(4 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI support what my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay just said. There is a fundamental distinction between the Executive branch and the legal branch. My objection to the Bill is that it includes a country where that division is nothing like as strong as ours. One of the issues is that these mechanisms for extradition are politically motivated in one of the five countries. The distinction between the Executive and the judicial system is crucial in people’s protection. Therefore, I very much support my noble and learned friend making that distinction, which distinguishes us and four of the other countries from the fifth. We ought to underline that very strongly.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have made their points on these amendments and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for moving Amendment 1. To recap, at Second Reading there was considerable cross-party consensus on the Bill’s aims and measures, alongside the robust scrutiny that I expect from the House, and now the Committee. The amendments before us rightly tease out some of those points.
Noble Lords will be interested to know that the Director of Public Prosecutions, Max Hill QC, wrote to the new Security Minister on 2 March. His letter, which I will put in the Library following Committee, says:
“Overall, it is the firm view of the CPS that this Bill strikes the right balance between ensuring sufficient human rights safeguards and delivering the capabilities that the police and CPS require in order to safeguard the public … under the current process there remains a risk that UK law enforcement could encounter a potentially dangerous person wanted for a serious crime by a trusted partner, but for whom they would have no power to arrest and detain … The Bill does not make it more or less likely someone will be extradited, but it does increase the chances that persons wanted for serious offences by some of our closest and trusted partners will enter, with all the existing safeguards, the extradition process.”
I know that reporting on the effectiveness of the legislation, and the reliability of Interpol alerts, is a topic of interest. If the Committee will allow it, I will address Amendments 1 and 2 together as both concern reporting on the legislation’s effectiveness.
On the perceived risk of abuse of Interpol notices highlighted in Amendment 1, I reassure the Committee that the immediate power of arrest proposed in the Bill will apply only to requests from specified countries—currently the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. These countries have been specified as we have a high level of confidence in their criminal justice systems and use of Interpol notices. The Government have no intention of specifying countries likely to abuse the system to political ends.
Additionally, the UK is currently working with Interpol to ensure that its rules are robust, effective and complied with. The former chief constable of Essex was recently made the executive director of policing services for Interpol, the most senior operational role in that organisation. A UK government lawyer has also been seconded to the Interpol legal service to work with it to ensure that Interpol rules are properly robust and adhered to by Interpol member states. We will continue to work with Interpol to increase the reliability and trustworthiness of the whole red notice system.
Did my noble friend notice that the President of the United States has just taken credit for 3,000 judicial appointments and said that he has therefore ensured that those judicial appointments will make decisions in line with his and Republican Party policy? How can one possibly say that this is the same kind of judicial system that we have?
A judge would take a view on whether something was politically motivated. Something blatantly politically motivated would be rejected.
I understand that, and we have the protection that the request has to go before a judge but, in this document, the Government give accreditation to the United States, which has no reciprocal arrangements with us, and talk about a “trusted partner” when it is not a partner. It will not do this the other way around and, clearly, it asks for the extradition of people on political or commercial grounds, which would not happen with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Liechtenstein or Switzerland. We are saying something about the United States that surely none of us believes.
I think my noble friend is referring to the Extradition Act itself, not the pre-extradition arrest process. I do not know whether he is questioning the Extradition Act’s efficacy, but that is not what we are talking about in the Bill. He also has an amendment down for later in Committee so perhaps we could come back to this at that stage if he wants to make further points.
I am happy to do that; I merely say to my noble friend that I have tabled the amendment and wish to discuss it because this is our opportunity to do so and we are repeating our view. My noble friend is using phrases that are, I think, unsuitable, given the relationship. We are, after all, extending—perfectly properly, I think—the way the Extradition Act works. It seems reasonable at this point, before we go any further, to question whether one ought to use those phrases in these circumstances.
We will get on to my noble friend’s point, but we use Parliament to make law rather than to make points. I hope he will respect the point that I make.
The noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, asked about obligation to extradite. He is absolutely right. The Bill creates powers for the police, not obligations to other countries.
Amendment 2 requests the publication of an annual statement on arrests. The NCA already keeps data and publishes statistics around arrest volumes in relation to Part 1 of the Extradition Act. It does it without being required to do so by primary legislation. We have no doubt that it will similarly do so in respect of arrests under this new arrest power, as this is a sensible operational practice. I have sympathy for the amendment, so I have asked officials to look at how we can give the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, some reassurance. I hope he will accept that I will liaise with him between now and Report.
I am not persuaded that the either the Secretary of State or the NCA require a statutory obligation to take these steps. I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Lord not to press his amendments, but we will have further discussions between now and Report.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. I am obviously happy to withdraw my amendment for the moment.
I agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood. The noble Lord, Lord Deben, has also made some important points, which I know we will come to later.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, mentioned Parliamentary Questions. Sometimes, the Answers we get are not very good, to say the least. That goes across government. I am going to have to start tabling Questions about Parliamentary Answers. I asked one recently of another department. I asked, “What do we here?” and the Answer had no bearing whatever on the Question. I raised that with the Minister concerned and he accepted that. I thought, “Just answer the Question. If you can’t answer it, tell me you can’t answer it.” They had sent back a ridiculous Answer that had no bearing and it is not good enough. Unfortunately, that is a problem across government. Maybe we need a debate in the House about it. I am going to try putting in FoIs and comparing answers between PQs and FoIs. Will the answers be as bad there? We will see. But that is a separate issue. I would love to think that PQs were the answer; unfortunately, in my experience of being here for nearly 10 years, they are not.
Having said that, I am pleased with the Minister’s response, especially to my second amendment. I look forward to further discussions between now and Report. On that basis, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment 5 in this group is in my name. It would simply put “National Crime Agency” into the Bill. Throughout the Bill, there are references to the “designated authority”, but there is no mention of a specific agency. I am sure that the Minister will set out why the Bill is framed in that way and I look forward to that explanation.
Other amendments in this group are in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. They are all useful, as they give the Minister the opportunity to explain further the Government’s reasoning in specific areas and to convince the Grand Committee of the protections in the Bill.
On Amendment 4, who will be responsible and accountable if the safeguards fail and we end up complying with a request that is politically motivated? Amendment 11 would take away the uncertainty built into the Bill. I do not like phrases such as “the designated authority believes”. “Believes” is a strange word to have in legislation. I like there to be a bit more certainty than is offered by a word such as “believes”. It seems very loose and open to all sorts of interpretations by all sorts of people.
Amendment 11A raises the circumstance where somebody could be rearrested under a new certificate. I accept that circumstances can change and maybe those powers are needed, but if somebody has been released under one certificate, we need to make clear what would need to change for them to be rearrested under a new one.
Amendment 11C has my full support. In many ways, it is a compromise between what the Bill says and what Amendment 5 says. Doing it through an SI is probably the best way forward, so I fully support Amendment 11C. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for their points on these amendments. They have been grouped together as dealing with the functions of the designated authority and the criteria applied by it in certifying requests.
Amendment 4 proposes a new criterion for certification. This would require the designated authority to be satisfied that the request is not politically motivated. Making consideration of political motivation a precondition of certification for the designated authority would reverse the present position for arrests under the Extradition Act 2003. Presently, the courts are required to consider during the substantive extradition hearing whether any of the statutory bars to extradition apply. These statutory bars include whether the request for extradition is made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing an individual on account of their political opinions—that comes under Section 81 of the Extradition Act 2003. The Government’s position remains that it is right that the judge considers these points based on all the evidence before him or her during the substantive hearing and not the NCA prior to arrest. It is the judge who is ultimately accountable.
Furthermore, we are all aware that the Extradition Act contains substantial safeguards in respect of requests motivated by reason of the requested person’s political views. These safeguards will continue to apply, and we fully expect the courts to continue to exercise their powers of scrutiny as usual.
Arguments of political motivation are of course not usually simple. It is right that the question of whether an individual extradition request can be described as politically motivated should be assessed by a judge before an open court. It is vital, of course, that the requested person should be able to put their arguments on this basis to a judge, but it is also crucial, in the fulfilment of our obligations under the international arrangements on extradition that give rise to such proceedings, that the requesting authority should be able to respond to such arguments and put their own case as to why the request is not politically motivated. This should be openly and fairly arbitrated, so importing this consideration into the process for determining whether an individual may be arrested would be at odds with existing extradition law. Noble Lords will be aware that judges and justices of the peace are not required to consider such factors when deciding whether to issue an arrest warrant under Section 71 or Section 73 of the 2003 Act.
Were the designated authority to make such a deliberation in effectively, it would need to be able to invite representations on the point from both the requesting authority and the requested person in each case before certification. Not only would this be hugely resource-intensive, it would also advertise to the wanted person that they are wanted. I should note that the designated authority, as a public body, would already be under an obligation to act compatibly with convention rights under Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. At the point of certification, this will include consideration of whether an arrest is ECHR-compatible.
I bring the attention of noble Lords to the types of territories proposed as appropriate specified territories. These are democracies whose criminal justice systems are rooted in the rule of law. I am certain Parliament would not accept the addition to the schedule of territories that we believed would send the UK politically motivated arrest requests. I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Baroness that there is no gap in safeguards here and that, consequently, she will be content with withdraw her amendment.
She also asked what is meant by the “seriousness of the conduct”. The language mirrors the test in Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003. As she thought, there is indeed case law on the point. The intention is to capture only conduct sufficiently serious to ensure that the power is used only where proportionate. For example, the minor theft of an item of food from a supermarket or a very small amount of money is unlikely, without exceptional circumstances, to be sufficiently serious. Only when the designated authority decides that the offence satisfies the test will it be able to certify the request.
I turn now to Amendment 5, which seeks to define the designated authority as the National Crime Agency in the Bill. Our approach here mirrors that of the designation of the authority responsible for certification of European arrest warrants under Part 1 of the Act. The Government consider that the designation of the authority responsible for issuing a certificate is an appropriate matter to be left to secondary legislation. A regulation-making power affords the appropriate degree of flexibility to amend the designated authority in light of changing circumstances, including alterations to the functions of law enforcement bodies in the UK. To future-proof the legislation, the Government believe that the current drafting leaves an appropriate amount of flexibility. As I said, the Government’s intention is initially to designate the NCA, which is the UK’s national central bureau for Interpol, as the designated authority. I hope I have persuaded the noble Lord that we have got the balance right and that he will be content not to press his amendment.
I turn finally to Amendment 11, on requests made in the “approved way”. My noble friend’s amendment suggests that a request should be considered to have been made in the approved way only if it is made by an authority that has the function of making such requests in the territory concerned, rather than an authority which the designated authority believes to have this function.
Perhaps I may momentarily be a bit philosophical. The amendment attempts to base the assessment of the authority’s function on an objective truth. That is admirable from the point of view of legal certainty, but the designated authority does not have a monopoly on truth. The best it could do in practice, when making the assessment described in the amendment, would be to decide, to the best of its ability, whether the authority in question has the function of making such requests, arriving at what I think we would characterise as being a belief that it does so. Of course, the designated authority, as a public body, must take decisions that are reasonable and rational.
As such, we expect there to be no difference between how the assessment would be made in practice under the amendment and how it would be made under the existing text. The benefit of the text, as we have proposed it, is that it mirrors language elsewhere in the Extradition Act—for example, when the designated authority under Part 1 may issue a certificate in relation to a warrant and when the Secretary of State may issue a certificate under Part 2.
On the perceived risk implicit in Amendment 11A—that an arrested person could be rearrested for the same thing, having been discharged by a court, perhaps because they were not produced at court on time or for some other failing—I reassure the Committee that this is neither the intention nor the effect of the new sections in the Bill. New Section 74A(8) makes clear that an arrested person may
“not be arrested again in reliance of the same certificate”
if they have previously been discharged. The intention of this drafting is to stipulate that an individual may not be arrested again on the basis of the same international arrest request once a judge has discharged them. This mirrors Section 6 of the Extradition Act 2003, which provides for the same thing, where a person provisionally arrested on the basis of a belief relating to a European arrest warrant may not be arrested again on the basis of a belief relating to the same European arrest warrant.
On top of that, new Section 74B(3) requires that a certificate has to have been withdrawn before any arrest takes place to allow a new one to be issued relating to the same request. This again illustrates that a further certificate cannot simply be issued on the basis of the same request once an individual arrested under this power has been discharged by a judge.
Of course, it is vital that a certificate can be issued on the basis of a new request, or on the basis of a wholly different request, so that an individual wanted for another crime is not immune to any further arrest because they were once arrested and discharged for a different crime. Organised transnational offences, such as people trafficking, often involve offences in different countries, on different dates, with different victims, and no individual should be able to avoid answering for more than one serious crime using a legal loophole. The amendment would create that impunity. For that reason, I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Baroness and that she will be happy not to press that amendment.
Amendment 11C would require an affirmative resolution procedure to apply to any statutory instrument that designates an authority as a “designated authority”. Given that the framework and criteria for the issuing of a certificate are provided for in the Bill, we consider that the negative resolution procedure affords an appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny. We have plainly set out what the designated authority will do and how they must do it. Which particular body exercises that function is not, in our view, a matter that needs to be subject to debate in both Houses. The use of the power to designate an authority is necessary to accommodate any changing circumstances, including alterations to the functions of law enforcement bodies in the UK, and we consider it appropriate that we can respond to this promptly. The application of the negative procedure is also, again, completely consistent with the procedure for designating an authority for the purposes of issuing a certificate in respect of a European arrest warrant under Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003.
I am sorry for my long-winded response to these several amendments. I hope the noble Baroness and the noble Lord are happy not to press their amendments.
I do not think the Minister was long-winded; it is quite a long group of amendments. I am grateful to her for that. I should have brought my iPad so that I could have followed all the references to the 2003 Act. I take all the points that the Minister made—in particular, the point about organised crime. One does not always remember how the nature of crime changes. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate. The amendments before us relate to the delegated power to specify any additional territories to which this new power may be extended. As I have said, in the first instance, the powers afforded by the legislation would be granted only to the UK’s closest criminal justice co-operation partners, these being the Five Eyes powers and the EFTA states. These are the countries in whose criminal justice systems and use of Interpol systems we have a high level of confidence. The amendments address the power to add, vary or remove countries from the Bill and a minor consequential amendment to vary what is meant by making an extradition request in the approved way if there is a good justification for doing so in the future.
I shall start with Amendment 9 because the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, began with it and other noble Lords have expressed a great interest in it. It specifies that territories should be added one at a time. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for speaking to me about this and I did slightly warn him ahead of time that we are not going to agree with it. That is not to say that we would want to add territories in multiples, but it is common practice to allow for multiple territories to be specified together for similar legislation. Noble Lords will know that this is the process for adding territories in Part 1 and Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003. I hope that the affirmative resolution procedure would give Parliament the opportunity to scrutinise the Government by voting either for or against a resolution and to express an opinion towards any country being added to the Bill. I expect that if the Government attempted to add a territory which Parliament did not agree with, it would act accordingly. However, I understand the substance of the point that the noble and learned Lord made.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, referred to our debate the other day on the Norway/Iceland issue. The Norway/Iceland surrender agreement operates under Part 1 of the 2003 Extradition Act, so an agreement with the EU based on that precedent would keep EU member states in Part 1 of the Act, where the power of immediate arrest already exists. The Bill is only for specified Part 2 countries where currently there is no power of immediate arrest. I do not want to prejudge the outcome of the negotiations, but we may well return to this issue.
I shall reverse engineer, as it were, and go back to Amendment 6. It looks to determine how varying a reference to a territory will be distinct from the addition or removal of a reference. I assure noble Lords that the term “vary” aims to future-proof the legislation and to ensure that technical changes do not place a restriction on the use of the power. An example of such a technical change would be a situation where part of a territory seceded from a specified territory and the Government wished to maintain this power in relation to only the successor state. This is of course not a particularly likely scenario but one for which it is responsible to be prepared.
Amendment 7 proposes to remove the power to vary the meaning of making a request “in the approved way” under new Section 74C. In the current draft, a request is made “in the approved way” if it is
“made by an authority of the category 2 territory which the designated authority believes has the function of making such requests in that territory.”
The power in new Section 74B(7)(b) is included to enable similar provision to be made, where appropriate, to that in Section 70(5) and (6) of the 2003 Act. These subsections set out the variations to the meaning of “the approved way” for extradition requests made from British Overseas Territories and for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. I will set out some examples of how that power might be used.
Where a newly specified territory had a number of different authorities which had the function of making requests, the power in new Section 74B(7)(b) would enable one or more authority to be singled out as the appropriate authority for making valid requests, should that be necessary. A further example might be if the Government sought to specify one or several of the British Overseas Territories. In such a scenario, the Government may wish to provide for requests to be made by the governor-general of the territory rather than the authorities within it. In such circumstances, the regulations might provide for requests to be made in the approved way by or on behalf of a person administering the territory.
Regarding preparing and publishing a report on adding a new territory, as well as any intention to add further territories or negotiations with prospective territories, to the scope of this legislation as specified in Amendment 8, the Government are committed to ensuring that Parliament has the ability to question and decide on whether any new territory could come within scope. Therefore, it is mandated in the Bill that any Government wishing to add a new territory to the scope of this legislation should do so through the affirmative resolution procedure. Any statutory instrument laid before Parliament will of course be accompanied by an Explanatory Memorandum, which will set out the legislative context and policy reasons for that instrument.
This procedure will give Parliament opportunity for scrutiny and will allow the House to reject the addition of any new territory to the Bill. Any Minister looking to add a new territory to the Bill would be expected to give Parliament good reason for doing so, therefore negating the need for this amendment. Having said that, I have sympathy with the spirit of the amendment and have asked officials to look into how we can give the noble Lord some reassurance on this. I will continue to liaise with noble Lords ahead of Report.
Amendment 10 would add a specification criterion for new countries to the Bill. This has not already been included to ensure that Parliament is given the full freedom to decide on any new territory. If criteria were to be added, Parliament might be put in the invidious position of having to accept that a particular territory that was not appropriate for specification for other reasons should be added. In this circumstance Parliament would likely want to consider all aspects of the proposal, so adding these criteria would limit Parliament’s discretion. As I have outlined, any Government proposing to add a new territory would also need to give clear reasons for doing so, both in the explanatory documents accompanying any statutory instrument and during any subsequent debate. We would not want to bind the hands of future Governments to decide on the criteria they use to specify a new country.
I think we can all agree that the factors identified by my noble friend will of course be important and relevant considerations that we would expect any Government to take into account when deciding whether it is appropriate to seek to add a new territory. However, we do not consider that they need to be in the Bill. The current drafting ensures that Parliament can assess the merits of each territory which is due to be added to the Bill and scrutinise any addition through the affirmative resolution procedure. I am not persuaded of the need for this amendment.
Amendment 11B aims to remove the United States from the Schedule. The US is a critical partner in fighting terrorism and international organised crime. It is a responsible user of Interpol and has a criminal justice system with extensive checks and balances. We are confident of these points in relation to the US as much as to the other countries that we seek to specify. The new power of arrest, which is designed to protect the public in this country, has nothing to do with whether UK extradition requests to other countries are successful. It is about ensuring, when we have robust and trustworthy information that a person is wanted for a serious offence, that the police can arrest that person. Requests from the US are backed by judicial warrants predicated on probable cause. This is a firm ground on which to bring a person before a judge in the UK to decide on their further detention.
My noble friend talked about the US President’s comments on judicial appointments. Of course, this was raised by the leader of the Opposition in another place. We need to bear in mind the context in which the President might have said that in an election year. The Prime Minister made his views on the US treaty very clear in another place last month. The Government’s long-standing position is that the treaty with the US is fair and balanced in practice.
Not at the moment. If my noble friend could wait until I have finished my comments, I will be happy to take his intervention. It is just that I have a number of points to make; I hope that is okay. The Prime Minister has committed to looking into the questions raised by the leader of the Opposition, so I am sure that my noble friend will look forward to that. This issue should not delay or undermine our efforts to ensure that police in the UK have the right powers in place to get wanted fugitives off British streets.
My noble friend talked about Anne Sacoolas, which is a valid issue; the US refusal to extradite her is a clear denial of justice. The Government and UK law enforcement continue to explore all opportunities to secure justice for Harry Dunn’s family. I bring to my noble friend’s attention the fact that this is the first case that has ever been refused under the UK-US extradition treaty. By contrast, we have refused 19 cases. The Government’s long-standing position is that the treaty is fair and balanced in practice. My noble friend also mentioned Dr Lynch. As we have stated, consideration of the substance of an extradition request includes any statutory bars to extradition such as political motivation. These are properly a matter for a judge at the extradition hearing. I will not comment any further as this is before the courts.
My noble friend also talked about reciprocity. What we are doing in this Bill is creating powers for the UK police, not obligations on the countries concerned. I know that he is concerned about reciprocity, but the Bill will enable UK police officers to protect the public more effectively. It is about ensuring that UK police officers have the power to remove dangerous individuals from our streets before they can abscond or offend, not relying on some sort of reciprocity that may depend on the nature of the regime in the other country. I am happy to take his intervention now if he wishes.
I thank my noble friend the Minister. I realise what she is saying and acknowledge the care with which she is saying it; I thank her very much for that. I tried to intervene earlier specifically on the issue that President Trump had said what he said. The Minister said that we had to realise that that was an election situation. She then moved on to the Prime Minister. I put this to her: how happy would she be if our Prime Minister got up during an election and said, “I am very pleased that there are 181 judges that I have managed to get appointed, who will make decisions much closer to the Conservative Party’s views than the judges whom they replaced.”? I think that she would be deeply upset and would feel that that struck at the very heart of British justice. I am trying to make the point that the United States makes political decisions about judges, who are very often able to act in support of American business. In fact, this is one of the issues that President Trump has always raised—“America first”. My concern is that there is an actual case where that appears to be what happened. I do not think that it helps us to give the impression that the United States’ legal system is on a par with that of Switzerland, because it is not.
On the point about taking the countries one by one, and the group that a country is in, as I said, in any secondary legislation that comes before your Lordships’ House there has to be a statement about the rationale for that secondary legislation, which Parliament can reject if it wishes. However, as I said to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, I utterly understand where he comes from.
On the point about judicial appointments in the US, putting aside what President Trump said, I think that the US judiciary is very protective of its independence. Certainly, on the issue of arrest warrants, the US has a criminal justice system in which we can justifiably put this level of trust.
I have a note from the Box about favours from the US. This power is, of course, in our interests. It benefits UK police. On that note, I hope noble Lords will feel content not to press their amendments.
I do not have many remarks to make on this and I could not think of a quixotic quote. However, I really like Shakespeare because he is connected with the borough I grew up in, so I will remind you of this quote
“haste is needful in this desperate case.”
Some of the points which have been made are very important and should be taken on board. What are we doing here? We support the legislation in principle, but we have asked for reasons why we are doing this and we have gone through some of the wording before.
I look forward in particular to the Minister’s response to Amendment 12 because when you look at the wording it seeks to take out, it is quite worrying that it is in there at all. It may well be that there is a perfectly understandable explanation and I will be able to get up in a moment and say, “I fully support what the Minister intends to do”, but as it reads now, I am worried about what we are passing here. Perhaps she will say that it is fine because it talks about further consequential provisions in the sub-paragraph above and the Government will do nothing. However, there is an issue about the powers we are giving to the Executive and our ability to scrutinise or change them at a later date. That point has been made by the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, so I want this to be looked at.
Amendment 13 seeks to remove regulations about “saving” or “incidental” provision. What is that about? We could make all sorts of changes by saying that something is a saving. We could get rid of whole swathes of stuff, so what are we agreeing to? We do not want to find ourselves saying months or years ahead that we did not realise when we agreed to this that we were giving those powers to the Executive. I will leave it there and look forward to the Minister’s response, but I may intervene at some point for further clarification.
I thank noble Lords for the points they have made and I hope to be able to allay any fears around what Amendments 12, 13 and 14 seek to address.
As noble Lords have said, paragraph 29(1) confers a power on the Secretary of State to make further provisions that are consequential on the amendments made by the Schedule to the Bill. This is a standard power which is commonplace in legislation and is naturally constrained. It can be used only to make provisions that are consequential and it is not a power to make substantive policy changes. Rather, it will allow the Government to make small, technical amendments for good housekeeping to ensure that that statute book is consistent and functions well.
As we implement the new arrest power, it is in everyone’s interests to ensure legal continuity for law enforcement partners and those subject to arrest for extradition purposes. While many of the amendments required to other enactments are made by Part 2 of the Schedule to the Bill, it is anticipated that further consequential amendments may be identified as part of the implementation process. That is why the standard power is taken to provide the flexibility to ensure that the new arrest power can operate smoothly and efficiently. Placing a timeframe such as 12 months on the use of the power would unnecessarily frustrate the aim. In any event, as noble Lords will know, the power cannot be used to amend future legislation.
As to the scope of the possible amendments, the Bill is narrowly focused. Its purpose is to provide a power of provisional arrest for specified category 2 territories for extradition purposes. I stress the point that it does not affect or relate to the subsequent extradition process. The purpose of the consequential power is to deal with the consequences of those changes to the statute book. As such, just as wider amendments to the Extradition Act 2003 fall outside the Bill’s ambit, so amendments to effect wider extradition policy would fall outwith the consequential amendments power. The power extends to provisions that amend, repeal or revoke any provision of primary legislation. As I hope I have made clear, this is not unusual or exceptional. It is standard practice to take such a power to provide flexibility for smooth and efficient implementation.
Similarly, the power to make saving or incidental provision by regulations found at paragraph 29(3) of the Schedule is a standard power commonly given in legislation for the purposes of smoothing the introduction of a change to the statute book. Incidental provision would include only amendments that are necessary or expedient to make the Bill’s substantive provisions work. Saving provisions are required where it is necessary to preserve existing law following a change to legislation —for example, to ensure fairness or consistency in court proceedings in progress at the time of a change to legislation. As I have stated, these are standard clauses. Any amendment by regulations that amended, repealed or revoked primary legislation would be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure by virtue of paragraph 29(5), as befitting a Henry VIII power of this type. I hope that I have allayed noble Lords’ fears about that.
As a final point to my noble friend Lord Inglewood, the power in this Act would not allow us simply to move countries from Part 1 to Part 2 of the Extradition Act, nor to substantively amend Part 1. Those are not consequential amendments. With those explanations, I hope that noble Lords will feel happy to withdraw their amendments.
I thank the Minister very much for explaining that. I am reassured to a large extent by what she said. Would it be possible to give an example of one of those little technical things that would be changed so that we are clear what we are all talking about? If she cannot now, maybe she could write to us.
My Lords, I acknowledged that the regulations referred to in paragraph 29(2) must be within paragraph 29(1). I come back to the point that good housekeeping should be done before a Bill is presented to Parliament, not least because it would reduce the amount of time needed on the Bill in Parliament. For many years, I have recognised that it is a great deal easier to sit on this side of the House or Committee and pick holes than it must be to draft this stuff. Nevertheless, it is our job to pick some holes.
I do not apologise for raising this and cannot say that my concerns are wholly allayed: the words “necessary” and “expedient” were used in the delegated powers memorandum, along with “detailed and technical” about the nature of the amendments. I would like to assure myself that the words in the Bill reflect what has been said. I will possibly talk to the noble and learned Lord before the next stage. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 12.
My Lords, the Government have laid Amendment 15 to reflect Section 2 of the Senedd and Elections (Wales) Act 2020, which changes the name of the Welsh legislature to “Senedd Cymru or the Welsh Parliament”. This amendment is a technical consequential amendment. It follows the new practice of using the Welsh name when referring only to the Welsh legislature. I hope noble Lords will be able to join me in voting for this amendment.
I am very happy to support this amendment. While looking at it, I was thinking that Members of the Welsh Parliament are called Assembly Members. What will they be called in future? They are in a Parliament and are called AMs—will there be some consequential change there? Maybe someone could clarify that at some point.
I will try to do that. It is a technical point to which I do not know the answer.
My Lords, it might assist the noble Lord if I point out to him that they are Aelodau Senedd, or AS, in Welsh. It is “Senedd” with a “th” sound, not a “d” sound.