Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 2nd September 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

On the last point, I think that history teaches us that unilateral abandonment of nuclear weapons is not the way to bring about a more rapid elimination of those weapons, much as we would all like to see that happen. I can tell the hon. Gentleman that the estimates produced in the 2006 White Paper for the cost of replacing the existing submarines with a four-boat solution were between £15 billion and £20 billion—in terms of the 2006 economic conditions—and they remain unchanged.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

In order that the Secretary of State does not keep having to tell us that he must not go above his pay grade, will he carry the message back to No. 10 that as Labour Front Benchers say they are willing to sign up to two of the four boats before the next election, and as the majority of people in this House would like to have that main-gate decision implemented at least in part, why should we not go ahead so that we cannot be blackmailed by the Liberal Democrats in the event of a hung Parliament after the general election?

[Mr Hammond]

I understand my hon. Friend’s point of view. He has on other occasions raised the issue of entering into a contract for the submarines at an early stage. Our current way of managing our equipment programme is to enter into contracts with industry at the point at which projects are mature enough to enable us to secure the best possible value for money for the taxpayer. Entering into a contract at this stage, when the project is relatively immature, would not represent value for money.

UK Submarine Supply Chain

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 10th July 2013 Westminster Hall

[John Woodcock]

My hon. Friend touches on a key issue. I will come on to that in a moment if I may, because I have some important questions on which the Minister can give us some reassurance.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his generosity in giving way. I should like to revert to the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Jonathan Lord), whom I thank for his kind remarks, which I did not deserve. Will the hon. Gentleman cast his mind back to the last Defence questions, when the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) made the excellent point from the Dispatch Box that if the alternatives study says that the choice is between a full-time deterrent and a part-time deterrent of, say, only two submarines, then at least we should get round to signing the contract straight away for the two submarines? I was encouraged by that and I shall be pressing the Secretary of State for a meeting to discuss that proposal so that Trident cannot again become a political football between the Liberal Democrats and the two major parties that support it.

[John Woodcock]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his wise words on this issue, which we hear so often from him. There could well be a number of reasons why it makes sense to bring forward the main gate decision. Indeed, if that requires a new coalition for that one issue in this Parliament, then I know that many of us, from across the House and in this Chamber today, will be prepared to be a part of it.

I will make a little more progress. Although it seems that the Trident alternatives review is set to dismiss such options as a land-based, air-based or surface ship delivery system, and indeed to give up finally on the Liberal Democrats’ mini-deterrent fantasy of adapting Astute-class submarines to carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, recent media coverage has suggested that the review may set out proposals to abandon the UK’s posture of continuous at-sea deterrence, which for decades has ensured that at least one British deterrent submarine is operational at all times.

We read that that could take place either when the Vanguard submarines reach the end of their life or perhaps even within the next few years, if the extensive leaks to the national newspapers can be believed. Colossal savings could be realised, says the unnamed brain-box who briefed the Financial Times in May. We are also told that we could build half the boats and save half the capital costs. As the submarines are predicted to cost, on average, about £2.5 billion each, that must mean a £5 billion saving to the Exchequer. Also, we are told that £1 billion a year could be saved by downgrading Britain’s nuclear capability to a part-time deterrent. Perhaps we could even keep Britain’s nuclear warheads in a cupboard, as the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey) has curiously put it in the press. Alternatively, perhaps the main gate decision could not be brought forward but further delayed, and the proposed in-service date for the new submarines could be put back yet again.

Unfortunately, I am afraid that like so much that the Minister’s coalition partners transmit on defence issues, all of that is complete bunkum. For starters, does the Minister agree that it is nursery school logic to believe that we can save half the capital by building half the boats? The outlay on the submarine fleet is not simply a matter of purchasing these submarines; it is also about investing in the ability to design and build them. Those costs are fixed, whether we order two, four or more submarines—I am not necessarily suggesting that we order more than four submarines. Therefore, can the Minister confirm that he anticipates that the first of class would cost effectively double the average across the fleet, and that the fourth boat would be the cheapest of the batch? Can he also confirm that there would be significant savings from placing a four-boat order from the outset, rather than ordering two with the option to order two more? Also, can he confirm that if the Government were inclined to press ahead with the main gate decision in this Parliament, as was originally planned, there could be further substantial savings for the British taxpayer?

Similarly, with running costs the savings would not be anything like the amount that the antis boast it would be. Will the Minister confirm that at least 70% of those costs are fixed, covering the fuelling and basing facilities, and that they will be the same whether Britain operates patrols around the clock or takes the submarines on the occasional fishing expedition once or twice a year? What is his estimate—if he can share it with the House—of the annual savings that would accrue from stepping down from a class D posture?

Also, given the high fixed costs, does the Minister agree that abandoning class D would mean a disproportionate downgrading of the deterrent’s capacity to deter the grotesque horror of a nuclear war, by removing the guarantee that currently exists, namely that any nation that launched a nuclear attack on the UK could be hit by a counter-strike no matter what damage our country sustained? Furthermore, does he agree that it would be highly perverse if those who pursue disarmament—admittedly for absolutely laudable motives—were actually to increase the risk of nuclear conflict in future decades through their unilateral gestures, rather than making the world safer? Also, if I can tempt him to speculate, does he think that it was that woolly thinking from the Liberal Democrats that has left the party in the extraordinary position of having no representation at all in the defence ministerial team at this vital moment?

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Thank goodness for that. [Laughter.]

[John Woodcock]

Well, let us see.

On the timing of main gate, will the Minister confirm that a further delay to the build process is effectively ruled out by his Department’s assessment, which was communicated to me by the Secretary of State at the last oral questions, that the Vanguard hulls would be rendered unsafe if their life was extended beyond the current 35-year plan, which of course is the longest period that any British submarine has ever been in service?

Finally, building two boats rather than four means that work across the UK supply chain could grind to a halt as early as 2031, six years earlier than is currently expected. Without more submarines to build, Barrow’s unique specialised work force will break up, as they did the last time there was a gap in the submarine drumbeat. However, as we have just discussed, the consequences would be felt in every part of the United Kingdom. That would leave us with two expensive choices. Either the Government, and taxpayers, would have to pick up the tab for the sustained unemployment of that work force, and consign to history the nation’s capacity to build submarines, with the loss of valuable skills and export spin-offs that would occur as a result, or alternatively—this is surely more likely—the Government of the day would bring forward the next submarine programme. That programme would involve the successors to the Astute class submarines, which of course have not been built yet, sooner than those vessels are actually needed from a military naval capability assessment, to keep the industrial drumbeat going. Can the Minister confirm that because that would mean that the bulk of capital spending on that next generation of boats would be required as early as the Parliament after the next one, bringing that spending forward—by bringing forward the successor to the Astute class—would completely wipe out the savings from ending continuous at-sea deterrence?

Bluntly, that is the choice that we would face if the decision was made to abandon class D. We would have to be prepared either to put at grave risk a significant part of Britain’s cutting-edge industrial base or to bring forward a significant amount of spending well before it would actually be needed.

Everyone in this House has a responsibility to guard against siren voices peddling false economies. The submarine supply chain is one of Britain’s great unsung assets, providing high-skilled manufacturing jobs that will rebalance the economy. We must not sacrifice those 13,000 jobs on the altar of cuts that would end up saving nothing significant at all but would leave the country vulnerable in future decades.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Dunne]

I am afraid that I do not have time to cover that point, but I am more than happy to meet the hon. Gentleman in the autumn to talk about the disposal programme. We made an announcement recently. The hon. Gentleman knows that this multi-year challenge is being carefully monitored and managed by the Ministry of Defence.

The sensor support programme contract that we signed with Thales will provide support to the eyes and ears of the fleet, which includes periscopes, sonar and electronic warfare systems for both the current and future submarine classes, as well as vessels in our surface fleet.

Although the ongoing build programme and the support to the current fleet are the most visible signs of our continued investment, defence is all about planning for the future and we must look ahead to building the next classes of submarine, the subject to which the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness devoted most of his speech. I will attempt to deal with some of the questions that he posed, but will not cover all of them, as he may not be surprised to learn.

We have learned much about the importance of sustaining this supply chain from the 10-year gap in submarine production in the UK after HMS Vengeance was launched in the 1990s, which the hon. Gentleman mentioned in respect of delays to the Astute class. Having to re-establish a submarine design, build, testing and commissioning capability that had lain dormant for a decade had a serious impact on the delivery of the Astute class and economic ramifications in Barrow. This has been well documented, but it is important that we do not lose sight of these hard lessons. For this reason, the Astute programme is crucial to sustaining the skills and the work force we need to meet our clear commitment to retain and renew a credible, continuous and effective minimum nuclear deterrent.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I thank the Minister for giving way. I know that his time is so limited. It is worth putting on the record that the Prime Minister has said that, as long as he remains leader of the Conservative party, we will have a continuous at-sea deterrent. But it would help—and it would be nice—if those of us who have requested a meeting with the Secretary of State to discuss how we can prevent being blackmailed in future by the Liberal Democrats in the event of a hung Parliament, as we were in the past, could be given a particular date to look forward to.

[Mr Dunne]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reinforcing the commitment of the Conservative party, from the highest levels, to continuous at-sea deterrence. I was not aware that he had requested a meeting with the Secretary of State. I am happy to take that up, and if the Secretary of State is unavailable I am happy to meet him as a fall-back, in the first instance.

The Astute programme is crucial to sustaining the skills and the work force that we need. Through that programme, we are undertaking the planning required to prepare for the successor submarines that will replace the Vanguard class from the late 2020s. Hon. Members will be aware that we are taking the steps necessary to be ready to start building the first submarine as we lead up to a main gate decision in 2016.

The hon. Member for Barrow and Furness asked whether this decision could be advanced, saying that this might help both cement the decision and, potentially, reduce the cost. Another lesson that we have learned from shipbuilding programmes is that unless the design is mature enough at the time that the investment decision is made—in other words, if a decision is rushed—additional frictional cost could be built in, through changes to the design programme after the contract has been priced, which can delay the programme and add significantly to the cost thereafter. We do not want to repeat the mistakes made at the time of the Astute contract being laid, by making a premature decision on the successor design.

Armed Forces

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 25th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

We can disagree with nothing in the motion, but without wishing to break the consensual mood of the House, I think that this is too good an opportunity not to ask at least some questions of Ministers, in the hope that they will at least reflect on them and perhaps return later.

I am concerned, as are a number of Members on these Benches, that by keeping on cutting defence expenditure, we risk creating imbalances on a variety of fronts. Can it be right, for example, that the budgets of Departments dealing with health, welfare and international aid are being protected, if not expanded, as a percentage of Government expenditure? That puts disproportionate pressure on other Departments, such as Defence, when trying to save costs. I also wonder whether imbalances are being created in regard to our transatlantic relationship. Our defence capability is one of the key anchors of that relationship, but it is not a one-way ticket. There are obligations on both sides, including our own. If we keep shaving our defence capability, might we put elements of that relationship at risk?

I also suggest that we might be creating imbalances in other areas, such as our capability to meet our foreign policy objectives, whatever they might be, and defend our interests overseas. The House knows that I have not been supportive of our military interventions over the past decade, but let us put that to one side. There have been moments during those interventions when our resources have not matched our ambitions. It was not the fault of the troops on the ground, but in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular the necessary resources were lacking, and that had a knock-on effect on our ability to achieve our objectives.

I have other concerns but, as an ex-soldier, I shall focus on the Army. The plan to disband 20,000 regulars before knowing whether the plan to recruit 30,000 reservists to take their place will work is high risk, given that we do not know whether those reservists will be able to plug the gap from a capability point of view, or from a boots-on-the-ground point of view. I ask Ministers to ensure that that issue is centrally addressed in the forthcoming White Paper. There are key questions that need answering very soon, because redundancies are taking effect as we speak, and we do not know whether the plan will work.

There is a real danger that Government proposals will prove a false economy, in financial terms and in terms of military capability. Let us take cost savings as an example. I am conscious of the figure of £1.8 billion over 10 years, and more details will follow in the White Paper, but at the moment the Government are long on promise and short on costings and details. They have admitted in the Green Paper that it costs more to train reservists than regulars. The financial incentives being offered to regulars to join the reserves mean that they will be on a better scale of pay than a serving brigadier, if we include the £5,000 sign-up bonus, the bounty, the daily rate and so forth. There is also the question of civilian salaries being matched, although I am aware that the Government are considering capping an element of that. Again, we need to see the details. And all that is before we even consider the fact that the reservists will not be deployable in their first year.

I have already raised the question of the number of reservists that will be required. According to Ministry of Defence figures, the present Territorial Army mobilisation rate is 40%. If we apply that to the 20,000 regulars, we will need 50,000 reservists. I look forward to seeing the details of how that magic figure of 40% is going to be increased. It will take a concerted effort to achieve a mobilisation rate of much more than 40%, given that many people in the Army believe that we are not even hitting 40% at the moment.

There is also the question of the capability gap. In the 1980s, when many of us served, the TA did a very good job that basically involved reservists being transported out to Germany, digging a trench and waiting for the Soviet or Warsaw pact forces to arrive. Today, asymmetric warfare is becoming the norm. The skills base will become much higher, and our requirements will be much more demanding, yet I understand that the number of training days is being increased to 40 overall—an increase of only five days. I question that on the capability front, particularly when those forces are going to be mobilised as groups rather than as add-ons. That factor must be considered.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend share my fear that, with the scale of priorities we have at the moment, there is a danger that if we reduce the size of the Army much more, they will all be able to fit into the single first High Speed 2 train?

[Mr Baron]

Let us hope it is not a one-way ticket!

Let me finish with a concern some of us have about the potentially distorting effect on the ground. Excellent, well recruited battalions, such as the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, are being axed, while more poorly recruited battalions are being saved. It is costing millions of pounds to keep over-strength battalions up to the mark. Such a policy is, in many respects, simply reinforcing failure.

In conclusion, I think this is a high-risk policy, and I ask Ministers to make sure that they cover the base very carefully. In my view, we need to see concrete evidence that the reservist plan will take effect and will work—before we let the regular battalions go. Here we are dealing with the defence of the realm, and this is happening when many countries not necessarily friendly to the west are arming and increasing their expenditure on defence. No one here can tell when or where the next threat will come from. I therefore ask Ministers to consider these points very carefully.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 17th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

First, I will check my diary. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind invitation.

I am not sure whether the hon. Gentleman is asking if we have considered whether it is possible to extend further the life of the existing submarines or to design the successor class with a longer in-service life. On the first question, he will know that we have already extended the life of the Vanguard class once, and it is not judged possible or safe to extend it further. On the second question, we will of course be looking to design the successor class with the longest possible in-service life.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is clearly very robust on this issue, but may I urge him to consider deeply the suggestion of the shadow Armed Forces Minister, the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones)? If those on both Front Benches agree on the need to renew Trident and to keep continuous-at-sea deterrence, why should they not agree before the general election to make this irreversible, so that Trident cannot again become a political football, as it unfortunately did between my party and the Liberal Democrats in 2010?

[Mr Hammond]

I have to say to my hon. Friend—who is a great expert on this subject and has been one for longer than I can remember—that the essence of our strategy for defence procurement, which is at the heart of our determination to maintain a balanced budget, is that we do not make contractual commitments until we need to for the delivery of equipment in a timely fashion, when we need it. Locking in decisions before they need to be made merely reduces flexibility and, as the previous Government found out, drives cost into the programme if changes have to be made.

Operation Herrick

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 14th May 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Gentleman’s views on this subject are well known. As I have announced, a small number of people—mainly logisticians—will possibly remain after 31 December 2014 to complete our redeployment from Bastion. In addition, we have committed to providing trainers and life support personnel for the Afghan national army officer training academy outside Kabul, which is a military training academy modelled on Sandhurst. Those are the only commitments we have made at the moment, amounting to a couple of hundred personnel on an ongoing basis. We judge that to be an effective and appropriate way for us to continue supporting Afghan national security forces, together with the £70 million a year cash support that we have pledged as part of the international community’s commitment.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Even before British troops have left, our brave Afghan interpreters have been threatened with assassination. How many of them must be killed before we do what we ought to do and offer those who wish to come to this country the opportunity to do so, as the previous Government rightly did for Iraqi interpreters?

[Mr Hammond]

The situation in Afghanistan is not the same as that in Iraq. Lessons were learned from the Afghan campaign, and the way that interpreters and other civilian employees have been recruited in Afghanistan has been modified accordingly to take those lessons on board. I assure my hon. Friend, however, that we will not turn our back on those who have served us in Afghanistan as locally employed civilians. We believe that Afghanistan has a future that will require skilled, capable people who are committed to building it post-2014. We want to explore all options for encouraging people, wherever they can, to be part of that future and help to build their country in which we have invested so heavily. We have and will continue to have mechanisms that deal with cases of intimidation or threat, including those that could, in extremis, allow for resettlement in this country.

Reservists

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd April 2013 Westminster Hall

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

You are extremely kind, Dr McCrea, and I shall stick to two minutes if I possibly can. Not for the first time has my gallant and hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) done a great service to the country and to the House—to the country previously in his distinguished military career and to the House today in securing this debate. Inevitably, the debate has concentrated on the Territorial Army, or the Army Reserve as it may be known in the future. Let us also put in a word for the Royal Naval Reserve, the Royal Marine Reserve, and the RAF Reserves, all of whom make a valuable contribution.

As a former junior member of the senior service reserve, I well recall what a bridge the reserves constituted, and still constitute, between the armed forces and society. The role of the reserves should be flexibility to deal with the unknown. As my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) said, we do not know from where the next crisis will come, and we will not know the nature of that crisis until it is upon us. Reserves should be an augmentation of, not a substitute for, regular forces. If trained-up former regulars constitute our reserve, we will have a better chance to get them to the sort of standards that we need very quickly than when we are dealing with civilian-only reserves. Nevertheless, there is potential in both cohorts. I am concerned that the strategic context is being skewed by budgetary constraints. The truth of the matter is that we are having the debate in these terms because not enough money is being spent on defence.

Finally, I am concerned that in the future we will see a repeat of the sort of false opposition that was put forward by certain people in the past between what was called preparing for a war in the future against an unknown modern state, and fighting the war in which we are engaged at the moment, namely counter-insurgency. We have seen how quickly the threats change. We are making important decisions about the future. For example, we must decide about the future of the nuclear deterrent. I do not want to see that debate skewed by people who think that if we cancel Vanguard class replacement submarines we will get more troops. The truth is, we get the defence that we pay for. We are not paying enough; we should pay more.

Army Basing Plan

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 5th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I do not think that is right; I am conferring with my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces. I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman to confirm to him, as set out in the document, exactly what the lay-down will be in Wales after the completion of this move.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

May I welcome the Defence Secretary’s recent statement to the Treasury that it should stop basing its tanks on the MOD lawn? May I congratulate him on an entry in the basing plan that seems to suggest that Marchwood military port in New Forest East will continue as the military port for the Army for the indefinite future?

[Mr Hammond]

I would not want to encourage my hon. Friend to draw that conclusion. Marchwood military port is scheduled for disposal, and—this is not part of this announcement, of course—it may well still be used by the Army but under the ownership of a civilian contractor.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 25th February 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dunne]

The right hon. Gentleman should be aware that the coalition agreement made it clear that the Liberal Democrats were allowed to produce their own alternative review. It is up to the Liberal Democrats to decide as and when they wish to publish the review’s findings.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Talking of alternatives, does my hon. Friend agree that the few percentage points of the defence budget that will be spent on replacing Trident give far better value for money than the alternative of putting nuclear cruise missiles on Astute class submarines, as has been recommended by the Liberal Democrats, almost all of whom are unaccountably absent from the Chamber today?

[Mr Dunne]

My hon. Friend is a stalwart defender of this country’s nuclear deterrent. I applaud him for that and for the debate that he called on this subject at the end of last year. It remains to be seen what costings are attached to the alternative plans that our coalition partners may or may not publish in due course.

Maritime Surveillance

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 7th February 2013 Westminster Hall

[Sir Gerald Howarth]

Good. I am so pleased.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

He did stop us going into the euro.

[Sir Gerald Howarth]

Yes, he did. I have been searching for something positive to say about the hon. Gentleman’s right hon. Friend, and I am happy to say that he was right about that.

I got the House of Commons Library to do some research for me last week. I pay tribute to the Library, which does a fantastic job for us. The Library found that this year, the overseas aid budget will increase by £2.65 billion. The Government are struggling to spend the money as it is. We have done our bit and shown an example to the rest of the world. It does not make sense for us to increase overseas aid when we lack such important capability.

Perhaps my right hon. Friend the Minister will go back to our right hon. Friend the Prime Minister—I know that they are close friends—and say that this is what we should do. When I put to him the issue of ring-fencing overseas aid and not defence, the Prime Minister said, “I gave a commitment in 2009, as I did on the third runway.” I respect the Prime Minister for that principled view, but the world has changed. We have had the Arab spring and turmoil around the world. Our armed forces are one of this kingdom’s greatest assets, and our defence industry is one of the economy’s. There is a need, a requirement and an obligation, and we have a number of options to deliver that capability. I believe we should provide it now and that, quite legitimately, we should divert funds from overseas aid to provide a maritime patrol aircraft, which would contribute to stability around the world and greater prosperity among the countries we are trying to help.

I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire and his colleagues on the Defence Committee on their report and on bringing the matter before the House. They have done a great service to Parliament and the country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Robathan]

I have told the hon. Gentleman that I will not engage with him again, because we have done it before and he is in denial. One cannot have military or economic security based on unsustainable defence spending. The Soviet Union found that out. That is why we took a number of difficult decisions during the SDSR, including the decision not to bring the Nimrod MRA4 into service.

At the beginning of the debate, my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire said that he did not wish to concentrate on Nimrod, but I am afraid that it has been largely about Nimrod, which I will therefore have to deal with in some detail. I asked the officials present—this huge number of serving personnel and civil servants—at what date the original Nimrod decision was taken, so I knew before his confession that it was, sadly, taken under the previous Conservative Government.

We should not forget the background to the decision to cancel Nimrod. There were no maritime reconnaissance aircraft flying in the RAF when we came into government. We did not create the capability gap—the capability did not exist. Owing to cost growth in the programme, the original plan to convert 21 airframes for the MRA4 had by 2010 been scaled back to only nine. The in-service date had been delayed from 2003 to 2012, costs had none the less risen from £2.8 billion to £3.6 billion, there were still outstanding technical problems which would have taken further large sums of money to solve and we knew that it would cost about £2 billion to operate over the next decade. While the capability’s role in support of anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, strategic intelligence gathering, and search and rescue remained important, in a financially constrained environment dominated by the operations in Afghanistan among other threats, it made the most military and financial sense to discontinue the programme, however unhappy that made us.

I was particularly interested in the comments of the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife. I joined the armed forces in 1970 and, during my time in the Army and in Parliament since, I have seen a long list of poor procurement projects—[Interruption.] That is the Leader of the Opposition ringing. Out of a litany of procurement disasters, as the hon. Gentleman said, this has been one of the worst. It was more than nine years late, each aircraft was to cost three times the original amount and we still had not finished. We did not where the programme was going, there was no end in sight and we were not asked to throw good money after bad. I am afraid that that decision, much as it is regretted, was the right one.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I apologise to the Minister and to other right hon. and hon. Members for coming late to the debate. I was serving on the Justice and Security Bill Committee, which has only just finished. Given that so much money was sunk into this project and that considerable technological advances were made for the equipment that was to be carried on the Nimrod, will we still get the benefit of that advanced technology development for possible use in future programmes?

[Mr Robathan]

My hon. Friend asks a good question, but I am afraid that I cannot answer at this moment. I will write to him and let him know but, certainly, technological advance does not go away—it has happened.

We have not been idle in dealing with the consequences of the decision. Revised plans and operating procedures are in place for other platforms to mitigate the absence of a maritime patrol aircraft capability. I will not go into too much detail, as some things are classified, but we can request support from allies and partners if necessary and we have established a seedcorn initiative to maintain the skills and knowledge necessary to operate maritime patrol aircraft in the future, should circumstances change. I was in New Zealand last year and saw some of our RAF personnel who were taking part in the seedcorn initiative. They said it was extremely valuable, and I thought it also sounded like a pretty good posting.

Nuclear Deterrent

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 17th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the matter of the nuclear deterrent.

The motion stands in my name, and that of the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn).

Obtaining the debate involved a genuinely collaborative effort across the political divide. Part of the beauty of the Backbench Business Committee process is that it compels people who disagree profoundly about issues to work together to ensure that those issues are brought to the Floor of the House. No fewer than two dozen colleagues representing both sides of the argument supported our application for the debate at various stages. They are too numerous to list, but representations were made to the Backbench Business Committee by—as well as the hon. Member for Newport West and me—the hon. Members for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), and my hon. Friends the Members for South East Cornwall (Sheryll Murray), for Crawley (Henry Smith), for Woking (Jonathan Lord), and for Wellingborough (Mr Bone). Others who were particularly supportive include the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Sir Gerald Kaufman), the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), and my hon. Friends the Members for North Warwickshire (Dan Byles) and for Broxbourne (Mr Walker).

I know that several of those Members, as well as others—not least the former Defence Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), who is participating in a broadcast on this very subject this afternoon—regret that Committee meetings and other inescapable commitments prevent them from attending today’s debate. I am grateful to them all, and I hope that the tone and content of our debate between now and 5 pm will justify the effort that they all put into encouraging the Backbench Business Committee to select this important topic.

Given that we must fit some 20 speeches into just two hours, I shall endeavour to make my own remarks as brief as possible. I wish to outline just five military arguments and four rather more political arguments in favour of our retaining the independent deterrent. The first of the military arguments is the most important argument of all: that future military threats and conflicts will be no more predictable than those that engulfed us throughout the 20th century. That is the overriding justification for preserving armed forces in peacetime as a national insurance policy. No one knows which enemies may confront us during the next 30 to 50 years—for that is the period that we are discussing, when the next generation of the nuclear deterrent will be in service—but it is highly probable that at least some of those enemies will be armed with weapons of mass destruction.

[Henry Smith (Crawley) (Con)]

I greatly regret that, owing to a prime ministerial meeting with GPs from my constituency, I shall be unable to take part substantively in the debate.

Does my hon. Friend agree that our independent nuclear deterrent has helped to keep the peace in Europe for the past six decades, and that, because we effectively bankrupted the Soviet Union, it has led to the freeing of millions of people in eastern Europe?

[Dr Lewis]

I am sure that will be a central topic in our debate, and I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. I hope some of the later points in my list of nine arguments will serve to endorse what he has said.

My second argument is that it is not the weapons themselves that we have to fear, but the nature of the regimes that possess them. Whereas democracies are generally reluctant to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear dictatorships—although they did so against Japan in 1945—the reverse is not true. Let us consider what might have happened if in 1982 a non-nuclear Britain had been facing an Argentina in possession of even just a few tactical nuclear bombs and the means of delivering them. Would we then have dared to use our conventional forces against its inferior conventional forces?

The third military argument is that the United Kingdom has traditionally played a more important and decisive role in preserving freedom than other medium-sized democracies have been able, or willing, to do. Democratic countries without nuclear weapons have little choice but either to declare themselves neutral and hope for the best or to rely on the nuclear umbrella of their powerful allies. The UK is a nuclear power already and is also much harder to defeat by conventional means than many other democracies because of our physical separation from the continent.

[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

Is the hon. Gentleman arguing for every independent country in the world to possess nuclear weapons?

[Dr Lewis]

Absolutely not. I am saying that those countries that do not have nuclear weapons already often have other reasons that make it difficult to defend their borders, whereas, fortunately, we find it easier to do so because of our physical separation from the continent.

The fourth argument is that our prominence as the principal ally of the United States, our strategic geographical position—to which I have just referred—and the fact that we are obviously the junior partner might tempt an aggressor to risk attacking us separately. Given the difficulties in overrunning the UK with conventional forces in comparison with our more vulnerable allies, an aggressor could be tempted to use one or more mass destruction weapons against us on the assumption that the United States would not respond on our behalf. Even if that assumption were false, the attacker would find out his mistake only when it was too late for all concerned. An independently controlled British nuclear deterrent massively reduces the prospect of such a fatal miscalculation.

The fifth of the military arguments is that no quantity of conventional forces can compensate for the military disadvantage that faces a non-nuclear country in a war against a nuclear-armed enemy. The atomic bombing of Japan is especially instructive—not only because the Emperor was forced to surrender, but also because of what might have happened under the reverse scenario. If Japan had developed atomic bombs in the summer of 1945 and the allies had not, a conventional allied invasion to end the war would have been out of the question.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

I want to follow on from the question from the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) and press the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) on the logic of his argument. How can it be right for us to claim that we should have nuclear weapons, yet lecture every other country against trying to acquire them? If we are saying that the UK depends on nuclear weapons to be safe, does it not logically follow that every other country has the right to make the same argument?

[Dr Lewis]

The answer to that is catered for by the point I made earlier: it is not the weapons we have to fear but the nature of the regimes that have them. I have no desire to lecture other democracies on whether or not they should have nuclear weapons, as that is a question for them and it is about whether they feel they can afford to do that. It does not bother me if democracies have nuclear weapons, but I do reserve the right to lecture dictatorships, and preferably to try to thwart, baulk and deter them from having such weapons, because they are the threat, not the weapons themselves.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

rose—

[Dr Lewis]

I will give way, but it will be for the last time as otherwise I will be in danger of taking too much time. [Interruption.] I thank my hon. Friend for his courtesy in resuming his seat.

I wish briefly to make four political points. The first political argument is that when people are asked whether it is safer for this country to continue to possess nuclear weapons as long as other countries have them, a large majority of the population consistently take the view that we should do so and that it would be unwise and dangerous to renounce them unilaterally. We can ask different poll questions that seem to point to a different answer, but when that question is asked, the answer is surprisingly consistent.

The second political argument is that in the 1980s, under cold war conditions, two general elections demonstrated the toxic effect of one-sided disarmament proposals on a party’s prospects of gaining power. The third argument is that it was and remains widely believed—this refers to the intervention made by my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Henry Smith) a few moments ago—that the nuclear stalemate of the cold war enabled all-out conflict between the majors powers to be avoided for 50 years, despite their mutual hostility and in contrast to what happened in those many regional theatres where communists and their enemies could and did fight without fear of nuclear escalation. The final political argument is that the ending of the east-west confrontation has not altered the balance of public opinion on this question. First, that is because a danger could easily re-emerge of a reversion to a confrontation of that sort. Secondly, it is because even today there are unpleasant regimes, such as Iran’s, on the point of acquiring nuclear weapons and some, such as North Korea’s, that have already done so.

The role of our strategic nuclear force remains what it has always been: to deter any power armed with mass destruction weapons from using them against us, in the belief, true or false, that nobody would retaliate on our behalf. The use of our deterrent consists of its preventive effect on the behaviour of our enemies. The actual launching of a Trident missile would mark the failure of deterrence and would presuppose that a devastating attack had already been inflicted on our country.

Because strategic nuclear deterrence is largely irrelevant to the current counter-insurgency campaigns with which the British Army has been involved, some senior Army officers have been suggesting that we must choose between fighting “the war” of the present and insuring against the more conventional prospect of state-versus-state conflict in the future. I say that that choice is unacceptable, and that the underlying message that the era of high-intensity, state-on-state warfare is gone for good is a dangerous fallacy. Every sane individual hopes that such warfare will never return, but to rely on that in the face of past experience would be extremely foolhardy. The lesson of warfare in the 20th century, repeated time and again, was that when conflicts broke out they usually took their victims by surprise. Obvious examples are: the failure to anticipate the first world war; the follies of the “10-year rule” from 1919 to 1932; and the entirely unanticipated attacks on Israel in 1973, the Falklands in 1982, Kuwait in 1990 and the United States in 2001. Conversely, and on a brighter note, the speed with which the Soviet empire unravelled from 1989 left even its sternest critics largely nonplussed.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Dr Lewis]

I will not, because I am about to finish. I hope the hon. Gentleman will forgive me.

Our current counter-insurgency campaigns are very important indeed, but they cannot be compared with battles for the very survival of the United Kingdom homeland. Such existential threats confronted us twice in the past 100 years and, if international relations deteriorate, they could easily confront us again.

My final remark concerns the alternatives. I can see only three possible alternatives to renewing Trident other than getting rid of the nuclear deterrent completely. The first is that suggested by the Liberal Democrats of putting cruise missiles on Astute class submarines. I have said in the past and say again that that would be more expensive and less effective, would put the submarine at risk because of the shorter range of the missiles, which would bring the submarine closer to shore, and could start world war three by accident because no one would be sure whether the launched missile had a conventional or nuclear warhead. Apart from that, it is a great idea.

The second alternative is to come off continuous at- sea deterrence, to put the nuclear deterrent on stand-by and to say that we will reactivate it if things get worse. That is an extremely dangerous suggestion as having a part-time deterrent is probably as dangerous as, if not more dangerous than, having no deterrent at all.

The final suggestion is that we could perhaps combine our deterrent with that of the French and therefore have fewer submarines. All I can say about that is that our deterrent is strongly connected with the excellent working relationship we have with the United States, which would not admit of such a solution.

I hope that I have given people plenty of food for thought. We have an hour and three quarters left and I very much look forward to hearing both sides of the argument in the time that remains.