Lord Phillips of Sudbury
Main Page: Lord Phillips of Sudbury (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Phillips of Sudbury's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have only one point to make. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, said that these amendments in effect introduce Leveson by the back door into a Bill dealing with other matters. To my mind, that is an important merit of the Bill because we are unlikely to get Leveson through the front door. I particularly emphasise the point that these amendments are the best chance we have of getting the Leveson proposals implemented in their full integrity. The amendments are about access to justice. They would put in place two fundamental elements of Lord Justice Leveson’s proposals, namely means of legal redress for ordinary people if their rights are breached and a fair and independent system to deal with complaints against the press. I doubt whether those who support these fundamental elements will get another chance, or at least as good a chance as now exists, to have these principles embodied in law. The private Member’s Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, will not afford the same chance, for reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Fowler. If we fail to take advantage of this opportunity, we will in effect kick Leveson into the long grass. The amendments would make the Defamation Bill relevant to the entire population instead of just to the rich, and it is vital that we support them.
At Second Reading, I devoted most of what I said to the issue of access to justice. I take my hat off to the noble Lord, Lord Puttnam, and his supporters, as well as the noble Baronesses, Lady O’Neill of Bengarve and Lady Hollins, for concentrating on the huge lacuna in this Bill and in the law of defamation generally. Let no one be under any misapprehension as to how unjust our law of defamation is. I speak as one solicitor—long in the tooth, it must be said—who has dealt over the years with defamation, from time to time. It is a scandal how much it is a plaything of the rich, completely beyond access by people of even ordinary means. So I am wholly emotionally in favour of what is intended by this set of amendments and the schedules.
I have listened to the noble Lord, Lord Lester, who never speaks with less than authority. At first hearing, I am not sure how all the points that he made would impact, but I accept at large what he has said. One has to hope that my noble friend Lord Fowler is correct, and that if we pass this set of amendments today the defects in them can be rectified either at Third Reading in this place or in the House of Commons or when it comes back to us. I am convinced that to leave this for another day would not be responsible of us—as the last speaker said. We must take the chance that we now have, defective though the amendment may be.
I add only one detailed point. My noble friend Lord Lester said that he was wholly opposed to the notion of exemplary damages pretty well willy-nilly. At least subsection (8) of Amendment 1 talks about exemplary damages for,
“a flagrant breach of … rights”,
of the claimant. Given the sensitivity of the relationship between the press and the citizenry, it might be an acceptable use of what is generally not desirable—exemplary damages, or the concept of it—in respect of a “flagrant breach”. Incidentally, subsection (8) of the amendment has in it a serious misprint. It talks about breach of a defendant’s rights when it should refer to a claimant’s right. That is but one of several matters that could and, I hope, will be improved in the course of this Bill through the two Houses. On that basis, I am in favour of the amendments going through.
My Lords, first, I apologise that I was not in Grand Committee when the Bill was going through. The noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, always speaks with great authority on human rights and the conventions, but I would have thought that this was not the Third Reading of the Bill. If it were, we would be coming to the end of the game. This is Report, so the noble Lord, Lord Lester, might put right the defects in the amendments so that when the Bill comes back at Third Reading it will be amended. So that argument does not hold water.
In the end, it is to do with trust. If trust is absent, what do you do? We all want to trust our newspapers, but what happens when there is no trust? The amendment proposes an:
“Arbitration Service for defamation and related civil claims against members of Independent Regulatory Board”.
Because it is to do, first of all, with a question of arbitration, I am attracted to it. I am attracted to it because the preacher from Galilee said that, if you have a dispute with your neighbour, it is better to try to settle it before you go to court, because when you go to court you may find yourself being given such a stiff sentence that you end up losing doubly. Therefore, I am attracted by the whole question of arbitration. The courts, of course, can look at whether the parties were willing or unwilling to engage in arbitration. If a person has been wronged and another person does not think that is the case, arbitration obliges them to have a conversation. It seems to me that we should accept Amendment 1 at this stage. Then the Government can perhaps suggest alterations to it. Certainly, the noble Lord, Lord Lester, is always very assiduous in correcting things that are not well put. Perhaps he can suggest alterations to the amendment.
I am not persuaded by the part of the amendment in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady O’Neill and Lady Hollins, which seeks to delete subsections (5) to (7) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 1, although I may be persuaded by other parts of their amendment. Those subsections are very important. They set out what needs to happen. Therefore, I urge your Lordships’ House to pause and consider whether we really think that only the rich ought to have recourse to a remedy in defamation cases. The ordinary citizen could find redress very easily and quickly through arbitration. The press ought to welcome arbitration because it would cost far less than an elaborate court case, which may collapse in the end after a lot of costs have been incurred. When there is no trust, what do you do? You want to be in a position to rectify your situation. For those reasons, I support Amendment 1 and resist deleting proposed new subsections (5) to (7) from it.
My Lords, I support Amendment 7. I welcome the Government’s amendment to Clause 4. However, if the change from “believed” to “decided” guarantees that the checklist does not return and that authors will not be exposed to long and expensive cases in libel courts, I as a journalist think that that must be a good thing and I support it.
I wish to make a short point. I wholly agree with what my noble friend Lord Lester said about the confusing drafting of Clause 4(2). It is a most barbaric concoction and, coming in an age when we are all trying to make legislation as accessible as possible to other than legal experts, it really will not do. One particular aspect adds to its inadequacy; namely, reference to,
“an accurate and impartial account of a dispute to which the claimant was a party”.
I do not quite see why this clause should apply only to a dispute to which a claimant was a party. Why would it not apply to a matter in which the claimant had an interest? There may be no dispute there but it could be to do with a campaign where again there is no dispute. Apart from the generality, that is a bit of a drawback.
My Lords, I have no amendment in this group but I wish to speak partly in support of Amendments 6 and 7. I am persuaded, I think, that Amendment 7 may bring more to the clarity of this legislation than Amendment 6. I also wish to express some concerns about Amendments 6 and 7, which require clarification. I hope that we will be able to get that clarification from the Minister and perhaps reflect during the rest of the process of this Bill on whether the total effect of Amendments 6 and 7 will be as is being argued.
I approach this from a slightly different perspective. My reading of the effect of these amendments is that they are designed to improve Clause 4, which I accept, but that they would remove the element of subjectivity in the test of whether the publication was in the public interest. The clause has been substantially amended and, in fact, it has been recast. That has been welcomed, particularly by the promoters of these amendments, as the noble Lord, Lord Taverne, made clear at the outset. This is a much improved clause but, as I understand it, the aim has been to move away from Reynolds but to reflect the case of Flood in the law.
My Lords, there has been an understandable preoccupation thus far with the traditional media, but, of course, the web is becoming an increasingly dominant player in the world of communication. Clause 5 deals with websites and in particular with the position of operators of websites. As fellow Peers will know by now, the Defamation Bill preserves primary liability, fairly, to the author of any defamation and protects and gives a blanket protection to the operators up to the point that a notice of complaint is lodged—and for a period after that.
As we have all said endlessly, it is extraordinarily difficult to strike a balance in this difficult field between on the one hand preventing censorship by threats of libel actions and on the other hand protecting an individual’s personal reputation. The chill factor, mentioned a great deal in Committee, operates on both levels, so to speak. At Second Reading, my noble friend Lord McNally said,
“The Government want a libel regime for the internet that makes it possible for people to protect their reputations effectively but also ensures that information online cannot be easily censored by casual threats of litigation against website operators. Clause 5 of the Bill sets out a framework for how we wish to achieve this”.—[Official Report, 9/10/12; col. 935.]
Fair enough, but my noble friend Lord Faulks and I do not think that the balance has been quite well enough struck—or we would not have put down the amendment. At a previous stage of the Bill, I talked about the position of the little man and we talked earlier today about the position of those without resources in trying to protect their reputations.
One needs to acknowledge that the web is so different from traditional publishing via newspapers and magazines as to be almost another world. It provides a conduit for libel that enables defamations to be carried to the ends of the earth simultaneously at no cost. The libels will not be erased and they are universally and instantly accessible. It is interesting that in Committee my noble friend Lord Allan of Hallam said that,
“there are so many millions of pieces of content being posted by so many millions of people within the United Kingdom and elsewhere that to be able to operate these platforms at scale and not have some kind of defence becomes unworkable”.—[Official Report, 19/12/12; col. GC 574.]
I agree with him on “some kind of defence”, but that has to be a fair defence or it will reverberate unfairly against the individuals libelled.
I remind all noble Lords that Clause 5 says that the operator of the website cannot be liable for any defamation posted, however grotesque or damaging, unless and until a notice of complaint is filed and the operator fails to deal with that notice in accordance with the Bill and the regulations yet to come. That is not sufficient or adequate. Under Clause 5 as it stands, the web operator loses his defence only, as I say, once the notice of complaint has been given and he fails to respond in accordance with the regulations. I am happy that Amendment 17, to be moved shortly by the Government, will put into the Bill the amendment that I moved in Committee that would defeat a defence if there is malice on the part of the operator. The onus will be on the person defamed to prove malice, which is a high bar.
One needs to recognise that sometimes, not infrequently, the primary person responsible for the libel—the author of the statement posted—may not be accessible. I do not want to elaborate on what was said last time except briefly to remind the House that often these libels are anonymous, and behind one anonymous libel is another and so on. It is a commonplace for those affected by the defamations to go to court and get one order, only to find that another is required, and another and another. It is vital that the role and responsibility of the operators should be fair to both sides.
Just consider for the minute what the defamed citizen has to do under the Bill as it stands even to get a notice up on the web. First, he or she will need to get legal advice about what to do—we have spoken a lot about the complexity of this whole web of arrangements. That will be expensive—just that will be too expensive for many citizens—but so be it. There then has to be drafted a complaint notice that satisfies Clause 5(6), explaining why a statement is defamatory—fair enough. There will then be extra tests, or at least extra requirements, under the regulations when passed that may add substantially to the complexity of drawing up and lodging a notice. Other amendments tonight would impose yet more complicated tests on the defamed citizen—Amendment 14, for example. Then and only then, when the notice of complaint has been duly drawn up and served, will the operator of the website have to act to preserve his immunity and defence. There will still be time—I think probably 14 days—after all that when he can consider whether to take down the statement complained about. In that time—we could easily be talking about a month—the libel will be up and will have spread across the globe and back. The more grievous the libel the further it will have travelled and the more damage will have been done.
It is against that background that Amendment 10 is drafted. I suggest to noble Lords that it is neither unfair on nor unduly restrictive of operators. It will for example provide that if an operator was aware that the person posting the defamation had his knife out for the person defamed then it could well be falling foul of proposed new subsection (1)(b) of our amendment, namely that,
“the operator took reasonable care in relation to its posting”.
It could also fall foul of proposed new paragraph (c), which states that,
“the operator did not know and had no reason to believe that what it did caused, encouraged or contributed to the posting of the statement”.
Take another situation, where the operator had a stake in this and was maybe a partner or had some business association with the person posting the defamatory statement. Surely then the operator should be under a special duty to keep an eye on what that person or company was doing. Otherwise, as I say, there could be an unfairness to the person defamed and the operator would not be entirely at arm’s length or wholly unaware. It would not be in a position where it could not anticipate some potentially malign action on the part of the person who posted the defamation. It could be, for example, that it was part of a joint campaign. It could be that the website operator itself had an agenda. More and more websites are campaigning websites and have an axe to grind. Our amendments would at least ensure that where that was the case and the court felt that the operator had not taken reasonable care, and had knowledge or anticipation of what was likely to be posted by the individual or company concerned, it would not be able to hide behind the provisions of Clause 5(2) as it stands.
I think I will cease at this point, except to say that the uncontrolled use of the web is, as many would agree, coarsening our culture. There is a great deal of matter put on to websites every minute of every day that is unseemly, often bullying and sometimes pornographic. There is, as I say, a coarsening of our culture. This amendment will not change all that fundamentally, but it will at least control to some extent what is posted by dint of making the blanket immunity of the operator subject to reasonable and fair conditions.
I leave my noble friend Lord Faulks, who has put his name to this amendment, to deal with the relationship between it and the Defamation Act 1996, and to talk about the flexibility that the amendment will introduce into the defamation regime.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I particularly thank my noble friend Lord Lester for his intervention.
Clause 5 provides a defence to website operators if, upon receipt of a notice of complaint, they follow a process designed to ensure that the issue is resolved with the poster of the material. My noble friends Lord Faulks and Lord Phillips raised concerns in Committee about Clause 5, and my noble friend Lord McNally and I met them to discuss those concerns. I am pleased to say that, as has been acknowledged, as a result of those discussions the Government have been able to bring forward Amendment 17 on the issue of malice, which I shall speak to in the next group of amendments. However, this amendment takes a different approach to that taken by the Government in Clause 5. As has been said, it would replace the Clause 5 defence and the accompanying process with provisions which substantially replicate the defence for secondary publishers currently found under Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 but with one important addition. New subsection (1)(d) would require the operator, on receipt of a complaint, to respond with expedition and to take such action as is reasonable in the circumstances.
This additional requirement would mean that, in order to have a defence, the operator would, on receipt of a complaint, need to make a judgment on what action it was reasonable to take. This would inevitably involve them reaching a view on the merits of the case, which in most instances they would not be in a position to do. The fact that they would lose the defence if a court decided that they had not acted reasonably would create a great deal of uncertainty for website operators, and we believe that in practice it would mean that many operators would simply choose to take the material down. That would result in exactly the same situation that we have now—an approach which has been criticised as unsatisfactory not only by a large majority of the responses to our public consultation but by the Joint Committee on the draft Bill and by the Law Commission in its 2002 scoping study on defamation and the internet.
Subsection (2) in the amendment would require the court, in considering whether or not the defence was made out, to take account of any steps taken by the operator to have and comply with a code of practice in relation to defamation, a complaints procedure or a system for providing identity details of posters to claimants to enable them to bring proceedings against the poster. I totally understand the intention behind the proposed subsection but Clause 5 already sets out a simple process in relation to the handling of complaints and the provision of identity details. In the event that a complainant brings proceedings against a website operator, the court will be able to assess whether the operator has complied with that process. This will ensure that the court takes into account how the operator has responded to the complaint. Perhaps I may also inform noble Lords that we will be publishing specific guidance on how the new process will operate for all those involved.
We have heard a great deal about balance. This new approach is about striking the correct balance and also providing protection to website operators. It is about striking a fair balance between those who have allegedly been subject to defamation and freedom of expression and speech. We believe that the defence in Clause 5 strikes a fair balance between all the interests involved. It will help freedom of expression by giving the poster of allegedly defamatory material an opportunity to stand up for it if they wish to do so, and it will give greater certainty to website operators. At the same time, it will enable claimants to secure take-down of the material on a short fixed timescale in the event that the poster does not wish to defend it. Where the poster does wish to defend it, it will also ensure that the Norwich Pharmacal process is more likely to give the claimant the information they need to pursue proceedings. I hope that on that basis my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to those who took part in this debate. I heard what the Minister said but I fear that I remain completely unassuaged. I think that we will rue the day that the Bill goes through in this form. All I can say is that I hope very much that when the regulations come to be drafted and debated, they will in some way compensate for what seems to my noble friend Lord Faulks, myself and indeed others to be a serious misbalance. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.