Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [Lords]

Angela Eagle Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 19th February 2024 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

The simple truth of the matter is that I disagree. In legislation of this nature, maintaining consistency of language with previous relevant legislation, including the Intelligence Services Act 1994, is incredibly important to clarity of intent. I recognise that the right hon. Gentleman has given thought to this, and we do not disregard his point, but we have thought through the importance of consistency of language, which is why we have maintained it.

[Dame Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

A general listener to our proceedings might worry that the new powers could be used for fishing expeditions, rather than the very specific powers that they replace. Could the Home Secretary give some words of reassurance from the Dispatch Box that the broadening of bulk data collection without specific dates will not be used for fishing expeditions, which might affect the privacy of ordinary citizens who have done nothing wrong?

[James Cleverly]

The hon. Lady makes an important point, but the powers could be applied to any bulk dataset collection, of which she knows there are many across Government. Provisions are in place to ensure that innocent people’s data is not held but deleted, and that our security services and other organisations that will utilise these powers always do so carefully and cautiously. There are relevant safeguards in place, as I have made reference to—the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the tribunal—if there is wrongdoing. The proposals are put forward for a very specific reason. The Government have given thought to mission creep and broader expansion, and we feel that this is a modest extension that will give significantly greater protection to the British people.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

In common with all the speakers who have made their contributions thus far on Second Reading of the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill, I will not say that I oppose the Bill or that these powers should not exist or be updated in this rapidly developing area of technology. As others have observed, the rapidly evolving technology is creating threats about which we could not have dreamed when the original Act was introduced after an ISC report on privacy and security in 2015. Although the issues are evolving, some things stay the same, namely that in a democracy it is important that the security services and all the agencies, whether they relate to police or security, can be held to account by the democratic structures that are created to make our democracy real.

I emphasise a point that has not been stressed by others: we are living through an era during which authoritarian governments across the world are beginning to challenge the openness of democratic structures and test whether those who live in a democracy have the political will to maintain their democracy, keep it vibrant and protect it from threats. Against that background of being challenged—we do not have to look much further than Europe and the borders of Ukraine to see how some of those challenges are beginning to develop—we are being asked whether we rate the health and strength of our democracy enough to protect it. We are also being asked, which is the nature of this debate, to justify the powers we are giving to the security and police services to our constituents and those citizens of our country who wish to see their democracy protected, as well as having a proper balance between democratic oversight safety and the powers we give our security services to do their jobs.

As others have mentioned, there is a balance between the effectiveness and speed of those powers and the safeguards that this Parliament puts in place in order to ensure that there is proper oversight and use of them. We have heard how that balance and safeguarding has been developed in law. We are looking now at amendments to the existing law in order to update and modernise those powers to make them more effective, efficient and easier to use, and to ensure protecting our security, be it from criminality, terrorism, paedophilia or state actors who wish to our country harm, is balanced correctly with safeguards, openness and transparency oversight. Then we can protect our society and values, while respecting the privacy of every individual citizen who enjoys the freedom of living in our democracy.

The Bill seeks an expansion in investigatory powers and some of those powers available to agencies to deal with the evolution of this area. Our job, not only in the debate tonight, but in the scrutiny of this Bill in Committee, is to test and ask the appropriate questions about whether the right balance has been struck by Ministers and the relevant agencies in the extra powers that they want to introduce. As the newest member of the ISC, I believe that, as the investigatory powers evolve, it is also important that the powers of the Intelligence and Security Committee to do its job in these new areas are properly developed and resourced. I shall just leave that on the record. It is not a surprise to those who have read the Lords debates that this is an issue.

I draw attention to an area of the Bill where amendments were agreed in the Lords: what is known as the triple lock, rather than the double lock. That is the mechanism that protects the communications of Members of this Parliament and other relevant legislatures from being arbitrarily intercepted by agencies for no reason. In fact, it is part of the protection that one would expect in a robust democracy for those people who are elected to represent their constituents. They have a reasonable expectation, I think, to be allowed to go about their business without being subjected to that kind of intrusive power, unless there is an extremely good reason for it. Members will know that the underlying principle is that the communications of Members of this Parliament and other relevant legislators should be intercepted and read only where it is absolutely essential to do so—in the most serious of circumstances. In the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which this Bill will change, Parliament recognised that that was an issue by adding a third layer of safeguards to the approval process for warrants for targeted interception and targeted examination of communications. Those warrants are issued only by a Secretary of State and reviewed by a judicial commissioner, which is the double lock, but they are also approved by the Prime Minister personally. As my right hon. Friend said from the Dispatch Box, there is an issue if the Prime Minister is unavailable to do that. It is important that there is not a gap in security protection, which would happen if the Prime Minister is unable to be the third part of that triple lock.

Nobody disagrees with the idea that that process should be made more robust, but there is also an issue about how wide the power to issue that final approval—currently, that final approval rests only with the Prime Minister—should go. There were debates about that when the Bill went through its stages in the other place. The question of balance is how the new Bill deals with ensuring that the triple lock is robust while not creating a lacuna should the Prime Minister be indisposed and unable to issue warrants without that power going too wide. The ISC supports the intention behind this, which is to provide resilience around the current arrangements. It is important that the Prime Minister is the person who approves these things, but this may affect the operations of the intelligence agencies when they are seeking a targeted interference or a time-sensitive warrant. None the less, there was agreement that, in truly exceptional circumstances, it may be appropriate for a Secretary of State to temporarily deputise for the Prime Minister. The Committee considered that it was important that decisions in this area should be delegated only in the most exceptional circumstances, and delegated only to a limited number of Secretaries of State who are already responsible for authorising relevant warrants. We want the Prime Minister to retain sight of all warrants relating to Members of a relevant legislature. Most of that was agreed in the other place, although there is an issue about whether the relevant Secretaries of State—there can be up to five of those—are ones that already issue warrants.

[Mr Jones]

I was a little taken aback that the Home Secretary just assumed that, once these had been agreed by a substitute, they would automatically be reviewed by the Prime Minister. Clearly, that is a big assumption. Does my hon. Friend not think that it would be better if we put it in the Bill that the Prime Minister had full oversight of this warrant?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Clearly, putting such things in the Bill is often an important safeguard. Certainly, I do not understand why the delegation of these powers should not be limited to Secretaries of State who also issue warrants. I do not quite understand why there is an obsession with five Secretaries of State. We could have four and still have robust oversight.

[Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (The Cotswolds) (Con)]

Is the hon. Lady aware that the Wilson doctrine is still in operation? This came about in the ’60s and ’70s when Harold Wilson, the Prime Minister of the day, gave an undertaking to this House that the mail of Members of Parliament would not be routinely tapped; it would happen only in exceptional circumstances. All this triple lock is doing is putting that doctrine on to a statutory footing.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments. Obviously, the Wilson doctrine is in the previous Investigatory Powers Act. However, given what happened with the incapacity of the Prime Minister during the covid pandemic, we are seeking to tweak it. It seems sensible to do so, but we need to tweak it in a way that is as narrow as possible to ensure that there is no lacuna in protection.

I wonder why this idea of five Secretaries of State is so important. I also wonder why we cannot restrict the Secretaries of State who could operate in place of the Prime Minister in this very particular circumstance to those Secretaries of State who also issue warrants, and why that cannot be on the face of the Bill. I hope that, in his response, the Minister might have some contribution to make about why the Government are sticking on this particular issue, given that everyone understands how important it is to have resilience. But the resilience that the ISC is seeking is slightly stricter than that which the Government seem to wish to grant. It would be helpful for Committee stage if the Minister explained why that is.

It is important that our discussions on particular bits of the Bill, which we will have in Committee, are seen in the context of a widespread acknowledgement that we need to ensure that the investigatory powers to which the Bill relates are updated, and continue to evolve, to make them relevant, and efficient and effective to use. At the same time, any expansion in investigatory powers must have particular safeguards and oversight in a democratic country, so that we can assure our constituents that it is being done in the interests of preserving our democracy and ensuring that we can protect the population from growing and ever-evolving threats, be they of terrorism, state actors or crime, and that their human rights and rights to privacy are still appropriately protected with proper oversight, which of course the ISC is an important part of.