Offender Rehabilitation Bill [HL]

Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts

Tuesday 11th June 2013 Lords Chamber

Although I am sympathetic to the amendment as described by the noble Lord, it raises a wider question of how current best practice as provided by our probation service might be superseded by the commercial interests of the provider, particularly given that that provider will be paid by results, and when we are led to believe that the results bonus will be less than 5% of the total value of the contract. That raises a fundamental question about the judgment which the responsible officers must make and how that may come into conflict with that of their employer.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords who have taken part in the debate, in particularly my noble friend Lord Marks for highlighting in his contribution the importance of both family matters and, of course, sensitive issues of faith, which is also relevant to a fair percentage of our prison population.

This group of amendments would place an additional duty on responsible officers instructing offenders under the new rehabilitation activity requirement created by Clause 13, and would also place a new duty on the courts when imposing community orders and suspended orders more generally. To address first the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about organisations’ or providers’ commercial interests right away, it would be wrong and totally inappropriate for those to supersede any other offender requirements. The whole point of rehabilitation is putting the offender at the centre.

I do not agree with the noble Lord’s three cohorts—the groups he put together. Even the no-hopers are worth a try. We need to ensure, in all the reforms we put forward, that anyone—even people whom society at large perceives as no-hopers—is worth a try. We should seek to assist them to become productive citizens of society.

Noble Lords may also find it helpful if I briefly explain what Clause 13 provides. It creates a new rehabilitation activity requirement that will combine key elements of the existing supervision and activity requirements available under community orders and suspended sentence orders. At present Section 213 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides for a supervision requirement that may be imposed as part of either order. The requirement involves attending appointments during the period of the order with either the responsible officer or another person determined by the responsible officer. Section 201 of the 2003 Act provides for an activity requirement as part of either order. Under an activity requirement, an offender must first, present himself to a person specified in the order for a specified number of days, and secondly, participate in activities specified in the order for a specified number of days.

Clause 13 repeals both those requirements and merges them into a single rehabilitation activity requirement. Under the new requirement, offenders must comply with any instructions given by their responsible officer to attend appointments, participate in activities, or both. These instructions must be given with a view to promoting the offender’s rehabilitation, although they can serve other purposes as well. The effect of the clause is to allow the probation provider who is the responsible officer, rather than the court, to decide the exact details of what appointments or activities the offender should take part in to maximise their chances of turning away from crime.

Amendment 26 would require a responsible officer who is instructing an offender to attend appointments or participate in activities under this new requirement to take account of the offender’s family circumstances and, of course, any caring responsibilities that the offender might have. That would mean ensuring that appointments were suitable, that activities were compatible with the offender’s family circumstances, and that any place to which the offender was sent to take part in activities was suitable if the offender needed to take a child with them.

Amendment 30, although inserted into the clause about programme requirements, would apply to all requirements under any community order or suspended sentence order. It adds to the provision in Section 217 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that already requires a court to avoid, as far as possible, any conflict with the offender’s religious beliefs and any interference with his or her work or education. The amendment would add to Section 217 a new duty requiring the court to avoid—again as far as is practicable—any interference with the offender’s ability to carry out any caring responsibilities that he or she might have.

As I am sure that noble Lords will appreciate, the criminal justice system at all points endeavours to accommodate the personal circumstances of an offender. Courts will always sentence an offender in the light of their individual circumstances, together with the circumstances of the offence. Indeed, the law requires, where a court imposes a community order, that the requirements chosen must be, in the court’s opinion, the most suitable for the offender.

In addition to these general requirements, I can assure all noble Lords that there are already important safeguards in place to address childcare and other caring responsibilities where an offender is sentenced by the courts. These issues are covered in the assessments carried out when compiling pre-sentence and other reports that are considered by the courts before sentencing.

Probation staff will also respond to requests by the courts for specific information about family circumstances and courts will sometimes adjourn briefly so that such issues can be considered. If an offender is reluctant to divulge information about their children for fear that they may be taken into care, a post-sentence interview will often elicit the necessary information or the offender might tell their lawyer. If necessary, liaison will take place with local authority safeguarding authorities, or social security emergency duty teams, to safeguard the child or vulnerable person in question. In addition, the Sentencing Council has made it clear in its guidelines that:

“Where the offender is the sole or primary carer of the victim or other dependants, this potentially should be taken into account for sentencing purposes, regardless of whether the offender is male or female”.

Both courts and responsible officers are public authorities within the terms of the Human Rights Act 1998. This means that they are required to balance the need for the offender to attend appointments and take part in activities in order to secure his rehabilitation against his right under the Human Rights Act to respect for his private and family life. This point was well made by my noble friend Lord Marks.

What this adds up to is a clear indication that the courts already take all possible steps to avoid, as far as is practicable, any interference with the offender’s ability to discharge any caring responsibilities that he or she may have. For this reason, I argue that Amendment 30 is unnecessary. With these assurances and clarifications, I hope that my noble friend will be minded to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I am again grateful for that helpful explanation of the Government’s position. The difficulty, as I see it, is something that I hope that we can consider between now and Report. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, pointed out, we are entering an entirely new era in the provision of probation services. The Minister is entirely right to say that best practice and sentencing guidelines require the courts and responsible officers—who are now in the public sector probation service—to have regard to caring responsibilities. However, there is a risk that in the new regime, which is a new world for probation provision, there will be a departure from best practice or, at any rate, a temptation to depart from it. I hope that, by amending the Bill in a similar way to our amendments, we could send out the message that family commitments have to be taken into account just as faith and education commitments are. In those circumstances, I invite the Government to consider these amendments carefully and sympathetically before we come back. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for that clarification. His reasoning may not have been clear when he notified his intention to oppose the Question that the clause stand part, but it was in his explanation. It may be helpful to reiterate what Clause 14 intends to do. Currently an accredited programme can take place only in premises that have been approved by a probation trust or other provider of probation services. There is therefore a slightly redundant step built into the process for delivering accredited programmes, whereby trusts currently have to set up premises for programmes and then approve those premises themselves before courts can require offenders to attend. Clause 14 removes this requirement. Although probation providers will still want to satisfy themselves that a programme’s premises are suitable for those attending, as a result of the amendment there will no longer be a formal requirement in law for them to ratify or sign that off internally before courts can require offenders to attend.

Parliament has already approved a change in the law that means that the responsible officer, who is the person responsible for delivering the requirement, now chooses the accredited programme that the offender must follow. This was previously in the gift of the court. This change was made by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and commenced in December last year. As a consequence, the court no longer specifies where the offender must go to participate in the programme but simply imposes a programme requirement and sets the number of days on which the offender must take part.

The detail of the requirement is now in the hands of the provider, who is best placed to know which programme is the most likely to promote rehabilitation. This also means that where it emerges that a different programme would work better—for example, the offender starts on a cognitive programme but it becomes clear that a domestic violence programme would be better—the responsible officer can switch the programme without taking the order back to court. The amendment in Clause 14 merely furthers the principle of operational discretion for providers by removing the largely redundant requirement for formal approval of a place as suitable for offenders subject to a programme requirement.

In closing, I reassure noble Lords that the Government see a continued place for accredited programmes under our new framework for delivering services for offenders. Accredited programmes are evidence-based and developed from the academic literature on what works. Where interventions have a substantial degree of evidence for their effectiveness, it is important that we build on that success. Those advising the courts through pre-sentence reports will continue to be able to recommend a programme requirement where a particular intervention is available locally, and where probation professionals believe that it is the right way of dealing with the causes of an individual’s offending. Based on that clarification, I urge that Clause 14 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Beecham]

I am very grateful to the Minister for his clarification. It occurs to me to ask whether it would be envisaged that a provider of services in respect of the premises to which the noble referred could require, for example, repair work to be carried out for the benefit of the provider. That potentially would create a conflict of interest. I do not ask for an off-the-cuff response, but I would be grateful if the Minister would look at it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised some interesting points about the role of the responsible officer when an offender applies to change their residence. When considering this amendment, I immediately thought of all the potential problems that might arise. There is also the general point about the level of independence of judgment of the responsible officer when considering these applications. Two questions came to my mind. What would be the position if somebody with a series of convictions for domestic violence wanted to move into a house with a new girlfriend? That might hinder rehabilitation; it would be a judgment that would have to be made by the responsible officer. I do not know what the result might be. I am not sure that the responsible officer would necessarily be told that that was the situation.

Conversely, what would happen if the girlfriend wanted to move into the offender’s current address? If told about it, the responsible officer may have a responsibility to the new girlfriend to ensure that she is informed of the offender’s previous convictions. These are difficult matters which need a lot of expertise to be able to deal with them and there needs to be guidance—maybe non-statutory guidance—for the officers. In general, I am sympathetic to the amendments which the noble Baroness has moved, but I am conscious that there may well be many problems with making those decisions.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee for moving her amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his contribution.

Before responding to the substance of the two amendments, it may be helpful if I briefly set out the purpose of Clause 16. In essence, it would place a new duty on offenders serving community orders or suspended sentence orders to seek permission from their responsible officer or from a court before changing their residence. It replaces the existing requirement for offenders simply to notify their responsible officers after they have moved. It is intended to deal with cases where an offender moving from one probation trust puts at risk the effectiveness of their rehabilitation. For example, a move to a different area may bring to an end an established relationship with the offender’s supervisor. Instead, they may have to start again with a new supervisor from a different probation trust or, in the future, a different rehabilitation provider.

Noble Lords will know that the personal relationship between offenders and their supervisors is important to reducing reoffending. Evidence suggests that offenders with a positive relationship with their offender manager are less likely to offend. This will be particularly important with a move to a through-the-gate model of support, where an offender may have had contact with the same mentor or supervisor before and after release. Another example is a case where a specialist programme that the offender is attending is not available in the area that the offender is proposing to move to. In such cases, a court or responsible officer may consider that ending participation in that programme may set back the offender’s rehabilitation.

Clearly, there are many reasons to support, rather than prevent, an offender changing residence. For example, an offender may be moving to live with family or to take up a new job. We recognise that there will be many cases where a move would not have any negative impact on rehabilitation or on compliance with the order. For example, it may be a move of only a short distance which does not prevent the offender attending required appointments. Even with a long-distance move, programmes may be available in the new area that are equally as appropriate as those in the old area. We recognise this and have built it into the way that the clause is structured. The clause limits the circumstances in which a court or responsible officer can refuse permission to change residence to only two scenarios: where the move is likely to prevent the offender complying with a requirement of the order; or where the move would hinder the offender’s rehabilitation.

Amendment 31 would make explicit that these are the only grounds on which a court or responsible officer can refuse permission to change residence. However, the effect of the way that the clause is drafted is to provide already for these two circumstances, and only these two circumstances, to be grounds for refusal. I am very happy to make that clear to my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I hope that, on that basis, she will see fit to withdraw the amendment.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, who always comes to these matters with great experience and expertise, gave the example of an offender who had been committed for domestic violence. This situation would require a subjective assessment to be made and it would be for the responsible officer to weigh it up in the risk assessment. This is the sort of decision that professionals make on a daily basis. I listened with great care to the noble Lord’s suggestion about looking at the guidance. I am sure that we will look at it, and I take on board the comments that he made in that respect.

Amendment 32 would provide that a court or responsible officer cannot refuse an application to change residence unless the offender’s rehabilitation or compliance with a requirement of the order would be significantly less likely to be achieved. I hope that I can reassure my noble friend on a number of points. First, even if a move is likely to prevent compliance or would hinder rehabilitation, courts and responsible officers will still have to balance this with other factors. For the purposes of this clause, both courts and responsible officers, whether probation staff or from the voluntary or private sectors, are public authorities within the terms of the Human Rights Act 1998. This means that they are required to balance the impact of the proposed move on rehabilitation or compliance with the order against the offender’s interests in making such a move. They will have to consider the availability of rehabilitative support in the area that the offender wishes to move to, and the extent to which an offender could comply with a requirement in the new area. They will also have to consider the offender’s Article 8 rights. For example, an unemployed offender may wish to move to take up a new job or for family reasons—for example, if their partner is taking up a new job or if a parent is unwell and they need to provide them with care or support. In many cases, factors like these would outweigh concerns about compliance with a requirement or continued rehabilitation. It would be open to a responsible officer to take the order back to court to ask for it to be varied or revoked to suit the offender’s new circumstances.

I would also point out that the clause provides the safeguard of allowing offenders to apply to the court for a decision in cases where the responsible officer has refused permission to change residence, so in cases where offenders feel there are compelling reasons to move which outweigh any potential impact on compliance with a requirement or rehabilitation, they would be able to apply directly to the court to reconsider their case. I hope that these points reassure my noble friend, and, indeed, all noble Lords, that this clause provides a means of supporting the continuity of rehabilitation in cases where a change of residence could put it at risk without impinging on offenders’ wider family or work commitments. With those reassurances, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hylton]

My Lords, I want to add only that just one court with a proper support network would be very much better than nothing.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for tabling this amendment. I listened carefully to the very poignant story that he told of Mr A’s experiences and how we can build upon that. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, who is extremely well placed and well qualified to speak with authority on this subject, with his background in the Armed Forces, as a former Chief Inspector of Prisons and as president of the Veterans in Prison Association.

As my noble friend Lord McNally said at Second Reading, we share the concerns that have been expressed by all noble Lords in this debate and by the House as a whole—indeed, by Parliament as a whole—that ex-service personnel are ending up in the criminal justice system and, even worse, at times ending up in prison.

However, we should not make our genuine concern, which we have heard today, about our ex-service personnel appear unduly alarmist about service in our Armed Forces. To keep this in perspective, there is some evidence that points to the fact that having served in the Armed Forces is a preventative factor in offending—that is, those who serve in the Armed Forces are less likely to offend than the general population. However, many of those ex-service personnel who offend—I fully acknowledge this, and I am sure that this sentiment resonates with everyone in your Lordships’ House—have served their country, and we owe it to them to ensure that we are doing all that we can to support them.

I do not want to go into the specific wording of the amendment because I acknowledge, and I am sure that this was the intention of both noble Lords, that it was designed to highlight this issue so that we could discuss it further. The amendment raises some fundamental and important questions about the different approaches that could be taken. For example, should we be looking at a body designed to divert ex-service personnel before they get to the criminal courts? Should we be considering whether there is a case for ensuring that courts have greater knowledge and awareness in dealing with this group of offenders? Or should we be considering an oversight role, looking at the most effective ways to rehabilitate ex-service personnel? These are questions that we will look at in conjunction with the judiciary, my colleagues in the Ministry of Defence and other government departments.

This is not to suggest that there is nothing going on in regard to veterans. It is true that some ex-service personnel will struggle to adjust to civilian life, but the Armed Forces do much more than other employers in retraining and reskilling staff who are leaving their employ. We are doing more to identify the particular needs of those offenders who end up in prison, including issues arising from their previous service. All prisons should now have a “veteran in custody support officer” to help with and co-ordinate the assessment and support of ex-service personnel offenders.

I should like to take a moment here, and I am sure that noble Lords across the Chamber will want to join me, to praise the excellent work that many voluntary sector organisations do both in prisons and in the community with offenders, notably the Royal British Legion and SSAFA, the Soldiers’, Sailors’ and Airmen’s Families Association.

Important work is therefore going on, and we will be looking at how that may be best developed. I should say that, as part of our plans to improve the rehabilitation of offenders, we will expect providers of probation services to provide flexible and tailored services to offenders, including addressing the particular needs of ex-service personnel. During meetings that we have had around the Bill with the Lord Chancellor, the Secretary of State and indeed with all Peers, I know that this issue was raised by other Peers. The noble Lord, Lord Reid, raised specific examples of what he had seen in Scotland. We have seen examples of this through the PbR pilots. For example, as part of the pilot at HMP Doncaster, ex-service personnel are being matched up with mentors who themselves are from service backgrounds to support their rehabilitation on release from custody.

I cannot say that we will bring back amendments in this Bill to create a new veterans’ court, and in fact legislation for a pilot may not be required. However, to pick up the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Slim, I fully acknowledge that we need to give this issue particular thought and much more careful consideration, and the department is already looking at it. I invite all noble Lords across the Chamber to work with us in this respect; I would welcome the opportunity. That will enhance and develop our discussions further, and I think that we will benefit a great deal from the expertise in your Lordships’ House.

While we will continue to ensure good practice is continued and developed among providers, we will also consider what further options may be required for the longer term. I noted in particular the comment by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, when he talked about the establishment of such a court and what surrounds that court—the need for support that goes much wider. It is important that the Government, and indeed the House in its contributions in looking at this matter, take a very holistic approach.

With those reassurances of our continued and passionate shared commitment, as expressed around the House today, to develop support for ex-service personnel, I hope that the noble Lords are able to withdraw their amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I express a sense of slight disappointment with the Minister’s reply. I am grateful to the noble Lords who have supported the amendment. I rather expected the Government to say that they would at least go forward with a pilot, whether or not legislation was required for that. I would have hoped that they would acknowledge that there would be space in the Bill to allow for the establishment of these courts if legislation were required for that, although maybe it is not—it will be interesting to find out on Report if it would require legislation to establish this system—and for the Government to allow for such an eventuality after a pilot. If the Government are not prepared to give an assurance that a pilot will be mounted, it will be necessary to bring this amendment or something like it back before the House and, perhaps, to test its opinion. Sympathy is welcome but, as we have heard already this afternoon, sometimes it only goes so far.

Offender Rehabilitation Bill [HL]

Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts

Wednesday 5th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I shall resist the temptation to reach for my copy of Roget’s Thesaurus but simply confine myself to commending my noble friend Lord Bradley on the amendment and to paying tribute to his long record of very effective concern for this issue. His point about the desirability of having some knowledge of the proposed guidance on good behaviour is a matter on which the Minister should reflect. I hope, even if a final version is not available, that at least an outline of what is intended by that definition can be provided before Report. I hope that he will accept the amendment, which seems to make a great deal of sense.

I have just one further observation. It seems important that the communication and explanation recommended in the amendment should be given at the prison gate, as it were, before the prisoner leaves, not at some point afterwards. That would obviously make sense and I hope that the Minister will take that on board as well as the question of defining what would have been meant by “good behaviour” for the purposes of communication with a group who may struggle with that concept without adequate explanation being proffered.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, as always, I have listened with great interest. I am for ever learning when I hear such wisdom from across the House, although, when listening to the debate on rehabilitation and good behaviour, I was reminded of my childhood. I perhaps disagree with one noble and learned Lord who suggested that we are all innocent. We were all guilty in front of mother, and “rehabilitation” was not a word that she used when putting us right.

Nevertheless, I join the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, in commending and acknowledging the terrific work of the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, in this area. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for raising this issue, and acknowledge the incredible work of the work of the Prison Reform Trust. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, said that perhaps his worth in the Prison Reform Trust was not quite recognised because he was merely the chairman. However, his worth is well recognised in your Lordships’ House, as it is in this debate.

All noble Lords who contributed referred to the importance of communication. I firmly believe that that is important in ensuring that the people we are seeking to assist understand what is being resolved for them in their lives and what is ultimately the goal—that they become productive citizens for the benefit of them, their families and society as a whole. The noble Lord, Lord Bradley, asked whether I would acknowledge the importance of the requirements of those who have learning difficulties or problems in understanding. I do so from the outset—absolutely.

--- Later in debate ---

As we have heard, the problems faced by women in prison are very different. I think it is generally acknowledged, and as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, these amendments put forward a common-sense approach. I very much hope that my noble friend Lord Judd is right when he says that the Government’s real intention is to address rehabilitation, which is a fundamental problem. This Bill introduces provisions that were not in place before. We might differ about the funding and all the rest, but the fundamental intention of this Bill is a good thing.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, first, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. Again, many valid contributions have been made. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Judd, right from the beginning that of course it is the Government’s intention, as has just been acknowledged, to ensure that people in unfortunate circumstances, which they sometimes do not have control of, are actually rehabilitated and become productive citizens, as I said in our debate on the previous group of amendments, for themselves, their families and for society as whole.

I also was a bit concerned—and I must confess something here—when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, not once but twice and perhaps even thrice referred to Ministers not remaining in their place. I looked with great concern at my noble friend Lord McNally. I thought that he was indeed my friend, but perhaps that is a discussion that we shall have privately. Nevertheless, I take on board the more serious point which the noble and learned Lord made in that respect. However, it is important, as discussions thus far have demonstrated, that the principle behind this Bill and the importance that underlies it are not just respected but that every Member of your Lordships’ House, no matter where they sit in the Chamber, is committed to ensuring that this Bill, as my noble friend Lord McNally has said on a number of occasions, reflects the great expertise in your Lordships’ Chamber when it leaves this House.

This group of amendments all relate to the conditions that can be imposed as part of top-up supervision and to what the Secretary of State should have regard to when specifying the conditions that can be included or what providers of services should have regard to when directing offender activities. In short, they are all about tailoring top-up supervision to the particular needs of offenders.

Amendment 7 relates to women offenders, about whom many sentiments and points have been raised, many of which, if not all, I agree with. The amendment, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, would, as he explained very eloquently, place a duty on the Secretary of State when imposing supervision requirements to have regard to the particular needs of women. The Government fully share the noble and learned Lord’s intention and view it as essential that the justice system is properly responsive to the needs of female offenders. We know that we will rehabilitate these women who have fallen into this area and enable them to lead positive and productive lives only if we truly take account of their experiences and, more importantly, their needs.

Noble Lords will be aware that the probation service already takes a women-focused approach to female offenders. All probation trusts are required by the National Offender Management Service commissioning intentions document to make appropriate provision for women in the community to address factors associated with their reoffending, and to use third sector and private sector services where appropriate. Similarly, we expect providers to recognise and respond to the particular needs of female offenders. Therefore, in employing the new supervision requirements introduced by the Bill to female offenders, it will likewise be essential to take account of the particular needs of the case in question, including, importantly, any childcare responsibilities.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee raised the fact that stable family relationships are important in supporting rehabilitation. A failure to take childcare responsibilities into account could put at risk the very purpose of the supervision period itself. However, the Government’s view is that we do not need a statutory provision to ensure that the needs of female offenders are taken into account. The key difference is that in future all offenders, both women and men, who are serving a custodial sentence of less than 12 months will have an assessment of risks and needs. This assessment will be undertaken by prison or probation staff and will cover the key areas of need. These include accommodation, mental health needs, skills and employment, children, families and, something which many women often sadly endure, issues of domestic violence.

The Government recognise that a significant number of female prisoners are vulnerable and have complex needs. The process allows for additional time to complete the assessment in such cases, so as to ensure that all their needs are not just identified but fully understood. The information gathered by this assessment will be used to draw up a bespoke plan for the sentence in custody and in the community that takes account of and will address the particular needs of that individual. This information will also be shared with service providers in the community, so that they, too, fully understand the individual offender’s needs and can then, importantly, tailor their services to help address these needs. We are therefore confident that the needs of female offenders will be identified and taken into account when setting the new supervision requirements. Therefore, we do not believe that the noble and learned Lord’s amendment is necessary.

Amendment 9 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on mental health assessments, relates to Schedule 1, which sets out the conditions that can be applied to the top-up supervision and adds a mental health assessment requirement. I welcome the noble Lord’s focus on mental health. Addressing the mental health needs of offenders is a priority for the Government. We know that we need to do more to make sure that offenders with mental health issues do not fall through the net. We all share that sentiment; indeed, that was discussed during consideration of the previous group of amendments. However, this should be done at the earliest possible opportunity—indeed, the noble Lord himself identified that—and not at the end of the process with top-up supervision. When my noble friend and I discussed this matter with officials, we impressed upon them the need to ensure that wherever in the process this issue is raised, we seek to address it according to the individual needs of that person. Providing appropriate intervention and treatment at the right time and in the right place is vital to improving outcomes for people with mental illness.

For some offenders with severe issues, in-patient treatment under the Mental Health Act will be appropriate. For others with less serious problems, there are already many opportunities for intervention and treatment. These include mental health treatment as a requirement of the community sentence and the comprehensive screening of every offender as they arrive in prison. I will share my own experience with noble Lords, since I have been involved in this area. When I visited Peterborough prison, I saw that as prisoners entered through the prison gate, their health, training, development, language, family and cultural issues were identified. That is the kind of model that we need to be working to. As soon a prisoner enters through the prison gate, we should be looking to help to reform—a word that has been used—and rehabilitate them from that point on so that by the time they come to the end of their sentence and go out into society, and I have no qualms about repeating what I said earlier, they become productive citizens for the benefit of themselves and of society as a whole.

I understand, of course, what the noble Lord has said about mental health also being a key element of tackling reoffending. It is of course crucial that the mental health status of the offender is ascertained before any trial or sentence, which is why pre-sentence reports will continue to give assistance to the court.

We also need to ensure that more people are assessed effectively and early enough to make sure that all those with mental health issues get referred to treatment. That is why the Government are developing liaison and diversion services to be introduced into every police station and criminal court. Liaison and diversion services will enable all those who come into contact with the criminal justice system to be assessed at the outset for a range of health issues, including mental health. Where people are identified as having health needs, a referral to a treatment or appropriate services is made. That means, of course, that health needs can be taken into account at all stages of the process, including charging and sentencing decisions. Information will be shared that will support the continuity of treatment for as long as it is needed by the individual. This should mean that more people are identified and that those with responsibility for the management and care of the offender as they move through the system and come out of prison will be aware of any treatment needs.

What is needed post-release is to ensure the continuity of treatment, rather than to reassess offenders. I am sure all noble Lords agree with that objective. Our proposals include a through-the-gate service where providers will engage with offenders before release and then help them to resettle into their communities. This service will support better continuity of treatment and access. Providers will be able to support the offender to access the services they need as they return to their communities.

I also expect any mental health treatment to be addressed as a priority. Engaging with the offender before release means that the providers can seek to arrange provision immediately upon release on licence for the offender to be supported into treatment in the community. I therefore welcome this amendment, but I believe that assessments at an earlier stage, as the noble Lord has acknowledged, are likely to achieve the desired objectives.

Moving on to Amendments 10, 11 and 12 in this group, in the names of my noble friends Lady Hamwee, Lord Marks and Lord Dholakia, Amendment 10 would add a new requirement to Schedule 1, which places a duty on the supervisor giving instructions to offenders on activities as part of top-up supervision to have regard to the compatibility of the activities with the offender’s family circumstances or, indeed, importantly, childcare responsibilities. Amendment 11 would add a new provision that every requirement imposed as part of top-up supervision must be reasonable and proportionate to the purpose of top-up supervision. Amendment 12 would add to the Secretary of State’s order-making power an ability to make provision about the requirements of top-up supervision and how they may be varied by supervisors.

I of course understand why it is important that activities do not interfere with family circumstances or childcare responsibilities, and why the requirements and activities under top-up supervision should be proportionate. I say to my noble friends that the Bill already includes a number of provisions that are particularly designed to focus the top-up supervision on rehabilitation. Clause 2 explicitly states that the purpose of the top-up supervision is for the rehabilitation of the offender, and the supervisor of the offender must have regard to that purpose when supervising the offender. Schedule 1 also provides a power for the Secretary of State to make a provision about the requirements of top-up supervision and the circumstances in which they are imposed.

For many years, prison governors acting on behalf of the Secretary of State have set licence conditions for those serving custodial sentences of over 12 months. The Secretary of State and his representatives will continue to set licence and, now, top-up supervision conditions. The experienced staff who set these conditions are aware of the need to make them proportionate and relevant to the individual offender. They are aware of the need to make these requirements practical and, indeed, achievable. They will be able to amend or vary the conditions if circumstances change. Providers supervising offenders will have to refer any breach action that is to be taken to court to the public sector probation service, which will also act as a second pair of eyes in regard to the appropriateness of conditions and the circumstances of any failure to comply. In short, there are already safeguards designed to ensure that the top-up supervision is focused on rehabilitation and that the conditions are sensitive to the particular circumstances of the offender.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee raised the issue of Section 196 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Currently, we have no plans to amend that section, but I will look at the specific concern that she raised and if need be I will write to her in that regard. Based on the assurances that I have given, I hope that the noble and learned Lord will be minded to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, the amendment relates to new Schedule 19A, which deals with supervision default orders and incorporates new provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The amendment addresses the issue of the unpaid work requirement embodied in new sub-paragraph (2)(a).

It is a straightforward amendment that might not be necessary. To be frank, I do not know the Government’s current thinking or, for that matter, the present state of the law. However, if unpaid work is to be required it should not be to the profit of a private sector organisation that is in the business of, perfectly legitimately, generating profits. If unpaid work is to be done, it should be for a public body or a social purpose. Obviously it is important that people have the opportunity to develop skills. It is also good that the discipline of work should apply. That is very much part of the rehabilitation process, which is not always easy to achieve. Unpaid work might be very helpful in that respect. However, I repeat that it would be wrong if that work were to the financial advantage of a profit-making organisation. One could well envisage placements with voluntary organisations, local authorities or whatever, which would be perfectly reasonable and satisfactory.

I hope the Minister can assure us about that. Otherwise, we might have to return to this issue on Report because it is an important point. We hear too much of what can only be described as bogus apprenticeships, shelf-stacking and the rest of it under the Work Programme. One does not want to see that kind of work, particularly if it is unpaid, being imported into this agenda. It is desirable that the range of activities that might be encompassed within such a programme benefits the offender and perhaps society. It would be wrong if financial benefit was thereby given to a private business. I beg to move.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord and I can from the outset assure him, as is clear in all these matters, that the objective is not for any operator to make profit from such work. My understanding of the purpose of the amendment is that it would prevent any offender who is carrying out unpaid work as a sanction for breach of a supervision requirement from doing that unpaid work for any private sector organisation. I would make a number of points in response to the noble Lord.

First, as noble Lords will know, we intend to open up the delivery of unpaid work, along with other services for offenders in the community, to a wide variety of organisations. This will include the private sector. However, the model for private sector organisations’ delivery of unpaid work would, I should make absolutely clear, not involve the offender working directly for them. The private provider would be responsible for organising the community work and supervising the offender’s progress. Unpaid work is intended to be of benefit to local communities. The private provider would make arrangements with a local authority, community group or charity for the actual work to be carried out. The private provider may also subcontract another organisation to deliver the unpaid work. This may be particularly important for women offenders or offenders with particular needs, such as learning disability. In these cases a smaller organisation within the community with the relevant expertise is much better placed to arrange the unpaid work.

However, the amendment might prevent private providers even from making arrangements with other bodies to deliver unpaid work. Consider the case of a private provider with responsibility for supervising offenders carrying out unpaid work and that wants to make arrangements for placements with a local charity or community group. The amendment could prevent the private provider from doing so, although I am sure that this was not the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, in tabling the amendment.

Unpaid work can fulfil a number of purposes. As part of a community order or suspended sentence it provides a credible punishment, but it can also help offenders to learn new skills or disciplines of work. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, raised this important issue. Too often offenders are looked at in a particular way, but some lack the basic ability to turn up at a given time to serve a particular number of hours. We need to help develop these basic skills and mindsets.

Unpaid work is also reparative, allowing offenders to pay back the harm done by their crimes to the wider community. This is equally true of unpaid work carried out under supervision default orders. It is a sanction for the breach, but this is not to say that it cannot also support the offender’s rehabilitation, or allow them to put something back into the community they have harmed.

My point here is that unpaid work needs to be meaningful, whether it is carried out as part of a community order or as a sanction for the breach of supervision requirements. Even if it is imposed as a sanction for a breach, the work needs to be of sufficient quality. This remains true whether the provider is a private sector organisation, a charity or the public sector. For this reason I do not believe this amendment’s singling out of private sector organisations to be the right approach. The key issue is ensuring that whoever delivers unpaid work does so to the appropriate standard. We will ensure that our new arrangements deliver this. For these reasons I hope the noble Lord will see fit to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I cannot say that I am terribly happy with the noble Lord’s response. It seems to me that there is almost a moral issue here about what is in effect the exploitation of unpaid labour. There is already some concern about the degree to which this now forms part of the process of imprisonment. Bringing in unpaid work has a potential impact on competitor organisations that do not have the advantage of cheap labour, or as in this case unpaid labour. If private sector employers are to be engaged in the process of assisting rehabilitation by providing work—and there is no reason why they should not be—it is incumbent on them to pay for that labour. There is no reason why they should not pay at least the minimum wage. It seems wrong that they should benefit from this process.

I regret the Minister’s response. I invite him to think again about this, as it is not satisfactory. Otherwise we might have to return to it on Report, because it strikes me as a wholly inappropriate response. There are many opportunities outside unpaid work in the private sector that would encourage the rehabilitation that we all want to see. The Government should rethink their position on this issue.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, perhaps I may clarify this. The noble Lord’s point about paying someone who is caught up in one of these arrangements or rehabilitation schemes is a slightly separate one. I emphasise that the amendment as tabled would prevent the private sector from providing any kind of service as part of the rehabilitation process. I have made the point, which I wish to underline, that the private sector organisation is there not to make any profit. As I have said, the person actually performing this particular arrangement within the community would be doing so as part of their rehabilitation. The issue about whether that person should be paid or unpaid is a slightly separate matter.

As the noble Lord has said, we will come back to this. For the benefit of the Committee I would like to clarify that many offenders are currently subject to unpaid work. Currently, around 60,000 offenders have successfully completed community payback sentences, for example. That is 7 million hours of work on projects that directly benefit local communities. To be clear, the intention is that any unpaid work is of benefit to the community and to the individual as part of their rehabilitation process. The underlying objective is not for any provider, whether private or otherwise, to make a profit from that arrangement.

[Lord Beecham]

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s most recent remarks, although the points that he made did not really come across when he previously addressed the matter. There is perhaps not the great difference between us that I had perceived. However, it would be better, if the noble Lord agrees, to go back and look at how the Bill might be worded to deal with this situation, which I now apprehend does not really divide us.

I am well aware of community payback schemes, and I see them in my own ward. They are very valuable and seem to me to be the right approach, although not necessarily in exactly the same form. I sense that really we agree about the notion of people carrying out work for a profit-making organisation on a profit-making project, in which case perhaps the noble Lord would look again at the amendment and see whether we can come up with something on which we can agree. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Offender Rehabilitation Bill [HL]

Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts

Wednesday 5th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

This is a fairly simple amendment. It requires the Government to seek approval for changes to the list of class B drugs for the purposes of the Bill as set out under the heading,

“Drugs and offenders released during custodial sentence”.

If it is thought sufficiently significant for class B drugs to be involved and for the list to be changed, then, following the effective precedent of the Bill in dealing with drugs issues, it seems to me that the Government should proceed by way of an order to be debated here. It is presumably not likely to be a frequent occurrence but one would hope that some element of parliamentary oversight would be involved. It may be that the Government intend that anyway but it is not clear from the Bill. Perhaps the Minister could clarify the position. I beg to move.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I am thankful to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for summarising his thinking behind this amendment. Clause 10 amends Section 64 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, which allows for the Secretary of State to impose a drug testing requirement on offenders aged 18 or over released from prison on licence. The Bill deals with efforts to improve the rehabilitation of offenders and to cut reoffending. Many noble Lords will agree that tackling offending behaviour will often mean tackling an offender’s problem with drugs. Drug use is common among offenders serving custodial sentences. One study reported 64% of people surveyed as having used class A drugs and 74% as having used class B or class C drugs.

Research has also shown that drug use among prisoners is strongly associated with reconviction on release, with the rate of reconviction more than doubling for prisoners who reported using drugs in the four weeks before custody, compared with prisoners who had never used drugs. And it is not just class A drugs that are associated with higher reconviction rates. Offenders who use class B or class C drugs in the four weeks before imprisonment had a reconviction rate of 48%, compared to 30% for those who had never used drugs. What drives this association will vary from offender to offender. For some offenders who are dependent on, say, cannabis or amphetamines, their crime may be linked to the need to fund their drug habit. For others, a propensity to misuse such drugs may expose them to other offenders, risky environments or situations that encourage further reoffending. That can make the process of rehabilitation that much harder. If a connection, direct or indirect, with class B drugs, such as cannabis or amphetamines, is a factor in a significant number of offenders ending up in custody or reoffending, we should do what we can to support offenders to break that connection. Testing for class B drugs is designed to complement those activities.

Turning to the substance of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, Section 70 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 currently provides a power for the Secretary of State to specify via statutory instrument the class A drugs for which an offender released on licence can be tested. This power is subject to the negative resolution procedure. In extending this order-making power to cover class B drugs, we have proposed to keep the negative resolution procedure. It is important that if changes need to be made to the list—for example, if drugs are reclassified or renamed or new drugs appear—that can be done quickly. When initially specifying what class B drugs are within scope, we will, of course, want to look in detail at the evidence for their usage by offenders, their links to reoffending and the availability of testing equipment. I should also point out to noble Lords that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee did not raise any issues with this extended power remaining subject to the negative resolution procedure. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply. I am satisfied with it as it clarifies the situation. I rather thought that that would be the case, and I am grateful for his confirmation that that is correct. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

I am glad the Minister is prepared to do that. The letter says that the vast majority of prisoners transferred to NOMS North East Region are from adjacent areas. An adjacent area could be the north-west of England. I know that there are significant numbers of prisoners from the north-west of England in prisons in Northumberland. The north-west region runs from Cumbria to Cheshire. To say that is an adjacent region does not take us very far, especially as I suspect most of the offenders will come perhaps from the Merseyside and Manchester conurbations. That would be a reasonable inference. This is a significant number of people to be resettled somewhere nearer home and that is just from one region. How much have the Government thought through the implications of dealing with this? Have the Government given consideration not only to the numbers but the length of time during which the resettlement will take place? I raise this point because it has been raised by organisations concerned with women prisoners especially. Has it been looked at from their perspective?

Incidentally, the letter says, in a point which rather echoes the point about women prisoners and which may account for the figures for young offenders, that there are fewer establishments holding young offenders and they are on average likely to be further from their home area. How realistic is this resettlement process likely to be? It looks to me as though the north-east region is accommodating considerably more than its “fair share” of prisoners. It would be interesting to know how many north-east prisoners are housed elsewhere but I suspect that we have a surplus of accommodation in the north-east and that is not going to assist in the resettlement process. How developed are the Government’s plans? The amendment therefore seeks details and for a scheme to be set out in regulations and laid before both Houses for debate. That would be ideal but at any rate some oversight of the detail and the implications of this scheme are needed, which as I say is welcome in principle but it is difficult to see quite how it is going to work. It may be that the Government are going to take some time over this and that may be necessary, but any indications at this stage would be gratefully received. I beg to move.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I first thank the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for tabling his amendment and for then detailing specific issues in relation to women, young adults and a region with which he is far more familiar than is any other noble Lord currently in the Chamber. Nevertheless, he raises some important issues specifically about women prisoners. Indeed, we heard earlier during the debate about the importance of this issue.

From a general perspective, the main purpose behind this proposal is to co-ordinate better the delivery of rehabilitation through an offender’s time both in prison and then in the community. Most offenders will spend the final part of their sentence in one of their home area’s designated resettlement prisons, which may involve prisoner movement, but it is also unlikely to result in any significant increase to the number of transfers carried out.

On the issue of women prisoners and young adult offenders, it is very important that we make the best use of the existing provision for women offenders in the prison estate, both taking account of its size and the geographical spread. We will be consulting with both providers and stakeholders to design the most suitable resettlement arrangements for women offenders, ensuring that, wherever possible, women offenders are held as close to home as possible and with strong links with providers of rehabilitative services. In an earlier debate this evening, we discussed the importance that the Government lay on family issues, particularly in relation to women offenders.

Young adults have some of the highest reoffending rates, and it is crucial that these reforms are delivered to this group of offenders. Again, we are planning to consult providers to ensure that they design the most suitable model for young adult offenders, taking account of existing provision in the prison estate for this group.

The amendment itself would restrict the ability of the Secretary of State to set up a system for sending prisoners to resettlement prisons prior to their release by requiring this to be done in regulations. Such a restriction would be unprecedented intervention by Parliament in the operational management of prisons. The role is conferred by the Prison Act 1952 on the Secretary of State, although, in practice, the Prison Service is run by the National Offender Management Service, as noble Lords are aware. The power is a broad one for a very good reason: NOMS needs operational flexibility to respond swiftly to fluctuations in prison numbers and to move prisoners around the prison estate for a number of reasons, including access to appropriate interventions as a result of security information or, indeed, for the prisoner’s own protection. Policies for the allocation of prisoners are set out in the Prison Service instructions, which are published; accordingly, such policies are both accessible and transparent. I therefore hope, with the explanation I have given, that the noble Lord will find it appropriate to withdraw his amendment and agree that operational arrangements are matters more appropriately left to the Secretary of State.

[Lord Beecham]

I am not sure that I would leave very much to the present Secretary of State, but that is by the way. The question is surely that this is a welcome, novel scheme which ought to be at least discussed. I cannot see why there should be any inhibition on the part of the Government to laying out their proposals for discussion. It may be that seeking to deal with the matter by regulation may be regarded as a step too far but, at the very least, it should be subject to some parliamentary debate. There are people in your Lordships’ House who can contribute to that kind of debate very effectively, I should have thought. I do not necessarily include myself in that group, but there are people like the noble Lords, Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Bradley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Corston, with a record of involvement. These are the very people who should be contributing to a solution to a problem which the Government rightly identify and want to do something about; there is no difference between us on that. Why be so defensive about it? Why not be open about it, have the discussion and let us try to improve the situation with the contribution that Members, particularly of this House, are in a position to afford?

I do not see why the Government should stonewall on this issue. However, it is two minutes to 10 pm. The Chief Whip is with us; I tremble before her, as ever, and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Defamation Bill

Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts

Tuesday 5th February 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Puttnam]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 1, 24 and 25 and associate myself with those tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady O’Neill and Lady Hollins.

Four months have passed since the Second Reading of this Bill—

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I ask those who are leaving the Chamber to, as a courtesy to the noble Lord, do so quietly.

[Lord Puttnam]

My Lords, four months have passed since Second Reading; two days earlier, on 7 October, the Prime Minister had committed to implement the Leveson recommendations so long as they were not, as he put it, “bonkers”. Since returning from the Christmas Recess, I do not believe myself to be the only Member of your Lordships’ House to have felt a little like the principal characters in Samuel Beckett’s tragicomedy Waiting for Godot. As your Lordships will remember, they came even to contemplate suicide—anything, as they put it,

“to hold the terrible silence at bay”.

These amendments are designed to break that terrible silence.

Like my fellow signatories I was moved to act following the remarkable display of unity mixed with frustration that typified the delayed debate on the Leveson inquiry that was held in your Lordships’ House on Friday, 11 January. This mood was, I felt, brilliantly summed up by my noble friend Lord Alli when he concluded:

“I … say to my fellow Back-Benchers on all sides of the House that leadership … does not always come from … the Front Benches. We, too, have our role to play … this would … be a good time to intervene on timing. If we believe that the recommendations of Lord Justice Leveson require action, we on the Back Benches in this place have a … constitutional role to play in making that happen”.

He went on to say:

“There is an onus on us to ensure change. In doing so, we can help to restore trust in the press, in the police and in … Parliament”.—[Official Report, 11/1/13; col. 381.]

He is right, of course. I believe that we, as active Members of this House, have an obligation to act, and to be seen to act, on behalf of victims past, present and future.

I am no lawyer, but my concern to create movement has been enormously buttressed by the support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, all of whose exemplary careers and knowledge more than compensate for my legal and constitutional inadequacies.

The Bill before us contains a fatal flaw: it does not deal with the manner in which ordinary citizens will be able to utilise the protection that it offers. The Bill has been drawn up with the help of newspapers, which understandably see the world through their own looking glass. Anyone who reads the Bill as it stands will not find so much as a hint of the fact that we live in a country that has spent much of the past two years debating the fall-out directly attributable to the unaccountable power of newspapers over our public life and over the lives of ordinary citizens. It is almost as if Leveson never happened.

In his reply, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, might wish to recall the absurd situation that he and I were placed in 10 years ago when we were asked to scrutinise the then Communications Bill but not to debate or discuss the implications of the emerging digital world. That was pushed safely back into the “too difficult” drawer. We have all looked a little daft ever since. These amendments seek to address those real-world concerns. They put into effect an arbitration system that would allow ordinary people to get redress if they are defamed under the new definitions that we are passing into law within the body of this Bill.

The Bill may deal with some of the perversities of the current libel system, which is largely to be welcomed, and it can be reasonably expected to lead to fewer defamation actions against newspapers. However, for the citizen who has a case in law that suggests they have been wronged by the press, the Bill has absolutely nothing to say about access to justice or the costs of seeking that justice in the courts, all of which is plainly unaffordable except for the very wealthy. After everything that we heard at the Leveson inquiry, the problems of access to justice and to remedies are far too important to be left unresolved. It is fundamental to the issue of balancing the rights of the citizen against the rights of the press; it cannot continue to be overlooked or shoved off to form part of some future piece of legislation.

Fortunately for us, Lord Justice Leveson has already proposed a ready-made and carefully considered solution. The advantage of our simple amendments is that they closely follow those recommendations, which laid out exactly the way in which this system of low-cost arbitration should be introduced to deal with legal disputes involving newspapers. They also have the merit of showing that the arbitration service proposed by Lord Justice Leveson can be put into effect in a remarkably simple and straightforward manner.

After his exhaustive and searching inquiry into the newspapers and their relationship with politicians, Lord Justice Leveson’s written recommendations said that the board, by which he means the new independent self-regulation body to be set up by the newspapers,

“should provide an arbitral process in relation to civil legal claims against subscribers, drawing on independent legal experts of high reputation and ability on a cost-only basis to the subscribing member. The process should be fair, quick and inexpensive, inquisitorial and free for complainants to use (save for a power to make an adverse order for the costs of the arbitrator if proceedings are frivolous or vexatious). The arbitrator must have the power to hold hearings where necessary but, equally, to dispense with them where it is not necessary. The process must have a system to allow frivolous or vexatious claims to be struck out at an early stage”.

That is the system that these amendments seek to put into effect. It also happens to be the system for which the newspapers have shown broad support, and it closely resembles the system welcomed by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, who is holding the national newspapers’ negotiations with the Government. In his evidence to the Leveson inquiry, the noble Lord said:

“It could prove extremely valuable to the UK system of self-regulation if such a provision could be inserted as an amendment to the current government Bill”.

He went on to say:

“I do not believe this in any way crosses a ‘red line’ for those of us who have serious qualms about a statutory regulator”.

The newspapers also know only too well that an arbitration service could save them collectively hundreds of millions of pounds a year in legal costs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, of course, there is in the Bill a significant hurdle for any claimant, whether a non-natural person or a natural person: they have to show serious harm, so that is a hurdle of itself.

I supported the general tenor of this amendment in Committee but expressed a reservation at that time. Indeed, the Joint Committee on Human Rights expressed a similar reservation, which is: what about the small companies? Of course, I accept that the individual can sue if he or she is sufficiently identified, but if it is a small business—say, the local ice cream vendor; maybe nobody knows them by name but they have a valuable local business reputation—it will have to overcome considerable hurdles before suing. It will have to show substantial financial loss; it may not be very substantial objectively but it may be very substantial to that business. The hurdle of serious harm added to this procedure seems to prevent it recovering in circumstances where it should be able to recover.

Malicious falsehood may be difficult to prove, in the sense that malice is always difficult to establish. None the less, if I say that Hayter & Co. is going out of business, when it plainly is not, it is not difficult to infer malice from that pronouncement. It would be unfortunate if companies had to resort to the alternative tort in circumstances where they should, in my view, be able to rely on ordinary defamation.

My final observation relates to proposed new subsection (4). I accept what my noble friend Lord Lester said about the public function. Deciding whether somebody performs a public function is not necessarily very easy, just as deciding whether something is a public authority for the purposes of the Human Rights Act has caused the courts considerable distress.

I have sympathy with the general tenor of this amendment but I cannot go all the way with it.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. As has been pointed out, Amendment 2 concerns two distinct but related issues. Indeed, my noble friend Lord Lester, who I greatly respect with regard to this Bill in particular, described it as two limbs. That is a nice way of reflecting on the current Government, in having two arms to the same body, and we are seeking to move forward on these matters.

The issues that have been raised again this afternoon were extensively debated during the previous stages of this Bill. These are whether there should be restrictions on the right of bodies corporate and other non-natural persons to bring an action in defamation, and whether any non-natural person which is performing a public function should be prevented from bringing a claim in relation to a statement concerning that function.

In relation to the first issue, the Government have made it clear in previous debates that there is a difficult balance to be struck, as the most reverend Primate articulated. Considerable damage can be done to the reputation of a business by unjustified and defamatory allegations, and this has an impact on all those involved with the business, including its shareholders and employees. On the other hand, we fully recognise the need to ensure that powerful businesses are not able to—for want of a better term—bully individuals or organisations with limited means into remaining silent on issues of public importance by the threat of libel proceedings.

However, if that is the problem we are trying to solve, imposing specific restrictions on the ability of businesses to sue does not seem justified. Wealthy individuals can equally send threatening letters to those with limited means. This is why we think the twin-track approach we are proposing is preferable. It embraces both elements within the Bill and procedural changes alongside it.

First, all claimants—corporate or otherwise—will have to satisfy the new test of serious harm, as my noble friend just mentioned. As we have made clear, it is our intention that the serious harm test will raise the hurdle for bringing a claim and will ensure that trivial claims do not proceed. In order to satisfy the serious harm test, businesses are likely in practice to have to show some form of actual or likely financial loss. The courts have talked in terms of,

“a tendency to directly affect its credit or property or cause it pecuniary damage”.

Quite what that will require will depend on the type of business concerned and the facts of the particular case, and we do not think that it is helpful to attempt to define explicit restrictions in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, as a website operator, I urge my noble friend the Minister to take no rubbish from website operators. I have great sympathy with the purpose of this amendment. There are a lot of people out there who are essentially defenceless when things appear about them on the web. We need to make sure that the regulations enable them to get easy redress and relief and that we do not allow long timescales to suit operators when short timescales would suit the people who have been defamed. At the same time, as my noble friend said, we have to balance that with our freedom to be rude about people who we need to be rude about and to say nasty things about Ruritania or anywhere else, and to keep the powerful under control. It is a difficult balancing act. I think that the right way to deal with this is in the regulations under Clause 5(5), which can go into some detail and some precision about this. I would hate to be subject to this amendment. As a website operator I really would not know where I was, or what I was or was not allowed to do, particularly with no supporting regulations. Therefore, I cannot support the amendment but I very much support the spirit behind it.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I particularly thank my noble friend Lord Lester for his intervention.

Clause 5 provides a defence to website operators if, upon receipt of a notice of complaint, they follow a process designed to ensure that the issue is resolved with the poster of the material. My noble friends Lord Faulks and Lord Phillips raised concerns in Committee about Clause 5, and my noble friend Lord McNally and I met them to discuss those concerns. I am pleased to say that, as has been acknowledged, as a result of those discussions the Government have been able to bring forward Amendment 17 on the issue of malice, which I shall speak to in the next group of amendments. However, this amendment takes a different approach to that taken by the Government in Clause 5. As has been said, it would replace the Clause 5 defence and the accompanying process with provisions which substantially replicate the defence for secondary publishers currently found under Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 but with one important addition. New subsection (1)(d) would require the operator, on receipt of a complaint, to respond with expedition and to take such action as is reasonable in the circumstances.

This additional requirement would mean that, in order to have a defence, the operator would, on receipt of a complaint, need to make a judgment on what action it was reasonable to take. This would inevitably involve them reaching a view on the merits of the case, which in most instances they would not be in a position to do. The fact that they would lose the defence if a court decided that they had not acted reasonably would create a great deal of uncertainty for website operators, and we believe that in practice it would mean that many operators would simply choose to take the material down. That would result in exactly the same situation that we have now—an approach which has been criticised as unsatisfactory not only by a large majority of the responses to our public consultation but by the Joint Committee on the draft Bill and by the Law Commission in its 2002 scoping study on defamation and the internet.

Subsection (2) in the amendment would require the court, in considering whether or not the defence was made out, to take account of any steps taken by the operator to have and comply with a code of practice in relation to defamation, a complaints procedure or a system for providing identity details of posters to claimants to enable them to bring proceedings against the poster. I totally understand the intention behind the proposed subsection but Clause 5 already sets out a simple process in relation to the handling of complaints and the provision of identity details. In the event that a complainant brings proceedings against a website operator, the court will be able to assess whether the operator has complied with that process. This will ensure that the court takes into account how the operator has responded to the complaint. Perhaps I may also inform noble Lords that we will be publishing specific guidance on how the new process will operate for all those involved.

We have heard a great deal about balance. This new approach is about striking the correct balance and also providing protection to website operators. It is about striking a fair balance between those who have allegedly been subject to defamation and freedom of expression and speech. We believe that the defence in Clause 5 strikes a fair balance between all the interests involved. It will help freedom of expression by giving the poster of allegedly defamatory material an opportunity to stand up for it if they wish to do so, and it will give greater certainty to website operators. At the same time, it will enable claimants to secure take-down of the material on a short fixed timescale in the event that the poster does not wish to defend it. Where the poster does wish to defend it, it will also ensure that the Norwich Pharmacal process is more likely to give the claimant the information they need to pursue proceedings. I hope that on that basis my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am grateful to those who took part in this debate. I heard what the Minister said but I fear that I remain completely unassuaged. I think that we will rue the day that the Bill goes through in this form. All I can say is that I hope very much that when the regulations come to be drafted and debated, they will in some way compensate for what seems to my noble friend Lord Faulks, myself and indeed others to be a serious misbalance. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Defamation Bill

Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts

Tuesday 5th February 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I listened carefully to what my noble friend Lord Allan of Hallam said. He will forgive me if I say that, coupled with what he said in Committee, there seems to be a leitmotif in his objections to amendments that really the industry is too big to control. That has echoes of the banks being too big to fail. The truth is that they are enormous organisations and with that enormity comes enormous power and the ability to inflict enormous damage on occasion.

I like the purport of Amendment 11. It seems right that, while the operator is considering what to do in the longer term, a notice of complaint should be there so that anybody reading the original defamation will see the complaint alongside it. I also understand some of the points made by my noble friend Lord Allan of Hallam. Perhaps in responding the Minister will tell us whether under Clause 5(5) it will be possible through regulations to introduce a regime for posting complaints and so on that would be practical in the variety of circumstances to which my noble friend Lord Allan of Hallam alluded. That would seem to be the obvious way to go: to take the time to work out a provision that works for all the different types of platform, and at the same time plays fair both by the operator and the complainant.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, again I thank all noble Lords who took part in the debate. I will turn first to government Amendment 17 in the name of my noble friend Lord McNally. I shall speak also to Amendment 11 in this group.

Amendment 17 provides for the defence under Clause 5 to be defeated if the claimant shows that the website operator has acted with malice in relation to the posting of the statement concerned. We tabled this amendment in response to the concern raised in Committee by my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury that situations might arise in which a website operator acts maliciously, for example by inciting the poster to make the posting or otherwise colluding with him. While we consider that these situations are unlikely to be common, on reflection we agreed that in circumstances where a website operator acts maliciously it is right that the defence should be defeated. I thank my noble friend for bringing this issue to the fore.

Amendment 11 was also tabled in Committee. It would require a website operator who wished to rely on the Clause 5 defence to publish a notice of complaint alongside the material complained of within seven days of receipt of the complaint. The amendment also provides that if the website operator fails to post a notice within the set period, they will forfeit this defence and will be able to rely solely on the standard defences available to a primary publisher.

The basis for this amendment is a recommendation of the Joint Committee on the Bill that website operators should attach notices to online material when complaints are received. The Government’s position on this proposal was first set out in our response to the Joint Committee’s report. We repeated our position during the passage of the Bill in this House and the other place. The issue is one of practicality. Ministry of Justice officials received representations from internet organisations following publication of the Joint Committee’s report, highlighting the practical and technical difficulties with the proposal relating to the posting of a notice of complaint alongside defamatory material.

I will go through some obvious concerns that were raised, which may underline the practical issues. First, the point was raised that complained-about content might be embedded in a number of different sites, making it unclear who should be responsible for attaching the notice, where it should be placed and how it could be transferred across to other sites on which the material might subsequently appear. Again, as I said in Committee, I fully appreciate that the argument presents itself as one that it is in the interests of internet organisations.

In Committee we heard various arguments on both sides. My noble friend Lord Allan of Hallam highlighted practical issues from his own experience in the field. The noble Earl, Lord Erroll, talked about his daughter’s experience as a graphic designer for websites, and of the complexities of an operator attaching additional content without going back to the original programmer. I also acknowledge fully that my noble friend Lord Lucas expressed the view that it was far from impossible for website operators to attach such notices.

However, I will repeat on the Floor of the House what I said in Committee. The Government’s concerns around the practicality of this proposal have been clear from the publication of our response to the Joint Committee report almost a year ago. In that time nobody has presented to us any persuasive evidence to suggest that those concerns are not warranted.

On the issues raised by my noble friends Lord Allan and Lord Phillips about regulation, perhaps I may come back to them in writing to clarify the position. I have made a note of the suggestions that have been made.

I have listened, as ever, to all of the noble Baroness’s contributions and I am sure that she will say that our position has not changed since Committee stage, which I accept. However, we are where we are on this proposal. I repeat that no one has come to us to present a counterargument. Certainly if they have come forward, their arguments have not been of a persuasive nature. For those reasons, the Government cannot support Amendment 11 and I hope that the noble Baroness will see fit to withdraw it.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken and, obviously, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, for his support and the interesting suggestion about it being in regulations. I congratulate the Government on their consistency. If that is all they have to offer, they may wish to look further.

The amendment relates only to subsection (3). In a situation where it was not possible for the claimant to identify the person who posted the statement, the claimant has given the operator a notice of complaint and the operator failed to respond to that in accordance with regulations, we ask that a notice is posted—it could be just a little red spot—that says “challenged by”.

I am concerned that the Government have met with the internet operators and, with no one else coming forward—we did not know that the meetings were taking place and were not asked to produce extra information—that they have taken the internet operators’ view on this as the one which will guide their hands.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Colville of Culross]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his forbearance in the various attempts I have made to persuade him to adopt this procedure.

I raised the issue of the declaration procedure in Grand Committee. However, this amendment widens out the wording of the amendment that I proposed then. Proposed new paragraph (b) would allow either a website operator or the author of a statement to apply to query the contents of a notice of complaint.

I emphasise that this procedure will be voluntary and should not be available to decide whether or not a statement is true, or any other issue that needs a contested hearing. It is simply a quick process to decide whether the claimant has demonstrated a prima facie case. It would not necessarily lengthen the notice of complaint process as it should be issued at the same time as the notice of complaint is sent to the poster. It would run in tandem with the Clause 5 procedure.

There are concerns that this amendment might allow the website operator almost routinely to choke off the notice of complaint process by turning instantly to the declaration procedure. However, for website operators to use the procedure routinely would be to shoot themselves in the foot. The claimant could get a positive declaration, which would not only reinforce his case but give him an official document to send to other website operators showing that he met the basic requirements, which could be used in dealing with repeat postings of the statement on other websites.

As for concerns about the expense, I have suggested that the declaration procedure goes before the masters or a procedural judge. I am assured that despite the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, in Grand Committee, who was worried that it would be very expensive, that a web-based procedure could be developed for as little as £25.

I ask the Minister to consider once again whether such a procedure could be included in the Bill.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, Amendment 16 would allow the regulations governing the Clause 5 process to provide for a procedure for a complainant, website operator or person who posted the statement complained of to seek a court declaration as to whether the complaint meets the basic requirements of a libel claim.

This amendment seems to envisage the creation of a system whereby, alongside the Clause 5 process, any party can seek a court declaration on a prima facie basis. It is difficult to see what incentive there would be for a complainant to do this. Such a declaration would not be determinative of the merits of the case or affect the availability of the Clause 5 defence, and so it would potentially just be an additional—and costly—step before registering a notice of complaint. Instead, the proposal appears primarily to be aimed at helping website operators to make informed decisions as to the strength of complaints so that they can be more confident in removing material or leaving it online depending on whether or not a declaration is granted.

We have serious practical concerns about this proposal. It has been suggested that the process could operate through consideration by a High Court master, on the papers, at very short notice and on payment of a nominal court fee. That seems unrealistic. We consider that it does not adequately take account of the time the process would take, given the significant additional burden on the courts, the extent of the evidence that could be needed to reach a decision and the consequent costs to the parties involved. There is also the possibility of rulings being appealed, which could add to the time and costs involved. Bearing in mind that the prima facie declaration would not be determinative of the merits of a case, it is difficult to see how that is warranted.

In any event, we do not consider that this additional process is needed. Clause 5 is intended to operate in such a way as to avoid website operators having to make decisions about the merits of defamatory complaints. The representations we received from many website operators during consultation on the draft Bill indicated that they did not have sufficient knowledge to make these judgments and that it was not appropriate for them to be doing so.

In response, we have sought to create a simple, quick, cheap and effective means for the complainant to request the removal of defamatory material and for the poster to engage with this request and stand by his posting if he wishes to do so. We think it is right to remove the website operator from the process as far as possible, so that if they follow the process as will be set out in regulations they will have a defence against a defamation action.

Of course, if for business reasons a website operator wishes to protect their users because doing so helps them financially, there is nothing in Clause 5 that will stop them from doing so. However, we do not think that an amendment to support them in doing so is appropriate.

I say again that the Government believe that the Clause 5 process, which, as I explained, focuses on creating a system under which website operators do not have to reach judgments on the validity of complaints, is a preferable approach which will be fair to all parties involved and will deliver additional certainty and protection for website operators. We believe that it is simpler and will not involve the cost and delay of the system envisaged under Amendment 16. With the explanation that I have given, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for that. I say as an aside that I always considered that the business of this House was to consider a Bill properly, not to get home to bed, and that we should take the time that it takes. Perhaps my noble friend will give me at least a short explanation of Amendment 22 when we get there, but meanwhile I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I start by thanking my noble friend for tabling the amendment, and the noble Lord, Lord Browne, for his timely intervention. Amendment 21 would provide that a court may order a defendant to publish a summary of the court’s judgment only where it has given a final judgment for the claimant in an action for such a defamation. The aim of this amendment appears to be to prevent the court ordering the publication of a summary of its judgment while there remains the possibility of the defendant appealing the ruling. As the noble Lord, Lord Browne, has already said, I can assure my noble friend that this amendment is not necessary. As is the case in any other civil proceedings, a party seeking to appeal a decision may apply under Part 52.7 of the Civil Procedure Rules to have an order or decision of the lower court stayed. In considering whether to grant a stay, the court will be required to consider all the circumstances of the case, including whether it would create an injustice to enforce the terms of the judgment while an appeal is outstanding. We therefore see no basis for treating an order under Clause 12 any differently. I hope that with that reassurance and the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, my noble friend will see fit to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Black of Brentwood]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the opportunity to raise the point, and for the assurances from my noble friend. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

22: Clause 13, page 9, line 5, at end insert “, or
(b) any person who was not the author, editor or publisher of the defamatory statement to stop distributing, selling or exhibiting material containing the statement.(1A) In this section “author”, “editor” and “publisher” have the same meaning as in section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996.”

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, Clause 13 currently enables the court to order the operator of a website to remove defamatory material in circumstances where a claimant successfully brings proceedings against the poster of defamatory material online. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Browne, raised the question specifically of whether this provision could be extended to cover situations where a claimant successfully brings an action against the publisher of offline material, but a secondary publisher refuses to stop distributing, selling or exhibiting material containing the defamatory statement. Clause 10 would prevent an action for defamation being brought against the secondary publisher if it was reasonably practicable to sue the primary publisher. While in the great majority of cases it is likely that secondary publishers would act responsibly and remove material when requested to do so, we consider it desirable to close any possible loophole. Amendment 22 is intended to capture any situation where the material in question is publicly disseminated by a secondary publisher. I beg to move the amendment.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, for the reasons that the Minister spelt out, I strongly welcome this amendment. I thank the Minister for listening so carefully to the argument put before him in Committee and responding in this way.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I am just nitpicking again but we might as well get this right. I think the amendment should start by saying that in line 4 an “(a)” should be inserted after the word “order”. There is no “(a)” to balance the “(b)” introduced by Amendment 22. As I say, that is nitpicking but I am sure I am right. We better get it right for Third Reading.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

Let me assure my noble friend that, whether it is an “(a)” or a “(b)”, I am sure the officials have taken note and will seek to correct that.

Amendment 22 agreed.

Defamation Bill

Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts

Thursday 17th January 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I support the principle of Amendment 44A moved by the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton. The single publication rule in this Bill is an important reform for avoiding multiplicity of actions and is thoroughly welcome, but its impact is markedly diminished by restricting its application to republication by the same publisher. I can see no justification in principle for restricting a claimant suing on a second publication by the original publisher but permitting him to sue on a publication at a later date by a second publisher.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

In terms of audibility for all noble Lords, please could noble Lords make sure that their mobile phones are kept well away from the microphone because they cause issues with listening and difficulties for all concerned.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I rather hope it was not mine, but it might have been. At any rate, it has been moved now.

The proviso of republication in a different manner as the application of the rule in my view provides sufficient protection. That was the unanimous and strongly held view of the Joint Committee, and it is one which I urge the Government to reconsider. I would add one caveat which is that, while I support the principle of this amendment, I can see the need for its qualification to ensure that this situation is addressed. It is possible to envisage a first publication by an insolvent publisher and then a second publication by a publisher who is worth suing. It would be perfectly reasonable for a claimant to take the view that he did not propose to sue the first publisher, but that he did wish to sue a publisher at a later date when the original limitation period might have expired because that publisher was worth suing and was likely to be good for the costs and the damages. It does not seem to me to be beyond the wit of draftsmen to cater for that position and to allow suing a second publisher in those circumstances. Subject to that caveat I support the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, we have heard much about balance. In order to provide balance from the Dispatch Box, at least in terms of the coalition, it is only right and appropriate, after my noble friend has spoken, that I now address the Committee and deal with some of the issues that have been raised. I listened with great interest to the noble Lord, Lord Browne, proposing the amendments and noted with great care what he said. At times I felt that some of my responses had winged their way over to him.

I shall respond to the amendments in front of us and share some thoughts as well. I assure noble Lords that when looking at the tabling of an amendment and its implications, both I and my noble friend Lord McNally look at these wordings in rigorous terms to test their application, ultimately from a layman’s perspective, to try to understand and get behind the true meanings of the different clauses.

Amendment 44A would amend Clause 8(1) to provide that the single publication rule would apply to the publication of the same material by any publisher rather than by the same publisher. As noble Lords have acknowledged, this would significantly extend the scope of the single publication rule, and there are implications for the protection for claimants. I shall talk through some technicalities. First, it would mean that if the claimant were to bring an action in relation to the original publication and that action took more than a year to resolve, he would then have to rely on the court to exercise its discretion under the Limitation Act and permit him to bring a further action against another person who might have republished the material. Although the claimant may have obtained a court injunction against, say, a local newspaper in this regard to prevent further publication of the material, another newspaper under different ownership in a neighbouring town would still be free to republish it.

The scenario painted by my noble friend Lord Phillips is certainly not something that I have looked at, and I will have to refer to our officials in that regard. Sorry, it was my noble friend Lord Marks who painted the scenario on solvency, which was an interesting proposition to dwell on.

I talked about understanding what this would mean from a layman’s perspective. In our discussions, one of the things that have been conveyed to me is that the purpose behind the amendment, or at least its effect, would be, in short, that one newspaper could simply report what another one had reported without paying any due regard to whether it was defamatory. Of course, in these circumstances a court has a discretion and in some cases would be likely to exercise its discretion in favour of the claimant. However, the concern remains for the Government that this process would involve additional delay and expense. We do not believe—I am going to use the words again—that it would strike the right balance.

Amendment 47A relates to the provision in subsection (5) that the single publication rule does not apply where the manner of the subsequent publication is materially different from the manner of the first publication. As the noble Lord, Lord Browne, acknowledged, unless considered in conjunction with Amendment 44A, it is difficult to see how this amendment would apply. When a statement is published for a second time by the same publisher, as Clause 8 provides, the comparative quality and credibility of the source will, in most cases, always be the same, even though the place where the subsequent publication appears may be different.

In any event, the Government do not consider that the amendment is necessary. Subsection (5) identifies certain matters to which the court may have regard in considering whether publication is made in a materially different manner. It is difficult to see what relevance the fact that a subsequent publication has been made in a more credible place has to the question of whether a claimant should bring a claim.

The noble Lord, Lord Browne, raised the question: what does “materially different” mean? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Browne, acknowledged that to define “materially different” may be a little fact-sensitive. We believe that the question of whether the publication is materially different should be decided by the courts rather than that we should attempt to provide a definition in the Bill. In the unlikely event that the court considered issues such as those contained in Amendment 47A to be relevant, there is nothing to prevent the court taking them into account.

Amendment 47B provides that subsequent publication shall not be deemed to be materially different in two specific instances: first, where the statement is part of an academic or scientific journal and goes from being accessible only on payment of a fee to being accessible free of charge; and, secondly, where the subsequent publication is as a result of an archive accessible on the internet. We recognise that concerns have been expressed about the importance of archives and material in scientific and academic journals. We have taken action elsewhere in the Bill to protect material which has been properly peer-reviewed.

However, there may be circumstances in which making previously subscription-based journal articles freely available could significantly increase the extent of the publication and could cause serious harm to the claimant. This is also the case where the material was previously available only in an off-line publication and is placed on an archive accessible on the internet as this may bring it to the attention of a much wider audience. We do not consider that it would be right to say that a claimant should never be able to bring an action in these cases, which would be the effect of the amendment.

In any event, the court would need to be satisfied that the publication has been made in a materially different manner, and how that test is applied is, again, best left to the court to determine in each individual circumstance. In the event that the court decides to allow a claim to proceed, the serious harm test would have to be satisfied for the claim to succeed. We, again, believe that this strikes the right balance.

On Amendments 45, 46 and 47, I cannot add much more to the words of my noble friend Lord Lester in describing the Government’s position. We believe that there is clarity in the Bill as drafted. On that basis, I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mawhinney]

If peer-review is one of the principles that we want to hang on to, combating chilling effect should be another that we want to hang on to. I have no idea, and I am not competent to judge, whether the wording of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, is right and precise, but combating chilling effect ought to be deemed to be so.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I will take all three amendments together as they have been grouped. In doing so, I will refer first to Amendments 50B and 50D. They seek to provide that Clause 10 should prevent an action for damages for defamation being brought against a person who was not the author, editor or publisher of the statement complained of unless the court is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable for an action to be brought against the author, editor or publisher, but should not prevent a court from granting any injunction or order requiring a person to cease publishing a defamatory statement.

As the noble Lord, Lord Browne, indicated, the amendments were originally tabled in Committee in the other place by the honourable Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme. His concern was that circumstances could arise where a claimant who had successfully brought an action against the author of defamatory material on a website was left in the position of being unable to secure removal of the given material. This situation might arise as a result of the fact that an author may not always be in a position to remove material which has been found to be defamatory from a website, and the new defence in Clause 5—together with the more general protection provided to secondary publishers in Clause 10—might prevent the website operator from being required to do so. As the noble Lord acknowledged, it was precisely for this reason that the Government introduced Clause 13 into the Bill on Report in the other place.

In an offline context where a successful action is brought against an author, editor or publisher and a secondary publisher is made aware of the successful action, we believe that in the great majority of cases the secondary publisher would act responsibly and remove the defamatory material from sale.

However, there are issues that still appear pending and this point has been reiterated by my noble friend Lord McNally and made by me as well. We are listening in great detail to the debates and discussions in Committee. As has been illustrated from the Government’s perspective in the other place, appropriate clauses and amendments are being introduced to refine this particular Bill if and when they are needed.

Amendment 50C is identical to the one tabled on Report in the other place. It was said then that it was in part an attempt to codify the defence of innocent dissemination. As the Government explained then, Clause 10 is about jurisdiction. To require the court, as part of an assessment on jurisdiction, to assess the merits of the case before it in the manner proposed would be highly unusual and potentially confusing. Furthermore, it would involve additional evidence and expense, which would be wasted in the event that it was held that it was reasonably practicable for the claimant to pursue the primary publisher. Such arguments are properly pursued once it is established that the court indeed has jurisdiction. Subsection (1)(c) would also put the onus on the claimant to show what was in the knowledge of the secondary publisher, which, as well as being practically very difficult, would be a significant shift in the current law.

The noble Lord, Lord Browne, drew to the Committee’s attention the fact that there is a debate over the terms of Section 1 of the 1996 Act—the noble Lord, Lord Lester, referred to this as well—and how that compares to the common-law defence. A question was raised about the Government’s position. The Government believe that it is preferable to adopt the approach in Clause 10 of directing claimants towards those who are actually responsible for defamatory material. This reflects the approach that we have taken elsewhere in the Bill. In the unlikely event that it is not reasonably practicable to sue the author, editor or publisher, Clause 10 allows a claimant to bring an action against a secondary publisher, such as a bookseller. However, nothing in the clause would then prevent that bookseller from deploying any defences available to him them.

We believe that this approach strikes a fair balance that provides substantial protection for secondary publishers while not denying claimants a means of redress where this is deemed appropriate. I hope that on that basis of these explanations, the noble Lord will agree to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, for his intervention and for indicating the value of at least one of my amendments in a broader, international sense. I think that that will help to concentrate our minds on the value of looking with some care at the provisions of Clause 10. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, for his reminder that we should be seeking a direction of travel away from what may inadvertently have been created by the effect of Section 1 of the 1996 Act on the common-law defence that existed.

I am grateful, too, to the Minister, although I have to say that I am disappointed in his articulation of the Government’s position. There is a lack of courage on their part if, even in these circumstances where we are all agreed on the direction of travel, they are not willing to say that the law in relation to secondary publishers is moving in the direction of undermining the chilling effect of the behaviour of lawyers, who often act for very wealthy clients, intimidating small people from pursuing business because to some degree it involves an expression of free speech.

The appropriate response to this short debate is to indicate to the Minister that I will go away and think about this again. With regard to the first of our amendments, Amendment 50B, after this debate I am minded to consider whether Section 13 should be broader in scope. That may be the answer to the problem and a more appropriate way of dealing with it—not to restrict it only to secondary publishers and the web but to seek that it be broader in scope. That might be a simpler way of addressing at least part of the problem.

On the pre-1996 common-law position being better and less chilling than the present situation, even when improved by Clause 10, I am not sure that I will abandon my attempt to persuade the Government that something must be done. I now have the difficult job of solving how one can do that without challenging the court to deal with jurisdiction and the substance of the case at the same time. My limited experience of practising before the courts—limited by being elected to the House of Commons, although it was 20 years’ experience—suggested that once one started to make arguments about preliminary issues, one often got far into the substance of the case to do. In making arguments before the court, it was quite difficult to do the sort of thing that we suggest is possible here, by keeping these two issues separate. Apart from anything else, you often do not understand the arguments until you understand the facts and where the credible argument likely lies in a set of circumstances well enough. Anyway, never mind that.

I will go away and think about this again. We may have room for some progress in extending the scope of Clause 13. I am not sure that I will ever persuade the Government to move beyond, with all due respect, a slightly timid position on innocent dissemination, but we may have to return to this issue on Report. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for introducing the amendments. I want to revert to the broadening of the scope which was talked about in Clause 13. Again, in the spirit of what has been said before by my noble friend Lord McNally, if that is required and desired, the Government are happy to contemplate it.

Amendment 51A envisages introducing a regulation-making power to set out the specific procedure to be followed in relation to the making of an application for an order under Clause 13(1). We do not believe that this amendment is necessary. Clause 13, as the noble Baroness acknowledged, was introduced in the other place to address the concern that the claimant who had successfully brought an action against the author of defamatory material online may be left in the position of being unable to secure removal of the material. This situation might arise as a result of the fact that an author may not always be in a position to remove the material and the new Clause 5 defence might prevent the website operator being required to do so. The clause, therefore, applies only where the claimant has brought proceedings against the author and is completely separate from the process under Clause 5. As drafted, it enables an order for removal of the material to be made during or shortly after the conclusion of those proceedings, or on a separate application under Part 23 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Part 23 governs applications for court orders and sets out in detail how the process should work, including rules in respect of how an application is to be made, where it should be filed, what information should be included and how it should comply with any relevant time limits, among other matters. To the extent that any supplementary provision might be required, it is the Government’s view that the existing power to make rules of court is entirely sufficient to enable such a provision to be made. A regulation-making power is therefore unnecessary and could perhaps add confusion about the relationship with Part 23 and possibly cast doubt on the scope and applicability of the existing power in the Civil Procedure Rules.

Amendment 51B provides that the removal of allegedly defamatory material from a website and the publication of an apology or correction should not prevent an action for damages being brought. It is not clear how this amendment fits specifically with Clause 13. As I have said, this clause is to address situations where a claimant brings a successful action against the author of defamatory material online but where the author may not be in a position to remove material which has been found to be defamatory from a website. Where the content is removed by website operators in other circumstances—for example, after following the Clause 5 process where the poster chooses not to engage or agrees to removal—there is nothing in either Clause 5 or Clause 13 which would prevent a claimant bringing a defamation action seeking damages against the poster. Clearly, there may be cases where the damage caused by a defamatory statement is so serious that simply having it removed from the website will not provide the claimant with sufficient remedy. In these cases, it is right that the claimant should be able to pursue an action against the poster, and if that is the intention behind this amendment, then we agree entirely with the principle and the sentiment. However, we do not believe this amendment works in conjunction with existing provisions in Clause 13 and, for the reasons I have given, such a provision is deemed unnecessary. Where a statement is removed by a website and the claimant still wishes to pursue an action against the author, there is nothing to prevent them doing so.

In light of the assurances I have given and coming back to the issue of the scope, which the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, addressed earlier, I hope the noble Baroness will agree to withdraw the amendments.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I thank the Minister for that. He is right about Amendment 51B; that was the intention. His assurance that although defamatory material has been taken down there can still be an action for damages meets the point that we were trying to raise. On regulations and his reference to Civil Procedure Rules, the problem is the same. To expect an ordinary citizen to know that there are even such things as Civil Procedure Rules, let alone where to find them or what they say, is difficult. When the Government come to look at the guidance and other regulations attached to this, I urge them to look at whether the Civil Procedure Rules may be incorporated, even if they are word-for-word the same. Asking ordinary folk to go through lots of rules or even to know that they exist is a tall order. I will leave that thought with the Minister. I beg to withdraw the amendment.

Defamation Bill

Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts

Tuesday 15th January 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, first, perhaps I may say how glad I am that Sir Brian Neill is with us now, having recovered, and how sorry I am to have told the Minister that I was not well, as it enabled him to attempt to curtail me. On these amendments, it is extremely difficult for one country to deal with these problems on its own within its own legal system, since, by definition, we are dealing with the world wide web. Secondly, it is a question of getting this right. The Government are right to say that they are going to deal with this by regulations rather than in the Bill, and that there will be full consultation on that. Thirdly, it is a question of a balance. In view of what we have heard already, I thought that one might think of the other side of the coin; namely, that unless we get the balance right there will be interferences with free speech which ought not to be there.

Mumsnet has written to my noble friend Lord McNally about this and its approach is interesting. Although it welcomes the Government’s efforts to reform the law, it is concerned with Clause 5 having a “significant chilling effect” on free expression. It states:

“Although internet businesses would be able to benefit from new defences, the practical outcome of the procedure as it stands will be that the vast majority of complained-of posts will continue to be taken down upon receipt of a complaint”.

Mumsnet then goes into how that will be and how it will be intimidated. It says:

“As with most major internet companies, Mumsnet is a responsible organisation that has no wish to be associated with abusive or serious defamatory comments. We have always acted promptly to remove abusive or defamatory posts once they are brought to our attention, and we will continue to do so … However, we feel that legislators have yet to fully appreciate that the problem, for companies such as ours, does not lie with seriously abusive or defamatory posts; our decision to remove those, once we are made aware of them, is easy and swiftly acted upon. The difficult cases are almost always relatively low-profile, and involve claims which—while they may be potentially damaging for the claimant—represent the truthful, non-malicious opinion or experience of members of the public. We feel it is unfair and onerous, in cases such as these, to expect Mumsnet administrators or members of the public to act as legal specialists, attempting to assess whether the complained-of material might be able to benefit from any of the defences in the Bill. We also feel that it is in no way unjust or unduly burdensome to expect the claimant—who, after all, will be in possession of the facts—to provide a minimum degree of information to support his or her assertion that the material is defamatory or unlawful”,

and so on. That is the other side of the coin, which one needs to be clear about. When we come to my separate amendment, I shall address why we need to raise the standard a bit on the word unlawful.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, as the debate, albeit part two of the debate that we started before Christmas, has indicated again, there are wide-ranging opinions. Let me first set out that the Government agree that it is about getting this right and getting the balance right. This is an evolving area and it is important that we discuss these matters fully. My noble friend Lord McNally and I are listening carefully and intently to the arguments being made. It has never been the intention, nor should it be, that websites should be beyond the reach of the law. My noble friends Lord Mawhinney and Lord Faulks asserted that perhaps that is what this clause is trying to do. On the contrary, it is not.

My noble friend Lord Mawhinney made the point about being beyond reproach, and that what is said on the web is instantly translated and is, as we all know, retranslated and retweeted, wherever that may go. However, to draw a comparison with the printed media, while there is a source available, there are times when a story is printed on the front page of a newspaper and gets picked up on the internet. When that story is shown not to be correct, the retraction is quite limited. In the same way, I suggest that the damage is done. Too often, what is remembered is the headline which struck when the news broke, how it broke and the sensationalism behind that news story. It is not just about the website, although I concur with my noble friend in saying that the website is something which can sometimes go beyond the limits of the person who is hosting it, and the person who initially posted it, because it is replicated elsewhere.

I will take each amendment in turn. In doing so, I will pick up the various points that have been made by noble Lords and comment appropriately. First, it is absolutely right that the law on defamation should apply in relation to online as well as offline material. The Government’s proposals would enable claimants to take action against the poster of the material, the person responsible for making the defamatory statement, rather than the website operator. However—and this is a crucial point—the operator will still be liable if the operator is shown not to have followed the process which is designed to enable that to happen. That is a crucial point.

My noble friend Lord Faulks suggested that websites are being given protection beyond other media channels. Let me be absolutely clear: the defence for such websites only applies where website operators are not the ones who post the statement. The closest parallel might be a letter to an editor which the paper chooses to publish: it is not automatic.

Amendment 23A seeks to provide for the Clause 5 defence to apply to other “electronic platforms”, rather than simply “websites”, that have defamatory material posted upon them by third parties. The purpose of Clause 5 is to provide a defence to website operators that host third party content over which they exercise no editorial control. We chose to focus on this specific category of service providers because, as the noble Earl alluded to a moment ago, it is about definitions. How do you define things? My own background in business dictates that when I saw the words “electronic platform”, I saw them from the perspective of the world of financial services, in which it often alludes to banking platforms, which are slightly more limited than websites.

I also undertook during the summer break—apart from visiting Australia as I informed noble Lords I would—to look up definitions. How do you define an “electronic platform”? The varying degree of definition not just of electronic platforms but of platforms themselves is interesting. There is no consistent application one can put in.

Looking to the development of the world wide web, the word “website” emerges from that. The noble Lord, Lord Browne, made the point that we are living in an evolving and ever-changing world. As we are looking at this issue, as crucial and sensitive as it is, I am sure that we will return to this in the years to come.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, also talked about DPP guidance on criminal prosecutions. We are certainly looking at the DPP’s guidance, but we can see nothing in our proposals that would be likely to conflict with that guidance specifically.

It is not clear what “electronic platform” in Amendment 23A is intended to cover. As I have said, it has been suggested that the term “websites” is too narrow and risks not capturing new technologies in this fast-changing marketplace. We can debate and discuss which term is more appropriate, but I go back to the words of the noble Lord, Lord Browne: we live in a changing world. If in further discussion in Committee or at Report a form of technology is brought to our attention that is akin to a website and serves the same purpose in hosting third-party content, and a suitable form of words can be found adequately to describe that in legislation, the Government are open to considering that point further.

Amendment 23B would mean that a website operator who complied with Clause 5 would have a defence only against a claim for damages in defamation. As Clause 5 stands, the website operator will have a complete defence provided that he complies with the new process. As noble Lords will know, damages are by far the most common remedy in defamation proceedings, and it is difficult to see what difference the amendment would make in practice. It appears unlikely that claimants would bring a claim for a remedy other than damages. The Clause 5 process will provide a quick and cheap means for a complainant to establish contact with the poster of the material and secure take-down. Should legal proceedings be necessary, action can be brought against the poster. In the event that such a claim succeeds, damages would be payable by the poster, and Clause 13 enables the court to order the website operator to remove the material. We therefore do not consider that the amendment is necessary.

Amendment 24 seems to stem from concern that a website operator will use associates to post defamatory material on their sites, knowing that they can hide behind the Clause 5 defence. The Government are not persuaded that there is a significant risk of that happening. The noble Earl also referred to practical issues. However, in the event of such a situation, the claimant would be able to pursue an action against the individual poster and would not be left without a remedy.

In addition, there is the obvious difficulty in respect of establishing what is an association. For example, who would qualify as an associate of the website operator and how would the claimant be expected to prove that association? Conceivably, an associate of the website operator could post something defamatory without the website operator’s knowledge. In such cases, it would seem entirely inappropriate to prevent the website operator from relying on a Clause 5 defence, provided, of course—I come back to the point I made earlier—that the operator had followed the Clause 5 process.

Amendment 24A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lucas, would mean that a website operator would not lose their defence if they had moderated the statement or had made or suggested alterations to the content. We do not believe that the amendment would be appropriate. Subsection (10) already makes clear that an operator would not lose the defence simply by reason of the fact that they moderated statements posted on the site by others. That will ensure that operators are not discouraged from moderating their sites in a responsible way. However, the amendment would go further and allow them a defence if they moderated in a way which changed the content of the statement. In practical terms, this could mean that an operator who changes the statement in a way which made it—dare I say?— defamatory, or makes the defamation worse, would be protected. I fully accept that that is not my noble friend’s intention.

I believe that my noble friend Lord Phillips seeks by Amendment 25 to add clarity. However, we do not believe that the amendment is necessary. I shall explain why. The Government’s view is that subsection (4) already provides that test. For the purposes of subsection (3)(a), it is possible for a claimant to identify a person only if the claimant has sufficient information to bring proceedings against the person. As such, the Government’s view is that the insertion of “reasonably” would not make it any clearer, because it is clear from the clause as it stands.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

Does my noble friend have any comprehension of just what that last process would require from the complainant—the time that it would take and the costs that would be incurred in getting the court order to reveal the identity of the poster? In reality, that puts an absolutely impossible barrier against anything like a reasonable remedy for the complainant.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

As I alluded to in my opening comments, this is about getting the balance right. If there were such a case, and I totally accept that there are issues that would arise here, there would be a cost element to this process. At the same time, there are many occasions when a balance must be struck on this, whether we are looking at professional websites or websites where people often post under a pseudonym and may be posting for good reasons of safety and security to protect themselves. That being said, though, I hear what my noble friend has said. I assure him again that we continue to consult with stakeholders across the board on the contents of such regulations and have sought their views on the practicality aspect of this new process. As I have said, this is something that we are looking at, and any suggestions that are made are looked at and discussed. I am sure that we will return to this, if not in Committee then on Report.

As I have said, we are looking at the issue of whistleblowing and the necessity at times to protect confidentiality, and setting that against the very arguments that have just been put forward by my noble friend. We feel that Clause 5 strikes the right balance. As my noble friend Lord Lester said earlier, there are two sides to the coin. The process set out in Clause 5 provides a quick and easy way for the claimant to obtain the necessary detail where the poster has no objection to providing it, but then places responsibility back on the claimant to secure a court order where the poster is unwilling to share the detail. This broadly reflects the position that applies in relation to anonymous material published offline. Where a claimant is unable to identify the author of a defamatory statement, and in the offline context does not wish to pursue the publisher, they can seek a court order for release of that information by whoever is in possession of it.

Amendment 26A would make a drafting amendment to Clause 5(4), replacing “was” with “is”. I can understand why this amendment has been brought forward, but I hope that I can reassure the noble Lords on this point. When the clause refers to posting, it is the act of posting with which we are concerned. No matter whether the posting stays up or comes down, that act has happened in the past, so it is our view that “was” is the most appropriate word. The amendment however raises important questions about what a website operator’s responsibility should be where a posting has already been removed. We are seeking views as to the content of proposed regulations and will take that issue away and consider it alongside the responses that we receive.

Finally, Amendment 29, in the name of my noble friend Lord Phillips, provides that a Clause 5 defence be defeated in cases where the claimant can prove malice by or on behalf of the website operator. The Clause 5 process requires the website operator to act in accordance with the process and entirely neutrally. It is difficult to foresee circumstances in which a website operator who complied with the Clause 5 process could do so maliciously. If it is the poster who is acting with malicious intent on behalf of the website operator, the claimant will still be able to bring proceedings against the person responsible for posting the statement. Therefore, we do not see what an amendment such as this would add to the clause.

[Lord Mawhinney]

My noble friend started by saying that it was the Government’s policy to achieve a balance and he repeated that as he made his way through the amendments. It was mildly ironic that he followed immediately after the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, who read a rehash of Mumsnet evidence to the Joint Committee and finished by saying that he was doing it just to ensure balance.

On the one hand, as has been made clear, lots of organisations are saying, “Free the shackles; let us do this and that; there should be no, or minimum, restriction”. We know who is arguing for freedom to defame. On the other hand, there will be lots of individuals who find their reputations tarnished or trashed, and they will have no organisations standing up for them. Will the Government therefore argue for the individuals whose reputations are at stake to ensure that the end point is balanced? If not, how do they envisage balance, when you have got Goliath on one side and not even a mini Goliath on the other?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I thank my noble friend for his intervention, although my recollection of the David and Goliath story is that David ended up winning. Divine intervention is always something that one should bear in mind.

Coming back to the point raised by my noble friend Lord Mawhinney about clarity and balance, as my noble friend—and indeed the whole Committee— recognises, this is a difficult area. I reiterate that the Government want to get this right and we are still taking views, as we are in this Committee, on this area. We are consulting stakeholders, as I have already said, on the content of the regulations provided for under Clause 5 and have extended the deadline for responses in this respect to 31 January. I reassure my noble friend Lord Mawhinney, whose guidance and mentoring I always welcome, that this is about ensuring that, when it comes to issues of defamation, those people who have been proven to have fallen victim are properly protected and that recourse is available. However, the balance of that has to be in ensuring that there is not too much of a burden on website operators. In some cases, as has been illustrated by other noble Lords, it is something that is, at times, beyond their control. What is important is to ensure that website operators follow the appropriate process. That said—

[Lord Mawhinney]

I thank my noble friend but encourage him to edge slightly closer to answering my question. He said a very interesting thing: that we are consulting with stakeholders and, indeed, have extended the time for consultation. That actually makes my point. The stakeholders are on one side of the argument, and the individual whose reputation is at stake is on the other side of the argument. The consultation is not even balanced. That causes, I think, concern to a number of noble Lords in this Committee. It certainly does to me, and I would like to know what constitutes balance in the mind of the Government. Incidentally, I will just throw in that we are going to have plenty of opportunity shortly to debate this Government’s theological position, and perhaps my noble friend would take a little advice: I would not go there if I was him.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

Theology is always one to park, but, as a man of faith—and as a fellow man of faith—I take my noble friend’s guidance on that. The point I am making is about stakeholders—those people who are looking at this issue. Yes, it involves website operators, but the point of this clause is that it is not the website operators doing the defaming, it is the person who has written the statement. That is the person who should be held accountable and responsible. Where the website operators’ obligations come in is whether they have followed the process as detailed in Clause 5.

Coming back to the point about balance that my noble friend made, this is not just about talking to website operators but about talking as well to people who represent claimants, to ensure that those people who represent the body that feels it may be subject to such actions are also heard and that their case is also made. However, I am sure that my noble friend would agree with me that, if we started consulting every single individual who may or may not be concerned on an individual basis with this, our Committee would continue for a very long time. Nevertheless, as I have alluded to several times—and I repeat the point again—in speaking to all these amendments it is important for me to place on record that the Government are aware of the pace of change in internet and electronic communications. Even as perhaps one of the younger Members of your Lordships’ House, I remember in my professional life when the internet first came alive. Things are changing by the minute, and the pace of change is somewhat beyond even my comprehension. There are innovations in electronic communications and, as I have indicated in all my responses, in particular in response to Amendment 23A, we have an open mind in respect of terminology. In addition, we believe that putting the details of the Clause 5 process in the regulations provides greater flexibility to adjust aspects of the new procedure should that prove necessary as technology develops.

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way; he has been patient and has had to deal with a lot of amendments. He was dealing a little while ago with Amendment 29 in the name of my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury. I understood his answer to be that he could not conceive of circumstances in which an operator of a website could be malicious, and this amendment was therefore not necessary. However, operators of a website are given an admittedly qualified privilege by Clause 5 which puts them in exactly the same position as those in other fields of the law who have a qualified privilege, the defence of which is defeated by malice. Is it not therefore inconsistent that such a remedy should not be available in the terms of this amendment? It may not happen very often, but that is no reason for it not existing at all.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I hear what my noble friend says. Perhaps we can refer to this matter; he makes a valid point. As he rightly acknowledges, we would not see this issue occurring on a regular basis, but I will certainly reflect on his comments on this.

A variety of amendments has been tabled. On “balance”, I suppose it depends how you define the word. However, in seeking to bring the Bill forward, and particularly with this clause, the Government are seeking to strike the right balance. We continue to listen, hear and consult with all parties on both sides of the coin. We are working to ensure that something practical and workable, which protects those who are subject to such actions, comes out of this process.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I was encouraged by my noble friend’s response, and by his batting at the subsequent bowling. It is clear that we are both aiming in the same direction and that, given the expertise of his colleagues and the good will of the Government, we may get somewhere interesting. I would be grateful if he would allow me to come in for a meeting with officials, preferably before the end of January if that is his consultation deadline, to pursue some of the practicalities; a nod will do on these occasions.

We should be more robust in talking to website operators about right of reply. This is merely a question of tweaking a few lines of code. It may be inconvenient for people to do it, but it is essentially practical. It is such a fundamental thing, given the way in which views, opinions and statements travel now, that one should be able to attach a reply to it and deal with it robustly in that way. To have a statement with a reply available to people as soon as they pick something up is a powerful thing in the internet world. That is has not been provided for is merely that it has not been coded. It is essentially not impossible under any circumstances with any website if people put their mind to it. It will not happen immediately, but it should certainly happen within a year if that is a requirement. I would be chary about accepting excuses on that.

There is something to be said for looking at different arrangements for statements about real persons as opposed to statements about businesses. Picking up on the points made correctly and forcefully by my noble friend Lord Faulks, if someone is accused of something which goes to their person, that cannot be allowed to hang around for seven days, or even seven hours, without being dealt with. It should not be within the policies of any reputable web operator that such statements are allowed on their website. These things belong in the hands of the police if there are real accusations. It should not be part of our view of electronic media that it is there to give currency to that sort of statement, whether true or not.

On the other hand, we must be powerful in allowing people to make statements about businesses or the way in which people do business, and to allow website operators to be robust in their defence of people who have made those statements on their websites. As Mumsnet said, the easy answer is to take them down. The only way to defeat that easy answer is to make very clear and very practical the responses that are available to the website operator so that they can have certainty in knowing whether a comment is sensible and that the law allows them to stand by it. That is what I want to pursue with the Minister when we have our meeting. On the point about maliciousness, we are talking about a lot of little website operators and not just the big guys, and there are some very malicious ones out there.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I would of course be happy to arrange a meeting. The benefit of being in the Moses Room is that your officials are right behind you, and I am sure that they have noted it as I have.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, as in December I wished the Committee a happy Christmas, maybe now that the Minister is back from Australia I can wish the Committee a happy new year. I thank the Minister not only for coming back from Australia to address us but for his response. I thank also everyone who has spoken, particularly my noble friend Lord Triesman and the noble Lords, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, Lord Lucas, Lord Faulks and Lord Mawhinney, for their support. I am grateful also for the contributions of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, and the noble Earl, Lord Erroll. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, does not need reassurance that his summary of the Joint Committee was, as always, spot on and symptomatic of what he did in that committee, focusing straight in on the victim, who often has no recourse to law.

There is a view that somehow the web is less serious than the printed word, but when I was learning my journalism, I was told, “Remember that today’s newspapers are tomorrow’s fish and chips wrappers”. Actually, some printed words are so ephemeral that the web is more serious rather than less serious.

I am still not quite sure what the Minister thinks is a website. Perhaps he will tell us in a moment whether Facebook is a website, whether a Tweet is a website and whether our Lords blog—which I recommend to you all—is a website, because it would be useful to know.

Given that we are in the slightly unusual position of having previously adjourned in the middle of an amendment and having the Hansard for part of it, perhaps I might quote what the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, said on 19 December. He said:

“The disparity of arms between claimant and defendant is nowhere more vivid than in relation to the web operators, many of which are huge multinational companies. They do not do this for fun—they are not like a village notice board. They do it for profits, and mighty big profits … They are the Goliath in the defamatory relationship … and … their impunity is not justified in terms of freedom of speech”.—[Official Report, 19/12/12; col. GC568.]

That is really the nub of what we are talking about. Along with the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, I cannot agree with the view of the noble Lord, Lord Allan of Hallam, that, with the web, we are talking just about private speech in a public space. We are talking about a publication, whether it arrives on your iPad, on a laptop or on something else. The issue of anonymity arises more frequently on a website than it does in a publication, which is perhaps why we concentrate on it, but if what the Government are suggesting—the 72 hours, the seven days and then going to court—is accepted, everyone who wants to defame will just go anonymous. Why should they not just go anonymous, knowing that they will basically be beyond the reach of the law?

Some of our amendments to which the Minister has referred are fairly uncontroversial. I would have thought that the “electronic platform” proposal is surely worthy of consideration. We may not have got it right, but I hope that what we have at the end is robust even if it is done by attached guidance. However, I will concentrate on two of these amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this detailed debate. Arguments have again been presented to show both sides of the coin. Amendment 26, in the name of my noble friend Lord Lester, would require a claimant to set out in a notice of complaint why the statement complained of was not merely defamatory but also unlawful.

Our clear aim in bringing forward the Bill is, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has said, to make the law on defamation clearer, cheaper and easier for the ordinary citizen to use. It is perhaps reasonably easy for an ordinary person to understand and explain why a statement may be regarded as defamatory; it is quite another for the same person to explain, without recourse to legal advice, how that could be deemed unlawful. That arguably would involve a thorough knowledge of the law, both statute and common, and a rebuttal of the various defences that might be available to the person making the statement. The aim is to avoid putting lawyers rather than the parties at the heart of the argument. For those reasons, the Government are opposed to the amendment.

That said, we of course share the concern of those who argue that complainants should give some explanation as to why they think a statement is defamatory. The note that we have provided to the House on the content of the regulations makes clear that, where appropriate, complainants should, in a notice of complaint, provide details such as the meaning attributed to the words complained of and why they are defamatory, including any factual inaccuracies or unsupportable comment. This reflects the wording in the defamation pre-action protocol in relation to the contents of a letter before a claim, and we believe that this is an appropriate level of detail to expect complainants to provide.

Amendment 27, in the names of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Lord, Lord Allan of Hallam, has two purposes. First, it seeks to place in the Bill, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, suggested, a number of requirements that a complainant’s notice of complaint should meet. As I indicated in speaking to Amendment 26, we share the concerns of those who argue that complainants should have to give some explanation as to why they think a statement is defamatory of them. I have explained the level of detail that we think is reasonable to expect a complainant to provide in order to enable the poster of the material to understand the basis of the complaint.

As I have also said, we believe that to require a claimant to go further and prove that the statement was unlawful would make it more onerous and difficult for a layman to make a complaint without first having sought sound legal advice, nor do we see how it would be in the interests of website operators, who would also have to seek legal advice, and could end up in litigation over the validity of notices that they chose to reject.

My noble friend Lord Marks talked about the need for as much detail as possible to be put in the Bill so that people can readily understand what is required. We believe that the regulations are the appropriate way to deal with the issues of detail within the framework established by Clause 5. However, we will ensure, after listening to the debate as well, that detailed guidance is published prior to the commencement of any new provisions to assist complainants, posters and website operators in understanding and following the new process.

The second part of Amendment 27 would allow the Secretary of State to make a provision in regulations for a procedure whereby a complainant can obtain from the court a declaration that his notice of complaint is valid—namely, that it meets the requirements of subsection (6). It has been indicated with regard to amendment that the procedure would also be available where either the poster of the material or the website operator wishes to apply for such a declaration.

I referred to the contribution made by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. I agree with him that the whole purpose of Clause 5 is to provide a simple, quick, cheap and effective means for the complainant to request the removal of potentially defamatory material and for the poster to engage with this request for removal and stand by his posting if he wishes to do so. It was suggested that the Norwich Pharmacal process may not be effective in securing the necessary information on the poster. We propose in the consultation that the poster should be required to provide the full legal name and contact details, including their postal address. If they fail to do so, the website operator would have to take the material down. This, we believe, should help to ensure that the Norwich Pharmacal process enables the complainant to obtain sufficient information to enable him to bring proceedings against the poster.

As several noble Lords have noted, the system that Amendment 27 proposes would seem to require complainants to go to court at the outset, prior to making a complaint, to obtain a court declaration that their notice of complaint is valid. Presumably, any complainant who did not have such a declaration would not have their complaint processed by the website operator. It is unclear to us how this procedure could be adapted to deal with applications by posters or website operators, and at what stage these would be made. In any event, and as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has mentioned, this additional process is likely to add unnecessary cost, delay and burden for the individual. In at least some cases, we believe that posters will be content for their statements to come down. Under this system, complainants would have to incur the time and expense of going to court irrespective of the attitude of the poster. Additional burdens would be created for the court system. The proposed amendments do not strike a fair and appropriate—we come back to that word again—balance between the interests of freedom of expression and complainants’ rights to reputation.

I concur with many of the points made by other noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Faulks, and hope on the basis of the explanation that I have given that noble Lords will not press their amendments.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, my noble friend has got his answer to Amendment 26 completely wrong, particularly so far as website operators are concerned. I do not care a fig about knowing whether a comment is defamatory; it is obvious that “The food was filthy” is defamatory. What I want to know is whether I can publish it or whether the restaurant says, “No such meal was served on that evening” or “We know this fellow from before and he has been completely unreasonable on other occasions” or gives us some reason that the comment is fair. It is absolutely crucial that Amendment 26 is accepted. Just to know that something is defamatory gives you no information and you can see that with your own eyes; it is obvious. What is not obvious is why it is unlawful. In order to take a reasonably robust attitude to standing between a complainant and the person who has made the posting, and who may well quite reasonably wish to be shy, not least because they think that they have sinned against some large corporation that will skin them in the courts if they are identified, I would want as a website operator, as I imagine other website operators do, too—certainly, those to whom I have talked do—to be in a position to stand behind something that we consider to be fair comment. We need to know why the complainant thinks that it is unlawful. We all know why it is defamatory.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood]

My Lords, it may be a response to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, to say that while there is of course a distinction between what is defamatory and what is illegal, it is not necessarily for the complainant to dictate why it is illegal. Thought might perhaps be given to making a regulation under Clause 5(3)(c) that put on the operator who sought to invoke this defence the need to say why, notwithstanding that the statement was defamatory, it was none the less lawful to publish it. That might be a better way of achieving the balance than putting, as other noble Lords have recognised, the often financially onerous burden on the complainant to anticipate and meet in advance the several defences that may or may not be urged as justification for the publication.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

The noble and learned Lord makes a valid point, which we shall certainly consider.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, I am grateful to everyone who has taken part in this brief debate and particularly to the Minister for his reply, with which I do not agree and will have to come back at a later stage to explain in more detail why.

I should like to talk about the wider world, because what we are debating today will be of interest not only in this country but in Beijing and Washington DC. Noble Lords will probably understand that in the United States, on the one hand, the extreme position is adopted that there is absolute immunity, subject to malice, for website defamation. You cannot sue an American website operator under federal statute law, state statute law or common law in the United States. On the other hand, in China you have the opposite position, and the same is true in the former Soviet Union. In China in particular, the great firewall of China and the Chinese intranet prevent proper access to an uncensored website within China. Noble Lords will have read what happened last week, deplorably.

In Europe, we have a compromise. We have the e-commerce directive, which has a notice and take-down procedure in general terms. We have to obey EU law. We have e-commerce directive regulations. The balance is put in very broad terms and can be fleshed out in various ways, but it does not allow either an absolute immunity on website operators, American style, nor does it allow the extraordinary regulation by the state that obtains in the People’s Republic of China.

Curiously, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, suggests that we do not need any law on this at all. That will make the noble Lord, Lord McNally, smile, if he remembers that when we discussed all of this many months ago, he quite rightly said that we have to try to clarify the internet position and we cannot just duck it; we need to have reasonable legal certainty in order to include it in the Bill. He was right, and it was quite right of the Government to seek to do that. It is extremely difficult, which is why most of this will have to be done by way of regulations and not in statute.

The burden of proof in all defamation cases under English law will remain upon the defendant. We have not adopted the Sullivan rule in this country and put the burden of proof on the claimant. The defendant therefore starts off and finishes with having the burden of proving the various defences. All that we are considering is what is appropriate for a complainant to have to provide to the website operator. The great problem is that the website operator—if it is Google, Yahoo! or Amazon, or a newspaper with a website—has no commercial interest in keeping matter that is in the public interest on the website if they are threatened with litigation or, worse, “unreasonably”.

Suppose, for example, that Google were to make serious allegations of corruption in the state of Ruritania, and someone from the state of Ruritania then complained about it being on the web. Google would have no commercial interest in maintaining that very important public-interest statement on the web, especially if it was going to be faced with multiple claims to take down without any obligation on the complainant. We are therefore trying to find a balance in a way that we protect free speech by not encouraging unnecessary take-down, while at the same time providing effective remedies to the serious victims of violations of reputation on the net.

The reason I do not agree with the Government’s present position is not just an argument about whether or not it is compatible with the e-commerce directive to leave out the word “unlawful”. It is also because the Government give the game away in indicating that the regulations that they are proposing will, in effect, do precisely what the words “and unlawful” will—or, as my noble friend Lord Phillips suggested, “unlawfully defamatory”; that would do perfectly well. However, there must be something more than a simple statement that something is defamatory.

I am sure that we will need to come back to this, because it is very important and difficult. I am not dogmatic about a solution. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Transforming Rehabilitation

Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts

Wednesday 9th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords—

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, we have yet to hear from the Conservative Benches.

[Lord Faulks]

I welcome this Statement, particularly its focus on those with sentences of less than 12 months and its identification of that period of vulnerability as young offenders leave prison. One of the particular areas of vulnerability is those offenders who have a previous history of drug addiction who are then prone to taking large doses of drugs which can result in death. I therefore welcome the role of a mentor, although I recognise what the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has said about the perception of custody plus because I was sitting as a recorder at the time. However, the role of a mentor seems to me to be potentially very important. Can the Minister help the House by identifying who exactly is going to perform this mentoring role and what its scope might be so as to assist in avoiding those traps that I have attempted to identify?

Defamation Bill

Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts

Wednesday 19th December 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I should be interested whether the Minister who is to sum up can tell the Committee whether there has previously been a conspiracy of judges frustrated in the manner that we have seen today.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I note with great interest that everyone referred to my noble friend Lord McNally, but it falls upon me at least to attempt to address some of the issues raised. I am mindful also of the fact that some holiday reading was put forward, and I now realise why my noble friend suggested that I deal with these amendments—I will be travelling to Australia and, rather erroneously, I asked him to suggest some reading for my long trip. Now I know what it will be.

I should like to respond to the various amendments in the group, Amendments 11, 11A, 12 and 13. Amendments 11 and 13 relate to Clause 3(3). The subsection reflects the test that has been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Spiller v Joseph. This provision has been included to address the concern of the Joint Committee on the draft Bill that unless an indication of the subject matter on which the opinion is based is included it is difficult to assess the real nature of the criticism that has been made.

Including the word “adequately”, as proposed by Amendment 11 in the name of my noble friend Lord Phillips, would make no difference to how the provision would operate in practice. In order to succeed in establishing the defence, or indeed any other defence, the defendant will have to show that all the conditions attached to the defence are adequately met. If the way in which they are met is not adequate, it will be inadequate and by definition will fail. We therefore do not consider that this amendment is necessary at this time.

My noble friend also referred to Clause 8, which deals with a different situation, where the material is republished by the same publisher. Clause 3(6), however, deals with situations where the defendant is not the author of the statement—that is, where the newspaper editor publishes a comment piece written by someone else.

I move on to Amendment 13, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. It is true that this issue was flagged up at Second Reading. He referred to the specific assurance that he suggested was given, whereby a detailed letter was to be sent to him. If that has been overlooked, I am sure that the officials and my noble friend have noted that, and we will write to him quite specifically.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

Regretfully noting such a thing is not enough. I was promised a reply and it did not come. Something more than noting is required.

[Lord Mawhinney]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Apropos of his comments about the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, that noble and learned Lord is not the only one who finds my noble friend’s response slightly lacking. Governments have a habit of making promises that are important, first, because they come from the Dispatch Box or whatever, and secondly, because they are important to the recipient of the promise. When those promises are not upheld to Members of this House or of the other place there is a significance to the absence, which my noble friend did not entirely encapsulate in his reply. If he will forgive me, as a friend, for saying so, conveying the Government’s understanding that breaking such a commitment is simply not acceptable probably needs more substance than a quick apology, en passant, and the promise of a letter.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I thank my noble friend. He emphasised the word “friend” and I acknowledge this fully. I can assure the Committee that I did not intend to appear as if I did not fully understand the nature of the question put by the noble and learned Lord. If that has been communicated, I make an unreserved apology and assure the Committee that we fully acknowledge the fact that a letter should have been written to the noble and learned Lord, based on the discussions at Second Reading. I am sure that my noble friend Lord McNally has taken particular note of the comments and expressions that have been made. As a reasonably new Member of your Lordships’ House, I always welcome direction, particularly on the way that the House operates. I reiterate that I intended no discourtesy to the noble and learned Lord and thank my noble friend for his direction, which I acknowledge and will take on board. I hope that the noble and learned Lord also feels that I have acknowledged any shortcoming in my initial response.

[The Earl of Erroll]

This is not on the subject we have been talking about but goes back to the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. Subsection (3) says,

“the basis of the opinion”.

Is that the same as the subject matter on which you may form an opinion? In English, the basis of my opinion would be formed by my knowledge or experience or other knowledge that I had, whereas I am commenting on something external: the subject matter. In ordinary English, the subject matter on which I am making an opinion is very different from the basis on which I form this opinion about the subject matter. I am not sure whether the Minister’s reply covered the noble and learned Lord’s point or whether it should be reconsidered.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I hear what the noble Earl says. We shall return to this point in writing. If the noble and learned Lord wishes to return to this point, it can be debated more extensively at a later stage of the Bill.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

We know that the common law is being overruled by this clause. As I understand the Minister’s reply, it is that, without saying that the majority opinion in Telnikoff has been overruled, this clause effectively no longer reflects that narrow view of the majority of the Law Lords. Is this right?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

We will take this on board in light of the comments that have been made. I seek the Committee’s indulgence on this. As I said, as ever, some valued points have been made and they will be duly considered. I will write to the Committee on that specific issue.

On Amendment 11A, my noble friend Lord Lucas spoke about Clause 3(4). Amendment 11A would remove the bulk of subsection (4) so that the third condition for the defence to apply would be satisfied if the defendant simply shows that an honest person could have held the opinion. That rather asks the question as to the basis on which they might have reached that opinion. Subsection (4) would simplify the current law. It would give some guidance as to the basis on which the opinion might have been formed, while avoiding the complexities which have made the defence too complicated and technical. The provision as drafted therefore strikes the right balance.

Amendment 12 would change the drafting of Clause 3(6) in a way which the Government do not believe would be helpful. Subsection (6) relates to situations where the “honest opinion” defence is raised but the defendant is not the author of the statement—for example where an action is brought against a newspaper editor in respect of a comment piece, rather than against the person who wrote it. In these circumstances, the defence will be defeated if the claimant can show that the defendant knew or ought to have known that the author did not hold the opinion.

To the extent that Amendment 12 shifts some of the wording in the subsection, it does not alter the effect. However, it also inserts a reference to the statement being published by the defendant in a form which is “substantially the same” as the statement by the author. This would create uncertainty in the law, as it could be read as implying that the defence might be available in situations where the defendant has changed the statement by the author. This is not desirable.

We have looked at specific issues. I return to the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Berwick. I end my comments by again assuring him unreservedly that, while there were shortcomings, no offence was intended in my response. We will write to him fully on the matters he has raised previously and today. I hope that, on the basis of my comments, the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Morris of Aberavon]

My Lords, I am sorry to say that I am confused by the Minister’s reply to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. It is not the Minister’s fault, I am sure; it is the departmental brief that he has been given. As I understand it— I may be wholly wrong—at present the Government are unable to respond to the noble and learned Lord’s comments which were canvassed in appropriate detail at Second Reading. Is the position that there is no government position?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I did refer to that. We believe that the situation is already covered by Clause 3(3), to be clear. However, I have again noted and totally taken on board the comments made by the noble and learned Lord, and acknowledged the fact that, as was mentioned at Second Reading, this issue would be fully addressed in a letter. As I have stated previously, I have asked the Committee whether we may write specifically on that issue and address any other issues which remain outstanding. Again, however, as I said in my comments, the Government’s position is that the situation is already covered by the clause.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, perhaps I may first ask a question on the matter raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. The Minister said in his reply that he thought that it would now, under this Bill, be fine if someone reading the letter could refer to the article, because that was referenced, and that would cover things. Would that be the case if the letter concerned was behind a paywall? As would commonly be the case on Twitter or blogs or whatever, you might well find that the letter had been published in the Times or the Financial Times or some other place which is only accessible if you pay some mogul a large sum of money annually, and is therefore not in a practical sense accessible to someone who just happens to read the letter and react to it. Would that mean that if you published behind a paywall and then commented on it you were not protected by the law as it is set out in this Bill?

Secondly, I turn to the subject of my amendments. As a practical user of the Bill, I am going to find it very difficult to know what is opinion and what is not. At the moment one has to go through ridiculous and convoluted forms of language such as, “I felt that the food was cold” or “I believe that my son was bullied”, in order to make it clear that you are talking about opinion. It does not say clearly anywhere in this Bill that when you are talking of personal experience, that is equivalent to opinion. We are coming to the effects of this clause on Clause 5 concerning website operators when judging whether an incoming comment is a comment or a statement of fact. It is very important to have rules and to know where the law lies, but at the moment Clause 3 does not make that clear. I continue to have a problem with the way paragraph (4)(a) is expressed. Something is not an honestly held opinion,

“on the basis of any fact which existed at the time”.

That does not appear to have any application to whether the person who held the opinion was aware of the fact, or indeed was even capable of being aware of the fact. If the fact existed, that makes the opinion a dishonest one and therefore not protected. Again, I find that concept very difficult.

I shall certainly bring these matters back on Report, but I will be grateful for any guidance and perhaps the opportunity to go through these things with officials before the next stage.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I thank my noble friend for his questions. I can give him an assurance that we will write to him on the specific points that he raised. That will allow for a proper period of reflection.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lester, for his support for this amendment, and indeed to other Members of the Committee, some of whom have spoken with particular knowledge of this aspect of the law. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, was concerned about the language of the amendment, and of course I accept that the wording could be improved. It may be that it is in fact too narrow in the sense that it refers only to newspapers and not to other places where articles might be published. It is the sort of thing that can be dealt with very easily if only one could have some sort of conversation on these matters with Ministers.

The noble Lord also said that it might be dealt with sufficiently with a statement under Pepper v Hart. There I think I would disagree with him. The point in Telnikoff v Matusevitch is so important in the law of defamation that it ought to be dealt with specifically so that it is on the face of the Bill, not just through a statement from the Minister. Nevertheless, I am grateful for his support.

As to the reply, of course I accept the apology offered by the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad. However, these things should not happen and it is not the first time it has happened, even to me. One is told that one is going to be written to, but then one is not, so it is important that when the Government say that they are going to write, they should in fact do so. There is simply no purpose in raising points at Second Reading unless they can be dealt with properly at the Committee stage. In this case, of course, that has not been possible.

There were two questions for the Government to consider. First, do they accept that the decision of the House of Lords was erroneous? They have not dealt with that at all. Secondly, if it was erroneous, is that point made sufficiently clear in Clause 3 as it stands? On that I very much echo the statement of the noble Earl on the other side of the table. My view is that it is not sufficiently clear and I can see no reason why it should not be made sufficiently clear. It does not cost the Government anything to accept an amendment of this kind. Although I necessarily will not press the amendment, I intend to raise the matter at the next stage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Triesman]

My Lords, I do not accept that supporting the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, is a Second Reading proposition. It may be very difficult, in a number of contexts, to achieve what the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, is suggesting, but it is well worth doing it. A comparison can be made with somebody at a football match. I heard over very many years that when people made loud, offensive, grotesque, racist comments in a football crowd you could do nothing because of the great mass of faces. Then CCTV came along and we were able to do something about it—and it was quite right that we did, though apparently not yet fully successfully. There will be technical means—there probably already are. That is why the amendment should be supported.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I am sure that the Committee will agree that, in light of the other contributions that remain to be made and of the time, further debate on Amendment 23A should be adjourned. Perhaps it would be a convenient moment to suggest that we adjourn this debate until Tuesday 15 January at 3.30 pm.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

Before we put that to the Committee, perhaps we may take this opportunity to thank the Deputy Chairman and all Members for what they have done so far and wish everybody a very happy Christmas.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon Excerpts

Tuesday 18th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I take the Government’s point about resources, but as my noble friend rightly points out, there are two sides to that equation. One is the cost to the system, which can flow from inadequate representation of defendants, adjournments and the rest of it, as well as the cost of providing it. Of course, there are defendants who get assistance in the form of interpretation. As it turns out, recent developments in interpreting services have been, to put it mildly, controversial. Contracts have been given to organisations that apparently have not performed very well, at considerable cost in terms of the fees paid to them. Equally, as might be the case in connection with people who are unable to understand proceedings and follow them unassisted, some of the interpreters who turned up to the courts were simply not up to the job. It has been something of a disaster.

This is an analogy for the Government to look at in terms of providing services for people who, for different reasons, are unable perhaps to follow a case properly, to understand it properly, or to give proper instructions to their legal advisers. I hope that the Government will look at that and look at this position in the round. The noble Baroness has already identified the discrepancy between witnesses and defendants. Here, we potentially have two classes of defendants, some of whom may not speak English adequately and for whom interpretation will be provided, and others who may not be able to follow because of learning disabilities or other aspects, and for whom nothing would be provided.

Looking at the whole situation surely is sensible. I hope that the Government will acknowledge that there is a disjunction here between what is provided for different classes of defendants, and will not simply put this on the back shelf but will look at it with a degree of urgency. Miscarriages of justice can flow at any time from failure to provide adequate assistance, whether that is legal aid or, as in this case at least, the kind of support that can be offered by those described in my noble friend’s amendment. I hope that the Government will acknowledge that there is an issue here and that, at the very least, if they are not able to respond firmly and conclusively tonight, that they will give it more urgent attention than was indicated in the letter which was recently sent out.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I must admit that, as I listened to the debate, time stopped for a moment when I saw the annunciator freeze. I do not know whether that was due to the weight of arguments that were presented on the previous amendment. Nevertheless, my attention remains focused on this one. As noble Lords acknowledged—including the noble Lords, Lord Bradley and Lord Beecham—my noble friend Lord McNally, following the last debate, wrote to interested Peers on this amendment.

I have nothing specific to add but certainly I will seek to answer some of the questions that arose. As was said on Report in response to an amendment moved by my noble friend Lady Linklater, there is already a provision in statute for “certain vulnerable defendants” to receive assistance from an intermediary when giving evidence. I shall return to that point in a moment. That is in Section 104 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.

The point was made about the Government deferring implementation. It is important to understand that they decided to defer implementation until full consideration could be given to the practical arrangements and resource implications. I reassure the House that we are still looking at these practical and resource issues because they are important.

On the points raised about discrimination, not only does Section 104 provide for intermediaries to be used in support of defendants but the courts already have the power under common law to order such use when they consider it necessary.

The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, referred to vulnerable defendants. As I said, common-law powers exist to appoint an intermediary to assist vulnerable defendants if and when the courts consider it necessary. Guidance, therefore—the Government have moved forward on this—on appointing intermediaries in such circumstances was issued to all courts last year. It is the duty of the courts to ensure that defendants receive a fair trial. In the case of vulnerable defendants, that entails making sure that they fully understand what is taking place and that trials are conducted to timetables that take account of their ability to concentrate.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, made a point about a fair trial for all vulnerable defendants. To give a couple of examples, the court can make an order allowing a vulnerable defendant, for example, to give evidence over a live link. Much more can also be done by the defendant’s legal representative to aid communication. A vulnerable defendant should always be represented, as one of the criteria in the interests of justice test that is used to determine whether an applicant is entitled to legal aid is that the defendant may not be able to understand the court proceedings.

Coming back to the crux of the point, it is the duty of the courts to ensure that defendants receive a fair trial. The Government are committed to ensuring that vulnerable defendants fully understand what is taking place. I have already alluded to the fact that much can be done in terms of the defendant’s legal representative to aid communication.

In view of the reassurances that I have given, the letter written by my noble friend Lord McNally and the assurance that the Government are looking at this and at the common-law provisions that exist, I hope that the noble Lord will be minded to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, I wonder whether the Minister could answer a question about the increase in the number of out-of-court settlements. This is of extreme concern to the Magistrates’ Association, not least because of the increase in the number of out-of-court settlements of cases involving violence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

The noble Lord raises an important point and, with the permission of the House, the Minister will write to him directly on that point. With the amendment as it stands, this issue may not have a direct impact, but the noble Lord raises an important point and the Minister will write to him.

[Lord Bradley]

It is disappointing that between Report and Third Reading the Government have not reached the conclusion that they should immediately implement Section 104, but I assure the Minister, as he would expect, that we will continue to pursue this matter with the implementation of the National Liaison and Diversion Programme, which fits neatly with the provisions for vulnerable defendants in court, to ensure that there is fairness of approach between witnesses and defendants in court proceedings. However, in the light of the Minister’s comments, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.