projects involving the NHS, social care or the criminal justice system. I have appeared before not only medical research ethics committees, or MRECs, which test whether a research protocol is scientifically valid and ethical, but local research ethics committees, or LRECs, which consider the suitability of individual researchers and local issues.

I was involved in a research project which reused data acquired from patients on a Covid isolation ward during the first two waves of the pandemic. That research project sought to understand how nurses interpreted continuous data from the clinical-grade wearables we used to monitor these high-risk patients during Covid. It took our research team more than 18 months to obtain the relevant permissions to reuse the data for our proposed analysis. Our application was reviewed by the Confidentiality Advisory Group—CAG—which provides independent expert advice on the use of confidential patient information without consent for research and non-research purposes. CAG already considers whether accessing the confidential data is justified by the public interest. Its advice is then used by the HRA and the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care to decide whether to grant access to the confidential data.

The existing provisions in this country to allow access to data for research purposes are stringent, and it is entirely right that they should be. The UK is respected the world over for the checks and balances of its research governance. The relevant safeguards already exist in the current legislation. Adding a further public interest test will only increase the amount of bureaucracy that will inevitably be introduced by the research services offices, or RSOs, and the translational research offices, or TROs, of our universities, which are very good at doing this.

The extra burden will fall on the researchers themselves, and some researchers may decide to concentrate their available time and energy elsewhere. This amendment, I am afraid, will have the unintended consequence of having a negative impact on research in this country, so I cannot support it.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, an onlooker might be forgiven for not perceiving a common theme in this group of amendments, but I thank the Minister for his introduction and the noble Viscounts for introducing their amendments so clearly.

I acknowledge that Motion 32A and Amendments 32B and 32C and Motion 52A and Amendments 52B and 52C from the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, are considerably less prescriptive than the Spencer amendment in the House of Commons to introduce new Clause 21, which seemed to require public authorities to comb through every record to rectify data, went significantly further than the findings of the Supreme Court judgment, and potentially failed to account for the privacy afforded to GRC holders under the Gender Recognition Act. However, the Liberal Democrats will abstain from votes on the noble Viscount’s amendments for several key reasons.

Our primary reason is the need to allow time for the EHRC’s guidance to be finalised. I thought the Minister made his case there. The EHRC is currently updating its code of practice, as we have heard, to reflect the implications of the Supreme Court judgment on the meaning of sex in the Equality Act, with the aim of providing it to the Government by the end of June. This guidance, as I understand it, is intended specifically to support service providers, public bodies and others in understanding their duties under the Equality Act and putting them into practice in the light of the judgment. The EHRC is undertaking a public consultation to understand how the practical implications can best be reflected. These amendments, in our view, are an attempt to jump the gun on, second-guess or at the least pre-empt the EHRC’s code of practice.

On these Benches, we believe that any necessary changes or clarifications regarding data standards should be informed by the official guidance and implemented consistently in a coherent and workable manner. We should allow time for the EHRC’s guidance to be finalised, ensuring that any necessary changes or clarifications regarding data standards are informed by its advice and implemented consistently across public authorities in a coherent and workable manner. We have concerns about workability and clarity. Although the amendments proposed by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, are less prescriptive than previous similar proposals in the Commons tabled by Dr Spencer, we have concerns about their practical implementation. Questions arise about how public authorities would reliably ascertain biological sex if someone has a gender recognition certificate and has updated their birth certificate. I have long supported same-sex wards in the NHS, but I do not believe that these amendments are helpful in pursuing clarity following the Supreme Court judgment. We heard what the Minister had to say about passports.

I welcome the clarity provided by the Supreme Court judgment, but there are clearly implications, both practical and legal, to be worked out, such as those mentioned by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I thought he put his finger on many of those issues. I trust that the EHRC will deliver the right result. I agree that data needs to be accurate, and I welcome the Sullivan report, as did my noble friend. In summary, we will be abstaining. We believe that the EHRC process needs to conclude and provide comprehensive guidance, while also reflecting concerns about the workability and appropriateness of specific legislative interventions on data standards at this time.

I move on to Amendment 43B, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. This amendment may not reinstate the precise wording

“conducted in the public interest”

that we previously inserted in this House, but it would introduce safeguards that seek to address the same fundamental concerns articulated during our debate on Report. It does two important things.

First, it provides a definition of “scientific research”, clarifying it as

“creative and systematic work undertaken in order to increase the stock of knowledge”.

This directly addresses the concerns raised on Report that the line between product development and scientific research is often blurred, with developers sometimes positing efforts to increase model capabilities or study risks as scientific research. Having a clear definition helps to distinguish genuine research from purely commercial activity cloaked as such.

Secondly, and critically, Amendment 43B would require:

“To meet the reasonableness test”


already present in the Bill,

“the activity being described as scientific research must be conducted according to appropriate ethical, legal and professional frameworks, obligations and standards”.

This requirement seeks to embed within the reasonableness test the principles that underpinned our arguments for the public interest requirement on Report and is the same as the amendment put forward by the chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Select Committee, Chi Onwurah MP, which ties the definition to the definition in the OECD’s Frascati Manual: Guidelines for Collecting and Reporting Data on Research and Experimental Development:

“creative and systematic work undertaken in order to increase the stock of knowledge—including knowledge of humankind, culture and society—and to devise new applications of available knowledge”.

The Frascati framework is used worldwide by Governments, universities and research institutions to report R&D statistics, inform science policy and underpin R&D tax credit regimes, and it serves as a common language and reference point for international comparisons and policy decisions related to scientific research and innovation. These frameworks, obligations and standards are important because they serve the very purposes we previously identified for the public interest test: ensuring societal benefit, building public trust, preventing misuse for commercial ends, addressing harmful applications, and alignment with standards.

Amendment 43B in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, is a thoughtful and necessary counter-proposal. It is Parliament’s opportunity to insist that the principles of public benefit, trust and responsible conduct, rooted in established frameworks, must remain central to the definition of scientific research that benefits from data re-use exceptions.

I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Winston, had to say in his very powerful speech, but I cannot see how the amendment from the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, cuts across all the things that he wants to see in the outcomes of research.

[Lord Winston (Lab)]

As the noble Lord has mentioned my name, I simply ask him this question: does he recall the situation only some 45 years ago when there was massive public outcry about in vitro fertilisation, when there were overwhelming votes against in vitro fertilisation in both Houses of Parliament on two occasions, and when, finally, a Private Member’s Bill was brought, which would have abolished IVF in this country? Had that happened, of course, an amendment such as this would have prevented the research happening in England and would have made a colossal difference not only to our knowledge of embryo growth, but our knowledge of development, ageing, the development of cancer and a whole range of things that we never expected from human embryology. I beg the noble Lord to consider that.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I have had a misspent not-so-youth over the past 50 years. As a lawyer, when I read the wording in the amendment, I cannot see the outcome that he is suggesting. This wording does not cut across anything that he has had to say. I genuinely believe that. I understand how genuine he is in his belief that this is a threat, but I do not believe this wording is such a threat.

I also understand entirely what the noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, had to say, but an awful lot of that was about the frustration and some of the controls over health data. That does not apply in many other areas of scientific research. The Frascati formula is universal and well accepted. The noble Viscount made an extremely good case; we should be supporting him.

[Lord Vallance of Balham (Lab)]

I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, for his Motion 32A and Amendments 32B and 32C, and Motion 52A and Amendments 52B and 52C. I reiterate that this Government have been clear that we accept the Supreme Court judgment on the meaning of sex for equalities legislation. However, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, says, it is critically important that the Government work through the effect of this ruling with care, sensitivity and in line with the law.

When it comes to public sector data, we must work through the impacts of this judgment properly. This would involve considering the scope of the judgment and the upcoming EHRC guidance. Critically, the Equality and Human Rights Commission has indicated that it will be updating its statutory code of practice for services, public functions and associations in light of this ruling, which will include some of the examples raised this afternoon, including by my noble friend Lady Hayter.

Ministers will consider the proposals once the EHRC has submitted its updated draft. It is right that the Government and, indeed, Parliament fully consider this guidance alongside the judgment itself before amending the way that public authorities collect, hold and otherwise process data—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about the EHRC ruling.

I set out in my opening speech that this Government take the issue of data accuracy seriously. That is why, as I outlined, there are numerous existing work streams addressing the way in which sex and gender data are collected and otherwise processed across the public sector.

The digital verification services amendments that we have discussed today are misplaced, because the Bill does not alter the evidence and does not seek to alter the content of data used by digital verification services. Instead, the Bill enables people to do digitally what they can do physically. It is for organisations to consider what specific information they need to verify their circumstances, and how they go about doing that. Any inconsistency between what they can do digitally and what they can do physically would cause further confusion.

While this Government understand the intention behind the amendments, the concerns regarding the way in which public authorities process sex and gender data should be considered holistically, taking into account the effects of the Supreme Court ruling, the upcoming guidance from the equalities regulator and the specific requirements of public authorities. It is very unlikely that the digital verification services would be used for many of the cases specifically raised by or with many noble Lords. We expect DVS to be used primarily to prove things like one’s right to work or one’s age, address or professional educational qualifications.

The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, rightly highlights that the proposals have the potential to interfere with the right to respect for private and family life under the Human Rights Act by, in effect, indiscriminately and indirectly pushing public authorities to record sex as biological sex in cases where it is not necessary or proportionate in that particular circumstance. I raise the example that has been brought up several times, and again by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox: it is not relevant for the French passport officer to know your biological sex. That is not the purpose of the passport.

We acknowledge, however, that there are safeguards that address the concerns raised by noble Lords, including those of the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, regarding information being shared under Clause 45 but without presenting issues that could cut across existing or prospective legislation and guidance. I remind the House that the data accuracy principle is already included in law. The principle requires that only data accurate for the purpose for which it is held can be used. Again, there are workstreams looking at data use to answer the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, and indeed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked why it was not accurate for 15 years and what that means about our reliance on this accuracy. I am afraid the fact is that it was accurate for 15 years because there was a muddle about what was being collected. There was no requirement to push for biological sex, but that is the case now. In response to the question of whether you could end up with two different sources of digital verification showing two different biological sexes, the answer is no.

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[Lord Freyberg (CB)]

My Lords, I support Motion 49A from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I will also address claims that we have heard repeatedly in these debates: that transparency for AI data is technically unfeasible. This claim, forcefully pushed by technology giants such as Google, is not only unsupported by evidence but deliberately misleading.

As someone with a long-standing background in the visual arts, and as a member of DACS—the Design and Artists Copyright Society—I have witnessed first-hand how creators’ works are being exploited without consent or compensation. I have listened carefully to the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, in both his email to colleagues today and the letter from entrepreneurs to the Secretary of State. Although I deeply respect their expertise and commitment to innovation, I must firmly reject their assessment, which echoes the talking points of trillion-dollar tech corporations.

The claims by tech companies that transparency requirements are technically unfeasible have been thoroughly debunked. The LAION dataset already meticulously documents over 5 billion images, with granular detail. Companies operate crawler services on this dataset to identify images belonging to specific rights holders. This irrefutably demonstrates that transparency at scale is not only possible but already practised when it suits corporate interests.

Let us be clear about what is happening: AI companies are systematically ingesting billions of copyrighted works without permission or payment, then claiming it would be too difficult to tell creators which works have been taken. This is theft on an industrial scale, dressed up as inevitable technological progress.

The claim from the noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, that these amendments would damage UK AI start-ups while sparing US technology giants is entirely backwards. Transparency would actually level the playing field by benefiting innovative British companies while preventing larger firms exploiting creative works without permission. I must respectfully suggest that concerns about potential harm to AI start-ups should be balanced against the devastating impact on our creative industries, thousands of small businesses and individual creators whose livelihoods depend on proper recognition and compensation for their work. Their continued viability depends fundamentally on protecting intellectual property rights. Without transparency, how can creators even begin to enforce these rights? The question answers itself.

This is not about choosing between technology and creativity; it is about ensuring that both sectors can thrive through fair collaboration based on consent and compensation. Transparency is not an obstacle to innovation; it is the foundation on which responsible, sustainable innovation is built.

Google’s preferred approach would reverse the fundamental basis of UK copyright law by placing an unreasonable burden on rights holders to opt out of having their work stolen. This approach is unworkable and would, effectively, legalise mass copyright theft to benefit primarily American technology corporations.

Rather than waiting for a consultation outcome that may take years, while creative works continue to be misappropriated, Motion 49A offers a practical step forward that would benefit both sectors while upholding existing law. I urge the House to support it.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, it has been a privilege to listen to today’s debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, really has opened the floodgates to expressions of support for human creativity. I thank her for tabling her Motion. I also thank the Minister for setting out the Government’s position and their support for the creative industries.

I suppose I straddle the world of AI and creativity as much as anybody in this House. I co-founded the All-Party Group on Artificial Intelligence and I have been a member of the All-Party Group on Intellectual Property for many years. That is reflected in my interests, both as an advisor to DLA Piper on AI policy and regulation, and as the newly appointed chair of the Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society. I declare those interests, which are more than merely formal.

The subject matter of the amendments in this group is of profound importance for the future of our creative industries and the development of AI in the UK: the critical intersection of AI training and copyright law, and, specifically, the urgent need for transparency. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, described, the rapid development of AI, particularly large language models, relies heavily on vast volumes of data for training. This has brought into sharp focus the way copyright law applies to such activity. It was impossible to miss the letter over the weekend from 400 really important creatives, and media and creative business leaders urging support for her Motion 49A. Rights holders, from musicians and authors to journalists and visual artists, are rightly concerned about the use of their copyrighted material to train AI models, often without permission or remuneration, as we have heard. They seek greater control over their content and remuneration when it is used for this purpose, alongside greater transparency.

Like others, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who has brilliantly championed the cause of creators and the creative industries throughout the passage of this Bill in her tabling of a series of crucial amendments. Her original amendments on Report, passed in this House but deleted by the Government in the Commons and then retabled in the Commons on Report by my honourable friends, aimed to make existing UK copyright law enforceable in the age of generative AI. The core argument behind Amendment 49B, which encapsulates the essence of the previous amendments, is that innovation in the AI field should not come at the expense of the individuals and industry creating original content.

The central plank of the noble Baroness’s proposals, and one these Benches strongly support, is the requirement for transparency from AI developers regarding the copyrighted material used in their training data. Her Amendment 49B specifically requires the Secretary of State to make regulations setting out strict transparency requirements for web crawlers and general-purpose AI models. This would include disclosing the identity and purpose of the crawlers used, identifying their owners and, crucially, keeping records of where and when copyrighted material is gathered. This transparency is vital for ensuring accountability and enabling copyright holders to identify potential infringements and enforce their rights.

The Minister described the process in the consultation on AI and copyright, published last December. That consultation proposed a text and data mining exception that would allow AI developers to train on material unless the rights holder expressly reserved their rights or opted out. The arguments against this proposed opt-out mechanism are compelling; they have been made by many noble Lords today and have been voiced by many outside, as we have heard. This mechanism shifts the burden on to creators to police the use of their work and actively opt out, placing an undue responsibility on them.

This approach undermines the fundamental principles of copyright, effectively rewarding the widespread harvesting or scraping of copyrighted material that has occurred without permission or fair remuneration. The Government’s proposed text and data-mining exception, which it appears that they are no longer proposing—as the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, asked, perhaps the Minister can clarify the Government’s position and confirm that that is indeed the case—risks harming creative sectors for minimal gain to a small group of global tech companies and could erode public trust in the AI sector. As the noble Baroness observed, this approach is selling the creative industries down the river. Voluntary measures for transparency proposed by the Government are insufficient. Clear legal obligations are needed.

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[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has said everything I was going to say and more and better, so I want just to pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, and to say that I too have witnessed her forensic fight over the last few months. I hugely admire her for it, and I congratulate her on getting this far. I absolutely share all the concerns that both noble Baronesses have expressed. Just in case I do not have the opportunity again, I congratulate the noble Baroness on her extraordinary work and campaigning.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the three noble Baronesses, and I too congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, on her magnificent and successful campaign to outlaw the making and requesting of non-consensual images, first with her Private Member’s Bill and then with amendments to this Bill. She has fought it with huge skill and determination, and, rightly, she has pushed it to the wire in wanting the most robust offence and tightest defences possible. I thank the Minister for his flexibility that he has shown so far—with the emphasis on “so far”.

The amendments that the noble Baroness has put forward represent a compromise, given the strong and rather extraordinary opinion of the Attorney-General that the defence of “reasonable excuse” is needed for the defence to be compliant with the ECHR and that, therefore, the whole Bill risks being non-compliant if that is not contained in the defence for these offences. That is the equivalent of a legal brick wall, despite an excellent opinion from Professor Clare McGlynn, which in my view demolished the Attorney-General’s case, which seems to be based on ensuring the ability of big tech companies to red team their models on images used without consent. That is a rather peculiar basis. Why cannot the big tech companies use images with consent? They would then be red teaming in a rather different and more compliant way.

AI: Child Sexual Abuse Material

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 30th April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

The noble Baroness is quite right that we have to keep the technology up to date, and of course we are endeavouring to do that. I should say that UK law applies to AI-generated CSAM in the same way as to real child sexual abuse. Creating, possessing or distributing any child sex abuse images, including those generated by AI, is illegal. Generative AI child sexual abuse imagery is priority illegal content under the Online Safety Act in the same way as real content. However, she is quite right: we have to keep abreast of the technology. We are working at pace across government to make sure that we have the capacity to do that.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the Children’s Commissioner, Dame Rachel de Souza, and the IWF have both called for a total ban on apps which allow nudification, where photos of real people are edited by AI to make them appear naked. The commissioner has been particularly critical about the fact that such apps

“go unchecked with extreme real-world consequences”.

Will the Government act and ban these AI-enabled tools outright?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for that question. The Government are actively looking at options to address nudification tools, and we hope to provide an update shortly. It is a matter that we take seriously. If such tools are used to create child sexual abuse material, UK law is clear that creating, possessing or distributing child sexual abuse images, including those generated using nudification tools, is already illegal, regardless of whether it depicts a real child or not.

Electronic Communications (Networks and Services) (Designated Vendor Directions) (Penalties) Order 2025

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 25th March 2025 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government take the security of public telecoms seriously. As noble Lords know, the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 received Royal Assent on 17 November 2021. The Act established powers to introduce a new telecommunications security framework and introduced new vendor security powers. It is these vendor security powers that are relevant to this statutory instrument.

The Act allows the Secretary of State to issue a designation notice to a vendor whose presence in the UK networks poses national security risks, and designated vendor directions to public communications providers placing controls on their use of equipment or services by a designated vendor. The Act also gives the Secretary of State powers to impose a penalty on a public communications provider that does not comply with a designated vendor direction issued to it. That penalty can be up to 10% of a provider’s turnover. The Act states that the Secretary of State must set out rules for how they intend to calculate a provider’s turnover. That includes what relevant business the Secretary of State will take into account when calculating that turnover.

The Electronic Communications (Networks and Services) (Penalties) (Rules for Calculation of Turnover) Order 2003 sets out rules for Ofcom to calculate a provider’s turnover when it contravenes conditions set under the Communications Act 2003. The statutory instrument makes changes to the 2003 order so that rules in that legislation apply when calculating turnover for the purposes of determining a penalty for enforcement of designated vendor directions. It also defines what is to be treated as a network service facility or business by reference to which the calculation of turnover is to be made.

The Secretary of State could have relied on the 2003 order for the purposes of enforcement of a designated vendor direction. However, this SI removes any ambiguity and provides legal certainty and absolute clarity on the rules that apply. Turnover will be calculated in line with accounting practices and principles generally accepted in the United Kingdom and will be limited to the amount derived by that provider after the deduction of relevant taxes.

In conclusion, this is a narrowly focused but important statutory instrument through which we are ensuring legal certainty and clarity. It makes clear the Secretary of State’s approach to calculating turnover, which will underpin any decision to penalise a provider in relation to the designated vendor directions. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her introduction to this draft statutory instrument; it was brief and to the point. These penalties will be able to reach 10% of turnover or £100,000 per day for continuing breaches, so getting the calculations right is crucial. However, I have some concerns about the SI, the first of which is about timing.

I do not understand why we are looking at a three-year gap between the enabling powers and the calculation rules. The Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021, which I worked on, was presented to this House as urgent legislation to protect critical national infrastructure, yet here we are, in 2025, only now establishing how to calculate penalties for breaches in the way set out in this SI. During this period, we have had enforcement powers without the ability to properly determine penalties. As I understand it, tier 1 providers had to comply by March 2024, yet the penalty calculation mechanism will not be in place until this year—no doubt in a few weeks’ time.

Secondly, there is the absence of consultation. The Explanatory Memorandum cites the reason as the SI’s “technical nature”, but these penalties—I mentioned their size—could have major financial implications for providers. The telecoms industry has complex business structures and revenue streams. Technical expertise from the industry could have helped to ensure that these calculations are practical and comprehensive. The technical justification seems remarkably weak, given the impact these rules could have. For example, the current definition of “relevant business” for these calculations focuses on traditional network and service provision, but modern telecoms companies often have diverse revenue streams. There is no clear provision for new business models or technologies. How will we handle integrated service providers? What about international revenues? The treatment of associated services needs clarification.

Thirdly, the implementation sequence is an issue. We are being asked to approve penalty calculations before seeing the enforcement guidelines. There is no impact assessment, so we cannot evaluate potential consequences. I understand that the post-implementation review is not scheduled until 2026, and there is no clear mechanism for adjusting the framework if problems emerge. The interaction with the existing penalty regime needs clarification.

There are also technical concerns that need some attention. The switch from “notified provider” to “person” in the 2003 order, as a result of this SI, needs rather more explanation. The calculation method for continuing breaches is not fully detailed, there is no specific provision for group companies or complex corporate structures and the treatment of joint ventures and partnerships remains unclear.

Finally, I hope that, in broad terms, the Minister can give us an update on progress on the removal of equipment covered by the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021. That was mandated by the Act; I know it is under way but it is not yet complete.

This is about not merely technical calculations but creating an effective deterrent to the telecoms industry, while ensuring fair and practical enforcement of important security measures. Getting these rules right is essential for both national security and our telecoms sector. I look forward to the Minister’s response on these points.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for bringing this important SI forward today and for setting it out so clearly and briefly. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. He made a range of interesting points: in particular, the point on timing was well made, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s answers on that. This instrument seeks to implement provisions relating to the enforcement of designated vendor directions—DVDs—which form part of the broader framework established under the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021. That Act, introduced under the previous Government, was designed to strengthen the security and resilience of the UK’s telecommunications networks, particularly in response to emerging national security risks.

We all know only too well that one of the most prominent issues at the forefront of this framework has been the removal of high-risk vendors, such as Huawei, from UK telecommunications infrastructure. Huawei’s involvement in the UK’s 5G rollout has long been a point of debate, with growing concerns about national security risks tied to its equipment. This SI therefore provides a mechanism for enforcing the penalties that may be applied to public communications providers —PCPs—that fail to comply with the DVDs to ensure that the UK’s telecommunications infrastructure remains secure from undue foreign influence.

The primary change introduced by this SI is the formalisation of the penalties regime for public communications providers that fail to comply with the conditions outlined in DVDs. It establishes a framework for calculating and enforcing penalties that may be imposed by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State retains discretion in imposing penalties, but they must be applied in a proportionate manner. In considering penalties, the severity of the breach, the culpability of the provider and the broader implications for the sector must all be taken into account. The aim is to ensure compliance with DVDs while protecting the integrity of the UK’s national infrastructure.

However, while the objectives of this instrument are understood, this debate offers a good opportunity to scrutinise some of the specifics a little, particularly with regard to the proportionality of penalties and the potential economic consequences for the sector. It is with that in mind that I shall raise questions in just three areas regarding the provisions set out in this instrument.

First, the SI grants the Secretary of State significant discretion in the imposition of penalties. Of course, we recognise the value of flexibility here, but there is legitimate concern that this discretion may result in inconsistent enforcement across different public communications providers. Can the Minister assure us that transparency and accountability will be maintained throughout this process? How will the Government ensure that the application of penalties is fair and consistent, particularly when considering the varying size and scope of telecoms providers?

Further to this, can the Minister clarify how the penalties will be calculated? I echo the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, particularly in cases where a breach does not pose an immediate or severe national security threat. Do the Government anticipate that penalties will be tiered with lesser fines for breaches that do not substantially compromise national security? Can the Minister further explain how such decisions will be communicated to the public and to industry to ensure transparency?

Secondly, providers are required to remove Huawei equipment from the UK’s 5G networks by 2027. This is, of course, a significant and costly task for telecom providers. Given these financial challenges, will the penalties for non-compliance take into account the costs already incurred by providers in replacing Huawei’s technology? Will the penalties be adjusted to reflect the substantial financial burden that these providers are already facing in removing Huawei equipment from their networks? Thirdly, where PCPs have been issued with a DVD, this can be a long and demanding process. How are the Government going to keep track of progress? What progress reports can be shared with Parliament and the public?

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their valuable contributions to this debate. We believe that legislative certainty is important, which is why we are seeking to resolve potential ambiguity by making this instrument at the earliest opportunity. This SI will ensure that important decisions on national security, specifically the enforcement of national security powers introduced by the Telecommunications (Security) Act, have clear rules underpinning them.

I will now have a go at answering the questions raised in the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, asked about the three-year gap and why the SI was not taken forward earlier. I should thank Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee clerks for asking for clarification on the operability of the regime. The system has not been inoperable for four years. The Secretary of State can and has used their powers to monitor compliance with a direction under the current rules. The Secretary of State could have taken enforcement action without this SI being in place. The 2003 order could have applied for the purpose of enforcement of a designated vendor direction. However, there is some ambiguity concerning whether the rules set out in the 2003 order can apply to the enforcement of a designated vendor direction. This could have left enforcement action imposing a penalty on a provider vulnerable to legal challenge. We are therefore making an SI to ensure that there is legal certainty and clarity when penalties are imposed, and that position was set out in a letter to the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee clarifying that.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, also asked about the lack of consultation, but this is a technical clarification for rules that were already in operation. He asked about how turnover would be calculated. It will be done in conformity with the accounting practices and principles that are generally accepted in the United Kingdom. The turnover will be limited to the amount derived by that provider from the relevant business after deduction of sales rebates, value added tax and other taxes directly related to turnover. If the provider’s relevant business consists of two or more undertakings that each prepare accounts, then the turnover should be calculated by adding together the turnover of each undertaking. Any aid granted by a public body to a provider should be included in the calculation of turnover if the provider is a recipient of the aid and if that is directly linked to the carrying out by that provider of the relevant business. The business activities to be included in the turnover calculation for a provider are as follows: the provision of public electronic communications network; the provision of the public electronic communication of services; and the making available of facilities that are associated with facilities by reference to such a network or service.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, asked about the removal of equipment and the progress report on that. Using the powers provided by the Telecommunications (Security) Act, the former Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport issued a designation notice to Huawei and a designated vendor direction to 35 providers in October 2022. The direction gives 12 specific requirements for telecom providers’ use of Huawei equipment. The previous Secretary of State decided that these legal controls on the use of Huawei equipment or services were necessary and proportionate to the national security risks they were designated to mitigate. The UK is now on a path towards the complete removal of Huawei from its 5G networks by the end of 2027.

The noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, asked whether the application was being applied in a fair and consistent way. I would say that this was an evidence-based decision, reflecting the national security risk. The designation notice issued to Huawei set out the reasons why the use of its equipment is viewed as a national security risk; it includes concerns about, among other things, corporate control, cybersecurity and engineering quality. This action builds on long-standing advice from the National Cyber Security Centre and the Government on the use of Huawei equipment in UK public tele- communications networks.

The noble Viscount asked about the cost to business of removing this equipment. The Government have estimated that the removal of Huawei equipment due to the designated vendor directions will cost providers up to £2 billion in total.

The noble Viscount also asked how the Secretary of State monitors compliance with a direction. The Communications Act 2003, as amended by the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021, provides the Secretary of State with powers enabling the monitoring and enforcement of requirements imposed in designated vendor directions. The Secretary of State is responsible for determining compliance with a direction, based on evidence provided by the industry and Ofcom. The Secretary of State may give Ofcom a direction requiring Ofcom to monitor providers’ progress in complying with the direction and to report to the Secretary of State to inform their assessment of compliance. The former Secretary of State received Ofcom’s report in spring 2024 on the removal of Huawei from relevant providers’ core network functions, and that ongoing appraisal continues.

I hope that I have answered all the questions that were asked. If I have not answered on something that is very technical, I can write to noble Lords, of course. In the meantime, I hope noble Lords agree on the importance of introducing this instrument to ensure legislative certainty and therefore agree that enforcement through these powers should be introduced as swiftly as possible.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Is the Minister confident that the 2027 deadline will be met; that no vendor, purchaser or telecoms company will be caught by the Act; that no fines will be levied; and that what we are talking about today is, therefore, entirely theoretical?

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

While the Minister is working on her answer, perhaps she could include in that something about how progress against the delivery of these objectives will be reported to Parliament, potentially —and, indeed, to the public.

Online Safety Act 2023 (Category 1, Category 2A and Category 2B Threshold Conditions) Regulations 2025

Lord Clement-Jones Excerpts

Monday 24th February 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Clement-Jones]

At end insert “but that this House regrets that the Regulations do not impose duties available under the parent Act on small, high-risk platforms where harmful content, often easily accessible to children, is propagated; calls on the Government to clarify which smaller platforms will no longer be covered by Ofcom’s illegal content code and which measures they will no longer be required to comply with; and calls on the Government to withdraw the Regulations and establish a revised definition of Category 1 services.”

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am very pleased to see the Minister back in her place. I thank her for her introduction to this statutory instrument. Her disappointment at my tabling this regret amendment is exceeded only by my own disappointment at the SI. However, I hope that she will provide the antidote to the Government’s alarming tendency to pick unnecessary fights on so many important issues—a number of them overseen by her department.

Those of us who were intimately involved with its passage hoped that the Online Safety Act would bring in a new era of digital regulation, but the Government’s and Ofcom’s handling of small but high-risk platforms threatens to undermine the Act’s fundamental purpose of creating a safer online environment. That is why I am moving this amendment, and I am very grateful to all noble Lords who are present and to those taking part.

The Government’s position is rendered even more baffling by their explicit awareness of the risks. Last September, the Secretary of State personally communicated concerns to Ofcom about the proliferation of harmful content, particularly regarding children’s access. Despite this acknowledged awareness, the regulatory framework remains fundamentally flawed in its approach to platform categorisation.

The parliamentary record clearly shows that cross-party support existed for a risk-based approach to platform categorisation, which became enshrined in law. The amendment to Schedule 11 from the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan—I am very pleased to see her in her place—specifically changed the requirement for category 1 from a size “and” functionality threshold to a size “or” functionality threshold. This modification was intended to ensure that Ofcom could bring smaller, high-risk platforms under appropriate regulatory scrutiny.

Subsequently, in September 2023, on consideration of Commons amendments, the Minister responsible for the Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson—I am pleased to see him in his place—made it clear what the impact was:

“I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes for her continued engagement on the issue of small but high-risk platforms. The Government were happy to accept her proposed changes to the rules for determining the conditions that establish which services will be designated as category 1 or 2B services. In making the regulations, the Secretary of State will now have the discretion to decide whether to set a threshold based on either the number of users or the functionalities offered, or on both factors. Previously, the threshold had to be based on a combination of both”.—[Official Report, 19/9/23; col. 1339.]


I do not think that could be clearer.

This Government’s and Ofcom’s decision to ignore this clear parliamentary intent is particularly troubling. The Southport tragedy serves as a stark reminder of the real-world consequences of inadequate online regulation. When hateful content fuels violence and civil unrest, the artificial distinction between large and small platforms becomes a dangerous regulatory gap. The Government and Ofcom seem to have failed to learn from these events.

At the heart of this issue seems to lie a misunderstanding of how harmful content proliferates online. The impact on vulnerable groups is particularly concerning. Suicide promotion forums, incel communities and platforms spreading racist content continue to operate with minimal oversight due to their size rather than their risk profile. This directly contradicts the Government’s stated commitment to halving violence against women and girls, and protecting children from harmful content online. The current regulatory framework creates a dangerous loophole that allows these harmful platforms to evade proper scrutiny.

The duties avoided by these smaller platforms are not trivial. They will escape requirements to publish transparency reports, enforce their terms of service and provide user empowerment tools. The absence of these requirements creates a significant gap in user protection and accountability.

Perhaps the most damning is the contradiction between the Government’s Draft Statement of Strategic Priorities for Online Safety, published last November, which emphasises effective regulation of small but risky services, and their and Ofcom’s implementation of categorisation thresholds that explicitly exclude these services from the highest level of scrutiny. Ofcom’s advice expressly disregarded—“discounted” is the phrase it used—the flexibility brought into the Act via the Morgan amendment, and advised that regulations should be laid that brought only large platforms into category 1. Its overcautious interpretation of the Act creates a situation where Ofcom recognises the risks but fails to recommend for itself the full range of tools necessary to address them effectively.

This is particularly important in respect of small, high-risk sites, such as suicide and self-harm sites, or sites which propagate racist or misogynistic abuse, where the extent of harm to users is significant. The Minister, I hope, will have seen the recent letter to the Prime Minister from a number of suicide, mental health and anti-hate charities on the issue of categorisation of these sites. This means that platforms such as 4chan, 8chan and Telegram, despite their documented role in spreading harmful content and co-ordinating malicious activities, escaped the full force of regulatory oversight simply due to their size. This creates an absurd situation where platforms known to pose significant risks to public safety receive less scrutiny than large platforms with more robust safety measures already in place.

The Government’s insistence that platforms should be “safe by design”, while simultaneously exempting high-risk platforms from category 1 requirements based solely on size metrics, represents a fundamental contradiction and undermines what we were all convinced—and still are convinced—the Act was intended to achieve. Dame Melanie Dawes’s letter, in the aftermath of Southport, surely gives evidence enough of the dangers of some of the high-risk, smaller platforms.

Moreover, the Government’s approach fails to account for the dynamic nature of online risks. Harmful content and activities naturally migrate to platforms with lighter regulatory requirements. By creating this two-tier system, they have, in effect, signposted escape routes for bad actors seeking to evade meaningful oversight. This short-sighted approach could lead to the proliferation of smaller, high-risk platforms designed specifically to exploit these regulatory gaps. As the Minister mentioned, Ofcom has established a supervision task force for small but risky services, but that is no substitute for imposing the full force of category 1 duties on these platforms.

The situation is compounded by the fact that, while omitting these small but risky sites, category 1 seems to be sweeping up sites that are universally accepted as low-risk despite the number of users. Many sites with over 7 million users a month—including Wikipedia, a vital source of open knowledge and information in the UK—might be treated as a category 1 service, regardless of actual safety considerations. Again, we raised concerns during the passage of the Bill and received ministerial assurances. Wikipedia is particularly concerned about a potential obligation on it, if classified in category 1, to build a system that allows verified users to modify Wikipedia without any of the customary peer review.

Under Section 15(10), all verified users must be given an option to

“prevent non-verified users from interacting with content which that user generates, uploads or shares on the service”.

Wikipedia says that doing so would leave it open to widespread manipulation by malicious actors, since it depends on constant peer review by thousands of individuals around the world, some of whom would face harassment, imprisonment or physical harm if forced to disclose their identity purely to continue doing what they have done, so successfully, for the past 24 years.

This makes it doubly important for the Government and Ofcom to examine, and make use of, powers to more appropriately tailor the scope and reach of the Act and the categorisations, to ensure that the UK does not put low-risk, low-resource, socially beneficial platforms in untenable positions.

There are key questions that Wikipedia believes the Government should answer. First, is a platform caught by the functionality criteria so long as it has any form of content recommender system anywhere on UK-accessible parts of the service, no matter how minor, infrequently used and ancillary that feature is?

Secondly, the scope of

“functionality for users to forward or share regulated user-generated content on the service with other users of that service”

is unclear, although it appears very broad. The draft regulations provide no guidance. What do the Government mean by this?

Thirdly, will Ofcom be able to reliably determine how many users a platform has? The Act does not define “user”, and the draft regulations do not clarify how the concept is to be understood, notably when it comes to counting non-human entities incorporated in the UK, as the Act seems to say would be necessary.

The Minister said in her letter of 7 February that the Government are open to keeping the categorisation thresholds under review, including the main consideration for category 1, to ensure that the regime is as effective as possible—and she repeated that today. But, at the same time, the Government seem to be denying that there is a legally robust or justifiable way of doing so under Schedule 11. How can both those propositions be true?

Can the Minister set out why the regulations, as drafted, do not follow the will of Parliament—accepted by the previous Government and written into the Act—that thresholds for categorisation can be based on risk or size? Ofcom’s advice to the Secretary of State contained just one paragraph explaining why it had ignored the will of Parliament—or, as the regulator called it, the

“recommendation that allowed for the categorisation of services by reference exclusively to functionalities and characteristics”.

Did the Secretary of State ask to see the legal advice on which this judgment was based? Did DSIT lawyers provide their own advice on whether Ofcom’s position was correct, especially in the light of the Southport riots?

How do the Government intend to assess whether Ofcom’s regulatory approach to small but high-harm sites is proving effective? Have any details been provided on Ofcom’s schedule of research about such sites? Do the Government expect Ofcom to take enforcement action against small but high-harm sites, and have they made an assessment of the likely timescales for enforcement action?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, if I have not covered any issues, I will of course write to noble Lords to clarify any matters that are outstanding.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I shall be extremely brief. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed this evening. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, used the expression “emotions raised”. That is exactly what this regret amendment has done. There is real anger about the way in which this statutory instrument has been put together. I think many noble Lords who were involved in the Act were extremely proud of our work, as has been expressed.

The Minister has made a valiant attempt, but I am afraid that she has been given a hospital pass. It is quite clear that the Secretary of State did not have to accept the advice from Ofcom. Its advice about functionalities, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, made absolutely clear, and the evidence that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, put forward, not to mention the evidence from the anti-Semitism foundation, all indicate that there is considerable belief around this House that we are not dealing with the high-risk but smaller sites such as Telegram, 8chan and 4chan.

In these circumstances, as I believe is accepted by many noble Lords across the House, the Government have got this completely wrong and it needs rethinking. Therefore, I would like to test the opinion of the House.