Iraq Inquiry

Lord Beith Excerpts

Tuesday 12th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I have had the pleasure of working under the chairmanship of Sir John Chilcot, admittedly on a task less monumental than this one. I was a little surprised at the amount of time the work took, but I am not at all surprised at the thoroughness, care and clear expression of criticism which we find in the Chilcot report. This is very much to his credit and to that of his team.

I voted against the Iraq war, and had clear reasons for doing so. It was illegal under international law. The intelligence, some of which I was familiar with through the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee, was in no way conclusive as to the presence of weapons of mass destruction, even if it could have been made to appear consistent with that possibility. There was no plan for the consequences: as Sir John says, the Government had,

“failed to take account of the magnitude of the task of … reconstructing Iraq”.

The Government were also unable to deflect the United States from its own catastrophic plan to dismantle most of the military and administrative infrastructure left from the Saddam regime and the Baath party, without which Iraq, at that stage, was ungovernable, which was the point made earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Williams. My other reason was that there was no need—containment and inspection were still functioning.

I want to turn from those reasons to the intelligence failure. There was an inappropriate use of intelligence to bolster beliefs already held, and to make a public case for war, for which purpose it was surrounded by over-interpretation and spin. There was a fatal and inexcusable absence of challenges in the assessment process, at the level of JIC and below. The most telling example of that is that those in the Defence Intelligence Staff with the expertise to assess whether material from the so-called new source was in any way credible were not given full access, and did not have their written concerns reported to the Joint Intelligence Committee. The Ministry of Defence was so embarrassed by this that it withheld details from the Intelligence and Security Committee even when the Secretary of State and officials were questioned about it. The committee strongly criticised both the Minister and officials for this in its report, and Geoff Hoon subsequently apologised to the House of Commons.

The 2004 report by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and his committee, which included Sir John Chilcot as a member, did a lot of the work which was needed in the intelligence area—on the intelligence failure and on its lessons. In this area, there is not a lot the Chilcot report could add to the work done by the noble Lord and his team. I am optimistic that, as a result of the Butler report, challenge processes have been built into intelligence assessment, and the role of the Joint Intelligence Committee is better understood. We now also have the National Security Council.

Incidentally, speaking of challenge, from a personal standpoint I am still puzzled that no one in the entire intelligence community seemed to have considered the possibility that Saddam Hussein thought it was in his interest, in the power rivalries of the Middle East, that other nations should continue to believe that he had or was close to having weapons of mass destruction.

Chilcot’s sections on the conduct of the war and its aftermath pose serious questions for the Ministry of Defence. Why was there inadequate preparation for the known danger of IEDs? Why was there such a failure to provide adequately armoured vehicles and what Chilcot calls an “unacceptable” failure to identify where responsibility for these things lay? My noble friend Lord Tyler reminded us that political obstacles were put in the way of prior preparation, with a resultant cost in human lives. There is surely a lesson there. Churchill went to considerable lengths during the Second World War so that he could continue to make various kinds of preparation while leading the enemy to believe that he was doing something completely different. We ought to know a little from that experience.

Is there a problem with the can-do approach which is in many ways a commendable part of the tradition of our service chiefs? It may get in the way of telling the truth to power if the truth is: “No, we cannot actually do it in this case”—at least, not in the timescale proposed or not in the way suggested. If the truth cannot be told to power, bad decisions will be made. Sometimes, very good motives may cause that to happen. Those are all issues which must now be given serious consideration.

The Chilcot report taken as a whole is a searing criticism of Tony Blair and those across the political spectrum who gave him uncritical support in this matter. It is also a severe criticism of those within the intelligence and policy-making processes of government who allow themselves to be caught up in groupthink without opposing the alternatives. I have believed all along, and Chilcot provides the evidence, that Tony Blair was motivated by a conviction that our central and vital alliance with the United States required us to be alongside it “whatever”. That seems to neglect the fact that in two important conflicts—important to each of our countries respectively—we had considerable differences. I refer to the Vietnam War and the Falklands War. In both cases, we took very different views, but our alliance survived and there was a degree of understanding between our two countries as to how each handled the conflict in which they were involved.

A leader with Tony Blair’s skills, determination and unquenchable self-belief should not have been presiding over a system which offered so little challenge. This sad story, which cost many British lives and is still costing so many Iraqi lives, has done lasting damage to public confidence in politicians and the political process. It has undermined in our country the very democratic institutions which our Armed Forces risk their lives to defend, and we owe them better.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Monday 11th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger]

My Lords, I spent a lot of time sitting on the Joint Committee, and since then, searching in vain for a cogent reason why the Secretary of State needs to sign off warrants that have no national security or diplomatic import. Why should the Minister spend her valuable time examining and authorising warrants about everyday criminals? We are told that two-thirds or three-quarters—I do not know which; I have heard both figures—of warrants have nothing to do with national security or diplomacy.

The Secretary of State has no role in authorising property search warrants, which arguably are more intrusive, and involve invasion of a person’s home and discovery of information about a far wider range of subjects than a person’s communications. The only reason ever offered is that the Secretary of State is subject to scrutiny by Parliament, whereas a judicial commissioner is not.

When they gave evidence to the Joint Committee I asked two former Ministers who were responsible for authorising warrants how many times they had been held to account by Parliament. Both the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, former Home Secretary, and Owen Paterson, former Northern Ireland Secretary, said that it had never happened. That was just as well because it is a criminal offence under RIPA for the existence or details of a warrant to be publicly disclosed. Clause 54 of the Bill continues that ban, with a penalty of up to five years in prison. Therefore, the whole notion of parliamentary accountability for Ministers who authorise warrants is a complete myth. It has never happened and the Bill prohibits it.

I expect that the Government will refer to the potential to be held to account by the ISC, but that does not fit the Bill and is not visible to the public. As far as I know—and as far as the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, knew when he gave evidence—there are no examples of the ISC holding Ministers to account. I should be interested if the Minister can give some examples of when that has happened. I, too, wait with interest to hear the Government’s response to the amendment.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the Secretary of State’s involvement in law enforcement warrants is a historical hangover from when this was the only kind of control or restraint on police applications that existed prior to this legislation. Perhaps it shows a lack of rethinking the nature of judicial authorisation, such as this Bill provides for, that her involvement—it may well be “him” in the future—should have survived when it does not seem either to have practical purpose or to add significantly to the protections that the legislation will afford against misuse or excessive use of the power.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, explained, these amendments seek to place the sole decision on whether to authorise a warrant application with a judicial commissioner. In the Government’s firm view, this would be a mistake. The noble Lord asked why there is a need for the Secretary of State’s involvement at all. Having a judicial commissioner be solely responsible for authorising warrants would remove all democratic accountability for that decision and would effectively remove parliamentary scrutiny from the process. In the scenario that a warrant was incorrectly either refused or approved, then the ability of Parliament to hold an individual to account for that particular decision would be greatly diminished.

Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Lord Beith Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe]

The right reverend Prelate makes some extremely important points. It is important for us to say to our Armed Forces that the work that they did was beneficial. Saddam was a brutal dictator; he was a threat to Iraq’s neighbours and Iraq is undoubtedly a better place without him. We can see that, in its development as a country since the war, Iraq is a healthier and better place. Of course, we cannot deny that it is going through a difficult time and that the people of Iraq continue to suffer, but there are glimmers of hope: there have been free and fair parliamentary elections three times since 2003; unemployment has fallen by half; oil production has doubled; there is more freedom of speech; homosexuality is now legal; it is the only Middle Eastern country with a national action plan on women, peace and security; and a quarter of MPs in Iraq’s parliament are women. We as a nation have continued to support Iraq in every kind of way. Between 2003 and 2012, we provided more than £500 million in support, including £180 million in life-saving, humanitarian assistance. Our troops and our civilian personnel need to know that they have made a difference.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, some of those involved in overseeing our intelligence community at the time know now, as has been confirmed in this report, the extent to which some of their work had weight placed upon it that it could not possibly have borne. Others found their expert contributions ignored or set aside. Is it not vital, as the Statement indicates, that we use the machinery that has been set up since the Butler committee to ensure that the intelligence community’s work is properly used and that those who work in it can have the confidence of knowing that it will not be abused?

[Earl Howe]

The noble Lord is, of course, correct. Much depends on the culture that exists and is encouraged, in particular within the National Security Council, but also across government departments. We should constantly question and challenge our sometimes ingrained and deeply held views about a particular situation and the way to address it. We should never dismiss, as I am afraid was done at times during the Iraq conflict, the clear advice and guidance from commanders in the field when things are not going as we would wish or expect.

Defence Reforms

Lord Beith Excerpts

Thursday 17th October 2013 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to be the first Liberal Democrat Member to welcome you to the Chair, Madam Deputy Speaker, and to wish you well. Of course, my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Sir Bob Russell) welcomed you when you were waiting in the wings and I am sure he shares my view that your eye should never stray far from the Liberal Democrat Benches.

The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers has a huge, historic association with my constituency. The regimental headquarters of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers was in Alnwick and its museum is still there. The regiment also has a major Fusilier Territorial Army centre and the benefit of very good recruitment areas, which is why it is such a well-recruited battalion. The north-east, Lancashire, the midlands and London could hardly be better places for recruitment.

The defence plans, which have been widely discussed today, involve a significant and risky reduction in regular numbers and are dependent on a massive increase in reservists on a scale unprecedented in modern times. Two things follow from that. First, we need to make sure that we achieve regular recruitment at the necessary level, organised in a regimental structure that supports efficiency of operation. Secondly, we need to make sure that we do not take out regular strength until we can be sure that we have the reservists to replace it.

That brings me directly to the mistake that I think has been made, namely the disbandment of the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. On Tuesday, hundreds of Fusilier veterans marched on Whitehall—it was a truly magnificent sight—after we had presented a petition to Downing street.

[Bob Stewart]

Based on the logic that we should keep regulars until we have reservists to take their place, we should mention in the same breath the other three regiments that are being lost, including mine, the Mercian Regiment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Beith]

The same logic can indeed be applied, but the sheer strength of feeling with regard to the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers is significant, as is the number of Members who are taking part in this debate because of their concern about the future of the 2nd Battalion and of the regiment in general.

I do not want to spend too long on why the mistake was made, but it is clear that in the case of the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers the decision to stand down was based not on efficiency, but on the cap badge argument, which preserved Scottish battalions that did not recruit as well as the Fusiliers. Interestingly, the cap badge argument did not count for much when, a few years earlier, we lost the King’s Own Scottish Borderers—the other regiment that had its regimental headquarters in my constituency—and they were merged with the Royal Scots to become one battalion of the Royal Regiment of Scotland. In effect, the two regiments associated with our area have sustained losses.

Since the decision was made—Ministers may claim it was right, but I think it was wrong—the facts have changed, and when the facts change, Governments have to look at things again. It has become clear how difficult it will be to meet the TA recruitment target. I do not know many people—indeed, anyone—who are confident that we will achieve the targets in the given time scale. It is therefore likely—in fact, I am certain—that there will be a capability gap.

[Mr Brazier]

The reason we are not meeting the targets is not that there is a shortage of people willing to enlist. As I explained in my speech, we have had two big surges, but both were wrecked because the Department in charge of recruiting and enlistment has set up systems that are simply not volunteer-reservist friendly.

[Sir Alan Beith]

My hon. Friend, who has worked diligently on strengthening the TA and its role in our military structure, makes an important point. I am not sure whether that is the whole answer or argument. If we are deterring potential recruits as a result of slow processes, that should be put right. Many years ago my hon. Friend was my Conservative opponent and he became aware during that time of the significance of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers in my area.

As well as the slowness of TA recruitment, TA centres are being closed. Alnwick in my constituency is keeping a good and strong TA centre of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. The TA centre in Berwick was reassigned some time ago to the Royal Logistics Corps, which no longer needs it. I think we should have kept it and that it should be reassigned back to the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers.

If we give up on rural areas and create a situation whereby it is too far for people from rural areas to attend training nights, we will cut off a significant source of recruitment. There are many loyal people in rural areas who want to serve and many ex-regulars return to rural areas. At the very least, we need to devise ways in which the training structure can accommodate people who live 30, 40 or 50 miles away from a training centre, if we are not simply to write off a whole area of recruitment.

I do not want to take up much more time. It is clear from today’s discussion that a lot of people, for various reasons, have serious concerns about our ability to meet the TA targets. I therefore suggest to Ministers that the contingency plan they should have to hand and keep in preparedness is the retention of at least one of the regular battalions, and the obvious choice is the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers.

Reserve Forces

Lord Beith Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

On that last point, as I have said already, a home-to-duty allowance is payable for travel between home and the place of duty. Over and above that, the Army will be looking on an individual basis to ensure that, within reason, anyone whose unit is closing, relocating or re-roling, and who wishes to transfer to a different unit, will be supported. We expect that to be done at local unit level, engaging with individuals to try to retain them in the reserve service if we possibly can.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

Instead of withdrawing entirely from a rural centre such as Berwick-upon-Tweed, which will lose its TA centre, Royal Logistics Corps and Fusiliers component, should not Ministers be looking at flexible ways of organising training and recruitment in rural areas, so as not to close off that source of recruitment?

[Mr Hammond]

I have looked at the situation in my right hon. Friend’s constituency. The driver is that the Pioneers, both regulars and reserves, are being withdrawn from the Army’s order of battle, so the Pioneer unit based at Berwick will no longer have a role to play. However, we hope that many of those serving in that unit will re-role and move to Alnwick, where the Army reserve centre will continue.

2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers

Lord Beith Excerpts

Thursday 18th October 2012 Commons Chamber

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

I welcome the work of the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) in securing this debate and leading the campaign. I do not think that there will ever be a cause in his parliamentary career that is dearer to his heart than this one, as an ex-Fusilier.

Alnwick in my constituency is the traditional heartland of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, which is one of the parent regiments of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. In Alnwick, the red and white hackle is a familiar sight, especially on St George’s day. It was a particularly welcome sight on the streets of London this morning—so much so that it caused me to miss a question in the House, because I was with the large numbers of Fusiliers outside, whom we were so pleased to welcome here. The regimental museum is also in Alnwick. People in Northumberland, as in other parts of the country, have watched with pride as they have seen what are often frightening television shots showing members of the Fusiliers serving in so many of the increasingly televised conflicts that we have seen in recent years—in Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan, and of course on the streets of Northern Ireland as well.

The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers is one of the best recruited regiments in the British Army, and the recruitment figures demonstrate that. That is what has led a number of us, such as the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay, to get into correspondence with the Ministry of Defence and with Ministers as soon as the decision was made. It appears from MOD figures that the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers has consistently had the best recruitment record over the period that the figures cover, apart for the final year. It has the best track record on being at or near establishment over the last few years. Indeed, the Ministry of Defence admits that the figures for 2010-11 are artificially low, owing to a nine-month pause in infantry training, which affected regiments differently, depending on where in the year their training slots were in the infantry training centre programme. When that feature is added in, we see that the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers has a superb recruitment record. That led us to pursue the matter further with Ministers and to seek a further response from them.

However, that response came in words carefully tailored by the Minister’s civil servants—the reply I received was from the Minister for the Armed Forces, who is in his place. He wrote to say:

“As I am sure you will appreciate this was a complicated piece of work and for this reason I am unable to provide the detailed information for recruitment catchment areas that you sought,”

although he then drew my attention to various websites where we could look at some of the sources on which the work was based, which we did. There were probably a number of mistakes in that work. I strongly suspect that the modern county of Northumberland was used in references to Northumberland as a recruiting area, rather than the county that stretches from Tweed to Tyne, which is the traditional Northumberland Fusiliers recruiting area, which also includes substantial urban areas. However, the letter went on to demonstrate quite clearly that the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers should not be one of the five battalions that go, saying:

“After the removal of four battalions, the method for predicting future sustainability became less statistically discerning.”

Let us think about that. I think it should win a “Yes Minister” prize for obfuscatory circumlocution—or, to put it another way, dodging the issue with fancy words. A little further, the letter says:

“Therefore to determine the fifth battalion to be removed from the order of battle required the application of criteria that went wider than demographics”—

in other words, “We told the officials to find some other reason which would enable us to disband the 2nd Battalion.” The letter continued:

“Historical manning performance and the need to maintain equity of opportunity meant that the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers…was the next appropriate regiment”.

What that “equity of opportunity” is I do not know, but it certainly does not apply to those who wish to serve in the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers in the north-east of England or the many other recruiting areas that have been mentioned today.

I also want to talk about the extraordinary consequence of creating a single-battalion regiment, which is in defiance of policy to date. In the last round of changes, under the previous Government, there was an explicit desire to get away from the idea of single-battalion regiments. For example, in his letter to the Chief of the General Staff, Brigadier Paterson, the Colonel of the regiment, sets out the position:

“During the last Options For Change the Army Board stated that large Regiments were the future for the infantry for all the well rehearsed arguments of operational capability and sustainability…What has changed for that policy to be reversed and for single battalions to be created deliberately?...Single Battalions fail to meet the criteria of sustainability…neither do they offer the variety and career opportunities of larger Regiments.”

We have been through the process of losing cap badges before in Northumberland, because my constituency is also the regimental headquarters of the King’s Own Scottish Borderers, which lost its cap badge when it was amalgamated with a less well recruited regiment—the Royal Scots—to form a battalion in the Royal Regiment of Scotland. Indeed, one of the arguments strongly used then was the argument against single-battalion regiments, yet here we are, creating one.

The other important consequence we must consider, which I would like to mention in the brief time available to me, is the consequence for the Territorial Army. In 39 years in Parliament, I have seen the TA in my area go up and down and up and down as changes of policy have led to changes in the extent to which use was made of the TA. We cannot do it like that, however, because that does not build up the core of officers and non-commissioned officers needed to run a really efficient TA. Remarkable things have been achieved, and TA soldiers have given wonderful service in regular units in all the conflicts that we have mentioned, but we are now expecting a major TA expansion without having the people in place to ensure that the necessary training and officer management are available for the increased force.

We all know why this decision has been taken. Political reasons took the place of military logic, and in such a blindingly obvious way that I do not know how anyone in the Ministry of Defence thought that anybody would be fooled by it. How did they imagine that nobody would spot what was happening a mile off?

[Bob Stewart]

May I put to my right hon. Friend the possibility that the decision was made not in the Ministry of Defence but in another street—namely, Downing street?

[Sir Alan Beith]

I am familiar, from my various spheres of work in the House, with the way in which missives from Downing street can bring about sudden changes in the development of policy, and it would be no surprise if evidence emerged that that had happened in this case. This is the wrong decision, for the wrong reasons and with the wrong results for the efficiency of the Army and the defence and security of this country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Robathan]

I do recall the phrase, and that is not what has happened.

Let me now explain in some detail how the application of the criteria that I listed earlier led us to the outcome announced on 5 July. Some of this may sound a little dry, but it is important for the House to understand the care that was taken in reaching these decisions.

Drawing on demographic data for the age cohort across the United Kingdom from which infantry recruits are drawn—the 15-to-29 age group, according to the way in which the Office for National Statistics segments the population—and taking account of historical trends in terms of the percentage of that cohort who were likely to join the Army, an assessment was made of which regiments were likely to be the least sustainable in the future in their current configuration. That work also included a comparison of each regiment’s historical outflow so that the likely recruiting requirement could be determined. On that basis, the Army’s analysis showed that the regiments likely to be the least sustainable in future were the Royal Regiment of Scotland, the Yorkshire Regiment, the Mercian Regiment, and the Royal Welsh Regiment. It was therefore decided to move one battalion from each of those regiments.

After the removal of the four battalions, and given the criterion that there should be no cap badge deletions and no regiment should lose more than one battalion, the method of predicting future sustainability, and therefore which battalion should be added to the four whose future had already been decided, became less statistically discerning. To put it another way, it was impossible to distinguish between a number of regiments on the basis of the future sustainability criterion alone.

[Sir Alan Beith]

In his letter to me, the Minister used those figures and there was a prediction that the Royal Regiment of Scotland would be one and three quarter battalions short on sustainability in the future. When we compare the risk to operability of that level of difficulty with the predictions for the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, do we not find that the military logic is overpowering?

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Beith Excerpts

Monday 16th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Philip Hammond]

On the first point, I take advice from the Army, and that is the correct way for the Defence Secretary to behave in these matters. On the preservation of the name of the Staffords, I am well aware of the concerns expressed by Staffordshire Members of Parliament, and as I said in relation to the Yorkshire Regiment, this is a matter for the regiment. If the regiment comes forward with a proposal to merge the antecedent name into the antecedent names of the 1st Battalion the Cheshires, we will be quite happy to support that arrangement.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

T3. Does the Defence Secretary agree that the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers has done everything that was asked of it in conflict, in peacekeeping, in recruitment and in coping with reorganisation? Why, then, has it been reduced to a single battalion, when its recruitment record is so much better than battalions unaffected by the infantry cuts?

[Mr Hammond]

I am afraid that the right hon. Gentleman repeats the comments that my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) made earlier, and that is simply not the case. Looked at over a 10-year horizon, the recruiting figures speak for themselves, and the Army has conducted a rigorous process that resulted in the withdrawal of the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. I can say no more than that to the right hon. Gentleman.

Air Force

Lord Beith Excerpts

Tuesday 19th July 2011 Ministerial Corrections

[Sir Alan Beith]

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will place in the Library a copy of the risk management strategy prepared by the Environmental Science Group in relation to the proposal to close the RAF ordnance clearance operations at Goswick Sands near Berwick-upon-Tweed; and what revisions to the report took place after the first version was considered by the Royal Air Force.

[Official Report, 26 April 2011, Vol. 527, c. 61-62W.]

Letter of correction from Nick Harvey:

An error has been identified in the written answer given to the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) on 26 April 2011.

The full answer given was as follows:

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Beith Excerpts

Monday 14th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Peter Luff]

I am delighted to pay tribute to the strong and close interest that my hon. Friend has taken in this issue, not least because of his close constituency interest. I can confirm that we are beginning again with a blank sheet of paper. We have learned the lessons from the previous process, which has been so unfortunately terminated, and will look again at what is the correct procurement route. That will include a thorough review of whether PFI is right for this particular procurement.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

What is the mechanism for making the decision? Would it not make more sense if the Department for Transport acted as the purchaser and the MOD put forward a bid to continue the involvement of the RAF and the Navy in the provision of the service?

[Peter Luff]

I understand the interesting point that my right hon. Friend makes. The present intention is that current procurement arrangements should be stuck to, and I have every confidence that the defence, equipment and support organisation at Abbey Wood can do an excellent job of it this time.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Beith Excerpts

Monday 31st January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Peter Luff]

I cannot offer that specific assurance—I am not aware of the specific situation—but I would be delighted to meet the hon. Gentleman to discuss the situation in detail, if that would help.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

What is the nature of the inquiries taking place into the procurement of the search and rescue helicopter contract? Do they involve the police or potential disciplinary action? When will we know whether the contract has been completely invalidated by what has been discovered?

[Peter Luff]

The investigation into the issue notified by the preferred bidder is ongoing. Until the issue has been properly considered it is not possible to progress to procurement. I hope that it will be possible to make a further statement to the House on the way forward. No decision has yet been taken on this matter and, in view of the issues involved, there is nothing more I can say at this stage to the House.