Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Conor McGinn Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Monday 22nd March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Chris Philp]

We had a very constructive debate on the Bill when it passed through the House last year, and I am delighted to speak to it again this evening.

Lords amendment 18, in the name of Lord Anderson of Ipswich, proposes a new upper time limit of four years for the duration of a terrorism prevention and investigation measure. The Bill as originally drafted sought to remove the current two-year limit and instead enable a TPIM to be renewed annually for as long as necessary. Having carefully considered the amendment tabled by Lord Anderson and consulted with him, the Government, in disagreeing with the amendment, have tabled amendments (a) to (e) in lieu, which set a five-year limit instead of a four-year limit.

I am given to understand that the noble Lord Anderson is content with that, and we believe that it represents a reasonable compromise between a desire to set a reasonable limit on the maximum duration of TPIMs and protecting our fellow citizens. We heard evidence from Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques during the passage of the Bill that occasions have arisen when there has been a cliff edge and people have posed a risk to the public after the expiry of a TPIM. The Government believe that a five-year hard time limit is, ultimately, a reasonable compromise.

Of course, TPIMs are reviewable on an ongoing basis. They are reviewed and renewed, and if somebody ceases to be a threat, the TPIM will be discontinued. Under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, there is not only an ability to have regular review hearings under section 9 but a right to appeal to the courts under section 16 for people wishing to challenge a decision for their TPIM notice to be extended. Given Lord Anderson’s agreement that five years rather than four is reasonable, I hope that the House will consent to our proposed amendments (a) to (e) in lieu.

Lords amendment 17 was a concession made in the Lords, and the Government will therefore support it. It elevates the burden of proof required before imposing a TPIM from reasonable suspicion, as originally proposed in the Bill, up to reasonable belief, which is a slightly higher standard of proof. Again, I hope the House will agree that this represents a reasonable compromise between this House and the upper House. The Government believe that with that slightly higher standard of proof, we can still keep our fellow citizens safe, and we feel that Lords amendment 17 strikes the right balance. We will therefore be supporting it, and it is backed up by Lords amendment 19, which creates an ongoing annual review by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation of the use of TPIMs, commencing for the first time next year.

I do not want to detain the House long with the other amendments, because there are a total of 77 and I do not wish to go through all of them one by one. [Hon. Members: “Go on!”] I can hear that there is enthusiasm for that, but I am going to disappoint the audience by not going through each one individually. I will just say that a number of them relate to the devolved Administrations. In particular, we have removed the polygraph clauses from Scotland and Northern Ireland, because the legislative power already exists there, should those Administrations wish to use it. We have also made some technical changes concerned with single terming in Scottish law, and some technical amendments that are consequent on the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill.

In summary and conclusion—always a popular phrase—I think we have now arrived at a good set of measures, which will protect the public while also respecting and protecting fundamental rights. I therefore commend these amendments to the House.

[Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the Minister, and I will not detain the House long or speak to each of the 77 amendments. However, there are some issues that I want to raise. I will start by thanking the Minister; I know we had a robust exchange today across the Dispatch Box, and I am sure we will have many more, but his conduct in speaking to and informing me over the course of not just this weekend, but the passage of the Bill, has been exemplary. I want to acknowledge that.

Clearly, we also want to thank those across counter-terrorism, policing and the security services and all their partners who selflessly put themselves in harm’s way to advance the effort to keep people safe. Following the horrific events of Fishmongers’ Hall, Streatham, Reading, and the Manchester Arena attack and others like it, I think that everyone across this Chamber acknowledged that there was a clear need for a change, both in legislation and approach. These Lords amendments, and particularly those that the Government have accepted, speak to the heart of that, and it is why we welcomed and supported this Bill in principle all along. It has returned to us from the other place in better shape, and I am pleased to see that some of the proposals that we made in Committee have influenced it.

However, even as amended, it is arguable whether any of what the Government have brought forward in the Bill would have had a significant role in preventing any of those attacks. I do not think there are many new tools here, if any, that the Government did not already have at their disposal. Since the passage of the Bill began, we learned that the perpetrator of the Fishmongers’ Hall attack was deemed a high-risk, category A prisoner before his release, and that there was intelligence suggesting he might be planning an attack. We know that the perpetrator of the Reading attack had been released from prison only two weeks previously, following a 17-month sentence for affray and assault, raising concerns about the influence and consequences of radicalisation in prisons, and that the ongoing inquiry into the Manchester Arena attack has already identified some serious questions about how terrorist suspects are monitored, as well as aspects of security around major events. We know that the number of offenders on licence for terrorism-related convictions recalled to prisons is steadily rising for 2020; up to just June of that year, it had doubled from what it was a decade before. That is why it was surprising for me to find out that the Government do not have any idea how many terrorist suspects are rearrested following their release after previously being arrested or charged.

On the specifics of the amendments, particularly Lords amendment 17, Lords amendment 18 and amendments (a) to (e) in lieu, the Government initially rejected our call for a review of so-called lone wolf terrorists last summer. We have since learned that they have, in fact, conducted one, but they are not willing to share the results or make clear the impact or actions that have come out of it. I have asked for a briefing on it and have not heard back. I do not think that is in keeping with my experience of my relationship with the Minister and his colleagues, and I hope that we can find a way to resolve that. [Interruption.] The Minister says from a sedentary position that it is a different Minister. He is right, but it is the same Department, and I trust that now and again they cross each other’s paths and liaise on matters relating to the Home Department.

We note the announcement in last week’s integrated review that the Government intend to set up a new counter-terrorism operations centre, but there is nothing in this Bill about that, and we have little detail about how it fits into current structures, where it will be based, who it will be accountable to and what it will do. Of course we then have the ongoing review of Prevent. Things move quickly in the sphere of counter-terrorism, and it is important that the police, the security services, their operational colleagues, this House and, above all, the British public have confidence that the Government are adapting to emerging threats and, indeed, pre-empting them. Tough talk is fine, but we need to see it matched with tough action.

In Committee, we tabled amendments that would, for example, have led to additional judicial oversight and an even higher burden of proof, and compelled the publication of an exit strategy for TPIMs. I think I argued rightly that it is not in the interests of anyone to allow individuals to remain on TPIMs indefinitely, not least in terms of bringing them to justice.

On the issue of the burden of proof, we want TPIMs to be robust but flexible. That is why we struggle to see the logic in lowering the standard of proof, whether from a procedural, administrative or operational perspective, because no prior TPIM request had been rejected at that threshold, proving that it was no impediment. That is why we tabled an amendment that would have raised the standard of proof, like the Government are proposing now some nine months later, to try to find a middle way on “reasonable and probable grounds”. The provisions before us now effectively retain that higher standard, and of course we welcome that.

We acknowledge the work of colleagues in the other place on Lords amendment 18 and the amendments in lieu in the Minister’s name. We welcome the fact that the Government have responded to our concerns and those raised by hon. Members across this House and, indeed, those in the other place, accepting the general principle of Lord Anderson’s amendment but making the limit of a TPIM notice five years rather than four. We accept that; it is a good concession. As I said before, however, we will endeavour to monitor its workings and impact as we move forward.

Again, we acknowledge the Government’s response to issues raised about the use of the polygraph. That is welcome too, and I appreciate the Minister’s engagement on that with the official Opposition and colleagues from other parts of the UK.

Finally, we welcome Lords amendment 19. We believe that the framework around TPIMs will undoubtedly be improved and enhanced by the input of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.

We will always be uncompromising in tackling terrorism and, in that spirit, willing to compromise and work constructively with the Government. That has been our approach throughout the Bill’s passage, and it is good to see that, in large part, the Government have listened to our concerns. However, I raise those questions, particularly because, as the Minister will be aware, this is a fast-changing environment and we need to be responsive. Getting that right is of the gravest importance for us all. Alongside scrutinising and, as appropriate and without apology, criticising the Government, I will always commit to working together where we can in this endeavour.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

I have been encouraged by those here physically who tell me that they will make short contributions to try to do this without imposing a time limit. May I encourage those participating remotely, if they have prepared short speeches, to stick with the speeches they have prepared?

Draft Extradition Act 2003 (Codes of Practice and Transit Code of Practice) Order 2021

Conor McGinn Excerpts

Wednesday 17th March 2021 General Committees

[Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for the first time, Mrs Miller. I thank the Minister for his good wishes for St Patrick’s day, and I extend mine to all colleagues in the Committee.

The Opposition will not oppose the codes. They are functional and practical, clarifying roles, responsibilities, and the need for officers to understand and uphold rights. I thank the Minister and his private office for their customary courtesy in engaging with us on these matters. I do have some questions for him, however.

First, we welcome the fact that both codes have been duly strengthened by feedback from relevant agencies, organisations, operational partners and, indeed, devolved institutions where appropriate, during a process of consultation. It is our view that such consultation is not simply a tool of scrutiny and oversight; it often vastly improves policy. The changes made in the SI, such as greater clarity on procedural rights throughout the extradition process and more clarity on the new power of arrest, are testament to that.

On the consultation, the formal response paper published by the Home Office outlines that suggestions were put forward on the issue of search and seizure of provisions, and indeed on legal professional privilege material, but it then concluded that these concerns were already adequately reflected in the codes. Can the Minister give some additional assurances on that? Perhaps he could explain what the original concerns were and why they would be raised if they had already been addressed. As I have said in previous Committees on which we have served together, I understand that officials are not present and I am happy for the Minister to write to me, because these are technical matters.

Secondly, we also know that concerns were raised about the then unknown future provisions for extradition proceedings with EU member states post Brexit, and of course about the lack of clarity right up to the 11th hour. I have great sympathy with such concerns: they are an expression of similar ones outlined by Opposition colleagues and those across the House on many occasions. But now we know about the arrangements, however, so can the Minister update us on their implementation? What are the experiences of police and operational partners on their operational efficacy? In practical terms, are they working? In short, is extradition now working as frictionlessly as under the previous regime?

I can give the Minister some feedback, which perhaps he might pass on to his colleague the Prime Minister. It comes not from the Opposition but from some of his own colleagues, including former Cabinet Minister David Lidington and other esteemed and highly regarded Conservative Ministers, who said in February that the Prime Minister was not being ambitious enough on security relations with our closest partners, and that the UK is less safe and secure as a result—not least given that, they say, some criminals will not be extradited under the current state of play. It is incumbent on the Minister to respond to some of those charges, because they are quite significant.

Finally, on the new power of arrest, we have always said that we would look studiously at the practical implementation and operational impact of the Extradition (Provisional Arrest) Act 2020 during its passage. Can the Minister give us an update on how it is functioning? Is it working, and what has been the feedback from operational partners?

To conclude, we will not oppose the SI. As I have said, the codes are practical and functional, and we do not wish to impede the measures or put operational clarity at risk for police working in this field, but we welcome the changes that have come out of the consultation.

As I have said on many occasions before, national security and the protection of families and communities is, and always will be, a top priority for the Labour party. On extradition, as elsewhere, our approach will always be one that supports our hard-working police and their strategic colleagues as they undertake vital tasks, while also ensuring that we place rights and freedoms at the heart of everything we do.

[Kevin Foster]

I thank the shadow Minister for the overall constructive tone of the comments that he has just made, and for the general support that he provides as shadow Minister to work in this area. We agree that people who have committed serious crimes that would be crimes in the United Kingdom should not escape to our shores as a way to avoid justice and facing cases that they are rightfully being asked to answer in foreign jurisdictions.

I will respond to the three specific questions that the hon. Gentleman asks. On the first one, I am happy to provide slightly more detail in writing. I can provide some reassurance that, in many cases, the codes of practice are very similar to the codes of practice under PACE. There is a lot of similarity, and in many cases the police would normally follow those as a default if there were any uncertainty about things such as legal access, the position with lawyers, and of course the very important principle of legal privilege and people being able to access legal advice during a process where potentially their liberty may be on the line.

On the operational positions with the European Union, our initial feedback is that they appear to be working fairly well. For clarity, those under the former European arrest warrant were carried over into the new system, and surrender requests have been issued under the new system. Our understanding from police operational colleagues is that they are working fairly well; of course, it is too early to have published detailed figures and analysis. I am sure that the shadow Minister will accept that we need to have had a period with them in place, and particularly a period without a global pandemic, which is inherently reducing people’s ability to travel and therefore to attempt to come to or leave the UK, if they are wanted for an offence.

The shadow Minister will be aware that some EU states have fundamental bars on the extradition of their own nationals beyond the European Union. I have placed in the Library the list of countries that have given us those notifications. We continue to engage with them, but to be clear we do not have a principle of reciprocity. We believe quite firmly as a Government that if our nationals have a case to answer in a friendly democracy on a matter that would be an offence here in the UK, and we are satisfied that it is not a political crime or charge, they should go to that country and answer that case.

The shadow Minister rightly highlighted the new provisions that allow police officers to arrest someone where there is evidence that they are wanted for a serious crime by one of our key international partners, certified by the National Crime Agency. Again, we very much appreciated his support during the process for that legislation. As he will know, there have been incidents where a police officer with access to Interpol and certified alerts encountered someone here in the UK and, because of a loophole in the law, could not immediately detain them pending a formal request for extradition of that person being made—in one case, that resulted in a child sex offender literally being able to walk away from the police, even though they were wanted in a friendly jurisdiction.

Those measures are starting and they are working. Police officers already had the information that they needed on their systems. The best way of putting it is that it has cleaned up and made much simpler the process of quickly bringing someone into custody if they are wanted. For the benefit of the Committee, I should say that the countries that it affects are effectively our Five Eyes partners. They are the main ones that we have designated so far, and we could of course designate more friendly democratic countries whose criminal justice systems we are satisfied operate independently of any political or other concerns.

Finally, it is worth putting on the record that the two orders do not extend or change in any way the matters for which someone can be extradited from this country. To again reassure the Committee, we would permit transit only where it is between countries to which we would usually extradite. The Committee will be aware that we do not agree extradition to all countries in the world, given our concerns about human rights.

[Conor McGinn]

You do trade deals, though.

[Kevin Foster]

We are not proposing to do a trade deal with one or two countries, that is for sure. To reassure the Committee, we would not allow transit if, for example, the death penalty may be an issue, such as in the United States. We would seek our normal death penalty assurances if transit were happening through the United Kingdom, or for matters that were not crimes within the United Kingdom.

I think that this has been a productive session, and we look forward to getting the measures in place on 1 May.

Question put and agreed to.

Draft Authority to Carry Scheme and Civil Penalties Regulations 2021

Conor McGinn Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd March 2021 General Committees

[Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship for the first time, Dr Huq, and it is always a delight to see the Minister in his place and to follow him on behalf of the Opposition.

As I have said before, the security of our country and its citizens is a top priority for the Opposition. Strengthening protections at our borders is integral to keeping the public safe, and we fully agree that our authorities should be able to pre-emptively stop and disrupt individuals posing a significant threat, terrorism related or otherwise, from travelling to or from the UK. We recognise, therefore, the practical necessity for an efficient and effective authority to carry scheme to ensure that those individuals cannot make their way into this country. We recognise also the need to update the 2015 legislation to reflect new and changed circumstances, particularly regarding the deportation and exclusion of European economic area nationals post Brexit, and including those affected by recent travel-related sanctions. Of course we, like the Government, would not have wanted the existing scheme to lapse without an adequate replacement, as it otherwise would have done in April 2022.

We welcome these measures, which will relieve our hard-working UK border officials and their operational partners of additional and unnecessary burdens, because they will not have to stop, process and report people at the border. We also recognise the vital importance of ensuring that people who pose a threat to our safety and way of life never make it to these shores.

However, even as we support these measures today, the Minister will understand that we have some questions to ask, particularly on some of the technical implications of the scheme. First, what discussions has the Home Office had with UK Border Force and its operational partners, not just on the proposed renewed scheme but on the effectiveness of the strengthened 2015 model, and are UK Border Force and its operational partners in full accordance with the proposals? Also, what benefits and challenges have they identified in relation to the new proposed arrangements?

Secondly, could the Minister update the Committee on the effectiveness of the scheme and carriers’ compliance, and does he have any information on where it has worked well and where it has not worked so well? The explanatory memorandum says that “Updated guidance” for carriers and

“industry on the operation of the 2021 Scheme and penalty regime”

will be provided, but it does not make clear when. Could he clarify that, not just for us here but of course for the carriers themselves, who at this current time, more than ever, will want maximum operational clarity?

Regarding the maximum penalty for carriers, can the Minister confirm that it will remain at £50,000? What assessment has the Department made about the effectiveness of that figure as a deterrent? Have any carriers actually being fined this amount? If not, is it a realistic amount and does it work as a deterrent? Will the 2021 scheme, if it is passed, be monitored and reviewed regularly by Ministers? And when, if at all, will the scheme be up for renewal?

I appreciate that some of those questions are technical questions, so I am very happy for the Minister to write to me if he does not have the information to hand now.

In summary, however, we find these measures to be reasonable, proportionate and practical, as we said in 2015, when a predecessor of mine in this role—David Hanson— responded to the Government. While it is important that we ensure that the existing regime does not collapse without the maintenance of these measures, it is also right that we subject them to scrutiny, as we have done today, because the safety and protection of the public is the responsibility of us all. I know that the carriers themselves take their duties seriously, and we in this place must ensure that we provide clear and robust regulations to support them.

Oral Answers to Questions

Conor McGinn Excerpts

Monday 8th February 2021 Commons Chamber

[Kit Malthouse]

I am slightly mystified by the hon. Lady’s attempt at surprise, not least because I think there was an exchange at this Dispatch Box some months ago when we discussed the serious violence taskforce, and, indeed, there have been previous questions. The Prime Minister—given that he had been a renowned crime-fighting Mayor—decided on coming to office that he wanted to take leadership of the crime effort himself, so we created the criminal justice taskforce. Beneath that sits the National Policing Board, and a performance board sits beneath that. That is all focused largely on fighting violent crime.

Our commitment to fighting violent crime remains strong. Just this morning, I was able to announce an extra £35 million of funding into violence reduction units, a very large proportion of which will obviously come to London. Both the Prime Minister and I have experience of fighting crime, and along with the Home Secretary—who was previously chair of the all-party parliamentary group on victims and witnesses of crime—have shown enormous commitment to this issue over a prolonged period, and that will continue into the future.

[Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)]

Crime has not stopped because of covid-19. After a brief respite during the first lockdown, the Department’s own figures show that overall violent crime is rising, and that drug and firearms-related offences are back at previous levels. The Government received the findings of Sir Craig Mackey’s review into serious and organised crime last February and told the House in June that the recommendations were being considered, but, as of today, they still have not come forward with them. So can I ask what we are waiting for and what it is that Ministers have been doing for the last year?

[Kit Malthouse]

As I am sure the hon. Gentleman knows, we have been dealing over the past year with a pandemic—it might have passed him by, but it has not the rest of us. That pandemic has had a significant impact on UK policing, its disposition, what it has been involved in and, critically, the types of crime and the trends in crime that it has been dealing with.

The hon. Gentleman is correct that post the second lockdown we saw a surge in violence for one particular month. That number has stabilised since, and we are trying to understand, by research and analysis, what the implications of the pandemic have been for crime and therefore what they are for the police. Alongside that, we have been in conversations with our partners at the National Crime Agency, with chief constables involved in serious and organised crime and with territorial forces about what the disposition of serious and organised crime should look like into the future, and we will be making announcements about how it will be disposed in the near future.

Oral Answers to Questions

Conor McGinn Excerpts

Monday 14th December 2020 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

National security remains our absolute priority. This country is a safe country and will remain so after the end of the transition period. The hon. Lady asks what alternative arrangements are in place. Obviously, we continue the negotiations and await their outcome, but we are prepared for a range of scenarios. In the event that it is not possible to reach an agreement, the UK has well developed and well rehearsed plans in place. They involve transitioning co-operation with EU member states to alternative, non-EU arrangements by the end of the transition period. These are tried and tested mechanisms, which the UK already uses with so many other countries.

[Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)]

The Minister recently wrote to me that, in the event of no deal on policing and security co-operation, the UK would fall back on non-EU arrangements. Does he agree with the former National Security Adviser’s comments this weekend that these fallbacks are all “slower and more clunky” and that they would leave us all less safe? Moreover, when the current head of UK Counter Terrorism Policing said that we need an agreement that retains or improves levels of co-operation, can the Minister promise the police, the Security Service and, most importantly, the British public that this Government will deliver precisely that?

[James Brokenshire]

I have already said that this country will remain one of the safest places in the world. It is worth underlining to the hon. Gentleman that the UK will continue to be a global leader on national security; we are now and we will remain so in the future. I hope that, equally, he will note the level of preparedness and the hard work by our police and all our other agencies to ensure that we are well prepared for the end of the transition period to give that assurance to the public over their safety and security and welfare and wellbeing, which absolutely remain a priority for this Government.

Draft Law Enforcement and Security (Separation Issues etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

Conor McGinn Excerpts

Wednesday 18th November 2020 General Committees

[Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg, although as your constituency neighbour and very much the junior partner in that relationship, it feels like I am getting my homework marked by the Chair—but it is genuinely a pleasure to see you in the Chair.

As has been said, this statutory instrument makes the necessary amendments to UK law to give effect to the separation provisions concerning law enforcement and criminal justice co-operation contained within the withdrawal and separation agreements. It facilitates legal and operational clarity on the winding-down of ongoing operations at the end of the transition period. The regulations also address several deficiencies in retained EU law that would otherwise arise following the transition period.

I make it clear that we will not oppose today’s regulations—they are necessary to ensure the ongoing integrity of continuing operations—but I want to raise some important concerns. I hope the Minister will take the opportunity to address them. While acknowledging that the instrument contains technical amendments, we also understand that they are necessary to meet our legal international obligations. It is good to see the Government agree on the importance of that point.

We are a responsible Opposition and want to ensure a functioning statute book after the transition period ends, and to make domestic law as clear as possible. We also recognise that UK law enforcement and its partners, which keep us safe, must have confidence that outstanding cases do not grind to a halt, which would compromise our ability to resolve serious cases, tackle criminality, prevent terrorism and protect our borders. Will the Minister take the opportunity to update us on what discussions he has had with UK agencies and with his European counterparts to allay such immediate and imminent fears and communicate that robust joint mechanisms will be in place to ensure relevant cases can be actioned with confidence, and not delayed or stopped?

The crux of the Government’s argument today rests on providing certainty—that is the claim at least—both operationally and legally to UK law enforcement and the public. I listened carefully to the Minister’s insistence that the regulations are a technical necessity to ensure the smooth transition to alternative arrangements. He also acknowledged that any clarity or certainty provided here is extremely narrow and limited.

We are hardly delivering certainty and confidence when now, just days away from the negotiation deadline and weeks away from the end of the transition period, UK law enforcement and security services still do not know what legal and regulatory framework they will be winding down to, nor what the practical, day-to-day impact of any security and criminal justice deal, or indeed no deal at all, will be on their ability to keep the public safe.

The Government need to be clear with law enforcement and the intelligence and security services, but most importantly, with the British people about what alternative —prospectively weaker—capabilities will mean for the UK’s security apparatus and our ability to protect the public.

On 5 November, the Minister told the House that if

“negotiations…do not conclude successfully, we will move back to pre-existing tools and powers.”—[Official Report, 5 November 2020; Vol. 683, c. 528.]

Two weeks earlier, on 19 October, the Minister for the Cabinet Office implied, in response to a question from the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), that under such a scenario, we could

“intensify the security that we give to British people”.—[Official Report, 19 October 2020; Vol. 682, c. 761.]

Can the Minister tell us what that means? From a senior member of the Government, not least one charged with securing a Brexit outcome, it seems rather vague and complacent.

In his letter to the Select Committee on Home Affairs, published only yesterday, Martin Hewitt, chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council laid bare the stark operational impact these measures will have. He said that

“the loss of some or all of the tools will mean that, even with contingencies in place, the fallback systems will be slower, provide less visibility of information/intelligence and make joined up working with European partners more cumbersome.”

I have some questions to the Minister on this point. How does he assess the likelihood of the situation that the chair of the NPCC has outlined arising? Given that, as I think he would agree, we need to take the warning very seriously, will he outline the details of any contingency plans that are in place for the loss of these vital tools? On data and information sharing, which is key and which, in terms of prospective ongoing cases, forms a large part of the regulations, lowering current capabilities would be seriously damaging and adversely affect the UK.

Lord Anderson, the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, said that UK police would be “increasingly unable to cope” without adequate cross-border data-sharing abilities. That would hinder our ability to receive alerts, search for criminal records, and extradite criminals.   

UK law enforcement agencies are concerned. They still do not know what capabilities they will have, for example, in relation to the Schengen information system, SIS II, which the UK uses prolifically and we are set to lose. The alternative, as it stands, is to fall back on the Interpol apparatus. Steve Rodhouse, the National Crime Agency’s director general for operations, made clear the impact of that loss. He said that there are

“capability gaps affecting both sides which will reduce our ability to… exchange real time alerts and data on persons and objects of interest.”

On fast-track extradition arrangements to replace capabilities enjoyed under the European arrest warrant, we are none the wiser. That applies also to the loss of the European criminal records information system—ECRIS—which, as the statutory instrument’s impact assessment highlights, affects around 4,000 requests every month.

The list continues. There is no certainty on Europol, and we have seen the success of European co-operation through Operation Venetic, the  biggest and most significant law enforcement operation in the UK. I pay tribute to the NCA for its incredible work on that, but it was done in partnership with law enforcement across Europe. It was instigated by the French and Dutch police and it led to 756 arrests and the seizure of 2 tonnes of drugs, £54 million in illicit cash and 77 firearms in the UK alone. It saved countless lives and took criminals off the streets. It is a tangible product of European co-operation between law enforcement agencies. We will also potentially lose future access to passenger name records data and the Prüm database. I do not need to outline the potential effect of that to the Minister.

I do not want to be uncharitable, but this is something of a mess. To have law enforcement, counter-terrorism and security services winding down operations, some of which we know will not be wound up again, and some of which, if a deal is forthcoming, may or may not be wound up again to effective levels in the new year, is not a responsible or sustainable way to proceed. It is clear that the approach to the negotiations has been dither, delay and complacency. I acknowledge that that has not all been one way. This instrument might be a practical stopgap for now, but I am afraid it represents yet more kicking of the can down the road—which increasingly looks like a cul-de-sac rather than a motorway—with more uncertainty about the impact on ongoing investigations and resources.

It is hard to countenance how an almost blasé, all-right-on-the-night approach has been taken to the vital issue of the security and safety of British citizens, with the result that police efforts and resources are wasted in communicating changes, and their focus is forced to move away from day-to-day priorities to this. We wish that the future had more certainty and clarity for UK law enforcement—and they do, too. With time running out, that is in the Government’s hands and it is their responsibility to deliver.

We appreciate that today’s regulations are necessary for us to fulfil our legal commitments on law enforcement and criminal justice separation provisions, and provide UK law enforcement with some clarity. We will not oppose the regulations because it would be irresponsible and put ongoing operations at risk and people in danger.

However, placed in the wider context, the Minister must realise that any certainty here is limited. Our law enforcement, security services, their operational partners and indeed the wider public, need clarity on where the UK is headed. Importantly, they need to know the practical reality that outcomes of the negotiations—or, worse, a no-deal scenario—will have on the ability to fight crime and terrorism and keep them and our country safe.

[James Brokenshire]

Although I appreciate the Opposition’s support for the statutory instrument, unsurprisingly, I do not accept the shadow Minister’s contentions about the Government’s approach and posture. I say to him that the UK is, and will continue to be, a global leader on security and one of the safest countries in the world. The Government take their responsibilities for the safety and security of the people of this country incredibly seriously.

As I have highlighted, the regulations will provide legal and operational clarity regarding the handling of live cases and procedures at the end of the transition period, and they will ensure the UK has a fully functioning statute book. As I have explained, they are required under any scenario, regardless of the outcome of the negotiations. Talks obviously continue in Brussels. There has been a constructive atmosphere, and progress has been made on putting legal texts together, but there are still significant differences on the familiar difficult issues—the so-called level playing field, and obviously in relation to fishing. Time is short, and we are focused on reaching an agreement with the EU. In the space of criminal justice, there is a good degree of convergence in what the UK and EU are seeking to negotiate on operational capabilities. In any negotiation, however, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We obviously look to continue those negotiations and to find a solution that fully respects the UK’s sovereignty.

I shall respond to some of the points made by the shadow Minister in relation to a non-negotiated outcome, which I think was the main thrust of his remarks. In the event that it is not possible to reach an agreement, the UK has well-developed and well-rehearsed plans in place. He speaks about the incredibly important role of the National Police Chiefs’ Council as well as the National Crime Agency, and I pay tribute to them for all their efforts and their work in seeking to ensure that we are well prepared under any scenario. If the shadow Minister looks at those letters, he will see that they underline those organisations’ preparedness. I pay tribute again to them for the work that they have put in.

[Conor McGinn]

Does the Minister agree with Martin Hewitt that the loss of tools will mean that, even with the contingencies in place, systems will be slower, provide less visibility and make joined-up working more cumbersome? That is not my contention; that is what the chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council said.

[James Brokenshire]

I will come to the hon. Member’s broader point. We can obviously discuss the specific issue of the second-generation Schengen information system, SIS II, and what that does and does not do. Notably, it was introduced in this country only in 2015. We had been reliant on various other measures, such as Interpol, to be able to facilitate exchanges.

This country will remain a safe place, and I reject any contention that there is any lack of emphasis on national security or on ensuring that we do not continue to be a global leader in the way that this country has been.

[Conor McGinn]

Will the Minister give way?

[James Brokenshire]

Perhaps I can help the hon. Member by saying that the plans for transitioning will clearly involve co-operation with EU member states in order to reach alternative non-EU arrangements by the end of the transition period where available. Broadly speaking, that would mean making more use of Interpol, Council of Europe conventions and bilateral channels, which are tried and tested mechanisms that the UK already uses for co-operation with many non-EU countries.

--- Later in debate ---

[Conor McGinn]

I have asked the Minister a very specific question: does he agree with the assessment of Martin Hewitt, the chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council? In a letter to the Home Affairs Committee, he expressed in stark terms his concerns about these specific matters. Does the Minister agree with him or not?

[James Brokenshire]

I think the shadow Minister’s points are specifically about the second-generation Schengen information system. We have always said—I have said it myself before—that there will be some mutual loss of capability in the event that the UK no longer has access to SIS II. That is why we offered to reach an agreement with the EU that delivers a similar capability. The Commission maintains that it is not possible legally for the UK to continue to co-operate through SIS II after the transition period, but we have maintained our offer. Obviously, we know that there is clear benefit on all sides to working together, which is why we are positive about a continuing relationship with our European partners. That allows us to benefit through our collective and shared security. In the absence of SIS II, we will use Interpol channels, which predate our SIS II access and provide the capability to exchange data and communicate with all our international partners quickly and securely. I underline that the UK has an excellent relationship with Interpol in that regard.

Work continues on the issues and on preparations for all outcomes. The hon. Member for St Helens North highlights national security and counter-terrorism. National security has always been the responsibility of member states. Co-operation with European partners on national security largely takes place outside EU structures and so is not dependent on our membership of the EU. Our bilateral and multilateral co-operation will continue regardless of the outcome of any negotiations. It is important to highlight the work of organisations such as the Counter Terrorism Group, which facilitates counter-terrorism co-operation across 30 European intelligence and security services.

It is important to stress the steps that have been taken, such as the establishment and funding of the International Crime Coordination Centre to help police forces adapt to new processes after transition. Alongside extensive domestic preparations, we are also engaging with member states who have expressed their willingness to continue to share critical law enforcement data with the UK using Interpol channels. Although I recognise that today’s statutory instrument is narrow, dealing with the effective continuation of various operational data sharing post transition that may have commenced before the end of the transition period, no one in this Committee should take anything I say today, as the shadow Minister has tried to play it, as anything other than an indication of our determination to ensure that the UK remains a leader in security. Steps have been taken by police, the NCA and other partners to see that we are ready and we have given them support. Clearly, we would like an agreement with our European partners. That is where the Government’s emphasis continues to be, and we remain positive that even though gaps remain and even though time is short, that can still be achieved in the time available. That is where the Government’s focus remains.

Question put and agreed to.

Oral Answers to Questions

Conor McGinn Excerpts

Monday 9th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

We look forward to them in Chorley.

[Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)]

Let me start by thanking the Minister for meeting me and the Daniel Fox Foundation, which is based in St Helens, does great work on knife crime in my constituency and was very encouraged by his support. We know the impact of coronavirus on our health and the economy, but it also has serious implications for public safety and the country’s security. There were anti-lockdown protests on the streets this weekend, but we see deliberate, harmful disinformation online all day, every day. So when ensuring that the police have what they need to meet all covid-related challenges that they face, what resources is he providing to them and the security and intelligence services to robustly counter the false online conspiracy theories, which are designed by nefarious elements, at home and abroad, to undermine our collective efforts to beat this virus?

[Kit Malthouse]

First, let me say that I enjoyed our meeting with the Daniel Fox Foundation. I am pleased that in the hon. Gentleman’s part of the world, St Helens, as in the rest of the country, we are standing shoulder to shoulder in the fight against knife crime. Sadly, we are having to do so once again, but it is a fight that we will and must win—I am sure there will be more about it later today. On misinformation and disinformation, he is right to say that unpleasant and untrue stories are circulating, whether anti-vaccine stories or the crazy stuff about 5G. Both the National Crime Agency and the security and intelligence services are engaged with our partners in the private sector in removing as much of that disinformation as we can. We have a role to play in this House as well, in standing together as democratically elected politicians and recognising that we charge others with assisting us in providing advice and data and that we must respect and acknowledge their views as being the basis on which decisions are made legitimately. That is the right way forward. I welcome the Opposition Front-Bench team’s support on that thus far, and indeed into the future.

UK Terrorism Threat Level

Conor McGinn Excerpts

Thursday 5th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for early and advance sight of his statement. I know that the Home Secretary also spoke to the Leader of the Opposition this week. It is important that the House and, indeed, the country know that there is unity of purpose between the Government and the Opposition on these matters.

I start by extending our heartfelt sympathy to the victims of the recent attacks in France and Austria. Our hearts go out to the family of Samuel Paty and to those who lost loved ones, killed in the most horrific and senseless way, in Vienna and Nice. I am sure that many Members will join me in sending solidarity and support to our friends and allies, the citizens of France and Austria, who have experienced this assault on their values, their freedoms and their way of life.

I have been clear from this Dispatch Box that we on the Opposition Benches consider it our first responsibility to keep this country, its people and our communities safe. We will be forceful, fair and robust in supporting the fight against terrorism and crime in all its forms. We therefore wholeheartedly support the decision of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre that the terror threat be raised from substantial to severe, and we share the Government’s view that this decision should not cause undue alarm. It is a precautionary move, but it demonstrates the importance of us all remaining vigilant, building up our current capabilities and closely monitoring existing threats. We are deeply grateful for the work of JTAC alongside our security services and our counter-terror policing, who continue to carry out vital work to keep us safe.

I would, however, like to ask the Security Minister a few questions. First, what is the Government’s strategy for enacting and reinforcing these heightened measures? Will the Minister outline to the House how regularly JTAC reviews the terror threat level, or is it on an ad hoc basis? We welcome the proactive response from the head of counter-terror policing, Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu, whose work and team I pay tribute to. He said that the police had “activated…established planning mechanisms”, increased “levels of visible patrols” and implemented wider security and protection measures. Will the Minister inform the House what additional resources have been made available to counter-terror police, the UK intelligence services, UK law enforcement and their operational partners to keep the public safe, in line with the heightened measures? Public communication will also be vital to the efficacy of these changes, and at a time when public health messaging has been uniquely bombarded and we are asking a lot of the public in terms of interpreting and co-operating with it, how can the Government ensure that they are successfully promoting a strong, clear and consistent message on public safety in this regard? What routes are available to the public for reporting suspicious activity?

Can the Minister confirm to the House the status of the independent review of the Prevent strategy? We feel that this is long overdue and it has a vital role to play as part of the holistic, preventive approach to tackling terrorism. Will the Government provide additional border and port checks in Great Britain as part of the measures? Does the Minister continue to be satisfied that a separate assessment for Northern Ireland continues?

We have faced our own challenges in this country, as the ongoing inquiry into the Manchester Arena attack demonstrates only too well. The citizens of France and Austria are enduring this pain now. We know that we can never let terror or extremism, whether from Islamism or the far right, divide or undermine our core values or diminish our way of life. It must always be met with a robust and decisive response. Keeping the public safe is our shared priority. We support today’s decision and urge the British people to remain vigilant and, as ever, steadfast.

Immigration

Conor McGinn Excerpts

Monday 19th October 2020 Westminster Hall

[Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David. The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) mentioned that you have been here forever. I am not sure that that is the case, but I know of your association with the all-party parliamentary group on the Holy See, and your Urbi et Orbi before the recess every year certainly means that you are a well-known figure in the House. Of course, in that Chair, Sir David, you are infallible in matters of debate.

I thank the Petitions Committee for allocating the time for this important debate. I congratulate the hon. Member for Ipswich (Tom Hunt) on leading it and on his speech. I also congratulate the hon. Members for Wakefield (Imran Ahmad Khan), for Don Valley (Nick Fletcher) and for Redcar (Jacob Young), because not only did they win their seats but they beat very good Labour MPs, who were friends and colleagues of mine and who had worked incredibly hard in those seats. Do not think for a minute that the lessons that the Labour party has to learn on why and how we lost those seats are lost on me, because they are not.

I rather enjoyed the railing against the Trotskyist, Marxist liberal left, because as I think the Minister will testify, it certainly does not land many punches on me. Having led last week on the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill for the Opposition, it certainly lends new ballast to my left-wing credentials that is much in need. All I would say is that some of the arguments that were rehearsed felt a little passé, because the Labour party is very much under new management.

As an MP for the north in the seat of St Helens, I very much take the point that my constituents, like those of the hon. Gentlemen I congratulated, have concerns about immigration that are in no way motivated by racism—quite the opposite. People are concerned about their jobs, the impact of coronavirus and what they see as a lack of Government support and action for the communities that they live in, so I caution them slightly on some of what they said about immigration being “the” priority for people in in the north of England, notwithstanding that they will know their constituencies much better than I will, of course.

Moving on to the substantive points raised, there is much that we could talk about, but I want to focus my remarks. We have all witnessed the increase in channel crossings in small boats over the summer months with huge concern. I recognise the strength of feeling in the petition and on this issue, and I know that seeing those boats for many people represents a breakdown in the systems that the Government have put in place to manage migration. I do not think that that is an unjustifiable view.

However, the issues here are complex and require a considered, compassionate and effective response. It is necessary that our words and actions both reflect an understanding of the harrowing and appalling circumstances that have resulted in many individuals and families taking extreme and desperate decisions, and also prevent any further exploitation by criminal gangs and traffickers of those facing such impossible decisions. We need to ensure that the United Kingdom’s strategy reflects our values—that we respect the rule of law and address illegality—and ensure that we provide safe and legal routes to those who have a case for seeking asylum here. I think there has been an inadequacy in delivering against some of those values, because what we need is calm, compassionate and rational decision-making, but I fear instead that we have had rhetoric over action.

This morning, as I walked my children to school before getting on the train to come to Westminster, I thought, “How dire would my circumstances have to be before I would let my family board an insecure dinghy across the channel?” Whatever challenges we personally have faced or that the communities that we proudly represent in this place have faced over the last months, we might all reasonably conclude that we would have to be completely without hope before it would even occur to us to do such a thing—a point made very eloquently by the hon. Member for Strangford.

However, that is the situation that many of these individuals are in. Over half of refugees globally originate from Syria, Afghanistan or South Sudan—countries that are completely ravaged by violence, chaos and destitution. Those who undertake the crossings understand the danger that they face, so the fact that they none the less make them shows us how desperate they feel their situation is.

I do not presume to understand all the push and pull factors involved as people continue to leave France and seek to come to the UK. However, we see the numbers of those deciding to undertake that journey. Will the Minister say what efforts are being made to understand those decisions, based on an analysis of the experiences of those who have crossed the channel? It is worth remembering that the vast majority of those who flee their homes to reach Europe never reach Calais at all. For example, Germany, France and Italy are all far more common destinations for migrants than the UK, for many reasons.

In our conversations with those working in asylum and immigration, the overwhelming motivation that we hear time and again for wanting to reach the UK is to be reunited with family who are already in the UK. Another common reason is that the person speaks English but not French and so would likely have more success in finding a job and a future in our country than they would elsewhere in Europe. The latter is not an impractical consideration, while the former is hugely understandable.

[Jacob Young]

Given what the hon. Gentleman is saying about language barriers and the like, does he agree that at that point we are no longer discussing an asylum claim and are instead discussing migration and the need to move to England as an economic route, as opposed to for safe refuge?

[Conor McGinn]

There is a lot of conflation and confusion around the various types of immigration, but once a person has embarked upon a route to claim asylum, that is the only one open to them, because, as the hon. Member for Glasgow South West (Chris Stephens) said, other avenues are no longer open. That is why it is important that a claim be processed promptly through a due legal route.

Also, given the predilection of the hon. Member for Redcar for pointing out Members who are not in this debate, I am keen to enable him to get back and join all my colleagues who are in the other debate on immigration, on the Floor of the House, lest his absence from it should be pointed out.

I have been disappointed by the Government’s response. The Minister knows me well enough to know that I make that point sincerely. Some of these issues need to be addressed. The first is the abolition of the Department for International Development. Arguably, doing that removes the support needed to address some of these issues at their source, and I have not yet heard a valid reason for why the Government have chosen to merge it with the Foreign Office.

We have also had these ludicrous proposals about Ascension Island and Saint Helena—I had to read it twice when I saw it in The Sunday Times, lest it was a reference to St Helens. Either would be preposterous, frankly. That shows a lack of strategy at the heart of Government around how we will get a grip of this issue.

I am fond of the Home Secretary, whom I know well and with whom I share interests in horse-racing and many other things—I am glad that none of my Back-Bench colleagues are here to hear that—but she should reflect on the divisive rhetoric that she has used. I am not sure it does justice to her or ministerial colleagues when she talks about the traffickers, the do-gooders, lefty lawyers and the Labour party as defending the broken system. To group together lawyers and Labour Members with human traffickers is really offensive and insulting. At first, I thought it was inappropriate and a bit beneath the dignity of the office of Home Secretary—one of the great offices of state—but subsequent events have proven it was quite dangerous. It has led to incidents where lawyers have felt their safety threatened. Human rights is not a bad word but something at which this country has been at the cornerstone of, through our role in the Council of Europe, the United Nations and other multilateral organisations throughout the world. We need to be careful about mistaking process issues with ad hominem attacks on individuals.

The frustrating thing is that, in spite of the rhetoric, the Home Office has not even been successful in achieving its commitment to deter these crossings. The closing down of other routes to the UK brought about by the coronavirus pandemic has caused exceptional pressures, but the number of migrants who crossed the channel in small boats in August 2020 was more than four times that of August 2019. It might be worth pointing out to hon. Members who arrived here with great gusto in December 2019 that we have had a Conservative Government, in whole or part, for 10 years, so all the criticisms made about the asylum system are suitably addressed to the Minister rather than the Opposition.

We need a practical, even-handed and realistic response. Many migrants arriving in Calais have legitimate claims for asylum, but they do not have practical or legal means to reach the UK. The strategy of deterring crossings from taking place is not working, so we need a renewed strategy. I am sure the shadow Home Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds), would be happy, as he has offered, to discuss the ways in which we can work together to deter crossings and ensure that the system functions adequately for those in need. The strategy must therefore ensure that legal and pragmatic routes continue to function for those with legitimate claims for asylum—that due process.

Back in June, in response to an urgent question on asylum, the Minister told the House that last year the UK made 20,000 grants of protection or asylum. Those are cases in which, against strict criteria, the Government deemed that asylum should be granted in the UK. However, we must ensure that those safe and legal routes do not drive those whom the Government recognise as having a case to be heard into the arms of human traffickers, who profiteer on the back of human suffering. We must protect the route to allow legitimate attempts for those who seek to reunite with family in the UK. That is currently protected in the Dublin regulation, which we will not be part of once we leave the EU. I am therefore keen to hear what the Government propose to do, because if we do not do our bit, as per the Dubs scheme and the amendments being considered on the Floor of the House tonight, to ensure that unaccompanied children in dangerous situations are given safe haven, what kind of country can we claim to be? We should be proud of the role we have played throughout history in providing safe refuge, particularly to children who have fled the most awful horrors of war, famine and poverty.

As I have said, this is a complex situation that demands rational and reasonable solutions. It is a topic that provokes strong reactions among our constituents. We have heard that from Government Members, I have heard it in my constituency and many of my Labour party colleagues feel it too. However, I think most reasonable people would agree that the current situation, whereby migrants are forced to make hazardous trips across the channel to stand any chance of claiming asylum, is untenable. That is why, as I hope I have made clear, Labour is committed to ensuring that we protect and improve the pre-existing legal routes, that we do more to meet our international obligations, that we address illegality and that we command the confidence of the British public.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Conor McGinn Excerpts

Committee stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Committee: 1st sitting & Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons & Report stage & Report stage: House of Commons
Thursday 15th October 2020 Commons Chamber

[Joanna Cherry]

I do share that concern. I really do not understand—others have eloquently made this point—why organisations indulging in lawful activity, such as trade unions and, indeed, other green activists, are required to be infiltrated by these sorts of covert human intelligence sources.

It is all very well to say that there is guidance. I listened carefully and with respect to those who are members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, because I know that they have information that the rest of us do not, but guidance is not good enough; it needs to be in the Bill. We are dealing with a Government who recently made commitments in an international agreement that they now evince the intention to break, so I will not apologise for saying that I do not have much trust in them. I want to see proper protections for civil liberties in the Bill. Without them, the Scottish National party will vote against it.

[Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure, as always, to follow the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), and to speak with you in the Chair, Dame Rosie. I rise to speak to the amendments in my name and that of my right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the Opposition and other honourable colleagues.

As I said on Second Reading, my right hon. and learned Friend has made it clear that security is a top priority for the Labour party under his leadership. We will be robust in supporting the fight against terrorism and crime in all its forms. We consider it our first responsibility to keep this country, its citizens and our communities safe, and we are grateful to those in the police, the security services, the National Crime Agency and wider law enforcement. They put their own safety and lives at risk to protect us, and we will meet our duty to support them.

It is worth noting that, since 2017, 27 terror plots have been uncovered and attacks foiled, and last year covert human intelligence sources helped to disrupt 30 threats to life. That is the sobering context of the debate, so we acknowledge and understand the Bill’s purpose, and recognise the need to put on a statutory footing the activity of those working to disrupt some of the most vile crimes imaginable, including terrorism, the activities of violent drug gangs, serious and organised crime, and child sexual exploitation.

It cannot be right, for those we ask to undertake that work, for those who might be affected by it or indeed for society as a whole, that that work continues in the shadows, and without boundaries and safeguards. In that vein, our amendment 7 seeks to ensure that the granting of criminal conduct authorisations may not take place until a warrant has been issued by a judge. We believe that it would provide reassurance to have independent judicial oversight of that process.

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle]

Whatever we think of the progress later on of the Bill, we have to agree that judicial oversight is really important. When a Labour Government get in, we will hopefully move towards that, but does my hon. Friend agree that the cases that he has just outlined are serious and severe, so these powers should be for agencies that are investigating them, not every Tom, Dick and Harry of the Food Safety Agency?

[Conor McGinn]

I am sorry that, having been present for the whole debate, my hon. Friend did not get to make a full speech, so I am happy to take his intervention. I hope that the Minister will reply to the valid and valuable point that he makes.

We understand that in a fast-changing intelligence landscape, a degree of operational flexibility is right and necessary, but I urge the Minister to provide some clarity and assurances that the requirements for certification will not simply become catch-all terms, and that there are clear and robust limits to their applicability.

The Bill already states that authorisation may not be granted unless the person believes that the conduct is proportionate to what is sought, but our amendment 11 intends to create a proper framework for that assessment. It ensures that the person must take into account several important questions before being granted any criminal conduct authorisation and provides rigorous assessment to ensure that such decisions are not taken lightly. Similarly, our amendment 10 is specifically about ensuring that the circumstances in which a criminal conduct authorisation is necessary must not include the activities of trade unions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

May I caution my hon. Friend? The excellence of his speech and the amendments should be an argument that says, “Without these, this Bill cannot be supported.” If he is not careful, his argument will encourage Labour Members to go through the No Lobby and vote against the Bill, should the Government not relent and accept these excellent amendments.

[Conor McGinn]

I always take seriously the advice of a senior and distinguished Member of the House. I am confident that, given the amendments that we have tabled today, as the Bill makes further progress through the House, our colleagues in the other place will be cognisant and take note of that. That is why we are asking the Government to listen carefully to what we propose in our amendments.

In that vein, I give my strong support to new clause 5, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Bell Ribeiro-Addy). It seeks to ensure that a CCA cannot be applied to a trade union and, specifically, to blacklisted workers. Of course, it was the previous Labour Government who made blacklisting illegal in 2010.

On the issue of oversight and accountability, I wish briefly to mention new clause 3, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) and members of the Intelligence and Security Committee. With the additional scrutiny, oversight and accountability that are at the heart of the right hon. Gentleman’s sensible proposal, the Secretary of State would be compelled, at the end of each relevant 12-month period, to make a report to the ISC that contains key information on both the number of CCAs authorised and the categories of the conduct authorised. That seems to me to be an eminently reasonable and sensible proposal.

On new clause 2, given the nature of some of the networks that the Bill looks to disrupt, there are clear concerns about its impact on communities and vulnerable individuals throughout our country. One important example is the gendered impact of actions taken by covert human intelligence sources. The Minister must commit, today, that the Government will seek to uphold the highest possible standards on gender impact.

New clause 8 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy). I have some experience of campaigning with her and know how formidable she can be on these issues. Her new clause raises another crucial point, which is the need to safeguard the welfare of children, vulnerable individuals and victims of modern slavery and trafficking. It would achieve that by ensuring that a CCA is authorised for a child or vulnerable adult only in certain exceptional circumstances, and by ensuring that an appropriate adult is present at meetings between the source and those representing the investigating authority.

As outlined in new clause 2, we propose to compel the Secretary of State to prepare and publish an annual equality impact assessment on the use of criminal conduct authorisations in covert operations involving women, children and black, Asian and minority ethnic communities. A motion should then be put to the House within three months of the assessment being published.

In conclusion, the Opposition are committed to working in the national interest to keep people, their families, our communities and the country safe. I entirely understand that some colleagues on both sides of the Chamber have an interpretation of what the Bill does that is different from mine and have arrived at a different view. I think they are wrong, but that does not mean that I do not respect the arguments they put forward. That is particularly the case in relation to my hon. Friend—and my actual friend—the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Dan Carden). He will know that I once resigned on a point of principle. I hold him and his family in high esteem. The decision he took today to make the points he made was a difficult one. He has my respect, continuing friendship and affection.

This is uncomfortable territory for the whole House. Many of the issues raised by the Bill are felt deeply personally. All I would say, gently, is that those who oppose the Bill in its entirety do not have the monopoly on principles, nor are they the sole moral arbiters when it comes to forming a view on the measures in the Bill. The position reached by the Leader of the Opposition—who literally wrote the book on human rights—and me is a principled one and comes after careful consideration and detailed discussion of the Bill.

It is also our view that we have a duty, as legislators, to meet our responsibility and acknowledge that it is not just the Government who have to make difficult decisions. We want to be in government so we have to take difficult decisions, too. When we are in government, we will return to the Bill based on the principles that I have outlined. That is why we have taken the approach that we have taken: to acknowledge the importance of putting CHIS activities on a statutory footing; to robustly and responsibly scrutinise the way in which that is done; and to place national security, human rights and support for victims at the centre of our attempts to improve the safeguards in the Bill. We will continue to do that as it progresses through Parliament and are confident that the other place will assist us in that task if our amendments are not made today.

[James Brokenshire]

This has been a very informed, considered and thoughtful debate on the various amendments to the Bill that have been tabled for consideration. As right hon. and hon. Members will know, covert human intelligence sources play a crucial part in preventing, and safeguarding the public from, many very serious crimes, including terrorism, drugs and firearms offences, and child sexual exploitation and abuse. In performing that role, it is essential that they can build credibility and gain the trust of those under investigation. At times, that may mean they have to commit criminality in order to maintain that cover.

I hear very clearly the points that have been made about needing to see those powers put on an express legal basis. Indeed, that is the essence of what this Bill is all about. It puts that on a clear statutory footing, putting beyond doubt Parliament’s intentions on the matter. From the contributions we have heard on all sides of the House, I think that that point is recognised—the seriousness of that and its implications for our own security in ensuring that the capability is maintained in order to keep us safe in the future, as it has done in the past, but also recognising the need for confidence in and assurance about how those agencies that act to protect us do so in an appropriate way.

Let me deal with the various amendments, because I do want to make as much progress on that as possible, and where I can I will give way to right hon. and hon. Members in doing so. First, in that context, there is the issue of oversight. The Government’s priority is to provide these public authorities with the powers they need to keep the public safe, while also ensuring that there are appropriate safeguards. This is the balance that the Bill seeks to provide. We do not believe that prior judicial approval, as proposed in amendment 7 and new clause 7, strikes that balance, as it risks the effective operation of the capability. This is a point we discussed at length on Second Reading. There are ways in which we can provide that safeguard and assurance, and prior judicial approval is not the only way to provide effective oversight of investigatory powers.

Members may find it helpful if I set out in more detail why this capability is different from other powers, such as interception or equipment interference. Put simply, human beings are more complex. Any decision on how to use a CHIS has immediate real-world consequences for that covert human intelligence source and the people around them. This requires deep expertise and close consideration of the personal strengths and weaknesses of the individual, which then enables very precise and safe tasking. These are not decisions that have the luxury of being remade. It is even more critical than for other powers that these decisions are right and are made at the right time.