(1 year, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 6.
With this it will be convenient to discuss:
Lords amendment 1, and Government amendment (a) to Lords amendment 1.
Lords amendment 16, and Government amendments (a) and (b) to Lords amendment 16.
Lords amendment 15, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 42, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 2 to 5, 7 to 14, 17 to 41 and 43.
It is a great pleasure to open this debate on their lordships’ amendments to the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill, which is a vital part of the Government’s agenda to regulate in a smarter, innovation-friendly way that will grow the UK economy. We have already taken advantage of many of the opportunities that leaving the European Union has created, and Brexit offers us the opportunity to rethink, from first principles, how and when we regulate. Of course, this includes ridding the statute book of unnecessary and burdensome retained EU laws through a process of revoke and reform, while always applying the same rigorous scrutiny to wider regulations that have accumulated over time, to ensure they are fit for purpose and of benefit to the UK.
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker, the Solicitor General just suggested that amendable SIs was a novel procedure—
Order. Stop. That is not a point of order. The hon. Lady has tried to intervene on the Minister. The Minister has already taken her intervention and he is not taking another. It is not a point of order for the Chair. The hon. Lady should not abuse the procedures of the House in this way. I call the Minister.
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I fear I have tried your patience for too long, so I will seek to conclude. I know a number of other right hon. and hon. Members want to catch your eye and I will allow them to do so.
I have set out the Government’s position. It is one that prioritises a clear statute book, that ensures that we have regulation that is fit for purpose and that works for the United Kingdom. I invite all hon. Members to support the Government’s motions today.
(7 years ago)
Commons ChamberOrder. There is very little time left and many people still want to speak. I cannot regulate the length of speeches, but hon. Members can do so if they do not want to incur the wrath of their colleagues who will not get a chance to speak if speeches are too long.
I will try to be brief, Mrs Laing. I wish to address some of the constitutional implications of this extraordinarily important Bill. I suppose that this is the most important constitutional Bill that this House has considered in many years. It is difficult to think of a Bill as important as this one, certainly since 1972.
This is not the first time that this task has been accomplished by sovereign nations. Provisions such as clauses 1, 2, 3 and 4 are to be found, in a simpler form, in the constitutions of a number of Commonwealth countries to which this country granted independence after the second world war. Invariably, those constitutions contained provisions that seek to preserve the laws as at the date that those nations became independent.
Now, they are simpler provisions because the complexity of our laws and the European Union’s laws, with the legal federalism that the EU implies, is much higher. But the essential task that those nations faced was not dissimilar from that which we face. When they became independent and the legal source of their laws changed from being the Queen in Parliament to a constitution, the task that the courts faced was not dissimilar in that, while retaining the body of the law that had existed up to the date of independence, they then became free to interpret those provisions and principles in the light of the new constitutional fact of their independence. And that will be the case for our own Supreme Court. The Bill intends to preserve continuity up to the point of exit day, and to allow the Supreme Court, under clause 6, to diverge where it thinks appropriate and to develop its own jurisprudence over successive years.
I have sat and listened throughout the debates yesterday and today, and it seems to me that we have done something of an injustice to the draftsmen of the Bill. Some very careful thinking has gone into the way in which the provisions have been balanced. I am not saying to Government Front Benchers that it is not possible to tighten some of those provisions and to provide greater safeguards, particularly in respect of the width of the powers permitted under clauses 7 and 17. But I can quite understand the policy and principle behind those provisions in the manner in which they are thus expressed.
Clause 4—we are speaking to the question of whether clause 4 stands part—is obviously an important provision, which seeks to mirror the wording of section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) asked what the word “allowed” meant in clause 4(1)(b) of the Bill. I would propose that, under that clause, the word means to admit, acknowledge or accept into our law. The word “allow” does not only mean to permit. It also carries the connotation of acceptance or admission; it certainly did in 1972. It seems obvious what clause 4 is intended to achieve: to ensure that a law that was enforced, available, recognised and allowed continues beyond exit day, in so far as that has not already been provided for by clauses 2 and 3.
I suggest to the Committee that the provisions introduced by clauses 2 to 4 are sensible, coherent and logical. I am not saying to the Government Front Bench that they cannot be improved, but I certainly understand their import. It is under section 2(1) of the European Communities Act that all the case law, the general principles and the decisions of the European Court of Justice on the interpretation of treaty provisions become admissible and admitted into our law. I take it that clause 4 is intended to achieve precisely that.
Although I accept the need for, perhaps, some tightening, I do not accept that the Bill is as wanting or as deficient as has been suggested. For example, I do not think that clause 7, which we will come to debate at a later stage, is as broad an invitation to the Executive to abuse their discretion as some right hon. and hon. Members have suggested. It is governed by three critical factors. The first is the fact that there has to be a deficiency caused by the withdrawal from the European Union. Now, if the power of the Government is limited by the fact that they have to be curing a deficiency caused by the withdrawal from the EU, it is difficult to see how they thereby gain a licence to interfere with fundamental rights or rights that have been acquired over many years in the decision making of the European Court of Justice.
My general point to those on the Front Bench is this: some parts of the Bill would benefit from some tightening, and perhaps some expression of the limitations on the discretion that is being conferred on the Executive, but I do not accept—I say this to my right hon. and hon. Friends—some of the more exaggerated and, frankly, hysterical analyses of the Bill. It seems to be a reasonably well-judged, measured and balanced set of provisions. Yes, it allows a lot of legal points to be taken, but, frankly, when a legal order is being changed to the extent that this one is, it is not surprising if lawyers are likely to have a field day.
I speak in support of new clauses 28, 30, 60 and 67.
As it stands, this Bill is fatally flawed. It puts huge power into Ministers’ hands without accountability, sidelines Parliament and the devolved Administrations, and puts crucial rights and protections at risk. The Bill also imposes new restrictions on the devolved Administrations. It risks eroding basic human rights and could prevent a transitional deal on the same basic terms that we currently enjoy, including those applying within the single market and the customs union. Such an extreme Brexit was not voted for in the referendum.
It is important that we safeguard the role the EU has played in strengthening and underpinning environmental rights and protections. Most of the UK’s environmental protections stem from EU law and offer us strong safeguards. Safeguarding and protecting the environment lies at the heart of the EU, and these core principles are reflected in its policy and law. I think we know that that is not the case for this Government.
In its current state, the Bill risks leaving dangerous gaps in environmental law. It contains flaws that will leave our natural environment less protected than at present. I want an assurance from the Government that the Bill will convert the entire body of environmental law into domestic law without any watering down, and provide for new governance arrangements so that there is effective implementation of environmental standards, whatever the UK’s future relationship with EU institutions. I want the Bill to restrict the use of secondary legislation before and after Brexit, and to create processes for the robust parliamentary scrutiny of any changes made through secondary legislation during the conversion of EU law. Finally, I want it to ensure that it will be up to devolved Administrations to make their own decisions and laws on those areas that are currently devolved.
I am particularly concerned about the loss of environmental principles. European environmental policy rests on the principles of precaution, prevention and rectifying pollution at its source, as well as that of “polluter pays”. Many of the strongest protections and international commitments to which the UK has signed up are underpinned by general principles of environmental law that are enshrined in EU treaties, but these are all at risk.
Let us put this in perspective by examining what is at stake. We have seen the decline of bees, with 20 bee species lost since 1900 and a further 35 at risk. EU laws on pesticides seek to ensure that potential risks are investigated, but what will happen to that scrutiny?
We must also ensure that the polluter pays. That fundamental principle has led to the improvement of our drinking water and to fines being imposed on operators that are found to have caused pollution, requiring them to repair any damage and to invest in preventive measures. Such laws and principles go a long way in helping to protect and enhance our natural environment. Will the Government continue to issue those fines, or will they bow to the pressure of lobbyists and trade deals? Where is the scrutiny? And where is the precautionary principle, which is also vital to safeguarding our food standards? Will chlorinated chicken from the US enter the UK market? The Bill must ensure at the very least that there will be equivalent provision for environmental standards—[Interruption.]
Order. There are a lot of conversations going on and I cannot hear the hon. Lady. She might be saying something important and the Committee ought to listen.
Thank you, Mrs Laing. I was saying that the Bill must ensure at the very least that there will be equivalent provision for environmental standards and protections, and access to justice, if the UK ends its relationship with EU institutions.
What will the new body look like? The Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has announced the creation of a Commission-like body post Brexit to uphold environmental standards, but he could not say whether it would be able to issue fines or demand change when or if the Government fail to uphold environmental standards. The EU Commission can currently fine the UK when the ECJ finds that it does not uphold environmental standards. Would there be a separate Commission-like body for the devolved Administrations, who make their own laws and should be able to continue to do so? The Secretary of State told the Environmental Audit Committee that he saw distinct bodies for the devolved Administrations, so how will they be funded?
What safeguards are in the Bill to provide that environmental standards will not get even worse? There are none. The Bill takes away the rights and freedoms that we currently enjoy, and once it is in force, it will be impossible to challenge an action in court. The Bill denies us our environmental rights, so I call on the UK Government not to compromise them. I ask them to work collaboratively with our devolved Governments to be ambitious, to commit to stronger environmental protection, and to support new clauses 28, 30, 60 and 67.
On a point of order, Mrs Laing. We have had insufficient time for the debate, certainly to hear from me and others who wanted to speak at greater length about these very important constitutional and environmental issues.
Order. That is not a point of order. We have had three hours on this group and I did beg the hon. Gentleman’s colleagues not to speak for so long so that he could have a chance. I do not know why they spoke as they did in order to stop him.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I seek your guidance concerning the cancellation of the proposed new lorry holding park at Stanford West in Kent to deal with congestion from the port of Dover and Eurotunnel, which was announced in a written statement by the Secretary of State for Transport. We are told that Highways England has been tasked with finding an interim solution by March 2019—the same month that the UK is scheduled to leave the European Union. Given that the Secretary of State last month acknowledged that a no deal Brexit could turn the M20 into a lorry park, have you been given any indication that he will come to the House tomorrow to make a statement as to why, among other things, the Government have so carelessly wasted months and millions of pounds, and have singularly failed to put together a coherent plan to address port congestion at such a critical time for our trading future?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising that matter but, as he is well aware, it is not a point on which the Chair can rule as a point of order. He is clearly seeking a way of bringing the issue to the attention of the House and he has succeeded in so doing. He is well aware that, if he wants to bring a Minister to the Dispatch Box, there are correct procedures whereby he can attempt so to do.
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. You may be aware that very important elections have taken place in Somaliland in recent days, towards which the UK has provided important support. But it has come to my attention that the Prime Minister, when answering a question in Prime Minister’s questions earlier, interchangeably used the words Somaliland and Somalia. Obviously, they are not one and the same, and I wondered how I might be able to encourage the Prime Minister just to be clear on the matter. It is of great concern to Somalilanders, and we should be celebrating the election.
I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman wishes to bring this matter to the attention of the House. It is not a point of order for the Chair, but I am quite sure that Members on the Treasury Bench have heard him.
(8 years ago)
Commons ChamberOrder. Before I call the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) on behalf of the Scottish National party, let me say that we have 19 minutes left in this very important debate and I have noticed several accomplished and learned colleagues attempting to catch my eye. I know they are as capable of making a good argument in three minutes as in 15 minutes, and I implore them to take the former course.
We have heard many heartfelt contributions to this debate from Members on both sides of the House and I recognise the strength of feeling on this issue. Time does not permit me—
Order. I think the hon. and learned Gentleman is seeking the leave of the House to respond to the debate.
I certainly am. I seek the leave of the House to respond to the debate, but time does not permit me to say much more.
I congratulate the hon. and learned Gentleman on his excellent brevity.
Question put,
Order. If Members are leaving the Chamber following the previous business, I hope that they will have the courtesy to be quiet while we begin the next business.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI will continue now, if I may, to allow for the many other speakers who want to speak this afternoon.
If encouragement or assistance is given for others to commit suicide, individuals are answerable for their actions, but when appropriate, the law takes a compassionate approach. Patients at the end of life are very vulnerable to influence, particularly from those providing care. Just yesterday a specialist consultant in palliative care told me of his concerns about any change in the law in this area. He told me of an incident which, he said, was not isolated, but typical. He said: “I had a single male patient who was dying of cancer. Life was difficult for him; he had an estranged daughter who confided in me that her father had asked to be taken to Switzerland because his life was not worth living. His daughter had left home quite early in life and they had lost all contact. I talked with him and he told me how proud he was that she had become a head teacher, he himself having been a teacher earlier in his life. I encouraged him to get to know his daughter again, to tell her he loved her, and that he was proud of her. They did so and they spent the last two weeks of his life together in the hospice having these conversations, which meant so much to both of them.” Is not that the approach that we should take towards those at the end of their life?
The consultant continued, “We”—that is, doctors—“have real concerns that it would place us in a very difficult position if the law is changed, since at the heart of what we do is the tenet that we should do no harm to our patients. So for someone to have their life terminated would place our relationship on a very different footing.” Doctors do not want the relationship of trust between doctor and patients fractured. That surely is why the DPP guidelines tend towards prosecution if assistance with suicide is given by a doctor or nurse as part of their clinical relationship with the patient.
Several disability groups have told me that they would be extremely concerned should there be any change in the law—that is, in this relationship—a change which could well occur should doctors, such as the consultant I mentioned, have the “option to kill”—as he put it—their patients as one of their choices.
Unlike Oregon, where assisted suicide was made legal in 1997, we have specialist palliative care in the UK, with a full four-year training programme. Oregon has had a four and a half-fold rise in assisted suicides since it legalised the practice in 1997, a practice that would result in over 1,100 assisted suicides in this country on a population basis. And Oregon’s safeguards are paper-thin. The Royal College of Physicians has stated that physician assisted suicide
“would fundamentally alter the role of the doctor and their relationship with their patient. Medical attendants should be present to preserve and improve life—if they are also involved in the taking of life, this creates a conflict that is potentially very damaging.”
Help the Hospices says:
“It is right that actions by a care professional are treated differently from actions by a friend or family member”.
Baroness Campbell of Surbiton, speaking on behalf of disabled groups, has said that a change in the law
“wouldn’t just apply to the terminally ill, no matter what the campaigners may say. It would affect disabled people too, not to mention the elderly. A change in the law. . . would alter the mindset of the medical and social care professions, persuading more and more people that actually the prospect of an ‘easy’ way out is what people such as me really want. Well, the vast majority of us do not.”
The motion should keep the DPP guidelines as they are, and support improved care at the end of life.
I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman has enlivened the debate, but does he agree that although some people will always do the wrong thing—there will always be such a minority—it is always up to the House and Parliament to create laws that allow the vast majority of people to do what is right?
That is precisely the situation that we have, and that situation has been clarified and developed further by the DPP; that is why we are, totally correctly, praising him in this debate. However, to think that the world is populated by people of great charity who think only of the person on the receiving end is to mislead ourselves, look foolish before our electors, and do vulnerable people harm.
I disagree with the second point that my hon. Friend the Member for Poplar and Limehouse made; I do not believe that we are autonomous. I find it amazing that those who are clearly on the centre left should have an individualistic view about human life. We are dependent on one another, and one person’s actions can affect another person. One might have a slightly different view if there had not been a whole series of reports about the horrors done to old people in hospitals and euphemistically named care homes. We tut, nod the reports through the House, and do damn all about them. We as a nation allow very nasty things to happen to many of our vulnerable constituents, and we do nothing, or very little, to prevent them.
Today’s debate, if I have understood it, is not really about the motion, or how it was seconded; it is about the amendment that my right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, Deptford, tabled, not because hon. Members wanted to talk about euthanasia, but because they believed that the amendment would be seen as a staging post on the way to gaining that objective. Although we are now confused about what we are supposed to be debating and what we are voting on, I hope that the House will agree with what the outside world thinks the debate is about, and what I read the motion on the Order Paper as being about.
We usually begin this sort of debate by congratulating the hon. Member who secured it, and that is usually done as a courteous opening, but today I genuinely heap praise on my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Richard Ottaway)—ah, here he comes—and the Backbench Business Committee for having secured the debate. It is pretty scandalous that the House of Commons has not debated this important subject for 40 years. Courage has been lacking but it is here today and there have been some wonderful and courageous speeches from Members across the House. It is strange that there should be reluctance to debate this issue because the one thing that is certain in all our lives is that they will end and death will come. Most of us do not know or want to think about the manner of our death, but there are some people who do know what the manner of their death will be because of the illness or disability from which they are suffering and know that they are suffering.
My hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South mentioned Melanie Reid, the columnist on The Times, who has become tetraplegic as a result of an accident. She has written an inspirational column these past 18 months. She says in this morning’s paper that
“there is no point keeping humans alive just for the sake of it, when they don’t want to be, in circumstances which we and they regard as intolerable. And if they need help to achieve a good death, in the comfort and peace of their own home, we should be able to give it to them.”
And so we should.
Many hon. Members have spoken about choice and palliative care, but palliative care does not work for everyone. If it did, we would not have a problem and we would not be having this debate. Some people who are in the final stages of life have intolerable and untreatable suffering and pain. They have no choice, and they deserve our compassion. Although I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr Leigh) about the right to life being paramount, we cannot ignore quality of life at its end.
The guidelines protect a person’s dignity by allowing them to die in a manner of their choice, rather than going sooner than they should have to, but while they still can, to a foreign country to die with dignity. My hon. Friend the Member for South Basildon and East Thurrock (Stephen Metcalfe) paid tribute to Nicky Dalladay. Nicky is also a friend of mine and lives in my constituency. I have watched her cope courageously over the years with a degenerative illness. She has urged me to be outspoken on this matter, which I am happy to be. Her husband looks after her with compassion every day, and one day he might have to help her to die, also with compassion. That is his only motivation and it is up to us in the House to protect someone who acts in such a way.
I welcome the clarification provided by the Director of Public Prosecutions. It is very important that Parliament today endorses the DPP’s guidelines. I am persuaded by the Solicitor-General that amendment (a) is not necessary, but I support amendment (b) and the hospice movement in general. I hope the House will show compassion and support the main motion today.
(13 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI understand the other point that the hon. Gentleman made, and I hope to deal with it shortly.
If the hon. Lady does not mind, I will make a little progress—oh, all right. The hon. Lady is very enticing.
I thank the hon. Gentleman. I seek, just once, to help him. I do not know whether he is aware that Winston Churchill, speaking at the Congress of Europe in The Hague in 1948, said:
“The Movement for European Unity must be a positive force, deriving its strength from our sense of common spiritual values… based upon moral conceptions and inspired by a sense of mission. In the centre of our movement stands the idea of a Charter of Human Rights, guarded by freedom and sustained by law.”
I hope that that helps the hon. Gentleman.
It does help me, and I think that it helps the House as well. What Britain was seeking to do was enshrine throughout the rest of Europe the freedoms that we had enjoyed for centuries in this country from the Bill of Rights onwards. That was Churchill’s vision.
Even in Britain, rights have been won thanks to the Court. The Attorney-General cited a couple of instances in which he agreed with the Court and disagreed with the previous Labour Government. Successive Governments, for instance, held out against allowing gays in the military in this country. It was the European Court that insisted in 1999, and today I am not aware of a single Member of Parliament who thinks that someone should be sacked from the Army, the Navy or the RAF solely by virtue of his or her sexuality. Likewise, it was as a result of the Court’s judgment in the case brought by Denise Matthews against the Labour Government that Gibraltarians were granted the right to vote in elections to the European Parliament in 2004. So Labour supports the European Court, but as a critical friend.
We have heard several criticisms of the Court’s operation today. Let me add a couple. The court has a backlog of many thousands of cases, which would take 47 years to complete. Its members are not all equally qualified. It has no effective triage system to filter out vexatious claims of little or no merit. There is no requirement for an appellant to seek leave to appeal to the Court from a national court in the first place, which is something that we might want to consider. Most important, some of its members believe that they are, or should be, a supreme court for all the contracting parties—to which I simply say that they are wrong.
Every high or supreme court in Europe has a democratic safety valve which allows its duly elected Assembly or Parliament to overrule the courts in certain circumstances. In the UK, that is our parliamentary sovereignty. We firmly contend that the 1688 Bill of Rights was right to assert that proceedings in Parliament cannot be
“impeached or questioned in any Court or Place”.
I apologise for not being in the Chamber earlier, as I was in the Armed Forces Bill Committee. That got me thinking that this Government have done nothing to make it easier for our gallant men and women serving overseas to get the vote—I will not repeat the arguments that we have had on the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill—but seem rather keen to help criminals to get the vote. I hope that the Attorney-General will reflect on that.
In fact, it was the previous Government who did nothing to help our armed forces to get the vote. Some of us argued from the Opposition Benches, hour after hour, day after day, to try to make the Government do something about it, and eventually, three months before the election, they did.
I have a great deal of time for the hon. Lady, but on this occasion she and I will have to disagree, although I hope she will be agreeing with me next Tuesday and Wednesday as we play ping-pong with the other place.
I have been raising the issue of prisoner voting rights for several months, particularly with reference to the Scottish Parliament elections. It is incredibly disappointing that none of the Scottish nationalists saw fit to grace us with their presence today, given that it is their Government in Scotland who have responsibility for the forthcoming parliamentary and local government elections next year. I raised the matter with the Cabinet Secretary for Justice last year. I do not intend to go through all the correspondence that my colleagues and I have had with him and with ministerial teams on this. However, the situation has been confirmed to me and to my colleague, Richard Baker, who is, for now, the shadow Minister but will, I am sure, become Justice Secretary. The SNP Government have not even bothered to write to the Deputy Prime Minister—who, let us be clear, is behind the move to give prisoners the right to vote—to express the Scottish people’s opposition to it.
My hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West (Sir Peter Bottomley) is right in much of what he says. He does not have a lot of support in the House today, but I agree with him that we ought to have another debate to consider the issues in greater detail and singly.
This issue is far more complex than it at first appears, and certainly more than the Daily Mail and others would have us believe. There is no question of criminals who have been convicted of serious crimes being given the vote as a result of today’s debate. The ECHR does not require it, the Government do not propose it and the vast majority of the British people—and, I think, of Members of this place—are firmly against it. The Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform took evidence last week, and we published a short report in an attempt to inform the debate. I am pleased that my hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Claire Perry) mentioned that, and that other Members have said that, after listening to the debate and reading the Committee’s report, they have thought about the matter more carefully than before.
The point made by the court in the case of Hirst is that
“there has to be a sufficient and discernible link between the conduct and the nature of the punishment.”
As Lord Mackay told the Committee last week,
“if somebody commits a crime of serious violence…one can argue…that is a fundamental attack on the basic human rights of the victim…and, therefore, it is perfectly reasonable, as part of the punishment, that the deprivation of the right to vote should be imposed.”
As I understand it, the hon. Lady is proceeding on the principle of “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”. Like the hon. Member for Glasgow South West (Mr Davidson), who is no longer in his place, I am not a lawyer, but I thought that British justice had abandoned that principle.
I am not saying that at all; the hon. Lady has totally misinterpreted what I have said.
Mr Hirst, who brought the case, helpfully submitted evidence to the Select Committee, in which he said that he
“calls into question the purported authority of the HoC Political and Constitutional Reform Committee to investigate a matter already decided by the highest court in Europe”.
Mr Hirst further accused me, as the acting Chairman of that Committee, of ignorance of the law. Okay, I know that it is difficult to admit it this afternoon, but I was once a lawyer. He goes on to threaten:
“Neither the Council of Europe nor I will let the UK off the hook with this one.”
Well, it is time that someone stood up to Mr Hirst, given all the taxpayers’ money that he has spent on legal aid in bringing this case, which is causing nothing but trouble for the Government, Parliament, our courts and our prisons.
My hon. Friend has hit the nail on the head. This is about malice on the part of this individual and about compensation money, which is wholly unacceptable.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right.
Mr Hirst killed a woman with an axe. He pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility, and his guilty plea was accepted on the basis of medical evidence that he was amoral—that is, he had no moral judgment. I would argue strongly that Mr Hirst took away the right to life of the woman he killed, and that he therefore deserves to lose some of his rights. Criminals who have broken the law forfeit some of their rights. I am sorry to disagree with something that my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing Central and Acton (Angie Bray) said earlier. Having a vote is not a privilege; it is a right. However, it is not an absolute right; it is a right with conditions attached, and this Parliament can attach those conditions.
I will vote for the motion before us today, but I also say to the Government that there is a way through this problem. We in this Parliament can adhere to our British principle that the loss of the right to vote is part of the punishment for those who commit a serious crime while at the same time fulfilling our obligations to the rule of law under the European convention, which the UK drafted in the first place. We can do that by drawing a distinction between different crimes, and by introducing some judicial discretion in sentencing, based on legislation. That would mean that we would no longer have a blanket ban on prisoners voting, but that only a very small category of prisoners would be able to vote. I do not have time to go into detail this afternoon, but I commend to Ministers and to the House the evidence given to the Select Committee on 1 February. Learned lawyers—very good ones, too—gave evidence on how a way through this could be found.
I also want to say something about public opinion. We have to be careful about this, because public opinion has been whipped up on this subject. There are people in prison who deserve not only retribution but sympathy and help. Edmund Burke said in his speech to the electors of Bristol in 1774:
“Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”
Lord Mackay of Clashfern told the Select Committee last week that
“the rule of law is very valuable to us. We tend to take it for granted but we need to make sure that we do not let it slip.”
It is only by upholding the rule of law that we can play our part in enabling the European Court of Human Rights to hold other countries to account when serious breaches of human rights occur. This afternoon, however, it is our duty to make it clear that this Parliament has at last considered this matter, and that it has a decisive view that, in most circumstances and with few exceptions, a criminal conviction carries with it the loss of the right to vote.