Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2014
Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts(9 years, 5 months ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Williams of Trafford
That the Grand Committee do consider the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2014.
Relevant document: 13th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
My Lords, this order was laid in Parliament on 7 November. It is part of continuing efforts to tackle the trade in so-called “legal highs”—a term which is unhelpful. On 30 October the Government published their response to the expert-led review into new psychoactive substances. They have set out an enhanced package of measures that includes looking at the feasibility of new legislation in this challenging area.
The Misuse of Drugs Act will remain the cornerstone of the Government’s legislative actions to curtail the availability of these new drugs where there is expert advice on their harms. The order being debated today is one part of the Government’s actions, which they continue to pursue with full vigour.
I would like to thank the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs for its continued support in reviewing the evidence base on new psychoactive substances sold as legal highs that have the potential to cause harm. The ACMD’s considerations and advice continue to inform the Government’s response to these drugs. Noble Lords will wish to note that the legislative measures the Government are proposing through this order are entirely in line with the ACMD’s advice.
If made, this order will specify for control the synthetic opioid AH-7921 and a number of LSD-related compounds, commonly referred to as ALD-52, AL-LAD, ETH-LAD, PRO-LAD and LSZ. The order will also extend the definition used to control the family of tryptamines to capture compounds such as alpha-methyltryptamine as well as 5-MeO-DALT for control under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.
The Government have received advice from the ACMD that the drugs to be controlled are being misused or likely to be misused. In the ACMD’s view, their misuse is having, or is capable of having, sufficiently harmful effects to warrant legislative action under the 1971 Act. Legislative action is necessary as a result of the real and potential harms identified by the ACMD. This action will send out a strong message to those who are considering experimenting with these drugs and help the Government to target their public health messaging in order to protect the public. It will also allow enforcement partners to prioritise resources accordingly to tackle the sale and supply of these drugs, sending out a strong message to those who trade in these harmful drugs, including high street “head shops”.
The Committee will be aware that this Government and the ACMD continue to monitor, through UK and EU drugs early warning systems, emerging substances marketed as legal alternatives to controlled drugs. This work has informed the ACMD’s deliberations and, as appropriate, its current advice to update our drug laws in relation to the new psychoactive compounds being controlled.
AH-7921 is a potent synthetic analgesic developed over 40 years ago by Allen & Hanburys pharmaceutical company in the UK. The ACMD reports that,
“the compound was not developed further, presumably because animal studies revealed a high addictive potential”.
AH-7921 has recently become available as a new psychoactive substance. It was first detected in Europe in July 2012. Since then a number of drug-related deaths have been reported in Europe, including three related deaths reported by the National Programme on Substance Abuse Deaths in the UK in 2013. AH-7921 is reported as being highly addictive, with a potency similar to morphine. Harms from the misuse of this drug are reported to include difficulty in breathing, severe pain and death.
The LSD-related compounds are potent hallucinogens which currently evade UK controls on this family of drugs. These compounds are reported as being offered for sale on specialist websites devoted to hallucinogens as new psychoactive substances. The harms associated with the misuse of these compounds are reported to include euphoria, hallucinations, rapid heartbeat and depression. These compounds are also known to cause acute mental health disturbances.
The tryptamines are hallucinogens, a large number of which are already controlled via a generic or group definition under the 1971 Act as class A drugs. The ACMD reports that in recent years there has been a significant interest in hallucinogens of this type. A number of these substances, which fall outside the current group definition, are being offered for sale as new psychoactive substances. Two in particular, commonly referred to as AMT and 5-MeO-DALT, have been encountered through the Home Office forensic early warning system. AMT was linked to the tragic deaths of Adam Hunt and Christopher Scott last year.
The physical effects of the tryptamines are reported as visual illusion, hallucination and euphoria, among others. The ACMD also reports a small number of confirmed post-mortem toxicology reports, rising from one in 2009 to four in 2013, with AMT being the most frequently linked to reported tryptamine deaths. For all these reasons, the Government accept the ACMD’s advice to extend current controls to these compounds as class A drugs under the 1971 Act.
The Government intend to make two further, related statutory instruments, which will be subject to the negative resolution procedure. The Misuse of Drugs (Designation) (Amendment No. 2) Order 2014 will amend the Misuse of Drugs (Designation) Order 2001 to place the compounds being controlled in Part 1 of the order as compounds to which Section 7(4) of the 1971 Act applies. These compounds have no known legitimate uses outside research. Their availability for use in research will be enabled under a Home Office licence.
The Misuse of Drugs (Amendment No. 3) Regulations 2014 will amend the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001 to place the compounds being controlled by this order in Schedule 1 to the 2001 regulations, as they have no known or recognised medicinal uses. These instruments will be laid in time to come into force at the same time as the Order in Council, if it comes into force as proposed. The Government will publicise the approved law changes through a Home Office circular. I commend the order to the Committee.
Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for the detail on this. The explanation she gave was very helpful. I also congratulate her on her pronunciation—these are not easy words; they have foiled many a Minister. However, the complications are more than just verbal when we look at the detail of the complexities of the compounds that we are seeking to prohibit. This order was actually laid in July and had to be withdrawn because of a mistake. That indicates how complex these issues are and how important it is that we get it right.
Too often, these drugs are referred to in a phrase that I do not like: “legal highs”. Sometimes the only reason that they are legal is because of the technicality that no one has got round to banning that particular compound yet, even though it has a very similar effect to another. That might be the initial reaction to these highs, but in too many cases they lead to death or very serious illness or psychosis, so it is right that action is taken against them. One thing that gives cause for concern is the growing number of artificial drugs—created or synthetic compounds—on the market. The Government’s approach now, of looking at groups of compounds rather than trying to ban an individual one so that when there is a slight change in the make-up another one has to be banned, is a much more sensible approach and one that we welcome.
I will just ask something briefly about process. There are two questions here. The Government sought advice from the ACMD on this order and it fully supports it. It is always helpful where there is consensus in these matters. Is there a process by which the ACMD can draw the attention of the Government to drugs being used on which it thinks action should be taken? Is there a two-way process?
The Minister referred to other orders coming before us. I think that this is the fifth order on the Misuse of Drugs Act that I have spoken to, so a number of substances have been banned already. We need to ensure that the action that we are taking is effective. There is no point in us sitting here, with the Minister having to learn the names of the drugs and read them through, with the immense work that goes into preparing such orders and the advice from the ACMD, if at the end of the day it is not going to have much effect. How many prosecutions have there been in line with all that has been done already in respect of substances and compounds that have been banned, and how many seizures of drugs banned in previous orders have we seen? Has any assessment been made or evidence emerged of a decline in their use? I am happy not to receive answers today, but I am looking for reassurance that when we take such action it does have an impact and makes a difference. With those points and questions, we give our support to the Motion.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I thank the noble Baroness for taking part in this quite brief discussion of a matter which—I think there is general consensus—needs to be tackled. Obviously, approval of the order will ensure that our drug laws remain effective and assist law enforcement to restrict the availability of compounds that have no legitimate use outside research.
The noble Baroness mentioned how unhelpful the term “legal high” is—because, as she said, the only reason that a substance is a legal high is that it has not yet become an illegal high. She also referred to how complex the whole thing is, because we are almost running to stand still, given the number of new compounds and substances being developed.
The noble Baroness asked whether the ACMD can take a proactive as opposed to a reactive approach if it gets intelligence on new drugs that are being developed. Given that it is a two-way dialogue, I assume that the answer is yes, but if it is any different from that, I will let her know. The expert panel made an assessment of our approach and concluded that we should build on it, but I am happy to write to the noble Baroness on that point.
On the increase or the decline in use, the use of new psychoactive substances among the general population remains relatively low overall compared to that of some of the traditional illicit drugs, with 0.6% of adults—that is, 16 to 59 year-olds—reporting use of mephedrone in the last year compared to 6.6% for cannabis, 2.4% for powder cocaine and 1.6% for ecstasy.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
That does not address the point that I am making; it tells us about the average use. What I am trying to do is understand the impact of orders such as these. I understand what the use is in the UK; I want to know whether the orders are having any effect. I am happy for the Minister not to answer today but to write to me, because I think that is a more complex question.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I will clarify that in a letter.
I think that I have answered the two main questions. I am happy to write with detail on the other questions that were asked. In light of that, I commend the order.
Serious Crime Bill [HL]
Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts(9 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
My Lords, these technical amendments relate to the rights of appeal in Scotland against decisions on seizure and forfeiture of substances used as drug-cutting agents. In Scotland, the appeal from the decision of a sheriff under Clause 60 is to the sheriff principal. The Scottish Parliament has recently passed the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014. Among other things, that Act establishes a new right of appeal from the sheriff to the Sheriff Appeal Court and, in the process, abolishes the current right of appeal from a sheriff to the sheriff principal.
Amendments 1 to 5 to Clause 61 accordingly update the avenue of appeal. The consequential amendment, Amendment 10, to Clause 74 is a transitional provision. As it is not known for definite when the Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill will come into force, this amendment provides a mechanism to refer to an appeal to the sheriff principal, if circumstances arise where this is necessary. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, these drafting amendments simply seek to split Clause 67, which, as amended on Report, now deals with two distinct, albeit related, issues; namely, the extension of the extraterritorial reach of the offences in the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 and conferring lifelong anonymity on the victims of FGM.
I look forward to hearing what the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, has to say about her amendment before responding to it. I also understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, would like to put on the record some further observations about her proposed new offence of encouragement of FGM. For now, I beg to move.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I am sorry not to hear further from the Minister about her amendments. We had a very helpful and productive debate on Report, where it was clear that your Lordships’ House was united in a desire to tackle FGM. The government amendment was welcomed, but it was agreed that the issues raised by our amendments, which I have again tabled today, were both valid and reasonable. There was no policy disagreement; the difference was one of approach and what would be most effective in achieving the aims that we all share.
The noble Lord, Lord Lester, emphasised the need to use civil law and family courts. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, agreed with him and said:
“I would like to see what is good in each set of amendments put together”,
and expressed the hope that,
“the Opposition and the Government will get together … and thrash out what would be the best of everything and get that into one list that could go into Third Reading”.—[Official Report, 28/10/14; col. 1092.]
That explains why we have retabled our amendment here at Third Reading. We felt that the House would want to hear what progress we have made in those discussions.
There were two issues of difference between us and the Government. I say “difference” rather than “disagreement”, as the whole approach on this matter has been consensual. Our intention in tabling amendments is to ensure that the legislation, and its application, is the best it can be. That is why we sought advice not just on policy but from leading practising lawyers in this area. I put on record my thanks and appreciation to Kirsty Brimelow from Doughty Street Chambers and the Bar Human Rights Committee and Zimran Samuel from 42 Bedford Row Chambers. Their considerable practical experience and expertise have been of enormous assistance in understanding all the implications of the proposed legislation. We are grateful to them also for attending the meeting we had with the Minister and her officials. I am also grateful to Catherine Meredith of Doughty Street and Dexter Dias of Garden Court Chambers. I am not a lawyer, but I felt that I needed to be absolutely clear on the implications of the amendments before us—not just how they would be implemented in theory but how much difference they would make in practice. There is old saying: in theory, theory and practice are the same, but in practice they are often different.
As legislators, we must be concerned about practice— the very point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lester, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss— when debating the use of civil law. There are two issues of difference, both relating to the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003. We welcomed the Government’s support for our calls for FGM protection orders and were grateful to them for bringing forward their own amendment on Report. The issues of difference that merited further consideration were highlighted by the Bar Human Rights Committee, whose members proposed such an order in the first place and are experts in this area.
The first issue relates to where the orders sit in relation to civil and criminal law, and which Act the amendment relates to. It might seem just an academic argument, but if that were that case, I would not raise it today in your Lordships’ House. The 2003 FGM Act, which the government amendment seeks to amend, is a criminal statute and not necessarily familiar to family law practitioners. The Family Law Act 1996, on the other hand, is their first port of call. Forced marriage protection orders, which are used all the time in the family court, are in the Family Law Act and have been successful. Having FGM orders also in the Family Law Act would mean that they would sit beside and complement the existing regime for the protection of children in the Children Act 1989.
I appreciate that the Government’s proposal remains a civil order, but it is a civil order within criminal legislation. Those who are involved in family courts told us of the practical reasons why not all family court lawyers would know, understand or appreciate that they should also look to criminal law statutes for civil measures.
There is the issue of the deterrent factor for those whom we want to come forward, when a civil measure lies within criminal law. The difference may be understood by criminal lawyers or across the Dispatch Box in your Lordships’ House, but it is not necessarily understood by those whom the orders seek to protect.
I totally understand that from the Government’s point of view it makes policy sense to have all the legislation relating to FGM in one place. It sounds logical. But when those who will use this law, and who really care that we get it right, tell us that it could make application for and gaining of an FGM order harder and therefore less likely, I feel obliged to take their views and experience into account. What matters is what works in practice.
The second issue is about the definition. As I explained in Committee, the government amendment uses the definition in the 2003 Act. The Government believe, as was the intention when we reintroduced the legislation in 2003, that this covers reinfibulation. I am not going to test your Lordships’ House again with an exact explanation of what is involved. Last time, “Today in Parliament” put out a warning before I spoke, and gave the programme a G certificate, standing for guidance. I think that is the first time that that has happened, but it does convey some of the brutality and horror of what we are talking about.
The law was intended to include reinfibulation. Any definition or interpretation should include reinfibulation, which involves unnecessary and non-medical restitching to reclose the female genital mutilation following childbirth. However, the Bar Human Rights Committee and Doughty Street lawyers tell us that there is some misinterpretation. That is why we use the World Health Organization definition instead. That would ensure that our law is consistent with recognised international standards and understandings and clarifies any existing confusion around offending conduct such as reinfibulation.
I was reassured on Report by the willingness of Ministers to discuss this further and, as a result, I agreed to withdraw our amendments. The lawyers who advised us attended the meeting with the noble Baroness and her officials. We were looking forward to the meeting, and we were optimistic that we would make the kind of progress that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and others, had wanted us to make. However, I have to tell your Lordships’ House that we are very disappointed with the outcome. It appeared to us in that meeting that the Government were not prepared to take on board any of the points raised by us or, more importantly, by the barristers who deal with this issue on a regular basis. On the issue of definition the Government are now concerned that such clarification as we have called for could affect any existing or current cases. I am surprised that that was not mentioned on Report. That assessment is questioned, including by senior lawyers who we have spoken to. Perhaps the noble Baroness and I could pursue that at another time.
No one is suggesting that the law is wrong; there is a problem with interpretation. When the Royal College of Midwives and the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists say that the definition does not include reinfibulation, that seems to me to be an excellent case for clarification. Despite the clear will of your Lordships’ House that such discussions should take place with the intention of ensuring that whatever was brought forward works well in practice, I deeply regret that I do not consider that we had productive discussions. The Government clearly have no intention of making any modifications or improvements in this area.
I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote. The government amendments are not wrong, but they could be better. We believe that this is a lost opportunity, and I ask the following questions.
First, can the Minister tell us what the Government will do to raise awareness among practitioners and the public that these orders exist? Secondly, will she agree to report to Parliament on the number of orders that have been made after, for example, one year of operation —although that might of course be under a different Government—so that the effectiveness can be considered? Thirdly, will she clarify the legal aid position? My understanding is that legal aid will be made available because these are civil FGM orders, even though they sit within criminal legislation. Without such legal aid, these orders would fail. How does the Minister intend to make that clear, or is my understanding of legal aid wrong? Fourthly, will the Government consult on the interpretation of the definition of FGM?
While we are disappointed that we do not have the best outcome, we feel that we have done all we can to make the case. The proposals from the Government are important, they are a significant improvement and we want to see them be as effective as possible.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in the discussions to enable the progress mentioned by my noble friend Lady Hamwee to take place. I think we all want the same thing; there is a slight difference of opinion in how we get there. I thank specifically the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith and Lady Meacher, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee for the time they have taken in the discussions.
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, raised two substantive points. The first concerned whether there would not be advantages in placing the provisions in respect of FGM protection orders in the Family Law Act 1996 rather than in the FGM Act 2003 and the second concerned whether the statutory definition of FGM should be updated expressly to refer to reinfibulation. I will take the two points in turn. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness and her advisers for discussing with me the issues she raised on Report. On the first point, I believe that the noble Baroness accepted that the Government’s provisions would allow proceedings for FGM protection orders to be heard in the family court or in the family division of the High Court as family proceedings with the full range of the court’s powers. However, she was concerned that civil or family law practitioners might not be able to find the FGM protection order provisions in a criminal statute and that victims would be deterred from availing themselves of them.
As its Long Title indicates, the FGM Act 2003 restates and amends the law relating to FGM. It is not exclusively a criminal statute nor do I think that is a particularly helpful label. We remain of the view that is sensible to have all the provisions relating to this area of the law in one place—that point was made on Report. We will work with the legal profession and others to ensure that the FGM provisions in the Bill are widely publicised when we come to bring them into force. I think this is crucial because it is not just the law but the reinforcement and the engagement with communities that will be so important.
With regard to the definition of FGM, I also had a helpful discussion with the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and her advisers on whether there should be an explicit reference to reinfibulation in the FGM Act 2003. I have tried to persuade the noble Baroness of the Government’s firm view, which I set out on Report and reiterate today, that reinfibulation is already covered by the wording of the 2003 Act. As infibulation is an offence under that Act, so is reinfibulation. That reinfibulation or resuturing is an offence is clearly stated in the multi-agency practice guidelines on FGM and in the guidance of almost all of the relevant royal colleges. There may of course be a need to communicate this point to practitioners more effectively—I think there will be—but we do not accept that there is currently any need to clarify the law.
The noble Baroness also asked about the legal aid position. The Government are giving this further consideration and will clarify the position on legal aid in due course. The noble Baroness also asked whether there would be a report to Parliament on FGM protection orders after one year. We expect that the provisions of this Bill will be subject to post-legislative scrutiny in the normal way. We will ensure that our report on the working of the Bill gives figures as to the number of FGM protection orders made. I think that will be very important. It will, of course, be open to any Member of your Lordships’ House to table a Question at any time seeking such information.
I will now respond to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. Again, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for the constructive way in which she has pursued her and the Local Government Association’s campaign for a new offence to outlaw statements that encourage the promotion of FGM. As I indicated on Report, the Government remain to be persuaded of the case for such an offence. The Government believe that the provisions added to the Bill at Report stage are a far more targeted, and therefore more effective, way of dealing with the problem.
Of course, as well as this now strengthened body of criminal and civil law, there is more that can and should be done to overcome the culture and attitudes that allow FGM to persist. That is why, at the Girl Summit in July, we launched a declaration condemning FGM, signed by more than 200 faith and community leaders from all major religions. The faith leaders have declared that FGM is not required by their religions and is a form of child abuse. The declaration has it made clear that all religions will work together to end FGM for good. The support from faith leaders has been overwhelming and the Government are committed to turning these signatures into further action through education and community engagement, which, as I have said, are crucial. Our aim must be for all these powerful voices from authoritative and respected local leaders to drown out the minority, to whom the noble Baroness referred, who advocate and encourage FGM.
Finally, we have real concerns about the necessity and proportionality of an offence of encouraging the promotion of FGM, given that it would engage Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights which protects freedom of expression. None of us would condone such statements, but it does mean that we have to tread carefully before introducing what amounts to a speech crime. The noble Baroness has briefly touched on these points and has referred to the advice she has recently received from Dexter Dias QC. I am ready and willing to meet both the noble Baroness and Dexter Dias to discuss these issues further. I hope that the offer of a further meeting will go some way to reassure the noble Baroness that we will continue to explore the issues she has raised, although I hope she will understand that I cannot offer her any commitment to bring forward a government amendment on this matter during the remaining stages of the Bill.
I say again that the whole House is united in seeking to eradicate the vile practice of FGM both from this country and across the globe. Your Lordships’ House is sending the Bill to the Commons with a powerful suite of new measures to help achieve that objective. I hope that, having heard the Government’s reasons for the approach we have taken, particularly as regards FGM protection orders, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, will not press her amendment—as she has stated she will not—and will join me in commending the government amendments to the House.
Serious Crime Bill [HL]
Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts(9 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken in this debate—in particular to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for setting out just what we mean by female genital mutilation and asking, as a supplementary, whether the current definition of FGM includes wider elements such as reinfibulation. I will deal with that point first. I confirm that the Government’s view is that reinfibulation is an offence under the 2003 Act. That is on the basis that if it is an offence to infibulate in the first place, it must equally be an offence to reinfibulate. The multiagency practice guidelines on FGM have long made clear that resuturing or reinfibulation is illegal in the UK. Current guidance issued by both the BMA and the Royal College of Nursing supports that view.
As we heard in Committee, the whole House shares an abhorrence of the practice of FGM and we can all agree that more needs to be done to stop such violence against women and girls. There are nuances on how best to tackle such abuse, but we all agree on the principle: FGM must end, and this Government are committed to ending it.
I will comment on the right reverend Prelate’s point about the cultural aspect, which adds strength to the argument. I totally share his view. At the Girl Summit in July this year, the Prime Minister and Home Secretary announced an unprecedented package of measures to tackle FGM in this country. This included a number of commitments to strengthen the law. To that end, this group of amendments includes a number of government amendments designed to ensure that our legislative response is as strong as possible. In particular, they will provide for lifelong anonymity for the victims of FGM, introduce a new civil order to help protect those at risk of mutilation, and create a new offence of failure to prevent FGM. I propose to say a little more about each of these new provisions.
On the subject of victim anonymity, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, moved an amendment in Committee to extend to victims of female genital mutilation the same anonymity that already applies to victims of many sexual offences. This followed a recommendation by the Director of Public Prosecutions, and I was then able to indicate in response to that debate that the Government were giving sympathetic consideration to the proposal. As many in this House will have seen at the Girl Summit on 22 July, the Home Secretary announced that the Government would bring forward legislation to this end. Amendments 46A and 46B deliver on that commitment. These amendments will give victims of female genital mutilation the benefit of anonymity, as already applies to the alleged victims of many sexual offences under the provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. Any publication of material that could lead members of the public to identify a person as the alleged victim of an offence will be prohibited. Anonymity should not end where the online world begins; publication would include traditional print media, broadcasting and social media.
Female genital mutilation is an offence of a particularly personal and sensitive nature. Without the prospect of anonymity, victims may be discouraged from reporting such an intimate offence to the police. Granting lifelong anonymity, therefore, will reassure victims that their identity will be protected and will go far to encourage the reporting of this offence. This protection needs to be automatic rather than discretionary; it must apply from the outset, when an allegation is first made, rather than from the point of charge; and it must last for the duration of that person’s lifetime. That is exactly what these amendments will bring about.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee has a couple of amendments to government Amendment 46B. They are far from being the minnows that she described. Amendment 46C seeks to amend paragraph 1(5) of new Schedule 1, which sets out the first condition that must be met in order to lift the restriction on anonymity. This allows a court to remove the anonymity that attaches to an alleged victim of an FGM offence where the anonymity results in the defendant’s case being “substantially prejudiced”. This wording is directly comparable to the provisions in the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992. We do not think that making a distinction between the two provisions would be helpful when both seek to achieve the same outcome.
Amendment 46D would lower the test for disapplying the reporting restrictions. We do not believe that this change provides sufficient protection for the alleged victim’s anonymity. Again, we have applied the two-pronged test that applies under the 1992 Act. By changing the test in this instance, the courts could well be more ready to lift the reporting restrictions as they apply to an FGM victim, thereby undermining the protection we are seeking to afford such victims.
Government Amendment 46G provides for FGM protection orders. It has been tabled in response to concerns that currently there is no specific civil remedy for the purpose of protecting potential or actual victims of FGM. The noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, made that point. The majority of responses to a recent consultation on a proposal to introduce a civil protection order for FGM supported the proposal for such an order, so as to protect potential victims and victims of FGM. The Government strongly believe that there should be a specific civil remedy to strengthen protection for potential victims of FGM and to help to prevent FGM from occurring in the first place. Amendment 46G aims to achieve this.
The provisions on FGM protection orders follow closely the model of forced marriage protection orders provided for in Part 4A of the Family Law Act 1996, with some modification to reflect the different nature of FGM offences. The new Schedule 2 to the 2003 Act contains a number of detailed provisions. I do not intend to go through each one but will focus on the key features.
As with forced marriage protection orders, an FGM protection order may contain such prohibitions, restrictions or other requirements as the court considers appropriate for the purposes of that order: that is, for the purposes of protecting a girl against commission of an FGM offence or a girl against whom any such offence has been committed. This could include, for example, provisions to surrender a person’s passport or any other travel document and not to enter into any arrangements, in the UK or abroad, for FGM to be performed on the person to be protected.
Application for an FGM protection order may be made by the person to be protected, the victim or a relevant third party, without leave of the court or any person with the leave of the court. This would clearly allow a wide category of persons to apply for an FGM protection order, which I believe is desirable. In particular, allowing a third party to apply for a protection order on behalf of a victim may be helpful in situations where the victim is unable to do so, for example because she is too young—it is clear that most victims of FGM are girls typically between the ages of five and eight—or because she is too scared to take such an action herself. It will also be open to a criminal court to make an FGM protection order on its own initiative, for example when sentencing a person for an offence under the 2003 Act.
Breach of an order would be a criminal offence with a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment, but with provision, as an alternative, for a breach to be dealt with in the civil court as contempt punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment.
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, questioned whether putting FGM protection order provisions in the FGM Act 2003 undermines the court’s powers, compared to putting them in the Family Law Act 1996. We do not think that that is so. The proceedings would be in the family court, with the full range of powers of the court, and expressly without prejudice to any other protective powers that the court may have. The location of the provisions does not affect this. Indeed, it would be helpful to practitioners to have all FGM-related provisions in one statute. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, made that point. She also stressed the point about the proceedings going to the family court. I point noble Lords to paragraph 17(1) of new Schedule 2, which makes it clear that the proceedings are in the family court.
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, also asked whether there would be a bespoke FGM unit, akin to the Forced Marriage Unit. I can confirm that the Government will set up a specialist FGM unit to drive a step change in this very important outreach service, with partners.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Rochester made a point about the provision in the Opposition’s proposed new Section 63T that it is immaterial whether any person believes that the operation is required as a matter of custom or ritual. The provision in question is already set out in Section 1(5) of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 and is applied by paragraph 17(1) of new Schedule 2 in the government amendment.
These government amendments, which provide for victim anonymity and FGM protection orders, have substantially the same effect as Amendments 44 and 44A put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. I trust, therefore, that she will be ready to support them in lieu of her own.
Amendment 46E provides for the last of the three new government measures. It will create a new offence of failing to protect a girl from the risk of genital mutilation. Again, this new offence gives effect to a recommendation by the Director of Public Prosecutions for the law to place a positive duty on parents or carers to prevent their children being mutilated. English criminal law does not generally criminalise a failure to prevent an offence. This new offence is unusual but, I think, entirely necessary.
In the context of FGM this approach is justified given the difficulties that have been experienced in bringing prosecutions under the existing law. Even if those who allow their daughters to undergo FGM believe that it is in the girl’s best interests to conform to the prevailing custom of their community, there can be no excuse for such a gross violation of their human rights. It is wholly unacceptable to allow a practice that can have such devastating consequences for the health of a young girl. The physical and psychological effects can last throughout her life.
The amendment provides that if an FGM offence—that is, one of the offences set out in Sections 1 to 3 of the 2003 Act—is committed against a girl under the age of 16, each person who is responsible for the girl at the relevant time will be guilty of an offence. My noble friend Lady Hamwee queried why this offence applies only to girls under the age of 16 whereas the existing FGM offences apply to girls and women of any age. We recognise that parental responsibility can be exercised in relation to a girl under the age of 18. However, in the context of FGM where, as I have said, victims are typically aged between five and eight, and given the diminishing control that a parent would have over a 16 or 17 year-old, let alone an older woman, we believe that the offence should apply where FGM has been committed on a girl under the age of 16.
The maximum penalty for the new offence will be seven years’ imprisonment or a fine or both. We believe that this is proportionate when it is considered against the maximum penalties for offences of violence, and bearing in mind that this is an offence of failure to protect rather than of directly perpetrating violence. My noble friend Lady Hamwee also raised a couple of points on the new offence. The offence has been carefully drawn to avoid criminalising people unnecessarily or unjustifiably, so the requirement for frequent contact is intended to ensure that a person who in law has parental responsibility for a girl but who in practice has little or no contact with her would not be caught under this provision. The courts have held that what constitutes frequent contact is a simple question of fact which does not require further elucidation or definition.
On the question of how the new offence applies to children in care, the Children Act 1989 refers to people who have care of the child. This seems to us to be too broad a category to make liable for the new offence. Instead, new Section 3A(4) makes liable, in addition to those who have parental responsibility and frequent contact, the more specific category of those “aged 18 or over”, who have current responsibility for,
“caring for the girl in the manner of a parent”.
The new offence is not a panacea for the long-standing difficulties in prosecuting FGM, but it will help to overcome some of the barriers to prosecution, in particular by reducing if not avoiding the need for a girl to give evidence or to identify who actually performed FGM on her. In so doing, it will enable the Crown Prosecution Service to bring prosecutions in cases where they could not have been brought before. At the request of the Northern Ireland Minister of Justice, David Ford, this new offence, and indeed the other two new provisions, will extend to Northern Ireland as well as to England and Wales. The other government amendments in this group are consequential on the three substantive new provisions.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Everything that the Minister has said is music to my ears, and I congratulate her and the Government. However, she has just mentioned Northern Ireland and that provokes in my mind the question about what happens beyond England, Wales and Northern Ireland. What will be the position if someone goes to Scotland or to another country? The same problem arises with forced marriage. Will the Government take steps to try to persuade other jurisdictions to collaborate, if necessary by amending their laws, so that when people move from this country to carry out this vile procedure, it can apply not only to England, Wales and Northern Ireland?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I thank my noble friend for bringing up that point. In actual fact, Scotland has very strong provisions in this area, and in a certain sense we are catching up, so I hope that answers his questions.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Sorry, I said not only Scotland but any other country. Scotland sounds as though it is fine. But what happens with any other part of Europe or the Commonwealth?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I apologise to my noble friend. I am sure that if other countries or jurisdictions want to take on our legislation, that would not be a problem. I will confirm that with the noble Lord in a letter and also put a copy of that letter in the Library, but I assume that to be the case.
I have been on my feet for some time, but I hope that I have set out in a little detail the effect of the government amendments. I am grateful to the House for bearing with me and commend the government amendments to the House.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness. She need not apologise for having been on her feet for a long time, as she did as much as she could to address the many issues which were raised in the debate.
On the issue of FGM protection orders, I think there is not a cigarette paper between us on what we are trying to achieve. However, I still do not fully understand—I am not a lawyer, but even the noble Lord, Lord Lester, could not help me out on this one—why the Government have chosen this approach and not the family law approach. That is the other point. I will look again in Hansard to see what she said, but given the comments that have been made around the House, I thought there was a willingness from the noble Baroness and from others for the Government to talk to us and say, “Have we got it right? Can we look at this?”.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I thank the noble Baroness, and I think there is a further conversation to be had, perhaps outside the Chamber. I am very willing to engage with her and other noble Lords who may wish to meet with me before Third Reading.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for that, because we just want to get it right. On the basis that she is prepared to discuss it and bring something back at Third Reading, we will be happy to withdraw our amendment. I am grateful and I appreciate that.
However, I must express my disappointment with her comment around the legal definition. I was unusually —and somewhat, I would say, embarrassingly—graphic about what reinfibulation actually means. I know that the Government believe that it is covered in law, and I said that in my comments. We believed that we covered reinfibulation when we brought in the law in 2003, but the evidence is that it is not. If the Royal College of Midwives and the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists say that it is not covered, we have to accept that there is a lack of clarity and there is some doubt. With the best will in the world, the noble Baroness saying to me that the Government believe that it is covered is not good enough. I ask her whether, on the same basis, she would be prepared to look at this and discuss this with us.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
I am extremely grateful. On both those issues, therefore, we would be happy not to press our amendments on the basis of further discussion before Third Reading.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
It could be argued that that was a considerable clarification. I am grateful to the noble Baroness.
If the Minister’s Bill team does not believe that this addresses the problem, and we in your Lordships’ House all understand what the problem is, can we look at it again? The Minister has been very good and I greatly appreciate her co-operation. We can have discussions before Third Reading and full debates in the other place as well. This is the only opportunity, as we will not have another Bill on this in the short term. We have an opportunity here to get it right. We would welcome discussions with the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, as well as the lawyers who have tried to find a way through on this without encroaching on the kinds of issues that the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, rightly addressed, or on issues of free speech. We can find a way through and this is the only chance we have. If we are to wipe this out in the UK, we have to address it.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
Again, this has been a further excellent debate on the role of the criminal law in helping to put a stop to the practice of FGM in this country. I am grateful for the constructive approach that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and others have adopted in both debates and in the discussions we have had outside and inside the Chamber.
As many noble Lords have said, we are aiming to get to the same end. It is slightly unfortunate that the amendment was tabled quite late and that there is a difference of opinion in terms of what the amendment seeks to achieve. My noble friend Lady Hamwee rightly pointed out, on the point about “other or others”, that the amendment does not seek to achieve what was sought in the original amendment, if that makes sense.
I also thank my noble friend Lady Tonge and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for pointing out quite strongly that this is not a religious matter. There is nothing in any religious text that points to FGM being something that should be carried out on young girls. It is a specific cultural practice that exists in certain communities in the world and has found its way to this country. Legislation alone cannot eradicate a practice that is so deeply ingrained in the culture and traditions of those who practise it and have been doing so for centuries, but I agree that the law is a very important part of our response to the abhorrent practice of female genital mutilation, and it is right that we should change it where necessary.
We believe that the new offence that we have just debated of failing to protect a girl from risk of genital mutilation gets to the heart of the issue. The Government’s new offence focuses on those who allow this dreadful abuse to be perpetrated on their daughters rather than on those who may only encourage them to do so. That is not to suggest that encouraging female genital mutilation, or indeed any crime, is in any way acceptable.
I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that such behaviour also constitutes an offence under the provisions of Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007, which contains inchoate offences of: intentionally encouraging or assisting an offence; encouraging or assisting an offence believing it will be committed; and encouraging or assisting offences believing one or more will be committed. As the noble Baroness observed, the revised wording of the proposed new offence follows closely the wording of the existing inchoate offences. That is both its strength and, dare I say, its weakness. As a result, it would not cover behaviour that is not already covered by the existing 2007 Act offences.
We are not persuaded that creating a specific offence of encouraging FGM is necessary or appropriate. The provisions in Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 apply to all criminal offences precisely so that it is not necessary to create specific encouraging or assisting offences for every crime. We agree that the behaviours now referred to in the noble Baroness’s revised amendment should be criminalised, but that is already the case. This amendment would not advance the criminal law in this area—I suspect this is where we are going to have a further conversation.
We believe that changing the culture and attitudes that allow female genital mutilation to persist will be better achieved through the awareness raising and community engagement that the Government have already embarked upon, rather than through the creation of another, arguably unnecessary, inchoate offence.
I wholeheartedly commend the aims of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and others in tabling her amendment. As I have said, this House is united in its desire to eradicate FGM, even though we may differ on how best to achieve that end. I hope the noble Baroness will agree that the government amendments that we have just debated represent a substantial package of measures to strengthen the civil and criminal law to tackle FGM. I firmly believe that they offer a better way forward, and on that basis I ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.
Baroness Meacher
I thank the Minister for her constructive response and all noble Lords who have spoken very constructively in this debate. I particularly thank my noble and learned friend Lady Butler-Sloss for her very important point that this amendment, unlike any other, would achieve deterrence, and that is what we want to do. We want to deter this dreadful act. We do not want just to prosecute after the event, although it is difficult ever to achieve a prosecution. If we can deter, we have really got to the goal that is now clearly shared across all sides of the House, which is to change the culture on FGM. We therefore need to change the way the leaders operate and the way they encourage people to indulge in this terrible act.
I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for her very helpful support. We must try to find a form of words that the government lawyers, our lawyers and all other lawyers agree will achieve this incredibly important objective. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“Knives and offensive weapons in prisons
After section 40C of the Prison Act 1952 insert—“40CA Unauthorised possession in prison of knife or offensive weapon
(1) A person who, without authorisation, is in possession of an article specified in subsection (2) inside a prison is guilty of an offence.
(2) The articles referred to in subsection (1) are—
(a) any article that has a blade or is sharply pointed;(b) any other offensive weapon (as defined in section 1(9) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984).(3) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for the accused to show that—
(a) he reasonably believed that he had authorisation to be in possession of the article in question, or(b) in all the circumstances there was an overriding public interest which justified his being in possession of the article.(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding four years or to a fine (or both);(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine (or both).(5) In this section “authorisation” means authorisation given for the purposes of this section; and subsections (1) to (3) of section 40E apply in relation to authorisations so given as they apply to authorisations given for the purposes of section 40D.””
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the violent use of knives and offensive weapons in prison poses a real threat to the safety of prison staff and prisoners. Only earlier this month we saw reports that an officer at Swaleside prison in Kent was attacked with a blade. I am sure that the whole House would agree that the possession of weapons in prison is unacceptable—and yet, unlike in public places and schools, possession of such weapons in prison is not currently a criminal offence. This new clause will put that right.
Amendment 48 would insert new Section 40CA into the Prison Act 1952 to create a new offence for persons in prison to possess any article that has a blade or is sharply pointed, or any other offensive weapon, without authorisation. This will include weapons manufactured by prisoners from everyday items, which are the types most commonly used.
While possession of such items is a criminal offence in a public place and in schools, it is not currently a criminal offence in prison. This has led to a disparity between the penalties available to tackle this sort of crime in the community and those available within prison establishments. This disparity must be addressed. Assaults and violence are a long-standing problem within prisons. If left unchecked, they can quickly destabilise a prison and threaten the safety of both staff and prisoners. While assaults without weapons are more common, assaults with weapons are not infrequent and can inflict life-changing injuries.
The new offence will add to the existing criminal offences in the Prison Act that make it an offence for a person to convey certain items—including firearms, explosives and other offensive weapons—in or out of prison without authorisation, or to be in possession of a camera, sound recording device, mobile phone or other similar device in prison. Possession of weapons by prisoners is currently dealt with through the prison adjudication system. The maximum penalty for a disciplinary offence under the internal adjudication system is 42 added days served in prison compared with the four years’ custodial maximum for the equivalent offence committed in the community.
Criminalisation will ensure that the more serious weapon possession offences can be punished through the criminal justice system rather than the prison adjudication system, as appropriate. The maximum penalty for the new offence will mirror the maximum penalty for the offence in the community: a four-year maximum sentence on conviction on indictment or a fine, or both; or, on summary conviction, a maximum six-month sentence or a fine or both.
There are of course legitimate circumstances in which persons in prison, including prisoners, may need to have sharp items or other articles in their possession. For example, a prisoner may need to use a bladed tool in a carpentry session, or may use kitchen knives when preparing meals. The authorisations framework in the Prison Act recognises this reality. Subsection (5) of the new clause therefore applies the existing authorisations framework to the new offence. Authorisations may be given administratively by the Secretary of State or by the Prison Rules in relation to all prisons or prisons of a specified description. Authorisations may also be given administratively by the Secretary of State, the governor or director of the prison, or by a person authorised by the governor or director in relation to particular prisons.
Amendments 58 and 65 are consequential on the lead amendment. All three amendments will ensure that the current maximum sentence for the offence of possession of a knife in the community is also available in prisons. This will act as a more effective deterrent and ensure that tougher punishments are available to tackle the problem of weapons and violence in prisons. The message to prisoners who want to possess offensive weapons is clear: we do not tolerate it in the community and we will not tolerate it in prisons. I beg to move.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I can be fairly brief in this debate because I think the Minister will have heard the very real and deep concerns across the House on this. It is not the first time that concerns have been raised about the use or misuse of RIPA. In this instance we are talking about the rights of journalists obtaining information from confidential sources to retain that confidentiality without which some information may never come to light. Previously, there had been anecdotal reports of local authorities using the legislation, which the noble Lord, Lord Black, mentioned, including identifying whether parents were living in a school catchment area. These issues raise serious concerns and have serious implications for individuals and for issues of collective privacy.
I will say something about the wider and serious implications of misuse of the legislation, but I want to address the specific role of journalists’ sources. In effect, we are discussing how new technology has brought with it new challenges for a free press and for personal privacy. Thirty years ago, if the police wanted access to journalists’ sources, they would have to go to a court to obtain their notes. There were no mobile phone records they could access at that time. Similarly, we would not have seen journalists illegally hacking into private phone calls, as shamefully came to light more recently.
Over the weekend, like other noble Lords, I read some of the obituaries of Ben Bradlee, and this amendment came to mind as I was reading about his editorship of the Washington Post. I also watched “All the President’s Men”, which is one of my favourite films. The main people portrayed in that film—Bob Woodward, Carl Bernstein and Ben Bradlee—uncovered the most serious corruption at the highest level of government. I might tag this amendment as “the Watergate amendment” because, although the jurisdictions are entirely different, the principle is the same. Would that story, with all the implications for democracy and secrecy, ever have been told if the Nixon Administration had been able to identify the Deep Throat source or access the records of the journalists he was speaking to? If Nixon had been able to obtain mobile phone records in secret, would we ever have found out what was going on? There will be parallels in the UK, although perhaps they will not be so dramatic. That underlines the value and importance of serious investigative journalism. I am not talking about sensationalist stories about people that most of us have never heard of, but about the best kind of journalism, which I hugely admire, acting in the public interest, not just on what is of public interest.
Noble Lords will recall that, when the Government brought in new powers into the DRIP Act by fast-track legislation to deal with serious and organised crime, including terrorism, we were highly critical of the way in which they acted and of the need to use the fast-track process. Part of our demands in supporting that legislation was that there should be a complete, thorough and independent view of RIPA. We have said for some time that it is becoming increasingly clear and obvious that RIPA is out of date and does not have the right kind of framework or the safeguards we need. Recent reports that RIPA has been used to access journalists’ sources reinforce that. It is right that the Interception Commissioner is looking at it, but in addition it is essential that we get a clear guarantee from the Minister today that this issue will be included as part of the comprehensive review of RIPA led by David Anderson, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, that was agreed by the Government during the debates on DRIPA.
For many, the world seems less safe today. We must be vigilant against organised and serious crime and terrorism. I believe that the public understand and support the need for measures that the Government must put in place to deal with these threats to our safety. In order to have and maintain that public support, it is vital that such powers are only ever used for the purpose for which they were intended. If those powers are abused, whether by government, police or local authorities, it undermines public confidence in the very measures needed for the most serious issues, and that puts us all at risk.
Of course, journalists are not above the law. Like anyone else, they need to be investigated if they have committed a serious crime, and I do not think anybody is arguing otherwise. As noble Lords have pointed out, there is already an independent judicial process with prior jurisdiction needed by which the police can apply for access to journalists’ information, but we have a long tradition of additional safeguards in law to recognise the role of a free press in a democracy and to protect whistleblowers, and this should not be compromised.
That is why we need the RIPA legislation to be examined in its entirety, including in context and in application, to ensure that the legal framework enables the police to access the data they need to solve serious crimes and to ensure that it does not have a chilling effect on free speech and the free press on which our democracy depends. The Government must ensure that David Anderson’s review is ambitious enough in scope to resolve these problems and to respond positively to the issue before us now. We seek an assurance from the Minister that this matter will be considered in the review. In addition, the Government must make it clear by whatever means are appropriate that such legislation must only ever be used for the purpose for which it was intended.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for explaining the purpose of this amendment. I do not believe there is any difference between my noble friend and me, or indeed any of your Lordships who have contributed to this debate, on the key issue at stake here. We all agree that a free and fearless press is fundamental to a democratic society. A key element of journalism is the protection of sources, and I can assure your Lordships that the Government do not wish to do anything which would undermine the operation of the vibrant and independent press that operates in this country.
The amendment which my noble friend has moved seeks to require public authorities who acquire communications data under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 to seek the authorisation of a judge when the material requested is subject to legal privilege or relates to journalistic sources. However, this is unnecessary, given the strict regulation RIPA already contains and the additional safeguards we are already putting in place.
Communications data—the who, when and where but not the content of a communication—would reveal the telephone number a journalist or lawyer calls, but would not reveal any of what was said or written in a communication. Last month, the independent Interception of Communications Commissioner issued a statement in which he said that communications data,
“do not contain any details of what was said or written by the sender or the recipient of the communication. As such, the communications data retained by CSPs”—
communications service providers—
“do not contain any material that may be said to be of professional or legal privilege—the fact that a communication took place does not provide what was discussed or considered or advised”.
None the less, I recognise that this is a sensitive issue. It is personal information and RIPA already applies rigorous controls on its acquisition.
Communications data can only be obtained when their acquisition is necessary for a specified purpose, such as preventing and detecting crime, and then only when it is proportionate to do so. Anyone can complain to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal if they think the powers have been used unlawfully against them. The whole system is presided over, and reported on, by the Interception of Communications Commissioner, a senior judicial figure.
These controls apply to all requests for communications data, and I believe we have one of the most stringent systems to be found anywhere, with both strict internal controls and independent oversight. If any of your Lordships have doubts on this point, I would recommend reading the annual report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner. Sir Anthony May’s report, published in April of this year, includes a detailed account of how the system works and a full statistical breakdown of communications data requests.
However, we recognise the special considerations that apply to journalists, lawyers and a number of other professions which may involve access to sensitive information. We have announced plans to update the Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data Code of Practice. These changes will make clear that specific consideration must be given by the senior authorising officer to the level of possible intrusion in cases likely to involve the communications data of those engaged in certain professions who may have obligations of professional secrecy. These professions include journalism, as well as those of lawyers, doctors and Members of Parliament, and will also include those known to be close contacts of members of these professions. Any application for communications data that are known to be the data of members of these professions or their close contacts will have to state this clearly in the application. It will also require that relevant information is available to the authorising office when considering necessity and proportionality. This change will make clear in the statutory code what is already existing best practice.
We will publish the updated draft code of practice for public consultation as soon as possible, noting the acting Interception of Communications Commissioner’s request to expedite publication of the code. It is also worth pointing out that on 6 October the acting Interception of Communications Commissioner, Sir Paul Kennedy, announced that he had,
“launched an inquiry into the use of RIPA powers to determine whether the acquisition of communications data has been undertaken to identify journalistic sources”.
It would certainly be premature to take any legislative action in advance of knowing his findings.
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, asked whether David Anderson’s review of RIPA would cover this area. I am sure that David Anderson will wish to look at all aspects of RIPA interception and communications data, including this issue.
In the light of the protections already available, the very clear commitment to strengthen these through the code of practice and the ongoing inquiry by Sir Paul Kennedy, I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Strasburger
My Lords, it has been an interesting debate. The House seems to have one view and the Minister seems to have another. I thank noble Lords who have partaken in the debate: my noble friends Lord Black and Lord Thomas, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Cohen and Lady Smith.
I do not think that the Minister was listening to what I said. Everyone outside the Home Office and the Foreign Office knows that the safeguards in RIPA have been proved ineffective time and again. I rather anticipated that the Government would try to fob us off with some tweak of the code of practice. Tweaking the code of practice is not going to offer the certainty that journalists need; it is not going to offer the transparency. All of this is still going to carry on in secret. We will not know what on earth is going on, and it will not give the press, the journalists or the media the opportunity to challenge the police’s intention to seek their phone records and others from the phone companies. So it will not take us any further forward at all.
I have to say that, as you might have detected, I am more than somewhat disappointed with the Government’s response. They have not listened to the debate. I hope they will reflect on the debate and come back with something more substantive. If not, I am quite sure that I and others, including those in another place, will return to this issue with a vengeance. However, for the sake of good order, I will withdraw my amendment.
Serious Crime Bill [HL]
Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts(9 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
My Lords, I can be relatively brief with this group of essentially minor and technical amendments to Part 1 of the Bill. Amendment 2 is consequential upon the provisions in the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill in respect of the new criminal courts charge, which will recover some of the trial costs from offenders. This amendment will ensure that, although the court takes no account of any confiscation order when imposing a criminal courts charge, payment of a confiscation order will take precedence over payment of the new charge.
Amendment 51 inserts into Schedule 4 a consequential amendment to Section 22 of the Proceeds of Crime Act, arising from the provisions in Clause 6. That clause provides that priority will be given to the payment of a victim surcharge order where a defendant has insufficient funds to pay both a confiscation order and a victim surcharge order. This amendment to Section 22 of POCA will ensure that a victim surcharge order is taken into account by a court when it is reconsidering the available amount payable under an existing confiscation order. Amendment 52 makes the equivalent change to Section 107 of POCA which relates to Scotland.
Amendments 3 and 15 are to Clause 7 and the equivalent provision for Northern Ireland in Clause 29. These clauses amend POCA to provide the court with the power to make any order it considers appropriate for ensuring that a confiscation order is effective. Such a compliance order may, among other things, impose a travel ban on the defendant. Clauses 7 and 29 provide for a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal by the prosecutor against a decision by the Crown Court not to make a compliance order, and by the prosecutor or person affected by a compliance order against the decision to make a compliance order. However, as currently drafted, these clauses do not provide for any right of appeal against a decision of the Crown Court to vary or discharge a compliance order. This is at odds with the existing provision in respect of the variation and discharge of a restraint order. These amendments remedy the inconsistency.
At the request of the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, Amendment 16 amends Clause 30. This clause empowers the Crown Court to discharge a confiscation order where the defendant has died and it is not possible or reasonable to seek payment of the order from the defendant’s estate—for example, where there are no assets remaining in the estate. In England and Wales, an application to the Crown Court will be made by the designated officer for a magistrates’ court. The Department of Justice in Northern Ireland has advised us that, in Northern Ireland, the prosecutor would be best placed to make any application to discharge an order and not the chief clerk. This amendment makes the necessary adjustment to Clause 30 to this end.
Finally, Amendment 54 corrects a drafting error in Section 185 of POCA. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, we are considering the third group of amendments, rather than the fifth, and I should move Amendment 5, as that is my role. I apologise to my noble friend Lord Bates.
Strengthening the proceeds of crime legislation is a priority for the Scottish Government, as it is for the UK Government. Maximising recovery of moneys through the route of criminal confiscation is a major part of this. Chapter 2 of Part 1 already replicates for Scotland a number of the changes made by the Bill to the confiscation regime in England and Wales. At the request of the Scottish Government, it is now proposed to replicate a number of further provisions—namely, those in Clauses 7, 9, 10 and 12. In each case, the England and Wales provisions are subject to appropriate modifications and adaptations to take account of Scots law and any policy refinements determined by Scottish Ministers.
Amendments 5 and 6 broadly replicate the provisions in Clause 7 to enable the courts to make a compliance order imposing overseas travel bans and other restrictions and requirements on an accused person, for the purposes of ensuring that a confiscation order is effective. Unlike in England and Wales, it will not be possible to make a compliance order against a third party. Amendment 7 replicates the provisions in Clause 9, which ensure that individuals who abscond before conviction, but are then convicted in their absence, may be subject to confiscation.
Amendment 8, which replicates subsections (1) and (2) of Clause 10, increases the maximum default sentences where offenders fail to pay confiscation orders in respect of amounts over £500,000. There are no changes to the early release arrangements in Scotland. Amendment 8 also provides that, where a confiscation order was made by a court in England and Wales, or in Northern Ireland, but it falls to be enforced in Scotland, the courts in Scotland, when sentencing the defendant for non-payment of the order, would apply the default sentences set elsewhere in Part I of the Bill, rather than the sentences applicable for non-payment of a fine.
Amendment 9 replicates the provisions in Clause 12 to ensure that a restraint order may be maintained following the quashing of a conviction and pending the outcome of a retrial.
Amendments 10 to 13 point in the opposite direction. Rather than adding new Scottish provisions to the Bill, they would remove Clauses 19, 20, 22 and 23. Those clauses, which were included in the Bill at the request of the Scottish Government, sought to make it an offence to breach a prohibitory property order or an interim administration order. These orders are designed to prevent a person from dissipating identified assets through the course of a civil recovery investigation. As such, they are analogous to restraint orders under the criminal confiscation regime. Under the existing civil recovery regime, the focus of these orders is on applying prohibitions on dissipating property rather than on the owners of, or those who control, the property in question.
After further consideration and discussion with operational stakeholders, the Scottish Government have concluded that the introduction of these offences would result in a loss of flexibility in the civil recovery regime and have therefore asked for the relevant clauses to be removed from the Bill. Breach of these orders will continue, as now, to be dealt with through contempt of court proceedings.
The other amendments in this group are either consequential on the amendments that I have already described or make other technical amendments to the Scottish confiscation regime in Part 3 of POCA. I beg to move.
“Compliance orders: appeals by prosecutor
(1) The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 108 (Lord Advocate’s right of appeal in solemn proceedings)—
(a) in subsection (1), after paragraph (cc) insert—“(cd) a decision under section 97B(2) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to make or not to make a compliance order;”;(b) in subsection (2)(b)—(i) in sub-paragraph (ii), for “or (cc)” substitute “, (cc) or (cd)”;(ii) in sub-paragraph (iii), after “paragraph” insert “(cd) or”.(3) In section 175 (right of appeal in summary proceedings)—
(a) in subsection (4), after paragraph (cc) insert—“(cd) a decision under section 97B(2) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to make or not to make a compliance order;”;(b) in subsection (4A)(b)—(i) in sub-paragraph (ii), for “or (cc)” substitute “, (cc) or (cd)”;(ii) in sub-paragraph (iii), after “paragraph” insert “(cd) or”.”
“(b) after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) In its application in relation to confiscation orders, subsection (2) of section 219 of the Procedure Act is to be read as if for the Table in that subsection there were substituted the following Table—
Amount to be Paid under Compensation Order | Maximum Period of Imprisonment |
|---|---|
£10,000 or less | 6 months |
More than £10,000 but no more than £500,000 | 5 years |
More than £500,000 but no more than £1 million | 7 years |
More than £1 million | 14 years |
(a) amend section 219(2) of the Procedure Act (as applied by this section) so as to provide for minimum periods of imprisonment in respect of amounts ordered to be paid under a confiscation order; (b) amend the Table in subsection (2A) so as to remove, alter or replace any entry (including an entry inserted by virtue of paragraph (a) of this subsection) or to add any entry;(c) apply (with or without modifications) any provision of the Procedure Act relating to enforcement of fines in consequence of exercising the power in paragraph (a) or (b) (including modifying any such provision in its application in relation to confiscation orders by virtue of this section).(2C) In its application in relation to a confiscation order under Part 2 of this Act, subsection (8) of section 222 of the Procedure Act is to be read as if, in relation to a transfer of fine order under section 90 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, for “139 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000” there were substituted “35(2A) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002”.
(2D) In its application in relation to a confiscation order under Part 4 of this Act, subsection (8) of section 222 of the Procedure Act is to be read as if—
(a) before the words “section 90” there were inserted “section 35 of the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1945,”;(b) in relation to a transfer of fine order under section 35 of that Act, for “139 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000” there were substituted “185(2A) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002”.”( ) In section 459 of that Act (orders and regulations)—
(a) after subsection (3) insert—“(3A) Subsection (3) does not apply to the power of the Scottish Ministers to make an order under section 118(2B).”;
(b) in subsection (5)(a), after “section” insert “118(2B),”;(c) in subsection (6)(b), after “section” insert “118(2B),”.( ) In section 219 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (fines: periods of imprisonment for non-payment), in subsection (8)(b), after “section 118(2)” insert “, (2A) and (2B)”.”
“Continuation of restraint order after conviction quashed or verdict set aside
(1) In section 121 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (application, recall and variation), after subsection (8) insert—
“(8A) The duty in subsection (8) to recall a restraint order on the conclusion of proceedings does not apply where—
(a) the proceedings are concluded by reason of—(i) an accused’s conviction for an offence being quashed under section 118(1)(c) of the Procedure Act, or(ii) the setting aside of the verdict against the accused under section 183(1)(d) of the Procedure Act,(b) the restraint order is in force at the time when the conviction is quashed or the verdict set aside (as the case may be), and(c) the High Court of Justiciary has granted authority under section 118(1)(c) or 183(1)(d) of the Procedure Act to bring a new prosecution or the prosecutor has requested that the court grant such authority.(8B) But the court must recall the restraint order—
(a) if the High Court of Justiciary refuses a request to grant authority under section 118(1)(c) or 183(1)(d) of the Procedure Act to bring a new prosecution, (b) if the High Court of Justiciary has granted authority under section 118(1)(c) or 183(1)(d) of the Procedure Act to bring a new prosecution but no proceedings are commenced by the expiry of the time mentioned in section 119(5) or 185(5) of that Act (as the case may be), or(c) otherwise, on the conclusion of the proceedings in the new prosecution of the accused under section 119 or 185 of the Procedure Act.””
“( ) After that section insert—
“168A Provision of information as to defendant’s interest in property
(1) This section applies if the court—
(a) is considering whether to make a determination under section 160A of the extent of the defendant’s interest in any property, or(b) is deciding what determination to make (if the court has decided to make a determination under that section).In this section “interested person” means a person (other than the defendant) who the court thinks is or may be a person holding an interest in the property.(2) For the purpose of obtaining information to help it in carrying out its functions under section 160A the court may at any time order an interested person to give it information specified in the order.
(3) An order under this section may require all or a specified part of the information to be given in a specified manner and before a specified date.
(4) If an interested person fails without reasonable excuse to comply with an order under this section the court may draw such inference as it believes is appropriate.
(5) Subsection (4) does not affect any power of the court to deal with the person in respect of a failure to comply with an order under this section.
(6) If the prosecutor accepts to any extent an allegation made by an interested person—
(a) in giving information required by an order under this section, or(b) in any other statement given to the court in relation to any matter relevant to a determination under section 160A,the court may treat the acceptance as conclusive of the matters to which it relates.(7) For the purposes of this section an allegation may be accepted in a manner ordered by the court.
(8) If the court makes an order under this section it may at any time vary it by making another one.
(9) No information given by a person under this section is admissible in evidence in proceedings against that person for an offence.””
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, as we noted in Committee, the tentacles of cybercrime can now stretch across the globe. A perpetrator, sitting in their bedroom in London, could be hacking into a computer anywhere in the world, or, located outside the UK, a British national could be causing serious damage to their host country or in our own. The new offence provided for in Clause 40 acknowledges this reality and captures the serious damage that cybercriminals can cause in any country.
Clause 40 goes on to define a reference to country as including a reference to: a territory; any place in, or part or region of, a country or territory; and the territorial sea adjacent to any country or territory. My noble friend Lady Hamwee moved an amendment in Committee to seek further clarity on the last of these three points, which gave rise to an interesting debate on how best to capture damage caused outside territorial waters.
Following that debate, we have given further consideration to the position of installations such as oil rigs, ships and so on that are located outside the territorial waters of any country. Although I acknowledge that this scenario is extremely unlikely, it is not clear that the offence as currently drafted would capture an attack that caused serious damage to the human welfare of those living and working on such an installation, or to the surrounding environment.
To provide greater clarity on this point, therefore, Amendment 17 replaces the reference to damage to human welfare in any country with a reference to damage to human welfare in any place. Amendment 18 similarly replaces the reference to damage to the environment in any country with a reference to damage to the environment of any place.
Once these changes are made, there is no longer any need to extend the meaning of “country” to include its territorial seas. References to damage to the economy or national security of any country will remain, as either the economy or national security of a country has been damaged or it has not. In these cases, it is not necessary to include territorial seas within the definition of a country, so Amendment 19 removes this reference. I am most grateful to my noble friend for raising this issue and I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am grateful to both my noble friends on the Front Bench.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, before I address the specific points raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, it might assist the House if I provide a little background to Schedule 1. The provisions to extend the serious crime prevention order to Scotland have been included in the Bill at the request of the Scottish Government. The main policy driver for this in Scotland is the implementation of the serious and organised crime strategy, Letting Our Communities Flourish, in which the Scottish Government have committed to tackle serious and organised crime and to disrupt and dismantle organised crime groups. That is a priority for both the Scottish and the UK Governments. Clause 45 of and Schedule 1 to the Bill will extend the serious crime prevention order regime to Scotland and provide an additional power for law enforcement agencies to minimise the harm that serious organised criminals do to communities in Scotland.
A serious crime prevention order is a civil order that is used to protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting a person’s involvement in a serious crime. It is not intended to operate as a punishment. Serious crime prevention orders have operated successfully in England, Wales and Northern Ireland since 2008. When the Serious Crime Act 2007 was going through Parliament, the then Scottish Government decided to consider the effectiveness of serious crime prevention orders elsewhere in the UK before deciding whether those orders should be introduced in Scotland. It is a measure of confidence in the value of the orders that the Scottish Government have now concluded, following consultation last year, that the provisions in Part 1 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 should extend to Scotland.
As the noble and learned Lord made clear, the intention of these amendments is that the serious crime prevention orders should only be made by a court following conviction for an offence. I hope that I can allay the concerns of the noble and learned Lord by reassuring him that there will be a robust framework of safeguards for the use of SCPOs—as they are called—in the civil courts.
The class of applicant authorities will be restricted. Only the Lord Advocate will be able to make applications for civil or criminal SCPOs in Scotland. This reflects the current position in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, where only prosecutors may apply for an SCPO. It is not the case, as suggested in the Law Society of Scotland’s briefing paper, that the police will be able to apply for stand-alone SCPOs. I hope the fact that the Lord Advocate will act as a gatekeeper in this regard will provide some comfort for the noble and learned Lord, as he is a former holder of the office.
When considering an application for an SCPO, the court will need to be satisfied that the respondent has been involved in serious crime and believe that imposing an order would protect the public. Courts will impose an SCPO only when it is a necessary and proportionate response. There will also be a right of appeal against the imposition of an order. Furthermore, third parties will have the right to be represented at SCPO hearings if a decision concerning the order is likely to have a significant adverse effect on them.
It is also worth noting here that, since the 2007 Act came into force, no stand-alone order has been imposed in the rest of the UK in the absence of a criminal conviction. That said, we are working with the CPS to make better use of this preventive tool in future, including by seeking stand-alone orders in appropriate cases. I stress that, although these orders are civil, their overriding aim is to protect the public from harm.
The noble and learned Lord made a point about stand-alone orders in the more junior sheriff courts. In Scotland, a sheriff court may consider both civil and criminal cases. For criminal cases, on indictment a sheriff court may consider all crimes except murder, treason, rape and breach of duty by a magistrate. Stand-alone orders may also be considered in the Court of Session. It will be for the Lord Advocate to decide in which court to make the application. If a sheriff court sitting in its criminal capacity has the power to impose an SCPO, it is logical that it should have the same power when sitting in its civil capacity.
Schedule 1 seeks to replicate what is already in existence in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Other than allowing for different legal systems, there are no real differences in how the regimes will operate. I very much hope that I have been able to reassure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, that the safeguards that will be in place will ensure that SCPOs will be imposed by Scotland’s civil courts only where it is necessary and proportionate to protect the public from the harm caused by serious crime. In the light of those assurances, I hope that the noble and learned Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Mackay of Drumadoon
I am very grateful to the Minister for her clear and helpful response to my question on the reasons for the Government’s position. In the light of that position and in the absence of any support from anyone else in your Lordships’ House, these four amendments are coming to a rather abrupt end. Speaking more seriously about it, I have little doubt that what the Minister has said today will be of use to those in Scotland who will come to implement the provisions in this Bill. In these circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the four amendments in this group are minor, technical and drafting amendments to the provisions in respect of serious crime prevention orders. I do not propose to go through them in detail, but I would of course be happy to do so if it would assist the House. In the mean time, I beg to move.
“(a) to the person from whom the substance was seized, and(b) if the officer thinks that the substance may belong to a different person, to that person.”
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, we now turn to the amendments relating to Clause 65—no, we do not. I am sorry but I had what is completely the wrong speaking note and I apologise to your Lordships.
During debate in Committee, I agreed to consider further an amendment put forward by my noble friend Lady Hamwee to what was then Clause 56—it is now Clause 59. Where a substance suspected of being used as a drug-cutting agent has been seized and the court makes an order authorising the continued retention of the substance, Clause 59(7) requires the relevant police or customs officer to notify a person entitled to the substance of that fact, if they were not represented at the court hearing. My noble friend queried why such notice should not also be given to the person from whom the substance was seized, if different from the person entitled to the substance.
I am grateful to my noble friend for raising a pertinent point. On further consideration, we agreed that her suggested amendment would strengthen the provisions in the Bill by helping to minimise any impact on the legitimate trade. Amendment 35 to Clause 59 therefore extends the notice provision in that clause. A similar point also arises in relation to Clauses 56 and 61, which also require notice to be given to a person entitled to the seized substance. Amendments 33, 34 and 36 therefore make equivalent changes to these clauses, while Amendments 37 and 38 to Clause 64 make consequential amendments to the definition of “entitled”. Once again, I am grateful to my noble friend for raising the point and I beg to move.
Serious Crime Bill [HL]
Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
I begin by wishing my noble friend Lady Hamwee a speedy recovery. It seems a little odd not to have her here when she has been omnipresent in our debates on the Bill.
Before I speak to the amendments, it may assist the Committee if I provide some background to Clause 63. The clause creates a new offence of the possession of paedophile manuals—that is, any item that contains advice or guidance about abusing children sexually. The Government have been made aware of a potential gap in the law which allows the possession of written material that contains practical advice on how to commit a sexual offence against a child. Such material is commonly referred to by investigators as “paedophile manuals”.
The material that we are targeting is deeply disturbing and has clearly been designed to facilitate sexual offending against children. Possession of some of that material, where illustrated with indecent images, is likely already to be a criminal offence under the law that deals with such images. However, the possession of purely written material would not fall under the current criminal law.
We are therefore creating a new offence to target possession of that potentially dangerous material. The offence will carry a maximum sentence of three years’ imprisonment. We have also included defences to the possession of that material that mirror those already available to individuals charged with similar possession offences; for example, the possession of indecent photographs of children under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 or extreme pornographic material under the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. The defences include a legitimate reason for being in possession of material. That will cover those who can demonstrate that their legitimate business means that they have a reason for possessing this material. Such groups may include law enforcement agencies, the Internet Watch Foundation and others. It will also cover those people working for software companies who may come into contact with such material during the course of developing filter systems, for example.
Amendment 40BZF would replace the legitimate reason defence with a narrower one which will offer protection only to those who are preventing or detecting crime. We believe that there is no need to narrow the defence in that way. As I explained, the legitimate reason defence already covers those in detection and law enforcement, but it also provides protection to others with a genuine reason for possession of this material. Our legitimate reason defence mirrors a long-established defence in this sensitive area of the law: one that is well known to the police, prosecutors and the courts and that has worked well. We can therefore find no reason to narrow the protection that that defence will provide. Any defences need to be tailored to the circumstances of a particular offence. The offences in Clauses 41 and 63 are clearly very different. We are satisfied that the narrower defence in Clause 41 is appropriate given the nature of the participation offence.
My noble friend has indicated that Amendments 40BB and 40BC are probing amendments to test aspects of the drafting of Schedule 3. That schedule ensures that the provisions which make illegal the possession of paedophile manuals are consistent with the UK’s obligations under the e-commerce directive, adopted in 2000. The provisions in Schedule 3 are nothing new and mirror those already in place for other similar offences—for example, the possession of prohibited images of children offence in Section 62 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and the related provisions in Schedule 13 to that Act.
Amendment 40BB would amend paragraph 2 of the schedule. The first half of paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 3 states that the possession offence applies to a domestic service provider who is in possession of a prohibited item in an EEA state other than the United Kingdom. The words in brackets in the second half of that sub-paragraph reiterate that the offence also applies to,
“a person, of any description”,
who possesses such material in England, Wales or Northern Ireland. The qualifying words “of any description” are designed to make clear that, in those circumstances, the offence applies to all persons: that is, not just domestic service providers. The words are not intended to imply, as was, I think, my noble friend’s concern, that the person can be a legal or corporate person, as well as a natural person. As my noble friend will be aware, by virtue of the Interpretation Act 1978, the word “person” is taken to have that meaning in legislation anyway.
Amendment 40BC is intended to clarify the application of paragraph 5(4) of the schedule. Paragraph 5 provides an exception from liability for a service provider who possesses the prohibited material while storing the information in certain circumstances. Sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) set out the two conditions that must be satisfied for the exclusion to apply. Sub-paragraph (3)(c) provides that where the service provider has actual knowledge of certain facts, it will be excluded from criminal liability only if, in addition, it promptly removes the prohibited material or disables access to it. Sub-paragraph (4) sets out the facts that give rise to that additional obligation.
The effect of the amendment would be to remove the availability of the exception in paragraph 5 altogether, where the service provider obtains actual knowledge of the facts set out in sub-paragraph (4). The Government’s intention, as required by the e-commerce directive, is that a service provider should not be criminally liable in those circumstances as long as the information is promptly removed or access to it is disabled.
I recognise that these issues are not straightforward and that my noble friend Lord Dholakia will wish to study my response in Hansard. If, having done so, he or my noble friend Lady Hamwee requires further explanation, I will be happy to provide it. However, for now, I trust that he will be content to withdraw the amendment that he moved on behalf of my noble friend Lady Hamwee.
Lord Dholakia
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the explanation that she has offered. I will certainly make sure that my noble friend Lady Hamwee receives a copy of Hansard. Whether she is cheered by it, we will soon find out at the Report stage. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I commend noble Lords who spoke to the amendments in this group, which show how seriously this House takes the practice of female genital mutilation. These amendments seek, in their different ways, to further our common objective of ending the abhorrent practice of female genital mutilation.
In moving Amendment 40BA, the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, is, as she explained, seeking to give effect to a recommendation made by the Local Government Association. The association recommended that a specific offence of “inciting and condoning” the practice of female genital mutilation would make it easier to bring cases against those who advocate it, whether they reside in or are visiting the UK. As I hope Clause 64 demonstrates, the Government are open to identifying ways in which the law might be strengthened to help put an end to female genital mutilation and better to protect victims. We are already considering recommendations made by the Director of Public Prosecutions, one of which we will debate shortly, and we are looking carefully at the recent recommendations made by the Home Affairs Select Committee, to which the noble Lord referred. In this instance, however, I hope to persuade the noble Baroness that her proposed amendment is unnecessary as the behaviour that it seeks to criminalise is already covered and can more effectively be punished by existing provisions of the law.
The common-law offence of inciting the commission of another offence was abolished by Section 59 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 with effect from 1 October 2008, and replaced by the provisions in Part 2 of that Act, which I will refer to as the 2007 Act. They are as follows: intentionally encouraging or assisting an offence; encouraging or assisting an offence believing it will be committed; and encouraging or assisting offences believing one or more will be committed. To be convicted of encouraging or assisting an offence, it is not necessary for the anticipated principle offence to take place. In addition to these legislative provisions, if an FGM offence is actually carried out then anyone who aided, abetted, counselled or procured the offence would be liable as an accessory.
We believe that the existing law is sufficient to cover those who encourage or assist the practice of female genital mutilation and those who take part in an offence in a secondary way, whatever their reason for doing so. The offences in Part 2 of the 2007 Act also have extraterritorial application: they can cover those who encourage or assist, wholly or partly from this country, offences of female genital mutilation that they know or believe will be committed abroad.
Baroness Meacher
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister but I wonder whether I have understood this correctly. My understanding is that the current law talks about aiding a particular offence of FGM. What we are concerned about is the general promotion by community leaders and faith leaders of this practice. I am not sure whether this is the case, but my feeling is that perhaps the current law does not fully and effectively cover that point.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I think I will get on to that further on. As the noble Baroness said, we need to go beyond the law and think about other aspects of how we stop this happening in our communities. I hope I will answer her question, but if I do not I am sure she will stand up again.
This possibly comes on to it: a person convicted of encouraging, assisting, aiding or abetting an offence is liable to any penalty for which he would be liable on conviction of the principle offence. So a person convicted of encouraging, assisting, aiding or abetting an offence of female genital mutilation would be liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for up to 14 years. Amendment 40BA, which provides a maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment for encouraging or assisting the promotion of the practice of female genital mutilation, would therefore have the effect of reducing by half the maximum penalty currently available for such behaviour.
The noble Baroness is, of course, right that the long-term and systematic eradication of FGM in the UK will require practising communities to abandon the practice themselves. While the criminal law can play a part in this, the recent Home Affairs Select Committee report quite properly also pointed to the need for more effective engagement with communities to persuade them to abandon the practice. To this end, the Government are spending £100,000 on the FGM community engagement initiative. Charities were invited to bid for up to £10,000 to carry out community work to raise awareness of FGM among women who have already been affected by FGM and young girls at risk, as well as men. We are now funding 12 organisations to deliver community engagement activity, and we will continue to work with civil society organisations to examine how we can support and facilitate their engagement with communities in the UK. It is noteworthy that in its report the Home Affairs Select Committee made no recommendation in favour of a new offence of promoting or encouraging FGM.
I now turn to Amendment 40CA. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has explained, this amendment would extend to the victims of FGM the same anonymity that already applies to the alleged victims of many sexual offences.
Baroness Meacher
Well, the Minister did say that I could stand up again if she did not answer my point. I was listening very carefully to her words, and they still related to a specific offence of FGM, whereas this amendment is about its general promotion—for example, in a faith leader’s sermon—which is a different thing. I only ask the Minister if she could take this back and consider it. I have said enough, and I do not want to interfere with her answer to noble Lords.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I shall certainly go back and think about what the noble Baroness has said. There is no provision in law for condoning something, and that is what she is suggesting. Perhaps I could clarify it with her further. I apologise if I have not quite answered her question.
Can we now move on to Amendment 40CA from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser? He talked about the same anonymity being applied to victims of FGM that already applies to victims of other sexual offences. This follows a recommendation by the Director of Public Prosecutions. FGM is an offence of a particularly personal and sensitive nature, and the DPP believes that it is important that its victims should know that their identity will be protected if a prosecution takes place. The DPP has argued: that this protection needs to be guaranteed, rather than discretionary; that it should apply from the outset, when an allegation is first made, rather than from the point of charge; and that it should last indefinitely. The director believes that such anonymity would go far to encourage the further reporting of this offence.
These are powerful arguments, and we are considering them carefully. In doing so, we will also take account of the fact that, in its recent report on FGM, the Home Affairs Select Committee endorsed the DPP’s proposal. There are some questions that we need to resolve, but I assure your Lordships that the Government see the force of the argument, and I am confident that they shall shortly be in a position to announce their conclusions.
Going back to the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, I have just been given an additional note. I will read it out: “Where the general encouragement of FGM related to a specific act, constituting an offence would depend on the circumstances of the case, but we believe such conduct could be covered”. If that still does not answer her question I am happy to write to her. But on the basis of everything I have said, and in the knowledge that we can and should return to this issue on Report, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, will be content at this stage not to press their amendments.
Baroness Meacher
I thank the Minister for her careful response. I hope that the Minister will agree with me that she has not really answered the point. I am grateful, therefore, that she will take this back, and hope that we can perhaps have discussions with Ministers and officials to sort it out. On that basis I withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, Amendment 40D to Clause 67 responds to a recommendation by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its report on the Bill. The committee has pointed out that any regulations made under Clause 67(2) amending, repealing or revoking any provision of primary legislation would be subject to the affirmative procedure, but that the negative procedure would apply to any regulations otherwise modifying primary legislation. The Government accept the committee’s argument that a non-textual modification of primary legislation is capable of making changes which are no less significant than textual amendments and that, accordingly, the affirmative procedure should also apply in such cases. Amendment 40D therefore amends Clause 67(5) to this end. I am grateful to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for highlighting this issue. Amendments 42A and 44 make a technical adjustment to the commencement power in Clause 70. I beg to move.
Serious Crime Bill [HL]
Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, both my Amendments 31A and 31B would delete wording, but they enable me to ask a question. The Secretary of State, and in the case of Northern Ireland, the Department of Justice, have the power to make an order to substitute a different amount for the maximum amount of the confiscation order which can be made by a magistrates’ court. Can the Minister give the Committee an assurance that the Secretary of State will consult before such an order is made? I appreciate that it is not in his gift to give any assurance on behalf of the Department of Justice, but he might be able to make a comment, because I know that the Government have been in touch with the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
My Lords, as the Proceeds of Crime Act currently operates, a confiscation order may only be made by the Crown Court. As a result, if someone is convicted of an offence in the magistrates’ court and the Bench considers the case is appropriate for a confiscation hearing, the matter must be referred to the Crown Court. This is clearly not the most effective use of resources for handling simple cases. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, notes, there is already legislation on the statute book that would enable the Home Secretary to modify Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act so as to enable confiscation orders to be made in a magistrates’ court in cases where the criminal benefit did not exceed £10,000. The relevant legislation can be found in Section 97 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.
I can fully understand the frustration of the noble Lord, as a sitting magistrate, in having to refer all confiscation cases to the Crown Court when it would be perfectly possible for straightforward cases to be dealt with in the magistrates’ court, subject to that £10,000 threshold. The noble Lord is all the more frustrated given that the legislation to allow magistrates’ courts to make confiscation orders has been on the statute book for almost 10 years, as he pointed out. The provision in Section 97 of the 2005 Act had, of course, already been on the statute book for five years when this Government came to office. Like the previous Administration, we judged that there were other priorities for improving the asset recovery regime and responding to serious and organised crime, including the setting up of the National Crime Agency. However, we are now working towards enabling magistrates’ courts to make confiscation orders, including putting in place the necessary judicial training from spring 2015.
Given that we are now actively working to implement a scheme empowering magistrates to make confiscation orders, I hope the noble Lord will agree that his amendment, which places a duty rather than a power on the Home Secretary to make such a scheme, is unnecessary. I would be happy to update the noble Lord in the autumn on progress in this area. On that note, I hope that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Turning to Amendments 31A and 31B, my noble friend Lady Hamwee indicated that her intention was not to remove the power to vary the £10,000 limit by order but simply to seek an assurance that there would be proper consultation before the order-making power was exercised.
Generally, our approach is that magistrates’ courts should be able to make confiscation orders only in less serious cases. However, there may be situations in which the defendant has been convicted in the magistrates’ court but is potentially liable to an order greater than £10,000. Such a case would still need to be sent to the Crown Court to be dealt with. The order-making power in the clause allows for the £10,000 threshold to be varied if the evidence following implementation shows that the limit is generally too low.
Once we have brought into effect the provisions allowing for confiscation orders to be made in magistrates’ courts, we will keep the arrangements under close review. I assure my noble friend that before any change is made we will consult with the senior judiciary, the Magistrates’ Association and other practitioners as to whether the £10,000 threshold can sensibly be raised.
I also remind my noble friend that this order-making power is subject to the affirmative procedure, so any change would need to be considered and approved by both Houses. I hope that with these comments I have been able to provide my noble friend with the assurance she is seeking.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for that answer. I think we got half a step forward. She said that there would be training in 2015 but could not quite go all the way and say when magistrates would actually receive these powers. Nevertheless, as I said, this was a probing amendment. I have got a little bit more information so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, Amendment 31C is a small probing amendment. There is a definition in the clause of “a country or territory”, which provides that references to them include,
“the territorial sea adjacent to a country or territory”.
My amendment would change that to “territorial waters”. I simply ask how extensive is territorial sea that is adjacent? It must be less than territorial waters. The natural meaning of adjacent, I would have thought, is “very close to the land”. Why is there a limit and what is the limit? I would guess that this is relevant in the context of the clause about computer misuse to damage to such things as wind turbines and oil rigs, and perhaps, in a transport context, ferries and maybe fishing. I am sure there is a list of matters. I am fairly unclear as to what the clause means. If my noble friend can help, so much the better. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, I hope I can clarify things to my noble friend’s satisfaction. As we know, cybercrime has a global reach; a perpetrator sitting in their bedroom in London could be hacking into a computer system anywhere in the world. The new offence acknowledges this reality and captures serious damage caused in any country. The clause goes on to define a reference to “country” as including a reference to a “territory” and to,
“(i) any place in, or part or region of, a country or territory;
(ii) the territorial sea adjacent to a country or territory”.
It is the last of these three points that my noble friend’s amendment seeks to address, and she raises a very interesting point.
The Territorial Sea Act 1987 specifies that the breadth of the territorial sea adjacent to the UK is 12 nautical miles. I can therefore reassure my noble friend that this form of words does not mean, as one might usually expect, the sea very close to the coastline, but captures the full 12 nautical miles of territorial water surrounding the UK.
However, the position will not be the same for all countries. Although the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea sets 12 nautical miles as a maximum for territorial waters, some states may have chosen a smaller limit. The boundary line for a country’s territorial waters will be governed by its own laws and by international agreements and conventions. The non-specific language in the Bill reflects this variation. Where the damage is caused in the UK the territorial sea adjacent to the country will be the 12 nautical miles around the UK. Where the damage is in another country we would expect the court to take into account the laws of the country in question, together with any relevant international conventions, such as the UN convention, and any other agreements, in determining the territorial sea’s breadth. I hope that my noble friend has found this explanation helpful and that she will agree to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Elton (Con)
Can my noble friend say whether territorial waters and a territorial sea adjacent to a country are normally co-terminous? My noble friend referred to some countries defining a territorial sea as extending less than 12 nautical miles, but she did not say whether it was less than the territorial waters of the country. I hope that is not too arcane.
Baroness Hamwee
My question was very similar—perhaps I will put it in a slightly different way. The explanation as I heard it is that this is about territorial waters. The language used seems to be that which is used to define territorial waters, whichever country one is talking about. However, it seems that there is no difference between the territorial sea adjacent to somewhere and the territorial waters. To give the Minister slightly more breathing space, perhaps I can also ask her to explain what a “territory” is, as distinct from a “country”?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, to answer my noble friend’s question last, and hopefully throw light on my other noble friend’s question: a “territory” is a geographical concept, the land and sea over which a state has jurisdiction. A country’s land mass may be divided into several territories, so the state of a country may also have jurisdiction over far-flung territories. For example, the state of the country of the United Kingdom has jurisdiction over various overseas territories, such as the British Virgin Islands. However, it is a matter for each state to determine, subject to the 12-mile limit. I hope I have not further confused the House.
Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)
My Lords, I hope to make a marginally relevant point. Is it not the case that by now the whole concept of a belt of territorial jurisdiction, 12 miles out from land, has been outdistanced by the realities of time? Grotius, I believe, was the international lawyer, who, many centuries ago, advocated a three-mile limit. Why? Because that was the range of a powerful cannon in those days. Then, ordnance became more and more powerful. Today, 12 miles is nothing in relation to the power of ordnance. Should not the whole question of the 12 miles therefore be eradicated?
Lord Swinfen (Con)
Before my noble friend answers that question, might I ask whether our gas and oil rigs and our large, hideous windmills that are beyond the 12-mile limit are within our territorial waters? If so, do not our territorial waters in some instances stretch very much further, and have we not claimed areas out into the Atlantic within the continental shelf in order to protect our own oil rights? Is the limit not much greater than 12 miles?
Lord Swinfen
If my noble friend will forgive me, if we have territorial rights that are limited to only 12 miles, who has jurisdiction over the gas and oil rigs that are further out than 12 miles? Are they outside the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom? If a crime is committed on them, is it not a free-for-all?
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I thank my noble friend Lord Bourne for very helpfully clarifying the issue over mineral rights et cetera. If a crime took place on an oil rig, windmill or anything out to sea, it would be a matter for whichever country had a flag on it. I hope that clarifies the matter in respect of anything that might be in any sea anywhere in the world.
On whether the 12-nautical mile radius should still stand, I do not think that that is a question for today. The fact is that it does stand.
Lord Elton
My Lords, I was hoping to protract the glory of this small question, but I think that I had better sit down in order to wrestle with my machine that is bleeping.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, after the tutorial that we have had from the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, I feel that I should just say that I surrender—but, before I do so, I will comment that it would be easier if the Bill were to refer to each country’s territorial waters as that country has determined, rather than using what appears to be general language without making reference to the technicalities. I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister, who no doubt now knows a great deal more about territorial waters than she really ever wanted to. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I will speak also to my Amendment 31H. Perhaps I should speak slowly to give the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, an opportunity to work out how to make her points in the debate on this clause.
In Clause 39, Amendment 31D would omit subsection (4) and Amendment 31H would omit subsection (7), both of which refer to a case in which the accused is in one country and the offence is linked to another jurisdiction, which will very often be the case when there is computer misuse. My amendments are probing; I am asking my noble friend whether there is a risk that a person could be prosecuted for the same act in more than one jurisdiction, and how it should be determined which jurisdiction takes precedence. Obviously, this point arises not only in connection with the Bill and the new offences, so I am not raising a novel point, but it would be very helpful to the House to understand how that conflict might be determined—I use the term “conflict” somewhat hesitantly as, technically, it is not a conflict—when more than one jurisdiction is involved. The first of these two amendments refers to the UK and the second to Scotland. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
I am grateful to my noble friend for the explanation of her amendments. I believe that I can provide the reassurance that she seeks. I know that a number of noble Lords are interested in this issue; indeed, it was raised in the House at Second Reading.
It might help if I briefly explain why we are making the amendments to the Computer Misuse Act in Clause 39 and then set out the safeguards against subjecting a person to double jeopardy. As the Committee is well aware, cybercrime is a serious threat that often crosses international boundaries. The Computer Misuse Act already recognises the transnational nature of cybercrime and provides for the extraterritorial jurisdiction of certain of the offences under the Act where there is a significant link to the United Kingdom.
Clause 37 adds nationality to the categories of significant linkage to the UK. This means that a UK national would be committing a computer misuse offence while outside the UK even where there was no link to the UK other than nationality, provided that the offence was also an offence in the country where it took place. Therefore, in the case of concurrent jurisdiction, a UK national could be prosecuted under the Computer Misuse Act in the UK subject to the usual extradition arrangements or the accused voluntarily returning to the UK.
Decisions about prosecution rest with the Director of Public Prosecutions. It would be for prosecutors in the affected jurisdictions to negotiate where the prosecution should take place. For example, in the EU, Eurojust was established to deal with criminality that extends over borders, and it has guidelines to help prosecutors decide where a case should best be tried. There is a similar protocol agreed by the Attorneys-General of the US and the UK for cases that in theory could be tried by either jurisdiction. The Crown Prosecution Service has domestic guidelines that its prosecutors are expected to follow to help them decide whether to bring a prosecution in the UK or cede jurisdiction to another state with an interest.
My noble friend is rightly concerned to ensure that an individual cannot be prosecuted in both jurisdictions where there is a concurrent jurisdiction. This is a risk that the existing guidance and agreed processes have been designed to manage. Using the UK and Clause 39 as an example, a UK national could commit a number of Computer Misuse Act offences in country B even if the criminality did not impact on the UK. As I described, the way in which we would expect this to work is that the prosecutors in the UK and country B would decide where to pursue the prosecution. In the absence of country B taking forward a prosecution, the UK could take one forward and would need to go through the extradition process to return the subject to the UK. If the case was prosecuted and the sentence served in country B, and the subject returned to the UK, the UK could not then take forward its own proceedings. Double jeopardy would prevent the subject being prosecuted for the same offence in the UK.
It is important to note that the extraterritorial scope of the offences in question does not place any requirements for the offences to be prosecuted here, especially in cases where the offence has taken place outside the UK and the only link to the UK is the nationality of the subject. Similarly, if the subject was outside the UK, the usual extradition procedures would be followed where prosecutors agreed that the prosecution should be pursued in the UK. I trust that that provides the assurance that my noble friend is seeking and that she will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, that was very helpful. I may have missed this, in which case I apologise, but I take it that the arrangements to which the Minister referred at the beginning of her reply deal with where the prosecution actually takes place and the decision between two states as to who takes the lead.
“(2A) A sheriff shall have jurisdiction in respect of an offence under section 3ZA above if—
(a) the accused was in the sheriffdom at the time when he did the unauthorised act (or caused it to be done), or (b) the computer in relation to which the unauthorised act was done was in the sheriffdom at that time.”
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, this is a technical amendment. Clause 39 extends the extraterritorial jurisdiction of certain offences under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. In doing so, the clause amends Section 13 of the 1990 Act, which relates to criminal proceedings in Scotland, to establish the criteria for when a sheriff court has jurisdiction to try certain offences under that Act. Our amendments to Clause 39(6) and (7) extend these provisions so that they also apply to the new Section 3ZA offence—inserted into the 1990 Act by Clause 37—of impairing a computer such as to cause serious damage. I beg to move.
(b) in addition to an order discharging the person absolutely.”
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, these amendments make further amendments to Part 1 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 as a consequence of extending serious crime prevention orders to Scotland.
The most substantive amendment in this group is Amendment 31Z, which inserts proposed new Section 27A into the 2007 Act. Sections 27 to 29 of the 2007 Act already make provision for the winding up of companies, partnerships and other bodies corporate where they have been the subject of a serious crime prevention order and are then convicted of a breach of that order under Section 25 of the 2007 Act. Hitherto, all SCPOs have been made against individuals rather than bodies corporate, but it is important that the legislation continues to provide for the possibility of an SCPO being made against a company or other commercial enterprise.
Proposed new Section 27A of the 2007 Act makes bespoke provision for the winding up of companies or other relevant bodies and dissolution of partnerships in Scotland. As now, the test of the winding up of a company or other relevant body or dissolution of a partnership will be that it has been convicted of the offence of breaching a serious crime prevention order and Scottish Ministers consider that it would be in the public interest for the company—or, as the case may be, relevant body—to be wound up or the partnership to be dissolved. Amendment 31Z effectively completes the provisions in Schedule 1, ensuring that all elements of Part 1 of the 2007 Act are extended to Scotland.
Amendment 31AA is in response to the helpful comments made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, at Second Reading. In his comments, the noble and learned Lord correctly identified that new Section 36A of the 2007 Act, as inserted by paragraph 23 of Schedule 1, went wider than the England and Wales equivalent in Section 36 of the 2007 Act. As drafted, new Section 36A provides that in any proceedings before the High Court of Justiciary or the sheriff in relation to serious crime prevention orders, the civil standard of proof is to apply. Amendment 31AA clarifies that the civil standard of proof applies where the High Court of Justiciary or the sheriff, when sitting in a criminal capacity, are considering the making of an SCPO on conviction, or the variation of an order made on conviction, or the variation or replacement of an order following a conviction for breach. The criminal standard of proof would naturally apply, as now, to criminal proceedings in relation to the offence of breach of an SCPO. I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord for highlighting the need for this amendment.
The other amendments in this group are minor technical or drafting amendments. I beg to move.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, I am aware that the Committee is hungry. I am hungry myself, so I shall be extremely brief. This amendment, helpfully tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, provides us with the only opportunity to debate the provisions in the Bill that deal with cutting agents used to bulk out illegal drugs. I simply want to draw to the attention of the Committee the law of unintended consequences. Cracking down on relatively harmless cutting agents such as benzocaine runs the risk that you drive criminals to use much more damaging cutting agents. A case was reported in Scotland recently in which six people died. They had used heroin that had been bulked out with a cutting agent contaminated with anthrax. Criminals are entirely unscrupulous. I hope that, when under the terms of this clause, the police, customs and courts are considering whether to return or retain cutting agents that have been seized, they will think very carefully about the consequences of impounding relatively safe cutting agents, thereby providing an incentive for criminals to use much more dangerous cutting agents.
I will also, although this is a painful thing to do, draw to the attention of the Committee the utterly tragic case of Martha Fernback, a 15 year-old girl who died nearly a year ago after consuming ecstasy—MDMA—which was 91% pure compared to the average street-level purity of 58%. Had that MDMA been cut and the purity been what it would normally be when it came into her hands, she would still be alive today. Her mother, Anne-Marie Cockburn, has campaigned with tremendous courage and great wisdom asking that the Home Secretary and the shadow Home Secretary think deeply about whether it would be right to move from the system of prohibition that trapped that girl towards a system of legalisation and strict regulation as well as vastly better education in this field. I will not enlarge on that theme because the Minister and the House know my views well, but as the House determines whether to approve these clauses we ought to bear in mind that legislation with the best of intentions, which the Government have, can lead to horribly counterproductive effects.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, if a court approves the further retention of a suspected drug-cutting agent beyond the initial 30-day detention period, it is only right that the responsible police or customs officer makes reasonable efforts to inform the person who may be entitled to the substances if the person was not present or represented at the court hearing. A person entitled to the substances is defined in Clause 53 as the person the substances were seized from or the owner of the substances. It is important that all those persons who are entitled to receive notice do so. This provides additional protection for the legitimate trade, ensuring people have sufficient time to consider and act upon the notice, if appropriate.
I commend my noble friend Lady Hamwee for ensuring that we continue to minimise the impact on the legitimate trade by setting out in clear terms who should be informed of the court’s decision. I shall therefore give further consideration to extending the provision to ensure that notice is given to the person from whom the suspected drug-cutting agents were seized, if different from the owner. I will reflect on this point and let her know the outcome in advance of Report.
On the two points made by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, about switching to more dangerous cutting agents, the proposals include a general seizure power which covers any substance suspected of being intended for use as a drug-cutting agent. Therefore, we do not anticipate that they will lead to drug traffickers using cutting agents that are more dangerous than those currently being used. I have heard of dangerous cutting agents being used currently. Any new substances that traffickers begin to use would be equally subject to seizure under these powers.
On the risk that the powers to seize cutting agents would place drug users in danger because of purity issues, by restricting the ability of drug traffickers to cut drugs we anticipate that the new powers will reduce harm by limiting the availability of drugs on the street. Lower availability should increase prices and therefore reduce use. The powers will also attack the profits of drug traffickers, which they use to fund a range of other harmful criminal activities. Moreover, the most common cutting agents are far from harmless. There has been a move away from inactive cutting agents to more dangerous pharmaceutical agents, such as benzocaine, lidocaine and phenacetin. Toxic doses of benzocaine and lidocaine can decrease the oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood and can cause convulsions that mimic the acute toxicity of cocaine. Phenacetin, a painkiller, is no longer used in the UK due to its carcinogenic and kidney-damaging properties.
I hope my response has addressed the issues that my noble friend and the noble Lord have raised and that my noble friend will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the Minister is extremely generous and I consider my wrist to have been slapped. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Serious Crime Bill [HL]
Baroness Williams of Trafford Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
My Lords, Clause 5 includes provisions designed to minimise delays in the confiscation process. This is achieved by amending Section 11 of POCA to make it crystal clear that the full amount that is ordered to be paid by the court must be paid on the day on which the order is made, unless the court is satisfied that the defendant is unable to do so, for example, because they need time to realise their property.
The maximum additional time allowed for a defendant to pay their confiscation orders has been reduced from 12 months to six. There will also be a further restriction on the length of an extension of the time to pay limiting it to more than is necessary, for example, to realise funds from a specific asset.
My noble friend has indicated that this amendment is designed to tease out whether the defendant has a right to make representations to the court about the time for payment. She has rightly pointed out the fact that the proposed new Section 11(8) expressly confers on the prosecutor the right to make representations, but no such express right is conferred on the defendant.
I can assure my noble friend that the defendant will indeed be able to make representations to the court. However, in view of the way in which the process will operate, it is not necessary to provide for this in the legislation. As I have explained, the default position is that a confiscation order will be payable on the day that it is made. This is the current position. We do not believe that it is impractical. Certainly, for lower value orders, there is no reason why the defendant cannot visit the fines officer and discharge the confiscation order before leaving the court.
The court will not be expected to allow additional time for payment on its own motion. In practice, the court will only be in the position to consider making an order under proposed new Section 11(2) of POCA to extend the time given to the defendant to pay their order if the defendant has made representations to the effect that they need more time to pay their order or part of it. This will be done as part of the confiscation hearing.
Similarly, under proposed new Section 11(4) of POCA, it will be for the defendant to make an application to the court to extend the period allowed for payment. It is implicit in making such an application that the defendant will set out his or her arguments for being afforded more time to pay the confiscation order. New Section 11(8) is intended to ensure that the prosecutor has the right to respond to the case made by the defendant. Having heard the explanation, I trust that my noble friend will agree that the amendment is unnecessary.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the noble Baroness will know that I was concerned about the very tight provisions of new Section 11. She has explained that the defendant will have an opportunity to make representations at the time. That is reassuring, because it is almost never possible to realise an asset on the day that an order is made and it is often not even possible to transfer money immediately. What she has said about the processes is helpful and I am grateful to her for her explanation of proposed new Section 11(8). I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, this is a short point because it is just a short question. Amendment 5 is to Clause 8 and Amendment 26 is to Clause 28—the equivalent Northern Ireland provision. Amendment 5 seeks to leave out new Section 25A(2)(a) of POCA, which allows the court to discharge an order in the case of a deceased defendant where,
“it is not possible to recover anything from the estate”.
My question is: is this not covered by new Section 25A(2)(b), which says that a discharge could be made where it is not,
“reasonable to make any attempt … to recover anything”?
It seems to me that if it is not possible to make an attempt, it certainly would not be reasonable. That is my question. I beg to move.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, Clause 8 deals with the discharge of certain unpaid confiscation orders and applications to vary unpaid orders down in value. Despite the best efforts of law enforcement agencies, some confiscation orders are uncollectable and sit on the books of Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, accruing interest at 8% a year.
Clause 8 provides that the court will be able to write off unpaid confiscation orders where the defendant has died and it is not possible or reasonable to seek payment of the order from the defendant’s estate: where, for example, there are no assets remaining in the estate. Clause 28 makes the same provision for Northern Ireland.
In Clauses 8 and 28 there are two cases where orders may be written off: first, where it is impossible to get any money out of the estate; and, secondly, where it is not reasonable to make any attempt or further attempt to get money out of the estate.
These amendments suggest removing the case for discharging orders where it is impossible to get any money at all out of the estate. My noble friend has indicated these amendments are essentially designed to probe what would be covered by a first set of circumstances for discharging an order that is not covered by a second set of circumstances.
My noble friend is correct to say that there is certainly a significant degree of overlap between the two. If there are no assets of any note in the estate, it would not be reasonable to make an attempt to recover moneys owing to discharge a confiscation order. Equally, it would not be possible to recover anything from the estate.
That said, I believe it is helpful to retain both cases. The first case where it is impossible to get any money at all out of the estate could be said to be a subset of the second case, where it is not reasonable to make any attempt or further attempt. However, there may be circumstances not covered by the second case. It is important that this clause should encompass all possible scenarios to ensure uncollectible orders may be discharged.
I hope that, in light of that explanation, my noble friend will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am not sure that I do understand that it would ever be reasonable to make an attempt to recover something where it is not possible to recover it. I am not going to make a fuss about it. However, when I hear about 8% a year, I think I need to review my investment strategy. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“( ) In section 47B of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (conditions for exercise of powers), in subsection (2)(d), for “is reasonable cause to believe” substitute “are reasonable grounds to suspect”.”
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, Clause 13 deals with the search and seizure powers available to appropriate officers under Sections 47A to 47S of the Proceeds of Crime Act. Sections 47A to 47S, which were inserted into POCA by the Policing and Crime Act 2009, provide for search and seizure powers, in England and Wales, to prevent the dissipation of realisable property that may be used to satisfy a confiscation order. These powers will, once commenced later this year, be available to law enforcement officers, such as the police and National Crime Agency officers. The power to seize property is currently subject to the same test as for the making of a restraint order. The existing test is that there is reasonable cause to believe that the person has benefited from conduct constituting the offence.
As we have already debated, Clause 11 is designed to enable assets to be restrained more quickly and earlier in investigations. It does this by lowering the test for the grant of a restraint order from the court having “reasonable cause to believe” that the alleged offender has benefited from his criminal conduct to the court having “reasonable grounds to suspect” that the alleged offender has benefited from his criminal conduct.
To exercise certain powers and investigative tools at the early stages of an investigation, the officer and the court have to be satisfied only to the threshold of suspicion, rather than of belief. For example, in order to obtain a production order under POCA, reasonable grounds for suspecting have to be shown, and under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, a police officer may arrest without a warrant anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting of committing an offence.
It therefore follows that the legal test for exercising search and seizure powers, which will enable law enforcement agencies to identify and protect assets through search and seizure for a future confiscation order, should complement that of a restraint order. Indeed, it is already the case that the reasonable grounds for suspecting test applies to certain of the powers in Sections 47A to 47S. For example, this lower test already applies to the power to search premises in Section 47D of POCA.
Amendment 17 therefore brings the test for the seizure of property in Section 47B into line with the change we are making in relation to restraint orders; namely, reducing the legal test to “reasonable grounds to suspect”. Amendments 25 and 28 insert a new clause into Chapters 2 and 3 of Part 1. These new clauses simply replicate for Scotland and Northern Ireland the provisions in Clause 13, as amended by Amendment 16. I beg to move.
“(5B) In the case of money held in an account not maintained by the person against whom the confiscation order is made, a magistrates’ court—
(a) may make an order under subsection (5) only if the extent of the person’s interest in the money has been determined under section 10A, and(b) must have regard to that determination in deciding what is the appropriate order to make.””
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, as we have debated, Clauses 1 to 4 include provisions designed to ensure that criminal assets cannot be hidden with spouses, associates or other third parties. This is achieved under Clause 1 by enabling a court to make a determination as to the extent of the defendant’s interest in property. Any such determination will be made by the court at a confiscation hearing. This determination may include money held in a bank or building society account.
Section 67 of POCA currently enables a magistrates’ court to order a bank or building society to pay over money to satisfy a confiscation order. This provision needs to be able to work in conjunction with Clauses 1 to 4 when the court makes a determination that the defendant has an interest in a bank account that is, for example, held by a third party, such as a company owned by the defendant.
Amendment 18 accordingly amends Section 67 of POCA so as to reflect the court’s new power to make a determination as to a defendant’s interest in property. The amendment provides for a magistrates’ court to order payment of funds held in a bank account that is not in the name of the defendant towards the satisfaction of the defendant’s confiscation order, in accordance with the court’s determination of the defendant’s interest in that account. This will enable funds held in a bank account to be confiscated rapidly where the account is not held in the name of the defendant. Any third parties affected would have the opportunity to make representations before such a determination was made. Only accounts subject to a determination by the court at the confiscation hearing will be affected by this amendment.
Amendment 29 makes a similar change to the Northern Ireland provision in Clause 33. I aim to bring forward on Report a new clause which will replicate for Scotland Clause 14 in its amended form. I beg to move.
“Restitution order and victim surcharge
(1) In section 97 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (effect of order on court’s other powers), in subsection (3)(a), at the end insert “, a restitution order or a victim surcharge under section 253F(2) of the Procedure Act”.
(2) After that section insert—
“97A Application of receipts: restitution order and victim surcharge
(1) Subsection (2) applies if—
(a) a court makes a confiscation order and a relevant order against the same person in the same proceedings, and(b) the court believes that the person will not have sufficient means to satisfy both orders in full.(2) In such a case the court must direct that so much of the amount payable under the relevant order as it specifies is to be paid out of any sums recovered under the confiscation order.
(3) Subsection (4) applies if—
(a) a court makes a confiscation order, a compensation order under section 249 of the Procedure Act and a relevant order against the same person in the same proceedings, and(b) the court believes that the person will not have sufficient means to satisfy all the orders in full. (4) In such a case the court must direct that so much of the compensation, and so much of the amount payable under the relevant order, as it specifies is to be paid out of any sums recovered under the confiscation order.
(5) The amount a court specifies under subsection (2) or (4) must be the amount the court believes will not be recoverable because of the insufficiency of the person’s means.
(6) Where the amount a court specifies in a direction under subsection (4) is sufficient to satisfy in full the compensation, the direction must provide for the compensation to be so satisfied before payment of the amount payable under the relevant order.
(7) Where the amount a court specifies in a direction under subsection (4) is not sufficient to satisfy in full the compensation, the direction must provide for the compensation to be satisfied to the extent of the amount specified in the direction.
(8) In this section, “relevant order” means—
(a) a restitution order, or(b) a victim surcharge under section 253F(2) of the Procedure Act.(9) In this Part, “restitution order” is to be construed in accordance with section 253A(2) of the Procedure Act.””
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the new clause proposed by Amendment 23 makes equivalent provision for Scotland to that contained in Clause 6 as regards England and Wales. It provides for the money collected under a confiscation order to be diverted to pay other financial penalties imposed by the court where the accused has insufficient means to meet all the financial penalties imposed on him or her.
The proposed new clause ensures that where the court imposes a confiscation order alongside a compensatory financial penalty, those compensatory penalties can be paid from money collected under the confiscation order where the accused does not have sufficient means to satisfy all the orders in full. The new clause caters for the situation where the court has imposed a confiscation order alongside either the victim surcharge or a restitution order. It also caters for the situation where a confiscation order is imposed alongside a compensation order and either the victim surcharge or a restitution order. The victim surcharge and restitution orders are financial penalties which can be imposed by the court under the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
Baroness Williams of Trafford
My Lords, the intention behind Clause 15 is to provide that the serving of a default sentence in Scotland for failure to pay a confiscation order does not discharge the outstanding debt. In making such provision, the clause brings the position in Scotland into line with that in England and Wales. Paragraph (a) of the clause achieves this intended outcome by amending Section 118 of POCA to disapply the relevant provision in the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, which relates to fine enforcement.
Paragraph (b) of Clause 15 makes a consequential amendment to POCA to modify the application of Section 224 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. That section requires warrants of imprisonment for non-payment of a fine to specify the date for the discharge of the liability to pay the fine—in practice once the default sentence has been served—notwithstanding the fact that it has not been paid. The effect of paragraph (b) is that that requirement will no longer operate where an administrator is appointed in relation to the confiscation order in respect of which the default sentence was served.
However, on further examination, the Scottish Government have concluded that Section 224 should be disapplied entirely. As currently drafted, the clause would result in some individuals still having their confiscation order discharged once they have served a default sentence, which is not the outcome the Scottish Government are seeking to achieve. I beg to move.