Trident

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 24th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Thank you very much, Madam Deputy Speaker, for permission to speak in this debate. I apologise to the House for the fact that because I was chairing a public sitting of the Defence Committee I could not be here for the opening speeches. For that reason, too, I have deliberately refrained from making any interventions.

Although the issue of strategic nuclear deterrence is very divisive, we can all agree that the calibre of the speeches on both sides of the House—and on both sides of the argument—has been very high indeed. If the Chairman of the Defence Committee had to mirror the views of its members, I would probably spend just over 90% of my time arguing passionately in favour of the nuclear deterrent and just under 10% of it arguing equally passionately against it, because we have, and are delighted to have, on the Committee the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Douglas Chapman), who is a consistent and thoughtful opponent of Trident.

Fortunately, however, I do not have to mirror those views. The views I am expected to put forward are clearly marked as my own, and they have been pretty much the same for 35 years, half of them outside this House and the remainder inside this House. On my having been elected to chair the Defence Committee, something may have come as a bit of a surprise to people who looked at the list of the five hon. Members from the Labour Opposition who were kind enough to nominate me to that role. One was the shadow Armed Forces Minister, the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), and that is hardly a surprise. However, at the other end of the spectrum, I was fortunate enough to enjoy the support of the current Leader of the Opposition. The reason was that we both agree on one thing. Even though our views on whether we should continue to have a nuclear deterrent are diametrically opposed, we both agree that both sides of the case have a good argument to make, and that when we make it on the Floor of the House, everybody learns something.

With the support of the now Leader of the Opposition, I managed to secure, on 17 January 2013, the first full debate on the whole issue of Trident and deterrence in the main Chamber since the vote on 14 March 2007 when the initial gate was approved. Anybody who really wants to see both sides of the intellectual argument at their best could do no better than to get a copy of that debate, from which I shall repeat my five main military arguments.

I fear that I will not have enough time to deal with the point about cyber-vulnerability, so I commend to the House the article in The Guardian today in which Franklin Miller, a leading expert for 20 years on the American nuclear systems and, indeed, the holder of an honorary knighthood from this country, explains why there is no question of the nuclear deterrent being connected in any way to the internet and being in any way vulnerable in that regard. Similarly, on the question of tiers, I merely say that tier 2 threats are often more dangerous than tier 1 threats, and that is why the Defence Committee has just published a report in which we challenge the utility of ranking threats in this way.

Let me now stick to reciting my few arguments. There is not much time for any detail unless someone is kind enough to intervene on me. The first of the military arguments is the most important of all: that future military threats and conflicts will be no more predictable than those that engulfed us throughout the 20th century. That is the overriding justification for preserving armed forces in peacetime as a national insurance policy.

[Mrs Sheryll Murray]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that deterrence is probably our best defence?

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[Dr Lewis]

That point leads directly to the question of what it means to say that we are “using” Trident. Those of us who believe that the possession of a deadly weapon is the best method of stopping other people who possess similar deadly weapons from using them against us, say that Trident is in use every day of the week, and if ever the button had to be pressed, it would have totally failed in its purpose.

My second argument is that it is not the weapons themselves that we have to fear but the nature of the regimes that possess them. Whereas democracies are generally reluctant to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear dictatorships—although they did against Japan in 1945—the reverse is not true. Let us consider what might have happened if in 1982 a non-nuclear Britain had been facing an Argentina in possession of even just a few tactical nuclear bombs and the means of delivering them. Would we then have dared to use our conventional forces against its inferior conventional forces?

The third argument is that the United Kingdom has traditionally played a more important and decisive role in preserving freedom than other medium-sized democracies have been able, or willing, to do. Democratic countries without nuclear weapons have little choice but either to declare themselves neutral and hope for the best or to rely on the nuclear umbrella of their powerful allies. We are a nuclear power already, and it is also much harder to defeat us by conventional means because of the existence of the English channel.

The fourth argument is that because the United States is our closest ally, if the continent of Europe were ever occupied and the nuclear forces of the United States had not been used, an enemy might feel that they could attack us with nuclear weapons with impunity.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

For those who say that our nuclear deterrent is in the hands of the Americans, what does my right hon. Friend make of the fact that every Prime Minister has to write a letter held in every submarine that is never, ever seen unless in the most dire circumstances?

[Dr Lewis]

My hon. Friend is exactly right. There is no question but that the Trident nuclear system is entirely autonomous. Indeed, nothing—not the Americans, not any form of cyber-bug—can possibly intervene if, heaven forbid, the worst happened, the United Kingdom were attacked in part or in whole and the submarine commander had to open the dreaded letter written by the Prime Minister.

The fifth and final military argument is the most important of all. I put this to people when they try to say, “Well, you’re inflicting cuts on our conventional capability.” The argument is that there is no quantity of conventional forces that can compensate for the military disadvantage that faces a non-nuclear country in a war against a nuclear-armed enemy. The atomic bombing of Japan is a perfect example, not only because the Emperor was forced to surrender, but because what of might have happened under the reverse scenario: if Japan had developed atomic bombs in the summer of 1945 and the allies had not, a conventional allied invasion to end the war would have been out of the question.

The debate should and will go on, and I congratulate SNP Members on giving us the opportunity to take part in it today.

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[Ronnie Cowan (Inverclyde) (SNP)]

Trident is a term often used to describe the UK’s entire nuclear weapons system, including Vanguard class submarines, Trident missiles and nuclear warheads. Each Trident D5 missile can hold up to 12 nuclear warheads, and each warhead has eight times more capacity to kill and destroy than the bomb that exploded over Hiroshima. Each submarine has 16 missile tubes, which means that it is technically capable of carrying 192 warheads. If deployed as per Hiroshima, 192 warheads, times eight, equates to killing 61 million people. With four submarines, that number grows to 250 million deaths. It would, of course, be far worse than that: a nuclear strike would lead to water supplies and arable land being polluted. Livestock would die; crops would fail. For those not initially killed by our nuclear weapons, starvation would follow. By arming themselves with Trident, the UK Government are saying that they are prepared to inflict that fate on millions of innocent civilians if that were deemed necessary.

Nobody can win a nuclear war. An exchange of nuclear weapons would lead to a level of devastation that neither side, or indeed the planet, could ever recover from. I acknowledge that we have imposed limits on the use of those weapons, but that will come as little comfort to the dead and the dying. The plan is to use a maximum of 40 warheads. Obviously, while sitting in the cloistered atmosphere of Westminster and playing war games, somebody decided that 39 warheads were not enough, and 41—well, that would be plain barbaric.

The only rational thought that could justify the renewal of Trident would be a genuine belief that its existence in some way, shape or form contributed to a more peaceful world. Since world war two, the nuclear deterrent has not stopped wars in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Falkland Islands—I could list 20 or 30 more countries. It has not deterred terrorist attacks in London, Tunisia, Mali, Paris or New York. If nuclear weapons have proved to be completely inadequate in preventing those wars and atrocities, what are its successes? What threat does Trident address, and who does it deter?

[Dr Julian Lewis]

The hon. Gentleman’s argument is like saying that just because the antidote to one deadly disease is ineffective against other deadly diseases, we should not have the antidote.

[Ronnie Cowan]

If we had used our time, effort, money and ingenuity to fight deadly diseases instead of creating weapons of mass destruction, the world would be a better place today. We should be looking for humanitarian solutions, not for death.

Former Defence Secretary Des Browne, and Ian Kearns, the former adviser to Parliament on national security, stated:

“It has become clearer, for example, that a set of long-term threats has emerged, to which deterrence, nuclear or otherwise, is not applicable”.

Former Conservative Defence Secretary Michael Portillo said:

“Our independent nuclear deterrent is not independent and doesn’t constitute a deterrent against anybody that we regard as an enemy. It is a waste of money and it is a diversion of funds”.

I agree with the hon. Member for Reigate (Crispin Blunt) when he said:

“The successor Trident programme is going to consume more than double the proportion of the defence budget of its predecessor…The price required, both from the UK taxpayer and our conventional forces, is now too high to be rational or sensible.”

I am not naive, and I know there are dangers in the world, but the sort of threats that we need to address will not be placated by Trident. The UK Government have identified terrorism, cybercrime, pandemics, natural disasters, foreign instability and foreign conflicts as our primary risks over the next five years. Trident will not solve any of those issues. In the meantime, Scotland’s coast continues to be poorly guarded, and our maritime reconnaissance is poor.

I am aware that the UK Government have finally committed to new maritime patrol vehicles, but the gap in our capability will remain, at least until 2020. Westminster’s irrational commitment to Trident has come at the expense of defence jobs in Scotland. Between 2000 and 2010, cuts to military personnel in Scotland were measured at 27.9%, compared with 11.6% across the UK as a whole. The decline continued between July 2014 and July 2015, as personnel numbers in Scotland dropped by a further 9.5%. At a lifetime cost of £167 billion, it is clear that Trident makes no economic sense. It solves none of our pressing foreign policy priorities, and it is draining resources from our conventional forces. Trident is not the solution; it is very much part of the problem.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 23rd November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

Yes. I discussed this matter in Ankara recently with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defence Minister of Turkey, who obviously want ISIL/Daesh pushed back from their own border in the remaining Manbij pocket between the two Kurdish areas. I emphasise, however, that all parties in Syria—Kurds, Shi’a, Sunni, Alawite, Christian and Druze—have to be brought into the process to deliver in Syria a more inclusive Government that can end this civil war.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

History gives us practically no examples of a determined enemy surrendering in response to conventional air bombardment, so what ground forces are credibly and seriously fighting ISIL/Daesh in Syria, other than some unpleasant Islamist groups, the Kurds—in a limited area—and the Syrian Government army?

[Michael Fallon]

There are moderate forces fighting Daesh in Syria that have also been engaged in the civil war. The key is to bring the civil war to an end as quickly as possible so that we can focus on dealing with Daesh. Troops are already involved in the conflict. We have been helping to train them and supplying non-lethal equipment to them, and we will continue to work with them to ensure that Syria is rid of both Assad and Daesh.

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[Mr Speaker]

Time for the good doctor again. I call Dr Julian Lewis.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

T7. I personally agree with the Government that ISIL/Daesh must be crushed in Syria as well as in Iraq, but the Secretary of State has made it clear that he wants to see the Syrian army forces defeated, too. We are reportedly being told to be more like Churchill than Chamberlain. Does the Secretary of State recognise that Churchill’s great strength was that he knew when to recognise which is the greater and the lesser of two evils, and that is why he was willing sometimes to fight alongside unsavoury allies against a common deadly enemy?

Defence Expenditure (NATO Target) Bill

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Friday 23rd October 2015 Commons Chamber

[Sir Gerald Howarth]

I am most grateful to my right hon. Friend for independently adding to the case on what we face around the world. Russia is engaged in about the same ramping up of its defence spending and, accordingly, its capability. I am very grateful to her for making that point.

Significantly, the message for those engaged in drawing up defence planning assumptions is that in the space of barely three years the assumptions on which we worked in 2010 were blown apart. None of the events I listed earlier was remotely foreseen. For those of us brought up in the shadow of the iron curtain, over which two massive superpowers pivoted in an uneasy equilibrium—I was brought up in Germany—today’s outlook seems decidedly more complex and more dangerous. It is against that backdrop of a seriously turbulent world that we need to judge the priority we accord to defence of the realm.

There is no doubt that Europe’s security and peace for the past 70 years has been largely delivered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation—NATO. The north Atlantic treaty was signed on 4 April 1949 as a means of establishing enduring stability and peace in Europe. Under article 5, the new allies agreed

“that an armed attack against one or more of them…shall be considered an attack against them all”

and that were such an attack to take place, each ally would take

“such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force”

in response. Understandably, much has been made of article 5 as the foundation stone of north Atlantic peace, and the onus it places on all alliance members, but it is also worth considering article 3, which states that

“the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”

Arguably, this set the precedent for the 2% target long before it was first mooted in 2006, and it has subsequently become the target for alliance members.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

May I urge my hon. Friend not to use the word “target”? It is in fact a minimum. Those countries that are below the minimum may have it as a target; those that have always been above it should not be ringing the church bells just because we have decided not to go below it.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I think the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) is pleading for terminological exactitude.

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[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It is possible to argue that my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth) has already achieved one of the main aims of the Bill, because he originally chose the subject and sought the sponsorship, readily given, of people like me in support of his Bill before the Government gave their welcome pledge to meet the minimum 2% commitment not only for the year ahead but for the remainder of this Parliament, year after year after year. However, I believe he was right not to let the Bill drop, just as I believe that I was right to continue to sponsor it after becoming Chairman of the Defence Select Committee.

The reason that is right is that we must not assume that pledges given at one stage in the political and economic cycle will be good for ever after. It is a sad state of affairs that the word of politicians in government is no longer sufficiently trusted so one feels one must enshrine something in law in order for the electorate to believe that a promise will be kept.

My hon. Friend referred to two previous examples, one of which was to do with overseas aid. In that case, it was indeed a target to be met, not a minimum to avoid dipping below. The other was the referendum—the in/out referendum, let us be precise about it—on our continuing membership of the European Union. That is possibly where a lot of the scepticism crept in, and why trying to get commitments nailed down in law originally took hold.

I distinctly remember in earlier debates about European treaties that referenda were demanded. Parties, not least our former coalition partners the Liberal Democrats, refused demands for a referendum—on the Lisbon treaty, I think—because they felt that it was avoiding the real question, which was: “Should we stay in or leave the European Union?” But, strangely enough, when they had the opportunity to support having a referendum on staying in or leaving the EU, they opted to oppose it. It is that sort of cynicism, frankly, that makes it necessary for my hon. Friend to persist with his Bill, although, fortunately, the people who reneged on their pledge to have an in/out referendum are no longer in a position to hold the Government to ransom.

It was indeed the work of many hon. Members on both sides of the House, but not least that of my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot, that ensured that the Government finally gave the 2% pledge. It would be unsuitable for me at this stage to go in any detail into the question of the extent to which creative accountancy may be involved in fulfilling that pledge, because one of the first two inquiries of the new Defence Select Committee is to examine that very issue.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

Apparently, the Secretary of State for International Development says that landing on 0.7% is like landing a helicopter on a moving handkerchief. The Ministry of Defence is an infinitely more complex Department, so are we not in danger of giving too much power to accountants in the MOD to try to land this helicopter on a moving aircraft carrier, creating chaos in the procurement process?

[Dr Lewis]

No, frankly, I do not think we are. That comes back to the fact that this is not a target that we have to hit precisely. This is a minimum—in my opinion and from my point of view, an inadequate minimum. It is much easier to land the helicopter on a deck when the deck is quite an enormous one: all we have to worry about is putting the helicopter down on some part of that enormous deck. We do not have to worry about which part of the deck we manage to alight upon. Therefore, should we end up spending, for example, 2.5%, 2.8% or 3%, we shall still have fulfilled the purposes of the Bill. At this point, it may be convenient to reflect on what the size of the deck of that carrier has been in decades gone by. Then, perhaps, we shall see that we should not be struggling to get on to the deck; on the contrary, we should be asking ourselves why we are engaged in achieving such a very modest aim.

Between 1955 and 1960, the percentage of GDP that we spent on defence varied from 7.2% to 5.9%. Between 1960 and 1969, it varied from 6.1% to 5%. From 1969 all the way until 1980, it varied from a high of 4.8% in 1975-76 to 4.2%. As recently as 1980-85, it varied from 5.1% to 4.7%, and in 1985-90, it varied from 4.6% to 3.9%. Even after the end of the cold war, in the period between 1990 and 1995, it varied from 4.1% to 3.2%. Not until the financial year 1994-95 did the figure dip below 3%. I would argue—and this was foreshadowed by my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot in his excellent speech—that a country with our level of commitments and responsibilities certainly ought to be thinking about spending 3% of GDP on defence.

The situation in terms of the threats that we face has become increasingly fraught. I, for one, was very surprised that only a year after the 2010 strategic defence and security review made what I think was an 8% cut in the defence budget, we were already keen to engage in an additional conflict in Libya, the wisdom of which has subsequently—and, in my view, rightly—been questioned. But whichever side we take in that particular argument, it follows that if we are in the business of still wishing to intervene, we must certainly be in the business of making the appropriate financial investment.

During one of the public hearings that we have held so far, it was pointed out that it is not enough simply to look at the amount of defence investment that we make, because it is possible to spend a lot of money on the wrong things and still end up with inadequately structured armed forces. If I may dip into history, I suspect that the Maginot line occupied a rather large chunk of the French military expenditure budget in the period leading up to the second world war. It was not a very good investment.

It is, of course, difficult to quantify outcomes when it comes to the appropriateness of the way in which money has been spent, but even if spending a lot of money on defence is not a sufficient condition for the achievement of good defence outcomes, it is certainly a necessary condition. Earlier, I described in detail what happened to the defence budget when it was in decline. Over the same period, our welfare budget ballooned, our education budget ballooned, and our health budget ballooned as percentages of GDP. I am not criticising that in any way, but it is rather extraordinary that that pattern of steep decline in spending on defence as a national priority has been allowed to occur, given the extent to which we have remained engaged in the carrying out of military activity from time to time on the world stage.

Embodying the proposal for 2% in law is a worthwhile endeavour because it will send a signal that any Government who wish to renege on the commitment will have to unpick the legislation in order to do so. It is unsatisfactory that we as a country cannot feel comfortable that defence occupies a sufficient role in our league table of commitments to spend from the public purse. As I said in an intervention, however, the endeavour of my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot to ensure that the commitment is enshrined in law carries with it the risk that what should be a minimum will become a target. It is true to say that, from time to time, some of us on these Benches who take a particular interest in defence have been less than totally helpful towards those on the Front Bench when we have felt that their commitment to defence had fallen short of what it should be.

Around the time of the Wales summit, the Prime Minister made a statement about the importance of urging our NATO allies to meet the 2% minimum, and I decided to seize the opportunity to show my full support for those on my Front Bench by asking him an easy question. I got to my feet and the Prime Minister gave way graciously, as he always does. I asked him whether he would like to give the House an assurance that, as long as he remained Prime Minister, there would be no question of this country dipping below the 2% minimum. Rather to my discombobulation—[Hon. Members: “Sorry?”] I thought that would attract a bit of attention. Rather to my discombobulation, I was told that, although the commitment was being met that week and that year and was going to be met the following year, after that we would just have to wait and see. That prompted concern among a number of us that the commitment to the NATO minimum was in jeopardy.

I well remember how, during the long years of opposition, we used to excoriate the Labour Government for playing fast and loose with the figures relating to the GDP spend on defence. In particular, I remember one statement that Tony Blair made, I think in 2007 when he was coming to the end of his 10-year period in office as Prime Minister. He made a speech on HMS Albion, in which he said that, taking defence expenditure as a whole over the preceding 10 years of the Labour Government, it had remained roughly constant at about 2.5% of GDP if the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan were included. As a Member of the shadow Defence team, I was quick to point out that the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan were supposed to be met from the Treasury reserve funds, and that if they were stripped out of the picture, Labour was actually spending more like 2.1%, which was inadequate. I continued to make that point in speeches in the House over quite a long period—some would say an excessively long period.

What worries me about the debate on defence expenditure generally is that we are being subjected to the management of expectations. There should never have been the slightest doubt that this country would continue to meet the NATO minimum. We had always done so, and we never even had to think about doing it because we had always surpassed that level quite comfortably. It is a measure of the situation in which we find ourselves today that, as I said in earlier interventions, we are apparently supposed to be ringing the church bells in triumph that we are not going to dip below the NATO minimum.

Because of this undercutting of belief in what politicians do, compared with the commitments that they give, I think it is important that this Bill should go through. I therefore propose to set a good example to other right hon. and hon. Friends by keeping my remarks brief, because I would not like us to find that we were running out of time for the Bill to make the necessary progress that it needs to today. Not that I would ever think for one moment that the Government Whips Office would encourage people to expatiate excessively on this important subject, but just in case they might be tempted to do so, I wish to make that task as difficult as possible and will therefore conclude my contribution to the debate.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

I call Bob Stewart.

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[Mr Dunne]

I will come on to the targets shortly, if I may, in relation to individual nations. The point is that we are increasingly recognising a need to engage with the German military to bring it more into line with operations training and other defence needs.

The reason for reading out such an extensive quote from last year’s NATO summit is to emphasise the importance of the words included in that statement. They are at the heart of the alliance. The commitment to an annual review of investment pledges by Heads of Government was new and is significant. It helps, for the purposes of this debate, to ensure that there is no doubt whatever about why our 2% spending commitment matters. That is what I shall go on now to address. There are three principal strands.

First, it will give the UK the capability we need to face the dangers ahead. It is no secret that our national security strategy will confirm that we are living in a darker, more dangerous world. That has been referred to by many hon. Members, not least by my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot in opening this debate. We have seen other nations upping their spending and, as we have also heard from Members today, upgrading their capability.

Russia has continued to modernise its military capability, bringing in new missile systems, aircraft, submarines and surface vessels, and armoured vehicles. As President Putin regularly reminds us, it is also upgrading its nuclear capability, preparing to deploy a variety of land-based intercontinental ballistic missile classes, planning to reintroduce rail-based intercontinental missiles, and commissioning a new Dolgoruky class of eight SSBN vessels.

I am sure hon. Members will be interested, if they are not already well aware, to know that this class of vessel is named after the Russian medieval founder of Moscow, Yuri Dolgoruky. Dolgoruky, my friends, literally means “long arms”, a rather sombre metaphor for President Putin’s ambitions to extend Russia’s military reach around the world.

This new military capability and assertiveness, as most recently seen in Ukraine and Syria, must inform our national security risk assessment that we are undertaking as a precursor to the SDSR. It also underlines the arguments in support of our decision to press ahead with the Successor replacement for our own Vanguard class strategic deterrent—on which more later.

I note the comments from the hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) that the Opposition are undertaking a strategic review of defence. I urge them to do that as swiftly as they can, so that they will have made their mind up by the time of the decision.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I am a little surprised at the vagueness of the Opposition today. I thought the position was absolutely clear—namely, that the Opposition are committed to continuous at-sea deterrence and the continuation of Trident under the Successor programme, because that was the position adopted by the Labour party and endorsed by its recent conference. The decision was taken not to change the policy. If a free vote is necessary for the Opposition, it will be the Leader of the Opposition who has to take advantage of it, not the people who believe in Trident.

[Mr Dunne]

My right hon. Friend has highlighted one of perhaps a number of apparent inconsistencies between certain leading members of the Opposition and those on their current Front Bench. I do not want to prey on the misery of the hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell). I should have started by welcoming her to her position. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] This is her second appearance in the Chamber this week in her new role as a Defence Minister. She is doing an admirable job, if I may say so, completely unsupported as she is in this debate by a single colleague. That speaks volumes for the interest the Opposition parties en bloc take in defence. I do not want to put her under any more pressure than my right hon. Friend has done. It is really for her to decide whether she wants to intervene to clarify the position. I would be very happy to take such an intervention, but I would not be surprised if she chose not to make one at this particular moment.

Moving beyond Russia, our friends from China are here in the UK today. They are already the world’s second-highest military spenders, with the world’s largest standing army. The Chinese are investing in high-tech equipment, such as submarines and stealth jets, and upgrading their naval forces, including their first aircraft carrier.

Russia and China are far from the last of the big spenders in defence around the world. India has announced a core defence budget of $41 billion for this fiscal year. Perhaps most understandably, South Korea plans to increase its defence budget sharply next year, with its ministry of national defence requesting a budget of $36 billion to bolster its combat power at the border with North Korea and to increase funding for anti-submarine warfare systems. Some of this increasing international commitment to defence spending brings with it opportunity. Where we can develop greater interoperability of equipment and capability with our partners and allies, we will seek to do so.

If we look at the emerging international picture, it helps to crystallise our need to stay competitive and keep ahead of the curve. That is why we have spent the past few years transforming defence, eliminating the black hole in our finances and turning our procurement arm, Defence Equipment and Support, into a bespoke trading organisation that is able to operate along more commercial lines with an agreed operating cost and more business-like relationship with industry. The reason we are doing this is to meet some of the challenges that have been posed by hon. Members in their remarks. If we are going to have a growing defence budget, we need to make sure we spend it wisely.

The reforms we have enacted so far have allowed us to put in place the £166 billion 10-year equipment plan I referenced earlier in my intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough. I commend it to the House. It was published yesterday and I have a copy here. It is a relatively easy read and has some helpful pictures to encourage hon. Members to get through the document readily. It provides us with a plan for the future to spend our growing budget, in particular our commitment on new equipment. We will do so meeting our NATO pledge throughout this Parliament.

This new financial rigour allows us to get far more bang for our buck by procuring more efficiently. Yesterday, alongside our equipment plan, the public spending watchdog, the National Audit Office, published its independent audit of our major projects and the equipment plan. It found that the cost of the Department’s 13 largest equipment programmes fell by £247 million last year. With the exception of one additional requirement to refuel a Vanguard class submarine, we brought the delivery-on-time performance for those 13 major projects down to an in-year increase of only eight months. If I may take a moment, I would like to contrast that with the performance highlighted by the NAO’s 2009 report, the last full year of the previous Labour Government, where the in-year delivery performance was on aggregate 93 months out of time. In real terms and in real English, that is around eight years. We have brought that down to eight months, which I think is the most graphic illustration I can provide of how we are transforming defence acquisition—an issue raised by several of my hon. Friends.

When we introduced the equipment plan, it was characterised as “hopeful” by the then shadow Defence team in that it was based on a number of assumptions. We have been publishing the plan and getting it reviewed by the National Audit Office each year, so the assumptions we have made each year are being assessed. I am pleased to say that in each of the four years, greater confidence has been gained in the assumptions being made. The proposals in this particular document have been described as more stable than in any of the previous years. The NAO believes that we are set to remain “affordable” for the rest of the Parliament under current conditions.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough will appreciate as former Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee—he had some of the closest dealings with the NAO—it is rare to receive praise from the NAO. For that office to declare a programme as “stable” is about as close as one can get to a positive red star. We are very pleased with the report. Perhaps a gold star is more appropriate in the school context.

Let me now touch on the capability that we will be able to call on as a result of our reforms. Some programmes have already been referenced by hon. Members. Of course, one of the largest programmes currently in build is the construction of the two Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, each 68,000 tonnes—the most powerful ships ever built in this country. Earlier this month, I was privileged to visit BAE Systems shipyard in Govan on the Clyde and see the latest blocks of HMS Prince of Wales before they were barged to Rosyth to be assembled. Shortly after I was there, the largest single block—over 11,000 tonnes—sent round to Rosyth was attached to the existing dry dock, and the process was described as “skidding”, whereby a block on a barge is gently moved into place. This was the largest such move of a block of shipbuilding anywhere in Europe ever. It happened successfully and to within the tolerance of 3 mm that it was working towards, which is an astonishing feat of engineering by any standards.

While I was in Scotland, I had the distinct privilege of cutting steel for the first time on HMS Trent, the third of our offshore patrol vessels, the latest class that we are commissioning for the Royal Navy. These projects are, in turn, securing the skills required to build the Type 26 global combat ship, which is another example of our investment in the Royal Navy. It will be one of the most significant programmes undertaken during this Parliament.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Given that the Minister mentions the Type 26, which I would loosely describe as a replacement frigate, will he take this opportunity to confirm, now that we have just the six Type 45 destroyers, that there is no question of going below the total of 13 Type 26 frigates, thus keeping our total of frigates and destroyers at 19—itself a huge reduction from the 35 we had in 1997?

[Mr Dunne]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend on securing the chairmanship of the Select Committee. I have no doubt that he will press Ministers on many programmatic issues. What I am afraid I cannot be tempted into doing is to pre-empt the conclusion from the SDSR, which will reach its conclusions, as I have said, before the end of the year. What I can tell my right hon. Friend about the approach to the SDSR is that any programmes not committed before the start of the process are on the table for review and consideration of allocation of spending in accordance with other programmes. I am not going to be drawn on what that means for Type 26 in particular, but as I have said, this is going to be one of the biggest programmes we have for the rest of this Parliament.

[Dr Lewis]

Do I therefore understand that when the SDSR comes out, we will know for certain that there will be no reduction from the total of 13 Type 26s?

[Mr Dunne]

I think all I can do is to encourage my right hon. Friend to read the SDSR carefully when it comes out, so that he can draw whatever conclusions he can.

Moving beyond the Navy for a moment, flying from the aircraft carriers will be the F-35B Lightning II Strike Fighters, which have stealth built into their DNA. Their advanced systems give pilots enhanced network connectivity, allowing them to send real-time information untainted and unseen by others from the battlefield to the back office, up to Ministers and back again if necessary to prosecute decisions.

Last month at the defence and security equipment international exhibition, we saw what is going to happen on the land front, but before I move on to land, I believe my right hon. Friend was fortunate enough to visit the showcase that took place when Parliament was in the conference recess and the F-35 cockpit simulator was here in London. He has indicated that this was an outstandingly good event and worthwhile experience, which unfortunately many hon. Members were unable to share because the House was not sitting at the time. I think he may have an observation to make on that.

[Dr Lewis]

I was not intending to intervene, but I cannot resist an invitation like that. This was an outstandingly good event. I am hoping that it may be possible to bring the same presentation—not only the cockpit simulation of the Lightning II, but the presentations by the representatives of many of the firms involved in the supply chain—to illustrate to hon. Members that hard power has economic value, as Lord Sterling is always trying to tell us in the other place.

[Mr Dunne]

I am grateful for that suggestion, and will happily take it up with Lockheed Martin, who I believe organised the event, to establish whether it would be willing to repeat it. On the issue of prosperity, I can give my right hon. Friend another sneak preview ahead of publication of the SDSR, in that there is likely to be a theme coursing through that document of how much defence contributes to our economy and the nation’s prosperity.

[Mr Dunne]

I am grateful for that endorsement. I completely agree with my right hon. and hon. Friends that the UK as a tier 1 partner has a unique role to play in the development of this programme over decades to come. It is the single largest defence programme in the world ever—in value terms, although that may be as much to do with inflation as anything else. We have a 15% share in the manufacture in this country of each and every one of those platforms as they come into service in air forces around the world. The contribution it will make to sustaining the vibrancy of our defence industry cannot be overstated.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

There is, in fact, one other aspect of the F-35 programme that I had not realised until recently: the potential for expansion in a crisis. When the assembly line is operating at its peak in America, it will produce one of these aircraft per day. If ever, heaven forbid, we found ourselves in sudden need of a large number of extra aircraft, that joint capacity between British industry and American industry will enable us to fulfil our needs.

[Mr Dunne]

That is a very interesting observation. At a time of surge and crisis, it will obviously be a challenge to produce a pilot every day at such a pace, but it is clear that that is currently being planned. Given the scale of the programme, which will last for three decades, it will involve a steady and regular introduction of capability to a number of air forces, including ours.

Let me say a little about what is coming to the land environment. At the DSEI exhibition, which a number of Members were able to attend last month, we showed what the next generation of Ajax armoured vehicles would look like. They are fully digital platforms with multi-purpose capability. They will have 360° thermal and visual drive-in cameras, laser detection ability, and numerous other new features that would be expected from a platform that has been designed in the 21st century —the first such platform to be available for our armed forces. They will act as the eyes and ears of commanders on the battlefields of the future.

Thanks to the Warrior capability sustainment programme, Ajax will line up alongside the Army’s fleet of upgraded Warriors, soon to be enhanced with a range of upgrades that will be relevant to their variant role. Some will have state-of-the-art turrets, cannon and electronics, which will keep this highly successful armoured fighting vehicle at the front and centre of combat capability for the next 25 years.

We are not just investing in our traditional single services; we have also created the Joint Forces Command, which has combined our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance with our cyber and command, control, co-ordination and communications assets for even greater effect.

That brings me back to the Successor programme, and the other major investment decision that will be made during the current Parliament. On Wednesday, I was pleased to be able to attend at least part of the “keeping our future afloat” event, which brought together the shipbuilding industry, unions and Members of Parliament from all parts of the House. At that meeting, the Defence Secretary again restated our commitment to building four Successor ballistic missile submarines to replace the four Vanguard boats, and to retaining the Trident continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence patrols that provide the ultimate guarantee of our security. He also reminded us why it is so vital to keep remaking the case for our deterrent at a time when the nuclear threats have not disappeared, when emerging states have not stopped seeking nuclear capability, and when we cannot guarantee that it will not be present again in the 2030s, 2040s or 2050s. There has never been a more important time for the United Kingdom to have a credible, operationally independent minimum capable deterrent—and we should not forget that it was Attlee and Bevin who argued for a nuclear deterrent with a Union Jack on the top of it.

I reiterate that I look forward to the conclusion of the review that the hon. Member for York Central is conducting with the shadow Defence Secretary, the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood (Maria Eagle), to clarify the Opposition’s posture, and we look forward to support from Opposition Members in the Division Lobby when we come to vote on the topic. We think it important for politicians of all stripes to put aside politics for the national good, and to work together to keep our country safe. After all, our deterrent advances our prosperity as well as our security.

That was at the forefront of the remarks of the host of Wednesday’s event, the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock), who is a strong advocate of the deterrent programme—not least because most of it is built in his constituency. He pointed out that in the Members’ Dining Room was a map of the United Kingdom on which were little red dots criss-crossing the whole country—every nation and nearly every county, although I cannot add “every constituency”. It showed the huge number of companies in the supply chain which support our nuclear defence industry: hundreds of businesses providing thousands of jobs. That is, of course, before we consider the physical facilities where the deterrent will be based. I believe that Her Majesty’s naval base Clyde is the largest employment site in Scotland. It currently provides about 6,700 military and civilian jobs, and by 2022 the number will increase to 8,200.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Dunne]

I am grateful for that further endorsement of the progress being made.

Having congratulated the hon. Member for York Central on taking up her now post, I should also take this opportunity to welcome her remarks. For most of what she said, I found we had very little issue between us. It was a particular pleasure to hear her endorsement of the 2% NATO pledge. That is extremely welcome and clears up one of the apparent inconsistencies that have been flying around the media, in connection with a potential lack of support from the Leader of the Opposition for NATO. It is very welcome to hear that that is not the case, and I am sure the whole House will agree that that clarification was useful.

Having referenced the contributions made by hon. Members in general, let me turn to some of the specifics, in particular some of the calculations. Much of the talk in this debate has been about one half of the calculation of 2%. There has been hardly any reference to the denominator, in this case gross domestic product. Members are aware that in this country, thankfully, GDP has been growing faster than in any other G7 nation over the last two years. That is to be welcomed. Of course, each year that GDP grows, more challenges are placed on defence and Government spending as a whole if our spending is not able to grow at the same pace. From a purely arithmetic point of view, it becomes harder for defence to achieve a minimum threshold expressed as a percentage unless we are able to grow in tandem. Under present plans, we are likely to grow, but not at quite such a pace.

There are also changes from time to time in the way GDP is calculated. One important such change took place only last year. That was the result of the European system of national and regular accounts—ESA 2010, as it is known—which gives guidance on standardising public finance accounts across the European Union. Major differences to the way GDP is calculated include ESA 2010 counting weapons expenditure and R and D spend as capital spend, as well as including non-profit organisations that serve households and—this is a particularly big one that affected the UK—the proceeds from what used to be called the black economy, but is now, I gather, called the underground economy, such as illegal activities, including prostitution and drug dealing. When we add the apparent proceeds from prostitution and drug dealing to GDP, it makes achieving the target that much more difficult, with of course no cash consequence whatever.

We adopted the new accounting methods to bring the country into line with other EU members. This initially added £43 billion to the UK GDP, following the re-evaluation—the equivalent of a 3.6% average increase in GDP, which was subsequently revised upwards, to 4.1%. Those changes will make the difficult task of meeting the NATO guideline of spending 2% of GDP on defence even more of a challenge, and the impact of the change in the GDP denominator has been estimated as a 0.09%—so almost 1%—reduction in the defence calculation for zero cash effect.

Article 3 of NATO’s founding charter states:

“In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”.

Like any insurance policy, defence only pays out when you pay in. Some hon. Members mentioned the contribution that the United States makes financially to the NATO alliance and the increasing dependence that we have on it. We cannot expect US taxpayers to go on picking up the security cheque so that nations on the European side of the Atlantic can prioritise social welfare spending when the threats are on our doorstep, especially at a time when the US is under increasing pressure to meet its own debt reduction targets and is pivoting to face new threats in the Asia Pacific region. Moreover, the combined wealth of the non-US allies, measured in GDP, exceeds that of the United States.

Non-US allies together spend less than half of what the United States spends on defence, and the gap between defence spending in the United States compared to Canada and European members combined has increased since 9/11. Today, the volume of US defence expenditure effectively represents 73% of the defence spending of the alliance as a whole. So there is an over-reliance by the alliance as a whole on the United States for the provision of essential capabilities, especially when it comes to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; air-to-air refuelling; ballistic missile defence; and airborne electronic warfare.

As it always has done in the past, the UK is once more taking the lead in turning NATO around. That is why we have committed to the readiness action plan. That is why we are playing a significant role in NATO assurance measures, protecting Baltic skies from Russian aggression and joining the transatlantic capability enhancement and training initiative, alongside the US and—yes—Germany, to offer reassurance to our allies and help to build regional capacity and capability. That is also why we are also a framework nation for the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (Land) Brigade and are committed to providing it with thousands of troops a year. In fact, the Spearhead Force, as it will be known —a rather more useful short name than the usual military acronym—is currently being put through its paces in Exercise Trident Juncture before it goes operational next year. The UK is committing some 2,800 personnel including an Army Brigade Headquarters and Battlegroup, three Royal Navy warships and aircraft, including Typhoon fighter jets and helicopters, to those manoeuvres.

Above all, our leadership in NATO is illustrated by the fact that we are prepared to put our money where our mouth is. We have a budget of £35 billion, the second largest defence expenditure in the alliance. We are one of those five nations projected to spend 2% of GDP on defence in 2015, and the Chancellor has made the commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence for every year of this decade. Make no mistake: our allies appreciate our efforts. It has been suggested in this debate that unless the Bill proceeds we will suffer opprobrium from some of our main NATO allies. I am afraid that hon. Members are misguided, because our principal allies in NATO have expressed on several occasions their pleasure that we are taking that lead. Let us not forget that President Obama was first on the phone to the Prime Minister after the Chancellor had made that major spending announcement.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I am sure that we all believe the Government entirely when they say that they will stick to the 2% up to the next general election, but can the Minister not see that passing this Bill would make it much harder for any Government of any complexion after the next general election to resile from the minimum spend because the legislation would have to be repealed first? While he is making an excellent case for all the good things that Britain does in NATO, can he assure the House that that case will not take him another hour and 15 minutes to outline, because it would be a terrible shame if we ran out of time before we had an opportunity to see whether the House wants the Bill to go into Committee?

[Mr Dunne]

My hon. Friend will be relieved to hear that, as someone once said, I am beginning to come to the end of my preliminary remarks.

I was just alerting the House to the confidence that the United States has in the measures that we have announced. I found that out for myself when I visited Washington in July, as the first Defence Minister to do so after the confirmation of our 2% commitment. I met Deputy Secretary Bob Work, who was effusive in his praise of the United Kingdom and the way we are showing such strong leadership within NATO and among its allies. When Defence Secretary Ash Carter was here at Lancaster House just two weeks ago, he pointed out that our Secretary of State was the first counterpart he had hosted in the Pentagon since his appointment, and added that

“that was only fitting given the special relationship our nations share. Simply put the United States have no closer allies and friend than the United Kingdom.”

Our actions have drawn wider praise, not least from the NATO Secretary-General who commended us for a

“Great example of leadership within the Alliance”.

But this is not just about what we spend: it is about what we spend the money on. When nations fail to spend more than 20% of their defence funding on new technologies, they run the risk of equipment obsolescence and growing capability and interoperability gaps, as well as a weakening of Europe’s defence industrial and technological base.

So at the 2014 summit in Wales, NATO leaders agreed that allies currently spending less than 20% of their annual defence on major equipment will aim to increase this annual investment within a decade. Here, too, we are showing others the way. I am pleased to say that the UK is one of only seven nations expected to meet this guideline by 2015, along with the US, France, Luxembourg—interestingly—Norway, Turkey and Poland. We are one of only three members meeting both targets alongside the US and, for the first time, Poland.

As part of our spending on equipment, we are also determined to help NATO meet some of its capability shortfalls. NATO summit members agreed to do that last year when they signed up to the defence planning package. That effectively committed allies to enhancing and reinforcing training and exercises; bolstering their command and control, including for demanding air operations; augmenting their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; strengthening their cyber-defence; and improving the robustness and readiness of our land forces for both collective defence and crisis response.

There is a third reason why our 2% commitment matters, and it is essentially a corollary of my first two points. Our spending guideline is a vital sign of our intent and a clear message to our adversaries. They need to know that we are determined to stand up to aggression wherever we find it, and our allies need to know that we will stand alongside them, while our armed forces need the confidence to know that they have our wholehearted support and fully funded backing. We will continue providing them with the high-tech kit they need to tackle the dangers to come.

In other words, we need no reminding of the importance of 2%, any more than we need a law to remind us to protect our country and our people. Britain has always historically spent above 2% of GDP on defence. It is something that comes naturally: it is ingrained in our psyche. That was why, when we saw the danger, we acted and committed to that spend until the end of this Parliament, despite the predictions of the doubters. That is why a Bill like this is ultimately unnecessary. Why do we seek to spend precious parliamentary time on passing legislation that, in effect, is unnecessary, taking up Members’ time in order to commit to something that in practice we already do and will continue to do? We should not forget that Parliament already has the ability to hold the Government of the day to account on defence spending.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Dunne]

I am most grateful. My hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (John Glen) hosted a visit I paid to DSTL where I met some of the people who had invented the tests that identified Ebola from simple blood samples and were able to rule out up to 20 other diseases with a simple blood test. It was a remarkably efficient and impressive innovation that the military has brought about to the benefit of the civilian population.

The test uses the latest lateral flow technology. We have had some long words already in this debate, and I am now going to use another. The technology is known as lateral flow immunochromatographic assays, to give it its full title, and allows local health teams to complete a test at the bedside without the need for high-tech paraphernalia and yet still get a result within 20 minutes. Aid has not only helped a country tackle a major emergency that put stability at risk but prevented an epidemic from becoming a pandemic that would have threatened our own security.

The MOD has a vital role to play in supporting humanitarian efforts. The cost of conflict stability and security fund programme activities led by the MOD and security and humanitarian operations that are partly refunded from the DFID budget contribute properly to both the ODA and NATO guidelines. That is why the MOD has typically been funding directly up to £5 million only of ODA-eligible activity each year, including disaster relief training and international capacity building. I, for one, support the international definitions of ODA-eligible spending but we need to consider them. I know that the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), who is sitting on the Front Bench, has been doing that to ensure that they accurately reflect the role of Government today. The guidelines were drawn up nearly 50 years ago and it is appropriate that they should be reviewed from time to time, because there might well be other areas in which it is entirely permissible and appropriate for other Departments’ spending to be included in the effort.

I know that some Members remain concerned about the apparent disparity between our approach to defence and our approach to official development assistance, given that we have enshrined the 0.7% of gross national income commitment in law. But I believe that we are talking about a very different set of circumstances when considering whether to put my hon. Friend’s Bill into law. We have always met our 2% defence guideline and we have never needed the stimulus of legislative requirement to do so, yet the UK only met the 0.7% target for the first time two years ago. My hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) made a brief intervention earlier—most unusually, he seemed to be present only for breakfast on this sitting Friday, although he is normally such an assiduous attender at our sittings on Fridays. He pointed out that the 0.7% international development target had been met prior to the legislation being concluded earlier this year. He is correct, but that was only after a very considerable increase in funding during the coalition Government, and throughout the 1980s and 1990s this spending was at about half the current level.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, especially as I know how keen he is to get through the rest of his comments rapidly. However, I think his argument is the reverse of the truth. The difficulty with putting into law something that was a target that we had to strain to meet was the danger that having put it into law, we would end up having to make inappropriate expenditure in order to fulfil the commitment in law, whereas that does not apply to this objective. As there is and should never be any question of us dipping below the 2%, we will not have to distort our spending; we will just be giving the assurance that we need to give to the country and to our allies that we will never fall below the 2% minimum, and it is strange that there was ever any doubt that we would.

[Mr Dunne]

I do not think there was doubt that we would, other than in the minds of those who seek to find fault. We are not striving to achieve the number by fiddling the figures. I have gone through the re-assessment that we undertook to the spending that we are making, and we are meeting the commitment this year and for the rest of the Parliament.

[Dr Lewis]

I am very sorry that the Minister doubts the account that I gave him in my contribution to the debate earlier, when I said that by asking the Prime Minister whether we would always meet the 2% as long as he was in office, I was not casting doubt at all. I was expecting him freely and readily to say yes, of course we would, and he did not. That is why the doubt crept in.

[Mr Dunne]

It is not for me to intervene between the Chairman of the Select Committee and the Prime Minister in their interpretations of meeting 2% or not, so I will not be tempted to carry on this debate. I am anxious to reach the end of my remarks and I am nearly there.

In the case of the international development commitment, the legislation became a mechanism to ensure that ODA spending was as consistent as defence spending, so the legislation should not be considered as a precedent for other areas of spending. Other ring-fenced budgets, such as for health and education, are not enshrined in law. It is worth making the rather obvious point that NATO’s calculation of our 2% of GDP is a much more significant amount in cash terms, amounting to almost £40 billion, than is 0.7% of GNI, which is just under £14 billion, so the risk to our financial flexibility from enshrining the defence commitment in law is that much greater.

Tying a Government’s hands with regard to defence spending, currently the third largest departmental budget in Government, could have unforeseen negative consequences in the future. For example, what if, God forbid, we had another financial crisis and the Government of the day needed to re-order spending priorities? We cannot have national security without economic security, and GDP, as I explained in my earlier remarks, is a flexible friend. It is subject to periodic review and amendment, and only last year, as I discussed earlier, we had the amendment prompted by changes in international accounting rules by the EU.

I am sorry to say that there is only one pot of money. The Government need to make strategic decisions about each Department’s budget based on both medium and long-term issues, and based also on the circumstances at the time, not based on legislative rules.

Like my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot, we strongly believe in the importance of the 2% guideline, but we cannot agree on the means to ensure that it continues. Britain has a long and proud tradition of spending what it needs to on defence. We have always done so, and we have committed to do so until the end of this Government’s life. We know what is right, and there is no further need to rubber-stamp our commitment. For those reasons, I have to say that for all his good intentions and noble purpose in proposing this Bill, if he were to press for a vote, the Government would not be able to support him. It would be far better instead to use our time to urge other nations to honour their pledges.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 19th October 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I should like to begin by welcoming the shadow Secretary of State to her first Defence questions and by welcoming the team that she has assembled alongside her. I made it clear yesterday, as I have done today, that ISIL has to be defeated in both countries, not least if we are to support the democratic Government of Iraq and help to keep our own country safe. This is a new Parliament and we will continue to work with colleagues across the House to build a consensus that will allow the RAF to operate in north-east Syria and not have to turn back at the border. When we have established that consensus, we will come to the House for the authority to act.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Countless past campaigns show that air strikes are seldom, if ever, decisive unless they are in support of credible ground forces. What credible ground forces are fighting Daesh in Syria, other than the Kurds, in limited areas, and Assad’s, which are not also Islamist?

[Michael Fallon]

There are moderate opposition forces contesting against Assad, trying to protect their towns and cities from the brutality of Assad, who is of course dropping barrel bombs on them—on his own people. The coalition is helping these moderate opposition groups where it can, with training and with equipment. Our troops have been helping to train some of those forces, outside Syria.

Légion d’Honneur (UK Normandy Veterans)

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 21st July 2015 Westminster Hall

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the administration of the award of the Légion d’Honneur to UK Normandy veterans.

It is a great pleasure to bring this subject before the House. It did not come as a complete surprise to me that this admirable scheme, in which the French Government have offered to award surviving veterans—not only from D-day, but from the subsequent campaigns to free France from Nazi occupation—has run into a little administrative difficulty. I hope that the Minister will give us a hopeful sign that the glitches and delays that have temporarily marred a brilliant scheme and a wonderfully generous gesture by the French Government can soon be overcome.

It was some years ago that some Normandy veterans had the opportunity to be awarded the Légion d’Honneur. I have in mind a remarkable gentleman, Bill Price, who will be 101 this Friday. He joined the Territorial Army in 1938 and served throughout world war two. On D-day, he was manning an anti-aircraft gun aboard a ship at Sword beach. He was given his award under a different scheme a few years ago, but it was in 2014, on the 70th anniversary of the D-day landings, that the Government of France made it clear that all surviving veterans of the landings, and of the subsequent campaigns to give France back her freedom, would be honoured in this way.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Does that apply to people in the Office of Strategic Services and to American forces? Does it apply to Canadian forces?

[Dr Lewis]

My understanding is that it does indeed apply to nationals of other countries, too. I suspect that there has been a bit of underestimation on the part of the French authorities, bearing in mind that most of the people involved would be in their 90s—the authorities probably underestimated the strength and resilience of the sort of people who stormed ashore on D-day and battled their way through France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. The fact that we are dealing with some particularly formidable individuals means that there may be rather more nonagenarians left to claim the award than had originally been anticipated.

To its credit, when the Ministry of Defence prepared the application form for these awards, it did so in a straightforward, simple way: it is a single sheet of paper that asks for certain basic details and for a short paragraph justifying the reason for the award. However, some 3,000 applications have been submitted from the United Kingdom alone, and that is where problems have arisen.

The indication that all might not be well came in a letter from the Defence Minister in the upper House, Lord Astor of Hever, who stated in The Times on 19 November 2014:

“The MoD is undertaking administrative work on each application before forwarding it to the French embassy. Extra staff have been allocated in order to process most applications by the end of the year. We would have preferred to have completed this work more quickly but we must respect the terms under which the French confer this award.”

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for bringing this matter to Westminster Hall. As the Member of Parliament for Strangford in Northern Ireland, I am obviously keen for those from Northern Ireland to be recognised. Sometimes those who served are unassuming, although never shy; they may not necessarily wish to register. Have efforts been made to chase up all those people who might otherwise miss out? Many people in the Republic of Ireland, although of a different religious persuasion and tradition, served in uniform in the second world war. What efforts have been made to ensure that they are also included?

[Dr Lewis]

The Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I definitely think that it is up to the individual to make the application, wherever they may now be residing. The Normandy Veterans Association, which was recently formally wound up, had membership lists, where records existed. However, there is no way of getting a comprehensive list because tens of thousands of people would qualify if they were still with us today. What has happened, therefore, is that the authorities—particularly the Ministry of Defence—have been doing a very good job of making the application process perfectly straightforward and the scheme well known, so that people know how to apply. There are no complaints about that.

[Bob Stewart]

I thank my very good friend for giving way. There is a problem with the special forces, with which I have quite a lot of dealings. It is that the Jedburgh teams of the Special Operations Executive, and 1 SAS, in particular—I have met a couple of them—are quite under the cover and remain under the cover. I have been encouraging them to come forward and get their names in, but there are still problems and people are still coming out of the woodwork. The Jedburgh teams, the SOE, 1 SAS and other special forces must be encouraged as well.

[Dr Lewis]

These people, who went behind the lines in advance of everyone else, are the bravest of the brave. They also take their obligations of confidentiality most seriously.

[Bob Stewart]

Very seriously.

[Dr Lewis]

I am glad that my hon. and gallant Friend agrees. Those special forces members should really put this aside now; they are in their 90s, after all. We can say to them, “It’s okay, fellas! Come forward and get the public acclamation that you deserve.” Of course, I am sure that privately they know how much their brilliant, courageous activities are appreciated.

A spate of reports over the intervening months has suggested that there have been hold-ups and delays. A report in The Times in November 2014 stated:

“The MoD and French Embassy in London said there had been ceremonies held in London for the award. Both said the level of interest had been higher than anticipated.”

The same report quoted Margaret Dickinson, a lady of 92:

“I was all ready to go to London…Then I got a letter saying that the weather was too bad. They said they thought it would be too bad for a lot of people. I was taken aback. The weather was not that bad.”

All I can say is that it is just as well that the people organising that ceremony, who were put off by a minor inconvenience such as a rainy day, were not in charge of organising the Normandy landings. Before anyone intervenes, I should say that I know that the invasion was postponed by 24 hours because of bad weather, but I do not think the problem in London was quite on the same scale—and it did not justify postponing that ceremony.

I know that colleagues wish to contribute, so in the time remaining I shall mention a few individuals, to give the House a sense of the people we are dealing with and why it is so important that the French authorities, having made this wonderful gesture with the support of the British authorities, do not now turn a good news story into a catalogue of disappointment.

From my family’s own circle of friends, I know of Sergeant Peter Carne, Royal Engineers, who landed on Juno beach on 8 June 1944. He was primarily tasked with constructing Bailey bridges to enable vehicles to break out of the beachhead. Peter will be 93 in two days’ time. As it happens, he is in very good health; indeed, he often gives talks about the landings and would relish coming to London or even going to France for an investiture. He sent his form electronically to the MOD on 9 February this year. So far, he has had no receipt and the MOD apparently cannot confirm whether it has passed the form on to the French.

[Kirsten Oswald (East Renfrewshire) (SNP)]

Cannot people such as the brave gentleman to whom the right hon. Gentleman is referring get some kind of reassurance that the system is working? Many people in the situation we are discussing will be reluctant to chase things up because of their character—they might feel that they are being a nuisance. If there was some kind of confirmation for them that things will be progressed, that would be terribly helpful.

[Dr Lewis]

The hon. Lady makes an important point. As will emerge from my other examples, people have for the most part had confirmation, but the fact that some have not is a cause for concern. I thank her for that helpful intervention.

Retired Royal Marine Stephen Roche, who is Peter’s son-in-law, has contacted the French embassy several times. He has been promised a reply, but none has ever come. I will give a few more cases from the recently closed New Forest branch No. 70 of the Normandy Veterans Association. I am particularly obliged to Roy Tamplin, who at the grand age of 91 has meticulously prepared many of the personal details that follow. Roy’s own contribution was as a lance corporal in the Royal Air Force. He began as part of the ground crew in the network of New Forest airfields, preparing the aircraft to cover the initial landings. On 17 June, he and his comrades were shipped by landing craft to Gold beach, from where they moved to a forward airfield near Caen to act as a staging post for the Hampshire-based squadrons. Roy survived all that, and campaigns in Belgium and Holland too. His application was made in August 2014 and acknowledged by the MOD on 15 December 2014. It was confirmed that the application had been sent to the French Government, but nothing more has been heard for more than six months.

Another RAF veteran is former Warrant Officer George Heaton, who is also 91. George was an air gunner in a Halifax bomber. D-day began just a little early for him when he was shot down on the night of 3/4 June while attacking targets in the Normandy region. Rescued by the French resistance, George evaded capture and eventually made it home. His application on 1 August 2014 was not confirmed as having been sent to the French until 19 March this year, more than seven months after the application was made.

I turn to the Senior Service. Able Seaman Sidney Slatter, 91, served on the battleship Ramillies on D-day itself, bombarding shore batteries and other targets in the vicinity of Bénouville with 15-inch shells, as well as tank formations later on. Sidney’s form was sent in August last year and was confirmed as processed and sent on by the MOD in December—since then, not a word. Sadly, Sidney’s wife died earlier this week, so she will not be seeing his award.

Veteran Ted Kingswell was an infantryman who landed on 6 June and went on to fight at Nijmegen in Operation Market Garden. Ted is now confined to a care home, but is known to have applied and received an MOD acknowledgement. Two days after Ted fought his way ashore, Rifleman Fred Newman landed on Gold beach. He took part in the long, hard slog through France and into the heart of Germany. Fred is now 93 and has a letter dated 15 December last year confirming that his application had been forwarded to the French. That was seven long months ago.

Then there are the artillerymen, such as Staff Sergeant William Chick, who fought in Normandy and later at Arnhem. Gunner Ivor Hopkins was at Caen, Falaise and later in Holland and Germany. The one I know best is the baby of the team, at only 90 years old. Gunner Tony Mott was recommended for an award at the time for his exploits, but nothing happened. It would be a pity if he were disappointed for a second time in relation to the Légion d’Honneur. Tony served with the 3rd Royal Horse Artillery and was a 19-year-old motorcycle dispatch rider when he came ashore at Arromanches towards the end of June. A few weeks later, he and his sergeant went out under shellfire to repair breaks in the cable to D battery. Sent to battery headquarters with a report, Tony was stopped by a civilian in great distress—many civilians had been wounded by German shellfire. As soon as he had delivered the message, he alerted the local doctor. That enabled help to be got to save the lives of those injured civilians; all the telephone lines had been knocked out, so otherwise they would have received no medical help. Tony’s form was sent on 3 July 2014. It was acknowledged in August or September 2014, but further queries on his place and date of birth were made as recently as March 2015. He is still waiting to know whether his award will be made.

Finally, I have been asked by the office of my hon. Friend the Member for Calder Valley (Craig Whittaker), who cannot be here today, to raise the case of one of his constituents. Mr Geoffrey Noble applied for his medal in June 2014 and has still heard nothing. Despite my hon. Friend’s writing to the Ministry of Defence and the French embassy several times on Mr Noble’s behalf, he is still waiting to hear. My hon. Friend’s office tells me:

“Mr Noble is not a well gentleman, is very frail and suffers, amongst other things, from heart failure. He is anxious as he knows that the medal is not awarded posthumously.”

With that in mind, can the cases involving particularly frail individuals be given priority? If they can, how do we let the Ministry know of the urgency of those cases?

I know that others wish to speak, so I will close with a final comment. Given his exemplary record of service in the armed forces, the Minister is ideally placed, if anyone is, to ensure that the scheme works and that these people—not superheroes, but ordinary people doing extraordinary things in highly dangerous circumstances—reap the belated benefit of a generous gesture by the French authorities. Let us now ensure that heads are knocked together and that the process is sped up in time for these 90-year-olds to receive the award—one that they so richly deserve and for which they have been encouraged to apply.

Counter-ISIL Coalition Strategy

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 20th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I repeat that the freedom of information request did not drag information out of us; we put the answer on the Ministry of Defence website, and we will do the same with any further requests. We have answered questions in the House from hon. Members, including the hon. Member for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson). If questions are tabled, we will answer them. But it has been standard practice for some time not to publicise the placing of embeds in other countries’ forces because, as I have said, those are their forces and their operations. It is for them to publicise them, not us. However, if we are asked to give details, we of course do so.

The hon. Gentleman rightly drew attention to the loss of life in Tunisia, which included Billy and Lisa Graham and James and Ann McGuire from Scotland, so I hope that he will also see, from the Scottish nationalists’ point of view, the need for us to combat ISIL at its source. He asked about the Prevent programme. The Prime Minister has today given more details of the programme, which we are intensifying. The hon. Gentleman asked where the military strategy fits in. As I have described to the House, the military campaign is only one component of the overall effort against ISIL.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

At home, may I warmly welcome the Prime Minister’s speech today, which reflects a counter-radicalisation strategy of precisely the sort that was recommended to his extremism taskforce approximately two years ago? Abroad, however, and particularly in Syria, it appears from the Secretary of State’s statement today that he still thinks it is possible to bring down Daesh without promoting, as it were, the Assad regime, or to bring down the Assad regime without promoting Daesh. The reality is that he has got to face up to one or the other, and until we know which he regards as the lesser of two evils, it is not true to say that we have a coherent strategy for Syria.

[Michael Fallon]

I do not wholly agree with my right hon. Friend. The fact is that none of us wants to see the Assad regime last a day longer than is necessary, but the regime has lost control of the part of northern Syria where ISIL is headquartered and from where its influence has spread. Tackling ISIL in northern Syria—tackling its command and control centres and interdicting its supply routes into Iraq—can be done in a way that does not prop up the regime, which was rightly the concern of the House when we last debated these matters. Of course, August 2013 was before the rise of ISIL right across Iraq and Syria, before the murder of British hostages there and before the slaughter we saw in Tunisia a few weeks ago.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 13th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Chair of the Defence Committee, Dr Julian Lewis.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Will the Secretary of State confirm that there is no question of ordering fewer than 13 Type 26 frigates? How much would we fall short of spending 2% of GDP on defence if we did not include items of expenditure normally borne on the budgets of other Government Departments?

[Michael Fallon]

As I have made clear, it is ultimately for NATO to classify from each member’s return what properly counts as defence expenditure in the table that is published each year. As far as the Type 26 programme is concerned, my right hon. Friend will know that we have already committed nearly £1 billion to the design phase and to the purchase of some of the long-lead items for the first three frigates in the series.

Britain and International Security

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 2nd July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I will give way in a moment.

As the Prime Minister said on Monday, there must be a full-spectrum response to deal with ISIL at its source in places such as Syria, Iraq and Libya. We know that ISIL is organised and directed from northern Syria. That is why the Prime Minister said during last September’s debate on taking military action in Iraq that

“there is a strong case for us to do more in Syria”.—[Official Report, 26 September 2014; Vol. 585, c. 1259.]

However, he recognised the reservations that some Members had, and we will not bring a motion to the House on which there is not some consensus. However, this is a new Parliament and it is for all Members to consider carefully how best to tackle ISIL, an evil caliphate that does not respect state boundaries.

Therefore, our position remains that we would return to the House for approval before conducting air strikes in Syria. The exception, as the House knows, is if a critical British national interest was at stake, or if there was the need to act to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. We are also clear that any action we take must not provide any succour to Assad or his regime.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

In 2013, the Government wanted to remove Assad without helping al-Qaeda or similar groups that later became Daesh. Now we apparently want to remove Daesh but without helping Assad. Those two things are incompatible. It is a choice of two evils. Which does my right hon. Friend think is the lesser of those two evils?

[Michael Fallon]

We do not want to give any succour to Assad. I do not think that anybody in this House wants the Assad regime to continue for a day longer than is necessary; we want Assad to go. But we are equally clear that ISIL operations in Iraq and elsewhere, probably including Libya, are being directed from northern Syria. We already have American air strikes being carried out in northern Syria and air strikes being carried out from other Gulf countries. We have air strikes being carried out by Canadian aircraft that are helping to keep our streets safe as well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It has been touching to receive so many messages of congratulations on my becoming Chair of the Defence Committee. It is a great responsibility and I will endeavour to live up to it. I pay tribute to the work of my predecessor, my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), for the reports he produced in short order, some of which were slightly overshadowed by the advent of the election campaign and deserve further scrutiny. There was a lot of very interesting material in them.

If I may, I will begin by addressing the excellent interventions made by the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire (Ms Ahmed-Sheikh) and my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray) relating to questions of terminology. In that connection, I pay tribute in his absence to my hon. Friend the Member for Gillingham and Rainham (Rehman Chishti) for his achievement. He attracted support from every part of the House—he gathered 125 right hon. and hon. Members’ signatures—and petitioned the BBC to stop playing the propaganda game of Daesh and to describe it correctly.

[Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)]

I am a former member of the Defence Committee. The right hon. Gentleman will recall a report from back in January that mentions the word “Daesh”. The Committee was ahead of its time.

[Dr Lewis]

I hope to be able to continue that degree of far-sightedness in future.

[Mr James Gray]

I am sorry to interrupt my right hon. Friend to make such a tiny point. It is most kind of him to describe me as “gallant”, but I was only ever a private soldier in the Territorial Army. Surrounded as I am by brave soldiers who truly deserve the title, I should say that I am not in any shape, size or form “gallant”.

[Dr Lewis]

My hon. Friend is, in my eyes, as gallant as they come.

In my hon. Friend’s intervention, he drew attention—he was kind enough to give me the copy of the news article to which he referred—to what the head of the BBC had said. According to today’s edition of The Times:

“The head of the BBC has refused demands from 120 MPs to drop the term Islamic State on the ground that its coverage of the terrorist group must be impartial. Lord Hall of Birkenhead, the director-general, warned that an alternative name for the militants was ‘pejorative’ and said that the broadcaster needed to ‘preserve the BBC’s impartiality’.”

I have news for Lord Hall. I am well familiar with the concept of impartiality that applies to the BBC and independent television. I used to look into it decades ago. It is not absolute impartiality. The example that is always given is that there is no need for the media to be impartial between the arsonist and the fire brigade. The BBC is required to show due impartiality, which does not mean that it has to be impartial between terrorists and constitutionally constituted Governments and their armed forces. Lord Hall would do well to reflect on how he would react if somebody from his ranks of well-paid BBC executives said that the corporation needs to be impartial between the Nazis and the forces that fought them. He would not stand up for that suggestion for a moment.

[Alex Salmond]

Far be it for me to defend the BBC, since it has done so little in Scotland recently to merit defence, but does the right hon. Gentleman not allow that perhaps we should unite across the Chamber in the expression of the term Daesh and the wisdom of using it? Once we do that, we can then reflect on whether the broadcasting organisations would follow, as opposed to just turning this into a bash the BBC session.

[Dr Lewis]

I am extremely grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, who anticipates the very next point I was going to make. If we use the term Daesh, eventually, with luck, the BBC will be the only organisation left not doing so. At that point, even the BBC might see sense.

I wish to paint a brief picture of the sort of problems we face that lead to the strange paradox that I alluded to when I intervened briefly on the Secretary of State. As I said, two years ago we were proposing to intervene on behalf of one side in a civil war and against the other. Now, it is being proposed that we do exactly the opposite. There are people in the House who are far more expert in these matters than I—

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I seem to recall that the vote was actually not to intervene, but to keep the option of intervention on the menu in negotiations. It was not an option for us to intervene.

[Dr Lewis]

I am afraid I have to disagree with my hon. and gallant Friend. If the vote had been carried, intervention would have taken place the very next weekend. The vote was defeated in this House and the Americans, as a result of that defeat, wisely followed suit, and we did not go down that dangerous road.

As I was starting to say, my interpretation of the situation we face in the world—it may be over-simple, but here it is for what it is worth—is that the western world is being caught up in a terrible recrudescence of the age-old battle between the Shi’as and the Sunnis, a point made by the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) in an earlier intervention. The complexity is that the Shi’a and the Sunni militants have a selection of powerful allies. On the Shi’a side, the Syrian Government two years ago posed the threat of chemical weapons, and the Iranian regime has the potential to acquire nuclear weapons. As part of that particular little gang, we also see our old friend President Putin, who has been flexing his muscles, in a way that we all strongly condemn, by taking unilateral action in Ukraine.

On the Sunni side, we see al-Qaeda and the Daesh militants. Behind them, we see strong elements at least of ideological support in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Qatar, who are supposed to be our friends and allies. The problem we face is that there are no good outcomes to be had, whatever course of action we take. What we therefore have to do is to choose between, at any one time, and adopt a policy that is the lesser of two evils. What we have to decide at any one time is: which is the greater danger posed by one element or another in those two unlovely collections of hostile regimes and terrorist organisations?

I wish today simply to sow the seed of the idea that, where we cannot get a wonderfully satisfactory outcome, and we know the only outcome we will get is to try to minimise the damage and that that will have to be done over an extended period, we should adopt a policy that stood us in good stead for half a century in relation to Soviet Communist Russia and its empire: the policy of containment. We cannot force countries that are not ready yet for democracy to become democracies at the point of a gun barrel, unless one goes to the same extent as at the end of the second world war when there was the total defeat and occupation of countries at the cost of millions of lives.

The idea of containment is not passive; it is an active containment. I spoke earlier today with Lord West, whom I greatly respect. He combines much knowledge with a great deal of practical common sense, and I consulted him two years ago before going ahead and deciding to vote against the proposed intervention then. I said to him today that I was minded to think that if we intervened on this occasion, we would be intervening in a very different way from the one that was proposed two years ago. We would not be intervening to bring down another dreadful Arab dictator and replace him with another failed state run by Islamist extremist terrorists. His response was interesting. He said it is a policy of deciding, at any one time, which of the crocodiles is swimming nearest to the boat. Of course, there is no way of permanently taking the crocodiles out of the scene and sailing blissfully out of danger. When dangerous organisations and deadly regimes wield their weapons in ways that are most threatening to us, we must constantly, over a period of time, try to contain the threat by active measures.

What we are seeing with Daesh and its activity is new. It requires containment, but it requires active containment. Daesh is seizing large areas of territory. By doing so, it is giving up the one great advantage that insurgencies and terrorist groups generally have: the advantage of invisibility. A policy of active containment will, from time to time, certainly require the step of military intervention to prevent the enemy on that particular side of the two-sided threat that I have been trying to describe from becoming over-dominant.

We must not fool ourselves into believing that any steps we take will result in a decisive solution. As the Secretary of State said, we are in this for the long haul. At any given time, we will have to intervene to keep whichever particular set of enemies is becoming too dominant, under control. In a way, that is nothing different from what was traditionally the role of the balance of power, when Britain looked after its national interests by ensuring that no one potential enemy power became overwhelmingly strong on the continent.

That leads me, very briefly, to the question of NATO and European defence. We have seen the concept of article 5—the guarantee whereby NATO ensures that none of its members is attacked without the potential aggressor knowing in advance that, if it does that, it will immediately be at war with all other NATO members—stretched to its limit. We have a long and honourable tradition of supporting the independence of the Baltic states. It goes back at least to the time of our intervention in the Russian civil war in 1919-20. I must say to the House, however, that the decision NATO took to extend its protection to the Baltic states is, realistically, as far as we can go. It is simply not fair to countries further east to hold out the false hope of NATO membership, which, if granted, would be totally incredible. If a potential enemy believes that it is not credible that all NATO members would, in fact, declare war upon the aggressor if there were an attack on one of these eastern states, we will have destroyed the whole foundation and the whole reason for having NATO in the first place. That does not do anyone any favours. It just takes us back to the scenarios of the 1930s, when an aggressor thought that it could pick off one state after another without larger states coming to their rescue.

Finally, I want to say this. The Government keep saying that defence is the first duty of Government. I agree: it is the first duty of Government. It is more important than any other duty of Government. If that is the case, there can be no coherent or rational case for safeguarding and ring-fencing the budgets of other Government Departments, thus increasing the pressure on the unprotected Departments, which include Defence. Something has gone awry with the Government’s sense of defence as the top national priority. We constantly hear talk about Britain punching above its weight, but in reality, the weight of the punch depends on the resources allocated to the armed forces. The stronger the armed forces in peacetime, the more likely it is that we will not have to engage in warfare, because anyone who is likely to attack us will be forced to think again.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 8th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

The purpose of the alliance is to defend its members. That is why our troops were exercising last week in Estonia and will shortly be exercising in Romania and the Baltic sea, and why our Typhoons are flying with the Norwegians to protect the skies over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the face of Russian aggression. We are one of the nuclear members of the NATO alliance, and that nuclear shield helps to protect all members of the alliance.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

When the Secretary of State is next having a word in the shell-like ear of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, will he mention that it does not make a lot of sense for any Government to say that defence is the first duty of Government if they protect other Departments’ spending but not defence spending?

[Michael Fallon]

I know of my right hon. Friend’s long-standing commitment to defence and to defence expenditure. He is right, of course, that the first duty of Government is to defend our country and our people. I reminded him earlier of the commitments in the manifesto to protect the size and power of our armed forces right through this Parliament. However, I note what he has said. Those commitments are for the remaining three financial years, from 2016-17 onwards. These are matters for negotiation in the autumn.

HM Naval Base Clyde

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 28th May 2015 Commons Chamber

[Alex Salmond]

That would not be first time that a Speaker has intervened on me in this House, Mr Speaker—[Laughter]. But always helpfully.

On 25 March this year, the Secretary of State for Defence, in a written statement, explained the decisions that had been taken on precautions following the discovery of the breaches in the cladding around one of the fuel cells at the shore test facility at Dounreay. For Members of the House who are unfamiliar with this, let me say that that has been a matter of concern for some considerable time. The breaches in the fuel cell cladding have led to the refuelling already of one of the Trident submarines and to the potential refuelling of a second one in the near future.

The prototype reactor is designed and operated at extensive level to test whether in future there might be breaches in the reactor on board the submarines. There are two aspects that should give the House considerable cause for concern. First, we have been assured by the current Secretary of State for Defence and his predecessor that when this has happened, all appropriate authorities have been informed and kept up to date with the consequences of these microscopic breaches, but I submit that the process of consultation and information is severely inadequate.

The responsible democratic body is the Scottish Environment Protection Agency, but despite the fact that SEPA was informed by the MOD within a reasonable timescale, but not immediately, it was years before the general public and this House were informed. Hon. Members may well ask why SEPA, a democratic agency reporting to Scottish Ministers, did not immediately and timeously release information, as it would in a civil nuclear incident affecting the environment. The reason is that the MOD invoked Crown immunity regarding the control and flow of information from the test reactor. I submit—I hope the Minister will reply specifically on this point—that we are past the stage where it is acceptable that the invocation of Crown immunity can conceal from the general public, for months and perhaps even years, nuclear incidents that may have a bearing on the safe operation of nuclear reactors in the Faslane base.

Secondly, the microscopic breaches in the reactor in Dounreay have resulted in that reactor being closed down. It is to be decommissioned in the next few years. That seems to me to be sensible when radiation leaks have been identified.

The difficulty in the matter which concerns this House is that that position has led to an examination of whether there should be a prototype reactor on the new generation of nuclear submarines. The conclusion that was reached and that was in the statement of the Secretary of State for Defence this year was that his expert panel concluded that it was a valid decision not to prototype PWR3 because there was no practical course of action that would enable a prototype facility to be built ahead of the first successor submarine.

It is bad enough that a prototype reactor is giving a signal of potential problems in a nuclear fleet, and that the Secretary of State for Defence did not timeously inform the general public of what was going on or allow the Scottish Environment Protection Agency to do its duty. That is bad enough, but to come to the conclusion that we might move to a maingate decision on renewing this nuclear deterrent without having a functioning prototype reactor which would tell us of potential problems in the new reactor is an extraordinary situation which must be inherently unsafe, unless the Minister has some information that the new reactor will be built in such a way that it does not have the failings of just about every other nuclear reactor built in recent history.

Lastly, I spoke of the new political reality in Scotland and the 57 out of 59 Members who were clearly elected as being against any decision to renew the nuclear deterrent at extraordinary cost at a time of austerity. The attitude of 57 out of 59 Members of Parliament from Scotland to next year’s maingate decision will be to oppose it. That should give the Minister substantial cause for thought.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I welcome the right hon. Gentleman back to his place in this House. May I appeal to him not to conflate two separate issues? They are indeed separate issues. One is the very real concerns about faulty operating practices leading to potential accidents. The other is the wider issue about whether or not we should have a nuclear deterrent. It might surprise him to know that many of us who believe that we should have a nuclear deterrent are as concerned as he is about the dangers of operating faults and accidents in the systems that we have.

[Alex Salmond]

These Members will conclude that, unfortunately, one of the consequences of having such a nuclear deterrent is having these systems in a situation which causes inherent danger. The point that I am making is that the working of the system is inherently dangerous because a nuclear reactor and nuclear weapons on a submarine are not an easy fit. The military value of this deterrent as an independent deterrent is non-existent. Its use would break international law. It is not a weapon of security, but a sign of the insecurity of the United Kingdom, believing that fading grandeur can be protected by being one of the big five in having possession of nuclear weapons.

If my hon. Friend the Member for Argyll and Bute is lucky enough to catch the Speaker’s eye in a minute or so, he will be, as far as I can check from the House of Commons records, the first hon. Member of this House ever to make two substantive speeches on the first two sessional days—an extraordinary occurrence which even the greatest of parliamentarians through history have not achieved. Such will be the activity of my hon. Friend.

With that in mind, perhaps the Minister will allow me to paraphrase one of the great parliamentarians of the past. Given the political realities in Scotland, she and the Government will be making a fatal mistake if they believe that this costly trumpery, this useless, expensive, unlawful and inherently dangerous military plaything will be tolerated any longer by those on the SNP Benches, by this party or by our country.