Wednesday 23rd July 2025
(2 days, 22 hours ago)
Lords ChamberEmployment Rights Bill 2024-26 View all Employment Rights Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 113-IV(b) Manuscript Amendment for Report (Supplementary to the Fourth Marshalled List) - (23 Jul 2025)
21:51 - Division on Amendment 154 - Ayes: 85 / Noes: 127 - Amendment 154 disagreed.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
Amendment 154 in my name seeks to remove Clause 113 from the Bill. Clause 113 was tabled at the 11th hour at Commons Report and gives the Secretary of State the power to bring legal proceedings in the employment tribunal, and to do so not because the Secretary of State is directly affected by what the employer is doing, but rather in place of a worker as if the proceedings had been brought by the worker. This is whether or not the worker consents and even if they strongly object. This is legally bizarre, unworkable and totally unnecessary. It could well destroy the relationship between employer and worker—indeed, any future employment relationship since, remarkably, the clause also applies to individuals who are seeking work.
I will focus on three things: the legal implications, the clause’s workability and its policy flaws. I will start with the legal ramifications. It is unprecedented, as far as I can see, for a Secretary of State to be able to institute employment tribunal proceedings or any legal proceedings in place of someone who does not want those proceedings to take place. The Secretary of State says that the provision is modelled on the Equality and Human Rights Commission but, apart from the very different public law context of judicial review, the commission has never instituted a private law action in place of another individual as Clause 113 now envisages for the Secretary of State.
The case of Wilson, to which the Secretary of State referred in her letter of 7 July to noble Lords, was not such a case, since the commission did not act in place of another person. It is inconceivable that the Equality and Human Rights Commission would initiate proceedings in place of a worker in the employment tribunal, let alone where that person did not consent. For the Secretary of State to be able to do so goes against the long-standing principle that, in order to instigate litigation, a claimant should have a sufficient interest—that is to say, be directly affected by whatever issue is being litigated. Exceptions to this general principle have occasionally been made for pressure groups acting in the public interest but, as the High Court reaffirmed in 2022, not where there is a more appropriate potential applicant who has chosen not to bring proceedings, which is the type of case we envisage.
Moving on to the workability of Clause 113, the debate in Committee showed that one reason why there is no precedent for what is proposed is precisely because any litigation lawyer will tell you it cannot work. If the worker does not consent then how will the Secretary of State acquire the evidence to bring a claim? In Committee, the Minister rejected an eminently sensible amendment tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, which would have required the consent of the worker before proceedings could be brought. This would have made a major difference, but the Government rejected it, which shows that they envisage the power being used even without the consent of the worker. Without that consent, one can see the possibility of a worker, disgruntled with the claim, trying to invoke Rule 25 of the Employment Tribunal Rules to withdraw the claim and the Secretary of State resisting that attempt—hardly a great use of taxpayers’ money.
Even if the proceedings continue, should the worker, who did not consent to the claim, really be liable for the costs if the claim fails, which could amount to thousands of pounds? Extraordinary as it is, this is the effect of Clause 113(6). It provides that:
“The Secretary of State is not liable to any worker for anything done (or omitted to be done) in, or in connection with, the discharge … of the Secretary of State’s functions”
under the clause. This immunity from liability for the Secretary of State applies irrespective of how incompetently the claim may have been handled.
Furthermore, as the noble Lord, Lord Murray, so graphically articulated in Committee, since it is a power for the Secretary of State to bring proceedings, the unions could judicially review the Secretary of State for not exercising the power. This means there could be, in the noble Lord’s words, litigation to require the Secretary of State to litigate
“on behalf of somebody who does not want to litigate”.—[Official Report, 18/6/25; col. 2048.]
As he suggested, we are in Alice in Wonderland here, but it is where Clause 113 takes us—and all at taxpayers’ expense of course.
Finally, on the policy flaws, Clause 113 is completely unnecessary. The Committee stage of this Bill in the Lords brought out the extraordinarily wide scope of the powers the Secretary of State will acquire via the so-called fair work agency. This is, of course, just the Secretary of State under a different name. These include the powers to summon people to give information, to enter any premises to inspect and seize documents and examine computers, and even police powers to search, arrest and interview suspects in relation to labour market offences. Most people would assume that these sweeping enforcement powers will be more than enough to crack down on labour market abuse without a power to bring legal proceedings in the name of a worker who may not want those proceedings to be brought.
This is especially so given that Clause 114 provides that the Secretary of State can give legal assistance to a worker who wants to bring legal proceedings against their employer. This is surely the way this should be handled, rather than the Secretary of State unilaterally launching such proceedings in the belief that this is in the best interests of the worker. Perhaps it is in the best interests of the Secretary of State.
What happened to personal autonomy, especially the basic right to decide whether or not to bring legal proceedings in one’s own name? It could come as a bit of a shock for a worker, who might know nothing about the proceedings, to receive in the morning post a summons to court, especially when they realise they are treated as having brought the proceedings themselves and against their own employer to boot. Talk about choking on cornflakes.
It takes some mental agility to imagine how all this will also apply to a person who is not yet a worker but is seeking to be employed. It is hardly likely to endear them to their prospective employer, is it? If and when the worker does not get the job, they will have no remedy against the Secretary of State for ruining their chances.
This is a bad clause which fails on grounds of legal incoherence, practical unworkability and policy flaws. It needs to come out. I beg to move.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere. He has spoken with great eloquence and killer arguments. I agree with him, so none of us needs to speak for very long.
As he has said, this clause was added late in the day in the other place and there is one aspect which particularly appals me. The clause provides that the Secretary of State, or rather, in practice, their Civil Service agents in the new enforcement body, or any other enforcement officer as in Clause 113(7)(b), will be able to take a case to an employment tribunal where an employee is unwilling to pursue their own complaint—that is, without consent. Consent is such an important principle. Subsection (6) makes it clear that the Secretary of State or enforcement officer
“is not liable to any worker for anything done (or omitted to be done)”,
such as an error or reputational or personal damage. The clause also risks putting further pressure on the hard-pressed tribunal system.
The Government’s recent implementation plan seeks expert help in getting the detail of the provisions right. I have worked for small companies, I have worked for a company with 500,000 people, I have worked with USDAW, I have been a member of two Civil Service unions and I have been head of HR in a government department. I believe that this lack of consent will cause untold trouble. The clause must be dropped, and I hope colleagues across the House will vote for the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Carter.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, first, I declare an interest as a barrister who occasionally practices in employment law. Secondly, in Committee on 18 June, Hansard recalls that I described the Bill as
“a complete Horlicks … truly bizarre”
and
“absolutely beyond belief”.—[Official Report, 18/6/25; col. 2048.]
I am amazed at my moderation. Nothing I have heard since addresses my concerns. As ably outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, whose amendment I entirely agree with, this clause allows the Secretary of State to bring a complaint to an employment tribunal without the consent of the complainant. Have these people ever been to an employment tribunal? This is absurd.
Is it proposed, in the event that the claimant has the temerity to disagree with the Secretary of State’s assessment that they have a valid claim, to witness summons the claimant, on pain of arrest, if they do not come and give evidence in support of their claim? If, when there, they have the temerity to give evidence against the claim brought by the Secretary of State on their unwilling behalf, will the Secretary of State apply to the judge to treat their witness as hostile, thus permitting the former to cross-examine the latter on the basis that they really were badly treated by their employer? This is palpable nonsense. This clause cannot stand part of the Bill.
I also draw the House’s attention to the fact that, as raised by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, the wording of the clause is an exercise in discretion and is therefore subject to judicial review. There can therefore be a judicial review of both the decision to bring proceedings on the part of the unwilling claimant and of the decision not to bring proceedings. This is going to be marvellous for those of us who are both at the employment Bar and the public law Bar. There will be endless litigation, all at public expense on every side. This is absurd. I invite the House to remove this clause from the Bill as swiftly as possible.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, that was a fascinating debate. I am not a lawyer either, but I was very taken by the arguments made by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, which I thought were quite superb, by my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier and by my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth. I thought my noble friend Lord Murray displayed exemplary moderation—I think that was his word—in his delivery. I cannot improve on the legal arguments made by the lawyers, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, my noble and learned friend and my noble friend. For a moment I wondered whether the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, had—to use my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier’s phrase—subsumed his legal personality to be a creature of the state for a moment. He seemed to come back fighting, so I applaud him for that.
Frankly, Clause 113 is one of the most chilling and illiberal proposals in the entire Bill, and there is competition for that accolade.
Let us also consider somebody who has not been considered in this particular debate so far: employers. What sort of message does it send to them? Your employees’ silence cannot be taken as peace or resolution, but rather as a vacuum that the state may fill with litigation. The noble Lord, Lord Goddard, has a rather more touching faith in the state than I do. How does that promote trust or fair resolution in the workplace? I cannot see how it does. It would fuel paranoia, it invites conflict and it certainly undermines mediation. If a worker feels intimidated by their employer, as has been claimed before in these debates, do they really imagine that an employee will feel less intimidated by the prospect of a Secretary of State marching into their dispute, as the noble Lord, Lord Carter, stated, without any liability and then turning it into a tribunal case in their name? That is not empowerment; it is political theatre at the expense of personal agency. We should not accept or normalise that.
I have a question to those who have been pushing the argument about anonymity. I am not a defendant—or rather, I am not a lawyer; I may be a defendant—so I may have phrased this slightly incorrectly, but the defendant presumably will be known in these cases, and if the defendant is known, it is not especially difficult to find out who the plaintiff is. I think that is the correct terminology. So how on earth would granting an individual anonymity achieve the purpose that is desired? I do not get that—somebody would have to explain it to me.
This clause represents a fundamentally dystopian instinct that the state can somehow supplant the will of the individual and act on their behalf without their active participation or consent. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, that this is paternalism being taken to an authoritarian extreme.
In this debate we have heard “ridiculous”, “manifestly absurd”, “ludicrous” and “bonkers”—which I think won on a split decision. But there is one last point. The tone of this debate has been to invite both horror and ridicule in equal measure. Is that really what the Government want to achieve with this piece of legislation?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)
The words that the noble Lord just said come from the Opposition Benches and do not reflect what we are intending by the Bill, or indeed these particular clauses.
I will first speak to government Amendments 156 to 158 in my name, which are minor but important technical amendments to Schedule 10. Amendment 156 makes a small correction to paragraph 36(6), replacing the phrase “that subsection” with a reference instead to “subsection (3)” of Section 15 of the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004. Amendment 157 ensures that Schedule 1 to the Immigration Act 2016 is repealed following the abolition of the Director of Labour Market Enforcement, and Amendment 158 removes specific reference to paragraphs 9 and 11 of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 2016. The purpose of these changes is to ensure that the provision functions as intended and provides legal clarity. They do not alter the policy or substance of the Bill in any way but ensure that the schedule functions as intended.
On Amendment 154 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carter, the Government were elected on a manifesto pledge to deliver the plan to make work pay in full. This sets out that the new employment rights enforcement agency would have the power to bring civil proceedings to uphold compliance with employment law. This clause delivers that pledge.
The noble Lord, Lord Carter, referred to the precedent, and yes, the precedent that we are citing is the example of the Equality Act 2006, Sections 28 to 30 of which are the precedent for Clauses 113 to 115. Section 28 of the Equality Act enables the Equality and Human Rights Commission to assist an individual who is or may become party to legal proceedings. Section 30 of the Equality Act, which is the precedent for Clause 113, affords the EHRC the capacity to institute and intervene in legal proceedings, including for breach of EHRC rights, even though it is not a victim.
The noble Lord, Lord Carter, said there was not an example of where the EHRC had taken over a case. However, in the case of MS (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the EHRC in fact substituted itself once the original appellant withdrew from the proceedings. This was a substitution, with the consent of the Supreme Court, by the EHRC in the same way that the fair work agency could substitute itself in place of a worker without their consent.
The EHRC uses Section 30 strategically to clarify the law and act where there are egregious breaches. We envisage that the fair work agency, rather than the Secretary of State as such, will use this power in Clause 113 similarly. Noble Lords have misrepresented what is intended by this clause. It is intended to address some of the worst employment practices that current regulations do not adequately cover. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that there are of course cases where individuals or groups of workers are unable or reluctant to take a case, but that does not necessarily mean that the case should not be taken, because there are wider issues at stake. For example, the fair work agency could use the power to clarify entitlement to holiday pay where enforcement officers do not have enough information to confidently issue a notice of underpayment, or the fair work agency could exercise the power to clarify the employment status of a group of individuals. Currently, employers may misclassify workers as self-employed to get out of giving them the rights that they are entitled to. Without this power, the fair work agency has no ability to challenge such claims.
To give a specific example on the possible application of Clause 113, the Director of Labour Market Enforcement has flagged endemic bad practice in the hand car wash sector. A particular challenge in this sector is misclassification of workers, which stymies HMRC’s efforts to enforce the minimum wage. Currently, if a hand car wash claims that its workers are self-employed, HMRC has no means to test this in the courts. It must go through the full notice of underpayment process and wait for the employer to appeal against the notice of underpayment. This can lead to nugatory work if the appeal is upheld and otherwise delay workers getting their due rights. This is a gap in the existing system of state enforcement, which this power will go some way to remedy.
Just as the current system works, the fair work agency will take a whole-employer approach to enforcement. This has the advantages of a resolution for more workers than individual cases against the employer. But in such circumstances, where the fair work agency may be taking action for hundreds or thousands of workers, it is simply not practical to get consent from every individual concerned. As a strategic approach, this power will be used when acting in workers’ best interests to clarify the law. As with the EHRC’s powers under the Equality Act, the fair work agency will not need the consent of each individual concerned to take on cases. The fair work agency will therefore be able to decide when to seek clear, neutral and authoritative guidance from a tribunal on the application of employment legislation.
As we know, in the worst cases of serious exploitation, workers may be reluctant to give their consent due to fear of retribution from the employer. The noble Lord, Lord Goddard, was quite right to say that there are circumstances in which we have the responsibility to look after the individuals who are suffering at the hands of rogue employers and feel powerless in those circumstances. We know that many migrant workers with legal rights to work in the UK, particularly low- paid workers, are reluctant or unable to enforce their employment rights. These workers have understandable concerns, including fear of retaliation, lack of awareness or language barriers. For legal migrants, employment is their prerogative and, for those workers, there are wider implications in challenging an employer that could bring about repercussions for their employment or potentially impact on their visa. We believe that requiring consent from workers would make it easier for employers to attribute blame to individual employees, and they would suffer as a result.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
I am going to carry on. When exercising this power—
Noble Lords
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, we have had advice already about what the Companion says on this. The noble Lord has spoken once.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
I think that the Companion overrides anything that I have to say.
When exercising this power, the fair work agency will of course act in accordance with the rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, including Article 8, and comply with data protection legislation. In doing so, it must act in accordance with the law and for a legitimate purpose.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, raised the issue of anonymity. In appropriate cases, the fair work agency will consider applying under Rule 49 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024. Rule 49 allows the tribunal to restrict public disclosure of aspects of the proceedings. That means that workers’ names can be kept from the public domain—
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
The point that we were making is that this is about test cases, which, as we know, is a frequent way of clarifying legislation, rather than primary legislation.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, raised the issue of anonymity. In appropriate cases, the fair work agency will consider applying under Rule 49 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024. Rule 49 allows the tribunal to restrict public disclosure of aspects of the proceedings. That means that workers’ names can be kept from the public domain to protect their anonymity and to protect them from any reporting in the media, where it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice or to protect their convention rights. When deciding whether to give an order, the tribunal must give weight to the principles of open justice and the convention’s right to freedom of expression. The tribunal can do this on its own initiative, or the fair work agency can apply for such an order. The fair work agency must also comply with convention rights and data protection legislation, ensuring appropriate protections for individuals and fairness of proceedings.
I understand noble Lords’ interest in how this power will operate and confirm to the House that the Government will publish guidance on how the fair work agency will exercise this power in practice. We will develop detailed guidance, following deep and extensive engagement with social partners and the fair work agency’s advisory board. It will then be for the fair work agency, acting within this guidance, to determine which cases it brings to the tribunal. That will ensure that this power supports those who play by the rules. This approach enables the fair work agency to protect workers’ rights and to tackle injustice and abuse against legitimate workers.
This clause presents an opportunity to make a genuine difference in tackling the scourge of labour exploitation in the UK. Unchecked labour exploitation is unfair on the individuals who are being exploited. It is unfair on the majority of employers, who want to do right by their staff, and it is unfair on workers who are denied jobs by employers exploiting loopholes. The new power will complement the existing powers of the fair work agency, such as the powers to issue notices of underpayment, while enabling the fair work agency to act where these powers cannot be accessed. The fair work agency will exist to end labour exploitation and create a fair and level playing field for employers and for workers. A fair work agency with any less power to act for these most vulnerable would be an unacceptable failure for workers’ rights.
To the noble Lord, Lord Carter, I remain open to discussing how best to deliver this power and to ensure that it is appropriately safeguarded. However, I reiterate that this power is neither novel nor unprecedented and that it delivers a manifesto commitment. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 154.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I am sorry to get up again, but would the Minister like to say something about adverse costs orders against workers?
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, when we debated this in Committee, we made it clear that there would not be any cost to workers. The noble Lord, Lord Carter, suggested that the worker would be liable to costs where they had not consented to the Secretary of State taking a case on their behalf. Let me be clear that the worker will not be liable for the costs in these circumstances.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
My Lords, I am grateful for all the powerful interventions we have heard this evening from very eminent speakers indeed, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, the noble Lords, Lord Murray and Lord Pannick, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Falkner. Some really powerful points have been made around the importance of personal autonomy, the unworkability of the clause in relation to witness summonses and adverse witness results, and a duty to consult, which was a powerful point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to the fact that the worker might not want to bring proceedings and therefore would be happy for the Secretary of State to do so in his or her place. That misses the point, which is that the worker might object to legal proceedings being brought in their name and might not give their consent. That is, for me, fundamental in this whole clause.
I believe that this is legally unprecedented—we can have further discussions about that. I think it is unworkable. I think it is completely unnecessary, given that the Secretary of State can support a worker to defend proceedings themselves. I read the manifesto and all I saw was “make work pay”. Those three words cover a multitude of sins. There was no mention of a power to bring proceedings on behalf of a worker—I read it very carefully. I feel that there has been enough power and passion in this debate to warrant seeking the opinion of the House, which I now do.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment corrects an incorrect cross-reference.
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)
My Lords, I do not believe that for a moment.
This has been such an important debate. I thank the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, the noble Lord, Lord Freyberg, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, and my fellow lawyer—not solicitor—the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for what has certainly been a long-standing advocacy on behalf of freelance workers. As my noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay said, with all his experience as a Minister, there is no doubt that freelancers play a vital role in our economy and their interests deserve proper attention.
We on these Benches have also made the case that this issue is likely to become more urgent after the passage of the Bill. We cannot avoid the suspicion that the Bill is going to drive more workers into at least considering turning freelance. Time will tell, but as the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, pointed out, the number could rise towards 3 million freelance workers.
We are all very grateful indeed to the Minister for organising an important meeting on this subject, because it was most useful. We welcome the Government’s intention to create a freelance champion, announced last month as part of the creative industries sector plan. That may be half a loaf, but it is a welcome enough commitment. We recognise the intent behind the amendment to establish a freelance commissioner, but at the moment, in the light of the assurances given by the Minister, we feel that the Government should have the benefit of the doubt for now, not least because we are not totally persuaded that the creation of another public body is the only solution.
What freelancers certainly need is clarity, simplicity and proportionate support. If the new champion can deliver that, all well and good. But we remain of the opinion, as came across in some of the contributions we had in Committee and just now, that socialists despise the very concept of freelancing. “How dare workers choose to avoid our elaborate structures?”, some of them say. So we will be watching with a very keen eye to see how this proceeds, particularly in the light of the speeches we just heard from the noble Lords, Lord Hendy and Lord Berkeley.
As we salute the expertise of the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, on the creative arts, I take this opportunity to assure him that if he is unsatisfied that the Government’s measures adequately address the issues that have been raised, we will certainly be on his side. So I encourage him to remain vigilant and to keep the Government’s feet to the fire. In the meantime, we look forward with great interest to what the Minister will say in response to the many questions that have been raised in this debate, in particular about the urgency of this problem.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. We have indeed had a very good debate, which once again has identified the significant contribution that the creative and cultural sector makes to our industries and our lives. The Government share your Lordships’ passion for supporting the creative and cultural sectors, and we previously spelled out in detail the significant work we are already doing in this area.
The creative industries and cultural sectors are a distinct part of the wider UK workforce. They have a significantly higher proportion of self-employed individuals, reflecting the sector’s entrepreneurial and freelance nature, which is one of the points that has been well made this evening. In the latest published data, as of 2023, there were 2.4 million filled jobs in the creative industries and 666,000 filled jobs in the cultural sector. Of these jobs, 49.6% in the cultural sector were self-employed, and 27.9% in the creative industries, compared with 14% of UK jobs overall. This reiterates the point that noble Lords have made about the significance of freelancers in the cultural and creative sectors. This flexibility not only drives innovation but supports the more project-driven nature of the creative industries. However, we also know that freelancers’ creative careers, while offering a more flexible and autonomous way of working, can also be precarious and come with lower job security.
Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)
My Lords, very briefly, I was a bound apprentice for four years, from when I was 17 or 18 on a council estate outside Greater Manchester. Apprenticeships are a little jewel in the employment Bill that have somehow been missed. We need to advocate the opportunities for apprentices and the pride that apprenticeships give to young people, especially NEETs, and there should be no one better to do that than a Labour Government who are trying to generate income, prosperity and jobs. There is a little place there and, with more consultation—I have spoken to Ministers, who are mindful to be supportive of that—if we can get this right for apprentices and take away the obstacles to creating apprenticeships, more people will take them on.
Apprentices tend to stay with a company. If you are an apprentice and you have been trained for three or four years, you will tend to stay with that company and repay the loyalty they have given you in giving you a skill that will carry you through your life. So we support the sentiment and hope that the Government will say some kind words tonight, at least to stop the noble Lord disappearing at midnight and looking for Cinderella’s glass slipper.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, there is really very little to say, but obviously I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf of Dulwich, for bringing forward this very thoughtful and necessary amendment. She is right that apprenticeships represent one of the most important pathways into skilled employment and a vital investment in our nation’s future workforce. I agreed with everything that the noble Baronesses, Lady Wolf and Lady Garden, and the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, said, and I wish the noble Lord well. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf, gets the reassurance that she needs and, if she does not, she should probably test the opinion of the House.
Lord Leong (Lab)
Good try.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. On behalf of these Benches, I wish the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, all the best for his forthcoming retirement, which is not today; it will be on 31 August. We wish him well and he will definitely be sorely missed in this House.
I will address the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf of Dulwich. Amendment 181 proposes to insert a provision in the Bill to require that the Government give due consideration to the impacts on apprenticeships during consultation. Amendment 182 proposes a review process specifically on the impact on apprenticeships. Although these amendments rightly raise the importance of apprenticeships, they effectively duplicate what we are, and will already be, doing.
We know that our country’s greatest asset is its people, and apprenticeships are one of the most powerful ways, as stated by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, that we can invest in that potential. They open doors, build confidence and provide a ladder of opportunity for those who might otherwise be left behind. Whether it is a young person taking their first step into the world of work or someone retraining for a new career, apprenticeships offer a route to success that is both practical and aspirational.
We are transforming the apprenticeship levy into a new growth and skills levy, giving learners and employers more flexibility. This will fund shorter apprenticeships and open up more tailored, responsive training options compared with the current system, where apprenticeships must run for at least 12 months. When we launch the consultations as described in the road map, every effort will be made to ensure that the consultations reach a wide audience. The Government are keen to hear from employers of all sizes and their representative organisations, as well as workers and their representative bodies, in order to understand the distinct perspective of these different stakeholders. They will play a crucial role in policy development. In developing options in our consultations, the Government will consider their potential impacts. The options analysts will, as is standard, consider the impacts on the labour market for different groups of workers and micro, small and medium businesses.
In addition, the road map shows that full implementation of the Bill will take years, so seeking to publish a review too early would prevent meaningful assessment of its effects, especially on young people.
The Government value apprenticeship, as I said earlier, and apprentices. We want to continue to engage with businesses that offer apprenticeship and encourage their contributions to forthcoming consultations, including on employment status, under the Bill. We will be happy to continue to engage with and meet the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf, to that end, and to listen to all young people and apprentices themselves.
These amendments are unnecessary and duplicative. Supporting young people and small businesses will already be at the forefront of our minds as we work to implement our reforms. I therefore respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw Amendment 181.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for tabling Amendment 184B.
We recognise that workplace temperatures are changing, especially as the climate changes. We are committed to ensuring that workplaces are safe in the modern world, and we committed in Next Steps to Make Work Pay to look at how to modernise health and safety guidance for extreme temperatures.
The Health and Safety Executive is Britain’s national regulator for workplace health and safety. It is dedicated to protecting people and places, and helping people lead safer and healthier lives. To deliver on our commitment, the HSE is reviewing the approved code of practice for the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 to ensure it is fit for purpose for a modern workforce. This includes monitoring emerging evidence around the impact of extreme temperatures on workplaces. The HSE will bring forward detailed proposals on workplace temperature in due course and there will be an opportunity to comment, which I encourage the noble Baroness and others to respond to.
I assure the noble Baroness that the workplace regulations currently require that, during working hours, the temperature in all workplaces inside buildings should be reasonable. All employers must make a suitable assessment of the risk to employees and take action where necessary. This includes assessing the risk from heat stress. The Environment Agency has also issued guidance on how employers can plan for climate change impacts to their sites of work and integrate climate change adaption into their management systems. Nevertheless, I hope this broad scope of work, which is currently under way, provides the noble Baroness with the reassurance that this is a matter that we already recognise as important, and that we are actively taking steps to address the impact of increasing temperatures on health and safety at work.
Before we conclude this group, my noble friends Lord Leong and Lord Katz and I would like to thank your Lordships’ House for the extensive and energetic debates that we have had throughout Report, as well as its continued engagement and scrutiny. Indeed, we have held over 50 engagements with noble Lords since the Bill came here from the other place, excluding the debates here in the Chamber.
This Bill will benefit 15 million people—half of the UK workforce. We were elected with a manifesto commitment to make work pay, and the Bill is a vital step in delivering that commitment. With that, I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, to withdraw Amendment 184B.