Continuous At-Sea Deterrent

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Wednesday 10th April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

The hon. Gentleman raises an important point, and it is something that I would be willing to look at. I am sure he is aware that it is not, sadly, a decision purely for the Ministry of Defence, but we would certainly be happy to look at the merits of that and how we give full recognition to all the crews that have served over such a long period.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

I thank the Secretary of State for giving way, for his welcome announcement and for his response to my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock). I am not cavilling, but will he try to ensure that these medals are made in the UK, please?

[Gavin Williamson]

I would be very disappointed if they were not to be made in the United Kingdom. My understanding is that the bomber pins are manufactured here in the United Kingdom.

Even as we pay tribute to the submariners, it is equally important that we think of their families, too—those who often have to go for months on end without hearing from their loved ones. We must also pay tribute to the thousands of industry experts who have played a vital role in this national endeavour.

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[Gavin Williamson]

I will make some progress. I am sure the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that.

The extent to which our deterrent underpins our special relationship with the United States must never be underplayed. We should be proud of the fact we are one of the few nations with both strategic nuclear and conventional carrier capabilities. We should be proud that those strengths give the United Kingdom influence not just in NATO but across the world, giving us the capability to influence events in our interest and stand up for our values and the United Kingdom.

My third point is that there are simply no credible alternatives to the submarine-based deterrent. Some claim that there are cheaper and more effective ways of providing a similar effect to the Trident system, but we have been down that road many times before. Successive studies by both Labour and Conservative Administrations have shown that there are no other alternatives. Most recently, the Trident alternatives review of 2013 found that submarines are less vulnerable to attack than silos or aircraft and can maintain a continuous posture in a way that aircraft and land-based alternatives cannot. Their missiles have greater range and capability than other alternative delivery systems. Overall, the review concluded that a minimum, credible, assured and independent deterrent requires nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles.

[John Spellar]

The Secretary of State is making a very compelling argument. Does he not therefore regret the dithering and delay that took place in the renewal of the submarine programme when the Conservatives were in coalition, at the behest of the Liberal Democrats, who have not even bothered to turn up today?

[Gavin Williamson]

We could spend a long time debating the Liberal Democrats, but it would probably be a waste of time. I am exceptionally proud of the fact that this Government have committed to a nuclear deterrent, and that in 2015 so many colleagues from both sides of the House united in one Lobby to make sure we delivered it.

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[Sir Michael Fallon (Sevenoaks) (Con)]

The only thing on which I agreed with the hon. Member for Glasgow South (Stewart Malcolm McDonald) was the tribute he took the trouble to pay at the beginning of his speech to the crews of the Polaris and Vanguard submarines. They have been the backbone of Operation Relentless, and the success of that operation is entirely dependent on the commitment of those who have conducted those patrols—in each case, an extraordinary service of perhaps three months or more.

There is no other service in the Navy quite like it, with submariners cut off from the outside world unlike in any part of the Royal Navy, unable to visit foreign ports or carry out different missions. They are isolated from their family and friends at all times in that three-month period. They are the stoics of the sea and we do owe them our gratitude. We should salute them all, past and present, and look again at how that service can be better recognised, but we should also tell them loudly from this House: thank you for helping keep us safe. They did keep us safe.

As my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) said, it is extraordinary that some still argue that the nuclear deterrent is never used. It is used every minute of every hour of every day to ensure uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor towards this country. While we have nuclear weapons, they can never be sure what our response is likely to be. He reminded us that that was endorsed by a majority of 355 as recently as three years ago when we authorised the replacement of the Vanguard boats by the new Dreadnought submarines.

The Prime Minister and I set out the arguments for that renewal three years ago. I will not repeat them, but I want to make three further points. The threats we identified then, back in July 2016, have increased. First, Russia not only has intensified its rhetoric but is modernising its nuclear forces. It now has the ability to station nuclear missiles in its exclave at Kaliningrad, or indeed in the territory it now controls in Crimea. Secondly, since that debate, North Korea has carried out nuclear tests and is developing systems whereby nuclear warheads can be launched from both space and submarines. We should never forget that London is as close to North Korea as is Los Angeles. Thirdly, nuclear material is now coming within reach of terrorist groups that wish us and others harm. Our response must be relentless and resolute.

[John Spellar]

The right hon. Gentleman rightly drew attention to the overwhelming majority in this House in 2016. Does he now regret that his Government delayed so long in actually putting that decision to the House?

[Sir Michael Fallon]

Certainly in my period of office, I wanted that decision brought to the House as soon as possible. We were of course, as the right hon. Gentleman will recall, in a coalition Government, and we spent a lot of time trying to accommodate the wishes of our coalition partners. As he has already observed, that party has not even bothered to turn up to this debate.

It is of course important, each time we make these renewal decisions, that we emphasise our continuing commitment to the international work of non-proliferation. There is a particular responsibility on those countries that retain nuclear weapons to continue to commit to that treaty and to reduce the weapons they hold. That is why I reduced the number of warheads on each submarine from 48 to 40. The stockpile is reducing, and this country now holds only half the number of nuclear weapons it held 40 years ago. However, we also have to look ahead. It takes 13 to 14 years to put a new nuclear missile submarine into the water. If hon. Members believe, as I do, that there may still be a nuclear threat to this country in the 2030s, the 2040s and the 2050s all the way up to 2060, then it would of course be irresponsible not to renew the delivery mechanism—first the boats and then in time, perhaps later in this Parliament, the missile system itself.

Let me end with three final points. First, on the budget, of course it is true that the £31 billion, and the contingency alongside it, is spread over a very long period of construction, but, equally, it remains a very lumpy and sizeable part of the Department’s budget, and we do not get the advantages of scale—we replace only four boats each time—that the Americans are able to profit from when they are replacing many more submarines. There may be points in the work of the Public Accounts Committee and of others in this House that require us to look again at how the submarine renewal programme is actually financed year to year and to see whether there are economies of scale in forward buying some of the parts for all four submarines right at the beginning.

Secondly, as the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) said in challenging the hon. Member for Glasgow South, the NATO alliance is a nuclear alliance. If, sadly, Scotland ever became independent, he would be applying to join a nuclear alliance. In the arguments he put before the House, he seemed to have forgotten that many members of NATO signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in the full knowledge that they would be protected by NATO’s nuclear umbrella. That is why they signed the treaty, as the hon. Lady pointed out. That means we need to keep reminding our allies in NATO of the importance of the nuclear planning group and of their commitment to maintaining their dual-use aircraft, and we need to remind their politicians and their publics that NATO is a nuclear alliance.

Thirdly, the point about independence, which was raised by the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire (Martin Docherty-Hughes), is worth addressing. Of course it is true, as my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East said, that the system gives us—the UK, the United States and France—separate sources of decision making, making it even more difficult for potential aggressors to be sure of a single response. However, it is also important that this nuclear deterrent of ours is independent, because we cannot be sure of threats that may emanate simply against our shores and nobody else’s. That is why it is important that we keep our deterrent independent and that we satisfy ourselves that it is independent. Indeed, David Cameron and I separately took steps to reassure ourselves that the nuclear deterrent was independent. These are not details I can go into in public session, but it is important that the deterrent remains independent.

Let me conclude by saying yes, this deterrent was born of the cold war, but it is by no means a relic of the cold war. It is a key part of the defence of our country, and a key part of the defence of our freedoms and those of our allies. I am very sure that we need it now more than ever. I am equally sure that our successors in this place will, in 50 years’ time, be commending the successors of those crews who have helped to perform this arduous but essential duty.

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[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The hon. Member for Glasgow South (Stewart Malcolm McDonald) said that he did not want to get involved in struggles with chimney sweeps, which seemed somehow a nod towards the concept of deterrence. However, as I am afraid is normal for contributions from the Scottish National party, he spent most of his speech attacking Labour party policy and the Labour party. It was more about internal politics in Scotland, I feel, than the national issue we are discussing.

My hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Nia Griffith) made an excellent speech reaffirming current Labour party policy, in line with long-standing party policy and indeed the bipartisan policy of British Governments of both parties. My right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) drew attention to the Attlee-Bevan Government’s record in developing the nuclear deterrent; not, as seems to have been implied, in some bombastic gesture but in response to being cut off from nuclear information by the McMahon Act. They had to decide whether Britain was to maintain an independent capability, and they made the right decision.

Today, we are discussing the 50th anniversary of HMS Resolution, built under the Wilson Government, which first sailed in April 1969. As has been mentioned, under the last Labour Government, a resolution of this House was carried overwhelmingly to renew that capability. It is only a shame, as I said in interventions, that the Cameron coalition Government did not go through with that. That caused considerable delay and dislocation not only to the industry but to the operation of the CASD, which had to be maintained at considerably increased maintenance costs.

That, frankly, only reinforces my view of the previous Prime Minister, David Cameron: deep down, he was shallow. There was very little there. He believed in very little, and he allowed himself to be dragged around by the Liberal Democrats, while they pursued all sorts of fanciful alternatives for maintaining a nuclear deterrent, whether land-based or cruise missiles. It is interesting today that while there have been genuine and proper disagreements about whether we should have a nuclear deterrent at all, there has been no mention of those fanciful alternatives that were basically a way of kicking the can down the road. That seems to have been the default setting of Conservative Governments since 2010.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

I wonder if there is something we could agree on: the decision taken by Cameron and Osborne to depart from Labour’s practice of having funding for this programme outside of the Defence budget. Does the right hon. Gentleman think that was the right or wrong thing to do?

[John Spellar]

I could wax lyrical about the deficiencies of George Osborne’s stewardship of the Treasury, but probably not within the time allowed. I move on to the broader issue. My right hon. Friend rightly drew attention to the view that the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the cold war rendered deterrence—and much of conventional defence—redundant. We had “Options for Change”, with huge dislocations. Frankly, when I came into the Defence Ministry in 1997, we were still dealing with the aftermath. If, however, we leave on one side any points about the issues then, it is now absolutely clear that a complacent attitude is no longer tenable. State and non-state threats have increased, are increasing, and need to be confronted and contained. Threats are a combination—are they not?—of capability, intention and doctrine. What we are seeing from Russia is a worrying and alarming increase in activity in all those areas. We are seeing the clear development of a nuclear doctrine in Russia, including in short-range, non-strategic nuclear weapons in the form of the Gerasimov doctrine.

The Defence Committee report, “Missile Misdemeanours: Russia and the INF Treaty”, goes into some detail about the several and continuing breaches of the INF treaty by Russia. Such breaches were agreed by all NATO states at the recent meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, who made it very clear that, frankly, Russia is tearing up that agreement. Indeed, in response to the United States calling it out on this, Russia has also moved away from that treaty. I must say that that may have worrying implications for the strategic arms reduction treaty negotiations on strategic weapons, and we should be arguing—in NATO, but also in other forums—for maintaining those discussions. If Ronald Reagan could come to many such agreements, quite frankly, the United States should now be able to do so. Let us be clear, however, who is the prime instigator in breaching these agreements—it is Russia.

One of the things that worries me sometimes about these debates, including on the INF, is that for me they are very reminiscent of the time of the cruise missiles issue. People campaigned in this country against cruise missiles, and I always found it slightly perverse that they were more concerned with campaigning against the missiles pointing in the other direction than with campaigning against the SS-20s pointing in our direction. Those missiles were changing the strategic balance in Europe, which was why leading social democrat figures, such as Helmut Schmidt, were arguing for cruise missiles to maintain the balance and therefore to maintain peace in Europe, and were showing resolution in doing so.

We are also seeing such activities away from the nuclear field. We are seeing a preparedness to use force in Ukraine and Georgia, as well as cyber-attacks on the Baltic countries and massive exercises within the Baltic region. We have to be clear that, while nuclear is awful and almost unimaginable, conventional warfare is also awful. That was summed up by General Sherman in the 19th century when he said that “War is hell”. Yes, we all remember the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but that conflict also saw the firebombing of Tokyo, in which hundreds of thousands died, and the bombings of Hamburg and of Dresden, let alone the bombings on our own soil.

[Carol Monaghan]

Is the right hon. Gentleman suggesting that indiscriminate bombing is actually okay and an acceptable part of warfare?

[John Spellar]

Quite the opposite: I am saying that warfare results in devastation and a huge loss of life, as indeed we are seeing in Syria today. The hon. Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley) drew attention to the seminal work of Sir Michael Quinlan on nuclear strategy, and one of the points he made very strongly in all his works was that conventional warfare, particularly with modern technology, has awful consequences. We must therefore try to contain, if not abolish, warfare, and rather than just focus on one aspect of warfare, that is the important issue we have to address.

Some believe that maintaining the peace is achieved by disarmament or by pacifism. I argue that history demonstrates that peace is better maintained by preparedness and vigilance. That is why continuous at-sea deterrence has been so critical in keeping the peace for the past 50 years and why we owe so much to those who operate it around the clock and those who build it and maintain it around the country. It may be a silent service, but this anniversary gives us the opportunity to both acknowledge and praise it.

[Mr Simon Clarke (Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland) (Con)]

It is an absolute pleasure to follow what I thought was an excellent speech by the right hon. Member for Warley (John Spellar). He sums up the ethical as well as the practical case for why we need a continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent.

This has been a really good debate. I praise my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), the Chair of the Defence Committee, who set out very crisply why we need to do this and why it is so much in our strategic interest to make sure we have this level of protection. The right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) referred to “The Silent Deep” by Hennessy and Jinks. That excellent book sets out the debt we owe to the technological brilliance of scientists and engineers; the political resolve of successive Governments and diplomats to ensure we acquire the technology; and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Anne-Marie Trevelyan) pointed out, the personal courage, sacrifice and professionalism of thousands of submariners and their families down the decades. Even as we speak, our forces are keeping us safe. As we sleep tonight, they will be keeping us safe. That is a debt that we can never really adequately repay and the least we can do is spend time in this House today to put on record our gratitude and thanks for their service.

Churchill referred to the Spitfire as a machine of colossal and shattering power. These submarines, in their own way, are our modern answer to that. It is a power that we all hope and pray will never have to be unleashed, but as the right hon. Member for Warley pointed out, the mere fact of its existence makes not just nuclear but all war less likely. If we think about the 1960s and 1970s and the superpower conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, it seems to me that it is almost inevitable at some point that that would have flared into a conflict had it not been prevented by the fact that the consequences of that conflict would have been unthinkable. The act of crossing into West Berlin would have come at too high a price to pay. That remains, still, the fundamental basis for why we need the deterrent.

In the world we live in today, Theodore Roosevelt’s adage to “walk softly and carry a big stick” seems never to have been more apposite. There is the presence, we must acknowledge, of real evil in our world. It is intense and increasingly unpredictable. Whether it be Iran, North Korea or Russia, we all know that there are malign forces in this world who will not act by the rules that we act by, who will not live by the values that we live by, and who set very little value in the sanctity or dignity of human life. That is what we are up against. That is the choice that, as democratic politicians in one of the most powerful countries in the world, it behoves us to make. We would be failing not just ourselves but the rest of the world were we to duck that responsibility.

There was a window in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union when we heard much talk about the peace dividend, but I am a great believer in what Vice-President Cheney said when he said that the “only dividend of peace is peace”. We should not in any way to attempt to do defence on the cheap, or without the resources and tools to make sure we can keep ourselves safe. That is why it is so welcome that the decision to launch the Successor class programme has been made. Indeed, as my right hon. Friend the Chair of the Select Committee and my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) pointed out, it is crucial that we get regular updates and focus on continuing that programme at pace. We cannot afford further slippage. Frankly, we are already at the limit of what we can expect the Vanguard class to continue to deliver.

It is also why we have brave Labour MPs on the Opposition Benches making the case for why we need the strategic nuclear deterrent. This is not a debate for partisanship.

[John Spellar]

I do not regard it as an act of outstanding courage to speak in support of long-standing and current Labour party policy.

[Mr Clarke]

I am absolutely delighted that the right hon. Gentleman regards this as an item of faith and that it will be pursued. However, the Leader of the Opposition, the shadow Chancellor, the shadow Home Secretary and indeed, the shadow Defence Secretary voted against the motion of 18 July 2016 in which this House pledged to renew the deterrent, so there is a question over this. Anyone who has seen—certainly in my part of the world—the actions of Labour activists and the noises they make will know that they do not suggest that this is in any way a question settled beyond doubt. That is important and I pay tribute to the right hon. Member for Warley for making that case. This should come from both traditions.

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[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

It is a real pleasure and honour to follow the hon. Member for Glasgow North West (Carol Monaghan), because she speaks with real authority and eloquence about these issues. I am happy to speak as well in my capacity as chair of the cross-party group on nuclear disarmament. Let me put it on the record at the top of my speech that I am very happy to pay tribute to the submariners for their service to this country and to their families for the sacrifice that they make, which the hon. Lady has set out very clearly.

I do not think that there is any contradiction between paying tribute to that service and also being very clear that, for me, nuclear weapons are abhorrent. Others have said during this debate that it is inconsistent to have a nuclear deterrent if we are not prepared to use it. I absolutely agree with that, and I am very proud to say that I would not, under any circumstances, use nuclear weapons, and still less would I support the Prime Minister’s position of a first use of nuclear weapons. I believe that nuclear weapons are indiscriminate, illegal and obscene.

Let us just think what that first strike, which the Prime Minister was so proud not to rule out, could really mean. The heart of a nuclear explosion reaches a temperature of several million degrees centigrade. Over a wide area, the resulting heat flash literally vaporises all human tissue. At Hiroshima, within a radius of half a mile, the only remains of the people caught in the open were their shadows burned into stone. People inside buildings will be indirectly killed by the blast and the heat effects as buildings collapse and all inflammable materials burst into flames. The immediate death rate in that area will be over 90%. Individual fires will combine to produce a fire storm as all the oxygen is consumed. As the heat rises, air is drawn in from the periphery at or near ground level. This results in lethal hurricane-force winds and perpetuates the fire as the fresh oxygen is burned. The contamination will continue potentially for hundreds of thousands of years. The Red Cross has estimated that 1 billion people around the world could face starvation as a result of a nuclear war.

Let me be very clear: I hate all war, but there is something particular about nuclear war. Simply saying that it is in the same category as other forms of war is wrong. What is wrong as well is to say that we cannot uninvent things that have already been invented. We saw what happened when it came to chemical weapons, biological weapons and cluster munitions being banned. If there was more support from countries such as the UK, nuclear weapons could be banned as well. There was the UN treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, and I found it frankly outrageous that the UK Government could not even be bothered to turn up to the talks. That was a campaign that was run throughout the world. One hundred and twenty two countries supported the nuclear ban treaty. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons won the Nobel peace prize for its efforts. The treaty is a strong and comprehensive text, with the potential to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. It opened for signature in September 2017 and will enter into force when 50 states have ratified it. It has so far been signed by 70 states and ratified by 22, and more and more are signing up.

I want to counter the argument made from the Labour Benches that the treaty is somehow not multilateral. It is, not least because there is no requirement for a country to join; there is no requirement on a country to have forgone their nuclear weapons before joining. If the UK had used its considerable clout on the world stage to have really shown some leadership on this issue, there could have been at least a chance of getting the countries around the table to have gone away and begun the process multilaterally of getting rid of their weapons.

[John Spellar]

The hon. Lady is very critical of the United Kingdom in this respect, but did Russia, China, France and the United States—in other words, the declared nuclear weapon states—attend either? Surely this is just another cul-de-sac, whereas the real way of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons is through negotiations, primarily between Russia and the United States initially, but then involving all the nuclear weapon states. Is not that real politics, rather than gesture politics?

[Caroline Lucas]

If the right hon. Gentleman really thinks that 122 countries around the world are engaging in gesture politics, I would suggest to him that it is perhaps more a gesture from him than it is from them. I believe in Britain taking a leadership role. Perhaps he does not. The constant sitting back and waiting for something else to happen—doing the wrong thing—would frankly be unconscionable.

It is very easy to characterise those of us who are against nuclear weapons as somehow not living in the real world, so perhaps I could just remind the House that there are plenty of people within the military world who do not think that nuclear weapons are a useful tool going forward. Back in 2014, senior political and diplomatic figures—including people such as the former Conservative Foreign Secretary Sir Malcolm Rifkind, former Defence Secretary Des Browne and former Foreign Secretary Lord Owen—came together with very high-ranking military personnel to say that they believe that the risks posed by nuclear weapons and the international dynamics that could lead to nuclear weapons being used are being underestimated and that those risks are insufficiently understood by world leaders.

The Government’s main argument for replacing Trident appears to be that it is the ultimate insurance in an uncertain world. I argue that they fail to acknowledge that it is our very possession of nuclear weapons that is making that world more uncertain. Nor have the advocates of nuclear weapons ever explained why, if Trident is so vital to protecting us, that is not also the case for every other country in the world. The Secretary of State did not answer me at the beginning of this debate—it seems a long time ago now—when I put it to him that we have no moral arguments to put to other countries to ask them not to acquire nuclear weapons if we ourselves are not only keeping them but upgrading them. I put it to him again that a world in which every country is striving for, and potentially achieving, nuclear weapons would be an awful lot more dangerous than the world we have today.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Monday 25th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mark Lancaster]

I have been accused of many things in my life, but lacking courage is probably not one of them. If the hon. Lady knew anything about me, she would probably realise why that is the case. None the less, the issue remains a challenge and I am confident—as I have just said, recent figures show the highest number of applications on record in January—that the situation is improving.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

3. What steps his Department is taking to support the British defence industry after the UK leaves the EU.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Stuart Andrew)]

The UK defence industry is globally competitive and creates and contributes to jobs across the United Kingdom. I am confident that it will continue to thrive in the future. The Government are seeking the best possible deal for UK industry after exit. We support European collaboration on capability development and are promoting the invaluable contribution of UK industry.

[John Spellar]

That was a standard complacent reply from the Minister. Ministers are still hanging on to the mythology that EU regulations prevent them from supporting British industry, most recently with the fleet solid support ships. Of course, no one else in the EU holds on to that view or, indeed, behaves like that. However, as leaving the EU looms, will the Minister now show some decisiveness and backbone, instruct his officials to scrap the old discredited dogma and start putting British industry first?

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Monday 14th January 2019 Commons Chamber

[Stuart Andrew]

I join my hon. Friend in thanking the RAF for its work. It worked incredibly quickly to get to both Gatwick and Heathrow. Of course, our armed forces are always ready to respond, should they need to, but it should be said that responsibility for drone activity at civilian airports lies with the airport operators.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

I have today received a parliamentary answer revealing that no Transport Minister visited Gatwick during the drone crisis. Can the hon. Gentleman tell us what contingency plans his own Department had for dealing with drones at airports? Will he also tell us on what date the Transport Department—or, indeed, the Cabinet Office—asked the MOD for help and support during the crisis? How did his Department respond, and when?

[Mr Speaker]

I say to the right hon. Gentleman in good spirit that he is uniquely talented in delivering an oral question as though it were of the written variety.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Monday 26th November 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

I cannot imagine what my right hon. Friend is referring to, but I think that when it comes to the issue of Russia’s lack of compliance with its treaty obligations, we need to keep hammering home the message, with all our NATO allies, that it cannot ignore its treaty obligations and must start complying with them.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Will the Secretary of State make clear that there could be dangers here, with threats not only to the INF treaty but to the strategic arms reduction treaty—START—talks on strategic nuclear weapons? Will he also, along with his colleagues in NATO, present a united front on NATO’s assessment, and that of the United States, that Russia is in serious breach of the INF treaty? Will he urge the Americans—who have not, as far as I am aware, announced that they have withdrawn, but have announced an intention to withdraw—not to do so, but also make clear that this is not a reaction from Russia, but a reaction from the west to actions by Russia?

[Gavin Williamson]

The right hon. Gentleman’s assessment is absolutely accurate. This is a US reaction to Russia’s lack of compliance with its treaty obligations. It is important for the whole of NATO to speak with one voice and make clear to Russia that it must start complying with its treaty obligations.

UK Sovereign Capability

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 20th November 2018 Westminster Hall

[Mr Sweeney]

Unit costs ought to come down but the problem is that the way that the shipbuilding strategy is defined makes it more likely that the cost reductions will not be maximised. That is a great shame, because it undermines the aspirations of the strategy.

I am a vice-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on shipbuilding and ship repair, and we hope to bring forward a report on the strategy very soon. It will highlight some of the opportunities to improve it, because we all share the same aspiration. We want to see a world-class industry in the UK that has the certainty to invest. We want a world-class product that is cost-effective enough to grow the size of the Royal Navy.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend rightly focuses on warships, but it is also about the civilian ships for the Ministry of Defence. Unlike every one of our European competitors, the Ministry of Defence stubbornly insists on advertising abroad. There is a point about maintaining a competent workforce and the drumbeat of production, as well as the supply chain and the supply ecosystem, which is so important for sustaining all the yards. Can my hon. Friend find a logical, rational explanation for why the Ministry of Defence refuses to behave like every other European naval country?

[Mr Sweeney]

My right hon. Friend’s point goes back to that made earlier about the Treasury’s behaviour. I feel that this is almost about an economic orthodoxy that drives behaviour and says that we must maximise competitive tendering for the sake of it, because there is some sort of axiom that it works because it does. That approach does not bear scrutiny. Shipbuilding has the highest barriers to entry of any major industry in the world. It is a hugely capital-intensive industry and the only way to make it work, and the only way to get to a world-class, market-dominant position—much like with aerospace, where, as we know, the Americans and Europeans built their own champions in the form of Airbus and Boeing—is by having that synergy between Government, industry and the research and development base that makes it work. That is what we ought to have with shipbuilding in the UK. Fragmenting it in the way proposed in the national shipbuilding strategy serves only to undermine the UK’s long-term sovereign capability in shipbuilding. It is the primary sovereign interest of the UK to have that capability. We are an island nation, a nation of islanders and shipbuilders, and we ought to maintain that capability.

There are critical issues at stake here. We have already heard that Appledore, owned by Babcock, is due to close in March, which will be a devastating blow to the local community and to the UK’s wider defence manufacturing base. It is yet another shipyard to fall. Once it falls, it will not recover and be reopened—that is a simple fact. Once it is gone, it is gone. Despite the recent contract announcement at Cammell Laird, it is also completing an HR1 notification form and making significant redundancies. That is very unfortunate, and speaks to the point about feast and famine. We cannot have these cycles in capacity any more; we need to smooth the cycle as much as possible.

In the context of major shipyard closures and significant downsizing, whether that is at Rosyth or Appledore, it is bizarre that the Government are quite happy to tender contracts overseas in international open competition. Under article 346 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union, the Government could quite easily designate the industry as UK-protected. It is entirely at their discretion. Any notion that their hands are tied is bogus. They could do that, smooth the production cycles and build a firm and stable footprint for UK shipyards, which would enable them to get match fit and then go out into the world and compete effectively for other orders. That is exactly what they do in Italy with Fincantieri, and what they do in France with DCNS. It is exactly what happens in Germany.

I do not understand why other European Union member states can achieve the same objectives much more effectively than us, but we are so holier than thou that it hurts when it comes to the zealous application of these EU rules and we seem to undermine our own industrial base and our prosperity as a result, meaning that communities are broken and skills lost. Ultimately, we undermine our objective of building a more resilient and effective industrial base to serve our defence industry and, potentially, commercial spin-offs.

Barrow-in-Furness is another example. The gap between the end of the Vanguard programme in the 1990s and the beginning of the Astute programme meant that the shipyard was essentially unable to build a submarine and they had to go to General Dynamics in the United States to be retaught how to build them. That is what we risk losing again if we are not careful.

[John Spellar]

It was surely not just the design capability and the managerial capability, but the actual day-to-day work experience and the work teams that have been created and then broken up. It took 12 to 24 months to rebuild that capability and was hugely expensive. The Ministry of Defence and the Treasury have still not learnt that lesson.

[Mr Sweeney]

My right hon. Friend makes a very prescient point. There is no calculation of the opportunity cost when those skills are lost or of how much it costs to build them back up. The feast and famine cycle is hugely costly and inefficient, and the national shipbuilding strategy risks going back to that pattern. I think that is a critical point that the Minister really ought to address in his remarks about the national shipbuilding strategy.

Let me make it clear that we are all here to try to deliver the best outcome for defence infrastructure in the UK—we are trying to get to the same end goal. We are trying to offer the best of our understanding and experience of these issues to inform this document and improve it as much as we can, and it is fair to say that we want to achieve the same objectives.

We have also seen the development of a combat air strategy—the Tempest programme—which is laudable and looks promising, but there is a lack of an overarching objective on defence. We have already lost the capacity to build large fixed-wing aircraft through the cancellation of the Nimrod programme, which was done hastily by the disastrous 2010 strategic defence and security review and means that we have permanently lost that capability in the UK. Similarly, we have lost the capacity to build main battle tanks.

What else is at risk, and where is the risk profile of the sovereign capabilities that will be lost? What is expendable and what is indispensable? That is not defined in the national shipbuilding strategy, where there is talk of potentially putting the Type 31e combat management system out to international tender. Why do we not define what the key sovereign capability is—not just in the shipbuilding programme, but in aspects of its critical supply chain, including gearboxes, gas turbines, combat management systems, weapons systems and so on? We need to have that granularity of detail in the national shipbuilding strategy, but it is not there. That leaves it open to interpretation and extreme gerrymandering by the Ministry of Defence.

Those are the key issues that we have to highlight, whether they are across land, maritime—I am biased towards maritime, which I have focused on heavily—or aerospace. I am sure that other Members are willing to contribute and add their own thoughts to this debate, but essentially that is an overview of my main concerns about our UK sovereign capability and the risks to sustaining it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North East (Mr Sweeney) on securing this debate. He emphasised the lack of strategy on maritime sovereign capability, but we need to ask the broader question of why we are in this mess today.

Since 2010, this Government have had no industrial strategy on defence. Some of the short-term decisions that were taken in 2010, when the Government slashed the defence budget by 16%, have resulted in capability gaps. A revolving door has been put on the office of the Minister for Defence Procurement, which means that they have a life expectancy a bit longer than a mayfly. That is not helpful when we need a champion in that role who can argue against the Treasury.

Why is sovereign capability important? If we want to have certain capabilities for the defence of our nation, we need to invest in them. The right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field) has raised the issue of defence exports. He is right to say that if we are to nourish that industry, there is a defence export role to it. The Ministry of Defence and the Treasury have adopted Donald Trump’s mantra of “Make America great again”, because the procurements that have taken place are suggestive of an “America first” strategy. In the past few years, they have procured more than $8 billion-worth of contracts from the United States.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North East and my right hon. Friend the Member for Warley (John Spellar) both said, those procurements were not put out to contract; they were simply awarded. There were no competitions. We have the Apache contract and the P-8 contract—direct foreign military sales—and we have the scandalous situation of the airborne warning and control system, or AWACS, and I understand the Department is now going down the Wedgetail route. From talking to colleagues in NATO, I know that the Ministry of Defence has had no role, and nor is it interested, in partnering the programme that is replacing the 15 AWACS NATO aircraft. It is going down the Boeing route again. I am not sure whether soon we will have a sign at the Ministry of Defence’s Main Building saying, “Sponsored by Boeing”, but that seems to be the way it is going.

We also have the joint light tactical vehicle contract that was awarded to Oshkosh, with £1 billion of sales to replace armoured vehicles. There was no competition at all. At the same time, the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury are saying that the contract has to go out to competition. This is dangerous for our capability. It is not just about jobs, which are important, but about our supply chain and investment in research and development in our technology. My hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North East will not remember the Falklands war, where we faced the issue of kit procurement from abroad. It reached a situation where we wanted to use the kit independently but were told that we could not.

I have serious concerns about this off-the-shelf approach to defence strategy, because there is no commitment at all. It would not happen in any other country—it would certainly not happen in the United States. If we were to sell equipment to the United States, there would have to be some offset in terms of jobs or investment there. This Government have not even tried. They trumpet the £100 million going into Lossiemouth, but that would have had to go anywhere. Boeing is going round on a public relations exercise, with glossy adverts that say it is now a British company, but it is not. There is very little evidence of real investment going into jobs and technology. That is not just today; our technology in this important sector is in long-term decline.

The hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Anne-Marie Trevelyan), who is no longer in her place, said that there is no indication that the Treasury or the Ministry of Defence recognises that if a contract is awarded in this country, the money will come back straightaway. That is a serious problem for them. Short-term decisions taken now will have long-term implications for our effectiveness not just at maintaining our sovereign capability in a whole host of areas including shipbuilding, which has been outlined by my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North East, but at maintaining our capability to use that kit in certain situations. For example, will we be able to get the upgrades on Apaches if a future US Government determine that we should not? That is why we need sovereign capability.

I hate to use the phrase “go back to basics”, but that is what the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence need to do. They need to make it clear that we need to procure and manufacture in the UK under sovereign capability, which should be the starting point for the defence industrial strategy. We have been promised it by the revolving door of Ministers for Defence Procurement, but it has never been put in place. It has to be a joined-up approach across Government that includes the prosperity agenda, which does not seem to matter when it comes to those huge contracts that have been awarded without competition. When there is a situation such as the fleet solid support ship contract, where we could have investment in UK jobs and prosperity, we put it out to foreign competition. My right hon. Friend the Member for Warley is right: no other nation in Europe would do such a thing.

[John Spellar]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I am sorry; I am running out of time.

This scandal needs to be highlighted. I hope the Minister, in the time he has got in his new role, stands up to the knee-jerk “America first” reaction.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Monday 22nd October 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

The right hon. Member for Warley (John Spellar) deserves some encouragement at this very early stage of his parliamentary career!

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Does the Minister not understand that to export defence equipment we have to have a strong home market, and that is why other European countries insist on building vessels such as the fleet solid support ships in their own yards, with their own workers. What blind dogma is stopping these Ministers and their Department doing the same and ensuring that we make them in Britain?

[Stuart Andrew]

As I said a moment ago, we are making sure that we go out to international competition, because that gives value for money to this country, and we can also then invest the savings we make in other capabilities. It means that we attract the best and affordable solutions. It also brings competition at the heart of our shipbuilding strategy, because we want our shipyards to go out there and compete for international orders.

Defence Industry and Shipbuilding

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Wednesday 11th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Nia Griffith]

It is incumbent on the Government, though, to look again and strain every muscle to get the very best work-share agreements wherever they exist.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The argument from the hon. Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne), whom I congratulate on his report, does not hold water. Of course, if we are buying these planes, we will need maintenance facilities, and if that is being done by industry, industry will provide those facilities, but they are service facilities for the RAF, and there might even be work from abroad. Where, though, are these planes being manufactured? They are being manufactured in the United States, with very little return of work coming to the UK. They have been allowed to get away with a very cheap deal.

[Nia Griffith]

On that note, I shall make progress.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Ellwood]

There is so much choice that I do not know where to start. Let us go with the right hon. Member for Warley (John Spellar).

[John Spellar]

Will the Minister confirm that the Korean shipbuilder that took this contract, DSME, underbid and actually lost significant sums of money on the contract? It was not a fair contract, and because of its general business practices, it came very close to going bankrupt and had to be bailed out.

[Mr Ellwood]

I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman put it like that, because I was worried that he was going to say that state aid had been involved. I am sure that he would not suggest that that was the case, because I know him better than that, even though that was hinted at by those on his Front Bench. That was the commercial decision that the company took, but we are left in a situation where Britain is getting value for the taxpayer’s money.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Dunne]

My right hon. Friend has been generous about my report, which was published on Monday, and I am grateful for the other comments about the report by Members on both sides of the House. On page 53 of the report, I refer to the fleet solid support ship and make the point that the fact that we are currently a member of the European Union means that we are precluded from taking advantage of the article 346 exemption to require that ship to be built in the UK. One of my recommendations is that we should take advantage of the opportunity of Brexit to consider the opportunity, after we leave the EU on 29 March 2019, to build UK content into our own procurement rules, which might allow us to change the position, but we cannot do that today.

[John Spellar]

Not true.

[Mr Ellwood]

I suggest that the right hon. Gentleman reads the report by my hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow to understand the full picture. My hon. Friend is correct that EU regulations provide guidance on building those ships. The regulations do not apply to royal naval ships because, from a security perspective, every sovereign nation is allowed to bypass them, but the rules absolutely apply to non-royal naval ships—as in Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships—that employ civilians on board. I encourage hon. Members to read the report before judging what my hon. Friend has just said.

Moving back to what I was saying, we must have an honest debate about what is happening, which is why we need to develop a modern, efficient, productive and competitive marine sector that allows us to build on the work that has been done on the Clyde, in the north, in Belfast, in Barrow, in the north-east, in the north-west and in the south-west of England. We have incredible capability, and I am pleased to see so many hon. Members representing constituencies in those areas in the Chamber today.

Our new shipbuilding strategy sets out exactly how we can achieve such a marine sector. We will continue to build Royal Navy ships only in the UK while encouraging international collaboration in harnessing open competition for other naval ships. Our new framework will ensure that the impact of UK prosperity will be considered as part of our procurement decisions. The 2015 strategic defence and security review created a new security objective: promoting our prosperity. Competition and strategic choice remain at the heart of our approach, but we recognise that there are several different models for working successfully with the industry, and we need to take further steps to bolster that and make the right decisions to enable a strong partnership between the Government and industry.[Official Report, 23 July 2018, Vol. 645, c. 7MC.]

That is part of the whole Government approach, spearheaded by the national industrial strategy, with its mutually reinforcing focus on driving productivity and supporting innovation, which provides a strong and clear policy framework in which industry can invest and grow. Key to that is how defence procurement might build economic value by strengthening UK productivity and industrial capability, including at a local level, and boosting exports sustainably. We recognise that responsible exports are now widely accepted as having a part to play in our wider national defence and prosperity objective. They are considered to be an opportunity, not a burden.

Sir John Parker’s 2016 independent review made a series of recommendations about improvements we can make, and, as I said, I am pleased that we will be accepting all of them. He did place emphasis on the dysfunctional relationships between government and industry. Old ships were retained in service well beyond their service date, with all the attendant high costs, and it is important that that changes. So our new strategy is founded on three pillars. The first is better planning, giving industry greater certainty and predictability. We are providing a 30-year Royal Navy shipbuilding masterplan to guide all future naval shipbuilding decisions, and to document the number and types of ships in which we will invest over the next three decades.

The second pillar is a new approach to design and construction. We want to challenge naval standards and introduce new ones, forcing through advances in design, in new materials such as composites, and in manufacturing methods. Our new carriers are a prime example of that. They are built in blocks, with parts built in different parts of Britain, drawing on the expertise of 10,000 people, and being brought together from centres of excellence from across the country. Thirdly, we want to focus on building exports, where there is an opportunity, as the Type 31 will be the first frigate for export since the 1970s. We know that more sales can cut costs in procurement over time and give us the potential to buy even more cutting-edge ships.[Official Report, 24 July 2018, Vol. 645, c. 8MC.]

For now, for reasons of national security, the shipbuilding strategy sets out that warships will be built and integrated in the UK via competition between UK shipyards. However, for the purposes of shipbuilding only, the national shipbuilding strategy defines warships as destroyers, frigates and aircraft carriers. All other naval ships, including the Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships, as well as other Royal Navy manned ships, such as patrol, mine countermeasures, hydrographic and amphibious ships, will be subject to open competition—that means international competition. That remains where the difference lies between us and the Opposition, but it is the cornerstone of our defence procurement policy. I remind the hon. Member for Llanelli that she talked repeatedly about value for the taxpayer, and it is important we understand that. I hope that there is a compromise whereby where we want to and can, we will utilise British shipbuilding capability, but when it comes in at twice the cost of an overseas opportunity, we will have to be very careful about which decision we make.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

I will now bring us back to the real world of the defence procurement industry. The Minister wrapped himself in knots over article 346, and it very much reminded me of Madeleine Albright’s response to Robin Cook when he told her during the events in Kosovo, “Our lawyers say I can’t do that.” “Change your lawyers,” she said, “and get better legal advice.” As I will come on to later, that is what every other country does.

We are not saying that we do not want to work in partnership with other countries; we do, and we want to do so effectively, and not just for shipbuilding, which obviously we are focusing on today. We have to look forward. I am pleased that the Minister announced an announcement on the air strategy next week. In particular, we are hoping for an announcement on the future combat aircraft, which we hope will go ahead, and some indications of who we will be partnering with.

Many firms in Europe are concerned by attempts to exclude us from such developments, as we are already seeing with Galileo. It is a bit ironic, in the week of the Brexit crisis, that we are asking Ministers and the Ministry of Defence to be good Europeans—to behave like our European partners. However, the MOD seems to want to act like the three wise monkeys, keeping itself in blissful ignorance. It told the Defence Committee:

“The MoD does not hold information on how other countries apply EU Regulations for defence acquisition.”

Why the hell not? Why has it not asked those questions? Why would it not make those inquiries? It almost reminds me of the sign outside Balliol College during the student demonstrations of 1968: “Do not adjust your mind—reality is at fault.” The MOD does not even want to know the reality, in case it finds it uncomfortable.

France is a very good example. Let me make it clear that I regard France as an excellent defence partner, both militarily and in manufacturing. I congratulate the Minister for Defence Procurement on an excellent performance in front of a joint committee of our Defence Committee and that of the Assemblée Nationale. That is what we are talking about—co-operation and collaboration between our two defence industries.

Let us be very clear: the four auxiliary oilers were awarded with no competition, and furthermore the work was directed to the Saint-Nazaire yard, which was the yard that needed it. From my experience as a Minister, that is not uncommon in Europe, in defence and in many other areas, particularly transport. Not only will European countries decide that work goes to a company of their nationality, they will say which company it goes to.

My respected colleague, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), the Chair of the Defence Committee, talked about the percentage of the economy that is spent on defence. I am sorry that he is not here; perhaps he has another commitment. He ought to understand that the economic multiplier effect—the taxes that are paid, and the money that is spent, by the people who work in the yards that will build the vessels—would increase national gross domestic product, and with it the amount that went to defence.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman, who is my friend, for giving way. Will he say quickly why we should not also support things such as Thales UK, Boeing UK and Leonardo in the UK? This is a way of doing it.

[John Spellar]

If they have locations in the UK and there is a fair share of the work, that is absolutely right, but let us look at shipyards. I have mentioned what happens in France. The Berlin-class support ships are built in Germany. The Vulcano-class tanker support ships are built in Italy. The Cantabria-class oilers are built in Spain, and of course the United States has an absolutely rigid “buy American” policy as well. That is the real world, not the fantasy world of neo-liberal economics.

It is poignant that, in the week of the National Audit Office report on the failure of Carillion, in particular through under-pricing contracts and the Government encouraging it to go for “cheapest is best”, we are still being urged to adopt “cheapest is best”. Even within that, we do not drive a hard bargain. We do not insist, in work in the UK, on compensation.

The hon. Member for Moray (Douglas Ross) talked about maintenance work for maritime patrol aircraft. Maritime patrol aircraft will be maintained by the RAF and/or by industry, or in collaboration. That is not the issue. The real issue is what actual work there will be in manufacturing. Of course, maintenance is important, but that has to be done anyway. I refer not just to our shipyards and our aircraft factories, but to the UK’s very successful defence supply chain, particularly in engineering, electronics and, with regard to shipbuilding, our steel industry, which has been so dismissed by Ministers in the past.

This is also about maintaining the necessary flow of work, partly for that supply chain but also for our yards, in particular Rosyth. Rosyth shipyard will have a gap between the completion of HMS Prince of Wales, the second aircraft carrier in 2019, and the expected refit of HMS Queen Elizabeth, the first aircraft carrier, in 2030. Work on ships could keep the shipyard operational in between those dates and would therefore be very important in maintaining flow of work. We know how important that concept is, because of what happened in Barrow. There was a break in the drumbeat in the manufacture and production of nuclear submarines. The workforce drifted away to other industries and it cost a lot of money to recreate it.

As I said at the start, I urge the Minister to look at how other countries operate; to drive out the Treasury dogma, which has been imposed on the health service, transport and defence, that the cheapest and short-term is best; to think long-term; to work with industry, the trade unions and the supply chain. Back British industry. Back British shipyards. Back British steel.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Guto Bebb]

I need to make some progress because I must cover some of the points that were touched on.

From a defence perspective, we are trying to put a coherent plan in place to ensure that we have a competitive UK defence industry that can compete with the best. The way to do that is not to be scared of competition but to embrace competition. We have a shipbuilding strategy that says very clearly that we will understand the need for a national sovereign capability when it comes to building our warships. We need to make sure that we can measure our shipbuilding industry against the best in the world. The way to do that is not to go down the route of a protectionist “Britain first” policy but to invest in the capability that we have in our shipyards. That is why we invested £6.3 billion in Rosyth when we saw the fantastic build quality in the completion of the Queen Elizabeth class. That is why we are investing £3.7 billion in the first three Type 26’s in Glasgow. That is why we are showing a degree of confidence in our shipbuilding sector that Opposition Members need to share.

[John Spellar]

In a throwaway line, the Minister just made a disparaging comment about putting Britain first. What is wrong with putting Britain first?

[Guto Bebb]

The key thing, as my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay said, is that when Opposition Members talk about threats to the south Wales steel industry as a result of the “America first” policy, they are quite happy to attack Donald Trump for his protectionist attitude. The same thing can apply to this debate in spades, I am afraid. Competition and the ability to compete internationally are based not on protectionism but on the ability to be open in the way that we deal with this issue.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Guto Bebb]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The weapons element of any ship that is not designated as a warship will be procured from the United Kingdom and fixed on to the platforms in the United Kingdom.[Official Report, 12 July 2018, Vol. 644, c. 7MC.]

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Given that every other European country that has shipyards and procures such vessels builds them in their own shipyards, why will the Minister not accept that the problem is not with Brussels or with European regulations but with Whitehall and its refusal to back British industry, British workers and British steel?

NATO

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Wednesday 20th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon (Sevenoaks) (Con)]

Like the hon. Member for Glasgow South (Stewart Malcolm McDonald), I am delighted we are having this debate and that it has attracted such strong attendance. NATO summits, unless we host them ourselves, do not always get the attention they should. I have attended three of them. They are always important, but they are each of them important in their own way. Rather than reminisce, however, I would like to focus on what I think will be important next month.

First, this will be the first opportunity for Britain to set out its view of our security post Brexit. We are leaving our partnership with the European Union, which involves far closer military co-operation inside the European Union than many people realise. For example, the European Union headquarters at Northwood has been mentioned. We need to be clearer about our ambition and the continuing role we want to play, both on the European continent and beyond. The security partnership document recently published by my right hon. Friends is a very good start, but I hope the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary will use the summit as an opportunity to set out their view of our security after we leave the European Union. I hope they might be able to find a way of doing that in harmony.

Secondly, it is worth reminding ourselves that although the Russian threat is very real and has grown, certainly since the 2010 review and even since the 2015 review, we need to continue to take a 360 degree view of NATO. It is worth reminding ourselves that the only time article 5 has been invoked was to help the United States after 9/11. The last time that NATO troops were sent into live military operations in Europe was to help save Muslims in Bosnia. So it is not just the pressure on the eastern frontier. We need to keep looking at NATO security in the round: pressures on the Black sea, on the eastern Mediterranean and from the south. We need to understand that the survival of those very fragile democracies in the Balkans and in the middle east—even in Afghanistan—is just as important for our security here in the west, because if, in the end, they do collapse, we are vulnerable to the spread of transnational terror groups and the threat of mass migration on a scale that we have not yet seen.

Thirdly, on NATO membership, of course we welcomed the accession of Montenegro last year. It is very important that NATO continues to demonstrate that it is open and that there can be no veto on future applications. It is particularly important to the continuing stability of the western Balkans that we show that, provided they meet the proper criteria, there is a route through for those war-torn countries into the alliance.

Fourthly, on resources, there is nothing new about the American President’s insistence that European countries pay more—that has been said by every American President throughout my political career, and we should, of course, listen. However, at the Wales summit, four years ago now, we did all commit to the 2%. It is bad enough that only four countries meet the 2%, but what I still find really shocking is that 16 countries—over half the alliance—do not even pay 1.5%, including three of the biggest countries in Europe: Germany, Spain and Italy.

Fifthly, I endorse what my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex (Sir Nicholas Soames) said about the need to continue to reform NATO—to drive forward the plans to modernise the decision-making structures, to enable the troops, planes and ships to be deployed faster across the continent of Europe, and to make sure that the political decision-making machinery is as equally adept and ready to be triggered.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The right hon. Gentleman talks about readiness and the ability to respond. Does he think now that we ought to review the previous decision to re-base from Germany back into the UK, and that we should actually have a forward presence in Germany?

[Sir Michael Fallon]

We continued in my time to keep that particular decision under review. There was not a particular year when all the troops were due to come home, and it was something that we watched particularly carefully as the plans for an enhanced forward presence in Estonia and Poland were developed. It is important, therefore, to be sure about whether the equipment is pre-positioned in the right places and whether it is ready to reinforce in the way that the right hon. Gentleman and I would want.

Finally, I hope that we will find ways beyond this debate of explaining the importance of NATO here at home—of explaining its success since 1949, as well as its obligations—to a new generation who do not, in this country, face conscription, but who are protected day and night by fresh cohorts of marvellous young men and women who step forward to serve in our armed forces. There is a compact there that I believe needs to be better understood. I hope this never happens, but when we next have to send our young men and women into military action wearing the blue beret, I think that we will regret that we did not do more to educate our public about the importance of NATO and the obligations that come with it. That said, I wish my hon. Friends every success at next month’s summit.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Monday 11th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Guto Bebb]

My hon. Friend makes a really important point about the importance of SMEs in innovation and capability. Our refreshed defence industrial policy published last December highlights how we are encouraging competition within the defence sector, maximising opportunities for SMEs. For example, we have produced new short-form contracts that make it easier for SMEs to bid into MOD opportunities.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Does the Minister recognise that SMEs depend on main contractors for an enormous amount of their work, and that that is why his previous replies on the fleet support ships have been so disappointing? Can he imagine our European G7 partners, let alone President Trump, buying navy support ships from foreign yards? When is he going to shake off Treasury dogma, wake up to European reality, and buy British ships built in British shipyards by British workers, backing British engineering firms large and small, and backing British steel?

[Guto Bebb]

I listened very carefully to the right hon. Gentleman, but I would not think that we should take any lessons on trade policy from Donald Trump.