Illegal Migration Bill

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, in the submission that Clauses 5 and 6 and Schedule 1 should not stand part of the Bill. The reasoning becomes increasingly repetitive and circular, because these provisions are parasitic on the meat of the Bill, which is really Clause 2. That is the duty that the Secretary of State is quite deliberately taking upon herself so that it looks as if no discretion is being exercised, she must remove people and therefore the courts have no ability to supervise that judgment. That is the heart of the moral and practical problem with the Bill, so when we look at the parasitic clauses that follow on from Clause 2, we come back to that central problem.

There are so many reasons why this is wrong in both principle and practice. As always, it is a privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, a most distinguished senior diplomat and former Permanent Under-Secretary to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—which is important. The poor old Home Office gets lumbered with all the tough talk and rhetoric and with translating press releases into legislation, but the foreign department has to represent this country all over the world, negotiate further treaties and hold its head up in its attempt to do so. The foreign department will no doubt try to persuade people that Mr Sunak is so right and that, as I said last time, we should be the hub of AI intelligence and the world regulator, and everybody should support the idea that these treaties should be formulated here. Once upon a time, we could have said that.

If any noble Lords, particularly on the Benches opposite, want to understand the importance of the refugee convention, not as it is being flexibly interpreted by the current Government but as it was intended after the war, they might care to read the correspondence between our wartime Prime Minister and the then Archbishop of Canterbury. That correspondence between Winston Churchill and William Temple is very revealing of what the obligations of the future treaty were going to be in relation to individuated justice for refugees, which of course is the problem.

We were treated last time to good cop, bad cop by two Ministers, from the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice respectively; I will leave Members of the Committee to decide who was which. But I think that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, was right in his rather forensic—if I may say so—examination to point out some tensions in the case as it was put by the two Ministers.

The Home Office Minister concentrated, quite rightly, on the message as we have heard it thus far: this is about deterrence; we do not want people to come here; this is all about stopping the boats. Therefore, he stressed the automaticity of Clause 2 and the absolute commitment—no ifs, ands or buts—to a duty to remove anybody who comes by an irregular route; no matter how genuine a refugee, they must be removed. When, as amendment after amendment was debated, and noble Lord after noble Lord gave the litany of heartbreaking cases of trafficked people, of gay people who should not be sent back to certain countries, and so on, the Minister from the justice department pointed up the possibility of exceptional non-suspensive claims—it will be all right, there will be the possibility of individuated justice in those cases. But, of course, both positions cannot be the case, and they were not intended to be. It was excellent advocacy, perhaps, but it does not stand up, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, said so clearly in his introduction to the debate.

This is the blanket treatment of claims that were always intended to be considered in a case-by-case analysis. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, pointed out, there are countries, including very large democracies such as India, perhaps, that are perfectly safe for some people but not at all safe for others—because they are political dissidents, because they are queer, because they are women. That is conceded by the Home Office in the schedule that lists some countries as safe only for men.

It is a diplomatic nightmare to be creating this automaticity of “These are safe countries; these are unsafe countries” and to be telegraphing it in the schedule to the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Murray, will say, “There has been this development for some years under Governments of both stripes to have inadmissibility and presumptive safety”. It is one thing to say to your officials considering individual claims that some countries might be prima facie safe, but you still have a duty to consider the individual asylum seeker before you to determine what their story is. That was always the intention in the refugee convention and that is the obligation on signatories to it—and, I would argue, not just signatories any more because non-refoulement has become accepted as a principle of customary international law. That is what we propose to breach by this legislation.

That is how serious it is. The Bill is wrong in principle, wrong in practice and internally incoherent. Certainly, the arguments that have been put by Ministers—elegantly, charmingly, patiently, late into the night—do not hold together, and these provisions should not stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, following the eloquent speeches of my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, I would like to refer again to the proposal that Schedule 1 should not stand part.

Some of those countries breach protected rights. I ask the noble and learned Lord the Minister which of the countries on the list practise female genital mutilation and do not reserve refoulement only for men? Which criminalise homosexuality? Which criminalise humanism? Noble Lords may remember the case of the president of the Humanist Association of Nigeria, who has received a life sentence.

Surely it is very odd to remove people to those countries. Does the Minister think that that conforms to our signature to the treaties of international law?

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker. I endorse everything that has been said in the debate so far, so ably introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. I particularly want to follow on from what the noble Baroness said to the Committee about the suitability of some countries in Schedule 1 as places to which people should be returned; my noble friend Lord Kerr and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, developed that point in their interventions earlier. I will take one example but the arguments I am going to put to the Committee could be applied to other countries on the list as well.

The country I want to talk about is Nigeria. In a later group of amendments, I have Amendment 85C in my name, which seeks to establish

“how the Secretary of State will assess Equality”

provisions

“listed in Schedule 1 and the potential harm to those with protected characteristics including victims of Modern Slavery”.

However, I want to ask the Minister specifically to engage with the issue of justice in Nigeria. This is a country to which we have said it is safe to return men but not women. I argue that it is not safe to return anybody to Nigeria, given the way in which the internal factors in that country currently stand.

The seriousness of the situation was underlined by the visit of Karim Khan KC, the prosecutor for the International Criminal Court, to Nigeria in 2020. He is continuing the investigation into the war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetuated by Boko Haram and other factions—as well as the involvement, I might add, of the Nigerian security forces. That investigation began in December 2020 and continues. Whether or not the ICC will determine that a genocide or crimes against humanity are being perpetrated against the religious minorities in the north of Nigeria lies in the future, but the evidence of why this is a hostile environment in which people face outright persecution is overwhelming.

Simply consider the role of what are sometimes euphemistically called “bandit groups”. They have killed, abducted, forcibly converted and displaced vast numbers of people, many of whom end up in small boats. According to government figures, 4,983 women were widowed; 25,000 children were orphaned; and 190,000 people were displaced between 2011 and 2019, with more 3 billion naira paid to bandits as ransom for 3,672 individuals who had been abducted.

In one incident last year, IS West Africa killed eight people and kidnapped 72 people on a Kaduna-bound train from Abuja while, in 2022, Boko Haram killed at least 60 people from the community of Rann, in Borno State, and killed more than 15 women in Gwoza, also in Borno State. In June 2022, the United Nations reported that Boko Haram and splinter factions abducted at least 211 children, recruited at least 63 children, killed or maimed at least 88 children, raped or sexually violated 53 girls and attacked at least 15 schools. In September 2022, UNESCO estimated that 20.2 million Nigerian children were out of school as a consequence.

I think particularly of the plight of Leah Sharibu, who has just turned 20. At the age of 14, on 18 February 2018, she was abducted by Boko Haram, raped, impregnated and forcibly converted. She is one of 110 girls taken from the Government Girls Science and Technical College in Dapchi, in Yobe State. Here in your Lordships’ House, I met her mother, Rebecca. I promised that I would never miss any opportunity that might come my way to raise Leah’s case. I do so again today because it illustrates the dangers faced by people being sent back to Nigeria, whether they are women or men; indeed, if they come from religious minorities that do not fit a particular mindset or ideology, they are doubly endangered.

Elsewhere in the country, secessionist forces in the south-east of Nigeria and protests by the Indigenous People of Biafra led to gunmen killing, maiming and destroying the properties of citizens in the region. Armed forces against separatists have also been involved in at least 122 extrajudicial killings. Media reports suggest that more than 287 people were killed in the south-east between January and May.

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[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

The Minister kindly said that, if he had not answered anything, he would do so. Would he please write to me about which countries practise female genital mutilation, criminalise homo- sexuality and criminalise humanism?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her question, but I cannot answer it today at the Dispatch Box. My respectful reply is that this issue does not arise for the reasons I have given. The Bill does not envisage, at the moment, returning people to such countries. The general position is that we can continue discussing the provisions on legal requirements, trafficking, unaccompanied children and so forth, but this part of the Bill is an essential part of the Bill. I therefore beg to move—

Human Rights Act 1998

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Thursday 14th July 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Whitaker]

To move that this House takes note of the practical impact of the Human Rights Act 1998.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, may I first acknowledge the contribution to human rights of my dear friend of many years, the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, a founder member of our Equality and Human Rights Commission, whose work for the rights of older people, among others, was so very effective?

I am grateful for the opportunity to explore what the Human Rights Act 1998 has achieved by way of impact on ordinary people’s lives—not, I hasten to say, as a legal expert, though I should perhaps declare that I have been a magistrate and a member of employment tribunals. More to the point, I am proud to be a member of the British Institute of Human Rights advisory board, and it is there that I have learned much about the very many examples of redress for breaches of human rights. What these amount to is, essentially, disregard for the dignity of our fellow citizens and a lack of respect for them on the part of public authorities. May I invite the Minister to congratulate the British Institute of Human Rights on the work it has done over the years to train public services in the application of the Human Rights Act to their functions?

I will first give some examples of what I mean by impact on people’s lives. Secondly, I will say a few words about what the Human Rights Act has not done. I will conclude by suggesting some of the lasting principles that have informed the Human Rights Act. My remarks are premised on the assumption that, although professional lawyers and judges at every level are essential for the interpretation and implementation of law—we are lucky in this country to have such a distinguished and honourable corps of practitioners—the law is meant for people, for everyone, so that they should understand their obligations and be clear about what they are entitled to. It follows that law should be intelligible, as far as possible, and that redress should be accessible.

Some examples of what our domestic courts have achieved for people through the Human Rights Act are well known. We have heard about the elderly couple who had their wish to live in the same care home respected. People must be allowed to wear religious symbols at work. Siblings should not be arbitrarily placed in separate, distant foster homes. Do we also all know that the police now have a positive obligation to protect women from domestic violence? This has achieved a change—somewhat—in police priorities and practice. There are several cases of children with learning disabilities who were subjected to damaging isolation, harsh restraints or unexplained evidence of violence, whose parents were able to use the Human Rights Act to obtain changes in their treatment, often resulting in an improvement in a child’s behaviour. We should also remember the case of Corporal Anne-Marie Ellement, whose family were finally able to obtain a full investigation after she took her own life following rape and bullying; that of the incontinent patient forced to use a bucket to urinate in and carry it along the corridor to empty it herself; the safeguarding of trafficked children as a result of the 2013 case of L, HVN, T v R; the Northern Ireland decision that same-sex couples can adopt children; and the use of the right to be free of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment after tragic deaths in mental health institutions.

All these cases relied on the Human Rights Act to achieve lasting improvements in their situation. Is it really plausible that all the people bringing these cases could have managed to get to Strasbourg for a hearing, also knowing that they would have to wait the customary four to five years? I suggest that the domestication of the rights in the European convention, through the Human Rights Act, was essential for justice to be done in these and many other cases.

I think it is important to remind ourselves that uses of the Human Rights Act do not necessarily involve going to court. One of the significant effects of domestic law is that well-meaning people—most people—want to comply. Carers have raised the specific human rights issues of their charges with the public service concerned, which has then responded positively. Conscientious public servants have been helped by discussions with, for instance, the British Institute of Human Rights to think again about how they can adapt their practice. The British Institute of Human Rights has trained over 40,000 people in the last 20 years in the application of the Act to their functions. I am reminded of the dictum of the great Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, the founder of the concept of crimes against humanity:

“the well-being of an individual is the … object of all law”.

The law can achieve that by simply being there.

To take this down to specific instances, a housing association specialising in people with offender backgrounds has been able to reduce their violent behaviour and thus improve the safety of residents through training in interpretation of the Human Rights Act; young people in mental health institutions have similarly been protected from grooming while still having their mobile phones for access to their families; students have secured protection for girls against sexual harassment at school; countless advocates and carers, both volunteer and professional, have obtained the exercise of rights essential to well-being for the people they look after.

There are several things that the Human Rights Act has not done, however. It did not vindicate the relationship with a pet cat as a reason not to be deported, as a reading of the judgment will show, contrary to the claim made by Theresa May MP. Unlike the original Daily Mail story that a “suspected Iraqi insurgent” “caught red-handed with bomb” had won £33,000

“because our soldiers kept him in custody for too long”,

the Iraqi, who was neither an insurgent nor a terrorist, and had no bomb, was unlawfully detained, beaten with rifle butts, punched in the face and subjected to sleep and sensory deprivation by soldiers while in custody. Fortunately, in this case, the Daily Mail, which had attributed its false interpretation to the Human Rights Act, was obliged by IPSO to make a full apology and retraction. The Human Rights Act has not supported a contention that a right to hardcore pornography exists for prisoners. There are quite a few other examples of these misleading and pernicious myths. Some of these centre on difficulties with understanding the import of Article 8, on the right to private, home and family life. This is an area where jurisprudence may be evolving—and we should try to clarify the balance that it is intended to strike.

There are some important principles in the Human Rights Act. Perhaps the first is that our judges have full discretion in determining human rights cases in the United Kingdom. The UK is the primary forum for deciding on the application of human rights to its citizens. Secondly, the Human Rights Act reflects the devolved settlement for the nations of the United Kingdom. This is of concern to the peace process in Northern Ireland. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who regrets that he cannot take part, has encouraged me to point out that under the Scotland Act, which also gives effect to the convention rights, there is no wish to alter the arrangements and that any changes would, of course, need the consent of the Scottish Ministers. I hope that the Minister can give me the assurance that that consent would be sought.

The Human Rights Act has also been helpful in defining a public authority as one which carries out public functions. This inclusive definition acknowledges the public/private partnerships which underpin our modern public services. The Human Rights Act also establishes judicial discretion about decisions on whether the Government acted fairly in restricting our rights. It stipulates positive obligations to act in accordance with human rights, thus making them a reality; to apply laws whenever possible in a way that upholds human rights; to underline the centrality of the interests of the individual citizen; to enable modern concepts such as belief to be understood together with religion; and, most significantly, by creating a system for hearing cases in the UK rather than in the Strasbourg court it enables access for all to justice. Domestic jurisprudence will encourage the development of clarity about proper limits to non-absolute rights, so that people can understand where the balance ought to be struck. So, while there is always room for updating, these are some of the principles of our modern legislation which should be maintained.

One other effect of having the Human Rights Act as part of domestic law deserves mention: the culture that it promulgates of respect for the dignity of our fellow citizens within public services. Sadly, this is not always present, not necessarily because of callousness but because the constraints felt even by dedicated public servants of expenditure, time and targets can be allowed to prevail over what should happen. The Human Rights Act is often cited as a practical tool to support public services in their work. Thus, we are in a position to create public ownership of rights values. To entrench this, we need to teach and debate them in schools and in citizenship education generally. We can explore what the balance between conflicting rights should be and how responsibilities are a necessary corollary of rights. In a diverse society, with different faiths and backgrounds, we can cohere better around human rights.

There is another reason for promulgating a domestic human rights culture. In this country, we prefer to enable equality of opportunities rather than equality of outcomes. But the inadvertent consequence of that is that it assumes that those who fail to benefit from equal opportunities were simply not up to it and lacked the necessary qualities of one sort or another—it was their fault. We need a human rights culture to ensure that scorn for the failures in our society does not undermine a humane and compassionate approach. Respect for the individual human being is the core of human rights. Human rights are a recognition that everyone is of equal worth.

In conclusion, in his writings on the theory of justice, Amartya Sen quotes Pip in Great Expectations, that

“there is nothing… so finely felt as injustice.”

Professor Sen adds,

“and there the search begins. The idea of justice calls for comparison of actual lives and iniquities.”

That is what I hope an exploration of the impact of the Human Rights Act can uncover. I look forward with keen interest to the contribution of learned and distinguished speakers in this debate, and very much to the response of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, whose speech in the crime reduction debate I very much admired.

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[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, it may not be often that one is instructed by one’s own debate, but I have learned much. I am extremely grateful to all the speakers who have put their wisdom, expertise and conviction to the service of one of the most important discourses of our time, perhaps of any time—one that crosses the boundaries of human nature, cultural concepts and ideas of what justice really consists of. It would be invidious, and would certainly take too long, to go through all the interesting contributions; in any case, as noble Lords have said, these debates will of course continue.

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, for his considered and thoughtful response. It opens up more grounds for debate, to which I look forward, not least on my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti’s point. When Ministers say that a Bill’s proposals will be perfectly all right because they are bound to be compatible with the Human Rights Act, what will happen if that Act has been substantially amended? But we can leave that for the next round of debates.

I have just one very quick thought. I shudder to think what the noble and learned Lord the Minister would be obliged to say if we proposed the adoption of the United Nations convention on economic and social rights. But anyway, I beg to move.

Motion agreed.

Prisons: Releasing Women into Safe and Secure Housing

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warwick of Undercliffe]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what progress they have made in releasing women from prison into safe and secure housing; and what assessment they have made of what constitutes a satisfactory accommodation outcome for women released from prison.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lady Warwick of Undercliffe, and at her request, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in her name on the Order Paper.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Wolfson of Tredegar) (Con)]

My Lords, our vision is that no female offender who is subject to probation supervision will be released from prison homeless. Building on the success of our Covid emergency scheme, last July we introduced a transitional accommodation service for prison leavers in five regions, and we are expanding it further. We hold the system to account through ambitious accommodation targets set out in the target operating model that we introduced last year.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, that is well and good—I am grateful to the Minister—but while it is good to know that some progress has been made, there are still problems. The accommodation service is in place in only five of the 11 probation regions of England and Wales, and there has been no commitment to timelines or to safe and secure housing specifically for women. Some 77% of women left one prison without any safe and secure housing; one was provided with a tent. The service provides temporary housing for only 12 weeks. Can the Minister give some commitment on timing for rollout and on what the Government will do for vulnerable prison leavers after 12 weeks? Can he indicate how support will reflect the particular needs of women?

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 24th February 2022 Lords Chamber

Secondly, and separately, I strongly support the proposition from my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. She has tabled a probing amendment to give the Minister the opportunity to put the Government’s position: what are they doing about the lack of confidence in the criminal justice system, particularly but not only in relation to the prosecution of sexual offences? Everybody in this Chamber knows that the figures for prosecutions of serious sexual offences against women are lamentable and have got worse. A few days ago, the Director of Public Prosecutions said that reforms have been made and things are going to be much better. People are doubtful about this. As with local justice, it is really important that the Government set out what they are doing. If there is a widespread sense that this is not enough, even though my noble friend says that hers is simply a probing amendment, a proper, across-the-board inquiry into how crimes against women are dealt with may well be appropriate.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, as a former magistrate, I warmly support the first point made by my noble and learned friend. The differences in offences, their nature and conduct vary enormously in general, from area to area and region to region. To understand not only the offence but its cause and, therefore, what a suitable disposal might be is really important.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group seek reviews or consultations in three quite disparate areas. The first, in Amendment 30 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, concerns the single justice procedure. The second, in Amendment 37 from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, concerns a call for an inquiry into the treatment of women and girls in the criminal justice system. The third, in Amendment 54 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, concerns local justice areas.

First, as to the single justice procedure, there is no reason in principle to oppose Clause 5, which is the related provision in the Bill. It simply extends the procedure to corporations—and it is probably an anomaly that it did not apply to corporations in the first place. Many of the points that I made during consideration of the first group, relating to a review of the new online procedure, also apply in respect of the single justice procedure. It would be sensible for the single justice procedure to be the subject of the same review, consultation and consideration as the new online procedure.

I join the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his helpful account today, and the help that he gives to the House generally as a practising magistrate and with his very important experience in the magistrates’ court. The magistracy is an extremely important part of our criminal justice system. I forget the precise statistic, but magistrates’ court deal with some 96% of all criminal cases. They are a crucial point of disposal.

I accept, as he did, that the single justice procedure has been of considerable use in minor cases generally, but he also pointed to the impersonality of that procedure and the lack of flexibility that it has in dealing with particular cases. It is valuable in minor cases and in cases such as television licence evasion, which I understand is one of the areas for which it is used. It has been particularly helpful with Covid regulations during the pandemic. However, we should not forget that imposing financial penalties remotely—for example, in the case of television licence evasion—can end up with people being severely penalised for failure to pay and even sent to prison. There is also significant evidence that that particular offence and its enforcement affect women disproportionately.

This brings me to the second area in which a review is sought in this group, Amendment 37, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, which seeks a judicial inquiry into the criminal courts’ treatment of and service to women and girls. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, spoke to it too. In debates on the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, now back in the other place for further consideration of our amendments, I moved an amendment seeking the establishment of a women’s justice board. It had significant and widespread support around the House, and for me it is a matter of great regret that despite having the personal support of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, the Labour Party was not prepared to vote for the measure. If the measure had been supported by the Labour Party, we might have succeeded on that Division. That is a major reform for which I will continue to press. I hope that the support of those who supported it across the House in that Bill will continue to be forthcoming in future attempts, because it is one way to have a significant effect on addressing the difficulties of women and girls within the criminal justice system. Meanwhile, I of course support the noble Baroness in her Amendment 37.

Amendment 54 mandates consultation with relevant stakeholders about the abolition of local justice areas before that abolition under Clause 43 can come into effect. I see the merits of abolishing local justice areas. It will remove the boundaries between such areas, which—as the Explanatory Notes suggest—are largely artificial. That ought to enable magistrates’ courts to work on a more unified or at least a more collaborative basis and manage their work more logically. However, I listened with care to the note of caution introduced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. If it is intended by the abolition of local justice areas to destroy the local base of the magistracy, that would be a great step backwards. It is very important that magistrates are dispensing, are seen as dispensing, and understood as dispensing, local justice. While I am completely understanding of the proposal to alter the artificial boundaries so that courts can collaborate on wider areas or narrower areas as appropriate, so that the artificiality is removed, it is very important to preserve the local justice principle. I expect that we will hear more from the Minister about the consultations that have already taken place on this issue in response to the amendment, and I look forward to hearing what he has to say. I hope that he will address that point with care.

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I express my support for Amendment 36A. When I was a member of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee we looked into the impact of the pandemic on the criminal courts. What was striking about our activity was the difficulty we had in extracting from the Ministry of Justice any valuable, reliable statistics on what was happening in the criminal justice system. To have a specific statutory obligation to produce data on this important subject is essential if Parliament is to know what the impact of these new provisions will be.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group. My support comes from my experience as a magistrate, and I appreciate the endorsements of the role of the magistrate from all around the Committee. As those who frequent magistrates’ courts will know, they are places where invariably vulnerable and some other defendants are simply not able to understand or cope with the requirements of the legal system, as my noble friend Lord Ponsonby described, so effectively they do not have a fair trial. With regard to increasing the powers of magistrates in Clause 13, magistrates too are not experts, and that is partly the point of them. In my view, the safeguards in Amendments 35 and 36 would be very useful against inadvertent injustice.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I have very considerable concerns, which have also been expressed by the Delegated Powers Committee, about the Secretary of State being able in effect to double the length of time that a prison sentence can last in relation to both summary offences and either-way offences. How long a person goes to prison for as a result of a magistrates’ court sentence is a considerably important factor in determining which cases are tried by a jury and which are tried by the magistrates’ court. If there is to be a change in the powers of the magistrates’ court of this dimension, it should always be done by primary legislation and not by regulatory powers. I oppose the proposal that the Secretary of State could in effect double the sentencing power of the magistrates’ court and think that should be left to primary legislation. For that reason, I support the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 7th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. Indeed, I rise with great trepidation among such distinguished and learned speakers. I will make a brief contribution from a different perspective: that of a former civil servant whose advice was liable to judicial review, and that of a former member of the employment tribunal whose decision was similarly placed.

There are some useful reforms in the Bill, but in the time allowed I shall confine myself to those proposals which make me uneasy, where I hope amendments can be negotiated. My starting point, as we were taught in the Civil Service, is that judicial review is the way in which an ordinary individual—a citizen—can remove a state action that was illegally made. We had a very well-written booklet, The Judge Over Your Shoulder, which set out the procedures necessary for a legal and democratic government or administrative decision to be reached, and how the court would examine them in a review. Proper consultation was often a key factor. I should emphasise that it was reassuring to know that damaging mistakes could be rectified and that the courts could legitimately pay attention to how we did things, although naturally we tried to avoid this happening. However, officials work under pressure much of the time, and so do Ministers. It is to be expected that mistakes are made and that political purposes can override legitimacy. While national policy is about aggregates, justice is for individuals.

Clause 1 immediately raises questions: the incentives for suspended and prospective quashing orders would be a problem for the aggrieved citizen because, as I understand it, the alleged wrong could not be righted while it was actually happening. The range of powers of the court to decide would be more constrained, and it would have to take into account some arguably extra-legal factors like the convenience of administrators. What might have happened if the proposed reforms were in place over the outfall of raw sewage into the rivers? I wonder if our ratification of the Aarhus convention is now in question.

Clause 2 also makes me uneasy. Removing one of the powers to appeal against a tribunal decision carries an obvious risk of injustice. There have been cases of abused tied domestic employees and deportation which succeeded under the current system, which would not have been allowed under the Bill.

I have one last question. When I was a magistrate, it was clear that many defendants were people who could not grasp the legal system we live in. That is not to say that they might not also have intended to do wrong, but among them were people who could not cope with the requirements of an orderly life and who were in several ways vulnerable. What arrangements will the Government make for people who cannot manage or have no access to the digital communication which would be obligatory under the Bill?

The Bill needs very careful scrutiny. Administrative law affects the public in a very direct way. We should be extremely careful about impairing the ability of communities and individuals to call the state to account, whether it is about protecting the environment, asylum, depriving people of benefit, or any condition the state imposes. I do not see the democratic or constitutional argument for fettering judges in the way the Bill proposes. We should allow their discretion to decide proportionate remedies. It is surely the birthright of citizens of a democracy for the rule of law to have enough force to maintain that democracy.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I wonder whether the interesting amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, might not have some unintended consequences that I, personally, would find very welcome. What if the “unlawful activity” included acts contrary to the Human Rights Act and the Equality Act? What if the landlord was trying to turf out Gypsies and Travellers who had no other home to go to? I believe that he will no doubt have an answer to that question.

More generally, on Clause 63—and I agree wholeheartedly with what the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, said—the openness of the terms, so eloquently laid out by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, amount to a tremendous allowance for prejudice. We should be in no doubt that this is very common. The hate crime reporting organisation, GATE Herts, funded by the then MHCLG, has ample evidence of explicitly Nazi sentiments being used whenever a Traveller or Gypsy community wanted to move on to a site. Stereotyping is the norm in these records. We heard examples in your Lordships’ House last week of whole communities being tarred by one incident. It is the same as somebody saying that white people should be barred from walking on the street at night because of a few incidents of night-time vandalism; it is that kind of remark, and it is prejudice. If such a remark urges violent action—the removal of Gypsies and Travellers—surely it is illegal.

Following the Minister’s remarks last Wednesday on police guidance in this kind of situation, she expressed some surprise at the use of the term “gold-plated”. Is “gold-plated” not a dog-whistle call to opponents of human rights? Most of us are proud of the Human Rights Act 1998, and how it reinforced our position as a leader in establishing a human rights culture after the Second World War. Be that as it may, the Human Rights Act, and behind it the European Convention on Human Rights, is our law—either one complies with the law or not. Gold-plating of human rights is not a term understood in law, and its implications, in this context, are to diminish any putative offence against the Human Rights Act. I think that Clause 63 is not helpful and should go.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Clause 63 amends Section 61 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Section 61 addresses the situation that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, alluded to on Wednesday—at Hansard col. 1313—when he told us that, 25 years ago, as a Member of Parliament, he was rung by a very distressed farmer in his constituency, whose land was being trespassed on. I make that 1996, but perhaps it was before the 1994 Act was effective.

As my noble friend Lady Brinton has said, Section 61 of the 1994 Act provides a power to remove trespassers on land. I will quote subsection (1):

“If the senior police officer present at the scene reasonably believes that two or more persons are trespassing on land and are present there with the common purpose of residing there for any period, that reasonable steps have been taken by or on behalf of the occupier to ask them to leave and … that any of those persons has caused damage to the land or to property on the land or used threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour towards the occupier, a member of his family or an employee or agent of his, or …that those persons have between them six or more vehicles on the land, he may direct those persons, or any of them, to leave the land and to remove any vehicles or other property they have with them on the land.”


Subsection (4) states:

“If a person knowing that a direction under subsection (1) … has been given which applies to him … fails to leave the land as soon as reasonably practicable, or … having left again enters the land as a trespasser within the period of three months beginning with the day on which the direction was given, he commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both.”


That is the law now, unamended by this Bill.

As many noble Lords said on Wednesday, what is the problem that Part 4 is trying to solve, when there are clearly adequate powers already in existence? Clause 63 simply brings Section 61 of the 1994 Act into line with the rest of Part 4 of the Bill. For the reasons so thoroughly and persuasively argued on Wednesday, this clause, like the rest of Part 4, should not stand part of the Bill.

Section 68 of the 1994 Act, as amended by the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, is the offence of aggravated trespass, where

“A person commits the offence of aggravated trespass if he trespasses on land and, in relation to any lawful activity which persons are engaging in or are about to engage in on that or adjoining land, does there anything which is intended by him to have the effect … of intimidating those persons or any of them so as to deter them or any of them from engaging in that activity … of obstructing that activity, or … of disrupting that activity.”


I am getting the sense of hunt saboteurs, HS2 protestors or, perhaps, those protesting against genetically modified crops, rather than Gypsy, Roma and Travellers. Section 68 appears to me to refer to deliberate interference with lawful activity by means of trespass, rather than coincidental interference; for example, ploughing a field that travellers are trespassing on. Unlike the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, I am not a lawyer, but perhaps the Minister can clarify the difference between Section 68 and what we have been talking about up until now.

As far as Amendment 150 is concerned, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, explained, it attempts to correct an error in existing legislation. I agree with the noble and learned Lord that the activity being disrupted should be and needs to be unlawful, rather than the trespasser simply asserting that he believes that it should not be happening. I am not sure that the accused should have to prove that they were not trespassing. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has said, that seems to be going perhaps a bit too far. We support the amendment in principle, in as far as the activity on the land that is being disrupted needs to be unlawful, rather than just being asserted as being unlawful.

As we leave this part of the Bill, I want to again acknowledge the long and tireless campaign by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, to defend Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. I fear that, at Report, we may need to adopt a different approach than simply removing all the clauses in Part 4 from the Bill, in the light of what the Minister said on Wednesday, at Hansard col. 1330, when she quoted from the Conservative Party manifesto:

“We will give the police new powers to arrest and seize the property and vehicles of trespassers who set up unauthorised encampments, in order to protect our communities. We will make intentional trespass a criminal offence.”


That is very interesting wording. New powers do not necessarily mean more draconian powers. I respectfully suggest that on Report this House should bring forward new powers that provide the necessary protections for all our communities, including Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. For example—I quote from the manifesto—it could be argued that making

“intentional trespass a criminal offence”

entirely supports Amendment 135 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, providing that, where Travellers have no suitable legal pitch on a relevant caravan site situated in the local authority’s area, the trespass should not be regarded as intentional.

It is absolutely right that we, and many others in this Committee, express our outright opposition to Part 4 as drafted but, when we return to these issues on Report, it will be with more sophisticated amendments to take account of the wording in the Conservative Party manifesto—and the convention of not blocking, at least not entirely, commitments made by the governing party in their manifesto—that protect all communities, including Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities.

Marriage: Humanist Ceremonies

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Thursday 21st January 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

These are complicated issues. As my noble friend quite rightly says, the Home Secretary has initiated a general inquiry into the use of sharia councils. One area of particular concern is the circumstances in which marriages take place and the fact that there are some people in the Muslim community for whom marriage can be used somewhat oppressively. It is certainly important that all the information is available before we come to any conclusions.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

It is not of course, as the noble Baroness would confirm, that we do not allow humanist marriage—a civil marriage can take place followed by a humanist ceremony. The gravamen of the complaint is that they cannot take place simultaneously.

[Baroness Whitaker]

My Lords, speaking as a humanist, may I ask the Government what the majority of respondents to their consultation on this subject of humanist marriage thought about it?

[Lord Faulks]

The vast majority—well over 90%—were in favour of humanist marriage. Humanists represented by far the greater majority of those who responded to the consultation. Pagans and naturists also responded—the latter, for some reason, were particularly keen on outdoor ceremonies, which might be challenging at this time of year.

Human Rights: UK Application

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Wednesday 18th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I will gracefully decline to answer the last part of the noble Lord’s question. As to the first part, the position is that this Government, and indeed this Parliament, were pioneers in passing the same-sex marriage Act. Since then, the Republic of Ireland has followed suit, the American Supreme Court has accepted the argument, and the European Court of Human Rights has also. We can be proud that we have set the way. We also commended it to the Northern Ireland Executive, both before and after the passing of the legislation, but ultimately this is a question of devolution. The Northern Ireland Executive are capable of making that decision themselves. The matter is the subject of two judicial reviews. At the moment, there is no inclination on the part of the Northern Ireland Executive to take matters forward, and I hope that that changes.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the human rights of Gypsies and Travellers are much better protected in Wales than in England because the Government have created an obligation on local authorities to provide sites? Why can we not do the same thing here?

[Lord Faulks]

The noble Baroness has particular expertise and knowledge of this area, and I defer to her knowledge, as it were, on the ground. The application of the law in relation to human rights should of course be common across England and Wales.

Ministerial Code

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I indicated that from time to time the Prime Minister may clarify duties, just as the Civil Service Code does. That is his prerogative. The duty on the part of Ministers is to obey the law.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I am not clear whether I heard an answer to either my noble friend Lord Dubs’s Question or the question from our Front Bench. Why exactly did the Government change the wording?

[Lord Faulks]

I fear that I will be repeating myself but they have changed the wording because it is a simple summary of what is plainly the position, which is that Ministers have an obligation to obey the law. The code does not change the obligation that comes from the law; it is simply a summary for Ministers.

Humanist Marriages

Baroness Whitaker Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, as a Christian who found the changes we made to the meaning of marriage in the previous Parliament somewhat difficult, I completely accept that the law has now been changed. I find it difficult to understand any logical objection to what the noble Baroness is calling for this afternoon. I hope that we can have an early decision on this and hope that my noble friend can reassure me.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Faulks]

I understand what my noble friend says about the approach to marriage which this House approved in the Marriages (Same Sex Couples) Act. It was a significant achievement of the Government. I understand the sense of frustration that he may feel that the Government are not moving swiftly enough. I assure my noble friend that while due speed will be shown in looking at this, because of the wider implications, it is necessary to consider this matter thoroughly.

[Baroness Whitaker]

My Lords, I apologise for my eagerness to ask the Minister my question, which may have seemed discourteous. Does he not recall that there was a substantial measure of support for the legal recognition of humanist marriage and does he not therefore think it would be just to allow it the same grace that is allowed to the Jewish and Quaker communities?

[Lord Faulks]

The exception for the Jewish and Quaker communities is based on the state of affairs in 1753. I agree that there are certain anomalies based on historical facts. There is no feeling on the part of the Government to discriminate against humanist marriages. It is simply a question of looking at the matter overall so that we can make our law consistent.