NATO

James Gray Excerpts

Wednesday 20th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. If we do not change not just our military structures to ensure that they can best respond, but the political structures to which the military structures will turn to be given their direction—if we do not change, if we do not reform, if we do not have the agility to respond to the enemies that this nation and our allies face—NATO will be an organisation that is found wanting.

[James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

The presence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Chamber, just before he ran out of the door—[Hon. Members: “He is here!”]—prompts me to raise with the Secretary of State the question of funding. Will he reconfirm the notion that our contribution of 2% of GDP is not a target but an absolute floor, and that if we are to stand true with our friends in NATO we must aim for 2.5% or 3%, because otherwise we will simply not be able to do what we are seeking to do in the world?

[Gavin Williamson]

With my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer peering at me from behind the Speaker’s Chair, I feel that I must be on my very best behaviour.

We have always seen 2% as a floor, and spending on defence has varied over the years. I think that when the Government came to office it was at a slightly higher level than 2%. Indeed, I think that when my right hon. Friend the Chancellor was Secretary of State for Defence it stood at 2.3% and 2.4%, but that took account of the operations in which we were involved in Afghanistan.

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[Nia Griffith]

As I have just explained, our leader has been very clear about the position we hold, and he does see that working within NATO is very important for projecting stability and promoting democracy. Let me make some progress now, if I may.

NATO’s founding was not meant in any way to undermine or detract from the primacy of the United Nations; rather, it was to work alongside the UN, in full conformity with the principles of the UN charter. The generation that established NATO, the one that endured the horror and destruction of two world wars, were keenly aware of the overriding need to achieve peace and stability wherever possible. When he outlined article 5’s implications and its guarantee of collective security, Bevin told the House:

“This does not mean that every time we consult there will be military action. We hope to forestall attack…We have to seek to promote a peaceful settlement.”—[Official Report, 12 May 1949; Vol. 464, c. 2020-2021.]

Indeed, the principle of settling disputes by peaceful means is articulated clearly in article 1 of the NATO treaty.

Today, the alliance has grown to 29 members and, as well as its central role of ensuring the security of the north Atlantic area, NATO supports global security by working with partners around the world. NATO supported the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in Sudan and has worked alongside the European Union’s Operation Atalanta to combat piracy in the gulf of Aden off the horn of Africa. NATO offers training, advice and assistance to the Afghan national security forces through the Resolute Support mission. In addition, the NATO training mission in Iraq provides support and mentoring to Iraq’s armed forces personnel. The alliance has also assisted with humanitarian relief efforts, including those in Pakistan after the devastating 2005 earthquake and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.

Russia’s recent actions, including its disgraceful and illegal annexation of Crimea and the Donbass in 2014, have led to renewed focus on the immediate security of the alliance area and, indeed, the need to secure NATO’s eastern border. At the 2016 Warsaw summit, the allies resolved to establish an enhanced forward presence in the Baltic states and Poland as a means of providing reassurance to those NATO members and a credible deterrent to potential adversaries. The tailored forward presence in the Black sea region makes an important contribution to regional security there.

I have had the privilege of visiting Estonia twice, and I have met our personnel serving there as part of Operation Cabrit. It was clear from our conversations with the Estonians that they truly value our presence there, particularly as they have worked so closely with our personnel in Afghanistan. The Estonians themselves have offered to help another NATO ally, France, with its mission in west Africa. For them, that is about offering reciprocity for the security that NATO allies give them to maintain their freedom in Estonia. They know that the collective protection of NATO is what makes them different from Ukraine.

Although the provision of deterrence through conventional means in Estonia, Poland and Romania is of great importance, we must also be alive to the risk that adversaries, including non-state actors, will increasingly deploy hybrid and cyber-warfare and use destabilising tactics specifically designed not to trigger article 5. We have all heard the reports of how Russia has used cyber-warfare; indeed, when I visited the cyber centre in Estonia, I heard about how Estonia has had direct experience of a cyber-attack that affected major computer networks throughout the country, and about what the staff there did to combat it. That was a reminder that when we reflect on the state of our own defences—as the Government are currently doing with the modernising defence programme—we must bear in mind the need to invest in the whole range of conventional and cyber-capabilities, and not to view it as an either/or situation.

The Warsaw summit communiqué, which set out plans for the enhanced forward presence, also stated that

“deterrence has to be complemented by meaningful dialogue and engagement with Russia, to seek reciprocal transparency and risk reduction.”

Of course, Russia’s aggressive stance, and her repeated assaults on our rules-based international system, have made any productive engagement nigh on impossible. The response to the recent poisonings in Salisbury, for which we hold Russia responsible, demonstrated the strength of the alliance in the face of Russian aggression, with a great number of our allies, and NATO itself, joining us in the expulsion of diplomats. It is none the less positive that the NATO-Russia Council has met recently, because we need to use any and all opportunities for dialogue. What is perhaps most worrying about the current state of affairs is that even at the height of the cold war we maintained lines of communication, which are essential to avoid misunderstandings that can lead to very rapid escalations. There is currently far less engagement.

Our co-operation with allies in Estonia and Poland highlights the importance of the interoperability of our equipment in enabling us to work closely with other NATO members in a variety of settings. That is something that was raised with me when I visited NATO headquarters in Brussels shortly after I took up my post. It was clear that NATO wishes to see greater harmonisation in equipment. Although I recognise that decisions about defence procurement must of course be taken freely by sovereign states, it clearly does make sense to maximise the opportunities to work together and to avoid unnecessary duplication, wherever possible.

Of course the need to invest in the equipment necessary for NATO missions merely adds to the case for proper levels of defence spending. NATO allies are committed to the guideline of spending a minimum of 2% of their GDP on defence, with 20% of that total to be spent on major equipment, including research and development. Only a relatively small number of NATO members can even claim to be hitting the 2% figure at present, and it is right that we encourage all allies to meet the NATO guidelines, as the 2014 Wales summit communiqué made clear.

We must lead by example. The simple fact is that the UK is barely scraping over the line when it comes to our own levels of defence spending. The latest Treasury figures for the year 2015-16 show that the Government spent 1.9% of GDP on defence. The International Institute for Strategic Studies has also concluded that UK defence spending is not reaching 2% of GDP.

The reality is that the UK only appears to meet the 2% in its NATO return because it includes items such as pensions that do not contribute to our defence capabilities, which Labour did not include when we were in government. Whichever way we look at it, the truth is that the deep cuts that were imposed in 2010 and the implementation by the Conservative party of those cuts in the years following mean that the defence budget is now worth far less than it was when Labour left office. Defence spending was cut by nearly £10 billion in real terms between 2010 and 2017, and our purchasing power has been cut dramatically owing to the sharp fall in the value of the pound.

I note that the Minister for defence people, the right hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), who is no longer in his place, has said recently that he would like to see defence spending rise north of 2.5%. I would be grateful if the Secretary of State could clarify whether this is, in fact, now Government policy, or whether it is simply another plea, which will, doubtless, be rebuffed by the Chancellor.

[James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I pay tribute to the hon. Lady for all she does in the defence world. I entirely agree with her about pressing the Government to increase our spending to 2.5%, or, as I have often said, to 3%. Will she take this opportunity to commit an incoming Labour Government to doing the same thing?

[Nia Griffith]

The hon. Gentleman simply needs to look at our record. We consistently spent well over 2% when we were in government. We do have a good record on spending.

I know that there is concern across the House about current levels of defence spending, as the hon. Gentleman has just indicated. The recent findings of the National Audit Office that the equipment plan is simply not affordable, with a funding gap of up to £20.8 billion, will have done nothing to assuage this. As I have said many times, the Government will have support from Labour Members if the modernising defence programme results in proper investment for our defences and our armed forces, but there will be deep disquiet if the review merely results in yet more cuts of the kind that have been briefed in the press in recent months.

The UK’s decision to leave the European Union means that our NATO membership is more important than ever. Although we have always recognised NATO as the sole organisation for the collective defence of Europe, and defence has always been the sovereign responsibility of each EU member state, it is none the less the case that from March 2019 we will lose our voice and our vote in the EU Foreign Affairs Council and in many other important committees. We must therefore look at other ways of co-ordinating action with European partners where it is in our interests to do so—for example, in defending the Iran nuclear deal, which was so painstakingly negotiated and risks beings completely trashed by President Trump.

It is also very important that we retain the position of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe once we have left the EU and that we resist any attempts to allocate that role to another European state. Ultimately, Labour believes very firmly that Brexit must not be an opportunity for the UK to turn inwards, or to shirk our international obligations.

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[Stewart Malcolm McDonald (Glasgow South) (SNP)]

It is a great shame that the Chancellor, who was lingering by the Speaker’s Chair earlier, did not take the time to join us. As those who normally attend these defence debates will know, we have been desperate to get a Treasury Minister to join us at some point, and we have still not used our collective imagination to deliver that outcome. I am sure he will read Hansard as soon as it is off the printers later this evening.

I begin by sincerely commending the Government for bringing this debate forward. Many of us have hoped that the Government would bring a defence debate forward in Government time at some point. We debated a defence-related Bill that was in the Queen’s Speech on the Floor of the House, and there was a broader debate on national security following the Salisbury incident, but it would be useful to have more of these defence debates in Government time where possible. I am sure that those on the Government and shadow French Benches will join me in congratulating NATO on its move to new headquarters and wish it well in its new home.

The upcoming summit carries with it much anticipation. A changing threat landscape could take the alliance, which is so crucial for security, into an uncertain future. Much has been said about an increasingly defiant Russia, and I am sure much will be said about the intemperate words of the United States President. Both those things should motivate member states to unite in solidarity for the sake of the future of the alliance, which does so much to underpin international order and security.

Arguably NATO has not faced a crisis such as this since the end of the cold war. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO was a changing body that had to adapt to a new purpose; it required a new vision to continue being the most successful defence and security alliance in the history of the world. Questions were raised as to whether solidarity could be upheld sans the threat of the Soviet Union; whether new forms of threat could be met by the north Atlantic alliance; and whether a security and defence alliance of this nature was ever really required at all. Some of those questions still echo in the discourse today, which is why it is important that those of us who believe in institutions such as NATO—and the United Nations Security Council, which is a failing instrument at the moment—continue to make the case for them.

In its longevity, NATO has kept land, sea and airspace safe, but new forms of attack, such as rising cyber-warfare and the horrifying poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in March, demonstrate that our security is being threatened by means not explicitly covered by the traditional article 5 definition of attack. Let us take the example of the Skripal attack. The Russian use of a nerve agent on UK soil was a violation of the chemical weapons convention and, of course, of international law. It was a premeditated attack that attempted to kill two people within UK borders. The choice of weapon in itself demonstrates the particular venom of the actor involved. The nerve agent Novichok blocks a crucial enzyme in the nervous system, causing nerves to become over-excited and sending muscles—both internal and external—into spasm. The whole House will rightly have been horrified by what happened in Salisbury in March. That is one example of how the changing threat picture affects us, but of course it is not new to our Baltic allies.

There are also the more traditional threats, some of which were outlined by the Defence Secretary himself. Let us, for example, take the threat of Russian submarine activity, which is now at the highest levels since the days of the cold war. The Secretary of State knows the concerns of SNP Members about the high north and Icelandic gap, but I implore Members not just to think of this as the Scottish bit of the NATO debate, because it would be ill-advised to look at it in that way.

[James Gray]

The hon. Gentleman knows of my passionate interest in the Arctic. Does he agree with me in very much looking forward to the forthcoming report from the Defence Committee, which I think is nearing completion? It will come out just in time to match the Norwegian report, which I think will come out in September. I very much hope that the hon. Gentleman will come along to the all-party group for the polar regions, where we will be discussing it.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right, and I pay a genuine and generous tribute to him, as I am sure my SNP colleagues do, for the work he has done in his party and as a member of the Defence Committee to bring attention to that part of the world. It is a seriously testing issue that, to be fair, is understood by the Defence Secretary, and is certainly understood by Sir Stuart Peach and General Sir Nick Carter. I am grateful to the Defence Secretary for taking the time to meet me and my hon. Friend the Member for West Dunbartonshire (Martin Docherty-Hughes) to discuss these issues. We now live in hope that the high north and Icelandic gap will be a prominent feature of the upcoming modernising defence programme.

Oral Answers to Questions

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 11th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

In my discussions with the US Defence Secretary, he has been clear about the US commitment to NATO and European defence. Let us not underestimate how supportive the US has been of NATO, or its commitment over the next couple of years to pump resources, troops and money into ensuring that our defence is the very best we can possibly have.

[James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

NATO is quite rightly concentrating on the Russian threat to the east and to the south-east of Europe, but what more can we do to encourage it to take an interest in the high north and the Arctic, where the Russians have recently built eight new military bases at enormous cost? They also have huge submarine activity coming out into the north Atlantic and have reinvented the old bastion concept that was left over from the cold war. Surely there is a huge threat there and NATO has to do something about it.

[Gavin Williamson]

We have seen a considerable increase in Russian activity in the high north, and we have seen an increase in our activity in the high north as well, with HMS Trenchant taking part in ICEX—Ice Exercise 18—and the announcement of the additional Astute class submarine, HMS Agincourt. This is all about how we invest to keep ourselves safe and the north Atlantic free from threats.

Oral Answers to Questions

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 23rd April 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

I would be very happy to look at those options. I hate to correct the hon. Lady, but actually a quarter of a million people are working in the defence industry, supporting not just the UK, but exports as well. I encourage her to have a dialogue with my hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne), who is doing a piece of policy work on how we can work more closely with industry in promoting prosperity.

[James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

While it is of course quite right that the Government should do everything that they can to support the British defence industry, the truth of the matter is that it is an international business. In our area of the south-west, Boeing, Airbus and Leonardo—all foreign-owned—are the main employers and contributors. The F-35, which is a fantastic aeroplane, is made in America, but 15% of the total value of that plane comes into Britain, enabling us to buy the planes ourselves.

[Gavin Williamson]

My hon. Friend makes a very important point about the international nature of our defence industry. We have to be looking more and more at how we can develop partnerships with international businesses and, when we are looking at procurement decisions, how we can deliver not just best value for the MOD, but the very best for jobs here in the United Kingdom.

National Security Capability Review

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 15th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

Let us make it absolutely clear: the reason we are looking so clearly at how we go about our recruitment is to make sure we meet the target and fully recruit, and that is why we are changing our approach. As is often said, “If you always do what you always did, you will always get what you always got.” We are trying to look at how to do this differently, so that we hit our numbers and get the right people who want to serve our country, and that is why we are going to do things differently. We have already seen a 15% increase in applications, and I hope that that will continue to rise.

[James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

It is perfectly reasonable that the Secretary of State cannot say much until the national security capability review has been completed, so when will that be?

[Gavin Williamson]

I hope very soon, so that I do not have to sound quite so evasive. I hope it will happen in the very near future, but I am not yet at liberty to name a date.

Oral Answers to Questions

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 15th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Ellwood]

The hon. Lady will be aware of the latest advertising campaign that is going through. She is absolutely right that, if we are to reflect society, we must be able to recruit from right across society, and that includes BAME people and women as well. We have this target of 10% for BAME and 15% for women by 2020, and I hope we will achieve that.

[James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I strongly support the Minister’s ambition to encourage more BAME people and women to join the armed forces, but what has led him to the conclusion that the new advertising campaign to which he alluded a moment ago, which is rather less than robust in my view, will be any more successful in doing that than the good old-fashioned “Be the Best”?

[Mr Ellwood]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s question. He will be aware that the “Be the Best” campaign continues, but he will also be aware that we must recruit from a diverse footprint. That means that we have to dispel some of the messages that are out there, and that is exactly what this new campaign is seeking to do.

Defence

James Gray Excerpts

Thursday 11th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Vernon Coaker]

I agree. I will come on to the point that my hon. Friend has made very well when I talk about affordability.

[James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on this debate and on his speech, with every single word of which the whole House would agree. We also could not possibly disagree with the motion, with one exception. It is exceptionally disappointing that he calls for defence expenditure to be maintained “at current levels”. Actually, defence expenditure should be increased quite substantially, and that is the thrust of his speech, so he has got the wording of the motion slightly wrong.

[Vernon Coaker]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his advice. I am sure that he has read the whole motion, which says that expenditure should be maintained

“at least at current levels”.

This is the problem that I have in trying to be conciliatory. I tried to put together something that everybody would agree with, but perhaps I should have been a bit stronger. I take the admonishment, but I did say “at least”.

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[Dr Lewis]

My right hon. Friend speaks with great experience as a former Armed Forces Minister, and he made a considerable input to our recent report, “Gambling on ‘Efficiency’: Defence Acquisition and Procurement”, by making that very point.

Quite rightly, the hon. Member for Gedling emphasised the current process involving the national security capability review, and he focused on the question of fiscal neutrality, which the National Security Adviser says he has been told to observe. When I challenged the National Security Adviser with that on 18 December, when he appeared before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, he said, “Well, it’s not as if the defence budget isn’t growing; it is fiscal neutrality within a growing budget.” He then did something else, which is indicative of a worrying trend: he lumped together the £36 billion that we are spending avowedly on defence with all the other money that we spend on everything else related to security, and he started talking about a £56 billion budget. That lumping together of money for security and intelligence services, counter-terrorism and even the relevant aspects of policing with the defence budget, is a form of sleight of hand that causes me concern. That is what I wish to address in the second half of my remarks.

We have a real problem in this country because the tried and tested system for strategic decision making has broken down. In my years as a research student, my area of study was the way that Britain planned towards the end of the second world war, and the early period after it, for what form of strategy we would need to deal with future threats. I was struck by the fact that there was a huge argument between 1944 and 1946 between clever officials in the Foreign Office who wanted to make the Anglo-Soviet alliance of 1942 the cornerstone of our post-war foreign policy, and the Chiefs of Staff who wanted to prepare their assessments of what Britain might have to face militarily on alternative assumptions that that alliance might well continue—in which case all would be well—but that it might break down. There was a tremendous stand-off until 1946, when finally the iron curtain had descended and it became clear that the Chiefs of Staff, who had looked at the Anglo-Soviet alliance in theoretical terms and said, “Well it could work, but it might not”, had been right to be cautious, and the Foreign Office staff, who wanted to put all their eggs in the basket of being able to continue the wartime alliance into peacetime, had been wrong. I was very struck by the systematic way in which the strategic arguments were hammered out, and at the centre of it all was the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee, as we all know, is made up of the heads of each of the three services. The shocking thing that I have to say to the House today is that one can now become chief of staff of any of the three armed services—one can become head of the Royal Navy, or head of the Army, or head of the Royal Air Force—and yet have no direct input into the strategic planning process. This is all part of the lumping together of military strategic planning with national security strategies that are vague and amorphous and, above all, primarily in the hands of civil servants.

If the civil servants themselves were steeped, as they used to be, in the subject matter of their Departments, that would be less of a problem than it is today. But some years ago, it was decided that those in the senior levels of the civil service—which are, of course, peopled by very clever and able individuals; that is not in dispute—should be able to hop from one Department to another. One might be at a senior level in one Department and then go for the top job in another, including, for example, the Ministry of Defence. What we have is a combination where formerly specialist civil servants have become generalists and the professional military advisers—the Chiefs of Staff—have become more like business managers serving as chief executives with an allocated budget to administer to their services. All their thoughts about strategy get fed through just one single individual—the Chief of the Defence Staff—who then has to represent all their views on the National Security Council. It is this melding together, this mishmash, of the military, the security and the civilian roles that is undermining what we need, which is a clear-headed and systematic approach to the strategic challenges facing this country.

[James Gray]

My right hon. Friend is making an extremely important point about the whole structure of decision making within the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Defence. Does he agree that he has not yet mentioned a very important element in that, namely Ministers? He has not yet discussed Ministers’ role in considering the strategy of the nation. Is it not particularly interesting that when Sir Mark Sedwill appeared before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy the other day, he let us know that the review that is currently being undertaken by his Department was commissioned during the general election campaign, when presumably Ministers had their minds on something else? I would be interested to know exactly who it was who commissioned the strategy at that particular time.

[Dr Lewis]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and he made a very useful contribution to the questioning of Mark Sedwill on 18 December. The reason I have not really mentioned Ministers is that, frankly, Ministers do not seem to be having much of a role in this, either. What I did not say, because I did not want to dwell too long on it, is that the stand-off between the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office in 1944 was finally resolved when it went all the way up to Churchill, who finally gave the Chiefs of Staff permission to continue doing the contingency planning for a possibly hostile Soviet Union that they wanted to do, and that the Foreign Office did not want them to do. The reality here is that there has been a loss of focus. There is no proper machinery, other than this rather woolly concept of a National Security Council, served by a secretariat, run effectively by the Cabinet Office.

In conclusion, what I really want to say is this. Constitutionally, we know what is right. That was confirmed when we spoke to the former Secretary of State for Defence in the Defence Committee and he was attended by a senior MOD official. We asked him, “Is it still the case that the Chiefs of Staff—the heads of the armed forces—retain the right to go directly to No. 10 if they think the danger to the country is such that they have to make direct representations?” The answer was yes, it is. But what is the point of their having that right if they are not actually allowed to do the job of planning the strategies and doing what they used to do as a Committee —serving as the military advisers to the Government? As my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray) says, ultimately, the Government always have the right to accept or reject such military advice as they get from the service chiefs, but the service chiefs ought to be in a position to give that advice.

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[James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

Rarely in debates in this Chamber can the fourth speaker have been faced with such a major challenge as mine in following three such well informed, all-encompassing, brilliant speeches as those of the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker), my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) and now the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), who knows what he is talking about. It is quite a challenge to think of something new to say after those three outstanding speeches. I agree with all of them, and I agree very strongly with the motion. However, you and I have known each other for 25 years, Madam Deputy Speaker, so you will be aware that it would none the less be entirely uncharacteristic of me simply to say “I agree,” and then sit down; that would not be in keeping at all.

I welcome the fact that the hon. Member for Gedling has secured the debate, but I regret the fact that it had to be called under the rules of the Backbench Business Committee. When I—and many of us in this Chamber—first arrived here, we had five such debates a year: one each for the RAF, the Army and the Royal Navy and then two further debates on spending matters. That was changed after the 1998 SDSR into five set-piece, major, full-scale debates in Government time on a variety of subjects: defence policy, defence of the UK, defence of the world, and one on personnel and one on procurement. They were serious debates opened by the Secretary of State, with a packed House and vast numbers of people watching; they were an important part of the body politic’s discussions on defence.

That system has now been replaced, however, and in fact for two or three years there were no debates on defence at all under the Backbench Business Committee. There are now one or two debates a year if we are lucky, secured by a Back Bencher choosing to do so. That is wrong; the Government should return to the way we were when the Backbench Business Committee was invented and say to it that we expect to have at least five substantive defence debates during the course of the year. It must find time in its programme for that. Allocating such debates to compete with such important matters as live animals in circuses is wrong and downplays the importance of the defence of the nation.

That situation might none the less be symptomatic of something that concerns me, and to which one or two Members have alluded: we as a nation are downplaying defence and the threat to us. There is a degree of war-weariness after Iraq and Afghanistan and so forth, and people would like our troops to come home and there to be no more wars anywhere in the world. But that will not happen, of course, because the world is an extraordinarily dangerous place.

We in this House are guilty of a degree of complacency over the threats to the nation, and that is then spread around the nation, and our voters do not realise what a dangerous place we live in. If we conducted a survey and asked voters on their doorsteps whether we should spend money on defence or health or education, defence would, sadly, come fairly low down their list of priorities. We in this place need to change that by having serious debates on the subject and highlighting the huge threats facing us today.

I will not repeat what others have said about the threats from an expansionist Russia, North Korea, events in the South China sea, and terrorism throughout the middle east, but those threats have not gone away and are worse now than they were before. I personally am extremely concerned about Russian ambitions in the high north and the Arctic and north Atlantic, and I am grateful that the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) has taken up the cudgels of the Defence Sub-Committee, looking into what the Russians are planning to do in the high north. At the moment, however, NATO is, to some degree at least, ignoring that, and it is right that we should remind people that the Russians have just spent billions of pounds on building eight new military stations along the Arctic coast, that they have very substantially increased submarine activity in the north Atlantic, and that they are threatening our lines of supply to the United States of America—and all of this is happening under our noses and we are not doing anything about it. It is right that we in this place should remind our colleagues and the nation that these very real threats are happening on our doorstep.

Part of the reason for that failure to address these real threats comes from what might sound like a rather technical, machinery of government matter, and which my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East touched on. The last truly proper defence review was in 1998, and I pay tribute to the then Defence Ministers, one of whom, the right hon. Member for Warley (John Spellar), is sitting on the Opposition back row. It was a first-class defence review: it was foreign policy led; it was the MOD sitting down and saying, “Given that these are the foreign policy threats to our nation, here’s what we in the MOD must now do to protect the country from them.” Since then, as my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East said, the whole process has become ever more muddled, obscured and complicated. Nobody now quite understands who decides what the threats to this nation are, nobody quite knows who decides what we must do about them, and nobody quite knows where we are going to get the money to do that.

For example, the SDSR used to happen at the same time as the national spending review, and that was extremely important. As the hon. Member for Barnsley Central said, what is the point of having a defence review if we know that, no matter what it concludes, there will be no money to change things? Let us imagine that such a review concluded that there was a vast cyber-threat or Russian threat against us and decided that we must significantly increase our Army, Navy or Air Force. The Treasury would turn round and say, “Well, we’re very glad you have had that review and we’re very interested to read it. You have made some important points and we will be reviewing the Ministry of Defence budget two years from now. So, no matter what you have said in your review, we can do nothing about it.” It seems extremely odd to be mixing the strategic defence review with the security review.

Sir Mark Sedwill, a very distinguished fellow who does an awful lot of good stuff, has said that we need to spend more money on cyber, and he is right, but every single penny that we spend on cyber comes out of other budgets. If we were to double our cyber budget, which might well be a very good thing to do, it might have to be paid for by cuts in the amphibious capability that the hon. Member for Barnsley Central mentioned. If it is any comfort to the hon. Gentleman, I can tell him that if any such cuts were to take place—if HMS Bulwark were to go, for example, or if 1,000 people were to be cut from the Royal Marines—he can be certain that I and many others on the side of the House would not support any Government who proposed to do that. I want to make it plain that we would not go along with any such proposals from the Government. I think that many of my friends in the Ministry of Defence would agree with that and are fighting that battle very firmly at the moment.

It would seem perfectly logical and sensible, when carrying out a review, to start with the Foreign Office assessing the risk. The Cabinet Office should follow that by determining how much of that risk is to do with us—with policing or with cyber, for example. Those conclusions should then go to the Ministry of Defence, which would identify the threats to the nation and decide what to do about them. Subsequently, the Treasury should say, “Fine, that is what you want to do about the threat. Here is how we are going to find the money for it.” But to have a national security review mixed in with a strategic defence review, and happening at a time that is not contingent with the national spending review, seems to be absolutely pointless and, indeed, substantially misleading. We are misleading ourselves that somehow we are looking into these things properly. I would like to see the defence part of the review separated out. It ought to be happening in the autumn of this year, at the same time as the Budget, in case we need more money to do what the Foreign Office says we ought to be doing.

That is all I want to add to what others have said. We are facing incredibly dangerous and worrying times, and this nation is under threat. There are very real threats to our people’s security and safety. If we in this place do not address that fact strategically, and if we do not find a way of increasing our defence spending towards the 3% that many of us in the Chamber want, I fear that we will not be doing our duty. We will not be doing what our people send us here to do, and we will not be putting in place the correct way to defend our nation.

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[Ruth Smeeth]

I could not agree more with my hon. Friend. At this point, the national security and capability review seems to equate to little more than a campaign of cuts and reductions so severe that it is causing concern not just within our armed forces but even among our closest allies, which regularly raise discussion about it. Perhaps the most egregious example is the Government’s reported plan, already mentioned, to decimate our amphibious capability and cut up to 1,000 Royal Marines.

I have seen at first hand the Royal Marines’ extraordinary courage, ability, focus and fortitude, and I am a fan. Following his photo op this week, I hope that the Secretary of State for Defence has also come away from his time at Lympstone with a fresh appreciation of what our Royal Marines bring to the table; perhaps he will use them more effectively, going forward.

[James Gray]

As chair of the all-party parliamentary group on the armed forces, I want to put on the record how much I appreciate the hon. Lady’s chairmanship of its Royal Navy and Royal Marines section, as well as the chairmanship of the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) of its RAF section. I want to thank them for it.

[Ruth Smeeth]

You’ll make me blush.

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[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

I am very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention because he is absolutely right. My preferred option would be to bring this back in house. I do not know whether he would go that far, but his central point is right that the MOD needs a plan B. I have been watching with interest the news on Carillion, which made the papers just this morning, and this is a really critical time for it.

I want to talk about capability, and I will do so briefly. We are running slightly ahead of time, but I wish to hear what the Minister has to say. Following the 2015 SDSR, there is a new mini-review, led by Sir Mark Sedwill, as several right hon. and hon. Members have mentioned. The review is looking at both security and defence aspects. My fear, which other Members have adumbrated, is that it is about what the Government can get away with spending, as opposed to what they need to spend given the threats they face.

As the hon. Member for Gedling said in his speech, we learned from a report in the Financial Times at the weekend that the review will now be split. Many of the Members who regularly attend defence debates will recall that the report was supposed to be published, and presumably a ministerial statement would have been made, early in the new year. I would have been charitable and extended that right up to the end of March. We now learn, however, that the defence aspects will be kicked later into the year. I would be grateful to the Minister if he told us in his summing up whether that is the case. The cynic in me does wonder—I am not normally one for being cynical—if this is about getting beyond the local elections in May. I sincerely hope not, because that kind of politics is not on.

[James Gray]

The hon. Gentleman seems to imply that there is some plot or conspiracy involved in splitting up the security and defence parts of the review. If that is the case, I strongly welcome it, because that means there is a much greater chance that the defence budget will not be cut. If the two parts are announced together next week, the extra spend—on cyber, for example—will come straight out of the defence budget. If he wants them to be announced next week, he is actually speaking in favour of defence cuts.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

The hon. Gentleman is much more optimistic than me. I have seen just this week, on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, how the Government do this kind of thing. They take every opportunity to pull the wool over people’s eyes. He need only ask his colleagues the hon. Members for Moray and for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine, as well as the rest of the Scottish Conservative intake. We need a proper SDSR that takes account of the fact that we will no longer be members of the European Union, and of the fact that we have had currency fluctuations and the devaluation of the pound. I am in favour of taking more time if we get a more considered outcome, but the cynic in me suggests that that is not what is at play.

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[Mr Ellwood]

I would be happy to do that. We perhaps take for granted how open our economy is, and how we require the freedom of the seas to ensure that we can trade and attract business here. There is now an entwined link between security and our economy, and we forget that at our peril. My right hon. Friend reminds us of this powerful point.

My hon. Friend the Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine (Andrew Bowie) went through a comprehensive list of our equipment. I feel that he must have copied my list! I will simply underline the fact that we have some amazing bits of equipment coming through as a result of our pledge to spend £178 billion. The aircraft carriers have been mentioned, as has the F-35B, of which 14 have now been delivered. We have heard about the Type 26, and we have had a good debate about the Type 31. We have also heard about the River class, and the Dreadnought programme is coming on line as well. In the Army, we have the Ajax armoured fighting vehicles; these were Scimitars and Samsons in old language, if my hon. Friend remembers them. In the RAF, we have the upgrade of the Typhoon, and the F-35 fifth-generation fighter is joining our armed forces as well.

Much of this debate has focused on expenditure. As has been mentioned a number of times, the Defence budget is £36 billion this year. We hold the fifth largest Defence budget in the world. The Government have made a commitment to increase this by 0.5% above inflation every year of this Parliament, so it will be almost £40 billion by 2021. The Secretary of State has expressed the view strongly in public that the capability review is a priority for the Ministry of Defence, and he will shortly outline in more detail the process of how we will move forward. The capability review was brought about because things had changed since the SDSR in 2015. We have had terrorist attacks on the mainland, and cyber-attacks, including on this very building. We have also seen resurgent nations not following international norms. It was rightly decided that this necessitated a review, to renew and reinforce our commitment to the UK’s position as a force for peace, stability and prosperity across the world.

[James Gray]

I am glad to hear that the Minister is taking the capability review so seriously. I want to ask one simple question. If the review comes to the conclusion that more defence spending is required, where will that extra money come from?

[Mr Ellwood]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. As I have said, it is for the Secretary of State to spell that out in more detail, and that will happen shortly, but that is the big question that we must ask ourselves as fiscal, and responsible, Conservatives. The money must come from somewhere, which is why we cannot simply rush in and say that it will be provided. The details need to come through, and I hope that we will hear more details from the Secretary of State in due course.

It is clear from the contributions that we have heard today, and also from the world around us, that the world does not stand still, and nor should we. We must be sure that we possess the right combination of conventional and innovative capabilities to meet the varied and diffuse threats that I have outlined. We must also retain our long-standing position as one of the world’s most innovative nations, and do more to harness the benefits of technological progress and reinforce our military edge. I can assure the House that the Ministry of Defence has no intention of leaving the UK less safe, or the brave men and women of our armed forces more vulnerable, as a result of this review.

Oral Answers to Questions

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 27th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

10. What progress he has made on the national security capability review.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Gavin Williamson)]

With threats intensifying around the world, it is vital that our armed forces have the right capabilities in order to defend global security. We are making good progress: evidence has been reviewed, analysis conducted and options developed. I very much look forward to working with my hon. Friend and listening to his comments on how best to take this forward.

[James Gray]

I very much welcome the Secretary of State to his new job because, given his background, he is ideally suited to fighting the corner in the upcoming reviews. Will he please speak to the Prime Minister and remind her that the primary duty of any Government is the defence of the realm? Will he speak to the National Security Adviser, and indeed the Minister for the Cabinet Office, and remind them that they must not use this review as some sort of camouflage to cut our services? Will he speak to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and ensure that he digs deep in his pockets to produce the money we need? Above all, will he speak to his right hon. Friend the Chief Whip and remind him that, if the Chancellor does not do so, he will be facing a very substantial rebellion?

[Gavin Williamson]

I thank my hon. Friend. I can assure him that I will speak to every single one of the people he has mentioned. As he rightly points out, the defence of our nation is the primary responsibility of every Government, and it is one that I take exceptionally seriously. When we see our armed forces and everything they do, and the commitment with which they give themselves to it, we cannot be anything but awed by it. I will do everything I can to deliver for them.

UK Amphibious Capability

James Gray Excerpts

Tuesday 21st November 2017 Westminster Hall

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

Order. A glance around the room indicates that a large number of hon. Members are trying to catch my eye, and a swift bit of arithmetic suggests that something like four minutes each would be sensible. I do not believe in formal time limits, because that seems to me to sacrifice quality in favour of quantity, but if Members could show courtesy to one another and limit themselves to about four or possibly five minutes, that would be extremely helpful. I call Mr Mark Francois.

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[Phil Wilson (Sedgefield) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North (Ruth Smeeth) on securing this very timely debate. I want to make a few points and quote what other people have said about this issue to get it on the record again.

The point of amphibious capability is to land where the enemy is not. The idea that the Government think that we, as an island nation, should be cutting that capability seems absurd. Combined with the scrapping of HMS Ocean, it would severely impact our amphibious capability to enter a war zone by sea. Not just that; it would affect not only our warfighting but our humanitarian work. The first task of HMS Ocean back in the 1990s was a humanitarian task in the Caribbean when there was a hurricane in Honduras, and as we know it was deployed just a couple of months ago in the Caribbean once again. The amphibious capability has been used at least 10 times since the second world war. It was used in Korea, in Suez and then in the Falklands. As has been mentioned, in 1981 our amphibious capability was again under threat. Just think: if we did not have that capability in 1982 when the Argentinians invaded the Falklands on 2 April, where would we be now?

The decommissioning of HMS Ocean came after a £65 million refit in 2014. The Minister at the time, the hon. Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne), said:

“I am delighted that this contract will not only ensure that HMS Ocean remains a significant, highly-flexible and capable warship for years to come”.

Well, that did not last very long. With the bilateral partnership and accords that we have with other groups, such as the US, the cutting of perhaps 1,000 Royal Marines has led one US Marine Corps colonel to warn that it could impact on UK-US military ties. Bulwark and Albion, loaded with landing craft, provide command and control in a maritime environment. The colonel said, “That is what the UK will bring as a unique selling point to the party, alongside their world-class Royal Marines.”

Last week we had an evidence session with some retired generals and other force leaders. On the need for amphibiosity, General Sir Richard Barrons said:

“Are we really saying that we do not want the capability to put a force ashore over a beach—that we want to confine ourselves to ports? Are we really saying that we never want to be able to take British people out of a trouble spot except through a port? Are we really saying that we want to remove that capacity for humanitarian assistance? If we are saying that, we are ignoring how the world really operates. The second line of madness is the idea that if the Navy needs to adjust manpower and find more sailors, the obvious thing to do is to cull some of the finest infantry in the world—the Royal Marines. If the Navy needs more manpower, surely in defence there is a better way of finding it than culling your elite infantry, which in any case supplies people to our outstanding special forces. It is just folly.”

Finally, just two years after the SDSR, when we are having another review, it seems to me that the threats are developing quickly and unexpectedly. That is why, after two years, we are having another review. The Government will boast that the defence budget is increasing, but at the same time they still see the need to cut our capabilities. The more flexible we can be, the more versatile the defence postures we can take in a crisis. Are we ensuring that we will not be able to do that in the future? I believe that Britain is a force for good in the world. The Government need to be honest with themselves as well as with us. If they agree with me, the Government need to invest in our armed forces, because if they do not, and they continue to praise our world-class military, no one will believe that they mean it.

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

I call Johnny Mercer.

[Johnny Mercer (Plymouth, Moor View) (Con)]

Thank you very much, Mr Speaker.

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

Mr Gray will do. Mr Speaker might object to you calling me that.

[Johnny Mercer]

I am so sorry; I am half asleep. It is only a matter of time.

I want to make three really clear points to the House, to the Minister and to the Government. I have made my views on this clear. I am grateful for all the support that we have had from across the House because this is an issue of singular importance. However, it is very important that we do not dictate tactically what we ask our professionals to do in this country. What I mean by that is that our job here is to hold the Government’s feet to the fire, and to ensure that what they do is consistent with what they say. I do not think it is our responsibility to say, “You can never change this or that capability.” My attempts with the letter that has been signed by so many are simply a first stage in drawing a line in that battle.

What I am saying, though, is that I hope the Government, the Department and, critically, the Treasury and the Prime Minister now understand that there is a resilient cohort of Government MPs who will hold the Government to account on defence spending. Whatever our party or priorities, above all we are patriots, and it is not right to allow the Government to say something about defence on the one hand and yet under-resource it on the other. They cannot always say that defence is the primary duty of Government and yet hold their hands behind their back.

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[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman and fellow member of the Defence Committee for giving way, but may I slightly correct him? He said that the Tories are the party of defence. They are the party that talks about defence. I fully accept the bona fides and the genuine intentions of the hon. Gentleman and many of his fellow Back Benchers, but in fact under “Options for Change” after the end of the cold war, it was the Tory party that slashed the—

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

Order. In the context of UK amphibious capability, Johnny Mercer.

[Johnny Mercer]

I take the point. All I will say to that is that while I am here, I am determined that we will see that manifesto commitment through. The Government have a very small majority and we will hold them to account on this issue. I am afraid that feelings are running high on this issue. We have to go back to our constituents every weekend and justify what we do in this place, and I am determined that we will see that commitment through and provide the country with the defences that we need.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

Like everyone else, I want to start by thanking my colleague and friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North (Ruth Smeeth), for securing this debate. It is important that there is absolutely cross-party consensus in this Chamber that we are about to do something extremely dangerous. The debate today is entitled “UK Amphibious Capability”, but it really should be, “Who are we? What role do we want to play in the world? Has the decline of the Royal Navy damaged our reputation and our capability as a naval power and an ally? And will the cutting of our amphibious capability and our Royal Marines finally sink our reputation as a naval power?”

We have been a naval power for centuries. A major part of that has been our ability to project force anywhere in the world, coupled with the ability to land personnel and equipment, using our amphibious forces quickly and effectively. Equally important around the world has been our ability to send humanitarian aid quickly and effectively everywhere. We have provided food and equipment and evacuated in humanitarian crises in a way that we should be deeply proud of, but we are about to lose that capability. As an island nation, our ability to conduct a conventional war in an effective manner hinges on our ability to deploy troops from our island to the theatre of conflict. That requires us to retain an amphibious capability.

We need to ensure that we can hold our head up high among our allies. Britain has a reputation as a serious maritime player. After the United States, the UK was NATO’s pre-eminent naval power. That reputation was not come by lightly and gave the UK a distinct and advantaged position, not just in NATO, but on the global stage—as a trading entity as well as a military force. Our amphibious capability played a vital part in forming and maintaining that reputation, but our allies are reassessing it.

Let me quote from an article by an ally. It was by Jonathan Foreman and was published in the April-June edition of the Australian Navy news. It stated:

“The paper proposes in essence that the Royal Navy cannot be saved in its current form, that the problems…frequently noted in recent years by other, often non-British, publications…are likely to be terminal. Given that the RN is already little better than a token force…manifestly unable to carry out many of the missions expected of it in home waters as well as distant seas…and that UK decision makers are unwilling to face up to the decisions and obligations required of a major maritime power, the best that Great Britain can hope for may be to field a moderately capable North Sea flotilla as part of a combined UK Defence Force.”

That was from our allies. That is how we are beginning to be seen. Let us wake up and recognise that.

Recently, The Times carried an article in which James Mattis was highly critical of our decision to cut two of our four minehunters from the Gulf. We are beginning to hollow ourselves out, as has been said repeatedly, including at last week’s sitting of the Defence Committee by the former First Sea Lord, Admiral Zambellas, who described us as a third-world nation militarily. We have to wake up.

We in this Chamber totally support the Royal Navy and its personnel, and I think I speak for us all in saying that. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear!”] We are all proud of its successes, its traditions, its long history of bravery and its capability to face down overwhelming force. We will not, and cannot, sit by and be silent while the Navy is hollowed out and while the Ministry of Defence spins stories of our retaining greatness, when even our allies are mocking our inability to project effective and enduring force in defensive and humanitarian actions.

The Navy must retain its amphibious capability and its Royal Marines. The spin and misrepresentation of the weakness of our Navy must be recognised. If we are to hold our role in the maritime world, which we once proudly ruled, it is time to tackle the weakness that we have all allowed to happen to the Royal Navy. Britain’s ability to deploy a full range of naval capability, including an amphibious option, plays a vital and central role in our security, capability and reputation. Without that, Britain’s Navy lacks the critical ability to project power and authority beyond the sea and, as such, limits the effectiveness of what a naval task force is capable of, as well as what this country is capable of doing in defending itself.

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

We have 15 minutes left for five speakers. I call Leo Docherty.

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[Andrew Bowie (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (Con)]

It is a genuine pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. I congratulate the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North (Ruth Smeeth) on securing this debate. It is nice to speak in a debate where there is such consensus in the room.

The year 2017 was supposed to be the year of the Navy. As the former Secretary of State said, it was

“the start of a new era of maritime power, projecting Britain’s influence globally and delivering security at home.”

This year has seen unprecedented levels of building and investment in the Royal Navy, creating a backdrop for the first ever mounting of a guard by the senior service at Buckingham Palace and Windsor Castle. Undeniably, this has been a year of historic significance for the Royal Navy and British sea power.

A key part of our sea power and a key strategic part of our non-nuclear deterrence is our amphibious capability. As former First Sea Lord Admiral Zambellas told the Select Committee on Defence:

“Nobody in the world of complex warfare…thinks that a reduction in the sophisticated end of amphibiosity is a good idea.”

Unfortunately, in a year that has otherwise been positive for the senior service, that is in fact what we are discussing.

Only four other countries in the world can boast such a strong amphibious capability: the United States, China, Russia and France, which happen to be the other four permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. That capability is integrated into NATO, serving a key role there. Its primary role for much of the cold war was reinforcing our northern flank; it was strategically crucial in controlling access to the North sea and the Atlantic. Who can tell whether such a role might not be required again in the near future?

We know how any downgrading of our amphibious capability will be received in foreign capitals: with great delight, I am sure, in Moscow, and with great disappointment in Washington. Only last week, General Ben Hodges of the US army said of potential cuts to our amphibious capability:

“I’d hate to lose that particular capability...Whenever you take something off the table unilaterally, then you’ve just made the job a little simpler for a potential adversary.”

What we are debating is the potential loss of 1,000 marines and our landing platform dock vessels HMS Bulwark and HMS Albion. I urge the Government to discard any suggestion of decommissioning either of those specialised world-leading ships. If we got rid of our LPDs, would we ever recover that lost capability?

Although in this debate we are making the case for protecting the Royal Marines and the fleet, we must also be clear that any progress on the issue must not come at the expense of other areas of military spending. Last week, in an answer to my written question, the Ministry of Defence confirmed that quick reaction alert Typhoon aircraft launched from RAF Lossiemouth and RAF Coningsby intercepted aircraft on 12 occasions in 2016. That shows beyond any doubt the importance of our Typhoon squadrons and why we must not eschew the need for our new F-35s, which are planned to become a core part of our defence capabilities in that area.

It must also be recognised that the Government will struggle to make any significant savings from the Army without jeopardising our capability on that front. In an answer to another written question—

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

Order. This is a little wide of the topic.

[Andrew Bowie]

I found out two weeks ago that of the Army’s current strength of 70,000, almost 18,000 soldiers fall into the medical deployability standard categories “medically limited deployable” or “medically not deployable”. We need to spend more on our armed forces. In an incredibly uncertain and unstable world, for our allies and dependencies, we must fund our armed forces properly so that they can do the jobs we need and ask them to do.

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[James Gray (in the Chair)]

I congratulate hon. Members on their self-restraint. We have heard 11 Back Benchers between the opening speech and the first Front-Bench spokesman.

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[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

Of course I totally agree with my hon. Friend.

Let us turn to our allies. The Kingdom of the Netherlands sees the UK-Netherlands amphibious force as a symbol of what it considers to be one of its most important bilateral agreements. It has allowed the Royal Netherlands navy to take important procurement decisions, such as to build the Rotterdam and Johan de Witt amphibious vessels, in the expectation of reciprocal agreements continuing. What consideration has there been of undermining such a relationship by reducing our own capabilities?

Our extensive history of co-operation with the US marine corps, which has been mentioned, was particularly prominent in the cold war, when the Royal Marines were a key component in the plan to reinforce NATO’s northern flank in Norway. It is the Norwegian dimension that first brought the current crisis facing the Royal Marines to my attention, when winter warfare training was scrapped to cut costs. It goes without saying that the reassurance that those joint exercises have given our allies and the skills that they have given the marines exceed any impact on that spreadsheet in the MOD Main Building.

Winter warfare training brings me to my second topic. Traditionally, marines have prepared for their Norwegian exercises in the Grampian mountains, which they have accessed from their base at RM Condor, the home of 45 Commando. There are worries in Angus. I had expected the hon. Member for Angus (Kirstene Hair) to be here to speak for that beautiful part of the world, but as ever it is left to the SNP to fight Scotland’s corner in this place. The possible closure of RM Condor is a story almost as old as the Grampian hills. It was mooted in 2004, again in 2009, and almost went through in 2013, before a Government U-turn. Finally, in last year’s defence estate review, it was announced that the runway at RM Condor would be sold off. I echo the words of my friend and colleague in the Scottish Parliament, Graeme Dey, who said in a debate about the plan:

“By any measure, the UK Government’s approach to Condor is haphazard and unsettling”.—[Scottish Parliament Official Report, 20 April 2017; c. 79.]

I would go further: it is a perfect case study of the dangers of salami-slicing our armed forces.

People in Arbroath will not be reassured if closing the airfield is the last we hear on the issue. Quite simply, a community that is already reeling from the effects of Brexit on its soft fruit industry does not want to read headlines about the jobs of 1,000 Royal Marines being cut. As an aside, I would ask whether the Minister has given much consideration to the Scottish Government’s suggestion that the runway at RM Condor be used to build veteran’s housing. That is vital in an area with a strong tradition of recruitment into the armed forces, particularly the Black Watch.

Following this debate, the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North and others will rush to a Defence Committee evidence session to hear from the MOD’s permanent secretary on the subject of the MOD’s accounts. I expect that we will hear an awful lot about the MOD’s budgetary black hole, which has precipitated this debate. While many will talk convincingly—

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

Order. The hon. Gentleman’s speech must be on the context of the UK amphibious capability.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

It is an important point, Mr Gray, about the accounts—

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

Order. That does not matter. The hon. Gentleman’s speech must be on the context of the UK amphibious capability.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

While many will talk convincingly about the need for tough decisions to be made on amphibious capability—you do well to remind me, Mr Gray—I can only conclude from all that I have read in preparing for this debate that the UK’s amphibious forces are being squeezed for one obvious reason, which few, other than SNP Members, are willing to raise. The simple and inconvenient truth is that amphibious capability is being sacrificed to maintain the nuclear enterprise. Let us look at the top lines of the 2015 strategic defence and security review:

“The Royal Navy delivers our nuclear deterrent, projects our maritime power”—

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

Order. The hon. Gentleman must contain himself to the UK amphibious capability. He may not talk about nuclear capability or anything else. UK amphibious capability is all he may discuss.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

I think I was, and I will continue to do so.

Three distinct and unique capabilities underpin the strategic context. As General Sir Richard Barrons elucidated, the failure of the 2015 SDSR was that

“at no time in that review has the amount of resources provided to defence matched the programme”

of which defence capability through amphibious programmes is a part. The talk that I hear from people who know a lot more about it than anyone here is that the First Sea Lord has been presented with a scenario whereby one of these capabilities must be sacrificed. Admiral Sir George Zambellas’s comments in the Committee last week have been quoted, but I will quote what he said in full:

“I imagine the First Sea Lord has a choice between having his left arm cut off or his right arm cut off. Nobody in the world of complex warfare, especially for an island nation that delivers force from the sea, thinks that a reduction in the sophisticated end of amphibiosity is a good idea.”

On the practicalities of the SDSR, no one would expect projecting maritime power, such as the plan to commission HMS Queen Elizabeth next month, to be considered expendable. I also place it on record that the carriers are in no way adequate as replacements for Ocean, Albion or Bulwark, as has been mentioned. That leaves two arms to be cut off. I am not sure that we would have had as many hon. Members along to talk about the Royal Marines had the subject for debate been, “Why the UK’s amphibious capability should be prioritised over the continuous at-sea deterrent”. My SNP colleagues and I have been quite consistent on the ring-fenced MOD budget as it stands: every penny spent on Trident is a penny less spent on conventional forces. Hon. Members need not take just my word for it; at the end of October, an article in The Times by defence editor Deborah Haynes stated that the armed forces would have to find £300 million of savings this year because of cost overruns in the Successor programme. One source quoted said:

“All that is now left to cut is capability”—

amphibiosity. That is why we are here today.

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[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

Yes, the United States recognises that you will not have one, because you cannot afford it.

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

Order. Please finish briefly, Mr Docherty-Hughes.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

I know that many hon. Members—including the Chairman of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), who is present in the Chamber—would like the defence budget to be increased, but unless the Chancellor pulls the rabbit to end all rabbits out of the hat on Wednesday, that ain’t going to happen. I applaud the willingness of my other colleagues on the Defence Committee, the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer) and the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), to stand up to their party on this matter. The Royal Marines and the unique capabilities they provide must be protected; no one on the SNP Benches disagrees with that.

I conclude—to your delight, Mr Gray, I am sure—by asking the Minister three questions. First, will she reassure our allies, particularly those in northern Europe, that the forthcoming defence review will not damage existing relationships? Secondly, will she give assurances to those who work at RM Condor that 45 Commando is safe? Finally, will she tell us why an island state is prioritising the maintenance of a weapons system that it will never use over its ability to adequately deploy amphibious forces?

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[Harriett Baldwin]

Well, Mr Gray, I really do not know where to start with that intervention, because the hon. Member and I disagree so profoundly on what we need to spend money on to ensure the security of this nation. Frankly, she might want to ask the former leader of her party why he wants to take a gig on Russia Today. [Interruption.] That is my response, because that is how we send out a strong message in terms of the strength of this country.

Mr Gray, I really do not know where to start in terms of the Scottish National party’s priorities, but I will say a few words about ours. [Interruption.]

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

Order. If I may, I will nudge the Minister gently back towards UK amphibious capability.

[Harriett Baldwin]

Indeed. In our national security capability review, we seek to understand how to spend that growing budget in the most intelligent way, by further modernising our armed forces against the traditional and non-traditional threats that we now face. In that context, it is only right that all areas of business across defence—

[Mr Kevan Jones]

On a point of order, Mr Gray. We have had a very good debate this morning. A lot of questions have been asked by Members across the Chamber. Now, call me old-fashioned, but I thought it was the role of the Minister when replying to a debate actually to reply to it and not just read out a prepared statement.

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that point. Of course it is not a point of order; the Minister may indeed say what she likes when replying to the debate. However, if she replies inadequately, that is of course a matter for the record.

[Harriett Baldwin]

Mr Gray, in considering how I respond to this debate, I am very conscious of the lack of time available to me, but I will respond to a few of the points that were raised in the debate.

My hon. Friend the Member for South East Cornwall (Mrs Murray) and the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard) both spoke about the important role of HM Naval Base Devonport and the particular importance of the south-west of England, which continue to be so vital for the Royal Navy. Also, I was very pleased to learn that the father of my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster) had served on HMS Albion.

I want to leave a couple of minutes for the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North to speak at the end of the debate, so I will conclude by saying that the national security capability review is ongoing work. I can say that no decisions have been put to Ministers and, at this stage, any discussion of the options is pure speculation. I emphasise that, while the review continues, the naval service continues to meet all of its operational commitments. I further affirm to hon. Members that, in order to protect the UK’s interests at home and abroad, the Government remain committed to the future funding, support and capability of our armed forces.

Oral Answers to Questions

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 23rd October 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

In the past few months I have had meetings with my counterparts in Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Italy and Romania, and I have received inward visits from my counterparts from Croatia, the Netherlands and Poland. The Lancaster House framework is the most important of all our relationships with other members of the European Union, and I assure my right hon. Friend that when I meet the French Minister, Madame Parly, next month, we will discuss how we take work under that agreement further forward.

[James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

Britain had close working defence relationships with all European countries for decades before the EU was even invented, and for centuries before that with many of them. Does the Secretary of State agree that although we will of course maintain close defence relationships with France, Germany and other European countries, Brexit gives us an opportunity to redevelop some of our defence relationships across the world—with the old Commonwealth and the United States of America, and of course with NATO being at the centre of it all?

[Sir Michael Fallon]

Brexit, of course, gives us the opportunity to look again at our global role. We currently contribute to more than a dozen common security and defence policy missions and operations organised by the European Union, and it is important that from outside the European Union we continue, where we can, to consider how we can further contribute to European security, as well as to the global role about which my hon. Friend and I agree.

Armed Forces

James Gray Excerpts

Wednesday 19th July 2017 Westminster Hall

[Leo Docherty]

I share my hon. Friend’s concern. I think we all agree that the internet has now been weaponised to an extremely alarming degree. That should be at the heart and centre of our defence strategy. I imagine the Minister will take the opportunity to address that.

We face today the simultaneous threats of state-on-state conflict and global terrorism. We are facing down those threats with our allies in NATO and elsewhere, such as our friends in the Gulf states. We will continue to need a very large and potent armed forces to do that; mass matters, and it will continue to matter. It will come as no surprise that, as a former soldier, I am and will always be an advocate for a bigger armed forces. In an ideal world, I would like to see not 2% of GDP spent on defence but somewhere nearer 3%. However, we have to live in the real world, and we have to play the pitch we inherited. We are still dealing with the legacy of Labour’s mismanagement of the economy, which left a large black hole at the heart of defence spending.

In my judgment, the 2015 strategic defence and security review did a good job of assessing and responding to the current global threats I described, and combined with the ongoing investment of £178 billion over the next 10 years, it will deliver a raft of impressive new hardware and, more importantly, an agile and highly deployable force. All of that is against the background of significant financial constraints. I am particularly pleased that elements of the new strike brigades formed as a result of that SDSR—including 4 Rifles, 1st Battalion the Royal Regiment of Scotland, 2nd Battalion Princess of Wales Royal Regiment and 2nd Battalion The Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment—will be based in my constituency. We have two impressive carriers coming online, new submarines and new frigates, as well as a total and unreserved commitment to our continuous at-sea deterrence, Trident.

While we praise all that, we must, as parliamentarians and constituency MPs, always critically assess our own Government’s policies. We must ensure that our procurement is smart and that the carrier group we are investing in can fight. We must ensure that 2% of GDP spent on defence actually means a real 2%, and we must ensure that projects such as the F-35 are completed on time and on budget. I know that my hon. Friend the Minister will reassure us on that note today.

We clearly need significant force, but just as important, especially when it comes to dealing with global terrorism, is our approach and attitude towards using that force. I think the primary lesson of the last 15 years of expeditionary counter-insurgency wars is that it is only when we are discreet in the use of force, and when we work to empower and partner with local allies, that we achieve great results in combating terrorism.

[James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. However, I am puzzled by his line of argument. He seems to be saying that expeditionary counter-insurgency warfare is what we expect to do in the years ahead, while at the same time saying we must be flexible. What does he think about the notion that NATO has this entirely wrong, that we are focusing on the last war and that the next war may well be, for example, in the north Atlantic or high Arctic? That is something that the Select Committee on Defence is halfway through studying.

[Leo Docherty]

If my hon. Friend is unsure of the meaning of my remarks, I am saying that mass is important—we absolutely need a very large and potent armed forces—but the lesson of the past 15 years in Iraq and Afghanistan is that we may get counter-productive results if we engage without the politics being right, as he will see from the remainder of my remarks. It is only when we engage and work with allies that results that match our interest and theirs can be achieved.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, our good intentions were overtaken by the realities of local politics on the ground and an over-optimism about what the British state can achieve politically by the overt use of military force. We must guard against that in future. I learned that lesson as a soldier in southern Iraq more than 10 years ago. I remember one particular day when I visited a police station run by an Iraqi police unit that we were mentoring in al-Amarah in southern Iraq. Despite our working very closely with them, I was alarmed to find, on visiting the interior of the police station, a picture of Muqtada al-Sadr, who was the leader of the Mahdi army—the very insurgent group we were fighting, supposedly with the Iraqi police. That kind of duality and duplicity undermined our capability and the likelihood of us having a positive outcome in Iraq.

I have carried that insight with me over the years, but for many others, including my friend and fellow soldier, Captain Richard Holmes, that duplicity and the central dilemma of our presence in Iraq had lethal consequences. Richard was a classmate of mine at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and went on to be a fine Parachute Regiment officer. He deployed on his second tour of Iraq in the winter of 2005 to mentor the Iraqi police—something he put his heart and soul into. Progress was made thanks to his efforts, but despite his commitment and earnest professionalism, the forces of sectarianism, violence, Shi’ite rivalry and Iranian meddling prevailed. One day, after leaving the very same police station that I had visited the previous winter, his patrol was struck by an IED, and he and his driver, Private Lee Ellis, were instantly killed.

The point I am making is that no matter how good or how dedicated the servicemen or women are, politics—in the middle east, it is often the politics of violence—will always trump good intentions. The lesson at the heart of this is that we must be discreet, and we must work with allies whose interests match ours and who genuinely need our help. That lesson and that approach should shape the way we do business in the future and the way we train and deploy our forces. If we follow that approach, we can achieve great results.

In Iraq, we are now having a very positive impact. Today we have more than 1,200 personnel deployed on Op Shader across Iraq and Syria, co-ordinating Royal Air Force airstrikes, taking the fight to Daesh and, critically, working very closely with Kurdish peshmerga forces, whose interests match ours. That type of involvement —helping our allies to achieve their goals with the bespoke use of expertise and hard power—is a model for the future. We can and should replicate that approach around the globe.

The other primary lesson we have learned from the campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan is that the current generation of British forces men and women are equal to the example shown by their forebears across all three services. Young men and women join the armed forces today in order to deploy. We are in their debt, and it is our duty to arm them, equip them and protect them as best we can. Our servicemen and women are this country’s most precious asset, and we must put them at the heart of our defence policy. I welcome the Armed Forces (Flexible Working) Bill, which will have a very positive impact on the working lives of our armed forces men and women. We should celebrate the fact that they are prepared to take risks. They are not victims, but heirs to a remarkable and magnificent tradition. The recent remarks made by the Chief of the General Staff about service personnel needing empathy rather than sympathy were very welcome and apt.

We must maintain our resolve to deploy whenever and wherever necessary. We must not lose our nerve. On that note, I will conclude my remarks by quoting from a letter sent to me recently by a veteran who, as a young commander, led a team in Afghanistan at the height of the conflict. At one point he survived an IED strike so powerful that it destroyed the armoured fighting vehicle he was commanding. His letter reads:

“In Afghanistan I was scared of many things. I was frightened of the Taleban, I doubted myself, I worried about the availability of helicopter medical support. The one thing I never doubted or questioned was the willingness of the soldiers under my command to fight tooth and nail. No matter how badly they were bleeding, no matter how cold, how hot, how tired or how dehydrated they were, time and again their willingness to take a step forward, put their hand up and say ‘ok then, let’s go’ was extraordinary. 18 year olds who had volunteered to go 5000 miles to protect the Afghan people. These much-maligned members of the ‘PlayStation generation’ were in fact the heirs to boys who stood at Waterloo, sailed at Jutland and flew in the Battle of Britain.”

I quote from that letter because those words so eloquently convey why we are proud to have the finest armed forces in the world, why our servicemen and women will always be our greatest asset and, importantly, why, despite all the financial and fiscal constraints of the current time, we should be confident and assured of our future as a formidable military power.

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[Chris Evans (Islwyn) (Lab/Co-op)]

I begin by paying tribute to the hon. Member for Aldershot (Leo Docherty), who spoke with passion based on his own distinguished service. Even though I am on the Opposition Benches, I also pay tribute to all those Government Members—who I am looking at now—who also served in our forces and served Queen and country with distinction. Thank you very much.

On Saturday 24 June, I joined my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David), who will respond to the debate for the Opposition, to witness our armed forces marching through Caerphilly town centre as part of Armed Forces Day. Anyone watching on that day would know the esteem in which the public hold our armed forces. If we asked anyone marching, they would tell us that they are able to serve only because they have the support of their family. However, many feel that they are being badly let down by the Government. No one will be able to give their best in theatre if they are worried about their loved ones back home, yet that is the reality that those living in service accommodation have to face each and every day.

All regular service personnel are entitled to subsidised accommodation, and those who are married or have children are entitled to service family accommodation. The accommodation is provided by the Ministry of Defence and managed by the private contractor CarillionAmey. The armed forces covenant dictates that service accommodation must be of good quality, in an appropriate location and reasonably priced. However, under the current contract, very few properties seem to meet those criteria.

A National Audit Office report earlier in the year about service accommodation was absolutely damning. One family were left without hot water and heating for weeks, despite informing the contractor, CarillionAmey, that they had a seven-week-old baby and a four-year-old. In fact, in 2016, an NAO report found that satisfaction levels with the contractor’s maintenance request responses and the quality of maintenance works undertaken had reached lows of 32% and 29% respectively. At the Public Accounts Committee hearing, we were even told that such was the worry on the part of the Department that the contractor had to face the then Secretary of State for Defence to discuss the way forward.

Since taking up the contract in November 2014, CarillionAmey has consistently failed to meet the key performance indicators that it was contracted to attain. One case in particular highlights the poor treatment of service personnel and their families by the company. The wife of a serviceman reported that their family had been provided with a damp and mouldy property and, despite there being alternative accommodation available, the contractor refused to move them. The family reported that the property’s carpets were stained and the oven was dirty, but rather than cleaning the property and getting rid of the mould on the walls, CarillionAmey painted over it. On top of that, the family spent up to hours on the phone to the contractor every day for eight weeks trying to get somebody to help them to deal with the property’s many issues.

[James Gray]

The hon. Gentleman is of course right to criticise CarillionAmey—in many respects it is not great at all—and his party of course does not like anything being contracted out, but if we took the contract away from CarillionAmey, what would an incoming Labour Government do?

[Chris Evans]

I am criticising CarillionAmey quite rightly, but what I am saying is that we need a different contract or a different way of tendering for these contracts. This is not good enough; it is not good enough for forces’ families or for our men and women in the field. I hope that the Minister will take these comments away and look with urgency at the way the contract with CarillionAmey is being managed. This is not good enough, and I think all of us in the House would agree with that.

On 24 occasions, the family to whom I was referring were told that they would receive a call back regarding the issues, yet they did not, and technicians refused to progress the issues and deal with them. It would be an absolute disgrace if any family had to suffer in that way, but these are the families of our bravest men and women. Joining the armed forces is not like joining Barclays or Tesco; we are asking people to risk their lives each and every day for our safety at home and abroad. No one should underestimate just how huge an impact the standard of service accommodation can have on those in the armed forces. Impact on family life is the most cited reason why people leave the armed forces, and accommodation is a critical factor in that.

I urge the Minister to look at the contract again, to look at the way CarillionAmey is treating our forces’ families and to do something about it. I think all of us in the House can agree with those sentiments.