Criminal Finances Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 3rd April 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interests, principally as a member of the Chartered Institute of Taxation. I wish to speak particularly on Amendment 161. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, is right that the mood of the public has changed dramatically and significantly against those who practise tax evasion—and to some extent tax avoidance, which I think she mentioned, although we are focusing here on tax evasion—so having such a clause in the Bill is very welcome.

Turning my mind back to 20 or 30 years ago when I was a tax practitioner, in many respects it would have been remarkable to think that this clause might appear in a Bill. Indeed, many of your Lordships may have noticed in Sunday’s and today’s national papers a two-page advertisement by a large Swiss bank protesting that it does not in any way condone tax evasion. It is quite extraordinary to see that—and most welcome—and it has no doubt come about in part because of the pressure to change public opinion brought to bear by the Government and Members of this House.

However, in respect of Amendment 161, I agree that the damage caused by economic crime is very serious. I welcome the Government’s consultation on corporate criminal liability for economic crime, but this is an extremely complex legal area that could significantly impact on the UK’s financial sector, in which I work, and in particular on the UK’s SME financial sector, which has a lot on its plate at the moment. Therefore, I hope that the Government will bring forward a consultation on possible options for reform following the conclusion of the call for evidence, which I think has just ended or will close shortly. We should wait until that is completed before a decision is made on introducing new legislation.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend has explained with magnificent clarity the purpose and nature of her two amendments. However, in discussions that I have had with her, she has still not quite convinced me that the use of a statutory instrument to create further facilitation crimes is something that I ought to be enthusiastic about. I well understand the purpose that she is pursuing and the care with which Amendment 161 incorporates various safeguards both within its own text and by reference to other legislative provisions. My concerns are not raised by Amendment 163, which she offers as an option.

As your Lordships look further at this matter, I just hope that we can focus a little attention on the fact that, if anything is created as a crime by a statutory instrument, it is done by a process which, although affirmative in terms of the amendment, is not capable of amendment. Therefore, any defect in the way it is worded or presented can only result in either it going through in a faulty way or the Government accepting that they should withdraw the amendment and come back with a better one. I wish that they would do that more often and quite quickly, because it would resolve some of the problems that we have with statutory instrument procedure. However, I listened to that part of the debate with still unresolved anxiety about the use of a statutory instrument without further qualification.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I think it is worth making two points. I understand the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, was making and the importance of the topic that she has raised. It is quite a serious matter to introduce a change of this nature by a statutory instrument—an issue that has concerned your Lordships’ House in the past. I understand that the noble Baroness has drafted her amendment to try to avoid some of the worst excesses but it is something which—with Henry VIII powers and so on—we are very concerned about. Widening this provision through a statutory instrument could lead to some difficulties regarding the appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny, given that statutory instruments are, by definition, not amendable.

My second point relates to Amendment 166 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I always support him when he wishes to do post-legislative scrutiny. I think that part of what he is getting at here is that we should look at whether all the holes have been blocked up. However, to do so within six months of the day on which the Act is passed will not give much time to see how the new legislative provisions are bedding down. Therefore, from my point of view, it would be more appropriate if a longer time was allowed during which the serious impact of the Act would, I hope, make itself felt.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Lord Bishop of Peterborough]

My Lords, I support the amendment. I also support the Bill and I am grateful for it.

I particularly support and follow a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, about this being a moral issue. I refer to Amendment 167. This time last year, shortly after the publication of the Panama papers, there was a Question in the House about this issue. I asked a supplementary and was assured by the then Minister that this was seen by the Government as a moral issue. It is important that we hold to that.

It is particularly a moral issue because of the effect of tax havens on people in developing countries. According to the United Nations conference on trade and development, tax havens cost developing countries at least $100 billion a year. That means three times the global aid budget is lost to developing countries in this way. It is a huge amount, which would be able to do a great deal in terms of health, education and so on in those countries which so badly need it.

My right reverend friend the Bishop of Oxford spoke on this issue in the Second Reading debate. He is sorry that he cannot be here in your Lordships’ House today but, on his behalf and that of others, I gladly ally these Benches with the four signatories to Amendment 167, who come from four different parts of the House.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, I wish to refer to Amendment 169, to which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has spoken. In doing so, I declare an interest as having been chairman of the Justice Committee of the House of Commons, which produced two reports about the constitutional relationship between the United Kingdom and the Crown dependencies. It made recommendations which were accepted by the United Kingdom Government and the Governments of the dependencies and appear to be working successfully. That relationship involves respect for the democratic nature of the dependencies and their jurisdiction as legislatures and sets clear limits on what it is appropriate for the United Kingdom Government to do.

An amendment was considered and voted on in the House of Commons which ignored the constitutional relationship. This Parliament does not legislate for Crown dependencies, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man except by consent, and rarely does so even by consent. I am grateful that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has given some thought to this. We had a brief discussion about it and the amendment he has included in this group is a much more ingenious and respectful one towards those provisions but it is still somewhat in breach of the spirit, although not the letter, of them.

There are obviously real benefits to be had from public, open registers of beneficial ownership. In those areas and parts of the world where public authorities are taking no action in the kind of circumstances noble Lords have described, exposure and publicity can lead to action being taken. In circumstances where what was being done may not have been criminal but did not seem consistent with being the Prime Minister of Iceland, say, public reaction can play a real part.

There are also problems with public registers, particularly if you are in a jurisdiction that is competing with others which have no intention of going in that direction for legitimate financial business properly conducted—the position which, to some extent, the Crown dependencies find themselves in. The place to pursue the argument for public registers of beneficial ownership in the dependencies is of course in the legislatures of those dependencies, and that discussion ought to be taking place. However, there is another route, which the Government refer to rather negatively but is in fact quite positive. We should seek international agreement imposing similar conditions across the world, accepted by a whole range of nations which are engaged in the kind of trade that can legitimately be carried out but can also be grossly abused by those with wealth ill-got by criminal means. The importance of a global standard is that it would create a level playing field for the various jurisdictions involved, and that is why it is seen as significant in the dependencies. If agreement was reached internationally, the Crown dependencies would have to revise their current view; not only that, the UK Government would then acquire responsibility because the United Kingdom has a responsibility for international treaties to which the Crown dependencies are committed. The Government would have to represent their interests in any discussion about the achievement of a global standard when such a standard takes the form of a treaty. They would have a responsibility to make sure that the Crown dependencies abided by it, but that is not the situation we are in.

Nor is that the priority in this legislation, because here the priority is to achieve effective action by law enforcement and the tax authorities, and what they most need is accurate and up-to-date registers which can be accessed quickly in real time. By June there will be no Crown dependency which does not have exactly that: a central register which can be accessed in all cases within 24 hours, or significantly less in urgent circumstances such as a terrorist case. That is the main thrust of this legislation and we should not ignore the fact that that has been achieved. It is partly a result of the Cameron exchanges by letter which have been referred to, but also of developments that were already taking place in the dependencies. I mention these points simply to underline that the way to approach this issue in the Crown dependencies is different.

Policing and Crime Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 16th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, we know that this is an issue on which it is very difficult to find a satisfactory compromise. I am also conscious of not taking drafting points which might serve to divert us from the central issue. However, I am a bit concerned about this proviso. I understand that it is a sensible idea to have one, so that a judge can be satisfied that it is in the public interest to remove the restriction in respect of a person. If that is to be meaningful, will the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, explain to the Committee in what circumstances he envisages an application being made and who will make it? How is the public interest going to be defined? Whose interest is the public interest? Reference was made to a case where there was corroborating or forensic evidence being circumstances in which a judge would be satisfied. However, many of these claims may concern young people who did not know they could complain. Many years have gone past; there is no forensic evidence. As far as they know, there may be no corroborating evidence. Are they to come within that exception? How is the judge to assess this? If this is to be a meaningful exception to change the law, we need to set out with some precision the sorts of factors that ought to be taken into account.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I have great respect for both my noble friend Lord Paddick and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. On this occasion, it is with the former, rather than the latter, that I agree, although one takes on either of them with a measure of reluctance and trepidation. I was partly struck to say something in this debate when the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asserted that to impose obstacles to convicting the guilty is a very high cost. We actually pay this cost throughout our criminal justice system. It would be a lot easier to convict some people that we and the police think are guilty if we did not have to prove that they actually are, to the satisfaction of a jury, or if various procedures, such as disclosure, did not have to operate—the prosecution must disclose any evidence it comes across that might support the innocence of the accused. Many of these things make it more difficult to convict people, but they are part of the protection for the innocent and uphold the principle that someone has to be proven to have committed an offence.

Much of the argument about whether the kind of prohibition which my noble friend has advanced—and I agree this should be done—revolves around whether people who have had similar experiences of the accused will come forward. There are several points at which, if this clause were in operation, they would still be able to do so: between charge and trial or between the various stages of a trial process, for example between committal and trial. I am not an expert in this, but it appears that in most of the cases where this has happened it has been at that stage, rather than at the stage of initial accusation, except perhaps in some of the most notorious cases, which have been referred to this afternoon, where injustice has been done by publicity.

As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, correctly pointed out, the proviso has to be precisely worded. The point of the proviso is that anonymity might be broken if the police and prosecuting authority consider that they would like to go to trial and the evidence is not quite strong enough for them to do so but there is some knowledge that it is likely that people will come forward. A case where there is substantial evidence that does not quite meet the Crown Prosecution Service’s normal criteria, yet there is reason to believe that there may be others, might be just the circumstances in which an earlier breach of anonymity would be justified.

The weakest point put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was the one about gossip and speculation. The whole process is attended by the risk of these. If the name of an accused person cannot be disclosed prior to charge, there may be those who seek to gossip about it. That is something we should try to deal with in whatever way we can. But of course the same applies to the anonymity of the victim. Most of us have read newspaper stories which speculate and hint at who the victim might be in such a case. We cannot use that as a reason not to afford protection to the victim, and we should not use it as a reason not to afford protection to the accused at a stage in the process when it is unreasonable to visit a punishment more severe than applies in many other criminal offences, arising out of the publicity and shame and loss of office and other consequences that have attended some of the cases that we have heard about.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, produced several convincing examples of drafting that might be improved in this Bill, but that is what it was—the principle needs to be addressed, and it is not adequately satisfied by guidelines. Even though the better the guidelines the better the situation, guidelines fall short of the value of a firm principle enshrined in law, which the criminal justice system can itself uphold.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I introduce what I want to say by suggesting that we need to question certainties that anybody advances in this debate. I went to, was well informed by and was deeply sympathetic to, the meeting arranged by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, where we heard the overwhelmingly poignant stories of Mr Gambaccini, Lady Brittan and Sir Cliff Richard, and I thought, “That’s a certainty, isn’t it?”. But then I remembered an experience that I had when I was a young member of the Bar, of a client in the Midlands arrested for murder. If he was arrested, it meant that there were reasonable grounds for suspicion—and there were. It was quite a notorious case, and the publicity given to his arrest meant that two people came forward who were quite unconnected with him and were able to establish an alibi for him. Another man was subsequently convicted for the murder, so this man was totally innocent. If those people had not come forward, he would have remained in custody pending trial. They might have come forward by trial, but he would have been in custody for many months before his trial began—and, if they had come forward then, the argument would have been, “How can they be so sure that they were together or they saw him in this particular place on this particular night?”.

So there are certainties both ways. I want to contribute to the debate by making two separate and additional points to the ones that have been discussed—perhaps one to meet a point raised in discussion. It is said that rape and sexual crime is particularly awful, and there is usually plenty of other evidence when other crimes are concerned. Well, with murder, the allegation that a mother has killed her children is not the kind of allegation that can be trivialised. There are cases in which mothers alleged to have killed their children have not done so. Noble Lords are all familiar with the phrase “cot death”, although it summarises a much more complex idea. There the question is whether the children were murdered at all, or whether they died from natural causes. It is a terrible allegation to have to face. Do we say, “Ah, well, it does not matter if they have publicity”?

Then there is terrorism. Half the time with terrorism, if the police did not act before the bomb went off, on the knowledge that they have, we would be blown up. So terrorist offences usually consist of conspiracies and offences contrary to various terrorism Acts which never came to fruition. The whole case depends on demonstrating that there was going to be a bomb, or whatever, and it never happened. We have to be careful about the sorts of cases that we are thinking about. I suspect that causing death by dangerous driving is a dreadfully serious allegation to the public mind—and certainly, if it is said to be accompanied by drink, of course it is a dreadfully serious allegation, because it is a dreadfully serious crime.

I ask noble Lords to pause. I understand that sexual crime now seems to be at the forefront of public concern, but let us not just dismiss those other crimes as really not so important, so we do not really need to preserve the anonymity of the accused for them because it does not really matter so much. We need to have a clear principle about this. I think that we should have a principle that either says yes or no to publicity or anonymity at various different stages. But I do not, I regret to say, share the view that sexual crimes should be treated as entirely one-off, on their own, and separate.

There is one more point that I want to add to the discussion. We are working on the basis that the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are drafting points—I do not share the criticism made of him. But drafting points matter in this context. Let us pause to consider what arrest means, if we are saying that “don’t disclose anonymity” stands on arrest but, once the charge happens, the anonymity goes. Pitch the time where you like—arrest means that there are reasonable grounds for suspicion. It means that you are incarcerated; it means that you have lost your liberty and that, lawfully, you have lost your liberty, and that it is justified because there are reasonable grounds for suspicion. I have concerns about a blanket prohibition imposing silence on the media in circumstances where somebody’s liberty has been taken from him or her, even if for a short time. That is not how we work in this country. We do not want people locked up for any time at all without anybody being able to say so. Those are considerations that I suggest should be added to the thought that we give to the issues in this debate.

Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse

Lord Beith Excerpts

Monday 17th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Alexis Jay said today that,

“the concerns that our terms of reference cannot be delivered are founded on an assumption that we must seek to replicate a traditional public inquiry in respect of each of the thousands of institutions that fall within our remit. We will do so for some, but we would never finish if we did it for all”.

I understand from that statement that the inquiry intends to look at some things in more depth than others. I hope that that results in a thorough inquiry, and I am sure that it will.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I support the point made by my noble friend, which I think the Minister missed—namely, that this inquiry will take a very long time and that some pretty glaring lessons for the police and the Crown Prosecution Service can already be learned. We should not argue that nothing can be done by those bodies because we are waiting for the result of the inquiry.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. Perhaps I did the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, a disservice by slightly getting the wrong end of the stick as regards his question. Of course those inquiries must go on as the independent inquiry proceeds.

Counter-Terrorism: Conflict Zones

Lord Beith Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Jason McCartney (Colne Valley) (Con)]

rose—

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker.

[Mr Speaker]

I will come to the right hon. Gentleman’s point of order, but, to be fair, the hon. Member for Colne Valley (Jason McCartney) has been present in the Chamber, although he has only just started standing—but that is perfectly proper. Let us hear from him.

Child Abuse Inquiry

Lord Beith Excerpts

Thursday 22nd January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

It is indeed the case that a member of the panel said that she had made a complaint to the Home Office about the conduct of the inquiry’s counsel. The Home Office can confirm that that complaint has been fully investigated, and that no evidence of bullying was found. As for the right hon. Gentleman’s final question, I intend to announce the name of the nominated chairman to the House, together with the details of the form that the inquiry will take thereafter. The Home Affairs Committee will then be able to hold its hearing, which, as we have discussed, is an important part of the process.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

I welcome the emphasis that the Home Secretary placed on the fact that the investigation of individual cases remains the task of the police. Justice will not be achieved unless, whenever possible, offenders are brought before the courts, and, if necessary, a police force other than the one in whose area the offence took place is involved.

[Mrs May]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right, and I have been very clear from the start in my statements to this House and more publicly and in what I have been discussing with survivors and their representatives that this panel inquiry will not have the ability to investigate potential criminal acts that have taken place. That is rightly for the police, and we will be ensuring that where people come forward with such allegations, those allegations will be appropriately treated. The national policing lead in relation to these matters is working on ensuring that a proper system is in place so that any allegations are dealt with appropriately by police forces.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Wednesday 7th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Karen Bradley]

I will return to that point in a moment.

I am sure that we will want to ensure that all appointments are made in accordance with best practice, but it seems to me that it would be premature unduly to prescribe the process until we have decided exactly how appointments are made. I think that that applies in this case.

Amendment 2 would change the board’s name. We have been clear that the primary objective of the board is to offer further assurance to the public that careful, independent scrutiny is being given to the UK’s counter-terrorism powers to ensure that, in the face of the threat to the UK, we are getting the balance right and that our legislation and policies have due regard for civil liberty and privacy concerns. The board’s name properly reflects that purpose, and I see no reason to change it.

I am pleased to say that there is no great disagreement within the House on what we are seeking to do. Given the threats that the UK faces, it is a sad necessity that we need a suite of counter-terrorism powers. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said in Committee:

“I have always taken the view that without our security we cannot enjoy our civil liberties”.—[Official Report, 15 December 2014; Vol. 589, c. 1229.]

To return to the point about Members of Parliament, we have no firm views on that question. We are currently consulting on the board’s composition, and we will take all views expressed into consideration.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

rose—

[Mr Simon Burns (Chelmsford) (Con)]

rose—

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Tuesday 6th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I must begin by apologising for not being present at the outset of the debate. The business of the House accelerated beyond my expectation and I am not as fleet of foot, perhaps, as I once was.

In the felicitous event that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and I had been sitting together in judgment, I would have contented myself by simply saying “I concur”, because there was nothing in what he said with which I would want to take issue. Indeed, there was a great deal in what the mover of the amendment, the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson), said with which I would agree. It is not necessary for me to delay the House over-long. It seems quite clear that the issue is whether the commencement of the sort of proceedings that regulated return would involve should be a matter of Executive responsibility or whether there should be judicial oversight.

I suspect that those who believe in judicial oversight do so as a matter of instinct, and perhaps not necessarily of logic, whereas, on the other side of the argument, people will think that an Executive decision is sufficient. As I explained on Second Reading, I have come down on one side of the argument against the background of reservations that I had, and still have, about the legitimacy even of managed return. A matter of this kind essentially enervates; it goes beyond TPIMs. It is a fundamental thing to say to someone who is a British citizen, “You may not return to this country.” That being so, we should incline towards the whole notion of judicial oversight.

That is a question of principle, but there is a pragmatism about it as well, because it would mean that every case would be considered on its own merits and that the Home Secretary of the time would have the protection of the court in proceeding in this direction. If the matter is left as one of judicial review, as it almost inevitably would be, there would be a period of uncertainty. In the course of a judicial review, the standard is not to satisfy oneself that there is a justification for the order but to satisfy oneself as to whether the execution of a discretion has been reasonable. It is sometimes described as having to demonstrate that a decision made as part of a ministerial discretion is arbitrary, perverse or capricious. That is a much more limited and very different approach from that proposed in the amendments. There should be a proper warrant for something that has an enervating effect on the rights of the individual. If one takes the view that rights depend only on loyalty to the principles under which those rights are exercised, then that opens up a very substantial door into areas where, for example, anyone who took a life would inevitably not be allowed the protection of life imprisonment but would be regarded as someone who, having taken a life, should sacrifice his or her own life. Our law has moved very firmly in the direction of judicial oversight.

I will vote for these amendments if they are pressed—indeed, I have told the Liberal Democrat Chief Whip that I intend to do so—because I think that this is a matter of principle. I will do my best to persuade reasonable men and women of the Liberal Democrats here present that they should do so also.

Having heard the debate so far, and having heard what was said on Second Reading and in Committee, I hope that the Minister may feel that this is an opportunity to try to produce a solution that reflects the view of the vast majority of the House rather than one that divides the House. In matters of this kind, it is always vital that if one possibly can, one should accept the will, if not of the whole House, then of the vast majority of the House. These are inevitably controversial issues, not least, as I said, because they have an enervating effect on fundamental rights. I shall wait with interest to hear what the Minister says. I hope that he will take account, if not of what I have said, then of the very eloquent and measured contribution of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

I seek clarification from my right hon. and learned Friend, based on his considerable knowledge and experience, on what question the court would address if it is not the judicial review question as to whether the Home Secretary acted reasonably in the determination that he or she has made. What question would the court address under the proceeding that he would like us to have?

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

The question is one of the Home Secretary having to persuade the court that he or she was entitled to make the order that was sought. In doing so, consideration would have to be given to all the individual circumstances that lay around that application. When one has gone a step further to judicial review, the question is not whether the decision was right or wrong but whether it was reasonable. That is a wholly different element of judicial oversight from the one that the amendments seek to achieve.

The Minister is a sensible individual, and he will, I am sure, understand the extent of the unease—that is perhaps the best way to put it—about this matter across the Floor of the House. He has within his power the opportunity to remove that unease by being sympathetic towards the points that have been made in the speeches we have heard so far.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Edward Garnier]

I am not going to answer that question, because it is not central to my point. When my hon. Friend and I meet elsewhere—perhaps in some shadow Attorney-Generals’ afterlife—we can have a long and fascinating conversation about the matter he has just raised, but if he does not mind, I want to make a few brief points.

Temporary is not two years; to my mind, it is something far shorter. I have no objection to the Home Secretary making a temporary exclusion order, but I prefer the expression used by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) on Second Reading when he talked about “managed return”. That is a much more accurate description.

[Sir Alan Beith]

Would the hon. and learned Gentleman be happier, as I would be, if, by the time the Bill returned from the Lords, it was a Bill about managed return, not exclusion, and if exclusion were the back-up to enforcing managed return?

Serious Crime Bill [Lords]

Lord Beith Excerpts

Monday 5th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for the interest he has taken in this subject and the way he has pursued it.

Finally, the Bill will close a gap in our current legislation in relation to terrorism. Clause 72 extends the reach of the UK courts so that those who prepare or train for terrorism abroad can be prosecuted should they return to this country. As the House is aware, a significant number of UK nationals or residents have travelled to Syria and Iraq to take part in the conflicts in those countries. We face the very serious threat that those fighters may seek to return to the UK and carry out attacks or radicalise people here. Extending extra-territorial jurisdiction for the offences in sections 5 and 6 of the Terrorism Act 2006 will bolster our law enforcement agencies’ ability to protect the public—but we will need to do more. Later this week, the House will have the opportunity again to debate the wider provisions of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, which is designed to disrupt the ability of people to travel abroad to fight and to counter the underlying ideology that feeds and supports terrorism. Given the immediacy of this threat, we will bring forward amendments in Committee to provide for the provisions in clause 72 of this Bill to come into force on Royal Assent.

Before I conclude, I want to advise the House of one further amendment that we will bring forward in Committee. The use of unauthorised mobile phones in prison poses a significant threat to prison security, as well as affording prisoners the opportunity to continue engaging in serious and organised crime while serving their sentence. While significant effort is put into tackling this problem within prisons, physically detecting handsets, let alone SIM cards, is clearly challenging given the ease with which they can be hidden. We need to find a more cost-effective way of denying prisoners the use of mobile phones. Our amendment will therefore confer a power on the civil courts to require mobile network operators to disconnect unauthorised mobile phones in use in prison.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

The Home Secretary has not found time in her speech to mention the provision on the possession of knives in prison, which ensures that that can be dealt with by the courts. Alongside the Attorney-General’s willingness to prosecute when prison officers are threatened with knives, that is very welcome.

[Mrs May]

My right hon. Friend highlights another important aspect of the Bill. When this was first brought to my attention, it seemed strange to me that the use of knives in prisons could not be dealt with in the same manner as the use of knives in other scenarios in public places. As he says, we have done the right thing in bringing that into the Bill.

The Bill contains a range of measures to protect the public from those who would do them harm. It will give law enforcement agencies and the courts greater powers to strip criminals of their ill-gotten gains and to prosecute those who support and benefit from organised crime, and ensure that no one is beyond the reach of the law. It will enhance the protection of vulnerable women and children who face violence and abuse at the hands of the very people who should care for them most. It will close a gap in our current terrorism legislation. Together, these measures will help law enforcement agencies to keep the public safe and secure. There can be no greater aspiration than that, and I believe it is an objective that all right hon. and hon. Members can support. On that basis, I commend the Bill to the House.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Frank Dobson]

I understand my hon. Friend’s point. The whole proposition of exclusion orders seems to be predicated on the idea, first, that these people are totally rational; and secondly, that their greatest desire is to come back to Britain. Neither of those things will necessarily be the case, because some very odd people are going to be involved.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

The right hon. Gentleman seems to be in danger of attacking the idea that was originally presented rather than that contained in the Bill, which is much closer to being a process of determining that, if somebody who is thought to be dangerous comes back to this country, we can control, monitor and supervise them. Surely that is a more sensible objective, which the original, apparent objective of making people stateless would not have been.

[Frank Dobson]

I agree that the Government have modified their position since the first daft statements were made—things have been made more rational—but I do not think they have come up with the best proposition. The proposal for notification and managed return orders may not be perfect by any means, but it is a better proposition than that suggested by the Government.

The peculiarity of the functions of British consular services when a person is suspected is extraordinary. The consular services will serve people with an order and then, if somebody else nicks them and puts them in prison or starts torturing them, the same consular services will turn around and start looking after their interests. That seems to me to be at the odd end of the functions of a consular service.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Tuesday 9th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Diana Johnson]

If the hon. Gentleman will be little patient, I shall move on to that subject in a few moments.

As I was saying, the Opposition accept that this extra category of data will be a vital tool for law enforcement—not just in protecting national security, but in combating a whole range of online crimes, including online child abuse, on which I shall speak in greater detail when we come on to new clause 2. The provisions for this extra category of data were first proposed in the Government’s ill-fated draft Communications Data Bill—I think that might help the hon. Gentleman in respect of his intervention. Although initially reluctant to provide any public evidence for why these extra data were needed, the Government did then provide the evidence that convinced the Joint Committee on the draft Bill of the necessity of this extra retention. The draft Communications Data Bill has been subject to much coalition grandstanding over the past few years, with the Home Secretary proposing a Bill of unprecedented, and in our view unnecessary, scope, while the Deputy Prime Minister refuses to accept the need for any legislation at all. Of course there was room for compromise and the Opposition have always supported this compromise. Some additional data retention is required, but not on the scale the Home Secretary proposed.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

How can the hon. Lady say that my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister did not see the need for any legislation at all when we are sitting here in this Committee this afternoon considering the legislation which we think properly balances the privacy issues with the need for public safety?

[Diana Johnson]

The right hon. Gentleman has made his point, and we will obviously disagree on what I have just said.

Our view, agreed with by most of the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, is that the data required to link an IP address to a device is one such category of data that is required and therefore we welcome what in principle clause 17 seeks to achieve. I say “in principle” because we do have some concerns about the drafting of clause 17, which is why we have tabled amendment 5.

--- Later in debate ---

Finally, will the Minister assure the House that the Government have obtained independent legal advice to ensure that this measure is compatible with the decision of the European Court of Justice to quash the data retention directive? In that judgment, the ECJ suggested that any form of blanket retention was disproportionate, and also called for additional safeguards on when the data can be disclosed. Is the Minister still confident that the measures contained within DRIP are sufficient to meet those demands?

[Sir Alan Beith]

The hon. Lady has produced a formidable list of questions, but I only have one for her, on amendment 5. It seems to me that the process we are describing does not enable people to discover who the user of an instrument was; it locates or identifies only the instrument from which the communication was made. Therefore, amendment 5 would be inoperative, because it could never be demonstrated that it was being used to establish who the user was as it cannot be guaranteed to do that.

[Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman’s observations on amendment 5. As with the previous grouping, the amendment was tabled to give us the opportunity to look at the specifics of clause 17 and to understand fully the thinking behind the Minister’s approach. I take on board what the right hon. Gentleman has said, which may be correct, but the amendment allows us to debate what would be disclosed and what information would be available.

I have just bombarded the Minister with a whole range of questions and I know that, as usual, he will be very thorough and go through each in turn. However, I want to turn briefly to new clause 2, which seeks to move on from the retention of data to a review of whether the form of storing the data is allowing the key authorities to access it in a timely manner. I will say, so everyone understands where I am coming from, that this proposal aims to probe the Minister’s argument, and to look at the clause to see what more can be done and whether we need to be aware of any issues for companies.

My concern arises from the police’s apparent problems in pursuing the majority of suspected paedophiles identified through Operation Notarise. My understanding is that Operation Notarise identified between 20,000 and 30,000 individuals whom the communications data suggested were taking part in online abuse. From that, only 700 people have been named, investigated and arrested, so well in excess of 20,000 IP addresses have been identified, but that information has not been translated into named users. At this point, I am not even talking about arrests, but about identifying the users to enable effective safeguarding interventions.

Once a user is identified, even if it is just an address, the police can make several key checks: first, against the police national computer to see if there is a known sex offender living at the address; secondly, against the Disclosure and Barring Service database to identify anyone who might be working with or have access to children; and thirdly, against the Department for Work and Pensions database to see if a child is registered at the property for the purpose of claiming child benefit.

At the moment, the police do not know how many of the people they have identified are known sex offenders working with children or living with children. Most people would see that as unacceptable and would believe there should be a response. This could start with a review of the degree to which the difficulty of linking IP addresses to users is behind the police’s problems with moving this forward.

Finally, I turn to the amendments and new clauses tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) and for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), and by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), on the degree to which RIPA is being used to access the records of certain professionals, including journalists. They address a real concern that Members and the general public have about the use of RIPA to access the records particularly of journalists and those in the media.

As the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), has said, this issue has to be addressed. Indeed, a key concession secured by the Opposition during the passage of the DRIP Bill was that a review of RIPA would be conducted by David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and that it would include the use of RIPA to look at the records of journalists. It is because we have confidence in that review that we do not feel amendment 11 is necessary.

However, that is also why the Opposition have a great deal of sympathy with the aims of new clause 1, which would require a court order before relevant authorities could access communications data that could be covered by a professional duty of confidentiality. The clause does not state whether the role of the court would be simply to ensure that due process is followed, or to apply some test of proportionality or necessity. However, the clause provides for the right of appeal for the individual. That means that an individual would have prior knowledge that their communications data were to be disclosed to law enforcement agencies. It is also important to note that the clause would apply not just to journalists but to doctors, lawyers and others, including Members of Parliament, when a professional duty of confidentiality could be construed.

[Diana Johnson]

I have the disadvantage of speaking first on this group of amendments, and obviously, this is not my amendment, so I am very much looking forward to hearing what the proposers feel would happen. However, the hon. Gentleman raises an important point, because we are not only talking about a limited group of people who describe themselves as journalists and who, in the past, we would have been able to identify clearly. Perhaps the proposers of the amendment would be able to address that when they speak to it.

I want to make a further point about the broad definition of professional duty that concerns me, especially when combined with the right of appeal. As I have said, a large number of professionals have some form of duty of confidentiality, and in many cases it is not clear, particularly when discussing communications data, how that potential duty of confidentiality would be separated from other investigations about which we would not allow the individual to have prior knowledge. There is a clear case for preventing a journalist from being targeted for their sources unless there is an overwhelming need to do so. However, the case is less clear in respect of other professions, particularly as we may be investigating issues involving criminal misconduct. Let me give an example for the Committee to consider: the case of Myles Bradbury, the doctor recently convicted of a string of horrendous sexual assaults of boys in his care. As a doctor, he would potentially have been covered by the new clause, especially in respect of some of his communications, and the Committee would be concerned about that. If he had been alerted to the fact that the police were investigating him, he would have had some time to delete much of the evidence which was then used to lead to his prosecution. I just give that as an example of the care we have to take in considering these matters.

I hope the Minister will respond in detail—I am sure he will—to the issues I have raised on this group, particularly the need for the drafting of clause 17 to be made much clearer so that the general public can be reassured about exactly what it is attempting to do.

[Sir Alan Beith]

The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) is right to seek clarification to satisfy herself and her colleagues that clause 17 achieves its intended purpose and no more. Its intended purpose is reasonable: to keep up with the technological changes that lead evildoers to move from one technology to another, and become more difficult to track as they do so.

[Julian Smith]

On that point—

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Beith]

Goodness me, I have barely started, but I will give way.

[Julian Smith]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that this provision does not keep up with the technology, and that much more has to happen and will happen? Will he clarify his party’s position on the changes that will have to come?

[Sir Alan Beith]

The hon. Gentleman has a strange desire, which he has expressed during a previous speech, to extend the debate beyond the bounds of clause 17 and the amendments to it. I do not think we should be drawn into that at the moment, except to make the general point that all processes involving intrusion into people’s private communications should have high levels of justification before they are used at all, and protections should be provided by various safeguards and authorisations. Finding the right balance for different levels of communication is a difficult task, and I expect a great deal of work will need to be done. Most of us in this House, and certainly most in my party, do not want, either by design or accidental discovery, a great deal of personal information about people to get in the hands of the state and its employees without any reasonable justification. On a matter that will be raised when the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) speaks, nor do we want the processes of investigation by journalists to be impaired by a fear that sources will be compromised from the beginning. There are very good reasons for extreme caution in this area, but I believe the Government have exercised that caution and sought to devise a process to deal with a particular and recognisable difficulty.

[Mark Field]

The right hon. Gentleman is making a perfectly valid point. In the midst of the more hyperbolic phrases that get used, such as “snooper’s charter”, does he recognise that legislation such as this—and further legislation, which will inevitably be required whoever is in government in the years to come—should also be designed to protect the individual? It is not just about the state getting more powers; it is about codifying the rules and protections for the individual. It is very important that we have that in mind when looking at any new legislation that comes into play.

[Sir Alan Beith]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman’s observation, which points to part of the purpose of the process, of which this is only a part. The clauses we are talking about in RIPA—or DRIPA, as it has become known—are the subject of a sunset provision, because significant further review is to take place and new legislation will be required on the outcome of that review. So those who think that detailed discussion of matters that often feel technically beyond us is just an occasional thing in this House will have to recognise that we are going to be coming back to this issue. That does not apply to me, because I do not anticipate being a Member in the next Parliament, having announced that I am going to retire, but Members in the next Parliament will certainly be engaging with these issues.

I simply wished to place on the record that my view—and, I hope, that of my right hon. and hon. Friends—is that the Government have striven hard to find a sensible way to identify the instrument or apparatus that has been the point of communication. In many cases, that will enable them to identify the individual, but I stress that it does not guarantee that, any more than knowing a telephone number guarantees that the person who used the telephone—that instrument from that number—is the person who engaged in the criminal activity. It is more complicated than that, but this provision is a necessary aid to investigations ranging from the activities of paedophiles through to the serious threats we now face.

--- Later in debate ---

[John McDonnell]

Everyone else who has spoken so far seems to have explained my amendments, and I am grateful to them. I tabled new clause 1 and amendment 11 because there is now a sense of urgency about dealing with this matter. I speak as the secretary of the National Union of Journalists group in Parliament—a group of MPs drawn from various political parties in the House. Throughout proceedings on RIPA and DRIPA and now this Bill, we have been discussing this issue. To put it simply, this House has always recognised in legislation the need to protect journalists, because we see journalism as one of the bulwarks of democracy in this country. Although we may not be enamoured of journalists or individual newspapers at times, we believe they play a vital democratic role in exposing what happens, particularly in regard to the behaviour of public authorities, Governments, corporations and others. That is why over the years we have written into legislation protection for journalists, as well as for other professions where there are issues of confidentiality, and the House has accepted that in all the debates so far.

[Sir Alan Beith]

It might be better expressed as “protection for sources”, because the primary concern is not to give a special elevated status to the journalist, but to avoid a situation in which the questions are asked, “Who told him and how can we get him?”

[John McDonnell]

Exactly. I was not arguing for preferential status for journalists—God forbid that I do that here. I was coming on to that point: this is about the ability to make sure a source is protected—as we all know, sources are often whistleblowers, blowing the whistle on abuses by public authorities and others—but it is also relevant to the protection of journalists themselves. We have seen across the world how, when the confidentiality of journalists’ sources is undermined, journalists become just as much a target as their sources, and in recent years large numbers of journalists in various countries have died as a result of persecution. What I am trying to say is that it is critical that we protect the role journalists play and enable them to undertake their work.

We have legislated in accordance with that principle—in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, for example. I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) that it is always difficult to find the mechanism, but the mechanism under PACE was the ability of the court to determine whether a production order should be made. We gave it over to the courts to determine that. What was important about that is that the journalist was notified of the application and could contest it before the court, and a decision would then be made that commanded the confidence of all those involved. The classic case since then is when the police failed to get an order under PACE and then used RIPA to obtain an order against a journalist to get information relating to articles that were being written, including the sources of that information. I think it was generally felt in the House that that was not what we intended when we passed PACE and was not in the spirit of RIPA. We have for some time consistently tried to get Government and this House—the responsibility falls on the shoulders of us all—to do exactly as my right hon. Friend said and to find an appropriate mechanism.

I tabled new clause 1 because I cannot find an effective mechanism other than the use of the courts at some stage. My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) asked whether it is a mechanism to enable the court to determine whether due process has been followed or the merits of a case. I have left that open for now because I welcome the discussion, but in my view, it is both.

--- Later in debate ---

[John McDonnell]

My right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley says that my local parish priest rather optimistically describes me as a lapsed Catholic. The secrets of the confessional need to be included; otherwise, there might be an excommunication.

The hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) makes a good point about journalism. I would like the definition to be membership of the NUJ, but there you are. These days, I would have the widest interpretation, but if it is to be contested, I would like to see a court make the decision on the basis of the evidence before it.

[Sir Alan Beith]

It is important that we distinguish what we are talking about here—the protection of the conversations that take place between lawyers and their clients and between doctors and their patients, discovered by entirely different processes. We are looking at the identification of the person who tipped someone off or provided some information. There may be good criminal law reasons for finding out who that person is, but I agree that some kind of measure is needed to ensure that those who warn a journalist or perhaps a Member of Parliament that something serious is going wrong have protection.

[John McDonnell]

Let me give one example of where RIPA was used. The case of Kirsty Green was in the evidence presented to the Home Affairs Committee by Michelle Stanistreet, the general secretary of the NUJ. Kirsty was a former regional newspaper journalist. Derby council spied on her meeting with local authority staff in 2009. Two Derby city council employees watched her when, as Derby Telegraph’s local government correspondent, she met four current and former council employees in a Starbucks coffee shop. The local authority said that RIPA was used to get surveillance authority for officials because they were protecting the council’s interests. The consequences for those individuals was a risk to their job in the local authority.

It is important that communication is protected, but names and sources also have to be protected, especially for whistleblowers, as we have seen when social workers have come forward in child abuse cases. The right hon. Gentleman makes the point well, but to me it emphasises even further the need for some judicial process in the oversight of access to the data and the way in which the legislation has been proposed.