Counter-Extremism Strategy

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Wednesday 20th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will take that as a representation on the outcome of the review, because I cannot comment on the review today. There are two aspects to extremism, the first of which is an external threat, so the Government have to be cognisant of individuals. That is why we have watch lists, security services and advice looking at potential threats from abroad. Equally, the strategy will be concerned with radicalisation at home—not just people from communities that relate to the faith of Islam, but people who might well be radicalised online by a range of sources, from outside the UK or from inside. Counter-extremism is about looking at the total envelope, at home and abroad, and the Government will focus on that when the review’s recommendations are brought forward.

[Lord Beamish (Lab)]

My Lords, the ISC, in its report on right-wing extremism, highlighted the issue of young men, in particular, being attracted by right-wing extremism online. Will my noble friend outline what the Government are doing to ensure that platforms take down content that is leading to the radicalisation of some young people?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Again, my noble friend tempts me to produce the outline of the review’s conclusions. But we genuinely take this issue seriously. When I was a Member of Parliament, a constituent of mine in a small village in north Wales was badly attacked and injured by someone with a machete who was radicalised by Nazi philosophy online. That radicalisation is extremely important, and we need to look at how we build up the stability of individuals to resist that radicalisation and, as my noble friend said, stop that radicalisation at source. If it comes from outside this country, we need to take effective action through the security services and others to close it down. I will give my noble friend further information once the review is complete.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment)Bill [Lords]

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 25th March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis]

That is a very useful clarification, and I thank the Minister for it.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I accept what the Minister has just said, but where is the threshold for publicity? As he said, the Panama papers were widely distributed in the public domain, but somebody’s Facebook feed might be put into the public domain. If it gets into the national newspapers and on the internet, or it is shared by a certain number of people, do we then determine that it is in the public domain? We need to be very careful about this.

[Dan Jarvis]

My right hon. Friend is undoubtedly right: we do need to be very careful. In the end, the Government have to take a view about where they draw the line. These are very difficult decisions that have to be made. We had really useful and constructive debates in Committee about where the line should be drawn, but the issue will no doubt continue to be debated in the future.

Before I draw my remarks to a close, I will briefly speak to other amendments on the Order Paper, including those tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, other members of the ISC, and the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Sir David Davis). We support amendment 23, which stands in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham. It is very similar to the amendments we proposed in Committee regarding the Prime Minister’s delegation to a Secretary of State to issue a warrant to interfere with equipment relating to a Member. The amendment sets out that the Prime Minister must be informed of a decision taken by a designated Secretary of State on their behalf as soon as the circumstances that prevented the Prime Minister from approving a warrant in the first place have passed.

We believe that the Prime Minister’s overall involvement in those warrants must be retained, even if it is retrospective in designated cases, so it was a positive step that the Minister said he would look into including such a provision in the statutory guidance, in response to the very sensible points made by the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings. However, we believe this does not go far enough, when this important notification arrangement should be on the face of the Bill.

This House should consider as many scenarios as possible when it comes to arrangements for prime ministerial power delegation on investigatory powers, even if scenarios of Cabinet members desperately trying to undermine the Prime Minister by any means possible perhaps belong more appropriately in “House of Cards” or “The Thick of It”. [Interruption.] I am sure that Conservative Members would have no idea about those kinds of activities; I am happy to take their word for that. But these are important matters, and we must seek to legislate carefully. The amendments tabled by the ISC are thoughtful and constructive, and I hope that, even at this late stage, the Government will consider accepting them.

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The Minister has a difficult job; there are no two ways about it. The task faced by the Home Office, and indeed the agencies, in dealing with the threats to this country is incredibly difficult but, from time to time, we have historically slipped from the standards we view as essential to our national character—a proper understanding and belief in the rule of law, and abiding by that rule of law almost irrespective of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. The first test—the first criterion—when considering a Bill such as this should be, “Do we always obey the rule of law? Does the Bill encourage Governments always to obey the rule of law, whether they are dealing with suspects abroad or with subjects at home?”

[Mr Kevan Jones]

First, let me put on record the apologies of the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), who chairs the Intelligence and Security Committee. Unfortunately, he is attending Lord Cormack’s funeral, and I thought it was important to put the reason why he is not here on the record.

First, let me refer to new clause 1, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), and say that it is disappointing that we have to have this debate. I am the longest serving member of the ISC, having been on it for nearly eight years. It is a serious Committee; its members take its work seriously and work collegiately. We work on the basis that we support the work of our security services, recognising the difficult job they sometimes have and the dangerous work they do, but that we are also there to provide scrutiny and oversight. If anyone cares to look at our reports over the years, they will see that they are not only thorough, but forensic in their approach. So it is disappointing that the current Government and the previous few have downplayed the Committee’s role.

On Second Reading, I referred to the scrutiny of our intelligence services being a bit like a three-legged stool, as we have the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, the tribunal and the ISC. Together, we should be an effective mechanism to reassure the public that there is oversight of our security services. This is important because the work they do cannot be discussed in open session, and that mechanism gives the confidence that in a parliamentary democracy, where we take freedom of speech and democracy seriously, we have that oversight. The problem with the Government is that, for whatever reason, they have set out their course to undermine our work—I put that on the record.

The new clause will say that the Prime Minister should attend our meetings. It should not be necessary to include such a provision—I believe you served on the ISC at one stage, Madam Deputy Speaker, and so you understand the work we do—but we have a situation where it seems this is seen as not important. The only one in recent times who offered a meeting was the right hon. Member for South West Norfolk (Elizabeth Truss), but that was because she was looking for friends in the last dying days of her Administration, so I do not think it counts. Again, I do not understand the reason behind this. The walls on the way into our office have various photographs of the Committee—you are on one of them, Madam Deputy Speaker—with various Prime Ministers of the day. But this is not about that; it is about the Prime Minister of the day knowing exactly what we are doing and our being able to raise things directly in our secure setting, which we do. That is important, but there is also a wider point to be made about how we scrutinise our security services and give the public that opportunity.

The amendments I have tabled also stand in the names of five other members of the Committee, and we support this Bill. Will we be back in a few years’ time with another Bill? Yes, we will, because, as was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central, technology is changing very fast and we will have to react to it. When the original Bill was taken through by the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), he recognised that it would not be set in tablets of stone and that this new Bill would be required. The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Sir David Davis) is right to say that AI will set some other tests that we have not perhaps thought about yet and those might have to be covered by future legislation. Are we reactive as a Parliament? We always are reactive, but this Bill is important because it will give our security services the abilities to react to the ever-changing world that we face.

I wish to refer to two pairs of amendments that relate to clauses 22 and 23, which go to the issue associated with the triple lock and the authorisations—

[Sir David Davis]

Before the right hon. Gentleman moves on, I wish to pick up on his point about the need for continually keeping up with the changing technology. One thing that was expected when the ISC was created was that it would become, if not quite a grandees Committee, a Committee of people who knew exactly what they were doing and took very seriously the issues before them, including the confidentiality of what they do. At least one of the Chairmen of the ISC has complained in the past about the level of redaction of ISC reports. That matters in the context of keeping up with the times because the only way the House of Commons has of understanding the ISC’s opinions is by reading its reports, and if Members are reading a lot of blank or black lines, they will not learn very much.

[Mr Jones]

I understand the right hon. Gentleman’s frustration, but, as Madam Deputy Speaker knows, there are good reasons for those redactions. The Committee does not just agree to everything being redacted; a thorough process takes place and we have some long arguments with the agencies. I would not want anyone to go away thinking that the members of the ISC are a pushover on redacting information. A lot of attention was given to why certain things were redacted from the Russia report. I am comfortable in the knowledge that the things redacted in that report could not have been put in the public domain. The main reason for this is not to save embarrassment for government or any of the individuals; it is about the ability to protect the tradecraft of our services. If we did put certain things in the public domain, our adversaries who want to do us harm would be able to work certain things out. I assure the House that we push back hard and some redactions that have been put forward over the years have been silly, as other ISC members in the Chamber tonight will recognise.

Let me get back to the issue about the triple lock, which is important. The issue is sensitive because it relates to intrusion into the communications of Members of this House and of devolved Administrations. We are talking about what is commonly known as the Wilson doctrine, but, it is like a lot of things in this age; it was announced in 1966, when it was about telecommunications and picking phones up, but we are in a different world now, as the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden said. We now have smartphones, and God knows what is going to be invented in the next few years in terms of how we communicate. As with a lot of things, the convention was thought to be the way forward, but clearly in 2015 it was found that the devolved Administrations were not covered by it and neither were MEPs. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that it had no legal enforcement at all, so it was credit to the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 that a formal process was put in place for it—that is important.

Currently, the 2016 Act has three layers of safeguards: the Secretary of State who asks for the warrant; a judicial commissioner who examines the communication that is the target of interception and the type of equipment involved, if it relates to a member of a relevant legislature; and, thirdly, the Prime Minister, who, as the final stop, has to agree this.

The Bill will allow the Prime Minister to designate “up to five” Secretaries of State who can approve the warrants in the event that he or she is unable to be available. As has been raised, the obvious example was when Boris Johnson was incapacitated through covid. When we think about the issue, this measure makes sense. The ISC recognised other unique situations when a Prime Minister may not be available, for example if they were abroad and secure communications were not possible. The ISC was keen that the circumstances needed to be exceptional, but we accept that there is a need for the requirement.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

I very much hope the right hon. Gentleman has brought Lord West’s smelling salts with him, because I would like to clarify the concession that Lord West got in the Lords here in the Commons. I can happily commit to strengthening the language on notification requirements in the code of practice, when it is formally brought forward in due course, to require that the Prime Minister “will” be notified of any decisions under the alternative process, rather than “should” be.

[Mr Jones]

I welcome that, but can I hear it again and pin the Minister down a little more? I am sure it is a massive victory, but is he giving a solemn pledge to the House that the code of practice will remove the word “should” and insert the word “will”? Is that what he is agreeing to?

[Tom Tugendhat]

Yes.

[Mr Jones]

Victory at last—there is such power in changing one word. The Minister has given a solemn undertaking on the Floor of the House that the code of practice will change the word “should” to “will”. A small victory for the ISC, but I am sure my colleagues will take it in the spirit in which it is offered. I say to the Minister gently that we could have agreed that the other day when we met, but no doubt the issue that we will be voting on tonight was concentrating his mind.

With that great victory under my belt and those of the members of the ISC, I turn to other amendments. New clause 3, in the name of the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden, deals with

“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”.

I understand why he has proposed the new clause. It is always worthwhile debating the issues, which run through the entire Bill. Am I assured that there are processes in place that protect our civil liberties? Yes, I am. However, there are occasions when things can go wrong or people ignore them. I think they have been strengthened greatly, but the right hon. Gentleman refers to an important point. I was on the Committee in 2017 when we did the inquiry into detention and rendition. That took a long time, but it was a good report given where it got to. It unearthed things that were not pleasant but had been done in our names as a democracy.

One conclusion the Committee came to was that in its view the UK tolerated actions and took others that were regarded as inexcusable. Well, they were inexcusable, because as the report outlined, we passed on information to allies who then used it. I think things have changed, and to give Members an example of how the ISC can improve things, we called for a review of the consolidated guidance surrounding the way that security operatives should operate regarding issues of rendition or torture. That led to the Fulford principles, which I think have moved on and tightened up the rules and guidance for members of our security services. That was a big movement forward.

I do not think the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden will push the new clause to a vote, but it reinforces the point that if we have a situation whereby, again, we get information that is passed to one of our allies, we must ensure that those principles are upheld. Am I confident that they are upheld now? I think I am, but how did we get to that pretty damning report in 2017? We got there because those principles and the guidance in place were not followed. We must be vigilant about that, and over the years the right hon. Gentleman has done not only this House but the country a service through his tenacity on these subjects.

[Sir David Davis]

I will not press new clause 3 to a vote, but I tabled it because in 2010-11 David Cameron, the then Prime Minister, made a promise that there would be a review and that the issue would be investigated properly, but that never happened. The implicit undertaking was that we would not do it again, and we did it again—over and over again. That is why at some point we needed to put our foot down. The problem is that whenever we put our foot down and make an absolute requirement, somebody says, for example “What about the Russians, with the terrorist attack in the last few days?” I am afraid there comes a point where we say, “We are not going to provide information if you torture people.” If we are clear about that, it helps the country and probably also helps the international battle with terrorism.

[Mr Jones]

I agree totally with the right hon. Gentleman, and I think that is where we are as a Government. Certainly those are the Fulford principles—that we do not share information. Again, some of the people who perhaps do not understand what our security services do, and those who want to malign their great work on our behalf sometimes say, “They are doing x, y and z.” Well as I know from seeing some examples, there are occasions where we deliberately do not pass on information to our allies because of the fear that the right hon. Gentleman set out. The detention and rendition report raised that issue, and the Fulford principles now give us strong guidance. Those principles have been put into being and sewn into the DNA of all new officers. As a result of a huge training programme, not just for existing officers but for new entrants into the service, officers now see that as an important part of their work. That is how it must be done, but it is always important to have this debate.

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[Sir David Davis]

Again I do not intend to press the matter, but if the ISC discusses this issue in the future, I point the right hon. Gentleman to the German model. They look at something and do not always release information if it is operationally sensitive.

[Mr Jones]

I agree, but that then places an unnecessary burden on the system. The current process with the Secretary of State, the judicial commissioner and the Prime Minister is robust enough to ensure that people are not doing this to find out what someone ordered on Amazon Prime this weekend or to look at their Tesco account, so I think those assurances are fine.

New clause 4 would

“remove the ability of the Secretary of State to authorise the interception of the communications of, or the obtaining of communications intended for, or private information belonging to, Members of Parliament.”

Again, it is good to have this debate, but I would support such a measure for the reasons I have outlined.

The other change in the Bill concerns bulk data. The right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings covered the original investigatory powers in detail, but there are now big data sets held not only by public authorities but by others, and that has made it more important that our security services are able to access them. Whenever we do this, however, it means more intrusion, so let me deal with the issue of oversight in the Bill, and with the broader, more intrusive powers to obtain internet connection records for the discovery of targets.

Again, that is something that I and other ISC members totally support, but the authorisation process is internal. One stance that the ISC has taken throughout all this is that if we are to give more powers to our security services, there must be a balance. There will not be a situation whereby what people have seen can be identified, but this power will drag in a lot of people who, as the right hon. Gentleman said earlier, are completely innocent. As I said, there is a need for such a power, but we thought there should be more oversight from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Therefore, the points I made about amendment 15 are important.

The Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office does a great job of ensuring public support for what we do, but, again, there is an issue around bulk datasets. Some of the examples that were given to ISC members—thanks must go to the Minister, who arranged a meeting for the Committee to be briefed on this—make sense when it comes to the issue of low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. It is burdensome, for example, to access the electoral register, but today the Government have said that somehow that is a secret document. Well, that is not the case under this Bill, in which case it is important that the security services should be able to use it, rather than having to go through the warrantry process. That goes to the point, which my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central raised earlier on, about the definition of “low expectation”.

Another perfectly legitimate reason that the security services need these measures is related to testing new AI models of learning. They need access to these new big datasets, which are out there and which companies use, and the Bill will allow them to have it without going through the warrantry system. If intelligence is going to be on the front foot when it comes to AI, we will have to have these big datasets that will teach the systems how to do it.

The problem comes back my hon. Friend’s question of what is deemed a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. That is something we have considered throughout this process. One thing the ISC has considered is adding to the existing categories. One suggestion we put forward was that, when the agencies do this, they should have to email the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to notify them that they have done it.

[Tom Tugendhat]

rose—

[Mr Jones]

I hope the Minister is not going to intervene again. My legs might get wobbly if I have to sit down again. I might even need some smelling salts. He has explained the internal system, which I am quite satisfied with, but as I said to him and his civil servants—I think other members of the ISC have also said this—it is not us that he has to convince, but the public.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank the right hon. Member for giving way. I just want to assure him that I have taken on board his points. I went back to the agencies and assured myself of the challenge that he had raised and found what I think is a better answer than the one we looked at when we were chatting. I wrote to Sir Brian Leveson and I am delighted to say that he responded, confirming that he will pay specific oversight to this regime in the early years until he is content that it operates in the way that the ISC, the Government and the British public would expect. IPCO has taken on this responsibility, which, I think, answers the question more succinctly than it would be if it were included in the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

Well, I shall take that as half a victory.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Take them where you can get them!

[Mr Jones]

May I just get some clarity? That is a perfectly legitimate way of doing it, and it will mean not interfering with the existing system, which was the concern of both the services and the Minister. I understand that this not as simple as an email being sent. Will that mean that there will be a section looking at this issue in the first annual report? If that is the case, we could at least say to the public that it is actually being considered and the promise is being followed up.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Member will understand that IPCO is operationally independent, so I will not instruct the office or speak for Sir Brian, who has been unbelievably rapid and helpful in his response today. I am sure that he will have heard the comments that the right hon. Member made and, no doubt, will want to draw attention to any areas where he has any doubts at all.

[Mr Jones]

That would be helpful. That would give reassurance to the public and provide a test of how the system works. As I have said, I am comfortable with the process of authorisation, but the public must be comfortable with it as well.

[Sir John Hayes]

I note the right hon. Gentleman’s proper consideration of the balance between privacy and security, which lies at the heart of the Bill, but I also recognise the Minister’s concern that we must not make the process too unwieldy and bureaucratic. I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman might invite the Minister to commit to a regular report going to IPCO as authorisations are made. That might be monthly, but it would at least mean that there was some iterative process of a kind that might reassure the right hon. Gentleman, me and others about that balance.

[Mr Jones]

I understand where the right hon. Gentleman is coming from. Our original idea about having an email was explained when I met the Minister and his civil servants. I think that that would really cut across some of the processes that we have in place. The suggestion that has been made would be one way of doing it, but IPCO already has the powers to look at such things. The only problem with doing that is that we would then have to set up someone in the agencies to produce another report. I do not want to do anything that holds up their work, and I think that that might do it.

Possibly the Minister’s suggestion of how Sir Brian Leveson is going to do it will give the public some reassurance. Let us not forget that Sir Brian has the power to take action if things are not being done correctly. If we read his reports, we can see that he is not fearful of doing these things. A fair compromise has been put forward. I think we have one and a half victories so far—

[Tom Tugendhat]

I think it’s two.

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[Mr Jones]

No, I would not quite say it is two. Hopefully, I might get another one on my other amendment, and then we can all go home happy.

[Sir John Hayes]

Is this an example of my being more hardline than the right hon. Gentleman? It seems like it to me, but perhaps not.

[Mr Jones]

I would not have thought that the right hon. Gentleman could be seen as hardline on anything, pussycat that he normally is. He portrays himself as hardline, but I know from working with him very closely on the ISC that he cares about this information. He has referred to the Investigatory Powers Act as his baby. It has grown up a little bit and is now being brought into the modern age. I should put on the record again his dedication and work as a Minister to bring in the original Act, which was groundbreaking for this country. It has stood the test of time. We know that we will be back here, so the measures will change. I have no problem with that. It is just that, as technology changes, things will change.

May I finish by thanking the members of our security services for the work that they do? I also thank them for the way that they have engaged with the ISC on the Bill. Hopefully, with the changes that have been brought forward, we can reach agreement on the Bill and our security services will have the ability to face up to the challenge that is coming forward: the ever growing use of larger datasets, and the more sophisticated way in which state actors and non-state actors have access to technology. That will enable the security services to do what we all want to do, which is to keep individual citizens and, just as importantly, our democracy safe.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), who is a fellow member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. As he mentioned, we work collegiately, and one of the many advantages of that collegiate approach is that I do not need to repeat everything that he has just said; I need only say that I agree with him. I realise that that is a radical approach in this place, but I will not say it all again. I will simply say that I agree with him; he is absolutely right. His point is that, when it comes to the consideration of warrants to authorise the interception of, or interference with, the communications of Members of Parliament, there is huge significance to such a decision. That is the reason the Prime Minister has had to be involved in it, and it is the reason we should not widen too far the pool of deputies who, for sensible and understandable reasons, as the right hon. Member explained, we now need to provide for.

That is why I hope that the next concession that the Minister will make will relate to the pool of deputies, and that in the language the ISC suggests that he adopts we ensure that it is a controlled group, based on either current responsibilities or previous experience. I am sure that we can discuss with him any changes to the wording that he thinks are necessary, but as the right hon. Member for North Durham explained, the current provisions allow for only one restriction: that the member of the Cabinet in question should receive a briefing on how to conduct their warrantry responsibilities. We do not think that that is restrictive enough, given the significance of this decision-making process. I am grateful to the Minister for what he has already said about notification of the Prime Minister in the process. That is a sensible change, which I welcome.

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[Sir John Hayes]

I am seeing the Minister nodding. He might want to say a word or two more when he sums up.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

May I gently suggest that the right hon. Gentleman goes back to the Minister now, just to pin down exactly what he is agreeing to? We on the ISC have no problem with the idea of our security services having these powers, and I do not think the public would either. They would be less comfortable, as I and the right hon. Gentleman are, with other organisations having them.

[Sir John Hayes]

The Minister may want to intervene on me again to do exactly what the right hon. Gentleman has suggested.

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[Tom Tugendhat]

Again, just to clarify for my right hon. Friend, this Bill offers no greater expansion than his own Bill did in 2016. In the same way he ensured that Bill was no snoopers’ charter, I assure him that this one is not either.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

rose—

[Sir John Hayes]

I was going to say that I have done this matter to death, but I can see that the right hon. Gentleman wants to intervene.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I think the Minister is getting another “dancing on the head of a pin” award for his explanation. What I think the right hon. Gentleman is trying to get on the record—perhaps not for the benefit of people in this House who understand this Bill, but for the wider public—is that the way the Bill will be used is that it will include, for example, a local authority when an investigation is being driven by a security issue, such as in his example of organised crime in cigarette smuggling.

[Sir John Hayes]

Yes, exactly. The right hon. Gentleman has put it very clearly, and the sense of what the Minister has said has reassured me that it is not the Government’s intention to extend those powers beyond the very strict legal limits associated with the kind of organised crime that he and I have both cited. For me, that is considerable progress. The right hon. Gentleman spoke earlier about half a win; I think that is three quarters of a win, at least. For that reason, I feel that I can move on to my next request of the Minister.

We spoke earlier about IPCO, and its role and association with Government. As the Minister will know and as the right hon. Member for North Durham referred to, this legislation provides for a report to be made available to the ISC on an annual basis. There has been some concern that that report might be rather different from the one that is made available to Ministers and others, and my anxiety is that it should not be different. All that it should exclude is current operational matters; nothing else should be excluded from what my Committee considers, and clearly, it needs to be the same as what IPCO gets. We cannot have three or four different reports.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), and indeed all the fellow members of the ISC who have spoken on both sides of the House in our debate on seeking to improve this important piece of legislation. I must say that it is very rare, when one is called towards the end of a debate, for there to have been concessions on most of the areas at issue, leaving very little else to say. It makes me happy that I did not write my speech in advance, since I would have had to rip most of it up following the Security Minister’s very welcome concessions on a range of issues during our debate. They are on the record, and they are indeed extremely welcome.

However, there is one area of detail that I want to comment on, which is about the triple lock amendment—amendment 22—on the qualifications and experience of the Secretaries of State who, under the widening of the triple lock, could if the Prime Minister of the day is incapacitated for some reason, be drawn into making a warrant to intercept the communications of a Member of this Parliament, or indeed a Member of any of the devolved legislatures in the UK. The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Sir David Davis) was very explicit about why that particular protection should be in existence, and I completely agree with his analysis. One of the ways we defend our democracy is by allowing Members of Parliament to do their unique jobs without interference unless it is for an exceptional and a very good reason, and has been authorised at the highest level.

There has been a lot of to-ing and fro-ing while the Bill has been going through its parliamentary stages about precisely how this widening of the power to make such a warrant away from the Prime Minister, if he or she is indisposed or unable to be near secure communications, should actually be defined. We have got down to the stage where everybody agrees that to make the system robust there should be an expansion, and we have even come up with a number of Secretaries of State—five—who should be authorised in such exceptional circumstances to make that warrant.

We are now down to the last piece of disagreement between the ISC and the Minister, which is about what the qualifications of those Secretaries of State should be. In seeking to try to draw out precisely what the Government mean, we have asked as a Committee that the relevant Secretaries of State who may be down to do this duty ought already to be responsible for warrantry, or have had previous responsibility for it. Thus far, however, the Government and the Minister have been unwilling to be that deliberate in the arrangements they have made.

As the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) said in his contribution to the debate, the only qualification apart from being a Secretary of State that the Government appear to have admitted is that the person standing in for the Prime Minister ought to have had a 20-minute security briefing about warrantry.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Does my hon. Friend agree with me that this is so important, because the Secretary of State will be acting as the Prime Minister at that time? Once that decision has been taken—even though we now have the commitment from the Minister that the Prime Minister will be told, not should be told—they will not be able to overturn or review it in any way, so that person is acting as the Prime Minister at that stage.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Yes, and it is clearly important that there is a reassurance that the Secretary of State who is picked to do that job in these exceptional circumstances will either have previous experience of being responsible for warrantry and issuing warrants, or have current experience. I do not see why the Security Minister cannot concede that that is where we should be. I do not understand why, over all of the parliamentary time spent on this Bill, the Government have not been able to give us that assurance, which just shores up the important nature of the commitment to widening the triple lock.

Clearly, the Minister’s very welcome decision to make the concession on amendment 23, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) has just pointed out, strengthens the situation, because that means the Prime Minister will have to be notified of such a warrant. However, my right hon. Friend is also correct in pointing out that the warrant cannot be rescinded if it has already been granted. I therefore gently ask the Security Minister whether he will not take the opportunity, in responding to the debate, to give the ISC members and the public we all represent the reassurance that the Secretaries of State who may have this power delegated to them either will already be responsible for warranting, or will have previously had responsibility for warranting. I do not understand why he cannot just get up and give us that final assurance. If he does, I think we will have done extremely well on Report and in Committee. I am rather disappointed that the Minister is not leaping to his feet, since he has been leaping to his feet a lot while my colleagues have been making their speeches. I see no such flicker in him as I am making mine. I suspect and hope that that is because he is just thinking about how he will wind up the debate and give us that final assurance that we need.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

The measure is doable, because we are not asking for something in the Bill; it could be done in the guidance. The Minister has already agreed on changing the “should” to “will”, so this measure could be reflected in the guidance that goes alongside the Bill.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I can see that the Minister is looking pensive, so I hope that means he is thinking of some way to reassure us on this final, important point with respect to the triple lock and the widening of those powers to other Ministers who are not the Prime Minister.

The whole debate around the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill demonstrates that when threats evolve, the requirement to meet them also has to evolve. We know that this area is rapidly developing, and we know also that we will probably be back in the not-too-distant future to see how these powers can be changed again to defend our democracy and meet some of the threats of serious organised crime and terrorism, which our security forces help us deal with day in, day out. We also know that if our citizens are to give us effective permission and consent to take some of these powers, any increase in powers has to be accompanied by an increase in proper oversight, to reassure them that democracy is being defended, not undermined. That includes oversight by the ISC, which is why I am a big supporter of new clause 1 as tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis). It is important that that can be an ongoing reassurance.

I do not want to repeat a lot of the arguments made by colleagues, and it is important now to listen to what the Minister has to say. I thank him for the concessions he has made, and I hope he can make just a slight move towards us on the warrantry issue in the instance of the triple lock, so that we can be even more content than we are now.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

If my right hon. and learned Friend will forgive me, I will be able discuss that in a more secure environment, but I can only say, “Not necessarily.” I will be able to describe why that is in a different environment, but I cannot do it here.

The reason for not accepting amendments 22 and 23 —I understand the points made by right hon. and hon. Friends and Members across the House—is that we are talking about a very limited number of people. One Secretary of State is already used to do the initial request. The second person on the triple lock is a judicial commissioner—a judge. The third therefore has to be one of the four Secretaries of State left. Therefore, it is important that we make sure that it is somebody in whom the Prime Minister has confidence. Given that we are about to have a new Government—I hope the new Conservative Government, but still a new one—it is entirely possible that there will be a new Cabinet and that the routine explanation will not be satisfactory. As routine duties do not have legal clarity, we will not use them.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

The Minister has used that argument before about new Secretaries of State, and it is complete nonsense, is it not? It would not happen on day one unless the Prime Minister suddenly got covid or was indisposed. By the time this came in, those three people would be there anyway. His argument is pretty weak.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Member has made his point and I have made mine; I am afraid I will leave it there rather than continue. The ways in which we have been able to engage on the Bill has been incredibly supportive and helpful.

The removal of clause 15 from the Bill would prevent the intelligence agencies and the National Crime Agency from detecting some national security and serious crime threats, and those intent on committing child sexual exportation and abuse. Given the robust oversight of the regime in general, and the internet connection records in particular, we simply do not believe that this is in the best interests of the British public. Removal would benefit only those who threaten our safety and serve to make the work of the intelligence services and the NCA significantly harder as they seek to protect us and bring paedophiles to justice. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner already has the necessary powers to inspect and report on all parts of the CD regime. If the Investigatory Powers Commissioner wishes is to focus attention on condition D of the internet connection record, they have the power to do so. With those clarifications, I commend the Bill to the House.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones]

It is gratifying that we will get this Bill on the statute book, because it will give our security services the necessary powers to keep us all safe. I add my thanks to the staff of the Committee on which I and other Members served, and like the Minister I thank the civil servants who I have engaged with throughout the passage of the Bill. I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) for his engagement on the Bill. The right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) would have liked to have been here today. He has played an integral part not just in speaking about the Bill, but in his work on the ISC. As I said earlier, unfortunately he is at the funeral of Lord Cormack; the House will understand his reason.

As I said, the Bill will improve our abilities. Perhaps the Minister would also like to put on record his thanks to the ISC, which he forgot to do. It might have been a painful process at times, but can I give him some advice, possibly for the future? He may well have been able to solve some of these issues earlier in our discussions, and avoided keeping his colleagues here on a Monday night—[Interruption.] The Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities says from a sedentary position that that was impossible, but the Minister has agreed to our amendments.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I was going to do so!

[Mr Jones]

The Minister says that he was going to, but if he had done that last week we could perhaps have had very short discussions tonight.

[The Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (Michael Gove)]

Some of us should take yes for an answer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

Well some of us do, but if the amendments had been agreed to last week, we could have had a shorter debate today and the Minister’s colleagues would not have been kept here for so long.

Finally, the biggest thanks we need to give is to the men and women of our security services who, as the Minister said in his earlier contribution, do not get any recognition publicly. They do their work day in, day out, some in very dangerous circumstances, to keep us all safe.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Committee stage & Report stage
Thursday 7th March 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Sir John Hayes]

It does the Minister great credit that he has made that list available during the course of our consideration. That is very important. What I had feared might happen was that we might not get it while we were in Committee. In fact, I have not actually seen it, but I am grateful to him for making it available, at least, during our consideration.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

This is an area that concerns me. I am quite certain the security services have protocols on how to deal with such things, but it worries me that the DWP is on that list. Having been involved in work on the Horizon Post Office scandal for many years, I know the DWP did not cover itself in glory on some of those cases. Can the Minister reassure the Committee that there are protocols governing when and how it will use those powers? That, I think, would give the public some assurance that there is a standard for how they will be used.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman tempts me towards an area that the Bill does not cover, so I hope he will forgive me for focusing on what it does cover, such as the safeguards. Clause 14 will limit communications data acquisition to the purpose of a body required to meet its civil functions and duties, such as a regulatory body providing oversight of financial markets, or indeed the DWP overseeing different elements of its responsibilities. Where disclosure is in support of a criminal prosecution and IPA part 3 authorisations for communications data must continue to be sought, using the existing safeguards and oversight provided for by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s office, the courts will oversee the use of those powers by public authorities in the same way as the acquisition of non-communications data under the existing powers. He has asked me specifically about a connected area, so—I hope he will forgive me—I will have a look at it and write to him very specifically about that.

[Mr Jones]

May I suggest that the Minister does write to the Committee? I accept the safeguards in place, but for organisations other than the security services, I want to know what internal mechanisms they have to ensure that use of those powers is proportionate in terms of investigations and so on, and what training and protocols they are using. If the Minister could write to us on that, that would be helpful.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Forgive me, but the right hon. Gentleman is asking for a very large piece of work there. I am setting out the legal authority under which those organisations can act. Their internal processes may be different in different circumstances and be answerable to different Ministers.

[Mr Jones]

I am sorry, but I do not agree with the Minister. He is giving those other public bodies additional powers, and I think it is quite reasonable for this Committee and the public to be assured of how those powers are actually going to be used. As I say, I have no problem with the security services, because I am well aware that they have very clear, strong protocols and safeguards governing the use of their powers internally, with authorisations and so on. I think he just needs to ask those other Departments how they are going to do this, and what the internal mechanisms are.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am very happy to ask them; I am just stating clearly that they are not under the responsibility that I have as a Minister. The legal powers that they are given are not additional powers; they are repetitions of the IPA 2016, so they are not additional powers—[Interruption.] Forgive me, but they are not additional powers. Their existing codes of practice under the different organisations have their own responsibilities within them.

[Mr Jones]

I beg to differ. In the next clause, we will come on to the breadth and depth of the new powers, but that is a different argument—I will save that until then. However, he is the Minister and, in my experience, the Minister leads the Bill. I would have thought it would be quite simple to ask those other Departments what those protocols are. If he does not ask, he does not get.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will happily ask. The right hon. Gentleman is asking for internal management structures, though.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

To be absolutely clear, the letter was in response to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings, so it was sent to him, it was copied to the secretariat of the ISC and it is in the Bill pack. The hon. Member for Barnsley Central therefore has access to it.

[Mr Jones]

May I ask the Minister to look at his internal process again? We also had this problem with the National Security Bill. I do not know whether he should change the pigeon post he is using to ensure people have it. May I also point out that the ISC is not constantly in session? Therefore, if he has to send it to the ISC, we do not automatically get it until our next meeting or when we do the next reading.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am delighted to clarify that the letter was emailed to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings. He is a traditionalist in many ways, but I believe he has entered the electronic age.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

We are now looking at internet connection records. Whether we are for or against the provisions, the requirement in 2016 for companies to generate and provide internet connection records was a radical departure and makes the UK something of an outlier: as I understand it, there is no other European or Five Eyes country that allows the same sort of requirements to be made, certainly in relation to its own citizens.

As the Minister explained, there are various conditions on who can access the records. At present, the investigating bodies need to know which personal device they are looking for ICRs in relation to or know a specific time when a website was accessed to identify who was responsible for the events of interest to them. There is some judicial oversight, but not always. We are being asked to move a little further from that already fairly radical starting point and remove the need for a particular time to be identified, so as to have a general look at who uses certain internet sites and services over broader grades of time. That risks moving us step by step away from suspicion-based surveillance towards broader mass surveillance. People become targets of surveillance because of websites they have visited that are not only of questionable ethics, but potentially in breach of article 18 of the European convention on human rights. Various examples of how that might work are given in the explanatory notes, particularly in paragraph 120.

The Minister also gave some examples in relation to access to sites that are clearly illegal. I was quite surprised to learn that there are not already other powers that can be used to investigate who is engaging with such sites. If that is not the case, why not confine the power to sites that are clearly illegal in and of themselves, rather than enabling a trawling of data in relation to other sites that are not? I am not a tech geek, as will become more and more apparent the more that we debate the Bill, but the explanatory notes themselves confirm that there is a danger of and huge susceptibility to error here. Paragraph 123 says:

“Whilst clearly having the potential to provide significant operational utility it is recognised that such queries are highly susceptible to imprecise construction. As a result, additional safeguards are proposed in this Bill with the intention of managing access to this new Condition and mitigating public concerns.”

I am not absolutely convinced by the additional safeguards that follow in paragraph 124, which seem to revolve around training and various other requirements.

At the very least, I would prefer to see us go for independent judicial oversight in all cases, including authorisations under condition D2. As I understand it, under condition D1 a judicial commissioner would need to authorise what has been sought, but under condition D2 it could be internal. If the Minister wants us to expand the powers without the need for judicial authorisation in all cases, he needs to explain how often he expects the powers to be used and why judicial commissioner involvement in all such cases would not be realistic. Are there not other ways in which we can make this work while still retaining judicial oversight in all cases under the new provisions? I understand what the goals are here, but this is an example where it could be framed more narrowly and oversight could be strengthened.

[Mr Jones]

I agree with the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, and the ISC feels strongly on this issue. We are clearly speaking English and the Minister is speaking Japanese, because this is about understanding what is actually being given to the agencies without any judicial oversight, which is being dismissed as if these powers are no greater or more intrusive.

As the Committee will know, under the IPA an internet connection record is a form of communications data. It contains data on who has accessed something: it does not actually provide the content of what they have seen or been in contact with. However, under the IPA information can be sought to develop knowledge of who is speaking to who. I think the ISC see the value of this for not only security services but issues around child protection and organised crime, as has already been argued. We are giving the security services and agencies a degree of authorisation here, which I would argue they have not had up until now.

We then come to the argument made by the Minister and the Government that these regulations are not any more intrusive than what we have at the moment. I would argue differently because the power is broad. Previously, targeted discovery condition A, under section 62 of the IPA, required that the agency and officer know the service and precise time of use to discover the identity of an individual, so that they actually know what they are targeting. The Minister used the words “fishing expedition”—this regulation will be a fishing expedition. By default, it will bring in a broader range of individuals who have nothing to do with the target the agencies are looking at the time and connection records for, and are of no interest to the agencies or anybody else.

The Government are arguing that this regulation is no more intrusive—but it is, if we are dragging in a large number of people in that way. Actually, by not having any judicial oversight, they are allowing the agencies to agree that internally. Although the intrusion is not deeper, it is certainly a lot broader than what we have at the moment. The Bill says that the new powers can only be used for “national security” and the catch-all phrase

“economic well-being of the United Kingdom”.

I am still yet to be convinced of that terminology, but I understand that the Minister and the civil service like consistency across Bills, and that is why it is in this Bill.

Under sections 60A and 61 of the IPA, requests to obtain an ICR are like requests to obtain other communication data: they have to be “necessary and proportionate”, which runs through all of this. Again, the Government are allowing the agencies to decide what is necessary and proportionate. I am not suggesting for one minute that they are going to go on a fishing expedition, but again there is a problem with the Government’s approach to the Bill, and certainly with the agencies’ approach. They want these powers, and I do not personally have an objection, but we have to look at how other people, who are not drowned in the detail of this Bill, will perceive them. Some opponents would say, “Why should I be dragged into this?” It is really about giving public confidence; as the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings said this morning, when the IPA was passed, it was about trying to reassure people.

It would be very simple to ensure that this regulation has independent judicial oversight, as the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East has just said. I know the catch-all phrase that the Minister will come back with, because I am a quick learner: he will say, “The IPC has the ability to look back at anything.” Again, that is the haystack—where is the needle? It would be better and more reassuring if they were to have some judicial approval in advance. I will give the Committee one example. Let us suppose that we are looking at train records and patterns of behaviour on WhatsApp or a train-ticketing website. There is possibly a valid reason to do that—to see someone’s patterns of travel, and so on—but it will scoop up a lot of innocent internet users. The assurance here is that they will not be of interest and therefore they will not be part of it, but their information is being dragged into the system. Then a decision has to be made as to which ones people are interested in and which ones they are not.

That is a big change. I accept that it would not be the exact content that somebody accessed, but the connections would be there. It does not sit comfortably with me to leave such a big change to the security services. Knowing them as well as I do, I do not suspect that they will use the provision illegally or for alternative motives, but we have to reassure the public, and I do not think this does that. Would that be onerous? I am not sure that it would be. This comes back to the point that we have made about the ISC all the way through. If we are giving the security services extra powers, we need the counterbalance of a safeguard.

As the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings said this morning, that was exactly how the IPA was approached. Clearly, he was a very good Minister, because he accepted amendments and suggestions, whereas only one has been accepted for this Bill so far. The Minister spoke this morning about working with the ISC. The Minister speaks to us, but he does not necessarily listen to what we say or take a great deal of interest in what we propose. This is an important point. It comes back to the fundamental point that if extra powers are going to be given, it is only right that they come with responsibilities and safeguards.

New condition D removes the existing requirement for the exact service and the precise time of use to be known. Basically, it will now be possible to do a sweep, which will mean dragging people in. Therefore, I cannot see the problem in having some oversight of these powers. I would like to know why the Minister thinks that condition D is not more intrusive. It is more intrusive, because a lot more people will be affected by it. I think the Government are hiding behind the idea that because it is not possible to identify what the individuals have actually seen, it is not really interesting. If that is the case, why have it in the first place? I know the reason for that, but it would be interesting to know what thought has gone into this and how many people will be dragged in. It obviously depends on how the provision would be used in practice. If we went down the street and said to people that we are giving these powers without any judicial oversight—the Minister will say that IPCO can always look at it, and I understand all that—I think that most people would be quite worried. We would give reassurance by providing that important oversight.

This provision certainly needs to be looked at. Is it of benefit and am I convinced that this is a new power that the agencies need? I am, and I think it is right, but coming back to the previous point, we have to ensure that we do not do anything that undermines what is done or that gives ammunition to those people who want to cast aspersions on what is actually done.

I think I know the arguments that the Minister will put forward. We will no doubt come back to this matter on Report, when there will, I think, be amendments from members of the Committee; and if we have an election wash-up, this is one proposal that I think will be pressed by the Opposition.

[Sir John Hayes]

To supplement what the right hon. Gentleman has said, this was part of the original legislation and it is and always has been a controversial aspect of it. There are two things that I would emphasise here. First, it is really important to understand that the kinds of inquiries that would necessitate the use of this power are exceptional. When we considered the original Bill in Committee, one of the arguments was around a criminal threshold: in what circumstances would the public bodies that we are talking about need to avail themselves of the powers? I am on the record as saying at that time that I entirely agreed with the then shadow Minister’s argument that it should not be permitted for minor crimes. In other words, the bodies that the Minister listed earlier would not be using the powers on a routine, daily basis for all kinds of things that they are lawfully entitled to do; they would take advantage of the powers in exceptional cases in which very serious matters were at hand. That would be a helpful way of assuaging some of the doubts raised by the right hon. Member for North Durham.

Secondly, we need greater clarity about the character of oversight. I am inclined to the right hon. Gentleman’s view that having judicial oversight would be helpful. At the very least, we need real clarity about the procedures in the relevant bodies, so that we can be sure they are robust.

[Mr Jones]

Or we could have what was suggested earlier: when the power is used, that is reported to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, so that it is aware of what is going on and can do something if it has concerns. At the moment, it is presented with a haystack and has to look for the needle.

[Sir John Hayes]

Exactly. That point was made when we debated the original Act, and I think that I committed at the time to those kinds of things being detailed in the annual report. To clarify a point that was made earlier, David Anderson was clear at the time, and has been since, that we cannot detail the operational purposes of the agencies if doing so would compromise them. The techniques and approaches that they necessarily use in the performance of their duties could be compromised if we were to talk in detailed terms about the character of their operational activities. However, we can speak in broader terms about the kinds of circumstances in which powers might be used—and all the more so for the other public bodies, in a sense, because even if a serious criminal investigation is taking place, those investigations are not typically as secret as they might necessarily be in respect of the security and intelligence community.

Perhaps those two grounds—greater sight of the processes in those bodies and clarity about the circumstances in which the powers can be used; in other words, exceptionally and for very serious matters—would be helpful ways of dealing with some of the points raised by my colleague on the ISC, the right hon. Member for North Durham.

[Tom Tugendhat]

As usual, right hon. and hon. Members have raised some excellent points. Let me be clear: it is not true to say that there is no judicial oversight. To say that there is no judicial oversight would be correct if the IPC were not in place. I know what the right hon. Member for North Durham is going to say, but that is a form of judicial oversight.

As to the way in which the authorisations work, I hope that I have been clear—I will repeat it to ensure that I am—that an investigating officer would have to make an application to use the powers. That would have to go to a senior officer in their service who is not in their chain of command: someone who is not overseeing the operation or in their management chain—a separate element. Any abuse of that system could mean that that individual, or those individuals, are in violation of section 11. I know that the right hon. Member for North Durham takes his responsibilities on the ISC exceptionally seriously and is fully aware that sometimes there can be a pressing need for operational action at pace. That is what this is also designed to help. It is important that officers have the ability to act under a regulatory framework that means that abuses are, at worst, extremely limited due to various constraints.

[Mr Jones]

I accept that and I have confidence in the internal protocols—do not get me wrong on that—but the Minister does not have to convince me or members of this Committee; it is about the public perception. What is the problem? If we are not going to have judicial oversight in terms of judicial authorisation, what is to stop us having another system whereby, when it is used, the IPC is informed? We could send a simple email so that it would at least have ongoing oversight when these powers are being used.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Gentleman is creating his own haystack here. Although I hope as ever that this power will be used only exceptionally rarely, sadly the nature of serious and organised crime and terror in this country means that it will be used more often. There is a slight misunderstanding as to how this will be used. Targeting a train website or a single authority would not be proportionate or meet the necessity provisions within the Bill. It would be neither necessary nor proportionate. In fact, it would be unnecessary and would be vastly disproportionate, because it would be a mass collection exercise that would neither be targeted in a way that would satisfy the proportionality requirement, and nor would it give a useful answer—it would give such bulk data as to be useless—and therefore it would not be necessary.

The whole point of this is that it sets out a series of conditions in which these powers could be used—perhaps against a certain website, that is true—but on the basis of intelligence. It would have to have a particular cause and a particular time. This is not a Venn diagram with a single circle, but a Venn diagram with four or five circles; it must be in the centre of those for it to be necessary and proportionate.

[Tom Tugendhat]

“Exceptional” does not mean that there is necessarily huge amounts of time to act; exceptional means that the seriousness of the offence is extremely grave. These powers are for things such as child sexual exploitation. I wish it were not so, but even in this country, the police very often have to act extremely speedily to prevent harm to a child and sometimes, very sadly, multiple children. They have also to act extremely speedily to prevent terrorist plots or other forms of very serious organised violence or criminal activity.

That is why “exceptional” does not necessarily mean that it can be dealt with in a procedural way over a number of weeks; exceptional may mean absolutely pressing as well, and that is what this is designed for. The right hon. Member for North Durham may have been aware from briefings that I believe he has received that, in some circumstances, this Bill will reduce the time taken to interrupt serious abuse of children, from months and occasionally years down to days and weeks. That is surely an absolutely essential thing to do, but that will not work unless these powers are used according to the Act, with the important words being “proportionate” and “necessary”. The reason I repeat those words is that were the intelligence services to go on some sort of fishing expedition—and I know that the right hon. Gentleman is not suggesting that they would—that would not be legally permissible under this Act and nor would it achieve the required results, because it would turn up so much data that it would simply be an unusable, vast collection of fluff. Effectively, instead of targeting the needle, they would have merely collected another haystack.

[Mr Jones]

It is not about a fishing expedition, but they will get into a fishing expedition anyway. He says that train lines would not be affected, but they would. If someone wants to see an individual’s travel pattern, that is what they may do. Therefore, a lot of people’s data will be dragged in, not because it has been looked for but because it will come in anyway.

The problem is that if the argument is about speed—which I do not necessarily think is the case in some cases—the Minister has to do two things to reassure people that the powers are going to be used in the right way. First, he must provide pre-authorisation judicial oversight, and secondly, the IPC should be told, perhaps via a simple email, when the powers are used. That would at least allow it to look at the trends and uncover any concerns. I accept the protocols in place and am 100% sure that they are being followed, but it is possible that some people will not follow them and that is what we have to guard against.

[Tom Tugendhat]

This is a somewhat odd argument, because the right hon. Gentleman and I are slightly together but also arguing at cross purposes. Both of us have a very high regard for the intelligence services and are confident in their integrity, but we are slightly at cross purposes because he believes that we are not satisfying the oversight element, but I believe we are.

Let me be clear. I am not being a stick in the mud about this for any political reason. I actually happen to believe that this is the right way to approach this. There is a constant balance in all forms of oversight between the ability to act quickly and the ability to be controlled from outside. I believe that this sets in place a very significant, burdensome requirement on those who are taking these responsibilities to act according to certain principles. To repeat, the principles are necessity and proportionality. I do not think anybody in here would argue against those. What this requires them to do is make sure that the principles are met by effectively targeting in advance.

The right hon. Gentleman’s comment about train line use would, I am afraid, not satisfy that proportional need. The individual would have to be specifically identified in advance. The pattern of use of the website from the single point and to the point of contact—from a phone to an internet server or whatever it might happen to be—would have to be clarified. These ICRs are Venn diagram circles that are getting narrower and narrower. The idea that this would end up with some sort of week-long or month-long trawl of a train line website is, I am afraid, not permissible under the 2016 Act. Were any intelligence officers to do it—though I do not believe that they would—they would fall foul of section 11 and would not be acting necessarily and proportionately. Therefore, it would not be permissible.

It is pretty clear that existing conditions B and C already enable public authorities to make an application for a known individual’s internet connections. New condition D only enables a request for details to identify individuals who have used one or more specified internet services in a specified time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will give way to the right hon. Member for North Durham.

[Mr Jones]

I do not think anyone could describe the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings or myself as woolly liberals, but I do have a concern with this. Where we are giving an extra power—which is what this is, although the Minister disagrees about the breadth—I want to ensure somehow that, in a democracy, we have oversight of it. I do not want to make it difficult for the agencies to implement their powers, but there are simple ways of doing so. That could mean telling the IPC when it occurs.

I have faith in the internal mechanisms that the Minister refers to, but I was also on the Intelligence and Security Committee in 2017, when we did our rendition and detention inquiry. All the safeguards were in there then, and they were ignored. That led to some fundamental changes, including the Fulford principles. There are occasions when the best things in legislation are not followed through, and that can lead to some very serious consequences.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I take the right hon. Gentleman’s point and the spirit in which it was made. I reiterate that requests for communications data must be approved by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, as he knows, unless they are urgent or for the purposes of national security. That is where this is being focused. Condition D, which we have spoken about, will be restricted to only the intelligence services and the National Crime Agency when it is pursuing a national security element within its remit—that is a separate area, as he knows. Those organisations have the necessary expertise to raise compliant and proportionate restrictions.

Again and again, the principle in the Bill is that the least intrusive power must be used. The oversight starts internally, but very rapidly goes externally, whether it is to IPCO or a judicial commissioner. The ability to review is always there, and the penalties under section 11 of the 2016 Act, which we all hope will never be needed or used, are pretty onerous on anybody who abuses their power or in any way exploits their ability in order to conduct themselves in a way that we would all agree is unsatisfactory in a democracy. It is really important to say that.

Going back to the question raised by the hon. Member for Midlothian, the reality is that condition D applications will limit collateral intrusion as much as is reasonably practical. The returned data may only provide an indication of involvement in an investigation, and further analysis will likely be necessary to allow fuller determination. That is the nature of handling intelligence data and then conducting an analysis on the back of it. In all cases, that activity will have to be justified, and will be no more than is necessary to achieve the desired outcome.

To be absolutely clear, that has to be targeted. This is a series of circles in a Venn diagram to target as narrowly as possible. Were others to be captured in that narrowest possible target, that data could not be held, or a separate application would have to be made in order to hold it. For example, one can imagine a circumstance in which an intelligence agency is targeting a paedophile on a particular street. Using different forms of communication technique, it narrows it down from a handset to an operator, a particular website, a particular time, and so on, so the Venn diagram narrows—it is very focused. If it turns out that there is another paedophile operating in exactly the same area at that time, that would require a separate application, because it is a separate target. The data could not just be held. Nor would it be ignored—I am sure the hon. Gentleman would not suggest it should be. But the judicial oversight needs to be gone through and the application needs to be made. It is a separate warrant, and so on.

[Mr Jones]

In the example the Minister gives, at the same time the agency targets that individual, it will have a lot of other people who communicated with that individual. How long will that information be kept? That is the concern people have. It is not the depth, but this is broad. Most of those people would be completely innocent of anything. There is then the issue of how long that information is kept and who makes the decision about how long to keep it.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Forgive me, but I disagree with the right hon. Member on this. It is unlikely that there would be a large number of people at a specific geographic location, using a specific cell site, from a specific handset, viewing a specific website at a specific time. Once it is narrowed down like that, the numbers are very small. That does not mean that any intrusion that is not legally authorised is acceptable—that is absolutely not what I am saying. But we are getting down to very small numbers of people, and quite deliberately so, in order to achieve an intelligence outcome.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

In the existing Act, one would have to be entirely specific about a particular time. It could not be 5.30 pm to 6.30 pm; an internet connection record could be done only at 5.30 pm exactly. The Bill extends that a bit, but it still has to be very targeted. This is a proportionate change in the law to allow the intelligence services to collect information that would enable the targeting of serious and organised crime.

[Mr Jones]

Let me go back to the Trainline example. Suppose it is not child exploitation—the Minister is possibly right that it is specific, and hopefully there are not many people in one street—and someone is trying to look for a person’s travel plans, so they want to know how many people in an area have contacted Trainline. It will be more than one person, so there will be a lot of other people they are not looking for in there. That is the problem, and that is all that the ISC, the hon. Members for Midlothian and for Glasgow South and the Labour Front Benchers are saying.

Earlier the Minister used the words “control from outside”. I am sorry if he sees oversight as control, but I certainly do not. It is about giving confidence to the public that there is independent oversight over these powers, whether that is informing the IPCO when they are used or having pre-authorisation, as was suggested earlier. I do not see the problem with keeping people informed. The Minister is hiding behind IPCO, but it was introduced in the first place to give the public confidence.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I suspect we are not going to come to an agreement on this, so I will probably leave it after this point. The IPCO oversight means that IPCO can look at a request at any point. The maximum period it can go without looking at it is 12 months, but it can look at any point. We have said that requests for communications data must be approved by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office

“except where they are urgent or are for the purpose of national security”.

That interaction, which the right hon. Gentleman rightly supports, is already there, so I do not accept it is lacking.

On the question of proportionality, the amount of information that one may need to investigate a paedophile network, for example, may mean being slightly vaguer about the specific time, whereas following a known individual may require different forms of flexibility and proportionality. I am afraid I am going to be very cautious about setting out what each one means, because these principles will have to adapt and be applied as appropriate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am entirely supportive of the idea that IPCO should update the ISC and the Secretary of State about how it is working and provide information so that a proper view can be taken. I think that is entirely appropriate.

[Mr Jones]

Well, that would be fine if the Government did not redact things in IPCO reports and try to stop us getting access to—[Interruption.] I am sorry, but the Government are doing that. They have done it over the past few years. That is the problem. The Government are paying lip service to the ISC. We are not trying to thwart the work of our security services; we are an important part of the democratic oversight of them. That is why we were set up under the Justice and Security Act 2013. I am sorry to say that the Government are trying to drive a coach and horses through it, including by preventing information from IPCO from being given to us.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I think we have covered the area, and I have said all I am going to about the matter.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Powers to require retention of certain data

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

I rise to speak briefly to Government amendments 3 and 4, which Labour welcomes. The principle of the appropriate Secretary of State giving approvals under section 26 of the Act was raised in the amendments proposed by Lord Coaker and Lord West in Committee in the other place. The amendments are an important further clarification regarding which Secretaries of States are eligible to be delegated the prime ministerial authority on investigatory powers relating to members. Necessary operational awareness demonstrated by the right people is, of course, crucial to ensure that the right decisions are made on what are, after all, very sensitive matters. I am mindful of the remarks made by the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings, so it would perhaps be helpful if the Minister could say something about how recent—mindful of the debate about whether “recent” is the right word—this operational awareness should be.

[Mr Jones]

I thought we had had a victory—one of those rare things we get with this Government—from the ISC in the House of Lords, but clearly the Minister has found a way of clawing that back.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I don’t think so!

[Mr Jones]

I think so, because the original wording talked about being able to nominate basically anybody. It was then defined, but the amendment widens it again. It says, “necessary operational awareness”; is that, for example, that any Secretary of State is aware that it is a voluntary process? For example, the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary sign warrants, and another Secretary of State could say, “Yes, I’m aware of that.” As the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings said, “operational experience” would be better wording, because “necessary operational awareness” is too broad. What does it actually mean in practice? For example, must they have any experience of having signed a warrant before? Or do they just need to know that the warrantry system exists?

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

First, I place on the record my gratitude to the ISC, to which I have listened extremely carefully on this matter; indeed, the Bill has been changed because of it. Let me be clear that although many people are aware of things, to be operationally aware is not the same as to be just aware. Many people were aware of the conflict in Helmand, but I argue that only the hon. Member for Barnsley Central and I were operationally aware of the conflict in Helmand. It is rather a different requirement. It does not mean that one knows about the operation; it means one is aware in an operational sense of it. It is not just an observation of the challenge.

[Mr Jones]

I have to say that from my experience as a former Minister in the Ministry of Defence—I said I was never a Secretary of State—I was not only aware of what was going on but operationally aware. Could an Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Defence therefore be designated as one of these people? On Tuesday mornings every week, I was very operationally aware of what was going on in Helmand, for example.

[Tom Tugendhat]

First, this goes alongside the code of practice, which challenges the right hon. Gentleman’s point. It would need to be people who were briefed into the warrantry process. It needs to be somebody who understands what a warrant is, so it is not somebody who is merely observing it, such as a Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport.

On the point that my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings made about experience, I understand the debate. There is a possibility—I know that he and I will do everything we can to prevent it—that there will be a change of Government soon. In that case, there will be an awful lot of people who have absolutely no experience at all of these matters. It would therefore be wise not to set up a provision that would immediately require amendment. Disappointed though we would be at that outcome, my right hon. Friend would agree that he would not want a law to be amended in its first year, if we could possibly avoid it.

To be clear, the Government view the four alternative approvers as being likely to be the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary. Only three would be able to act as the triple-locking Secretaries of State, because of course we would have already used up two of them to do the first two functions. That is why the numbers are required, and why I am incredibly grateful to the ISC for pointing it out and being very cautious on it.

[Mr Jones]

If what the Minister has just said is the case, why do the Government push back on a suggestion that I think they actually made earlier on? The Minister is now pushing back on it. Although I understand the need for the code of practice, if there was a change in it—because there might be sometime—would that come back to Parliament to be approved? We are dancing on the head of a pin here. I do not know why, but that is quite common with the Home Office. The Minister says that it will be mainly four people, but I would love to know what he means by “necessary operational awareness”, which is clunky language.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Codes of practice will be brought forward through regulations in the usual way, as the right hon. Gentleman is aware, and the House will scrutinise them in the usual way. This is a very legalistic process, as I recognise from the inside as much as he does from the outside. It is true that if, for example, the Northern Ireland Secretary became the Education Secretary, they could then be included. The idea is to ensure that it is somebody who is appropriate to the task, which is why the measure is worded as it is. I always listen to right hon. and hon. Members across the House. I believe that the amendment is the best version that we have come to so far. I will continue to listen to the right hon. Gentleman, as always.

[Mr Jones]

May I make a simple suggestion, then? “Necessary operational awareness” is clunky language; surely what is meant is operational experience. That would cover it, would it not?

[Sir John Hayes]

Given what the Minister said about a change in Government—I do not expect one, but I suppose it is a remote possibility—perhaps the words “operational responsibility or experience” would cover the point made and be slightly tighter than “awareness”. Also, there is the matter of notifying the PM. The Committee made the good suggestion that the PM should be notified as soon as practicable, which may be something with which the Minister agrees. If the Prime Minister were indisposed because of illness or whatever, they would be notified as soon as is practicable that a warrant had been issued.

[Tom Tugendhat]

On the second point, I am sure that, like me, my right hon. Friend finds it absolutely inconceivable that that PM would not be notified. I am not convinced that that must be in primary legislation. I find it genuinely inconceivable that the Prime Minister would not be notified at the earliest opportunity. Obviously, if they could be notified immediately, the provision would not be required.

[Mr Jones]

I made that point to the Home Secretary on Second Reading. Yes, I think that is logical—

[Tom Tugendhat]

Thank you—I am astonished. [Laughter.]

[Mr Jones]

But, Minister, let us be honest: a lot of things that we would have taken for granted were ignored in Downing Street over the last few years. Until Boris Johnson became Prime Minister, it had been a great part of our constitution that convention was followed. Surely it would therefore be better to have the point about notification in the Bill; otherwise, we are leaving it to the free will of convention. I would have trusted convention, but we have had Boris Johnson as Prime Minister.

[Sir John Hayes]

I want to help the Minister, because I do not necessarily agree with the right hon. Member for North Durham; occasionally, he and I do disagree, despite the impression that we have created in this Committee. Notification could be covered in a piece of statutory guidance that supports the Bill. It could state that the Prime Minister should be notified as soon as reasonable practicable, exactly in the terms just described. How’s that?

[Tom Tugendhat]

As is so often the case, I absolutely agree with my right hon. Friend.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister put it in the guidance, then?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will look at putting it in the guidance, as suggested by the right hon. Member.

[Mr Jones]

Just say it. If the Minister says it to the Committee, his civil servants will not have to do it. It is easier doing it that way than having negotiations in the office later on.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I have said what I am going to say on the matter.

Amendment 3 agreed to.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Committee stage & Report stage
Thursday 7th March 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

It is good to see you in the Chair, Mrs Cummins.

I echo what the shadow Minister says. We are all here to assist the brave personnel in our security and intelligence services, but that does not mean that we will not closely scrutinise this legislation. We did not oppose the Bill on Second Reading. Some parts are good, but we have indicated our serious concerns about other parts because we think the powers go too far. They have not been shown to be necessary and proportionate; rather, they are more for the convenience of the security and intelligence services. How these powers are drafted also causes us concern, because they seem to allow behaviours beyond what we were told the powers were going to be used for. At other times, it is the nature of the oversight that is a concern, as the Bill introduces potentially intrusive powers.

I have one other brief point to make, which I indicated I would make at last night’s meeting of the Programming Sub-Committee. I had hoped that this morning we could perhaps have had some witnesses to guide us through this process. I think that would have been very helpful. It was very helpful in 2016, when we were looking at the original legislation, and I regret that we do not have such an opportunity this morning.

The provisions on bulk personal datasets and so-called low/no datasets are an area where we fear that the legislation is rather more a matter of inconvenience than something that has been shown to be a necessity. That will emerge in the debate about clause 2, which contains quite a lot of the detail about how the regime is supposed to work. Basically, we have been told that there will be a significant increase in the use of bulk personal datasets. We have been told that scrutiny is too slow, so we will either have to remove it or, perhaps more accurately, water it down in relation to these so-called low/no datasets. Fundamentally, I do not like that argument. The Minister will need to make a compelling case.

When we discuss clause 2, it would be useful if the Minister told us how many bulk datasets are retained and examined each year currently; how many datasets it is envisaged will be retained and examined after these powers come into force; what percentage of the datasets he thinks would be considered low/no datasets; how long authorisation processes take currently and why they take that length of time; and why cannot we improve or accelerate that process in some way, rather than having to water it down in the way that this Bill suggests. We will ask the Minister for that sort of evidence, because he is asking us to do away with parts of the oversight system that were put in place in 2016, and we want to understand how that oversight system is causing a problem at the moment. If he cannot explain that, we cannot support this new regime.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve on this Committee with you in the Chair, Mrs Cummins.

My hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central said very clearly that there is general support for the Bill. The need for it is self-evident: things have moved on since the passage of the 2016 Act—indeed, they have moved on very quickly in terms of the amount of data there is, not only data that the security services have to deal with but data in general life.

Bringing the legislation up to date is important, but if we look at the Hansard reports of the debates in 2016, when the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings took the original legislation through the House, we see that there was then, quite rightly, concern that the state acquiring bulk data was intrusive into people’s private lives.

Having read those Hansard reports a couple of days ago, I accept that some of the concerns expressed in 2016 were overblown, as are some of the concerns expressed about this Bill. Frankly, if the accusations regarding what our security services are able to do were true, they would be 10 times, if not 100 times bigger than the actual security services we have today. Nevertheless, it is important in a democracy to ensure that the security services act proportionately—I am confident that they do—and that there is the necessary oversight of their actions and how they deal with the data they have. It is not just parliamentarians who need reassurance in that regard, but the public. The public need reassurance about the data that the state is holding.

Examples have been given, but frankly, they are a bit silly, because things such as the electoral register, which you, Mrs Cummins, I and everybody else can access, fall under the existing regime. The expectation that the data will not be made public is ridiculous, and the same is true of some of the other examples that have been given. For instance, some datasets for machine learning are open on the internet for everybody to see. I do not have any problem with that and I do not think that anybody else does.

Oversight, which we will discuss later, is important. We are giving the security services the powers to determine what is low and what is no. Do I trust that they will have the protocols in place to ensure that that process is done fairly? Yes I do, but I have been on the Intelligence and Security Committee for the last seven years; I know exactly how the protocols work internally in those organisations. To reassure the general public, we need a definition of how this process will take place. I will not touch on that now, but later I will raise the question of how we will have independent oversight of that process.

Neither I nor anyone else is saying that we distrust how the security services will handle those datasets, but one thing the ISC has been very clear on is that if we are going to extend the security services’ powers, there needs to be a corresponding extension of oversight to balance that. I do not want to put in place oversight that prevents operational effectiveness; it would be silly to give the security services powers and then make it impossible or too onerous for them to operate in practice, but striking a balance is important in a democracy.

We broadly got that balance right in the 2016 Act. Looking at international comparisons, we are way ahead of many other democracies in how we deal with oversight of those potentially very delicate issues.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

I will not detain the Committee unduly, my Whip will be pleased to know. However, I feel it is important at this juncture—in part because, as the right hon. Member for North Durham says, I was responsible for taking the 2016 legislation through the House, and in part because of my current role on the ISC—to make some comment on the first part of this Bill, which deals with bulk powers. There are misassumptions about bulk powers. The Minister will be aware of how vital they are to the security and intelligence services and to the police. These powers are used in almost all investigations —95% of them—and they are critical if we are to deal with the changing character of the threat we face.

Contextually it is important to note that when the 2016 Act was passed, the nature of the threat was metamorphosising, and that is even more the case now. The scale and character of the threats are altering all the time, so the legal powers available to those we mission to keep us safe need to be fit for purpose and up to date. We knew that when we passed the 2016 Act; we knew that the legislation was dynamic and that it would be supplemented over time to take account of that metamorphosis, which takes two forms. First, the threat now is probably greater from state actors, and secondly, it is greater from those inspired to do harm via the internet in particular. That situation makes an implicit case for the kind of measures the Minister has brought before us today.

Furthermore, there is a paradoxical change in the methodology used by those who seek to do us harm. Because of the nature of technology, those people are now able to do things that they were not able to do when we debated the original Act that this Bill amends. I describe the change as paradoxical because those people have simultaneously learned that they can do immense harm with a vehicle and crude weapon; we know that from some tragic cases in recent years. Those inspired people do not need a sophisticated organisation with all kinds of capabilities; they simply need the perverse, indeed perverted, will to do damage. All of those factors legitimise the case for the measures in the Bill, which we will consider over the coming hours and days—but not weeks I am pleased to say, unless something goes badly wrong.

--- Later in debate ---

I am very worried about how the clause could be interpreted. I absolutely understand the reasons why the powers have been sought, but I very much fear that the way in which the provisions have been drafted will leave them open to some rather more frightening propositions.

[Mr Jones]

My hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central has been trying to put a definition around this. That needs to happen. If it is not to be in the Bill, the Minister needs to put on the record exactly what his expectations are, because I can see this being challenged in court. Courts are very good at looking back at what is said and what is actually meant in Parliament, so it is quite important.

There are certain categories that no one has any problems with: open Companies House registers are available to anybody, for example, and so is the open electoral register. But how will the closed electoral register be dealt with? I would argue that people who want to be on the closed register would think that there was a reasonable expectation that that data would not be shared. We know that it is, but somebody might challenge that.

Likewise, there are telephone directories. I am not sure whether they are produced any more. Perhaps I am old-fashioned—I am showing my age now. [Interruption.] Well, I am sure they still exist in a digital format. Those who are old enough to remember will know that there was an ex-directory option for people who did not want their name published; someone could make a conscious decision that they did not want their private phone number to be in the public record. Now it must be all online, but how will that be dealt with? With a directory on which everyone’s number is publicly available, I would think that there was a reasonable expectation that that was public data; I think everyone would assume that. Where they are ex-directory, however, I think most people would reasonably expect their data not to be shared with anybody.

“No expectation of privacy” is very clear—it means things that are publicly available—but “no reasonable expectation” is a dance on the head of a pin. People’s interpretations of what is reasonable will be different. I am reassured that the agencies have protocols for dealing with that, and I am not suggesting for one minute that they will be on fishing expeditions, but we need some clarity on what it all means.

The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East made a point about Facebook and other types of social media. For those who are interested, my “North Durham morning” posts are on Instagram, Facebook and Twitter, or X. I have been doing them for many years.

[Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)]

Very nice they are, too.

[Mr Jones]

I have no reasonable expectation that those posts are private. I am not suggesting that the security services will want to look at North Durham mornings, but those posts are something that I have put in the public domain. That is fine, but it is different from what the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East was talking about. We might share a photograph or information on a small Facebook group, but do we expect everyone to have access to it? I am not sure that we do. Where does that fit into the definition of “reasonable expectation”? Would the individual think that it was available? That is the point.

[Sir John Hayes]

The right hon. Gentleman is making a persuasive argument about public expectations of what is reasonable versus what the Bill says and what the agencies do. He is right that there are good operational validations through the agencies’ protocols, but perhaps the best way of explaining the marriage between expectation and what is real would be by example. It would be helpful to hear some examples from the Minister of how the powers that are currently used, and those that will be used under the Bill, are necessary and proportionate; for all these things are about necessity and proportionality. By example, we can probably put this matter to bed.

[Mr Jones]

Yes. A point was also raised about leaked data. If something is leaked on the internet or any other portal and everyone has access to it, do we then assume that the security services think that it comes under “reasonable expectation”, even though the individual whose data it was perhaps did not want it out there?

I accept that under proposed new section 226B(4)(b),

“the authorisation is necessary for the purpose of the exercise of any function of the intelligence service”,

which is fine. I do not think that people will go on fishing expeditions—we will come on to that issue later— but I note that the phrase “economic well-being” appears later in the Bill, but not in this part. When I have raised the point before, the Government have argued that the phrase is used in other legislation and that they want to be consistent.

If nothing is to be changed in the Bill today or on Report, the Minister needs to put something on the record so that it when somebody challenges this provision in future, which they will, the Government’s intention is clear now and can be interpreted later.

[Owen Thompson (Midlothian) (SNP)]

I will be brief. I back up the comments of the right hon. Member for North Durham: much more needs to be done to define clearly what we mean by “low or no”. In many ways, separating the two out would make everything clearer. Everybody can tell what “no expectation of privacy” means. It is when we get to low expectation of privacy that we have debates: “Is it this or is it that?”

The factors considered in determining whether something qualifies as low or no include

“the extent to which…the data has been made public”.

If there is no expectation of privacy, that is obvious, so I do not understand why we cannot have more clarity and say, “This is what we mean by no expectation of privacy, and this is what we mean by low.” It might be fine for us in this room to have an understanding of what we mean, but there needs to be public understanding.

We all know that every time we go on any website, we are asked to click to accept the cookies, and sometimes we cannot progress any further unless we do. Data is being gathered left, right and centre. With the best will in the world, not everyone reads every single line of the terms and conditions. We need to be absolutely clear about exactly what we mean so that legal challenges do not occur down the line.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Before I address those points, I want to address the shadow Minister’s somewhat contentious argument that learning French is not a security issue —that was a bold innovation from him.

The points that have been raised are essential to understanding exactly why the Bill is so important. I will cover the “no” and “low” areas separately, for the reason that the hon. Member for Midlothian touched on. We all know what no expectation is; that has been largely covered, and the reality is that even the slightly more restricted version of the electoral register is shared with political parties, as the right hon. Member for North Durham knows.

[Mr Jones]

I agree with the Minister on party access— we get access to it, for example. However, does the person who ticks that box and takes their name out have a reasonable expectation? Do they know that it is being shared? No, they do not.

[Tom Tugendhat]

That is what I was going to say. Although the register is not publicly available and therefore would not fit in this category, that is where we get to the line. The “no” is for publicly available data, and that is relatively clear.

The “low” comes in areas such as the idea of leaked papers, which somebody raised—forgive me, I cannot remember who. That is where the Bill sets out terms under which datasets should be considered, because of course it is impossible for me to give an answer that applies to every single dataset into the future. One example that came up recently, as right hon. and hon. Members will remember, is the Panama papers. One would not argue for a second that the people listed in those papers had an expectation of openness initially. However, after those papers had been published and republished over many years, at what stage do we really think the expectation of privacy is maintained?

That is where the dataset becomes low expectation. We have set out the oversight regime in another area of the Bill, but I will touch on it. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner has a range of responsibilities, the judicial commissioners have other responsibilities for approving warrants and IPCO has responsibility for overseeing the regime. That is where that is addressed—in slightly ways at each moment of influence and each moment of power, but everything is covered.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

The issue of closing the gap between adding a bulk personal dataset to an existing category authorisation was raised on Second Reading by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, who has a long-standing interest in these matters. I agree with the argument he made on Second Reading and the simple solution he proposed to close the gap: a one-line email to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as reasonably practical.

Any such email would not be seeking real-time approval and would not necessarily be reviewed by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in isolation, but rather as part of a wider trend of what is being added to existing category authorisations. Labour does not seek to create additional work for the men and women who serve in our police and security services. On the contrary, a simple arrangement —to send a single-line email—would enhance wider oversight arrangements, while keeping extra requirements for the police and security services to an absolute minimum. In response to my right hon. Friend on the matter on Second Reading, the Minister said the IPA 2016

“allows the collection… with prior authorisation”

and that

“This is intended to speed the process up.”—[Official Report, 19 February 2024; Vol. 745, c. 556.]

We do not intend to slow the process down through the amendment, as any such notification would be made after it had happened. I therefore ask the Minister whether the problem is the act of notifying the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as reasonably practical, or the potential volume of notifications, that mean he deems it an unworkable arrangement. I would appreciate if he could be as open as possible in answering those questions. If the Government do not accept the amendment, perhaps a conversation could take place between my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, the Minister and myself to agree a practicable solution.

[Mr Jones]

As my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central said, I raised the matter on Second Reading. In no way do I or other members of the ISC want to slow down the process or give more work to the hard-working men and women of our security services. However, as I understand it, the only reason put forward by the Government was that it would impair operational agility.

The amendment proposes, and what I proposed, is not for the security services to go through an authorisation, as my hon. Friend just said; it is literally an email saying, “This is what we are doing.” Members might ask why that is important. It is important because we are giving the security services new powers in the Bill and for IPCO to be informed in real time. I accept the retrospective look at them, but at least if there was a trend, we could see it.

The Government have also tried to argue that there is no need for more oversight because it is a low or no dataset, much lower than those governed by the existing section 7 of the IPA. We have just had the argument about the definition of “low” and “no”, but it means that we are giving the security services additional powers here. I am not for one minute suggesting that the internal protocols within those security services will lead to things that are just a free-for-all, as some might suggest, but it gives that assurance that there is oversight of what is happening in real time.

If we were asking for authorisation of each one, I would accept that it would be too burdensome and would slow down the process, but this is literally a one-line email so the IPCO knows what is needed. I do not understand why the Government are resisting that, except that—let us be honest, Minister—we have form on this. With the National Security Bill, there was an idea that it would be a weakness on the Government’s part to accept any amendments from the ISC. However, there was one slight change made with Lord West’s amendment, so there is possibly a change of attitude. I accept that the Minister respects the ISC—I am not sure it is the same for many people higher up in Government. But that should not be a reason not to accept this very simple amendment, which I think would give people reassurance that there is some real-time oversight of this. If an election was called in the next few weeks, this Bill—

[Sir John Hayes]

I endorse what the right hon. Gentleman said. It is a straightforward matter. The Government could give way on this—because they already have the power to ask for it under existing arrangements—by making it a routine, light-touch process. I take the point that we do not want to impair the alacrity that is necessary for the agency. However, I think a simple change would satisfy the right hon. Gentleman, me, and many others.

[Mr Jones]

I agree entirely with the right hon. Gentleman. If the amendment goes into the wash-up of the Bill, things like that will have to be included anyway. I do not understand why the Government are dying in a ditch on quite a small amendment that would make no practical difference at all to the operation of this Bill. There are certain people—not including the Minister, who is quite a reasonable individual—who want to make sure that the ISC cannot claim credit for doing anything, which I think is quite sad. If the Minister cannot agree to the amendment as drafted, I echo the suggestion of my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central that we draft an amendment that the Government are happy with on Report that fulfils our ambitions on oversight, but that is also practically and technically correct. [Interruption.]

[The Chair]

I remind members of the public to please turn their electronic devices to silent as well.

[Tom Tugendhat]

If I may, I will come to the last point first. The information going to the ISC on this basis would be, as far as possible, the same as that going to the Secretary of State. Obviously, the operational data may not be included, depending on the relevant operational case. I hope that will reassure this Committee and, indeed, the ISC that the intention is to make sure that the ISC is as fully informed as possible.

On the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, he will know that the Bill, in many ways, has been a joint project between the Government and the ISC. I have spent many hours with members of the ISC, including the Chair, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), and with various members of the Committee. Their input has been exceptionally important to me and has been included in many areas of drafting on this.

Turning to amendment 15, the right hon. Member for North Durham and the hon. Member for Barnsley Central, in many ways, have both been the Occam’s razor of the Bill process, not just here, but in other areas. They have been rightly keen that we should not include powers or requirements that would otherwise constrain or block processes or confuse the law. I understand the argument that hon. Members are making about a one-line email, but the reason that I am not convinced—though I am very happy to have the conversation suggested—is that the reality is that it is possible for IPCO to investigate at any point, and it must investigate at 12 months. Therefore, if we ask for a legal requirement on the services, that would force an extra legal duty into the various elements and it will be an extra change.

[Mr Jones]

I disagree with the Minister. Yes, IPCO can look back and can go in at any time to look at things, but if it does not know where the needle in the haystack is, how is it going to actually find it in the first place? This is not an onerous proposal, and I do not understand why the Minister is resisting it, to be honest. This measure would just send another reassurance to the public that, again, the extra powers being given to the security services, which I fully support, at least have some oversight. We need to address the Bill in detail and in such a way that we cannot be accused of handing over powers without also providing very light-touch reassurance that there is outside oversight. I accept that, in most cases, IPCO would not actually look at any of these.

[Tom Tugendhat]

In the spirit with which the right hon. Gentleman has approached this, may I commit to meeting him and the hon. Member for Barnsley Central to discuss this?

[Mr Jones]

We might do it in the wash-up anyway.

[Tom Tugendhat]

Well, the right hon. Gentleman could make a virtue of a necessity if he wishes. I certainly will. I shall enjoy meeting him to discuss this, and I hope that he will take that commitment in the spirit with which it is made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Dowd]

This is as good a time as any to raise this point. If we are going to give the powers to the security services, which nobody objects to with the appropriate oversight, and ask them to do more assessments, more dataset investigations and so on, does my hon. Friend agree that the Minister should give us assurances on resources? Given that we are asking the services to take on additional tasks in one fashion or another, does he agree that we have to set aside the resources? Perhaps, during his meeting with the Minister, he could tease that out a little bit more, because I do not want these powers and responsibilities to be given to the services without them having the appropriate resources— financial and staffing—to do their job.

[Mr Jones]

Their budget was cut yesterday.

[Dan Jarvis]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle. I am happy to give way to the Minister if he wants to respond directly to that point.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [Lords]

Lord Beamish Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 19th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

We looked at that. There is a balance to be struck, and actually the bulk of those Secretaries of State to whom the function could be delegated in those two exceptional circumstances do have warranting powers—I think the Secretary of State for Defence is the only one who does not. My right hon. Friend’s point is a fair one, but the scope of the Bill is not much greater than that.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

As a member of the ISC, I welcome the Government’s acceptance of our recommendation. However, I would like to understand why they are not accepting our other, simple proposal: that when a delegation takes place, the Prime Minister would be informed about that afterwards.

[James Cleverly]

I think it is inconceivable that the Prime Minister of the day would not be informed of the use of a delegated authority.

[Mr Jones]

It is not about the Prime Minister not being informed about the delegation; it is about the Prime Minister looking at the case afterwards—they would not be second-guessing it, obviously, because it would already have been agreed. We suggested that, as a matter of course, the Prime Minister should be informed afterwards of the contents of that warrant. For some reason, the Government are resisting that. I cannot understand why.

[James Cleverly]

I understood the point that the right hon. Gentleman was making—perhaps my answer was not clear—but I suggest that it is inconceivable that the Prime Minister would not routinely be informed of the exercise of this power. Ultimately, that is a level of granularity that would add complexity to the Bill without utility. But, as I have said, through the passage of the Bill thus far, we have listened carefully to the Committee’s suggestions, and although we may not always agree, I can reassure him, other members of the Committee and Members of the House that we will continue to act in listening mode in relation to the Committee’s suggestions.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Cleverly]

My right hon. and learned Friend—and immediate predecessor—makes incredibly important points. Digital technology and online technology have been a liberator in so many ways, but, sadly, as has been the case with technology throughout time, it has also been used by those who would do people harm. Indeed, she mentioned in particular the harm done to children. We take that incredibly seriously. We value the important role of investigatory powers and will continue to work with technology companies—both those well established at the moment and those of the future—to maintain the balance between privacy and security, as we have always done, and ensure that these technology platforms do not provide a hiding place for terrorists, for serious criminals and those people taking part in child sexual exploitation.

The three types of notices under the existing IPA are data retention notices, technical capability notices and national security notices. Those notices must be both necessary and proportionate, and they are of course subject to the double lock. The Bill does not introduce any new powers for the acquisition of data. The changes are about ensuring that the system is up to date and remains robust. The Bill will create a notification notice allowing the Secretary of State to place specific companies under an obligation to inform him or her of proposed changes to their telecommunications services or systems that could have an impact on lawful access. This is not a blanket obligation, and it will be used only where necessary and proportionate, and then only on a case-by-case basis.

The notice does not give the Secretary of State any powers to veto or intervene in the roll-out of a product or services. It is intended to ensure that there is sufficient time for appropriate consideration of the operational impact of the proposed changes, and potentially for discussions with the company in question about them. The public, rightly, would want their representatives to know in advance if companies were proposing to do something that would put public safety at risk, and responsible companies will work with Governments to avoid endangering people, who are of course also their customers.

The Bill will also amend the IPA to require the company to ensure that existing lawful access is maintained. That means the company cannot legally take any action that would negatively affect the level of lawful access for our operational partners during the review period. In the other place, the Government tabled an amendment to allow a timeline for review of a notice to be specified in regulations. We also gave the judicial commissioner further powers for managing the review process. Taken together, they ensure that companies are clear on the length of time that a review can take, which reduces uncertainty for their business as well as providing greater clarity for the review process. In the other place, my noble colleague Lord Sharpe of Epsom also committed to a full public consultation before amending the existing regulations on the review of notices, and laying new regulations relating to the notification notices.

The Bill also clarifies the definition of a telecommun-ications operator, to make it clear that companies with complex corporate structures that provide or control telecommunications services and systems in the UK fall within the remit of the IPA. These changes do not directly relate to any particular technology, including end-to-end encryption, but are designed to ensure that companies are not able to unilaterally make design changes that compromise exceptional lawful access.

The Bill makes changes to the powers of public authorities to acquire communications data. Section 11 of the IPA made it an offence for a relevant person in a relevant public authority to knowingly or recklessly obtain communications data from a telecoms operator or a postal operator without lawful authority. The Bill will set out examples of the acquisition routes that amount to lawful authority outside the IPA, giving greater clarity to public authorities that they are not inadvertently committing an offence. Further targeted amendments will ensure that public sector organisations are not unintentionally prevented or discouraged from sharing data. Further changes will allow bodies with regulatory functions to acquire communications data.

The Bill also creates a new condition for the use of internet connection records—ICRs—by the intelligence services and the National Crime Agency. The IPA currently requires certain thresholds to be met on the known element of an investigation, such as exactly when a website has been accessed. That limits the ability of operational partners to use the ICRs to detect previously unknown criminals, terrorists or state threat actors who are acting online. The proposed measure will allow greater detection of high-impact offenders by removing the requirement to unequivocally know a specific time or times of access and service in use, and instead will allow these factors to be specified within the application.

[Mr Jones]

I understand the use of the measure for the security services, but the Bill broadens the scope of how many people could be dragged into it. There is no judicial oversight of the Security Service or whoever is using it. The Bill states that the measure is for national security and economic wellbeing—that is a catch-all for quite a lot of things. Although the intent is right, there need to be some safeguards to prevent innocent people being dragged into that potentially broad measure.

[James Cleverly]

I understand the right hon. Gentleman’s point. Innocent people’s data is often acquired in dataset capture, and it is always deleted. Economic wellbeing merely reflects the language that is used in other parts, for consistency across our various strands of work.

[Mr Jones]

I thought we were here today to scrutinise the Bill. It should not be a chore for the Home Secretary to be asked questions. The definition of wellbeing could be quite broad. I understand the meaning of national security, as I think he does, and the House, but wellbeing could have quite a broad definition and I am not convinced that I have seen what it is. I am not sure that consistency with other legislation is a great argument for including it in this Bill.

[James Cleverly]

The simple truth of the matter is that I disagree. In legislation of this nature, maintaining consistency of language with previous relevant legislation, including the Intelligence Services Act 1994, is incredibly important to clarity of intent. I recognise that the right hon. Gentleman has given thought to this, and we do not disregard his point, but we have thought through the importance of consistency of language, which is why we have maintained it.

[James Cleverly]

The hon. Lady makes an important point, but the powers could be applied to any bulk dataset collection, of which she knows there are many across Government. Provisions are in place to ensure that innocent people’s data is not held but deleted, and that our security services and other organisations that will utilise these powers always do so carefully and cautiously. There are relevant safeguards in place, as I have made reference to—the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the tribunal—if there is wrongdoing. The proposals are put forward for a very specific reason. The Government have given thought to mission creep and broader expansion, and we feel that this is a modest extension that will give significantly greater protection to the British people.

[Mr Jones]

As my hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey (Dame Angela Eagle) just said, we need to give confidence to the public that what we are rightly doing to protect ourselves has that level of security in it. There is no judicial oversight of internet connection records. If we are to give these powers to the Security Service—which I approve of—we should be able to say to the public that they are proportionate and that there is an independent process to ensure that they cannot be abused. Surely, judicial oversight throughout should be important.

[James Cleverly]

The right hon. Gentleman specifically spoke about judicial oversight, but there is oversight—

[Mr Jones]

There isn’t.

[James Cleverly]

There is oversight by the Secretary of State through the warrant process, and oversight of the whole process by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Through the Committee on which the right hon. Gentleman sits, there is oversight of the Secretary of State’s function.

[Mr Jones]

I agree, and I support that oversight, even though this Government have not made our job on the ISC easy. Unless I am missing something, there is no judicial oversight of internet connection records in the Bill. If we want to give people confidence, that backstop of judicial oversight should be important.

[James Cleverly]

As I said, I noticed that the right hon. Gentleman specifically said that there is no judicial oversight—

[Mr Jones]

There isn’t.

[James Cleverly]

I am not disagreeing, but there is oversight. The Committee on which the right hon. Gentleman sits is part of that oversight process.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

In common with all the speakers who have made their contributions thus far on Second Reading of the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill, I will not say that I oppose the Bill or that these powers should not exist or be updated in this rapidly developing area of technology. As others have observed, the rapidly evolving technology is creating threats about which we could not have dreamed when the original Act was introduced after an ISC report on privacy and security in 2015. Although the issues are evolving, some things stay the same, namely that in a democracy it is important that the security services and all the agencies, whether they relate to police or security, can be held to account by the democratic structures that are created to make our democracy real.

I emphasise a point that has not been stressed by others: we are living through an era during which authoritarian governments across the world are beginning to challenge the openness of democratic structures and test whether those who live in a democracy have the political will to maintain their democracy, keep it vibrant and protect it from threats. Against that background of being challenged—we do not have to look much further than Europe and the borders of Ukraine to see how some of those challenges are beginning to develop—we are being asked whether we rate the health and strength of our democracy enough to protect it. We are also being asked, which is the nature of this debate, to justify the powers we are giving to the security and police services to our constituents and those citizens of our country who wish to see their democracy protected, as well as having a proper balance between democratic oversight safety and the powers we give our security services to do their jobs.

As others have mentioned, there is a balance between the effectiveness and speed of those powers and the safeguards that this Parliament puts in place in order to ensure that there is proper oversight and use of them. We have heard how that balance and safeguarding has been developed in law. We are looking now at amendments to the existing law in order to update and modernise those powers to make them more effective, efficient and easier to use, and to ensure protecting our security, be it from criminality, terrorism, paedophilia or state actors who wish to our country harm, is balanced correctly with safeguards, openness and transparency oversight. Then we can protect our society and values, while respecting the privacy of every individual citizen who enjoys the freedom of living in our democracy.

The Bill seeks an expansion in investigatory powers and some of those powers available to agencies to deal with the evolution of this area. Our job, not only in the debate tonight, but in the scrutiny of this Bill in Committee, is to test and ask the appropriate questions about whether the right balance has been struck by Ministers and the relevant agencies in the extra powers that they want to introduce. As the newest member of the ISC, I believe that, as the investigatory powers evolve, it is also important that the powers of the Intelligence and Security Committee to do its job in these new areas are properly developed and resourced. I shall just leave that on the record. It is not a surprise to those who have read the Lords debates that this is an issue.

I draw attention to an area of the Bill where amendments were agreed in the Lords: what is known as the triple lock, rather than the double lock. That is the mechanism that protects the communications of Members of this Parliament and other relevant legislatures from being arbitrarily intercepted by agencies for no reason. In fact, it is part of the protection that one would expect in a robust democracy for those people who are elected to represent their constituents. They have a reasonable expectation, I think, to be allowed to go about their business without being subjected to that kind of intrusive power, unless there is an extremely good reason for it. Members will know that the underlying principle is that the communications of Members of this Parliament and other relevant legislators should be intercepted and read only where it is absolutely essential to do so—in the most serious of circumstances. In the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which this Bill will change, Parliament recognised that that was an issue by adding a third layer of safeguards to the approval process for warrants for targeted interception and targeted examination of communications. Those warrants are issued only by a Secretary of State and reviewed by a judicial commissioner, which is the double lock, but they are also approved by the Prime Minister personally. As my right hon. Friend said from the Dispatch Box, there is an issue if the Prime Minister is unavailable to do that. It is important that there is not a gap in security protection, which would happen if the Prime Minister is unable to be the third part of that triple lock.

Nobody disagrees with the idea that that process should be made more robust, but there is also an issue about how wide the power to issue that final approval—currently, that final approval rests only with the Prime Minister—should go. There were debates about that when the Bill went through its stages in the other place. The question of balance is how the new Bill deals with ensuring that the triple lock is robust while not creating a lacuna should the Prime Minister be indisposed and unable to issue warrants without that power going too wide. The ISC supports the intention behind this, which is to provide resilience around the current arrangements. It is important that the Prime Minister is the person who approves these things, but this may affect the operations of the intelligence agencies when they are seeking a targeted interference or a time-sensitive warrant. None the less, there was agreement that, in truly exceptional circumstances, it may be appropriate for a Secretary of State to temporarily deputise for the Prime Minister. The Committee considered that it was important that decisions in this area should be delegated only in the most exceptional circumstances, and delegated only to a limited number of Secretaries of State who are already responsible for authorising relevant warrants. We want the Prime Minister to retain sight of all warrants relating to Members of a relevant legislature. Most of that was agreed in the other place, although there is an issue about whether the relevant Secretaries of State—there can be up to five of those—are ones that already issue warrants.

[Mr Jones]

I was a little taken aback that the Home Secretary just assumed that, once these had been agreed by a substitute, they would automatically be reviewed by the Prime Minister. Clearly, that is a big assumption. Does my hon. Friend not think that it would be better if we put it in the Bill that the Prime Minister had full oversight of this warrant?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clearly, putting such things in the Bill is often an important safeguard. Certainly, I do not understand why the delegation of these powers should not be limited to Secretaries of State who also issue warrants. I do not quite understand why there is an obsession with five Secretaries of State. We could have four and still have robust oversight.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Let me start by thanking our security services. I think I am now the longest-serving member of the ISC, and it is a privilege to work with them and scrutinise their work, as our Committee does. They do not get a great deal of publicity—for the right reasons—but when they do, it is sometimes not factual by any stretch of the imagination. They do an invaluable job, and in protecting our democracy, the threat that they face—that we all face—is changing, so the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 needs revising.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey (Dame Angela Eagle) said, the important point is that any new powers that we give the security services to act on our behalf should come with an equally balanced level of scrutiny and oversight. I see the scrutiny of our security as like a three-legged stool, with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, and the ISC. Well, actually, I would say that it is more like a two-and-a-half-legged stool, because the Home Secretary has done what most Ministers do; they say how wonderful the ISC is, how much they value our work, and that they want us fully involved—in passing this legislation, for example—but since 2017, when I first sat on the ISC, there has been a marked increase in lip service paid to it, as I think we see again in the Bill. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) said, we have not met the Prime Minister for 10 years—any of them; I think we had one who offered to come in the dying days of her Administration. We have taken evidence from the security services on the Bill, and I have to say that they are not the problem: it is the Government who are the problem all the time. That was the case with the National Security and Investment Act 2021. Frankly, it is an uphill struggle to get things changed in this Bill—changes that would not only improve the Bill, but make sense. One has just been highlighted by the Chairman of the ISC, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis).

On occasions, it is a bit like going round in circles. I will give an example. We have actually made one little advance in the other place, in terms of acceptance of the changes to do with the triple lock. Now, though, the sensible thing we are asking for—that it should be in the Bill that the Prime Minister should actually see those warrants—is being resisted as though it would somehow stop the world. I am sorry, but I do not think it would. I think the Government believe that they have to be seen to be resisting any changes. I like the Minister, but the passage of the National Security and Investment Act was a pretty dark day for the Government’s relationship with the ISC, because we had to fight tooth and nail to try to get anything changed in that Bill.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I was not in the Government then.

[Mr Jones]

I think the Minister was, actually. I think he picked up the tail end of that Bill.

The ISC has looked at this issue in detail. We have taken evidence from the heads of the security services, and we want to be supportive of change, but we also want that important role of scrutiny and ensuring the public are protected from the occasions when things might go wrong. The other thing that struck me today is that, although the Home Secretary can read a good speech, I am not sure he had a great grasp of some of the detail of the Bill. All I ask of the Minister is to please take on board some of the things we are saying, so that we can make progress in Committee. They are not radical things that are going to upturn the Bill; they are things that will improve it. I suspect that in certain parts of the Government there is a hatred of the ISC, and the belief that we have to be resisted at all costs. That will lead to a poorer Bill, because the amendments we will be tabling would actually improve the Bill. Lord West also did a great job in the other place.

I now turn to clause 2 of the Bill, which introduces the bulk personal data regime. There is a worrying gap: oversight of what are deemed low or no privacy datasets added to category authorisations. At the moment, the system does not work, because things like the electoral register have to get special permission. That is silly, frankly, but we need to ensure that these provisions are scrutinised.

New part 7A of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, introduced by clause 2, provides for a light-touch regime for the retention and examination of bulk personal datasets by the intelligence services where the subject of that data is deemed to have low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. As the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) said, people are increasingly giving their personal data with little thought to how it is going to be used—not just by the intelligence services, but for commercial purposes. That needs looking at.

Approval of such a dataset will be sought either under a category authorisation, which encompasses a number of individual datasets that have a similar content and may be used for a similar purpose, or by individual authorisation, which covers a single dataset that does not fall neatly into a category authorisation or is subject to a complicating factor. For a category authorisation, a judicial commissioner will approve the overall description of the category authorisation before it can be used. A judicial commissioner will approve renewal of the authorisation after 12 months, and the relevant Secretary of State will receive retrospective annual reports on the use of category and individual authorisations.

However, as the Bill is currently drafted, this oversight is all retrospective. The problem is that what is missing is real-time or even near real-time oversight of changes. Under the present regime, once a category authorisation has been approved, the intelligence services have the ability to add individual datasets to that authorisation through internal processes alone. They examine the dataset without being subject to any political or judicial oversight, and they would be able to use those datasets for potentially a year without anybody being any the wiser.

We do not question why the security services need these powers, but there is potential for mission creep without any oversight of what is being authorised. We are not saying that these powers are not required; they are required. What we are really being asked to do is rely on the good faith of the intelligence services to use the powers in a certain way. I do not think that is strong enough, and no legislation should be solely dependent on good will. We also have to guard against—there are such occasions—situations when mistakes happen or people use powers for purposes that are not in the public interest.

It is important that we fill this 12-month gap, and the ISC thinks that the easiest and simplest way to change this process would be for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to be notified when an individual bulk personal dataset is added by an agency to an existing authorisation. I understand that Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in his review of 2023, recommended a similar proposal. The argument from the Government—it is similar to what they have used throughout this Bill, as the Committee Chairman has remarked—is that that will be onerous in adding to the work of the intelligence services. Well, it would not, because it would simply mean sending a one-line email to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner containing the name and description of the bulk personal dataset as soon as reasonably practicable.

The decision would be approved internally and then sent to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, so it is not actually asking for approval. It is just making sure that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is aware of what is being added, and that the individuals taking such a decision realise that they must inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. That would obviously allow the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to look at trends in what is happening. Clearly, after the 12 months, they could look back, but they could also intervene if they thought something was not in touch.

An argument the Government use quite often about this Bill is that it is to have a light-touch approach, and I think this suggestion is for a light-touch approach. I do not know what is onerous about the security services sending an email to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. I think it would ensure the oversight that is needed. Real-time oversight is what we are suggesting, and I do not think it would add to the administration of the security services, but it would lead to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner at least having some visibility on another layer at which decisions are taken.

The proposal would be a very simple thing to do, and I do not understand why the Government are resisting it. I suggest they are resisting it for the many reasons they have resisted some of the other sensible things we have put forward: just because they want to do that. I do not know how we go forward with the relationship between this present Government and the ISC. Dragging information out of them screaming and kicking is taking a long time, even though we have a legal duty to get information, and the critical point now is the starvation of resources from the Committee which is creating real problems in the way that it can operate.

I hope that things change and that when we table amendments we will not get the usual response that amendments to this type of legislation should only be done in the Lords. Are we here to cause trouble for the security services? No, we are not; we want to ensure we do our job, which is set out in statute, to supervise the security services and improve the powers, but to ensure that the public have the recognised safeguards we should expect in a democracy such as ours.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Tugendhat]

As my right hon. Friend will know, several powers in the earlier Bill—the one that he took through the House—were indeed overseen in various different ways. The Bill does not seek to undermine any of that oversight; what it seeks to do is clarify, in certain areas, where it is necessary. My right hon. Friend has highlighted individual agencies or bodies, and I should be happy to write to him to ensure he is aware of exactly where that is being covered.

The right hon. Member for North Durham spoke about prior judicial authorisation for ICRs. The purpose of the Bill is to try to streamline operations for the intelligence services in areas where the risk is of, as we are calling it, low or no expectation of privacy. He will have seen in the Bill what the expectation means, including areas where information has already been readily made public. I accept his commentary and I would be happy to enter into further conversations with him, but the reason we are not currently going down that route is simply that the existing law, the IPA 2016, allows the collection of bulk data with prior authorisation. This is intended to speed the process up. If we put in the measures he is referring to, we would effectively remain in the same place that we are now. That would make it harder for the volume of data that is now coming to be considered by the intelligence agencies. That is why we have made the provision for a subsequent approval rather than a prior approval. He is right to say that it involves a maximum of a year, although I think it unlikely that it would go to that maximum. That will be in cases where this is low or no expectation of privacy—after it has already been agreed by a judge to be in the correct category. I think the right hon. Gentleman might be looking at this through the other end of the telescope.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

What the Minister has to realise is that the big concern from the public—although let’s be honest, the public are not looking at the detail of this—is that somehow the security services will be getting access to huge amounts of bulk data and just having a free run at it. All that I and the Committee are suggesting is that an email should be sent when there are changes to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. That would be a simple thing. It would not be onerous, and it would reinforce the point that there was at least some potential oversight of the process.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I think we may be conflating different aspects of the Bill. I do believe that this already has oversight.

Let me answer the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne, which touches on a similar area. Where people have the right to and expectation of privacy and freedom, this provision does not remove that right. What it does is allow the intelligence agencies to use bulk data to target an individual at a particular point, and the excess collected information will not be able to be used for targeting an individual without the warrant process that would be expected for any initial search. In that sense, this is not undermining anybody’s privacy; it is allowing for the fact that information is now largely in bulk format. The hon. Member for Barnsley Central was talking about steaming open envelopes. It is impossible to steam open a single envelope today; one has to steam open thousands because that is how data comes. Without an amendment such as that set out in the Bill, we would simply be interrupting the work of the intelligence services to the degree that it would hold them back and make the process harder, but I would be happy to take this up with my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne later if he wishes.

I thank the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch), who was here earlier and made an interesting point about the various ways in which the memorandum of understanding should be looked at through the National Security Act 2023. Friends of mine will know my thoughts on that and know that I gave the Conservative party the chance to allow me to change that 10-year absence, but the Conservative party chose somebody else to make that decision so I have sadly lost the ability to have that influence.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) made a typically insightful speech and typically sensible comments on the ways in which we must consider how the authorisation must not be used to mount general surveillance. Condition D will be used only when an applicant makes a clear and compelling case, based on tangible, reliable intelligence leads, information and analysis, that the resulting data will identify parties involved in a relevant serious crime or national security-related specified operation or investigation. The applicant must explain any anticipated collateral intrusion, and how this will be managed to ensure that the application is necessary and proportionate to the outcomes of the investigation.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Beamish Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 12th December 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

There was a time not long ago when the unique selling point of the Conservative party was showing predictable and consistent support for the rule of law, being in favour of international treaties and organisations, and showing competency in the conduct of government. Alas, that has all changed. As we hear the rhetoric from those on the Government Benches today, we see a party that is increasingly going down a number of populist rabbit holes, fuelled by the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), whose scaremongering and irresponsible rhetoric is clearly designed for his leadership bid after the election rather than being any statement of fact.

The Conservative party now sees the courts and judges, not only in this country but abroad, as the enemy. They see lawyers as the pub bore does: as the enemy of the people, lefty lawyers and do-gooders. Where have we got to when the Conservative party goes down that route? The only person on the Conservative Benches I have heard defending the rights of the courts—an important part of our constitution—has been the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill).

Clause 2, as outlined by my right hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood (Maria Eagle) and my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Sir Chris Bryant), is not about changing policy; it is about changing facts. It is about saying, “Rwanda will be a safe country, and as long as we accept that and get it through this House with a parliamentary majority, that is a fact.” That is a little like saying, “The black cat is white,” as long as it gets through Parliament, irrespective of what the evidence tells us, which is that the cat is actually black. That is dangerous, because it leads to dictatorial parliamentary democracy. It is not only that the façade of democracy damages our reputation. I agree with the right hon. and learned Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland), who said that it is all very well for the Government of the day to argue for this, but what happens if the boot is on the other foot, and another Government put things forward that the Conservatives do not like?

The international treaties that we pride ourselves on were born of the destruction and ashes of the second world war. Today, they are being defended on the battlefields of Ukraine. It saddens me to hear the right hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) and others wishing just to throw away those conventions, or the hon. Member for Devizes (Danny Kruger) wishing to pick and mix which bits of international treaties we should abide by. It is a little ironic, as my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda said, that Rwanda is giving a nation such as Great Britain a lesson in international law.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley (Sir George Howarth) said that the Government are governing in slogans. He is right, but those slogans come with a cost: £300 million of taxpayers’ money has already been wasted, with possibly another £100 million to go, on a system that the Department’s permanent secretary has said will not work, with money that has to be signed off by ministerial order rather than by the civil servants. This is not the first try, as my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra) said; it is the Government’s third bite of the cherry in trying to solve the problem.

The right hon. Member for Bournemouth West (Sir Conor Burns) said that we have to “keep faith” and “be straight with” the public. Well, we do need to be straight with the public: not only will the Bill not work, but it will damage this country’s international reputation. The Bill will raise expectations are waste taxpayers’ money, and it needs to be ditched. That is why I will vote against it.

I look with interest, as we all do, at the spectacle of the Conservative party tearing itself apart, but although I may disagree politically with the coalition that is the Conservative party, I have respect for some of the individuals in it. What is happening now is not good for our democracy. Sadly, the tired old nag that is this Government will be put out of its misery only when we have a general election.

Draft Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Revised Guidance) Regulations 2023

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Tuesday 14th November 2023 General Committees

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I would like to say what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers.

First, I pay tribute to all involved in Prevent, because I think they have been maligned recently—and on two wings. Certain people from the Muslim community, for example, will never like Prevent and think that the state somehow uses it to try to brainwash people, which is further control; I will come to that in a minute. On the other side we have the former Home Secretary, who has tried to portray Prevent as somehow ignoring Islamist terrorism and penalising those with right-wing views. Both of them, I would argue, are wrong.

I thought that the Shawcross review was very disappointing, as it was quite clearly written with a political agenda from the beginning. It tried to somehow argue that right-wing terrorism is something we should not really be worried about, but that the real problem was with Islamist terrorism. We have also seen nonsense about referrals to Prevent being trivialised. There was a succession of wild stories in papers such as the Daily Mail suggesting that people were being referred to Prevent for silly reasons.

If any Member would like to know what the process is, I suggest they go and meet the people who actually do the work. Individuals are not referred to Prevent without there being some concern about them. I have to say that when it works, it is very good, but to somehow think that we can have a hierarchy of terrorism—I am sorry, I do not accept that. Whether it is a threat from the Muslim community or a threat from right-wing terrorism, neither should be tolerated and they should be dealt with equally.

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

Has the right hon. Gentleman ever taken part in the Prevent training programme?

[Mr Jones]

Yes. I spent a day in Leeds with the regional counter-terrorism group there with individuals from Prevent. I think they do a very difficult job, especially on referrals. They are the frontline and have to make some quite difficult judgment calls about individuals. I will talk about one particular case in a minute.

[Dr Johnson]

As an NHS employee, I have done the Prevent training programme, which addresses the various types of people who may be radicalised and the different ideologies to which they may be radicalised. It urges people in the NHS to make reports to the Prevent team when they think that individuals in their care may be a victim of radicalisation, vulnerable to it or may have already been radicalised by particular ideologies. This is done for Islamic and right-wing ideologies, and others besides.

[Mr Jones]

I agree with the hon. Lady; that is exactly how it operates in practice, but that is not the impression given by the previous Home Secretary, who suggested that one community was being targeted more than another. That is not the case. What the hon. Lady says is exactly right. Individuals should look at vulnerabilities in each case. That is not the agenda we have had, and that is why I think that the Shawcross review was a waste of time. A lot of its conclusions could have been written even before it even took evidence.

The important thing to remember, as I have said, is that terrorism is terrorism. Individuals under NHS care, to whom the hon. Lady referred, who are radicalised or vulnerable to either Islamic terrorism or right-wing terrorism should equally be referred to Prevent. I am a great supporter of Prevent, because if it is done properly, it works very well.

[Dr Johnson]

The other point I would make about the training is that it talks a lot about vulnerabilities of people who may be victims of ideology. We need to be making it clear that when atrocities are committed, people are responsible for the actions they have taken. They should not be excused because of being vulnerable to becoming victims of ideological radicalisation.

[Mr Jones]

I would agree, but when the Intelligence and Security Committee, on which I serve, did its right-wing terrorism report, there was evidence of groups targeting certain individuals with some vulnerabilities. The shocking thing for me is the rise in right-wing terrorism. Twenty-five per cent of the plots that were disrupted in the last few years were by right-wing terrorists, mainly young boys and teenagers, who were not radicalised by individuals, but usually on the internet. That is an area where it is very difficult for gatekeepers to intervene.

[Dr Johnson]

The right hon. Gentleman said that the right wing had increased and represented 25% of plots. What were the other 75%?

[Mr Jones]

It is right that Lord Anderson’s review moved the responsibility for right-wing terrorism to MI5 from the police. That is why we undertook our review. The other part is made up of Islamists and other types of terrorism. That is a growth area that we cannot ignore, and to try to categorise that, which is what the previous Home Secretary tried to do, is unfortunate. We should be coming together and, whether it is Islamist terrorism or right-wing terrorism, we need to deal with it in a co-ordinated and forceful way. Prevent is good at that but, unfortunately, political discourse in the last few years has led to fingers being unfairly pointed at certain people in Prevent. It is a difficult job. Certainly, as regards our report on right-wing terrorism, when dealing with young people and individuals who have been radicalised online, how do we get the gatekeepers to spot what they are doing? Let us be honest—some of those people will not go on to commit acts of terrorism.

Like it or not, the biggest threat to us now in this country is not necessarily organised terrorism; it is self-generating terrorism by individuals who are radicalised in cyber-space by other individuals. That is a very difficult thing for the security agencies to deal with. If we see some of the content on both the Islamist and the right-wing sides, it is pretty disgusting and it affects young people’s minds. That is why if we can get in there and use it properly, Prevent is the right way to try to stop people taking the next step, which is either to commit an act of terrorism or an act of hatred. We have seen a rise in such acts over the past few years on the right-wing side, with Islamophobia and others. That is the important thing that Prevent should do.

I just wish that Prevent had not become a political football to be kicked around by some people who have always been against it, for example in the Muslim community and likewise by those on the right in this country. We depend a lot on individuals and how they do the work, but a lot of the success stories are never told. As the Minister knows, having met some of the individuals as well, there are success stories.

I welcome the guidance. All I stress is that we must try and turn the temperature down on this and do what I think we all want to do, which is to prevent people from being radicalised.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank all hon. Members on all sides for the tone in which the debate has been conducted. The hon. Member for Barnsley Central is absolutely right that the first time we met I was sent out to shadow him. I very much hoped I would not have to take his job because we were in a combat theatre. This time, sadly, he is gunning for mine. I assure him I will resist just as hard as we resisted together nearly 20 years ago.

It is a great pleasure to work with the hon. Gentleman on this. As many will know, trust between individuals is what makes this Parliament work when it works at its best. We oppose each other on various areas—or rather, he opposes me as I try to do the best for the Government of the country—but the co-operation we have had has improved our ability to co-operate on things that matter. This is something that matters.

I want to pick up on the points the hon. Member—

[Mr Jones]

Right hon. Member.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I apologise to the right hon. Member who is sitting at the back and ask him to forgive me. He is an old friend and, again, he has raised some interesting matters.

As a friend of Jo Cox and a friend of David Amess, I appreciate the equality of terror in all its horror, in all its pain and in all its agony. I do not think that any of us in this place require a lesson in that. I hear point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, but I would just say that the services, the intelligence agencies and the police fully appreciate that. The right hon. Member will also know that his words about professionalism in the Prevent space are absolutely right. We have heard frankly disgraceful commentary about the professionalism of our Prevent individuals, who are conducting these services, which completely ignores the fact—and it is a fact—that Prevent is about making sure that all British citizens are treated equally. It is about making sure that there is no soft racism of cultural misunderstanding that tolerates the extremism in one community rather than another, because “that’s normal for them”. No—all British citizens deserve the protection of the British state. They deserve protection from violence used against them, but they also deserve protection from the radicalisation of their children or themselves. That is what Prevent is about. It is about equality; it is about the rights of British citizens; and it is about the right of every citizen and individual in the United Kingdom to be safe.

The hon. Member for Barnsley Central made some interesting points. The point about mental health is valid and true; we are working with the Department of Health and Social Care on that. It is a complicated area, because while it is extremely likely that an individual who seeks to do harm through terrorism may well be suffering from a form of mental illness, that does not undermine the fact that their ideology is radicalising them towards violence. I am afraid that the overlap between mental health and terrorism does not negate either side. The reality is that both can exist at the same time, and we must address both at the same time.

The hon. Member’s point about the recent protests was also extremely valid. One of the things that has shocked me most—I use the term appropriately, I think—is the number of people the police have identified and want to talk to about incidents of racism, antisemitism and vile hatred who fill positions of responsibility in our society. That is completely unacceptable. The normalisation of antisemitism that we have seen on the streets is utterly unacceptable. It is wrong and deeply harmful. Not only is it harmful in the fear that it spreads in parts of the communities that we are lucky enough to represent, but it is wrong because it normalises in the minds of young people attitudes and actions that could easily lead to their causing greater harm and pain. We are absolutely committed to this, and I know that the Prevent professionals working in this space are fully aware of the dangers that we face.

A lot of the engagement on the AI question that the hon. Member spoke about is covered in different ways in the Online Safety Act 2023. The work that has just been done by the Prime Minister at Bletchley Park—the hon. Member will know what a remarkable achievement it was to get all those countries around the table for the AI safety summit—was an extraordinary effort that started to address some of the questions he spoke about. I am delighted to have the hon. Gentleman’ support on that, because it will evolve. The reality is that artificial intelligence is an extraordinary process. It is not just an event, but a process by which the acceleration of algorithms produces information and consequences much faster than many other systems have allowed. We are seeing extremism operating in a very different environment. We are also seeing a very different environment in which the information flowing into algorithms and producing artificial intelligence is changing the way in which different people understand things. This is a question about not just the process, but the input.

The last point I want to make is on the question about mixed, unstable or unclear ideology. In response to the right hon. Member for North Durham, the reality is that while there is extreme right-wing terrorism, it is not in any way ignored; in fact, it is addressed very clearly by our policing and Prevent professionals. Sadly, a huge amount of it is emerging at the moment from the Muslim community. It is a real problem, and we are addressing it. To protect young men and women in the Islamic community, we need to be sure that we support them in a way that would support everybody in the United Kingdom and attack those centres of radicalisation. It also means that we must look at other areas where they are emerging. The question about incel violence—involuntary celibate violence, or mixed, unstable or unclear violence—is also emerging. Sadly, it has grown at different points. It is still a smaller percentage of the events that we see, but sadly it is far too present even now.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Committee has considered the draft Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Revised Guidance) Regulations 2023.

Contest: UK Strategy for Countering Terrorism 2023

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Wednesday 19th July 2023 Commons Chamber

[Suella Braverman]

I am very proud of the UK’s track record of supporting Ukraine and the Ukrainians both in Ukraine and abroad through the devastating illegal conflict that Russia and Putin have waged upon them. It is right that we provide military support, it is right that we rolled out an extensive set of sanctions against Russia, and it is right that we continue our international and diplomatic support for Ukrainians.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I add my comments to those of the Home Secretary on our security services and thank them for the work that they do. The Intelligence and Security Committee report last year on right-wing terrorism found that 30% of disrupted plots were from right-wing terrorism, and that they mainly involved young people who aimed to join either the armed forces or the police. We made recommendations on tightening up the vetting of police officers and proscribing membership of right-wing organisations for members of the armed forces. Will the Home Secretary update the House on what progress has been made on those two issues?

[Suella Braverman]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to refer to the emerging threat posed by extreme right-wing terrorism. The director general of MI5, in his annual update, referred to the ideologies that are emerging and increasing in activity, and the independent review of Prevent focused on work that can be better done. It is absolutely right that we take robust action. That is why I am acting on the recommendations set out by Sir William Shawcross on upgrading and updating Prevent, so that it better responds to the risk of extreme right-wing terrorism, as well as to the risk posed by Islamist terrorism.

National Security Bill

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Consideration of Lords message
Monday 26th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat]

The right hon. Lady will be delighted to hear the rest of my speech, in which I answer her wonderful questions.

As this House will be aware, the Intelligence and Security Committee memorandum of understanding can already be revised by agreement, which is one of the points that the right hon. Lady is raising. We do not believe that primary legislation is an appropriate mechanism for making amendments to the MOU. However, we recognise the strength of feeling on the issue, and in a spirit of compromise we have tabled amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 122B. The Government’s amendment will achieve a similar result and will create a duty on the Prime Minister and the Intelligence and Security Committee to progress a review of the MOU within six months of the provision’s coming into force.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

That is fine, but the ISC has been raising this issue for the past two years. It takes two to tango. Unfortunately, the only reason we have this Lords amendment is a sense of frustration—certainly among members of the ISC, but also among a lot of Members of this House.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I assure the right hon. Gentleman that I have heard him. I hope that the amendment will now satisfy the ISC with respect to its concerns. I am sure that hon. Members across the House will support Government amendment (a) in lieu.

I turn to Lords amendment 22B, which would require political parties to make an annual return to the Electoral Commission, setting out the details of donations from foreign powers. It would also create a duty on political parties to write an annual policy statement to ensure the identification of donations from foreign powers. I understand the intention behind the amendment, and I share the strength of feeling behind it.

The Government are very much alive to the risk that foreign interference presents. I am pleased that we have already taken action to address it, and I am pleased with the support that we have received on both sides of the House for our reforms to Companies House, which will deliver more reliably accurate information on the companies register, providing greater powers for Companies House to query and challenge the information it receives. The Government are also legislating, via the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, to enhance data sharing between Companies House and public authorities, including the Electoral Commission. This will help the enforcement of the rules on donations by providing greater confidence in the accuracy of the data held at Companies House.

--- Later in debate ---

Finally, I said at the outset that the threats to us are profound and dynamic. It is in recognition of that fact that members of the ISC go about their work. We should thank those in the intelligence and security services for all they do. They are remarkable people who do a remarkable job. All we seek is the power to help them do that job by holding them to account.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

In a democracy, the ability of Parliament or others to scrutinise the activities of our security services is not a “nice to have” but a vital part of the confidence that our citizens have in them. We have the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, and then we have the ISC, which is the parliamentary arm that ensures that there is full accountability.

The Justice and Security Act 2013 extended the powers of our security services and, in return, increased the powers of the ISC. The important thing is that it has to be independent. I have been on the Committee the longest—six years now—and what has happened over the past three years has been an attack on the Committee’s independence and our ability to scrutinise. It started with Boris Johnson’s attempt to rig the Committee by giving the Conservative party a majority on it and the chairmanship of it. That failed. We also had the delay of the Russia report for no apparent reason other than to avoid his own embarrassment.

The Minister asks, “Why have we got this amendment to the legislation?”. The reason is a sense of frustration. Our Committee has been trying for the last two or three years to get the MOU changed, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood (Maria Eagle) said, because the remit for considering departmental policy has grown, but at every turn we have been refused. It is not about a lack of willingness on the part of our Committee.

There are other aspects in which the Committee’s work has been frustrated. I mentioned the unnecessary delay of the Russia report, but it is still happening. We have just done a major report on China. It has gone to the Prime Minister and been through security clearance. He had 10 days to publish it; a month later, we are still waiting for a date for it. The report we completed on international partnerships was sent to the Prime Minister on 6 September last year, and we are still waiting for it to be published, so the Government have form when it comes to trying to frustrate the work of the Committee.

We on the Committee get frustrated, but the important thing is that Parliament is being frustrated. For some reason, the arrogance that was around when Boris Johnson was there seems to have continued. The Minister can say all those nice warm words—as he does in his nice, flannelly sort of way—but frankly it does not wash with us. The Prime Minister or whoever in Government is trying to stop this needs to recognise that it is not about whether the Committee gets access; it is about proper scrutiny, as laid down in an Act of Parliament. This is serious for our democracy.

I want to add a few final points about the passage of the Bill, during which I think we have had four Ministers. The Committee approached the Bill in a constructive way and worked with the security services to come up with amendments. However, that was not helped by the Minister’s Department, which frankly did everything it could to stop the positive amendments that we had agreed and that were put forward by the security services. They valued that, but were amused, frankly, that the Home Office was so incompetent, or for some reason did not want to give the Committee any credit for coming up with anything.

All I say to the Minister is that I can agree to this proposal, but frankly it means nothing unless there is a change of attitude among the higher echelons of this Government. The point that needs to be remembered is that democracy is important and our constituents need to have that confidence. Our security services, who work day in, day out in very challenging situations on our behalf, need the security and support of knowing that there is independent oversight and that the public can be satisfied with it. Unfortunately, the way that the Government are carrying on in this area is damaging that oversight.

[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

I want to make a few brief comments about both the amendments before us. Let me start with Lords amendment 22B and the Government motion to disagree with it. I find it very difficult to disagree with this amendment. I was a member of the Committee on Standards in Public Life when the 2021 report that has been referred to was produced, and I am a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee now. Both those Committees, as the House has heard this evening, take the view that further measures are required to protect our democracy from the influx of inappropriate foreign money, and I think both would say that the amendment is the bare minimum of what needs to happen.

Lords amendment 22B does two things. It says, first, that a political party should be able to identify donations from a foreign power and, secondly, that it should be transparent with the Electoral Commission about such donations. It is worth stressing that the donations we are talking about are those from a foreign power—not necessarily from an individual, but from a state, perhaps funnelled through an individual. It is surely important to recognise the significance of such donations—potentially, at least—on our democratic process. It seems to me that there are two scenarios here. Either there are hardly any such donations in British politics, in which case the work involved to identify and deal with them appropriately is hardly likely to be onerous, even for smaller parties; or there are substantial numbers of such donations, in which case the case for greater transparency is overwhelming.

Let me turn to Lords amendment 122B and Government amendment (a) in lieu. It is worth being honest: there is very little difference between the Government amendment in lieu and the amendment from the other place, but both, as others have said, are operating on the margins of the real issue. The real issue is that there needs to be the capacity for the Intelligence and Security Committee’s remit, and the memorandum of understanding that relates to it, to adapt as the processes and structures of Government adapt. If that is not the case, all the consequences flow that have been described so well by my Committee colleagues, which I do not need and have not got time to repeat.

My last point relates to a deficiency in both Lords amendment 122B and the Government’s amendment in lieu. Both say that the consideration or the review—depending on which version we choose—of the memorandum of understanding must begin within six months of the passage of the Bill. The problem with that, it seems to me, is that it is far from inconceivable that the Government may make a machinery of government change or a process change beyond that six-month point. It does not seem sensible to artificially limit the capacity for having that review or consideration of the memorandum beyond that point. For that reason, I am afraid, I do not think that either the Lords amendment that we have received or the Government’s amendment in lieu are sensible responses to the challenge we face. In my view, both are flawed.

Manchester Arena Inquiry: Volume 3 Report

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Monday 6th March 2023 Commons Chamber

[Suella Braverman]

As the inquiry’s report makes clear, the responsibility for the events of 22 May 2017 lie with the bomber and his brother. Responsibility rests with them. When it comes to whether lives could have been saved, the Government are of course incredibly sorry—I understand that sorry is a weak word for the people directly affected, and our thoughts remain with them—but Sir John Saunders is also clear in his conclusion:

“It remains quite impossible to say whether any different or additional action taken by the authorities could have prevented the Attack. It might have done; it might not have done.”

He also says that it is

“very hard to say what would have happened”

if the bomber

“had been approached under Prevent or the Channel programme.”

It is difficult to make those clear, direct causal connections. However, as I have said before, he does not shy away from saying that there was a significant oversight and there were failings in the process. There are no words that will provide solace to the families affected, but I hope that they can gain confidence from knowing that huge seriousness is attached to this report and we are doing everything in our power to make sure that the lessons learned will be applied in the real world.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Our thoughts are with the families of the victims, and I thank Sir John for his report. The Home Secretary will be aware that in 2018, the ISC, which I sit on, did a report on the Manchester bombing and the other terrorist attacks that took place in 2017. Many of the conclusions are mirrored in Sir John’s report, including on the purchase of precursor chemicals. Five years on, nothing has been done about that.

The Home Secretary said to the Chair of the ISC, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), that she respects the Committee’s work. As we are the only Committee that can look at the closed report and closed evidence, it is important that if we make recommendations, they are acted on. To date, the Government’s response to ISC’s work is not good. Last July, we produced our right-wing terrorism report. The memorandum of understanding says that the Government have 60 days to reply but we are still waiting. I also say to her that the actions of her Department in our scrutiny of the National Security Bill were far from helpful.

[Suella Braverman]

On chemical precursors, we have enhanced our capabilities to detect terrorist activity involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials and their precursors, and to control and safeguard those materials. Since 2017, among other things, we have strengthened the controls on access to explosive precursors. We regulated sulphuric acid, for example, in 2018. In 2023, we have laid secondary legislation that will improve how suspicious activity reports are made. We have done a lot of work on that issue, but we can always go further.