Afghanistan (Civilian Killings)

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Monday 12th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

It is important to stress that there is a US and Afghan investigation now under way into exactly what happened. However, I agree with the hon. Gentleman that this would appear to be the action of one isolated individual, completely outwith the control of the chain of command, and he is also absolutely right that it is in no way indicative of the behaviour of the rest of the ISAF forces who are there.

The hon. Gentleman asked me about force protection. We were already operating on an enhanced set-up for force protection in the light of the Koran-burning incident; following this incident, vigilance will be even greater, and at a local level, commanders on the ground will be making whatever sensible arrangements they think are necessary. Operations in the night are increasingly led by Afghan forces, and I think this is likely to be the case even more so in the foreseeable future.

The hon. Gentleman quite rightly raised the issue of trust. It is absolutely essential to what we are doing that there is trust between the international forces, and the Afghan authorities and the Afghan people. There is no doubt whatever that that trust will have been tested severely by the incidents of the last few weeks. Of course, this is not one-way traffic, because we have seen incidents where both British and French troops have been killed by Afghan troops they were mentoring. These are delicate relationships, but I was impressed when I was there two weeks ago that the commander of ISAF took this aspect of his work extremely seriously and had been very quick to get on the front foot and go to President Karzai and the Afghan authorities to apologise and make clear the profound regret that he and the west felt for the incidents that have happened.

As for the post-2014 situation, it is important that everybody understands—both in the west and in Afghanistan—that the end of western troops being in Afghanistan in a combat role does not mean the international community walking away from Afghanistan. It is certainly the case that we will continue to have troops stationed in Afghanistan, providing training and mentoring for Afghan troops. Specifically, we have made a commitment, as the hon. Gentleman will be aware, to take the lead internationally in running the officer training programme from 2013 onwards. However, as we begin and continue the process of transition, we expect to see a greater number of international partners coming in and helping Afghanistan to build up, in terms of both aid and, increasingly, ordinary trade and economics. We cannot allow the setbacks of the last few weeks to put us off that overall objective, which in my view, notwithstanding all the pressures, remains on course.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

We have got two years and about nine months left of combat operations in Afghanistan, and we have lost 404 soldiers so far. The idea that we can start challenging the plan to withdraw early worries me a great deal, because soldiers need certainty. It is needed for the officers to plan and for the soldiers to get used to it. It is going to be increasingly challenging for our soldiers over the next two years, as we move towards withdrawing from combat operations. Does the Minister agree with that assessment? We have got to support our soldiers utterly and completely. The plan is set and must now remain set.

[Nick Harvey]

Let me assure my hon. Friend that the internationally agreed plan remains firmly in place. It was reiterated two weeks ago at the NATO ministerial conference. It is important for all those who are engaged in the operations in Afghanistan to understand that the plan remains in place and that there is no question whatever of our cutting and running early because of these events or any others. Two out of five phases of transition—area by area, district by district—have so far taken place, and both appear broadly to have gone off very well. The three remaining phases will take us through this year and into next year. Within the time frame between now and 2014, the nature of the work that our troops are doing will increasingly shift to a supportive role, but they will still be there bearing arms until the end of 2014. It is important, particularly for those who grieve for the losses that we have suffered, that they should not believe that those losses have been in vain. We are not going to give up; we are going to see this through and finish the job off according to the internationally agreed plan.

Oral Answers to Questions

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Monday 20th February 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Howarth]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the question. It is important that we recognise that in the United Kingdom we are fortunate. We do not rely just on major defence companies such as Thales, BAE Systems and QinetiQ. We have a raft of medium-sized companies such as Cobham, Ultra, Chemring and Martin Baker, well known for its ejector seats, and those companies have a rich supply of high technology to offer other countries. I can assure my hon. Friend that we are working hard to promote those companies as well.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

However successful civil servants may be in trying to get defence exports, will the Minister reassure the House that they will not get bonuses in excess of what a colonel might make in salary every year?

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Thursday 26th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

I will not respond to the right hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne East (Mr Brown), because I am confident that one or two of my hon. Friends will do so. Instead, I will talk for a few minutes about defence procurement.

Twenty-five years ago, I was responsible for carrying out a survey with three colleagues as a management consultant to compare the procurement systems in seven western powers. It is depressing, a quarter of a century on, how little things have moved on from the issues at that time. I remain convinced, as I was at the end of that process, that Britain is about average or a little above average, and not as inefficient as it is presented to be by some commentators.

I share the view of the Chairman of the Defence Committee that Bernard Gray is exactly the right man in the right job and that his report is excellent. I am deeply concerned that much of Lord Levene’s report will undermine some of Bernard Gray’s best and most important ideas, much as I respect the noble Lord and the work that he did in procurement at about the time I was a consultant.

There is time to touch briefly on only four points, of which two relate to the procurement function and two to the Ministry of Defence. My first point is that Bernard Gray is absolutely right to point to weaknesses in the contract staff, who are grossly underqualified for the job of stacking up against the highly competent lawyers employed by the other side. In project after project, we have found ourselves badly damaged by the small print.

My second point is about project managers. Gray, Levene and everybody else who has looked at this matter have concluded that we need more continuity in project managers and that they need to be professionally trained. Nevertheless, we are out of line with most other countries in concluding that project managers should be civilians. The most efficient procurers in the world remain, in my view, the Swedes. Their project managers are overwhelmingly military. They are in post typically for four to five years and they are properly trained before they become project managers. The problem, particularly on the army side where there are large numbers of comparatively cheap interlocking projects, is that if civilians are in charge of the projects, as in France, one ends up with lots of detailed user-problems that would have become obvious earlier if they had been before a military project manager. That is why France, despite spending far more on research and development than any other continental country, does not have a particularly good record on land vehicles.

My third point goes more to the heart of the distinction—in my mind, anyway—between Levene and Gray. The heart of Gray’s report—perhaps his single most important recommendation—is at point 4 in his summary, where he says that we must

“Clarify roles and create a real customer-supplier relationship between the capability sponsor (MoD centre)”—

—this is a distinction that we, alone in the whole world, developed before the second world war—

“and project delivery (DE&S)”.

He goes on to stress that the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Capability) is the man who has to drive this. In contrast, Peter Levene suggests that DCDS (Capability) should be merged with one, or possibly two, other functions out of a long list—that it should be downgraded—instead of having, as Gray recommends, one board whose secretariat and day-to-day policing should be provided by DCDS (Capability) to oversee the process. In Levene’s structure we would end up with a complete muddle, with, in effect, four different bodies considering these matters—the new Defence Board, which is all-civilian except for the Chief of the Defence Staff, and the three armed forces themselves. That would take us halfway back to pre-1936.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

If the move is to make the CDS the commander-in-chief, and therefore in charge of the Army, with the same going for the other two services, surely it is proper that such people are represented on the Defence Board, if not particularly within the Ministry of Defence?

[Mr Brazier]

I thoroughly agree with my hon. Friend. I was about to come to that as my fourth and final point, but let me first finish my remarks on capabilities.

There is a very important reason, which Bernard Gray fingers exactly in his original report, for having a proper supplier-customer relationship. In the second world war, the Luftwaffe had a much more powerful research and development and industrial base, but the RAF, because it had a separate capabilities group, was able to make sure that all the pieces interacted so that we did not have problems with fighters that could not talk to bombers, and so on.

The A300M is a modern example of where that structure has broken down because—Gray criticises this—the capabilities staff have got weaker, and they will get a lot weaker still if the Levene recommendations are adopted. This aircraft is being bought for the Air Force—I have huge respect for Air Transport Command because of the brilliant work it has done in Afghanistan—but the user is the Army. Bizarrely, we have managed to arrive at a point where we are choosing to buy an aeroplane that is much more expensive than its tried and tested competitor, the Hercules, on the grounds that it can carry one armoured vehicle per aircraft whereas the Hercules cannot. If asked, the Army would say that armoured vehicles usually go by sea—it has C17s if it has to move them by air—and that it could not afford most of the armoured vehicles it wanted anyway. A strong central capabilities directorate would probably have been able to get a grip on that. Furthermore, the problem is as much in the detail as in the big picture.

That brings me to my fourth and last point, which was anticipated by my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart). Some countries, particularly on the continent, do not allow executives on to their company boards; we would say that their company boards are all non-executive. Putting those countries to one side, in all my years as a consultant—I worked on all six continents—I never came across a successful company anywhere in which the heads of the main operating divisions were not on the main board. Peter Levene’s recommendation that the individual chiefs of staff should not sit on the Defence Board is bizarre. If one puts that alongside my third point about capabilities, with the greater powers that the individual services are going to take back from the centre to monitor projects, one can see that it is a recipe for increased in-fighting and for a reduction in interoperability. That is a big step away from joined-up defence.

I should like to end on a more positive note. With Bernard Gray, who is probably the best informed and best equipped man in the country, being put in charge of procurement, there is a fair chance that he will manage to overcome many of these problems. Certainly, under his leadership the performance of the procurement function itself will move from being a little above average internationally to being among the best. However, if we simply implement at the centre the Levene reforms as they are constituted—I have mentioned two of the weaknesses, and I could go into some of the others in detail—there is a risk that, in this area and in several others, we may undermine long-term defence planning.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Woodcock]

That is a very important point with which I shall deal at some length in a moment. Suffice it to say for the moment that it is not simply the Liberal Democrats’ review; it is the Government’s review. They have commissioned it. The Conservative Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Mid Worcestershire (Peter Luff), looks like he is in two minds about it, but his own party’s former Defence Secretary sanctioned and announced it. The right hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), was clearly not booted out because of that particular misdemeanour.

We have to ask whether it is right for the UK to maintain its independent deterrent. It strikes me as strange that it is often the very people who rail against the hegemony of the United States of America in world affairs who are prepared to sit quietly under its nuclear umbrella and suggest that the UK should not take responsibility for its own defence. I do not include my right hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne East (Mr Brown) in that comment. I am glad to see him back in his place for my speech—I think.

We should redouble our efforts to tackle the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I am proud that the previous Labour Government were explicit in setting the ultimate target of zero nuclear weapons—of a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons—but we should not accept the argument that renewal is an act of proliferation. It is not. In fact, non-renewal would be an act of unilateral disarmament. It is right that our party has left those days behind.

Given the magnitude of destruction that the use of nuclear weapons would inflict, nuclear weapons are rightly an uncomfortable issue for all hon. Members and the country, but they are a deterrent. Our holding of nuclear capability is designed to make a nuclear war less not more likely. So far, that has been successful.

[Bob Stewart]

To slightly corrupt the saying, if we wish to avoid war, we should prepare for it and have the means to stop it. I fully support what the hon. Gentleman says about deterrence.

[John Woodcock]

The hon. Gentleman is quite right—he put it far more succinctly than I did and I am grateful to him for doing so.

I want to stress in the concluding part of my speech that the current Administration are creating a level of risk around the deterrent. That should be a matter of concern to Members on both sides of the House. As an aside, I hope the Minister who winds up could address the matter that was raised this week—

--- Later in debate ---

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), the Chairman of the Defence Committee, on which I sit. His leadership is outstanding.

I want to talk about what might be the most important thing: morale. As we all know, Napoleon called morale the sacred flame—the thing that matters more than anything else. He said that morale is to the physical as three is to one. When I was a captain, I used to teach leadership at Sandhurst and I could not quite understand what he meant. Ten years later, when I was a British military commander in Bosnia, people would ask me—Serbs, Croats or Muslims—how many men I had under my command. I would reply, “Lots. How many do you think?” They said, “Between 3,000 and 4,000.” I had 800. Morale made the difference.

High morale is definitely a force multiplier. It is not quantifiable statistically, but we can feel it. My experience is clear. When we go into a unit, we can feel what morale is like from the way people talk, stand and behave. Let us be clear: the British armed forces have the highest morale in the world on operations. Anyone who has visited our troops in Afghanistan can see that. Wherever British soldiers go in the world, their morale is high on operations. I am worried about what happens when they are not on operations.

In all the years I have been involved with the Army, and it goes back a long time—1967—I have never seen such low morale among personnel when they are not on operations. There is a difference. On operations they come up to the plate; they are fantastic. They are everything one would always expect. It is the British way of doing it. But off operations—boom! Down they go.

Obviously, the SDSR has an impact, because there is massive uncertainty on job security and life for the future. There is a pay freeze, and rising inflation has made life very difficult for the junior ranks. Some service personnel are involved in change programmes. They see an increase in work load and fewer resources being given to them. Obviously, barracks and the accommodation are not great. The Welsh Guards in Cavalry barracks are looking forward to having a hot shower when they go to Afghanistan—and they are in west London.

I hope last night’s Evening Standard is wrong that anyone above the rank of sergeant is going to lose his or her London weighting, because if that is the case a sergeant will get a 4.5% pay cut in London, when he or she has no choice over where they are deployed. Do we take a pay cut? Do we lose our London weighting? Do civil servants lose their London weighting? It is not fair.

Many people, of course, serve away from home for a long time, and the tour interval for some people is now down to about a year. Families do not like it, clearly, and they put pressure on soldiers. The biggest contributory factor to low morale is the fact that our armed forces are taking such a cut in personnel.

Leadership is essential. Leadership in the Ministry of Defence is about heart as much as statistics. Soldiers need to know they matter and are cared for by the people who look after them. Military commanders should look downwards first before they look upwards. I am slightly worried because I seem to think—I hope I am wrong, but perhaps I am not—that too many generals are trying to be political or be civil servants rather than looking down at their soldiers.

I will end, because I know we are short of time, by concluding on morale. If we want to be the best—to use the Army’s phrase, “Be the best”—we must get morale right. It is not right at the moment, particularly when our soldiers, sailors and airmen are not serving in the field. Addressing morale is the top priority of everyone in the Ministry of Defence, from the Secretary of State downwards. It is very important that everyone in a position of power and influence puts their heart and soul into getting that vital aspect as good as it can be. Thank you for calling me, Mr Deputy Speaker.

Oral Answers to Questions

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Monday 19th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

To the best of my knowledge, no such funds are being spent at all.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

As the patron of the Forces Children’s Trust, which looks after service orphans and widows, may I gently remind the Minister that it would be nice if the Ministry of Defence were to encourage all units, when they are having their Christmas celebrations, to look after the people who have lost loved ones within the unit? I am sure that that is happening, but a gentle reminder would not go amiss.

[Nick Harvey]

My hon. Friend makes a good point. I share his confidence that commanding officers and those responsible for the welfare of troops will have this in mind, but when there are opportunities to offer such reminders, we will certainly do so.

Oral Answers to Questions

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Monday 14th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

I say again that the details of how this policy will work are a matter for the Home Office. It will shortly issue guidance that will cover some of the points that the hon. Gentleman has raised. The Home Office has taken a view on the legality of the policy and it is satisfied that it is legal within existing legislation. On the interface with the armed forces, the armed guards who might be carried on ships—that is a matter for the owners to decide—are there in a preventive capacity. The Royal Navy and other navies will continue to patrol the entire area. The focus of the military effort is to deter and disrupt. As I said a moment ago, it would not be possible, no matter how much resource navies were to deploy, always to have somebody there in a preventive capacity. All ships that have taken the necessary precautions have successfully prevented themselves from being pirated.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

To follow up the question on rules of engagement, will the Minister ensure that ours are as robust as possible and allow people defending ships to engage the enemy, or the pirates, at the maximum distance possible, to give those ships more time to take evasive action?

[Nick Harvey]

I say again that I am perfectly satisfied that the rules of engagement provide the armed forces with as much flexibility as they need to deal effectively with the situations that we expect them to find. I have to say that the UK has been pressing international allies for a bolder set of tactics, and we continue to press them to agree to that.

Armed Forces Personnel

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Thursday 10th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Havard]

The “Taffia” is at work. That is true. At the local field hospital at Camp Bastion when we visited, Andy Morris, who is now Major Morris, was there as a paramedic. These are the people who jump in the back of helicopters and bring people out. He is a reservist, not a regular. There is a real debate to be had about what the balance of forces is going to be. The report by the hon. Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) is seminal. A decision will have to be made about the balance between regulars and reserves. We do not want to cheapen their capacity or their labour. We need to maintain and improve that quality. We must not make the mistake of using it as a way of cheapening the price, rather than improving the value.

The moral component is important. We heard reference earlier to war memorials. We all have the problem. I would like to find the bandit who nicked the bayonet off the Aberfan war memorial. We probably know who he is and where he lives, and we will get it back, but that is not the point. It is about respect. Tomorrow I will be in Rhymney comprehensive school, laying a wreath at the school at its memorial with the children. I will be visiting the cadets and the reserves at Maindy. We must engage with the people.

I do not have a big poppy. Perhaps the size of the poppy is important; I do not know. I have a 90th anniversary badge, given to me by the British Legion in Dowlais. There is a whole community involved. The social and economic impact that the Ministry of Defence has in all our communities is huge. We need to recognise that in deploying the resources that we have, because we also ask people to deploy.

Let me say a little about some of the things that we are discussing on the Defence Committee and the changes that are being made. Reference has been made to how it is possible to divide communities, as well as bringing them together. We can say that armed forces personnel have special interests, and therefore should have special services. By doing the right thing, we can inadvertently do something else and create divisions. Be careful that there is not a problem with consistency, rather than uniformity, in the application of these services across the United Kingdom. The right hon. Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds) mentioned that earlier, and the same applies to Wales. The National Assembly for Wales yesterday published a document about what it will do to improve services for veterans.

The organisation of the health service will be different, because it is very problematic, as is housing and the rest of it. There is a variable geography and the operational delivery of services varies between Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and England, but the Ministry of Defence must understand that the covenant is a UK document that will apply to service personnel wherever they are in the UK. If it does not have some consistency of application, it will get it wrong. That is a real problem it needs to grapple with, and I hope that we can help.

The Defence Committee—perhaps I am giving away secrets—plans to produce a report on housing in the same way as we produced reports on veterans and casualties. As my friend the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire said, the Committee’s work is to bring those matters to Parliament, because it is a servant of the House and our work should be debated here. Frankly, it is a disgrace that the House has not had a proper debate on the matter in more than 12 months. However well meaning Front Benchers have been in today’s debate, they have their political knockabout and absorb the time and the way the debate is conducted is not in the hands of Back Benchers. I know that the Backbench Business Committee has become some sort of petitions committee by default, but I appeal to it to provide time for the House to debate the work the Committee has been doing and allow Back Benchers to say what they want to say beyond the direct control of the Executive, rather than by any other process.

I would like to say one more thing about understanding people. We deploy the armed forces, so we need to protect them. One of the current debates about respect relates to people’s respect for how they are deployed and what we send them to do. The armed forces are sometimes uncertain about their legal and moral status, and if we are not careful, that will cause difficulties for the operational capacity to do things on the ground. It is known in the trade to those of us who discuss these things as the “lawfare-warfare” debate; is it legal, but is it also morally defensible? If we want respect and legitimisation, we must not only enable and provide for those people, but give them and the community on whose behalf they work some certainty that they are being properly deployed to do things that they feel comfortable being deployed to do.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

The morality of war is very well set out in the Geneva convention. As long as our officers and soldiers put the convention at the front of all their actions, they will not go far wrong.

[Mr Havard]

I agree that the Geneva convention sets out an important architecture, but let me give an example to illustrate my point. We were once running an internment camp—not a detention facility—in Iraq because that is what was required. That was legitimate and part of the UN mandate. It was legitimised, but it had to be reviewed from time to time and the authority to run it had to be agreed with the new Iraqi Government following an exchange of letters and all the things that go with UN activities. Otherwise, our military personnel, from Colchester and elsewhere, who were running the camp, which was not anything like Guantanamo Bay, needed to know that they were secure in what they were doing. They now serve alongside others, more often than not in coalition.

The Americans are not signatories to the International Criminal Court, but the United Kingdom is. Often there are people on the ground in a foreign place with some sort of architecture of legitimacy between the Government who have asked them to go, or the United Nations, and individually they may well find that domestic and international law are different from one another. That issue needs to be considered. At the moment we put in place mechanisms that we believe protect our individuals who are on the ground, but they are citizens serving abroad. There is a relationship between international and domestic law that we need to be very careful about, and the subject will need debate, because I see operational service personnel second-guessing their decisions. Rather than doing what they would normally do, they send it back up just to make sure. The window of opportunity is gone.

I could give a practical example of that relating to the current problem of piracy in the Gulf, but I am not allowed to. The person concerned did not do wrong; they did right in order to protect themselves. What we must have in place is a decision-making process that enables us to take all those things into account with the speed that they need to be taken into account so that the decision-making process does not disadvantage the individual when they do the job that they are required to do, not later after some gang of lawyers have assessed whether it is right or wrong. We must celebrate all those who have served, all those who do serve, and all those who will serve, but we must be careful how we make organisational changes to do the things we wish to do.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to follow my friend and Select Committee colleague, the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard), and indeed our excellent Committee Chairman, my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot).

As we remember those who gave their lives in earlier generations, we honour those who serve today. To visit them, whether on operations or on exercise, is to be humbled by the sheer quality of the men and women who serve in our forces, but over the generations since the cold war the structures that planned and organised them lost direction.

On the day after another young Territorial has died in Afghanistan, I want to talk about reserve personnel, but first I shall give the House some context—when tension between operational pressures and funding is especially tight. The Ministry of Defence has become distorted by the shape of most conflicts during the 20 years between the Gulf war and the Libyan operation. For most of that period, the main effort has been a single, medium-scale expeditionary force, led by the Army with air support. Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan mostly followed that pattern.

The intensity of the conflicts varied enormously, but each saw a brigade-sized expeditionary force supporting air elements in six-monthly rotations and in line with defence-planning assumptions, hence a strong temptation for the planners to configure our forces around that model. Resurgent problems in Northern Ireland and the 7/7 bombings figured very little in pre-strategic defence and security review planning, and two important overseas outliers were widely overlooked.

First, there was the planned invasion of Kosovo in 1999, when 1 million desperate refugees fled the Serb army. Almost all our allies demurred from sending ground forces and the MOD initiated a confused blizzard of call-out notices, summoning many reservists at a few days’ notice, even from units that it was in the process of disbanding. Britain was spared humiliation, of course, when the Serbs backed down under Russian pressure at the very last moment.

Secondly, in 2003-04 we were stretched well beyond expectations, as the continuing operation in Iraq overlapped with the incursion in Afghanistan.

The national security strategy rightly dismisses the assumption that our forces should be optimised almost entirely for medium-scale, Army-led expeditionary operations. It includes other roles, including, crucially, homeland security and upstream intervention, and there is even a faint hint of the scenario that dare not speak its name—general mobilisation for an unexpected crisis. Libya was Royal Air Force and Royal Navy-led—and led brilliantly, a point that I note in the week when we mourn the loss of Flight Lieutenant Cunningham of the Red Arrows.

How can we address so many scenarios, therefore, when the money available is so tight? The key surely is to reverse the slide towards an impossibly expensive manning model in which most units are full time, with costly payrolls, pensions, housing and so on. Of course they are worth it, but we cannot afford enough of them. Between two fifths and half the armies of our English-speaking sister countries are made up of volunteer reserves. On paper, ours make up less than one fifth, and in reality estimates suggest that the true figure is nearer 10%.

The US deploys National Guard armoured infantry brigades and fast-jet fighter squadrons to Afghanistan; Canada had a reservist company with every infantry rotation; and Australia has deployed formed companies and handed over its main commitments in Timor and Bougainville to reserve-led forces.

[Bob Stewart]

When we talk about National Guard pilots, I worry, because I wonder how much training they have to do, and whether it is different from what a regular has to do to be up to speed and to fly in combat.

[Mr Brazier]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Three quarters of the US National Guard’s fast-jet pilots are ex-regulars, so they are not wasting several million dollars in training when they leave, and the remaining quarter have to be very experienced pilots to be allowed to join.

As we stand in silence at war memorials up and down the country, let us remember that the vast majority of those who served and fell were not professionals, and that the volunteer reserves were the key link between our brave but small professional forces and the wider community. They also provided back-up that was immediately available and, crucially, a framework for expansion into a national effort.

In the great war, the Territorial Army provided almost half the combat units, winning 71 Victoria Crosses. The Royal Naval Reserve won 12. In the battle of Britain, the Auxiliary Air Force squadrons comfortably out-shot their regular RAF counterparts. Although those forces were trained in peacetime at a fraction of the cost of their regular counterparts, they were available when they were needed to fight—and fight they did.

When overstretch peaked in 2004, our small volunteer reserves provided a fifth of our forces in Iraq and one-eighth of the number in Afghanistan. Yet over the next two years, they were rewarded with a cack-handed reorganisation, recruitment ceilings and a demoralising freeze on collective training. Despite all that, they continued to achieve some remarkable successes. In 2007, when commenting on a company from the London Regiment, its commander Brigadier Lorimer—now General Lorimer —said:

“Somme Company was an outstanding body of men: well trained, highly motivated and exceptionally well led.”

More than 25,000 reservists have served in Iraq and Afghanistan and 28 have given their lives, including the young man yesterday. Yet, in 2009, all formed deployments to Afghanistan apart from field hospitals were stopped, and the use of reservists has degenerated into the backfilling of regular units, unlike what happens in the countries of our English-speaking counterparts.

Not surprisingly, the strength of the reserves rapidly dwindled, with the greatest deficiency among young officers. As the House knows, I was recently privileged to serve under General Sir Nicholas Houghton on his review of reserves. Two or three units I visited had no young officers left at all. While we were carrying out our study, the unhappiness among TA officers was compounded by the truly disgraceful announcement by the Military Secretary’s branch in July that an unprecedented four-fifths of TA commands were to go to regular officers, despite there being 25 Territorials in the frame who had all the necessary qualifications.

Our study recommended that we should move towards a better balance between regulars and volunteer reservists in the Army, with 30,000 trained reservists by 2015, and that they should

“no longer simply be used as individual specialists and augmentees, but as formed units and sub-units”.

The Royal Naval Reserve has plans to expand several areas, including its highly cost-effective air branch, which took over the training pipeline for some months in the overstretch crisis of 2004. It also has imaginative plans for the Royal Marines Reserve. The commission was disappointed with progress on the RAF, which has a pool of flying volunteer reservists that is only about a quarter of the size of that of the Royal Navy. Although there were some more imaginative ideas in the background, the recommendations it actually put forward were all rather expensive and seemed to be very modest in their actual value. That is why we recommended an independently led follow-up study on the RAF.

There are three keys to rebuilding our reserves: first, we must get out and recruit officers from the thousands of young men and women passing through our university officer training corps and restore the proposition. If we reintroduce demanding collective training for units and sub-units, it will restore the capability of the TA to deploy formed bodies and provide those leadership opportunities that are so vital for the commitment of young officers.

On a recent visit to 7 Rifles, I was told that four regular officers had just applied to join. I was astonished to hear, however, that some of them were stuck waiting to receive security clearance. Why on earth do we have security clearance for regular officers transferring to the TA?

That brings me to my second point. We need fit-for-purpose administrative systems, so that people can enlist, have their medicals and be fed into training without the endless delays that characterise the current dysfunctional system. My local unit, 3 PWRR, has had more than 100 recruits in a few months. Yet, the sheer incompetence of the MOD personnel administrative systems has already put off a large number of them.

Some regular officers are claiming that the TA cannot reach a trained strength of 30,000 by 2015. I urge my hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces, who made an excellent speech earlier, not to listen to them. It is the dysfunctional system and the blockages in the regular-dominated training pipeline that is holding our reserve numbers back.

Hence, my third and final item on the shopping list is this. Let us reintroduce regionally based phase 1 training, so that Territorials are not scrabbling for a place at the back of the queue in the regular establishments. In July, the former Secretary of State announced a £1.5 billion investment in the reserves over a decade. I am certain that my right hon. Friend the new Secretary of State is still committed to that. May I advise that it must be spent on rebuilding viable and usable structures to meet the 2015 deadline, not siphoned off to meet shortfalls elsewhere while that crucial date is allowed to slip?

Rebalancing our armed forces will enable Britain to afford more capacity within tight budgets—to expand the pool of talent available for defence, to increase the footprint for national resilience and, above all, to reconnect our excellent but increasingly remote regular forces with the nation they serve so well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs Moon]

I most certainly do congratulate such organisations. Service personnel have mentioned to me how important community support is for their families—for example, it is important to know that teachers are aware if children in their class have fathers who are away on operations. I am talking about Operation Ellamy, but I am sure that this is equally important for service personnel in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world. However, when personnel leave at short notice, as was the case in Operation Ellamy, it is even more important because they do not have time to prepare their families. The support of the organisations that the hon. Lady talked about is absolutely integral.

[Bob Stewart]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Mrs Moon]

I most certainly will give way to the hon. and gallant Gentleman.

[Bob Stewart]

As my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier) said, one problem is that when reservists and people who live away from their camp are deployed, their wives and families are left isolated. The Ministry of Defence is trying to find a way to ensure that people who are not on base are looked after properly, because they get extremely worried when they feel isolated. I am sure that the hon. Lady agrees with that.

[Mrs Moon]

I most certainly do agree. It is even more important that we recognise the need to give such service personnel help and support to reintegrate into their families. Often, their families have not had help and support from other service personnel, so when their family member comes back, their anxiety can add to the tension within the family and cause a lot of conflict.

It was interesting to hear about the important role played by employers, particularly the employers of reservists, in supporting people in going away and returning, so that they can settle back into their normal employment. When one has been working with the brakes off, 24/7, in the theatre of operations, it is difficult to come back to the slower pace of civilian life. That is an important lesson that employers need to build into their approach when they welcome service personnel back.

Industry is also important. Everybody has made a great deal of distancing themselves from industry today, but in Operation Ellamy, we needed the support of industry to ensure that the forces at the front of the fighting constantly had the supplies they needed, and so that Operation Unified Protector could provide the protection that was needed. That team spirit and can-do attitude is incredibly important.

The service personnel also talked about the range, reach and accuracy of our weapons—I see smiles on the faces of those who were at the meeting. We need to recognise that new is not always best. They talked with delight about how the VC10 is still such a valuable piece of kit.

I would like to mention briefly a wonderful piece on the front of Defence News entitled, “Stop Doing Things That Are Stupid”—a lesson that the Ministry of Defence should always bear in mind. Perhaps it should be on the front of every Minister’s desk. The USA is giving front-line personnel reports to send back about kit and equipment so that they can say, “This works,” or “If you did this it would work better,” or, “This is useless. Get rid of it.” We should stop asking people back at the Ministry of Defence to answer those questions. Why can we not follow the US example and get our front-line personnel to tell us what they want and what works best in theatre?

One of the sad things we heard was that NATO bases’ interoperability has been lost. I will take that up in my role as a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. We need our forces to be able to move around the NATO countries and know where they are and where they can find the things they need to make us more effective. A matter that we have repeatedly heard discussed is intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. In refuelling, we have relied on the Americans, but we cannot continue to expect them always to meet that requirement. It is critical that we consider how to develop and increase our own resources.

We owe the RAF, Navy and Army pilots a debt of great thanks for their professionalism. There were no deaths among our forces on Operation Ellamy, and they ensured that civilian deaths were kept to an absolute minimum. They showed a new way of operating in theatre. With few forces on the ground, they had to take greater responsibility for civilian life.

I wish briefly to discuss the military covenant. I have been extremely distressed to see the Royal British Legion being treated pretty shabbily for its involvement in the campaign and accused of delaying reform. The RBL is a vital voice for our armed forces, and especially for our veterans. I also struggle to understand why the chief coroner has come to be seen as surplus to requirements. I hope that the Ministry of Defence is considering that matter.

We have heard briefly about mental health. We know that American studies show that one third of American veterans needed psychological care, while one in five soldiers suffered combat-induced psychological problems post-Iraq. We also know that members of the reserve forces are more susceptible than others to mental health problems. We must commit to ensuring that every serving armed forces member and every veteran has access to the help and support they need, whether it is while they are serving, in theatre, when they come home, or many years later. We must not allow compassion fatigue to mean that as the years go by, we forget the service that people have given.

On accommodation, I welcome the Minister’s statement that money will go back into the accommodation budget if it can be found, but Julie McCarthy, the chief executive of the Army Families Federation, has said:

“The feedback we are getting is one of resigned disappointment. The upgrades that are being cancelled involved a total rebuild of houses—new roofs, windows, carpets, kitchens and bathrooms.”

The programme was about not just repainting a few rooms, but making quarters habitable. Our armed forces deserve habitable accommodation. They deserve the best that we can give them, and I hope the Minister will find the additional money needed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

It is highly appropriate that we conduct this defence debate only a few hours after armed forces veterans gathered at their own private commemoration in the churchyard of Westminster Abbey, where His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh was present.

I always wear a poppy between 1 and 11 November, but I do not need to wear a poppy—it is actually on my heart. The date I particularly remember is not this weekend but 6 December 1982, when six men were killed and 35 wounded under my command in Northern Ireland.

This debate is about personnel, so I shall concentrate on that. Getting the manning right is crucial for defence. When I commanded the Cheshire Regiment, I commanded about 600 people. When I joined it, the Cheshire Regiment had 700 people. In my time, tank regiments went from having 56 main battle tanks to having 42. Commanding officers are expected to do just as much as before, but with fewer people.

Of course, reducing manning has a direct impact on operational effectiveness. The strategic defence and security review suggests that Army strength should be at 82,000 with 30,000 reservists. I remain worried about how we shall get 30,000 reservists within a few years. The strength of the Royal Air Force is planned to be 39,000, with only 2,000 reservists. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier), who is worried and thinks that the RAF has to rethink the matter of reservists. He made the point to me privately—and I think he mentioned it in his speech—that it was reservist pilots who were the most effective in the battle of Britain.

I am worried about how the fitness levels of reserves will be monitored. Will they pass their annual fitness test and their annual personal weapons test? How will they do that? What about their dental records? They have to be dental fit, ready to go almost immediately. Mobilising reserves is not necessarily cheap—certainly not as cheap as some people might think.

The armed forces are still quite top heavy. Apparently, there are more than 250 officers of one-star rank in all three services. During the second world war, a three-star officer—a lieutenant-general—used to command about 100,000 people. That is the current all-out strength of the Army today.

I understand, although I am open to correction, that there are 33 officers of two-star rank and above in the Royal Navy. There are two full admirals, six vice-admirals, and 25 rear-admirals. If we include one-star officers, that means that the Royal Navy has more than one admiral for each of its 40 fighting ships—and, by the way, each officer of one-star rank or above receives a salary of about £120,000 a year.

I will not leave the Army alone, however. The Army has five four-star officers, who are generals, and, although I am not sure, I believe that it now has 17 three-star officers, who are lieutenant-generals.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Andrew Robathan)]

rose—

[Bob Stewart]

The Minister is about to correct me, so I shall sit down and listen.

[Mr Robathan]

Off the top of my head, I think we have four three-star officers in the Army at present, although I share my hon. Friend’s concerns.

[Bob Stewart]

I thank my right hon. Friend. I am sure that he is correct. However, I am not trying to give exact figures; I am merely trying to draw attention to a trend, and to suggest that our forces are top-heavy.

[Dr Murrison]

Does not part of the difficulty lie in the MOD, whose civil servants, during both my hon. Friend’s service and mine, have been keen to equate themselves with starred officers? I believe that that has driven some of the current inflationary pressure. Does my hon. Friend agree that the first priority for Ministers must be to deal with that management overhead?

[Bob Stewart]

I entirely agree, and I am sure that the Minister does as well. We must get that under control. Someone told me—again, the Minister probably has the figures at his fingertips—that the Army has some 1,700 lieutenant-colonels. If that is the case, they could man three battalions, and we have only 38 of those.

I will not go into the same details about the Royal Air Force, but the principle is the same: it remains quite top-heavy. I know that the Government intend to have a crack at reducing the problem. What we want in our armed forces are people coming in at the bottom—that is, people who actually do the business, rather than those who are in the background sitting behind desks.

[Mark Lancaster]

My hon. Friend is advancing a powerful argument, with which I agree. Does he believe that the only solution to the problem is for us to slow down the career progression of officers in the Army?

[Bob Stewart]

That is the dilemma. We want to encourage people to stay in the Army; we want to retain the experience of senior officers; and, in the event of something that we may not care to mention—a general war—we will require those officers to expand the Army, as my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury suggested.

As for the basing of our troops, I am still worried about where they will go when they come back from Germany, if we have to get them all out by 2020. The details of how many will go to which places are yet to be planned. I am particularly concerned about where those extra troops will be trained, because the training areas already seem to be mightily over-booked. Cost is another issue. Converting Kinloss, which is currently an RAF station, to enable it to house, say, an Army battalion, will not be simply a case of “All out, one in”. We should also ask where the families will go. As was said earlier, it would be a good idea to try to enable them to live further away, but there will be a problem with morale when there is a deployment and wives and children are separate from the main unit.

Finally, let me say a little about Afghanistan. I have heard an increasing number of complaints—some as recently as this week—about the suggestion that a quota of reservists are going there while regulars are being left behind. That quota, which may not be formal, is nevertheless causing some resentment. I ask the Minister to check on that. It costs more to deploy reservists; as regulars are already being paid for, they do not cost as much.

I am very concerned about reports this week that the United States will be withdrawing from Helmand. That has manpower implications. The gains from 2007 onwards might be in jeopardy, and who will take up the slack? It must not be us. We have three years to go before we are formally committed to withdraw from operations in Helmand and Afghanistan generally, although we will stay there in a training role. If the Americans withdraw, the commander in Helmand will have fewer manoeuvre units and fewer available reserves. I do not want us to reoccupy bases we have occupied previously, such as Sangin, Musa Qala and Now Zad.

It is also crucial that we maintain our own security as we withdraw. I know the Minister realises that; I am not trying to teach him to suck eggs. Withdrawing from an operational theatre is very complicated, however. It is often much easier to go in than to come out, and that can be very dangerous. We do not want to take pointless casualties, and we must not repeat the mistake of 2006, when we allowed our troops to be put into isolated locations unsupported. When we are withdrawing, we must not leave a thin line at the front and thin out from there. We must withdraw properly. I will not talk in detail about the tactics, but we must not leave our troops isolated and in a precarious situation as we withdraw.

I shall conclude now, but I should first apologise to the House as I must beg leave to be absent from shortly onwards as there is a constituency event I must attend. I do not wish to leave the Chamber, but once I have done the decent thing by listening to the next speech, I would like to be allowed to depart. Please forgive me, colleagues.

Afghanistan

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Tuesday 18th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

The Government have put a huge investment of time, management effort and money into that exercise, and I can assure the hon. Gentleman that those who need medical help as a result of injuries that they received while fighting on behalf of their country will receive it.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

The battalion that I commanded, 1st Mercians, will shortly return to Afghanistan, within two years. When it was there last it lost 12 men and more than 100 were wounded. May I ask the Secretary of State to write to me, when he can, to explain how battle casualty replacements will work in the future? Commanding officers find it very difficult if they lose 100 men out of 500, and it will be especially difficult as we will be withdrawing and drawing down in the next couple of years.

[Mr Hammond]

I am happy to write to my hon. Friend, who of course has direct experience of handling such issues. The good news, of course, is that casualty figures are substantially down. UK forces are taking far fewer casualties than they were at the time to which he refers. However, I will write to him.

Defence Responsibilities

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Monday 10th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I was first aware of them in June, when I saw them for the first time. I commented that it was inappropriate for a portcullis to be used on a private business card and that it was not appropriate for anyone to say that they were an adviser to the Secretary of State. At that point, I made it very clear that they should be withdrawn and not used again. They were funded privately, and have nothing to do with public or, indeed, my money.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

May I commend my right hon. Friend on not changing his programme, and on going to visit our armed forces abroad, when it must have been tempting for him to come home immediately, given what was happening here? I have listened carefully to what he said today, and I personally am very satisfied. May I advise him to go back to his job, which is looking after our armed forces, who are in combat in two operational theatres? That is what he must concentrate on now.

[Dr Fox]

Again, I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I intend to concentrate very much on those issues, which remain at the top of my in-tray. As I said, we in the House understand that those outside have legitimate concerns and that they have a right for them to be addressed, and I think that the correct way to do so is for the Cabinet Secretary to continue the investigation begun by the permanent secretary. I can only reiterate my willingness to co-operate in every way that I possibly can with that investigation.

Oral Answers to Questions

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Monday 10th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Robathan]

I think the hon. Gentleman and I would agree a great deal about this. We are extremely concerned about the future of many badly injured service personnel when they leave the armed forces, and that is why we have put in place a transition protocol. It is also why I often have meetings with Ministers in the Department of Health—indeed my next one is on Wednesday—to discuss how, going forward, we can better serve those who are badly injured. I beg your indulgence, Mr Speaker, but the hon. Gentleman will know of the Army recovery capability that was put in place by the previous Administration, which is similarly helping very badly injured people to go forward with their lives in future.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

The question I was about to ask was properly asked by the hon. Member for Halton (Derek Twigg), so I shall sit down.

[Mr Speaker]

The hon. Gentleman is setting an example that others could usefully follow.

Baha Mousa Inquiry

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Thursday 8th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

The mechanisms and approaches are set out in the appropriate training manuals and are emphasised during the training process. It is a matter of great regret that there was, as the former Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) has said, a loss of institutional memory in the Ministry of Defence. I personally find it difficult to understand how a statement given by a Prime Minister on the Floor of this House outlawing five interrogation techniques could be “forgotten” by the body corporate. There was a lack of codification, which has, I think, been put right in recent years. I share the disbelief that such a corporate memory failure could be allowed to occur.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

To follow up what my hon. and good Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) has said, I would like to take it to a lower level: when people are frightened, scared out of their wits, very tired and have lost friends, they sometimes lose their moral compass. Is my right hon. Friend instructing battalion commanders and brigade commanders to ensure that when such situations are likely, officers brief their men on exactly how they should act? In circumstances that we have heard about, as they apply to the Baha Mousa case, will my right hon. Friend ensure that supervision by officers and non-commissioned officers is as close as it possibly can be in order to stop weak people, who might also be thugs, from acting appallingly?

[Dr Fox]

In many professions, the whole point of professional training is to get individuals to behave under stressful circumstances in the same way as they would at any other time. That applies in the medical profession, and it applies to the Army. My hon. Friend is right to point to the duty of officers both to supervise and to guide those they lead. One of the most appalling failures set out in the Baha Mousa inquiry was the failure of those in command generally to supervise and guide those for whom they were responsible. My hon. Friend makes a very important point.