Defence Spending Priorities: NATO Summit

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The Prime Minister has made it clear that the investments we propose to embark on, such as AUKUS and FCAS, will mean that defence spending will reach 2.5% of GDP by the end of the decade. It is currently projected to reach 2.3% of GDP this year. We constantly assess the threat and our ability to respond to it, which is a responsible way to proceed.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, on Monday in the other place, while making a Statement, the Prime Minister was on more than one occasion asked a variant of the excellent question that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, asked. He never once answered the question but twice prayed in aid what he called the “gigantic” commitment we are making to the AUKUS agreement and how it will increase defence spending very considerably, taking it over the target of 2.5%—those are not the exact words but that is what he said. On 16 December when he made the initial Statement about AUKUS he said nothing about predicted costs. On the contrary, he said that AUKUS came with lucrative defence and security opportunities. There is no information in the public domain on the predicted cost of AUKUS so where can I find the evidence of the gigantic commitment we seem to have made, that only the Prime Minister seems to be aware of?

Ukraine: UK and NATO Military Commitment

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 21st June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I do not agree with my noble friend’s somewhat dismissive commentary on how the UK has responded to this. I think, by universal assent, the UK has played a pivotal role in coming to the aid of and supporting Ukraine, which knows that it has in us a solid and reliable friend. I say to my noble friend that within the whole Baltic area there has been a bolstering of the enhanced forward presence, to which the UK has been an important contributor. That has been a necessary response. As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, what we are witnessing is quite simply an illegal and barbarous invasion by President Putin of an innocent sovereign state.

It is interesting that, within the Baltic area, Sweden and Finland now seek to join NATO. I assume they are motivated by the sense of comfort and reassurance that the alliance will bring them if they are able to become members. That is a matter for hope and optimism.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I wish to associate myself with the expressions of gratitude to our Armed Forces and our veterans. Yesterday in the other place, Leo Docherty, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence People and Veterans, in answering this Question spoke about the Government’s

“absolute resolve to meet our NATO commitments”

and said that they are doing that by delivering

“at pace the technological and military revolution necessary to make ourselves more lethal, agile and deployable around the world than ever before.”

He went on:

“For too long, the measurement of our military capability has been about men and vehicles in garrisons, rather than our ability to project power”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/6/22; col. 558.]


The Minister knows that I think that is the right approach. Why then, on 15 June, did the MoD slip out, under cover of a Written Ministerial Statement, the Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy and its accompanying document on the ethics of military AI? When will the Secretary of State or the Prime Minister come to Parliament to explain how this strategy will, in the words of that Statement,

“transform the culture of defence”—[Official Report, Commons, 15/6/22; col. 13WS.]

and to answer questions about it?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As ever, I appreciate the noble Lord’s interest in these matters. Indeed, the Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy was published on 15 June. It is an important development; on artificial intelligence, we as a department want to be effective, efficient, trusted and influential. As for when there will be an opportunity to question the Secretary of State in the other place—or, for that matter, to question me in this Chamber—I will make inquiries about what the intention is for parliamentary procedure. I shall try to ascertain whether there is a likely date for a Statement. Personally, I think it would make for an interesting and very useful debate in this Chamber.

Ukraine Update

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Wednesday 27th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I apologise; I endeavoured to respond to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. The Foreign Secretary has expressed a view and of course is perfectly entitled to have it. My role as a Defence Minister is to explain how we in the MoD are working with our NATO partners and our allies and how we are trying to co-ordinate delivery. At the end of it all, as I said earlier, in conjunction with Ukraine we are trying to work out and supply not just what it needs but to do so when it needs it. Part of that is reflected in the response that I was able to give in explaining to the House that we can now confirm that Brimstone will be provided. That is something that the Ukrainians specifically wanted because of its capacity.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

One of the things that the Ukrainians really do need is the capability to clear up the incredible amount of unexploded ordinance, some of which has been seeded deliberately by the Russians as they remove themselves from around Kyiv. We should be proud of the Halo Trust, which has gone back to Ukraine and has over 40 locally employed people who have been doing that work, even during some of the dreadful violence that has been going on. I know the Government are supporting them. Apart from anything else, the trust needs funding to pay the people who work for it and who do this dangerous, difficult but much-needed work.

The second thing the trust needs is an appreciation by the Ukrainian Government of the importance of certain senior people avoiding national conscription to other jobs. It might be helpful if our Government, in conjunction with the Halo Trust, argued that the Ukrainian Government should allow these key people to this work. They are experts who have been doing it for eight years in that country, in the most dangerous of conditions, supported by this organisation. Can the noble Baroness, perhaps on their behalf, make some of these arguments?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am indebted to the noble Lord for a perceptive contribution. He is quite right that that has emerged as an issue in the area; indeed, it was referred to in the other place. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State, Ben Wallace, said that we were looking at it to see what we could do to help. I will take those comments back to my department and will see whether we can produce something more positive.

National Shipbuilding Strategy

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, in the absence of my noble friend Lord West of Spithead, I convey to the Minister that, having had a conversation with him, he, like I, welcomes this refresh of the National Shipbuilding Strategy to the extent that it reflects Parker, because it takes a systems approach to these issues. To that extent, it is an energising read.

However, I know that my noble friend would think that that butters few parsnips unless we know when the ships will actually be ordered. The infographic that is figure 3 in the document—I know now how much the Minister likes infographics; I shall come back to figure 1 in a moment—refers to what is called the

“Decision point for future Capability”.

That means absolutely nothing. One or two of them stretch over 14 years. The questions that I think my noble friend would like me to ask are: when are these ships going to be ordered and what ships are going to be ordered on those dates, because that is really important?

Perhaps I may stretch the House’s patience a little to ask my own question. I like the infographic in figure 1 because it shows the extensive, comprehensive nature of this industry across the United Kingdom. The executive summary says:

“The shipbuilding industry supports 42,600 jobs right across the country and adds £2.8 billion to the UK economy. It supports a vast supply chain and skilled jobs around the country in both the civil and defence sectors and delivers world leading capabilities for the Royal Navy.”


That is really encouraging. It is a very comprehensive view of the impact on our economy that the strategy could have as it is refreshed.

The problem is that the National Shipbuilding Strategy which is refreshed is that of 6 September 2017. Let me read to the Minister from the foreword by the then Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Fallon. He said:

“Today some 111,000 people are working in the maritime and marine sectors in the UK, including in the shipyards, supplying the parts, or supporting the equipment that keep this great industry alive, from Appledore to Rosyth and beyond.”


What happened to those 70,000-plus workers within five years of the first strategy?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord included a lot of material in his question, and I am not sure I can respond to it all. Let me pick up first on the important figure that he referred to, which is the outline of what shipbuilding will be for the United Kingdom over the next 30 years. That is a very healthy, refreshing and encouraging picture.

I appreciate that the noble Lord wishes to reflect the persistence of his colleague, the noble Lord, Lord West, in wanting to pin down figures. I have covered the timescale for the Type 26 and the Type 31. The noble Lord will be aware that the Type 32 is still in concept, but that will be an exceedingly important addition to the Royal Navy for the reasons that I described earlier, and they will be UK-built.

As the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, referred to, we will also be dealing with not just the fleet support ships but a multirole ocean surveillance ship and a multirole support ship—probably a number of these; these are the ships that will replace the landing platform docks and the landing ship dock auxiliaries in the early 2030s. We will be dealing with the future defence Type 83, which will replace the Type 45 destroyers. It will be a key part of the future of our air defence systems, and will provide wide-area air defence for the carrier strike group from the 2030s. In among all that is a miscellany of other shipbuilding activity.

The noble Lord will understand that I cannot be more specific about dates; it is impossible to do that when much of this is in the concept phase. He will understand that the plans are laid, the need is identified and the political resolve is there to order and deliver these ships.

Ukraine

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Friday 25th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, in light of the one issue I intend to speak about, I draw attention to my interests in the register, particularly that I am the chair of the European Leadership Network and that I have a consultancy contract with, as well as being the vice-chair of, the Nuclear Threat Initiative. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, who has made a wise and well-informed speech.

[Noble Lords]

Neville-Jones.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

I apologise to the noble Baroness. I will start again. With some trepidation now, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Sedwill, on an excellent maiden speech. I do not think that any of us who have known him in the many other important positions he has held are surprised that it was an excellent speech, to be candid. I thank him for his service and I look forward to his future contributions to your Lordships’ House.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have profound consequences for the security of all Europe and beyond, as many noble Lords have said. Putin’s resort to force sets Russia-West relations back by decades and it may be longer than decades before we can unwind the damage done. It is a totally unjustified attack. Among other things, it is a gross violation of Article 2 of the UN charter, which commits Russia to respect the “sovereign equality” of other states, to settle disputes peacefully and to refrain from

“the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”.

We stand in solidarity with the Ukrainian people. Those who believe in democracy and the international rule of law and who are peacemakers support the harshest sanctions against those responsible for this outrage and its inevitable tragic consequences, which are now playing out, hour by hour, on our television sets.

In recent years, we have lost important conventional and nuclear arms control agreements that grew out of the Cold War and helped to end it. Neglect of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, designed to prevent major force build-ups on the continent; withdrawal from the Treaty on Open Skies, which provided transparency about military capabilities and movements, and from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was designed to prevent an unconstrained offence/defence arms race; and non-compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which reduced the danger of nuclear war in Europe, have exacerbated a downward spiral of mistrust between Russia and the West. As a result, co-operation between the parties has eroded, concerns about military capabilities have grown and, consequently, the risk of miscalculation is heightened. Terrible and shocking as the unprovoked, unjustified criminal invasion of Ukraine by Russia is, worse still is the possibility that this invasion might escalate to global thermonuclear war—it really could do so.

On 3 January, the leaders of the five nuclear weapons states issued a joint statement titled

“On Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races”.


While they—even Putin—agree that

“a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”—

namely, that nuclear war serves no rational purpose—the mere fact that no one plans to fight a nuclear war over Ukraine does not mean that it cannot happen. It does not mean that it will happen; that is, to some degree, up to us and the decisions we make. While the Russian alert status has apparently not been raised, the annual strategic Grom drills of nuclear-capable missiles that took place on Saturday conveyed quite a different message, one of nuclear threat, and Putin has made statements that make such an escalation more credible.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, reminded us, Putin’s chilling warning to the West early yesterday morning on Russian TV, when he said—I paraphrase—that anyone who tries to interfere with Russia will suffer consequences such as they have never experienced before in their history, was bad enough. We are all very familiar with these words because they have been played out again and again on our television sets, but we are less familiar with the fact that he added something even worse:

“As for the military sphere, modern Russia, even after the collapse of the USSR and the loss of a significant part of its potential, is today one of the most powerful nuclear powers in the world and, moreover, has certain advantages in a number of the latest types of weapons. In this regard, no one should have any doubts that a direct attack on our country will lead to defeat and dire consequences for any potential aggressor.”


During the Cold War, when the fear of nuclear war was taken so seriously, words that could potentially pave the way for nuclear war were avoided. It appears that now at least one man has forgotten that fear and those words can be uttered.

In that context, where, as my noble friend Lord West said, the tripline for escalation is set so low, consequential war between Russia and NATO forces—war involving NATO allies such as Poland, the Baltic states or Hungary —could very easily escalate to war involving, first, tactical and, finally, strategic nuclear force. In the days and weeks ahead, leaders in London, Moscow and Washington and throughout Europe must be careful to avoid new and destabilising military deployments, close encounters between Russian and NATO forces and the introduction of offensive weapons that undermine common security. There will be a natural and understandable reaction in the West to isolate Russia, cutting off direct communication and interactions. But at this moment of high military tension, communication, arms control and continuing space for diplomacy are more important than ever for effective deterrence.

Ukraine: Military and Non-military Support

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 25th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I do not have any information on that precise point, but I undertake to investigate and respond to the noble Lord if I can.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, innocent civilians will pay the cost of political failure if the current tensions over Ukraine continue to escalate. The most important non-military support we can give Ukraine is to continue intense, robust dialogue. The Secretary of State for Defence explained this in the Statement he made last week, and I commend him for his willingness to meet with General Shoygu in Moscow. Does the noble Baroness not agree that if we are going to find a sustainable solution to this problem without further unnecessary deaths, we need to concentrate on diplomacy?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord speaks with authority and makes a very important point. He will be aware that the NATO approach over recent years has in fact been deterrence, dialogue and defence, and that is a sustainable way forward. It is certainly an approach this Government endorse, and it is the approach we are endeavouring to prosecute at the moment. We just hope that President Putin is hearing the entreaties being uttered and understands that there are very, very grave consequences to follow if he decides to pursue his proposals to invade Ukraine.

Ukraine

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 18th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Yes, I reassure my noble friend that we will do everything we can to support Ukraine. As I said earlier, Ukraine is a friend and an important bilateral defence partner. In terms of the agreements it has reached in its own right, and legitimately so, with the international community and NATO, it has positions which should be respected. Like NATO, the UK will continue to review, assess and monitor, and we shall continue to respond, in conjunction with our allies, in the best way we can.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the Statement and particularly that, of its three pages, one is devoted to dialogue, which is the only way in which the dreadful current set of circumstances will be resolved. However, I am disappointed that, despite the fact that the paragraphs on dialogue begin with the sentence

“I must stress that no one wants conflict”,


there is no recognition that there is existing conflict. There is conflict going on in the eastern part of Ukraine and, despite the refreshment of a ceasefire on 22 December, violations of that ceasefire continue. In fact, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine’s daily report for today says that it recorded, in the last 24 hours, 113 ceasefire violations in the Donetsk region. In the Luhansk region,

“the Mission recorded two ceasefire violations, including one explosion”

and 144 violations in the previous 24 hours. There is existing conflict going on and people are suffering. There are missing persons and all the aspects of violence that we have come to know in many countries across the world recently. My question for the Ministry of Defence, the Minister, the Secretary of State and the Government is: what are we doing to try to lessen or cease that violence for the people who are living with it daily? It is so bad that that amazing mine-clearance organisation, the HALO Trust, has had to suspend its work in the region at the moment.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a very important point. He is right that we should remember that a considerable part of Ukraine continues to be illegally occupied, with the negative and unwelcome consequences to which he referred.

The United Kingdom, as the noble Lord will be aware, has supported Ukraine for over 30 years since it became a sovereign state in its own right. Since 2015, through Operation Orbital the UK has done what it can to help build what I described earlier as the resilience of the Ukrainian armed forces. We have provided defensive training to over 22,000 Ukrainian troops since 2015. That includes the maritime training initiative, to which I referred, to help the Ukrainian navy rebuild its capacity.

In June last year we entered into an agreement with Ukraine through a memorandum of implementation, which affirmed the UK as open to supply Ukraine with defensive weapons systems as well as training. That principle remains. The noble Lord will possibly be aware that we signed a UK export finance treaty last November to finance the Ukraine naval capabilities enhancement project. That treaty amounts to £1.7 billion of assistance.

That is meaningful help and it might assist your Lordships to understand that this is not just empty rhetoric. The proposal is that there will be missile sale and integration on new and in-service Ukrainian navy patrol and airborne platforms, including a training and engineering support package. There is a going to be development and joint production of eight fast-missile warships with modern defensive armaments. We will also assist with the creation of a new naval base in the Black Sea as a primary fleet for Ukraine and a new base in the Sea of Azov.

What the UK is trying to do in a holistic manner is to come to Ukraine’s aid in helping it to be more ready to defend itself. I think the UK can be satisfied with, and justly admired for, the help it has been giving. It has not been doing that alone, of course. As the noble Lord will be aware, the United States has been assisting as well.

The United Kingdom is very conscious of the extremely sensitive position in which Ukraine finds itself, not least because of the issues to which the noble Lord referred, but we are doing a number of very substantive things to assist it.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 23rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

As I said earlier, I will not divide the House. I move this amendment in the spirit of wanting to work with the Government and with the Army in moving quickly to implement the new terms of service and to redefine and craft a junior entry policy that is fit for the 21st century and not the 19th century. I beg to move.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment and propose to speak for a few minutes in support of it. First of all, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, on the concise way in which he put the arguments for this amendment—he has exhausted nearly all my notes. I do not want to take up unnecessary time in the House this evening—we are running later than expected—as I think he made the arguments very well, but I want to reinforce a couple of them.

Before I do that, I want to go back to the genesis of my involvement in these amendments. I did not put my name to either of the two amendments debated in Committee, although I do support raising the minimum recruitment age for the Army to 18. I support that because, in studying and researching these amendments, I came across some quite persuasive evidence of an inappropriate level of potential damage to young people who had gone through that. I investigated further why that could be the case and learned quite a lot about the immaturity of people at 16 and their physical and mental ability to handle properly what they may have gone through in training. I have now discovered other things about this which worry me even more. I did not think that the benefit to our military, or to other young people, justified potentially damaging such a significant number of young people. That is why I spoke to it in that fashion in Committee.

This amendment was tagged on to that. When I looked at it, I honestly thought that, in this day and age, in the 21st century, there was no justification for continuing this discrimination. It seemed that we were on the wrong side of history on this, and there was no justification for pursuing or sticking with it—I thought it was a no-brainer. I was not surprised that there was not much debate about it; it seemed pretty straightforward, and I more or less said that.

When the Minister responded to the debate and seemed not to concede that this was even discrimination, I intervened and asked her a specific question about what the Army thought it got out of this and why it persisted in doing it. She again gave me an answer, which is to be found in Hansard at col. GC 461. She did not quite say that it was not discrimination but suggested that the Army was not intending to discriminate. She promised to write to me, and she did so today. Her letter expands on what the Army is intending to do.

The truth is, of course, that there was a review in 2015, and the Army put its best case forward at this attempt at judicial review. Two things came out in that very clearly, particularly in the evidence of the brigadier who was then the Army’s chief witness—whose name does not really matter but whose evidence is in the public domain.

It was about force level—about the ability, for a longer period, to take advantage of people in whom they had invested a lot of training. It seems from the noble Baroness’s letter to me that it is now more about what the recruits get out of this than what the Army gets out of it; that is a welcome development. We could go back to the debate about whether it is justifiable for some of these recruits, with the potential for damaging others, but I do not want to rehearse all that.

We debated all this on 8 November. The issue was not been raised in the debate at all, but Corporal Kimberly Hay was convicted of punching two recruits in the very establishment that everybody was singing the praises of just a couple of days later. I was surprised. I had no knowledge of this, obviously, but it had not been mentioned. That incident led me to delve into this issue a bit more. I discovered that, between 2014 and 2017, 50 cases of assault went to court martial but with no findings of guilt. This seemed to have been for process reasons rather than because any witnesses were deemed not to have been telling the truth. The criticisms made about the unsatisfactory nature of the prosecution were about the way in which the Army police had investigated the matter, rather than that any of the many witnesses who gave evidence against some 17 trainers had not been believed. Around the same time, between 2014 and 2020, there were 60 complaints by trainees or parents about the way in which trainees were treated at AFC Harrogate.

None of this seems to have been reflected in the debate or the information given in the debate. That certainly makes me want to reconsider many of the things said in support of AFC Harrogate and what it was actually doing with these young people. My suspicion is that this issue will not go away—that, like many issues over the last 10 years that have become apparent about institutions, it will be a slow burner but eventually much more will come out. Of course I cannot ask noble Lords to make decisions about changing legislation on the basis of an argument as weak as that, but history tends to suggest that there is something there that needs to be investigated.

My final point is to ask what the Army in the current circumstances gets out of this. Over the last decade, the size of the Army’s core recruitment pool— 16 to 24 year-olds—in the United Kingdom has remained steady at about 7 million potential recruits. I am not suggesting that the Army seeks to recruit them all, but that is the cohort. The stability of this demographic is projected to continue—it will not go down—but the targeted strength of the Army has reduced by 29% from 102,000 in 2011 to a planned 72,500 by 2025. In broad terms, for every four new soldiers the Army needed to recruit and retain a decade ago, it needs only three now, drawn from a demographic that has stayed about the same size.

The Army’s own evidence to the judicial review—which failed because of the terms of the Equality Act, not because the distinction was not discrimination—was that, if it lost those recruits for those extra two years, it would then need to recruit 40 more recruits each year. That was the evidence that it put in. I cannot take all these complicated figures to their logical conclusions, but it suggests to me that the problem is solved for the Army. I do not see what the justification is now for continuing with this discrimination. The Army should follow the logic of its own junior entry review of 2019, which is to change the terms in which they sign up 16 year-olds into the service.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I know that you are all waiting agog for my response to what has been a wide-ranging and very interesting debate, but I am required to make a correction in relation to our previous debate on Amendment 26. I have been informed that the process that I described is slightly different. The precise fees payable are made through both the affirmative and the negative resolution procedure, which is different from what I may have read out from the speaking notes. I am pleased to put that correction on the record.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Russell, for raising this issue, which is important and which we are all interested in. Clearly, some of your Lordships have concerns about it. As I said, it led to a very interesting debate. The essence of the amendment is that your Lordships are concerned that those who join the Armed Forces before their 18th birthday are obliged to serve longer than those who join after it.

Obviously, this is a bit of reprise of what I said in Committee, but I clarify that this is a matter not of length of service but of discharge. The statutory “discharge as of right” rules allow all new recruits, regardless of age, to discharge within their first three to six months of service, depending on their service, if they decide that the Armed Forces is not a career for them. In addition, service personnel have a statutory right to claim discharge up to their 18th birthday, subject to a maximum three-month cooling-off period. These rights are made clear to all on enlistment. Ultimately, all service personnel under the age of 18 have a statutory right to leave the Armed Forces up until their 18th birthday, without the liability to serve in the reserves, which would be the obligation on an adult aged over 18 who was leaving the services.

The noble Lord, Lord Russell, referred to a specific example, and I confess that I was not familiar with it. I understood that he referred to the RAF, but if he would care to write to me with the details, I will certainly look at that in detail.

The noble Lord, Lord Russell, was specifically concerned about the perceived unfairness to the under-18 group who serve longer than a new start of 18 years or over if they pursue a career in the Armed Forces. The noble Lord, Lord Browne, alluded to some extent to the letter I sent him in an endeavour to explain what these arrangements are about and the rationale behind them. I reiterate for the benefit of the Chamber that the policies in place covering the recruitment of young people below the age of 18 are designed carefully to be lawful, fair and fit for purpose, both for the individual and the service they volunteer to join.

The primary reason for the minimum period of service in the Army for those under 18 is that the Army must ensure that it maintains the right workforce levels to enable it to deploy personnel over the age of 18 on operations at home and abroad. Recruits under the age of 18 are not fully deployable on operations, and their notice period therefore runs from the point at which they become fully deployable alongside those who enlist after their 18th birthday. This minimum period of service for those under 18 also allows the Armed Forces to provide our young people with world-class training. It develops well-rounded junior personnel, both morally and conceptually, and, in turn, all this quite simply brings huge benefit to the individual, the Armed Forces and wider society. I feel that is positive and something that we should celebrate.

I acknowledge the recent reports of entirely unacceptable behaviour at the foundation college resulting in the conviction of an instructor, and the noble Lords, Lord Russell, Lord Browne and Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, referred to this. That is something we all deplore. It indicates to me that there is a system which works: that if somebody behaves absolutely unacceptably in a criminal fashion, they are dealt with within the system. I do not think we should be complacent about this in any way. I was as disturbed to read that report as anyone, but it suggested to me that there are systems in place.

I think the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, particularly sought reassurance about this. I want to reassure her and your Lordships that for under-18s any reports of bullying are taken extremely seriously, and tough action is taken against those who fall short of the Army’s high standards. The duty of care for all our recruits, particularly those aged under 18, is of the utmost importance, and we recognise the need to treat under-18s differently.

The Armed Forces foundation college—

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

I am very much obliged to the noble Baroness for giving way; she is very generous. However, at this point I think it is appropriate to ask her specifically if it is true that there were 60 complaints between 2014 and 2020 from parents or trainees about bullying behaviour at AFC Harrogate. Is that true?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I do not have that information before me. I will certainly undertake to investigate, and I will write to the noble Lord with whatever I find out.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

With respect, if it is true, will the noble Baroness also express in that letter whether she is concerned that that does not appear to have been reflected in the inspections of AFC Harrogate? If it had been, I am sure the noble Baroness would have shared that when we discussed this in Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

29: After Clause 19, insert the following new Clause—
“Use of novel technologies by the UK Armed Forces: review
(1) Within three months of this Act being passed, the Secretary of State must commission a review of the implications of increasing autonomy associated with the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning, including in weapons systems, for legal proceedings against armed forces personnel that arise from military operations, and produce recommendations for favourable legal environments for the United Kingdom’s armed forces, including instilling domestic processes and engaging in the shaping of international agreements and institutions.(2) The review must consider—(a) what novel technologies could emerge from the Ministry of Defence and the United Kingdom’s allies, and from the private sector, which could be used in military operations,(b) how international and domestic legal frameworks governing conflict need to be updated in response to novel technologies,(c) the United Kingdom’s engagement with current and new routes of international efforts to secure a new legally binding instrument governing the use of novel technologies in conflict, and(d) what protection and guidance armed forces personnel need to minimise the risk of legal proceedings being brought against them which relate to military operations in response to novel technologies. (3) Within the period of one year beginning on the day on which the review is commissioned, the Secretary of State must lay a report before Parliament of its findings and recommendations.”Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment mandates a review within three months of the passing of the Act of implications of increasing autonomy associated with the use of AI and machine learning in weapon systems. The review must focus on the protection and guidance that Armed Forces personnel need to ensure that they comply with the law, including international humanitarian law, and how international and domestic legal frameworks need to be updated.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, this amendment is also in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Houghton of Richmond and Lord Craig of Radley. Once more, I am grateful to them for their continuing support of this amendment.

This is the fourth time this amendment, or a variant of it, has been debated in your Lordships’ House in a relatively short time. This version of it has been shaved. The specific references to overseas deployment and overseas operations have been taken out, but subsection (2)(c), which relates to

“engagement with current and new routes of international efforts to secure a new legally binding instrument governing the use of novel technologies in conflict”

has been added to it as part of what the review that it would mandate needs to consider. I will explain that, hopefully in a relatively short period of time.

The amendment mandates, within three months of the passing of the Act,

“a review of the implications of increasing autonomy associated with the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning … in weapons systems”.

The review would be required to focus on the protection and guidance that Armed Forces personnel need to ensure that they comply with the law, including international humanitarian law, and how international and domestic legal frameworks need to be updated.

I have no intention of repeating the points I have previously made. I will just take a few seconds to remind noble Lords of assurances we have been given by the Minister thus far. I draw noble Lords’ attention to cols. GC 437-38 from the Grand Committee. I accept that we have been given some reassurances that the MoD is “alert to” the complex issues that this amendment raises and is working and

“has worked extensively on them over the … last 18 months.”

I also accept that presently the Government’s position is that the Minister

“cannot set out details until these positions have been finalised, but work to set a clear direction of travel for defence AI, underpinned by proper policy and governance frameworks, has reached an advanced stage”—

so we are in keen anticipation—and that:

“Key to this is the defence AI strategy”,


which, it is hoped, will be published

“in the coming months, along with details of the approaches we will use when adopting and using AI.”—[Official Report, 8/11/21; col. GC 437.]

These are substantially the Minister’s words. I do not intend to read all of this; people can read it for themselves.

Withdrawing the amendment in Committee, I indicated that I expected the issues, which are moving at a dramatic pace, to have moved on by the time we got to Report, and that the probability was that this amendment would come back, because there would be developments. There have been developments. Some of them are that my knowledge of matters relevant to this amendment has increased, but another of them was much more dramatic.

Last Wednesday the “Stories of Our Times” podcast published a podcast—do we publish podcasts?—entitled “The rise of killer robots: The future of modern warfare”. This was hosted by a journalist, a woman, a podcaster, Manveen Rana. The guests were Matthew Campbell, a Sunday Times foreign affairs features editor, General Sir Richard Barrons, former Commander of the UK Joint Forces Command, and General Sir Nick Carter, Chief of the Defence Staff. I think a British academic based in the United States also contributed. If I can find a way to do this—I think it might be possible—it is my intention to ensure that every parliamentarian in this building, here and in the other place, gets access to this podcast because, more dramatically and probably with better effect, it makes the points that I have been trying to get across in the last three attempts and this one, explaining why it is crucial that this work is done.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who contributed to this debate, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle and Lady Smith of Newnham, my noble friend Lord Coaker, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I am sorry that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, could not add his name to the amendment, but in my head it is there.

I thank the Minister, who was characteristically engaged with the debate and the issues. At this time of night, I do not want to start debating with her on whether some of her comments about this amendment and what it would do are justified. I do not believe that this would slow down the work; it is just a compilation of the things that the Government ought to be doing anyway. I do not care about the three months; a promise that this will be done, and done transparently, is what I, as a parliamentarian, demand of the Government. At some point, this will need to be done and need to be shared with Parliament. We will need to take joint responsibility for these weapons systems if we seek to deploy them in any fashion—even limited versions of them.

My second point is that I am glad to see that our country is complying with its international legal obligations to subject new technology to a rigorous review to make sure that it is compatible with international humanitarian law. I am satisfied that that is happening. I do not understand why my Government do not publish those reviews. The United States and many other countries publish such reviews. Why are they not published, so that we, the politicians who engage, not so much in this House but in the other House, in paying for them with taxpayers’ money, know that we are complying with this? Other countries can do so perfectly well.

I have been obsessed with this issue since 2013, when I read the Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat report of the US Department of Defense’s Defense Science Board. It said specifically that the United States did not have a resilient weapons system that could not be penetrated by cyber, because it had penetrated them. It went on to say that the same was true of “all of our allies”. It did not say in the report that it did that to all of their allies, but I would not be surprised if it did.

In 2013, I took that to the then Ministers in the Ministry of Defence and said, “Have you read this? We are deploying some of this tech that has been penetrated, and it can be penetrated by cyber threat.” I have to say that it was penetrated with software downloaded from the web; no one wrote a single line of code in order to do it. I have yet to meet a Defence Minister of that generation who ever even bothered to read the report.

This is where we are now—this will be my last word on this. General Sir Richard Barrons, Commander Joint Forces Command from 2013 to 2016, is publicly saying of autonomous weapon systems that it is not a question of tomorrow—the technology exists now, it is unstoppable and we need to get on to that bandwagon. He has been saying that for years. I do not know how many senior military officers who have worn our uniform are involved in this and saying this, but one of them doing so publicly terrifies me, because I am far from satisfied that I—a former Secretary of State for Defence —or any of our current Ministers understand this well enough to keep people who think like that under proper control. That is what concerns me. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 29 withdrawn.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

59: After Clause 18, insert the following new Clause—
“Liability for using novel technologies: review
(1) Within three months of this Act being passed, the Secretary of State must commission a review of the implications of increasing autonomy associated with the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning, including in weapons systems, for legal proceedings against armed forces personnel that arise from overseas operations, and produce recommendations for favourable legal environments for the United Kingdom’s armed forces operating overseas, including instilling domestic processes and engaging in the shaping of international agreements and institutions.(2) The review must consider—(a) what protection and guidance armed forces personnel need to minimise the risk of legal proceedings being brought against them which relate to overseas operations in response to novel technologies,(b) how international and domestic legal frameworks governing overseas operations need to be updated in response to novel technologies, and(c) what novel technologies could emerge from the Ministry of Defence and the United Kingdom’s allies, and from the private sector, which could be used in overseas operations.(3) Within the period of one year beginning on the day on which the review is commissioned, the Secretary of State must lay a report before Parliament of its findings and recommendations.”

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, this amendment is also in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Houghton of Richmond and Lord Craig of Radley. I am very grateful to them for joining me in this amendment, and I convey the apologies of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, who is unable to be present today because he had a prior, immovable commitment to be abroad representing your Lordships’ House in a meeting.

Amendment 59 focuses on the protection and guidance that Armed Forces personnel engaged in the deployment and use of new technologies will need to ensure that they comply with the law, including international humanitarian law, and that will explain how international and domestic legal frameworks need to be updated—all because of the predicted increased use of novel technologies that could emerge from or be deployed by the Ministry of Defence, UK allies or the private sector.

Today the private sector is often deployed with our Armed Forces on overseas operations as part of a multinational force. The amendment imposes an obligation on the Secretary of State to commission a review of the relevant issues, sets out what that review must consider and obliges the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament of the report’s findings and recommendations.

That is the focus of the amendment but underlying it is a much broader issue about the duties of the Government for our Armed Forces in respect of the development, deployment and use of these technologies, and another complementary obligation on the Government to ensure that they are parliamentarily accountable for these developments—to the extent, of course, that they can be.

Noble Lords will recall that the same amendment was tabled and debated during the passage of the overseas operations Bill but was not pressed to a vote. Separately, on behalf of those noble Lords who supported it, I told the Minister that it was our intention to bring it back in this context, which is perhaps a more appropriate and broader context for the amendment.

I thank the Minister and pay tribute to her and to the MoD officials who are wrestling with the complex legal challenges posed by the development and deployment of these weapons systems for their work on that, and for their repeated engagement with me and other noble and noble and gallant Lords, including those who have put their names to this amendment. As a result of that engagement, I am very aware that the Ministry of Defence continues, and has continued over recent months at pace, both domestically and internationally, to work hard on this, and is making progress with these complex challenges.

I do not want to take unnecessary time going over again all the arguments made in support of the measure in the overseas operations Bill context. I take them as read. There are still unanswered questions, but I hope that, over time, they may be answered. I shall refer to some of them, and more recent developments, for another purpose, which is to set the context, and reinforce the importance, of addressing these challenges—so I shall repeat a few points that I made in earlier debates.

First, the integrated review, published in March, was the third defence and security review since 2020, which alone is an indication of the pace at which these developments are taking place. It was described as forward-facing, recognising both current and future threats against the UK, and set out the capabilities that will need to be developed to deter and engage them. It does do that—imperfectly, I have to say, but it does do it.

When the Prime Minister made a Statement on the review in November last year, he said that

“now is the right time to press ahead”

with the modernisation of the Armed Forces because of

“emerging technologies, visible on the horizon”.—[Official Report, Commons, 19/11/20; col. 488.]

The Prime Minister said that these would “revolutionise warfare” and I think he was right. The CGS, General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith, said that he foresees the army of the future as

“the integration of boots and bots”.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond, who is with us today, has repeatedly warned your Lordships about the risks posed by the intersection of artificial intelligence and human judgment and has spoken wisely about the risks posed by technology interacting with human error.

These risks are with us now and they are very real. Last month retired General Stanley McChrystal, who led the coalition forces in Afghanistan for two years, said that artificial intelligence inevitably will come to make lethal decisions on the battlefield. However, he acknowledged the “frightening” risks of potential malfunction or mistake. He said:

“People say, ‘We’ll never give control over lethal strike to artificial intelligence.’ That’s wrong. We absolutely will. Because at a certain point, you can’t respond fast enough, unless you do that. A hypervelocity missile, hypersonic missile coming at the United States aircraft carrier, you don’t have time for individuals to do the tracking, you don’t have time for senior leaders to be in the decision loop, or you won’t be able to engage the missile.”


Now, at a less strategic level, military-grade autonomous drones can fly themselves to a specific location, pick their own targets and kill without the assistance of a remote human operator. A UN report about a March 2020 skirmish in the military conflict in Libya records that such a drone made its wartime debut. The report states that retreating forces

“were subsequently hunted down and remotely engaged by the unmanned combat aerial vehicles”,

but does not say explicitly that this lethal autonomous weapon system killed anyone. But it certainly tried to.

The very real fear is that autonomous weapons will undermine the international laws of war. These laws are premised on the idea that people can be held accountable for their actions even during wartime and that the right to kill during combat does not confer the right to murder civilians. But how can autonomous weapons be held accountable? Who is to blame for a robot that commits war crimes? Who would be put on trial: the weapon, the soldier, the soldier’s commanders, the corporation that made the weapon, or the person who wrote the code that gave the weapon the ability to do this?

In a world without regulations that compel meaningful human control of autonomous weapons, there will be war crimes with no war criminals to hold accountable, and the laws of war, along with their deterrent value, will be weakened significantly. I say “deterrent value” because I think, from my experience, that the laws of war and international humanitarian laws work because they are observed, not because they are enforced. It is important that we find some way of collectively reviewing these laws so that they can continue to be observed in this more complicated—and, in many ways, terrifying—new world that we are moving rapidly into.

On 21 October 2021, NATO Defence Ministers agreed to NATO’s first ever strategy for artificial intelligence—AI—which states:

“At the forefront of this Strategy lie the NATO Principles of Responsible Use for AI in Defence, which will help steer our transatlantic efforts in accordance with our values, norms, and international law. The NATO Principles of Responsible Use … are based on existing and widely accepted ethical, legal, and policy commitments under which NATO has historically operated and will continue to operate under. These Principles do not affect or supersede existing obligations and commitments, both national and international.”


Our Government must have agreed these principles. When will the Minister make a Statement to Parliament on them, allow them to be debated and allow Ministers to be questioned on their sufficiency or their breadth and depth? The provisions of Article 36 of Protocol 1, additional to the 1949 Geneva conventions, commit states, including our own, to ensure the legality of all new weapons, means and methods of warfare by subjecting them to a rigorous and multidisciplinary review. I have no reason to believe that we have not complied with our legal obligations in that respect, but, unfortunately, as we are not one of the eight nations in the world that publish a review of legal compatibility, including the United States of America, I have no Minister’s reassurance in that regard. When will we get that assurance or transparency?

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[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I have added to my choreography before standing at the Dispatch Box: can I get a Polo mint in before the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, concludes? The answer is no. That is the first question I am able to answer.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Browne, for tabling Amendment 59, which is supported by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Houghton and Lord Craig, and engages with the subject of novel technologies. It is a significant issue that merits discussion, and I am grateful to the noble Lord for his kind remarks.

There is no doubt that the increasing adoption of innovative technologies is changing how military operations are conducted. The noble Lords’ analysis—that we need to be particularly mindful of the legal ramifications—is hard to dispute. From the engagement that I and the department have had with the noble Lords, I know that they understand very well the broader complexities likely to be created by Defence use of AI and are anxious that we should address these issues both purposefully and systematically. This scrutiny and challenge is welcome, because we are grappling with questions and subjects that are indeed very complex.

I hope to reassure your Lordships that the department is alert to these issues and has worked extensively on them over the course of the last 18 months. Noble Lords will understand that I cannot set out details until these positions have been finalised, but work to set a clear direction of travel for defence AI, underpinned by proper policy and governance frameworks, has reached an advanced stage. Key to this is the defence AI strategy, which we hope to publish in the coming months, along with details of the approaches we will use when adopting and using AI. This commitment, which is included in the National AI Strategy, reflects the Government’s broader commitment that the public sector should set an example through how it governs its own use of the technology. Taken together, we intend that these various publications will give a much clearer picture than is currently available, because we recognise that these are important issues that attract a great deal of interest, and we need to be as transparent and engaged as possible.

Noble Lords asked pertinent questions. I think the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, asked some of these: where in the chain of command does responsibility for AI-related outcomes reside? When might the Government have an obligation to use AI to protect service personnel from harm? What are the military and moral consequences of machine-speed warfare? These are vital questions, and we recognise that we do not yet have all the answers.

Nor can we hope to arrive at these answers on our own. We have to persist in our engagement with our international partners and allies, and with our own public and civil society. It is perfectly legitimate for parliamentarians to take an interest in this subject, to ask questions and to table debates. I hope that our forthcoming publications will provide a solid platform for an ongoing effort of public engagement and efforts to enhance public understanding, subject to the usual caveats that may apply to the release of Defence information.

To turn to the subject of the proposed amendment, we are committed to ensuring that our Armed Forces personnel have the best possible care and protection, including protection against spurious legal challenges. I assure noble Lords that, regardless of the technologies employed, all new military capabilities are subject to a rigorous review process for compliance with international humanitarian law. Furthermore, we also adjust our operating procedures to ensure that we stay within the boundaries of the law that applies at the time.

International and domestic frameworks provide the same level of protection around the use of novel technologies as for conventional systems because their general principle is to focus on the action, rather than the tool. These frameworks therefore offer appropriate levels of protection for our personnel. Earlier this year, we acted to bolster this protection in historical cases, for example, through the overseas operations Act.

In respect of artificial intelligence, I have mentioned our forthcoming AI strategy and our plan to publish details of the approaches we will use when adopting and using AI. This is really where we come to the nub of the issue. The noble Lord, Lord Browne, put his finger on it, as did the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I want to try to encapsulate what I hope will be a substantive and reassuring response to them all.

These approaches will not affect or supersede existing legal obligations, but they will ensure coherence across defence. They will also drive the creation of the policy frameworks and systems that, in practical terms, are needed to ensure that personnel researching, developing, delivering and operating AI-enabled systems have an appropriate understanding of those systems and can work with and alongside them in compliance with our various legal and policy frameworks.

The noble Lord, Lord Browne, specifically referred to the NATO AI principles. Essentially, NATO’s position is that alliance members can sign up to these NATO-wide standards or they can produce their own to a similar standard. We support NATO’s leadership in the responsible use of artificial intelligence and, as I have indicated, we intend to publish details of our own approach in early course.

In addition, we will continue to engage internationally, including through the United Nations Conference on Certain Conventional Weapons, to promote consensus on international norms and standards for the use of new and emerging technologies on the battlefield, while continuing to act as a responsible leader in this area.

I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, who asked about the phrasing I used in response to her noble friend Lord Clement-Jones’s question last week. From memory, I said two things: first, the UK has no systems that could unilaterally employ lethal force without human involvement at some stage in the process. I think that I went on to say that, sharing the concerns of government, civil society and AI experts around the world, the UK opposes the creation and use of systems that would operate without context-appropriate human involvement. I think that is the phrase the noble Baroness sought clarification on.

The phrase means that a person is exercising some form of control over the effect of the use of the weapon in a way that satisfies international humanitarian law. This could be some form of control over the operation in real time, or it could be setting clear operational parameters for a system. I hope that that has been helpful to the noble Baroness in explaining what was behind the use of that phrase.

I have endeavoured to provide reassurance to noble Lords that the Ministry of Defence takes these matters very seriously, is already doing all that needs to be done, and is planning to be proactive in communicating our approach appropriately to Parliament and the public. On this basis, I suggest that the amendment is not needed.

I also say, with the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Browne, and no sense of impertinence, that I do question the utility of requiring a review and a report. This will necessarily be only a snapshot; it will quickly become out of date when we are dealing with a rapidly evolving subject matter. Not to put too fine a point on it, the effort of staffing it risks reducing the capacity needed within the department for developing the extensive systems and frameworks that we need to ensure the proper handling of AI.

I must say that I have enjoyed this debate, as I always enjoy my engagement with the noble Lord, Lord Browne—but, for these reasons, I ask that he withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for her response to this debate and, with the indulgence of the Committee, I will refer to parts of her response. I was greatly appreciative of it all, but some parts I welcomed more than others.

I will start with the last point. The criticisms the Minister made about the vehicle that I tabled in order to have this debate was correct. It is implicit in the way I debate these issues that they are moving so fast that probably there is no point in time at which we could publish a report that would not quickly go out of date. I accept that. In fact, for that reason I wish that people, and sometimes senior military officers—but thankfully no British ones—would stop talking about a “race” for this technology. A race requires a line, and the development of this technology has no winning line that we know of.

In fact, the likelihood is that when we move to AGI, which is a hypothetical but likely development, whereby an intelligent agent understands or learns any intellectual task that a human being can, it may well be that we think we are at the line, but the machine does not think we are at the line and runs on and looks back at us and laughs. So I accept all of that but, at some point, we need to find a framework in which we in Parliament can connect with these issues—a methodology for the Government to report to Parliament, to the extent that they can, and for all of us to take responsibility, as we should, for asking our young people to go into situations of conflict, with the possibility that these weapons will be used, with all the implications.

So that is what I am seeking to get. I want a 24 year-old who is asked to take some responsibility in an environment in which these weapons are deployed to know with confidence that he or she is acting within the law. That is my shared responsibility with the Government; we need to find a way of doing that. This may be an imperfect way, but we may always be in an imperfect situation with a moving target. So I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. None of these debates answers any questions fully, but they all add to our collective knowledge.

I thank the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, for his unqualified support. He took me slightly by surprise with the deployment of his eloquence to make the case for deploying the law as a weapon of war. I fear that I agree with him—I used to be a lawyer—but I will have to think long and carefully before I give him my unqualified support for that. However, I suspect that, as always, I will end up supporting what he said.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to both amendments. I thank my noble friend Lady Massey of Darwen for tabling them. My noble friends Lady Massey and Lady Lister and I are doing our level best, in his absence, to do justice to our recently deceased, much-loved and greatly missed noble friend Lord Judd, who was a person of the greatest integrity and enormous kindness, in the context of an issue which was very dear to his heart. But that is not why I want to speak to these amendments.

When I was Secretary of State for Defence, I attended a passing-out parade for young recruits and, on occasions, spent time with the young recruits themselves and those who were training them. I invariably enjoyed a morning of meeting recruits, their families and the Army training and welfare staff. Among other matters, we talked about some of the social challenges that these young people faced. On each occasion—this was some time ago—I left with an overwhelming feeling that the Army offers many young people an accessible alternative at a time when some could quite easily drift down another path; a point which the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, made repeatedly and which I think is not lost on your Lordships’ Committee.

Of course, the discussion was almost exclusively about how the Army had provided for these young people, often from very poor socioeconomic backgrounds, an opportunity to find meaning in their lives and to develop comradeship and interpersonal skills, as well as training them for a variety of trades—opportunities which may have been difficult for them to obtain otherwise. I admit all of that. I wish I had access then to the research I have now read because I would not have asked the young people these questions. I would have asked the people who were training them and responsible for them, and who had recruited them, many different questions. I now have access to this research, which I regret that the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, dismisses with a wave of his hand, saying that it clearly is being done by people who have a vested interest—as he does, of course.

Frankly, I have much experience of personal experiences which have been contradicted by the truth. I would, in the face of this peer-reviewed research, not be conceited enough to make the case that my short experience, which has never been peer reviewed or tested properly, was a better basis for public policy than that research. That is the point I want to make in this debate.

My attention has been drawn to the work of King’s College, which found that violent, sexual and drug-related offending increases after enlistment and then rises again before first deployment. My attention has been drawn to two recent studies by the University of Glasgow—my alma mater and hardly an institution which has some grudge against the Army or its practice of recruiting young people, but which has, like King’s College, an enviable academic record and an insistence that before any work is published it is properly and rigorously peer reviewed—which found that the mental health outcomes of junior entrants give further cause for concern. The Glasgow study found that PTSD among veterans who enlisted before 1995 was between two and three times more common than among civilians from the same social background.

In the face of these recent reports, it is hardly surprising that many people are calling for an end to the UK’s policy of permitting 16 year-olds to join the military, but I am asking for an urgent rethink. I press this upon the Minister. I will not rehearse all the many good arguments as to why this reconsideration ought to conclude with a termination of the policy, but my conclusion is that the case for consideration of raising the minimum age is comprehensive. It is built on medical evidence, sound logic and, much more importantly, ethical standards.

Beyond those recruited to the Army, adolescence is known as a time when the brain and the ability to make well-reasoned decisions are still developing. Why would we ask young people to make a decision of this importance when their brain is still developing? Of course we ask young people to make all sorts of decisions that affect what they do in the rest of their life, but this is a very special decision because of what the Army does. It means that teenagers recruited to the Army are more likely to be acting on impulse than making a fully informed decision about their future. I say no more; I do not say that every one of them is but they are more likely to be. That is enough to make me hesitate. It means that they are also less likely, although it is not impossible, to withstand the physical and emotional strains of military life and training. Young people who have experienced childhood adversity are also more likely to develop mental health problems in the Army.

There is credible research on all of this. The noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, invites each of us to visit a particular institution. I invite him to read the research with an open mind. I will be confounded if he does not come to the conclusion that there is a serious issue. One study found that three-quarters of military personnel have suffered two or more instances of childhood adversity and that factors such as younger age, lower educational attainment and serving in the Army were all linked with higher vulnerability to depression and anxiety. I understand that that might be because of what we ask these people to do and what we subject them to in order to keep us secure. That is their service to us and it has consequences for them. We have to ask ourselves, however: at what point in their maturity is it more likely that they will make the right decision to commit their lives to do that? All I ask is that we consider what that time is.

There are, of course, logical flaws in the policy of 16 year-olds joining the Army. It is inconsistent with other legal age limits. Supposedly 16 year-olds are not mature enough to vote but they still can make life-changing decisions about their future. They cannot purchase knives but they can learn to use lethal weapons. Perhaps the greatest irony is that the sale of certain military videogames is prohibited to under-18s. That is not at the heart of my argument, but there are these inconsistencies. This is not the only case where an age limit that we apply to activity appears arbitrary and illogical.

In answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, about what age we should choose: any age we choose is arbitrary because each of these young people—these children—is an individual. If we could find some way to measure their maturity and their ability to go through what they will go through, that would be a far greater way to decide whether they were ready to be recruited to the Army, but we cannot. It was tried and it proved to be ineffective.

Surely, if we are satisfied, on the incontrovertible evidence, that it is far less likely that we will expose young people who are actually not fit for this if we wait until they are 18 instead of doing it when they are 16, that is a very compelling reason for moving the age from 16 to 18. I am not suggesting that those arguments ought to convince the Government to go back on this policy; there are many others. But surely the time has come, now that we have this knowledge, to do what noble Lords in this Committee have repeatedly asked the Minister to do—to expand on the research until we can make the best judgment we can with what we have available to us about this. The preponderance of the evidence suggests that it should be to stop recruiting young people at scale into the Army at 16 years of age.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)]

My Lords—

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

I apologise, but I had not finished—it was a dramatic pregnant pause that misled the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Your preface is a long one.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

It is not a preface. I want to turn to Amendment 62, for a couple of paragraphs. The amendment would ensure that

“soldiers aged under 18 are not required to serve for a longer period than adult personnel.”

In my view, the amendment addresses an issue that is just wrong—we just should not be keeping people who signed at 16 in the Army longer than people who signed at 18, just because of their age. There is no justification for that discrimination, in my view. It is an abuse of their rights; they should be treated the same as everybody else, and we should simply get rid of their distinction. I have finished now.

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In conclusion, our Armed Forces provide challenging and constructive education, training and employment opportunities for young people, as well as fulfilling and rewarding careers. I hope that, following the provision of further information, and following those assurances, the noble Baroness will agree to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

On Amendment 62, can the Minister answer this deceptively simple question? Why do the Army, in their regulations regarding the minimum service period, discriminate against younger recruits? On the issue of whether this is legal, I am not arguing that it is illegal—but will the Minister confirm for the record that the only reason why this discrimination, which would be unlawful in civilian life, is lawful, is because the Armed Forces benefit from an exemption from the Equality Act 2010 which was put there to allow them to continue to discriminate?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I think I can add nothing more to what I have already provided by way of an explanation for how that system works and why it is there, and why we do not believe that it is as discriminatory as the noble Lord indicates. However, I am happy to look at his remarks in Hansard and see whether I can provide him with a fuller response.

In conclusion, I thank your Lordships for all contributions. I genuinely thought that it was an extremely interesting debate, and I have welcomed the thoughts from contributors all around the Room.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, I am very happy to add my support to my noble friend Lord Dannatt’s Amendment 48 regarding mental health support. I came to today’s debate thinking that it struck me as a very modest but effective way of keeping the Ministry of Defence’s feet to the fire on an issue patently requiring action. However, having listened today, I begin to worry that it may not be enough.

I think it is now more generally accepted in society that in human beings mental health is every bit as prevalent as physical health. The fact that mental health can suffer as a result of traumatic experience is also widely accepted. Mental health should nowadays carry no stigma and should be proactively monitored in the same way that physical and dental health are. This is where I improvise and part company with my prepared thoughts, as I reflect on my own experience of the mismatch in the approach to mental as opposed to physical health.

In September 1973, as an 18 year-old, I attended Sandhurst. On day one, I was weighed. Sandhurst had an idea that an officer had to weigh 12 stone 8 pounds. If you weighed more than that, you were put in a queue for extra PT. If you weighed less, you were put in a queue for extra milk.

In virtually every week, if not every day, of my life in the Army in the following 43 years, something to do with my physical health was assessed or tested, with a basic fitness test every other day, a battle fitness test probably once a month, the Army physical training assessment, the Army physical fitness assessment, annual medicals, hearing tests, foot inspections and dental tests. This mismatch between checks on my physical and mental well-being is remarkable. I was never once in 43 years asked by anybody how I felt mentally. I know from my own children that sports physiotherapists are everywhere. People, including my son, think nothing of taking a couple of sessions with a therapist to make them feel a bit better—he knows he will get better, but he just feels a bit down.

If the Minister will forgive me, the appearance of the annual online platform and £2.7 million in funding does not seem a sufficient amount of effort. It smacks of tokenism to meet something that actually needs a cultural shift in the whole approach to mental health from the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence. Whatever happens to this amendment, which I fully support, I hope that this sense of a need for a cultural shift is taken back to the ministry and the Armed Forces.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton. His sharing of his personal experience has honestly been of great benefit to the Committee on this group of amendments, although I am not sure I can match the impact it has probably had on your Lordships’ thinking. I should begin my first contribution to the Committee by offering my apologies for my absence from the first day; family commitments required that I was in Scotland.

The proposals before the Committee in this group have the same objective: they are aimed at safeguarding and improving the mental health and welfare of service personnel. I support Amendments 48 and 66A but have added my name to Amendment 60, and I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans for tabling it. I agree with the arguments that he put forward and begin my remarks in support of his amendment by referring the Committee to his Oral Question in your Lordships’ House on 13 September, on the prevalence of gambling disorder in the Armed Forces. In my supplementary question then, I drew attention to the Army Headquarters Regional Command IPPD information sheet, Gambling—A Serious Risk to Military Personnel, which he has drawn from today. If the Committee will allow me, I wish to do the same for part of my argument.

In the preamble—this is the Army talking—it is stated that

“service personnel … are potentially more vulnerable and at greater risk to the harm that can result from gambling than the general public”.

As has been pointed out, it goes on to assert specifically that:

“Military veterans are 8 times more likely to become problem gamblers than the general population”.


This is not an historic document. Examination of it reveals in its last footnote a reference to 30 April 2019, which I understand to be its publication date, so it is a relatively modern view of the Army.

The Forces in Mind Trust study on veterans’ health and gambling, published on 23 September 2021, reinforces the Army’s official conclusion that there is that prevalence among veterans. It finds that veterans who responded to its survey were 10 times more likely than non-veteran respondents to experience gambling harm, and that veterans gambling were seven times more likely to be motivated by a need to escape or avoid distress. But this research is much more valuable than that, because it reveals some other very disturbing traits among veterans. Veteran participants were found to be at much greater risk of poor mental health outcomes, including depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder, and to have an alcohol and/or nicotine dependence. This research found that veterans with problem gambling had higher healthcare and benefit costs, as well as higher levels of debt than non-veterans. It is relevant to the right reverend Prelate’s amendment that the recommendations from the report include routine screening for gambling problems, including when leaving the Armed Forces.

I have to be completely honest about this: on the publication of the report, the researchers emphasised that their research must be considered with some caution, principally because

“The sample was recruited online, and veterans who have gambled may have been more likely to take part”.


I say that, however, with some further qualification because it is exactly the broader discussion about gambling and gambling harm that the Government themselves have been relying on for the oft-made assertion in your Lordships’ House that such harm is present in only a very small number of gamblers. It is all based on research and data gathered in much the same way. However, Professor Simon Dymond, the lead author of the report, said:

“Despite this, the significance of the findings is indisputable. This is the first UK study to explore the impact of gambling on UK ex-Service personnel, and our findings are consistent with the international body of work which finds that veterans are at greater risk of gambling harm.”


From my perspective, in addition to its consistency with the international body of work referred to, this research is fully consistent with the position adopted by the Army itself, which is expressed unqualified in the transition IPPD information sheet. Further, it is significant that the veterans who participated, whether self-selecting or not, were motivated to gamble by the need for an escape from, or avoidance of, distress.

However, this is perhaps the most concerning finding of the research. I quote the executive summary of the study:

“All veterans surveyed experienced some symptoms of depression, anxiety, risky alcohol use, nicotine dependence at higher levels, and increased indications of PTSD and complex PTSD … diagnoses compared to non-veterans.”


Consequently, I repeat what I said on 13 September in my supplementary question. In considering this, the “appropriate questions”, both for the Government and for us, that need to be answered are—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I will get back to where I was. The problem is real. On the basis, nature, extent and clear effect it has on military personnel, questions need to be answered. The issue is not whether we have sufficient data, but how we get the data that answers these questions. Why are soldiers more vulnerable to gambling? Why do military veterans have such a heightened prevalence to problem gambling, as opposed to the general population? Much more importantly, what are we—and in particular the MoD—doing to understand what lies behind that prevalence and all the other findings of this research? How can it be tackled before the vulnerability forms?

These are the right questions, and they totally justify a requirement for proper research, such as that laid out in this amendment. I have a great deal of respect for the Minister. If she believes that this is not the right approach, I ask her to tell us what the right approach is to gather the data that will protect these people from the development of those dreadful conditions. If she cannot propose an alternative, I suggest that we would have no difficulty getting the Committee to support the amendment, were it given the opportunity so to do.

[Lord Boyce (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 66A. I will not cover all the ground covered on the overseas Bill; I merely want to say that I look forward to what the Minister has to say about delivering what she said at the time. Aspects of the welfare of our people should be looked at and some implementation of policy achieved.