Lord Lucas
Main Page: Lord Lucas (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Lord Lucas's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(11 years, 11 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI hear what my noble friend says. Perhaps we can refer to this matter; he makes a valid point. As he rightly acknowledges, we would not see this issue occurring on a regular basis, but I will certainly reflect on his comments on this.
A variety of amendments has been tabled. On “balance”, I suppose it depends how you define the word. However, in seeking to bring the Bill forward, and particularly with this clause, the Government are seeking to strike the right balance. We continue to listen, hear and consult with all parties on both sides of the coin. We are working to ensure that something practical and workable, which protects those who are subject to such actions, comes out of this process.
My Lords, I was encouraged by my noble friend’s response, and by his batting at the subsequent bowling. It is clear that we are both aiming in the same direction and that, given the expertise of his colleagues and the good will of the Government, we may get somewhere interesting. I would be grateful if he would allow me to come in for a meeting with officials, preferably before the end of January if that is his consultation deadline, to pursue some of the practicalities; a nod will do on these occasions.
We should be more robust in talking to website operators about right of reply. This is merely a question of tweaking a few lines of code. It may be inconvenient for people to do it, but it is essentially practical. It is such a fundamental thing, given the way in which views, opinions and statements travel now, that one should be able to attach a reply to it and deal with it robustly in that way. To have a statement with a reply available to people as soon as they pick something up is a powerful thing in the internet world. That is has not been provided for is merely that it has not been coded. It is essentially not impossible under any circumstances with any website if people put their mind to it. It will not happen immediately, but it should certainly happen within a year if that is a requirement. I would be chary about accepting excuses on that.
There is something to be said for looking at different arrangements for statements about real persons as opposed to statements about businesses. Picking up on the points made correctly and forcefully by my noble friend Lord Faulks, if someone is accused of something which goes to their person, that cannot be allowed to hang around for seven days, or even seven hours, without being dealt with. It should not be within the policies of any reputable web operator that such statements are allowed on their website. These things belong in the hands of the police if there are real accusations. It should not be part of our view of electronic media that it is there to give currency to that sort of statement, whether true or not.
On the other hand, we must be powerful in allowing people to make statements about businesses or the way in which people do business, and to allow website operators to be robust in their defence of people who have made those statements on their websites. As Mumsnet said, the easy answer is to take them down. The only way to defeat that easy answer is to make very clear and very practical the responses that are available to the website operator so that they can have certainty in knowing whether a comment is sensible and that the law allows them to stand by it. That is what I want to pursue with the Minister when we have our meeting. On the point about maliciousness, we are talking about a lot of little website operators and not just the big guys, and there are some very malicious ones out there.
I would of course be happy to arrange a meeting. The benefit of being in the Moses Room is that your officials are right behind you, and I am sure that they have noted it as I have.
My Lords, because of my general opposition to this clause, it is obvious that I would also oppose these very well meaning and well articulated suggestions of a mode of complaining by someone who feels that they have been defamed on a website. The debate has thrown up the fact that the industry is in the process of developing a response to this new problem, and I respectfully suggest to your Lordships that that is where the development should come from, not by means of legislation—we are bound to get it wrong and to be out of date. Rather, it calls for a response to a developing situation. If a code of practice is developed that provides an appropriate response, that will deter people from suing, certainly for anything other than the most serious defamations.
As for the amendment put forward by my noble friend Lord Lester, I entirely understand it and the fact that he wears his cloak from the JCHR. If there is to be such a procedure, however, it is asking quite a lot of an individual to make some form of assessment as to, first, whether it is defamatory and, secondly, whether it is unlawful. That would involve them reviewing possible defences: whether or not it was justified, which is an absolute defence; whether or not there was qualified privilege; whether there was responsible publication. That is a considerable series of hurdles for someone to overcome before deciding on and setting out the nature of their complaint.
On the alternative dispute resolution, of course I understand what animates that. It is very easy to sit around in a committee of any sort and suggest that something can be done quickly, cheaply and easily. The reality, of course, is that there are short cuts even within the current framework. People can get preliminary rulings on meaning and whether something is capable of being defamatory within the existing mechanism. I fear that what is suggested may sound like a good idea but may in fact simply be superorgative. It may add to what is already there and not provide the sort of cheap alternative mechanism that plainly is desirable. I respectfully suggest that the amendment should not be pursued.
My Lords, I support what my noble friend has just said. Having listened to the various alternatives, I think that the idea of having to involve the courts is just going to freak out any website operator, particularly those who deal in any volume. You are asking for some sort of cheap way to get to a judgment that is essentially expensive because there are a lot of things to be considered.
I think that the right answer to this, as my noble friend just said, lies in giving really good guidance to the courts and to website operators as to what is protected under the Bill and what is not. That comes back to points that I made under previous clauses. I do not understand what is going to be protected under the Bill; what is going to be regarded as fair comment; what is going to be required in terms of the person making the complaint or statement stating the basis on which they have made it; or the references to “fact” that creep in, which is something that you as a website operator know that you can never establish. As my noble friend said earlier, we all have insurance to cover those things. I am sure that the same applies to Facebook as it does at the bottom end, which I occupy. That insurance is not vastly expensive and is available on sensible terms from sensible insurers. As long as you have reasonable systems to ensure that you are doing your best not to publish things for which you may be sued, you are protected.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this detailed debate. Arguments have again been presented to show both sides of the coin. Amendment 26, in the name of my noble friend Lord Lester, would require a claimant to set out in a notice of complaint why the statement complained of was not merely defamatory but also unlawful.
Our clear aim in bringing forward the Bill is, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has said, to make the law on defamation clearer, cheaper and easier for the ordinary citizen to use. It is perhaps reasonably easy for an ordinary person to understand and explain why a statement may be regarded as defamatory; it is quite another for the same person to explain, without recourse to legal advice, how that could be deemed unlawful. That arguably would involve a thorough knowledge of the law, both statute and common, and a rebuttal of the various defences that might be available to the person making the statement. The aim is to avoid putting lawyers rather than the parties at the heart of the argument. For those reasons, the Government are opposed to the amendment.
That said, we of course share the concern of those who argue that complainants should give some explanation as to why they think a statement is defamatory. The note that we have provided to the House on the content of the regulations makes clear that, where appropriate, complainants should, in a notice of complaint, provide details such as the meaning attributed to the words complained of and why they are defamatory, including any factual inaccuracies or unsupportable comment. This reflects the wording in the defamation pre-action protocol in relation to the contents of a letter before a claim, and we believe that this is an appropriate level of detail to expect complainants to provide.
Amendment 27, in the names of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Lord, Lord Allan of Hallam, has two purposes. First, it seeks to place in the Bill, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, suggested, a number of requirements that a complainant’s notice of complaint should meet. As I indicated in speaking to Amendment 26, we share the concerns of those who argue that complainants should have to give some explanation as to why they think a statement is defamatory of them. I have explained the level of detail that we think is reasonable to expect a complainant to provide in order to enable the poster of the material to understand the basis of the complaint.
As I have also said, we believe that to require a claimant to go further and prove that the statement was unlawful would make it more onerous and difficult for a layman to make a complaint without first having sought sound legal advice, nor do we see how it would be in the interests of website operators, who would also have to seek legal advice, and could end up in litigation over the validity of notices that they chose to reject.
My noble friend Lord Marks talked about the need for as much detail as possible to be put in the Bill so that people can readily understand what is required. We believe that the regulations are the appropriate way to deal with the issues of detail within the framework established by Clause 5. However, we will ensure, after listening to the debate as well, that detailed guidance is published prior to the commencement of any new provisions to assist complainants, posters and website operators in understanding and following the new process.
The second part of Amendment 27 would allow the Secretary of State to make a provision in regulations for a procedure whereby a complainant can obtain from the court a declaration that his notice of complaint is valid—namely, that it meets the requirements of subsection (6). It has been indicated with regard to amendment that the procedure would also be available where either the poster of the material or the website operator wishes to apply for such a declaration.
I referred to the contribution made by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. I agree with him that the whole purpose of Clause 5 is to provide a simple, quick, cheap and effective means for the complainant to request the removal of potentially defamatory material and for the poster to engage with this request for removal and stand by his posting if he wishes to do so. It was suggested that the Norwich Pharmacal process may not be effective in securing the necessary information on the poster. We propose in the consultation that the poster should be required to provide the full legal name and contact details, including their postal address. If they fail to do so, the website operator would have to take the material down. This, we believe, should help to ensure that the Norwich Pharmacal process enables the complainant to obtain sufficient information to enable him to bring proceedings against the poster.
As several noble Lords have noted, the system that Amendment 27 proposes would seem to require complainants to go to court at the outset, prior to making a complaint, to obtain a court declaration that their notice of complaint is valid. Presumably, any complainant who did not have such a declaration would not have their complaint processed by the website operator. It is unclear to us how this procedure could be adapted to deal with applications by posters or website operators, and at what stage these would be made. In any event, and as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has mentioned, this additional process is likely to add unnecessary cost, delay and burden for the individual. In at least some cases, we believe that posters will be content for their statements to come down. Under this system, complainants would have to incur the time and expense of going to court irrespective of the attitude of the poster. Additional burdens would be created for the court system. The proposed amendments do not strike a fair and appropriate—we come back to that word again—balance between the interests of freedom of expression and complainants’ rights to reputation.
I concur with many of the points made by other noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Faulks, and hope on the basis of the explanation that I have given that noble Lords will not press their amendments.
My Lords, my noble friend has got his answer to Amendment 26 completely wrong, particularly so far as website operators are concerned. I do not care a fig about knowing whether a comment is defamatory; it is obvious that “The food was filthy” is defamatory. What I want to know is whether I can publish it or whether the restaurant says, “No such meal was served on that evening” or “We know this fellow from before and he has been completely unreasonable on other occasions” or gives us some reason that the comment is fair. It is absolutely crucial that Amendment 26 is accepted. Just to know that something is defamatory gives you no information and you can see that with your own eyes; it is obvious. What is not obvious is why it is unlawful. In order to take a reasonably robust attitude to standing between a complainant and the person who has made the posting, and who may well quite reasonably wish to be shy, not least because they think that they have sinned against some large corporation that will skin them in the courts if they are identified, I would want as a website operator, as I imagine other website operators do, too—certainly, those to whom I have talked do—to be in a position to stand behind something that we consider to be fair comment. We need to know why the complainant thinks that it is unlawful. We all know why it is defamatory.
My Lords, it may be a response to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, to say that while there is of course a distinction between what is defamatory and what is illegal, it is not necessarily for the complainant to dictate why it is illegal. Thought might perhaps be given to making a regulation under Clause 5(3)(c) that put on the operator who sought to invoke this defence the need to say why, notwithstanding that the statement was defamatory, it was none the less lawful to publish it. That might be a better way of achieving the balance than putting, as other noble Lords have recognised, the often financially onerous burden on the complainant to anticipate and meet in advance the several defences that may or may not be urged as justification for the publication.
I hope that Hansard noted that comment from a sedentary position and the general approval from the non-lawyers in the Committee for that observation.
At some stages during those debates, as a non-lawyer, I thought of John Wilkes, the famous radical. When he was about to publish his newspaper, the North Briton, he was asked by a French acquaintance, “Is the press free in your country?”. “I am about to find out,” said Wilkes. I think, having listened to this debate, that in some respects the internet is going to find out whether or not it is free. My noble friend Lord Mawhinney asked me where we were with regard to balance. It is not a question of balance between right and wrong, but the debates that we have had today show that there is a balance.
One of the great things about continuity in this House is that I was on the pre-legislative scrutiny committee that looked at the Communications Bill, where we deliberately advised against trying to legislate for the internet. On reflection, I think that we were right. My noble friend Lord Phillips said that he was on the side of the little man. On reflection, one of the greatest boons to the rights of the little man over the past decade or so has been the worldwide web and its freedoms. While I hear the passion and the righteous indignation of those who have been defamed and hurt, we as a Committee have to be careful not to overlegislate something that on the plus side has some considerable benefits for the little man.
That was a complete abuse of procedure, because I am moving a government amendment of some simplicity. It was also because I am wracked by guilt: at one point during the debates, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, helpfully sent me a note saying, “Are you on holiday?”. The truth is that when we were setting out who was going to handle what, I thought, “Clause 5 will be a nice snappy debate, since my noble friend Lord Ahmad—although he is learning disturbingly fast—should be given some experience of Bill-handling”. Little did I realise that he was going to have such a baptism of fire.
Amendment 28 provides for the affirmative resolution procedure to apply to the scrutiny of the regulations to be made under Clause 5 of the Bill, rather than the negative resolution procedure as the Bill currently provides. That is in the light of views put forward on this issue by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights and others. The affirmative procedure will ensure that the regulations receive more thorough parliamentary scrutiny. I hope that, as such, it will be acceptable to this Committee and to the House. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend for that explanation. Our noble friend Lord Ahmad has been doing a superb job, and I have been immensely impressed. I had assumed that my noble friend Lord McNally was silent because he was serving time in the penalty box after voting against the Government yesterday.
My Lords, those of us on this side of the Committee welcome this amendment because it follows the advice and recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the advice of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, but mostly because an amendment—identical in effect if not in words—was moved by my honourable friend Rob Flello in Committee in the House of Commons and was rejected by the Government. The reason given by the then Minister Mr Djanogly was that:
“The Government consider that the detailed and technical nature of the proposed regulations, and the fact that they will govern procedural issues, means that the negative resolution procedure is more appropriate, and provides the appropriate level of parliamentary scrutiny”.—[Official Report, Commons, Defamation Bill Committee, 21/6/12; col. 122.]
That sentence, in itself, argued for why that was exactly the wrong procedure for these regulations. I am pleased to see that the Government have accepted that that was the case and have now welcomed this provision into the Bill.
Having listened to the debate on Clause 5, I do not share the level of guilt that the noble Lord has for having had his colleague deal with it. I am delighted that my noble friend Lady Hayter has agreed to do this. She is well equipped for the job and, indeed, has much greater experience than I have in your Lordships’ House, which makes her better equipped for this complicated part of the Bill than I am.
I believe that the most important part of Clause 5 will be the consultation on the regulations, which everyone who has come to lobby me about this part of the Bill seems to be a part of. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, may well become part of this consultation process. Maybe it is time for all of us to become part of this consultation process, because looking as I do now, in the light of the discussion that has taken place in your Lordships’ Committee, at the 26 paragraphs of this consultation document, I would like to have my say about what should be in these regulations.
It might be helpful if some process was set in place so that those from all the various interests that are represented in your Lordships’ Committee who have shown an interest in this Bill could have an active role in a process of discussion in respect of these regulations. Otherwise, I suspect that at some stage in the progress of this Bill—perhaps on Report—we may find ourselves timetabling insufficient time for the debate that will ensue in relation to Clause 5.
My Lords, I hear what my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill has just said, and it is a very strong point. None the less, we have to legislate for our own circumstances. I come back to the point that we cannot leave the Bill in a state where individuals can be grotesquely, viciously and intentionally defamed, where huge platforms—website operators—can grow rich in allowing that to happen with total impunity and with no possible remedy for the individuals concerned. That cannot be right. I am reminded slightly of some of the arguments about the banking sector and the banks that are “too big to fail”. We cannot get into a mentality where website operators are too big to pay. We have never had a satisfactory answer for why website operators could not take out comprehensive insurance so that, if they were sued by individuals because of the defamations of those who post on their platforms, they could pay up in the normal way.
I have great sympathy for the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, put his case for Amendment 30, not least because we are all grappling with fiendish and unprecedented problems with no easy answer. Generally, I come down on the side of saying that nobody should have the right to defame others—in a way, incidentally, that will travel further and faster than any other system of publication in the history of the world—and be able to say, “Ooh, no, you can’t reveal my name; that’s a breach of my human rights”. There is another breach of human rights involved in defamation—indeed, it is worse because the defamer is doing it intentionally. I am, of course, taking the worst case. If you have to place in juxtaposition the vicious defamer on the one hand and on the other the possibility that that defamer’s particulars may have to be revealed by the website operator in the process of complying with our new legislation, I am afraid that I have to come down on the side of the person who has been defamed.
My Lords, speaking again as a web operator, I do not know any way of establishing a person’s identity just because they are posting. One could establish a web identity, but that may have a very fuzzy relationship with any individual. If someone posts, gives me an e-mail address and I verify that e-mail address, that is about as far as I can get. However, I think that we can reasonably insist on that. If we are offering website operators the protection of this Bill against being sued for what is posted on their sites, we can ask them at least to have verified a web identity. We can ask that they take some steps to have a method of communication with this person and do not just allow straightforward anonymous postings. Then, something put up on the net should come from someone with whom the website operator knows that they have an established means of communication. Whether or not that works, is fake or just ends in silence, I do not think you can ask the website operator to determine. But you can at least make them take the first step.
This is a sensitive and difficult issue but I find myself in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Lester, and others that the downside of doing this outweighs the upside. However, it was also my impression—which may just reveal that I did not understand what was going on—that quite a significant recourse is already given by what we were discussing under Clause 5.
My Lords, I support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Chesterton. Were I surrounded by the Joint Committee, it would be in agreement with my wanting to do so. I say to the noble Lord and, indeed, to my noble friend that the definition of “recognised” may need to be examined a little further and tightened just a little more, not least bearing in mind the point that the noble Lord, Lord May, has just made, but that is relatively straightforward. The principle seems to be a good one, in line with what we in the committee produced, and I commend the noble Lord.
My Lords, I am slightly sad that this privilege should not be extended to the Daily Mail, if one can imagine how that would work. I am concerned that the definition of “journal” should be wide enough. There are a lot of what might be called open-access journals now, rather than just the ones that are paid for, and I find them much more useful because I can actually get to read what is in them rather than being asked to pay £20 a time to see if what is in there is of interest to me. As the amendments point out, there are a number of websites that serve very similar functions, where intense discussions take place.
Even with regard to the Bill, how much does the word “journal” cover? Would it include Scientific American, for instance, or similar publications? At what point does something stop being a journal and start being a magazine or a publication that is ineligible under this part of the Bill?
My Lords, I support the direction of travel that the amendment proposes, but this is not yet a complete process. Let me explain. I had the benefit of a long engagement with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, in the early stages of the evolution of this amendment, and I gave him my views on this issue, which were quite strong. My understanding was that the purpose of the early amendment that was put to me was to create an environment in which there could be a debate or dialogue on an issue of controversy, in the public domain and in a moderated fashion, but which would attract privilege.
I expressed my concerns to him about that as an idea, and I summarise them in this fashion: while I agree that there needs to be the sort of debate among scientists, technical people and academics that the noble Lord, Lord May, robustly describes regularly to us, to the benefit of our deliberations, I am not entirely sure that it is in the interests of everyone who is affected by that for it be taking place in public. To give an example off the top of my head, if someone had concerns, based on good technical analysis and engineering understanding about the braking system of a mass-produced motor vehicle, then if I were a shareholder in that firm I would be very unhappy if that debate took place in the public domain before it was settled. I would be equally unhappy if we as legislators allowed that public debate to have privilege, because one could guarantee that no one would buy that motor vehicle while that debate was taking place and it could ruin a business. I am sure that others can think of many other examples that would be entirely inappropriate. So I have reservations about that.
However, if the amendment is not seeking to generate that sort of debate or a forum for that sort of debate and to allow it to attract privilege, and I do not hear that it is, there is now an interesting evolution of the peer-reviewed statement in scientific and academic journals that Clause 6 was designed to create the opportunity for, and to allow there to be privilege. It could properly reflect the changing, modern environment that we live in, where there is the possibility that the organisations that have been given this role, if they all accept it, could provide an opportunity for healthy debate and discussion—an appropriate point in the public domain that would aid academic consideration, and which would aid technical and scientific discussion. I have a number of problems with that and I do not think that we should conclude our debate on this issue at this stage. I hope that the Minister will approach this in the way in which he approached Clause 5 and say that the Government will take this away and think about it.
My understanding of Clause 6 is that it depends on the fact that what is published in scientific or academic journals—they could be e-journals—is entitled to privilege because it is peer reviewed. It does not reach the public, a wider audience, until a controlled discussion has taken place among those people qualified to do so. People who work at that level in a discipline are used to reviewing each other at peer level. We have significant confidence in them. Those of us who do not have the expertise in particular disciplines rely on them heavily as regards what, for example, the BMJ, will allow to be published.
If another institution, or a set of institutions—for example, the institutions identified by these amendments —is willing to take on the responsibility of that level of peer review before it allows these statements to be published, I am entirely in agreement. If that generates a controversial debate, we should consider whether that debate started by a peer-reviewed assessment should attract a level of privilege. I do not know whether other Members of the Committee will share my view that this is a really interesting idea but that it needs a lot more work. I am not in a position to do that significant amount of work but the one question that I ask the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is: what is the equivalent of this addition of peer review? We on these Benches could not support a view on an issue of controversy, which potentially could be defamatory, being exercised in a privileged environment just because it was a view held among technically gifted people, scientists or academics. I think that it could be just as damaging.