Crown Estate Bill [HL]

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 14th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Teverson (LD)]

My Lords, I shall be brief. I actually want to say something quite positive about the Government’s approach to this at the moment. I understand the issue completely: offshore wind is a complete waste of time if you cannot connect it to the consumers. That is obvious, and it has not been managed well. I very much welcome the Government’s commitment to achieve that in future, but we had on 1 October the foundation of the National Energy Systems Operator, whose whole role is to make sure that this works. When we passed the Energy Bill that set this up, we did not really give it enough power. It would be very good to hear from the Minister that that will be in progress and will actually happen.

Secondly, there is so much at risk for offshore developers. Yes, they can get their contract, their lease and their contract for difference in terms of the price for the low-carbon company. But at the end of the day, if developers do not believe that there is going to be a grid connection, they will not carry out their investment, so it is absolutely in everybody’s interest that we do this. A really good point has been made to the Minister, and I look forward to his assuring us that NESO— the new organisation from 1 October—will have some clout in government decision-making and will co-ordinate this effectively. It needs to have the power and influence to do so, rather than simply being an advisory organisation whose recommendations are ignored because of other private or public finance investment reasons.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond for introducing his amendment, which leads this group, which is fundamentally concerned with the generation of energy on assets owned by the Crown Estate. This is even more important now that there is a formal relationship with GB Energy, which has been announced, although I accept that details of the relationship are quite thin on the ground. I entirely support the intention of my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond to require the publication of a report on the potential for energy generation on the Crown Estate, and I draw attention to my Amendment 35, which would ensure that no new electricity generation licences are granted without confirmation that a corresponding grid connection exists.

The problem of grid capacity, connection and storage is real and important. In May of this year, a House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee report found that in order to achieve net zero targets,

“the transmission and distribution network must develop and expand alongside the growth in supply and demand”.

It concluded that renewable energy generation may be stunted by “slow grid connections” and “limited grid capacity”. That is the issue I am trying to fix, and that all noble Lords are very much focused on. The Government must continue to look at it urgently if they are to build on the previous Conservative Government’s progress toward our clean energy targets. However, it is not an easy task. Even Green Party parliamentarians have been known to be vociferously opposed to measures to boost national grid capacity. I hear a Liberal Democrat laughing, and I am not entirely sure that that is appropriate. However, in the face of that kind of opposition, I ask the Minister to reassure the House that the Government have a plan to get on with increasing our national grid capacity.

At this point, I think it worth pushing the Minister, although we will come back to this on a later group, on the partnership with Great British Energy, which was announced to great fanfare a few months ago. I am still at a loss to explain how the new partnership between the two organisations, the Crown Estate and Great British Energy, will work and what difference it will make; indeed, this is the point of my amendment.

When the previous Conservative Government announced in the 2023 Autumn Statement plans to work with the Crown Estate to increase offshore wind capacity, that was predicted to unlock a further 20 to 30 gigawatts of new offshore wind seabed rights by 2030—great; that seems very fair. The Government have claimed that this new partnership will

“cut the time it takes to get offshore wind projects operating and delivering power to homes by up to half”.

Okay, but their press release of 25 July 2024 stated:

“The Crown Estate estimates this partnership will lead to up to 20-30GW of new offshore wind developments reaching seabed lease stage by 2030”.


To coin a phrase, nothing has changed. What difference does the partnership with GB Energy actually make, or did the Crown Estate get it wrong when it was working with the previous Government? Noble Lords can see the issue I have here: I do not understand how the tie-up with GB Energy is going to benefit that organisation, the Crown Estate and, indeed, the nation.

That, among other reasons, is why I tabled Amendment 34, which also requires a report on the energy generation supported by the Crown Estate. Its scope is wider than Amendment 16 and it facilitates greater oversight via reporting. It requires the Crown Estate commissioners to report annually on not only the expected impact of the relationship between the Crown Estate and GB Energy, but the actual impact. It would also include the investment strategy for capital investment in the infrastructure, including port infrastructure. This is where I am confused, because when I speak to the port sector, it tells me that finances are not particularly an issue. In a report published last month, the British Ports Association recognised that the sheer scale and speed of the investment needed to meet the ports’ offshore energy ambitions is significant. However, it called for a carefully managed investment in ports that fills gaps in ports’ supply chains that cannot be met by the private sector. These gaps can be filled by, for example, the national wealth fund, the Crown Estate or Great British Energy. Can the Minister explain who is managing, and which organisation will be investing how much in what, and when? I, for one, am confused. It is right to get some insight into this now, and to monitor progress in the future.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

My Lords, I will address the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, and the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, both of which touch on the topic of energy. I will start by addressing Amendment 16, tabled by the noble Lord.

This amendment would require the Crown Estate to publish a report within 12 months on the potential for energy generation on the Crown Estate, covering onshore and offshore wind grid capacity and energy pricing. While the Government are not in principle opposed to the Crown Estate producing specific reports on energy generation on its own estate, it is not within its remit or ability to report on grid capacity or pricing. As I have set out previously, the national grid and relevant transmission and distribution network operators are responsible for the UK-wide strategy on grid connectivity, and the new National Energy Systems Operator will be responsible for creating a strategic spatial energy plan, which will provide future clarity on grid connectivity.

The Crown Estate has already published, in September, a 53-page report entitled Future of Offshore Wind: Considerations for Development and Leasing to 2030 and Beyond, which looks at, among other things, the prime areas of opportunity for new wind farms. It has also recently published a Marine Delivery Routemap, which sets out its vision for the seabed and coastline.

Amendment 34, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, would require the Government to publish a report on the scope, nature and expected impact of the relationship between the Crown Estate and Great British Energy within six months of the passing of the Act, and thereafter publish an annual report. The Government have no principled objection to such a report, but the timing might be more usefully linked to the passing of the Great British Energy Bill, currently in the other place, rather than the Bill we are discussing today.

UK Economy: Capital Gains Tax

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

Wednesday 9th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his expertise on this matter. At the risk of repeating myself, he knows I would not be able to comment on speculation about other specific taxes, but we must rebuild our public finances, including by addressing the £22 billion black hole inherited from the previous Government.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, can the Minister define a “working person”?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

A working person is someone who goes out to work.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th September 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, it falls to me to open proceedings again. This is very much a “what it says on the tin” amendment. If it were phrased as the question “Will the deposit guarantee always be honoured?”, I would expect the answer to be yes.

Last week, we discussed that there may be more than one recapitalisation dip. For a moment, let us imagine a worst-case scenario where there is more than one but things are worse than expected due to market circumstances—maybe contagion or other unforeseen circumstances—and the insolvency route has to be taken. Can we be certain that there would be no change to bank depositors’ entitlement—I do not think that is intended in any way, but I would like to hear the Minister say it—and that the system would have the capacity for whatever is thrown at it, if not cash capacity then some form of underwriting in addition to whatever borrowing is available? Does the overall capacity extend beyond the borrowing that is already set up or is it fundamentally underwritten by the Government? As they will get it back, I do not object to that; I am just inquiring as to what the mechanism is, although maybe one does not want to think about that until we get there, if we do.

Are the state of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme and the affordability of the levy, if there had already been recent large calls, for example, a factor in the analysis of whether to mount a recapitalisation rather than allowing the insolvency? There could be public interest factors that relate not merely to the bank under consideration per se. Does the public interest consideration also extend to the state of the compensation scheme? I beg to move.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to make a few comments about this, many of which have already been made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I am determined to make my comments none the less, so I shall use different words in a different order. The amendment does what it says on the tin—that is absolutely right—and I am confident that the Minister will state that there will be no diminution in the benefit of the deposit guarantee scheme, but is that in and of itself sufficient comfort? The framing of this Bill and the Minister’s exposition of it are shaped by a mindset that there will be a single resolution event; it will be an isolated occurrence; it will clearly be in the public interest, and it will be a single financial institution following specific issues relating only to that bank. That seems to be the vibe that I get when I read the information, particularly that which accompanies the Bill, and I remain concerned that there are insufficient checks and balances in place to enable Treasury input when the measures are used as envisaged, but also where there are multiple failures during a wider systemic event—a reasonable worst-case scenario.

A reasonable worst-case scenario can develop quickly, or it may become apparent only over time. In a slow burn and developing situation, decisions relating to banks facing challenges early on in a prolonged event will be made in a very different context from those whose challenges perhaps developed over a longer period. In essence, decisions will be made, but in very different environments, given what might have happened in the intervening period. It may well be that there is significantly less money left with which to play, so to speak, to ensure financial sustainability.

Whether a reasonable worst-case scenario is a one-off event or a slow burn, FSCS resources are going to come under significant pressure should two or more banks face insolvency or resolution, and choices will surely have to be made. Who makes those choices and based on what guidance? Will the FSCS prioritise DGI entitlements over the resolution of a bank or banks? What would happen in circumstances where the public interest test is at best marginal? There will be many circumstances when it is very clear, black and white, but there will be some when it is not quite so clear. On one hand, one might have a bank which needs to go through the insolvency procedure and therefore one set of obligations fall on the FSCS and, on another, a bank could go through resolution and it is a bit marginal whether the public interest test has been met. How are all those decisions going to be worked through, given the lack of direct oversight from the Treasury?

We have been told that the FSCS will be unfettered when it comes to decisions relating to the allocation of existing resources and borrowing from sources other than the Treasury for DGI or recapitalisation. Therefore, it seems that until the FSCS needs to go cap in hand to the Treasury to get more money over and above what it can already borrow, there is an obligation on the FSCS only to consult the Treasury and others and the decision-making essentially remains beyond the reach of Ministers. I will be interested in the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

Not surprisingly, I too support this amendment. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on her exposition of the genesis of the terms of Section 38 of the 2023 Act. Of course, I am a member of the committee that came as a consequence of that. In her presentation, although not in the amendment—wisely so—she suggested that maybe there would be some hearings and questions, and the possibility that they would be in camera.

I urge the Minister, the Treasury and, indeed, the Bank not to shy away from such suggestions, because it would not be the first time that I have heard mutterings about things being confidential and not wanting to talk about them to parliamentary committees. In Germany, its parliamentary committees can look into the books of the banks and get all kinds of confidential information and—do you know?—it does not leak out. It is quite possible for committees of this House to behave just as well. I put that in as some impetus for how you can get better accountability, oversight and, I suggest, help from the committees, where everybody, ultimately, is pulling in the same direction.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, there is not an awful lot more to say. This is a very elegant amendment from my noble friend Lady Noakes, and it was very elegantly explained. I am the sole member of this Committee today who is not a member of the Financial Services Regulation Committee—no, neither is the Minister—and I am sorry about that. All noble Lords involved in getting the committee set up have an enormous amount of experience in the field of financial services regulation and, looking at the inquiries that it is already doing, I think it will be a very valuable part of our regulatory infrastructure. I look on this amendment with warmth and favourability and I should imagine that the Minister will do so, too.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, focuses on the important theme of how the Bank of England is accountable to Parliament. As I have said in response to other amendments, the Government agree that it is right that the Bank of England is held to account for the actions it takes in resolution. That includes being accountable, as appropriate, to Parliament, so I do look warmly, in the words of my noble friend Lord Eatwell, at the intent of this amendment. I also stress that it is right that the Bank of England can act quickly and decisively when exercising its powers. That is particularly important in a crisis situation.

That said, the Government expect that the Bank of England would engage with Parliament after taking resolution action, including when the mechanism under the Bill is used. Specifically, under the existing provisions of the Banking Act, when the Bank of England exercises its resolution powers it must provide a copy of the relevant legal instrument to the Treasury. The Treasury must then lay that instrument in Parliament and the Bank of England must also publish it. This will continue to apply under the new mechanism and ensure that Parliament is notified when resolution action is undertaken. I shall give one specific example. In the case of SVB, the Bank sent to the Treasury the copy of the legal instrument the same morning as it exercised its power. The Treasury then laid the relevant document in Parliament on the very same day.

I also reiterate points I have made elsewhere about the Government’s commitment to require the Bank of England to produce reports in the event that the mechanism is used. The Government strongly expect such reports to be made public and laid in Parliament unless there are clear public interest grounds for not doing so, such as issues of commercial confidentiality. I hope this provides some comfort to the noble Baroness and, on that basis, I respectfully ask her to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I was not going to speak on this amendment, but I am also slightly in two minds. One hesitation is that it is very hard to know on the day you do the recapitalisation payment what the cost of an insolvency situation would be. However, I understand where the noble Baroness is heading with this, and there is a lot of sense in the sentiment behind it. This gives more ammunition to the question around reporting—we need the Bank of England to give a very clear explanation as to why it has chosen recapitalisation over insolvency. That might be my preferred way of going about it, but I understand absolutely what the noble Baroness said and support the sentiment behind it.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I also support the sentiment in the amendment from my noble friend Lady Noakes. I think all noble Lords here, including the Minister, would agree that this has the right intention but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, mentioned, there will be edge cases which we cannot foresee at this time. The question is: should such a statement of intent be in the special resolution objectives and, if not, where should it go? I do not know—perhaps in a code of practice, or perhaps not. I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, seeks to introduce a new objective into the special resolution regime. The new objective would state that the costs in using the new mechanism should not exceed those that would be incurred in the counterfactual of placing the firm into insolvency. This amendment therefore touches on an important point raised both in consultation and during Second Reading, which is whether there should be a formal test or objective that seeks to prevent the use of the new mechanism, or make its use significantly more challenging, where the cost is higher than insolvency.

I also note that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, raised similar points on the first day of Committee, which he alluded to today, making the case that the Bank of England should be required to present an assessment of costs in reports to the Treasury and to Parliament.

The Government carefully considered the case for inclusion of various forms of such a safeguard, sometimes referred to as a least-cost test, in response to feedback received during the consultation. In considering this matter, it is important to strike the right balance between ensuring that the Bank of England can respond quickly and flexibly to a firm failure and ensuring that costs to industry are properly considered. Having considered this, the Government concluded that the existing public interest test and special resolution regime objectives remained the appropriate framework for deciding whether the mechanism in this Bill could be used.

Adding a specific objective for the Bank of England to ensure that the costs to industry from using the new mechanism do not exceed insolvency could prevent it taking the most appropriate action to advance its broader resolution objectives. Those objectives include protecting financial stability, certain depositors and public funds. It is right that these aims are prioritised at a time of significant risk, which is part of the reason why the Government have not proposed changes to the broader resolution framework.

There is also the potential for such a change to impose important practical challenges. Resolution would likely take place in an uncertain and fast-paced context. Estimating the costs of different approaches during this period will be highly challenging and could change over time. There is therefore a risk that such an objective could create legal uncertainty around any resolution action, which in turn may undermine the usability and effectiveness of the new mechanism in situations where it is justified. This could have significant and undesirable consequences, including crystallising a set of indirect costs for the financial services sector and the wider economy. Further, it should be borne in mind that the alternative if the new mechanism is not available may be to use public funds.

However, I appreciate the intent behind the noble Baroness’s amendment and hope that I can provide some reassurance by reiterating previous points on the subject of the scrutiny and transparency of the Bank of England’s actions. As I have noted, the Bank of England is required under the Banking Act 2009 to report to the Treasury when exercising some of its stabilisation powers and, as was set out in response to the consultation, it is the Government’s clear intention to use these existing reporting mechanisms to ensure that the Bank of England is subject to appropriate scrutiny when using the mechanism provided by the Bill. However, I take the point that the noble Baroness made in response to my earlier point.

The Government have committed to updating the code of practice to provide further details on how these reporting requirements will apply when the mechanism is used. I reaffirm that the Government intend to include confirmation in the code that, after the new mechanism has been used, the Bank of England would be required to disclose the estimated costs to industry of the options considered, including the comparison with insolvency. The Government consider that using the code of practice in this way, rather than putting these requirements in the Bill, is the best approach to hold the Bank of England to account for its actions.

The Bank of England is legally required to have regard to the code and the Government are required to consult the Banking Liaison Panel, made up of regulatory and industry stakeholders, when updating it. Using the code will therefore ensure that a full and thorough consultation is taken on the approach. Given the complex and potentially fast-moving nature of bank failures, this will also ensure that any approach is sufficiently nuanced to account for the range of possible outcomes under insolvency or through the use of other resolution tools.

As I have previously said, the Government will share drafts of the updates to the code of practice as soon as practicable and provide sufficient opportunity for industry stakeholders to be consulted on them. The noble Baroness also made the case that insolvency should be a preferred strategy for small banks and I stress that this is the case. I hope that I have provided some helpful explanation to her of the Government’s position on this matter and respectfully ask that she withdraws her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

I should like to pick up on the request for detail put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I am concerned that the powers that the Bank of England has to act in an emergency, which this would presumably be, should not be constrained to any degree other than that which is absolutely necessary. In other words, we should not load up the code with detail, the reason being that the next crisis will be one that none of us has anticipated. It will be completely different.

If we look at the financial crises that have occurred, the major one in 2007-09 and some minor ones since, they have appeared in completely unexpected directions. The Bank must then have the freedom to adapt its procedures to whatever new challenge arises. I quite understand that we do not want just to say it can do anything it likes, but I feel strongly that we must be very careful about loading the code, and indeed the legislation, with excessive detail.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I added my name to the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes about the code of practice because it is important that we have this debate. I recognise what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, says, but it slightly struck fear into my heart because it is about those circumstances where there is not sufficient guidance or a code of practice. Essentially, this is not necessarily just for the Bank of England; it is for all those stakeholders who will be involved in the other side of a resolution. A lot of people will read the code of practice and internalise it. When it is needed, it will therefore already be in their hearts because they will have read it, so I am not as concerned as the noble Lord is about putting in too much detail. The simple fact is that we have not seen anything, so we do not really know what we are dealing with.

It struck me that in the slight rush to bring forward some legislation to keep Parliament occupied, perhaps, the Government are not providing all the information that the House needs to consider this Bill fully. It is complex, and as noble Lords go through it, it is clear that we are all picking up new nuances that we consider might be of concern in the future. The code of practice makes up an important component of the regime and the Committee is slightly flying blind, having not seen a draft of the changes—not only a draft of what would happen as a result of the Bill, but also potentially to fill gaps that we know are not going to be part of the Bill. We know that the code is potentially the only protection between anybody who uses banks—essentially, the taxpayer—and the Bank being able to perform maximum adaptation to a situation. There has to be something in the middle that stops that happening.

I am warming to my noble friend Lady Noakes’s suggestion that the Bill should not come into force until the code of practice is finalised, but I sense that that might be a little churlish. The amendment itself is a little anodyne. I think all noble Lords agree that the Government will, of course, make changes to the code of practice, but I would appreciate hearing more information from the Minister about what changes are anticipated—specifically, what will be left out—and the timing for any code of practice because while it remains outstanding, even in draft form, there is a significant lack of clarity.

At Second Reading, the Minister stated that the update will happen in due course. How many times have I used that phrase? I know exactly what it means. It means “when we are sort of ready”. We need to be a bit more ambitious than that. Can the Minister give any further guidance on timing? If he cannot, would it be helpful if I tabled an amendment on Report that required the code of practice to be updated within, say, three months and subject to approval by both Houses? I am happy to do that if it is helpful.

As my noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, pointed out, the Minister has referred to these things being addressed in the code of practice. Many of the elements in the reporting are also supposed to be in that code. My concern is that six weeks have now passed since the Minister said “in due course” and the House rises at the end of the week for Conference Recess. I presume that the Treasury is still working, so that would be a further window during which progress on a draft code of practice could be made. Therefore, I very much hope that the Minister can commit to having a draft document available for review before Report stage is scheduled. I look forward to hearing from the Minister.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I should state at the outset that the Government have no objections to the principle under discussion. Indeed, the Government have already stated publicly in our response to the consultation on these proposals that we intend to update the code of practice to reflect the measures in the Bill. I have already committed to share a draft of the proposed updates at the earliest opportunity, and I am happy to reaffirm that commitment today. I am aware that this is not the answer that the Committee is looking for, but I am afraid that I cannot commit to providing that before Report. However, I expect it to be available before the Bill comes into force.

As set out in the Government’s consultation response, the updates to the code will do three things: first, they will ensure that the code appropriately reflects the existence of the new mechanism; secondly, they will set out that the Bank is expected to set out estimates of the costs of the options considered and, as noted elsewhere, this is expected to include the case of insolvency; and thirdly, they will set out the expectation that any use of the mechanism is subject to the ex post scrutiny arrangements that I have described elsewhere.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, perfectly fairly asked for a series of clarifications of what the code will include. She asked about two points specifically. The first was whether the code will confirm the mechanisms intended for small banks and the expenses covered? Yes, it is the intention that it will. She also asked whether the code will cover multiple uses of the mechanism. Yes, the code will cover that. I will answer other specific questions in writing.

In preparing these updates, the Government are mindful to ensure that they are done efficiently and carefully to ensure that they achieve the intended effect within the wider resolution framework, for instance, ensuring that the right set of costs is considered on the appropriate basis.

The Government will ensure sufficient opportunity for industry stakeholders to be consulted on these proposed updates to the code of practice. In particular, the final wording of any proposed updates would be subject to review by a cross-section of representatives from the authorities and the industry on the statutory Banking Liaison Panel, which advises the Treasury on the resolution regime. As noted, the Government will aim to progress these updates and make the proposed changes available for consultation with industry as soon as practicable.

Finally, I note that the Banking Act 2009 already imposes an implicit requirement on HM Treasury to update the code of practice, even without this amendment. Addressing the operation of the new mechanism would therefore already fall within the scope of this requirement.

I know that this explanation may not be sufficient, but I respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I was rather enjoying being characterised as an old-fashioned central banker, until the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, attributed to me to me the idea that selecting from whichever pot would be entirely at will, so to speak. I add my support to what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, just said: in a recapitalisation, shareholders and MREL must clearly be used first, and FSCS money used simply when those pots have been exhausted.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I simply make the same point. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, was absolutely right to summarise the principle which I think all noble Lords on the Committee feel is the purpose of the Bill. There cannot be any circumstances by which there is MREL or whatever it might be left, yet money is going in from FSCS to ensure the resolution of the bank. I cannot see any circumstance in which that would happen—perhaps Treasury officials would be able to think of one—but I think all noble Lords are agreed on the need for some clarity on what would happen.

I appreciated the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I got about 60% of them, so I was really proud of myself; the other 40% went way over my head. I am going to try to understand her points. We are in quite a difficult situation, but the way that she has been so forensic about it has allowed the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, to state what the principle is. It is about combining those two things—the forensic attitude to “This is what the Bill could say if read in a certain way” versus “Just tell us whether the Bill abides by the very simple principle that basically FSCS money should be a last resort, not there for anybody else, but just to prop up a bank to make sure it gets through to the other side of resolution, for the public interest and no more”.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, in response to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I reassure her that the Bill does not seek to introduce measures to bail out shareholders. I note that she raised concerns about this point on the first day in Committee, about which I am about to write to her. I hope my response will provide the clarification she is seeking pending that letter and the worked examples that we have discussed.

The amendment relates to a subsection of the Bill that would amend Section 12AA of the Banking Act 2009. This sets out the definition of the shortfall amount, which is a figure calculated by the Bank of England when using the bail-in resolution tool. The shortfall amount determines how much of a firm’s resources need to be bailed in to restore its capital ratio to the extent necessary to sustain sufficient market confidence and enable it to continue to meet the conditions for authorisation for at least one year and to continue to carry out its authorised activities. The methodology for determining the shortfall amount is not changed by the Bill, and it remains the case that when using the bail-in tool a firm’s own resources and eligible liabilities—its shareholders and creditors—would bear losses.

The relevant provision is not intended as a means of reducing the amount of MREL that should be used when bailing in a firm. Instead, it is intended to ensure that, in the event the mechanism is used alongside the bail-in tool, funds from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme are taken into account and used rather than the Bank of England having to bail in other creditors further up the creditor hierarchy. As an example, without this provision, if a firm had insufficient MREL to meet its shortfall amount without being able to take into account Financial Services Compensation Scheme funds, it may need to bail in creditors, such as uncovered depositors. Retaining this provision therefore ensures that the Bank of England may exercise some discretion in not bailing in other liabilities beyond a firm’s MREL, such as uncovered deposits, where to do so might risk further destabilising the business of the firm, other participants in the banking sector or other sectors, or reducing wider confidence in the financial system. Therefore, the Government consider it important to maintain flexibility to respond to the relevant circumstances.

In this context, I also note that funds provided by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme under the new mechanism can be used to cover the costs of recapitalising the failed firm, the operating costs of a bridge bank, and Bank of England and HM Treasury costs in relation to the resolution.

It is important to note that Sections 6A, 6B and 12AA of the Banking Act 2009 require the Bank of England to ensure that shareholders and creditors bear losses when a banking institution fails. This is an important principle that will continue to apply where the new mechanism is used.

I can reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, that the regime provides an extensive and proportionate set of powers to the Bank of England to impose consequences on the shareholders of a failed firm in resolution. The bail-in tool specifically enables the Bank of England to impose losses on shareholders and to write down certain unsecured creditors. This is an important principle that ensures the firm’s owners and investors must bear losses in the case of failure.

This is of course a highly technical area, and I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns. To that end, I am happy to explore whether there is further material that the Government can make available, such as worked examples, to help illustrate how this approach may work in practice. I hope these points can reassure the noble Baroness and I respectfully ask her to withdraw this amendment.

Budget Responsibility Bill

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

2nd reading & Committee negatived & 3rd reading
Monday 9th September 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate with thoughtful contributions from all sides of your Lordships’ House.

From these Benches, we believe that information about the public finances should be open and transparent so that the public can hold the Government to account over decisions they make when it comes to spending taxpayers’ money. That is why the Conservative Government created the Office for Budget Responsibility in 2010, to ensure value for taxpayers’ money and that the Government of the day were making responsible decisions with the public finances. We therefore welcome the opportunity to ensure that this remains the case, but sadly that opportunity is not before your Lordships’ House this evening.

The Bill is so narrow in scope and effect that it can be assessed only for what it is; a naked opportunity to play political games and engage in a bit of political theatre, using a rushed and ill-thought-through Bill to fill a bit of parliamentary time. Its publication back in July was accompanied by an astonishingly overtly political statement from the Cabinet Office, as was noted by the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria; this statement had to be swiftly withdrawn. This is clear evidence that the Bill is the Government playing political games, as was also noted by my noble friend Lord Frost. To my mind, the Government are not taking the issues of transparency and accountability seriously when it comes to public finances, and this hastily assembled Bill reflects that.

The furore around the statements made on the publication of the Bill was one of the first missteps from this Government, missteps that have continued and intensified. Later this week, the disastrous decision to cut the winter fuel payment will be debated in your Lordships’ House. The Government have decided to buy off the train drivers—with no strings attached—from the pockets of pensioners. The impact of this cut is clearly significant, not only on pensioners themselves but on the public services that support them. But there is no impact assessment accompanying the cut, and certainly no report from the OBR. The timing of the cut could only be described charitably as ill conceived—out of the blue, with no notice, as we head into the winter period. It is all beginning to look a little ragged, and the Government have been in place for only just over two months.

I return to the Bill: what does it actually do? Not much. To summarise, I say that it sets a rather high and woolly trigger threshold for a tax and spending change above which a third-party body, the OBR, would have to write a report. There is no brake, no lock, no stop. It does not stop anybody from doing anything—much as, I hear from many noble Lords, they would like it to do so.

The Minister in his opening remarks rehashed quite a large quantity of doom-and-gloom, “Oh my goodness, we didn’t know what we were getting into” lines about the nation’s finances, echoed by the noble Lords, Lord Hain and Lord Liddle. I struggle to follow the relevance when it comes to this legislation. Many noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Moylan, pointed to the 2022 fiscal event as the single and only driver for this legislation.

The measures in the Bill are described by the Minister and the Treasury as a “fiscal lock”, which sounds very decisive. I have been trying to figure out who or what is being locked, fiscally or otherwise. It is not a lock. It is another example of the Government taking a very well-understood English word and simply redefining it to mean something else for political expedience. As my noble friend Lady Lawlor noted, it is merely fiscal advice—a report. The Bill does not create a lock. It does not empower the OBR to stop, to brake, or to prevent the Government taking fiscally significant action of any kind. I do not think that it was a lamentation by the Exchequer Secretary in the House of Commons, as noted by the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, when he mentioned that it did it not do that; it was simply a statement of fact. This Bill is so riddled with holes and high thresholds that I cannot see it having much effect at all, other than to use up a bit of parliamentary time while other more contentious Bills are being argued about with the unions and other stakeholders behind the scenes.

Yet there was an opportunity to improve this frankly underwhelming Bill. As noted by my noble friend Lord Trenchard, my opposition colleagues in the Commons tabled a helpful amendment which would have improved transparency and accountability. The amendment laid in the Commons would have required the OBR to publish a report not only when there are significant and permanent tax and spending changes but when fiscal rules, including the metrics used, are changed. Fiscal rules are important. They set the boundaries within which the Government have committed to operate tax and spending decisions. Fiscal rules are an important pillar, contributing to economic stability. It must be right that the Government should not be able to change their fiscal rules and the underlying metrics without some analysis and assessment of the impacts to enable scrutiny. As noted by my noble friend Lord Trenchard, changing the metric for the debt rule would allow for billions of pounds of higher borrowing, which would be funded by working people and other taxpayers. If large ad hoc tax and spending changes are to be subject to OBR analysis, surely ad hoc changes to the fiscal rules should also apply. These are, after all, very significant fiscal decisions and, as I said, contribute to economic stability. Sadly, the Government declined to accept the amendment.

This Government are beginning to show signs of fiscal incontinence, and I fear that they will seek to conjure up headroom by tinkering with the fiscal rules. Right on cue, only today the Trades Union Congress voted in favour of reforming the

“unnecessarily restrictive and arbitrary fiscal rules”,

citing a £500 billion public investment deficit. That is a pretty big increase. Is that the sort of quantum that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, has in mind? It is going to need quite a shift in the fiscal rules and quite some jiggery-pokery with tax rates. Rather than playing the hand that the Government have been dealt from the current pack, they may seek to simply swerve the difficult decisions and magic up a bigger pack of cards. Will the Minister confirm that, despite extreme pressure from the TUC, individual unions and the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, the Chancellor will stick to the current fiscal rules and metrics which guided the difficult decisions made by the last Government? Or will she make her difficult decisions substantially easier by changing the debt rule and piling the burden on to working people?

It is worth commenting on how the Bill works in practice, and I will turn to triggering the lock—or, in other words, exceeding the rather high and woolly threshold at which a third-party body must write a report. There are at least two elements to be considered by the OBR when deciding whether to write this report. The first is the size and nature of the tax and spending change. In the text of the draft Charter for Budgetary Responsibility, the Government state that “fiscally significant” is equivalent to 1% of nominal GDP in any single financial year in the forecast period. This is quite a substantial amount: just under £30 billion.

I accept that public sector spending is around £1.2 trillion and, as a percentage of that total, this is actually quite small. But realistically, discretionary spending is far less than that. Therefore, the Bill is setting a threshold which would be a massive change over and above what might be considered basal. It is so high as to be substantially meaningless—which possibly reverts to the rationale for the Bill in the first place being that single event. Furthermore, the impact must be in a single year, not the discounted value of the impact in the years in the forecasted period. Again, a carefully crafted but significant change could fall equally over many years and therefore escape scrutiny.

As importantly, how is the costing of the change decided? Who defines what is and is not a fiscal measure—a measure with a potential impact on the GDP of this country? I agree with the comments made by my noble friend Lady Lawlor, who also questioned the scope of what might be considered significant. Is the Minister able to give your Lordships’ House additional context about how that figure was arrived at and what will be in and out of scope? Might there be a temptation for a Chancellor to make one, two or more announcements totalling just under £30 billion, or 1% of GDP, over several years, and in doing so still substantially change the fiscal picture of our nation?

The second factor is that the change is excluded if it is temporary—if it will unwind within two years and is in response to an emergency. The world of the Treasury is littered with tax and spend decisions which were “temporary” and “emergency” at the time yet still became a permanent part of the fiscal picture. Many noble Lords mentioned income tax, which of course is one of the most famous, but I am sure there are many others—I think fuel duty was also mentioned.

This stipulation that temporary emergency measures be excluded puts the OBR in a difficult position. The OBR must decide what counts as a spending emergency and what does not—the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. The OBR is not part of decision-making within government, and it is reasonable to assume that the OBR will not have all the information available with which to reach a rather rapid judgment about whether something is an emergency.

If the OBR disagrees with Ministers, the process by which it would do so, and the consequences, are unclear. Would the OBR notify the Treasury of its decision, and would the Treasury then delay the announcement, or not? Would the OBR continue its work and produce a report, and over what timeframe? Would the OBR have full access to all the information relating to a temporary emergency measure? What impact would all this have on the markets?

I hope the Minister agrees that, in the haste to get this Bill into the current legislative gap, there are still significant questions to be answered. Has he considered whether the OBR should be under the same obligations when temporary emergency measures are announced but given the latitude to produce the report after the announcement has been made?

I have some questions around OBR decision-making, assuming that the measure is in scope of the arrangements currently in the Bill. How much notice will the OBR get that a fiscally significant announcement is planned? How much time will the OBR have to prepare and present its assessment, and how detailed will that assessment be? Is it the Minister’s expectation that a fiscally significant announcement will be accompanied by an assessment or a statement from the OBR setting out the reasons why one is not appropriate? There is a big grey area there in which I am sure the markets will show great interest. Will the OBR publish a summary of the information that it used to reach its determination one way or the other?

I note that the information in the draft Charter for Budget Responsibility text published on 18 July was quite limited. I would be grateful if the Minister could let your Lordships’ House know whether there will be any further guidance for the OBR around this, because I see pitfalls everywhere—where it may be charged with being too political when politics should not be part of what it does.

I listened with great interest to the wise words of many noble Lords when it came to the OBR’s governance and operations, particularly those of my noble friend Lady Noakes and, of course, my colleague and noble friend Lord Altrincham. The OBR cannot itself be beyond scrutiny, and I hope that the Minister will consider their words, alongside wider input into how we measure and present our public finances from the noble Lords, Lord Eatwell, Lord Davies of Brixton and Lord Sikka and the noble Baronesses, Lady Wheatcroft and Lady Bennett. There is an opportunity to continue to debate how public finances appear in front of the public, and it is incredibly important.

To conclude, the Bill before your Lordships’ House can be described only as a disappointment. It is with sorrow that I reflect on the political theatre accompanying it in political statements from the Cabinet Office and in contributions in the Commons and, to a lesser extent, your Lordships’ House. When he took office, the new Prime Minister seemed to imply that this Government would occupy the highest pedestal and would be above petty and theatrical politics. It is clear now that this is not the case. This Bill will be the first to receive Royal Assent under the new Labour Government; part of me thinks that is oddly appropriate. This Bill cannot be amended in your Lordships’ House, so to the statute book it will go.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th September 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to be back in this Room—sadly, standing on this side. Nevertheless, it is an interesting experience being in opposition and doing my first Committee—a learning experience. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in scrutinising the Bill. I recognise that we are at the beginning of the Session and sometimes it takes a while for things to get into place. There has been quite a lot of work done and I think we have made some very good progress. I, too, did not speak on Second Reading, and I blame that entirely on the Prime Minister, because he extended Parliament and I was already on holiday, so therefore I could not do that. I am very grateful and put on record my thanks to my colleague, my noble friend Lady Penn, who did it in my stead.

The Bill was originally developed by the previous Government and was waiting for parliamentary time, so I think my role today is to test the thinking of the new Government to make sure that they are still on the same page. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for kicking off this debate so eloquently and knowledgeably. I note her concerns about the scope of the Bill. I would love to say that she did not slightly lose me, but she did, so I will come back to that if it seems to be a problem that we need to look at.

I want to go back—to be helpful, possibly to me—to first principles on this. Having listened to the contributions that have gone before me, I think I have got it right that there are three groups of financial institutions. I am going to call them “banks”, because “financial institutions” is long and it takes a while to get my tongue around.

The first group are the MREL—the big eight banks. These are the ones that have been directed by the Bank of England to hold MREL, and they must also submit a resolvability assessment framework, or RAF, to regulators. The RAF is structured so that these firms can think about how their business works and what capabilities they need to achieve the three resolvability outcomes: having adequate financial resources; being able to continue business through resolution restructuring; and effective communication and co-ordination.

I read somewhere that the 2024 assessment of these documents was due to be published in September, and I should like an update as to whether it has been published. Can the Minister comment on the outcomes of this scrutiny: is the system working? I understand that one bank was not quite there yet. Let us see whether we are going to try to exclude the largest banks from the scheme or whether we follow the suggestion of my noble friend Lady Noakes of getting the involvement of the Treasury. We need to test whether those banks which are deemed too big to fail have a coherent and funded plan in place should they get into financial difficulty. If that were the case, there would be some argument for potentially excluding them from the Bill, but there should at least be some safeguards in place.

Then there is the second group. This was raised with me by UK Finance, and this is why my amendment is slightly different to those of other people. There are those banks in the second group that are on the glide path to full MREL status. These institutions will get there, but it would be helpful to get an update from the Minister as to how many institutions make up this second group so that we can consider further whether there is a substantial risk and where that risk might reasonably lie—and so how long they will take to reach their destination.

Finally, there is the third group. These are the important ones. They are the ones that the Bill should be focused on. These are the smaller banks, and they are often innovative, they are often very high growth and sometimes that in itself can lead to challenges. It is these banks that the Bill seeks to target. Indeed, it was my understanding, as it was that of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that they would exclusively benefit from this scheme.

If things start to go awry, due to either a business-specific issue or wider market turmoil, these proposed powers would create this mechanism where the banking sector itself, in its entirety—all three groups—would fund the recapitalisation of the relevant bank or banks, and the taxpayer would be relieved of that burden. So that all makes perfect sense to me.

Then we come to the reasonable worst-case scenario, which I think is what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, was referring to. It is not beyond our imagination that things could get very bad very quickly, with a number of small or even medium-sized banks getting into trouble at the same time. The first group would, I hope, have their MREL in place; they would have their plan, which has been approved by the regulators to make sure that they continue.

I am slightly less clear what would happen to the second group—those on the glide path to MREL—were there to be a market-wide event. These are significant institutions and if they are to be included in this mechanism, we get into issues of how the banking sector then repays that through the levy, which I will come on to. There might well be a situation where one, two or more quite substantial institutions need recapitalisation from the FSCS in the same financial year. Have the Minister’s officials done any sort of assessment of how bad that could possibly get and any thinking about what the plan would be if it were to get that bad? Also, what would the hurdle be for declaring this sort of state of emergency?

While the FSCS might have a looming potential liability from the second group, there is also the third group to be considered. These ones are the potential future lifeblood of our financial sector in the United Kingdom and they would most likely need a relatively small amount of recapitalisation funding to get them through the turmoil. This is why parity is needed around the applicability of the scheme proposed in the Bill, but also the circumstances in which the scheme would reasonably and rationally be used—and, frankly, the circumstances in which it would not be, because it would just not work. In a reasonable worst-case scenario, how is anyone going to decide which ones get saved and which do not? One has to rely upon the amount of funding that could be affordable over several years of a levy applied to the UK banking sector, but that is not going to be enough money. How would that resolve itself and what would that process look like?

As mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, which I picked up in one of the briefings as well, the FSCS will have significant powers to apply the levy, not only in the financial year when the event or events take place but in subsequent financial years. If I am in the UK banking sector and things have gone pretty bad, and I suddenly have this massive weight of a levy going over several years to repay the events of one financial year, that to me is concerning.

It is also concerning because, of course, things are done differently in the EU, so you would get a slight mismatch from a competitiveness perspective. I would be worried about that. Has the Minister done an assessment of the impact of this potential multiyear hit, once we have an idea of the reasonable size and then the potential maximum size? Has he assessed the competitiveness of the UK banking sector, should this multiyear levy suddenly be required? How much could the UK’s system cost our banking sector and over what period of time? Are there circumstances, and in which circumstances, when rationally there is a systemic failure and the only person who could step in would be the taxpayer? I do not want the taxpayer to step in, trust me, but that would prevent permanent damage to one of our most important sectors.

The other key consideration is the impact on the FSCS and its ability to meet its obligations under the deposit guarantee insurance scheme, because if that has all gone to recapitalisation funding, there will be nothing left. I believe we will come on to that later in Committee.

This is a range of thoughtful amendments tabled by noble Lords and I am grateful for them. As many noble Lords pointed out, they very much go along the same sorts of lines. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to them. I will not go into a great amount of detail on them, but I note that my Amendment 8 takes into account those on the glide path, which we need to recognise. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for the fine case she made for Amendment 22; I will move quickly on from that.

That brings me to the remaining amendment in the group: Amendment 18, which is in my name. Here, in essence, I am probing whether the Minister is content with the current imbalance between the banks liable to pay the levy versus the ones that, realistically, will make use of the new powers. Does he feel it is fair that the entire banking sector pays to recapitalise what, I feel, the Committee hopes will be smaller banks only? Does he accept and is he comfortable with the largest banks paying twice, in essence—particularly as they will have to have limited or no input in or influence on many of the events that might cause a resolution event or events? These largest banks will pay twice: once for their MREL and associated requirements, and again in the event of a resolution event or events of which they would not be able to take advantage.

Context is important here. We will come back to costs again but banks already pay a plethora of taxes, levies and charges, both to regulators and directly to Treasury funds. There is the bank levy, the bank corporation tax surcharge, the economic crime levy, the FSCS levy and the FCA/PRA fees. That is a lot—and let us recall that these costs are never borne by the banks themselves; they will always be borne by the businesses and consumers who use them.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for taking part in this debate on the first group of amendments. I note that the scope of the mechanism is a key and central issue, both for noble Lords and for the wider banking sector. I hope to offer some reassurance to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and other noble Lords regarding this concern.

I start by addressing Amendment 1, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which would prevent a recapitalisation payment involving a bank that has issued minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, otherwise known as MREL. I stress that the Government’s strong policy intention is for the mechanism provided by the Bill to be used primarily to support the resolution of small banks. The Government therefore do not generally expect the mechanism set out in this Bill to be used on the type of firms that these amendments would seek to exclude.

The principal issue here is whether that intention should be set out in the Bill. The Government’s considered view is that it is right for the Bill to contain some flexibility for the Bank of England to be able to use the mechanism more broadly in some circumstances. That is because firm failures can be unpredictable and there could be circumstances in which it would be appropriate to use the mechanism on such firms.

For example, this may be relevant in situations where a small bank has grown but is still in the process of reaching its end-state MREL requirements. Firms in this position would have at least some MREL resources to support recapitalisation but the new mechanism could be used to meet any remaining shortfall if judged necessary. Without the proposed mechanism, there would be a potential gap in this scenario, creating risks to public funds and financial stability.

Ultimately, the decision to use the mechanism would rest with the Bank of England, having assessed the resolution conditions. The Bank of England is required by statute to consult the Treasury before any use of resolution tools, providing an effective and legally binding window for the Treasury to raise concerns if it had any.

I also point out that, during the Government’s consultation period, more respondents were in favour of the scope set out in the Bill than opposed. I appreciate noble Lords’ concerns about this issue and am happy to commit to exploring how to provide further reassurance on the Government’s intent via the code of practice.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked whether the Bank of England should reduce MREL requirements in the knowledge that it could instead use FSCS funds. The Bank of England sets MREL requirements independently of government but within a framework set out in legislation. Any changes to firms’ MREL requirements would therefore be a decision for the Bank of England. The Bank of England will consider, in the light of this Bill and wider developments, whether any changes to its approach to MREL would be appropriate.

I turn briefly to Amendment 8, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, which similarly aims to exclude from the new mechanism those firms that are required to hold MREL. I hope that I have already fully responded to her concerns in that regard; the Government are clear that this Bill is primarily intended for small banks, but that it is right to retain flexibility.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

It may be best if I write to noble Lords to clarify this point.

Amendment 11, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, would exclude from the scope of the new mechanism those firms whose MREL requirement exceeds their minimum capital requirement. This would include both firms expected to be transferred to a private sector purchaser and those bailed in when they fail.

I stress to the noble Lord, as I have to others, that the Government’s intention is for the mechanism to be used primarily for small banks. That is ultimately central to the Bill’s purpose, but I emphasise the importance of having flexibility in the legislation for the Bank of England’s ability to respond effectively in a crisis. As I have noted, this may, for example, be relevant if a firm is still in the process of building up its MREL requirements to be able to fully implement a bail-in strategy.

I also note the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which intends to ensure that, if the Bank of England seeks to use the new mechanism on a bank required to hold bail-in liabilities, it must first get the consent of the Treasury.

I am conscious that there are other amendments related to the subject of Treasury approval for the use of the Bank of England’s powers and that we will turn to this matter more substantively later. What I will say now to the noble Baroness is that the Government consider it important for the Bank of England to be able to take decisions in a resolution independently and decisively.

I will mention two important safeguards. First, as required by statute, the Treasury will always be consulted as part of the Bank of England’s formal assessment of the resolution conditions. Secondly, if using the mechanism on larger banks had implications for public funds, such as requiring the use of the National Loans Fund, this would be subject to Treasury consent. But I repeat that the Government’s strong policy intention is ultimately for the mechanism to be used primarily on small banks.

Amendment 18 was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Vere. It seeks to clarify the rationale for the scope of financial institutions liable to pay the levy for the new mechanism delivered by the Bill, given the expectation that the new mechanism would apply primarily to small banks. The Government believe there to be benefits to mirroring the existing process for recouping the costs of paying out depositors in insolvency and maintaining a broad-based levy. In particular, as noted in the Government’s cost-benefit analysis, the exclusion of larger banks would raise concerns about the affordability of the levy for other banks, which would in turn increase risks to public funds and the overall viability of the new mechanism.

In addition, in cases where the new mechanism may be used, the counterfactual would be for the failed bank to enter insolvency. As a result, the sector would already be liable to contribute to the costs of a small bank failure. As set out in the Government’s cost-benefit analysis, while highly case-specific, the upfront costs of an insolvency are generally expected to be greater than those under the new mechanism delivered by the Bill. The Government therefore feel it is right to mirror the arrangements in place for an insolvency and to maintain a broad-based levy.

The noble Baroness asked about the Bank’s resolvability assessment framework. I am told that the latest update was published in August. She asked how many firms were on the glide path. I will write to her with specific details, and if any of her other questions are not answered in my speech today, I will write to her also on those points.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

One concern was raised in the document that has been published, so I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments on that.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I will write to the noble Baroness on that point.

I turn finally to Amendment 22 in this group, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which concerns the use of the bail-in resolution tool. Section 12AA of the Banking Act 2009 sets out the principles by which the Bank of England calculates the shortfall amount when the bail-in tool is used and, as a consequence of that calculation, how much of a failed firm’s resources needs to be bailed in. The addition to Section 12AA in Clause 4, which this amendment seeks to prevent, ensures that any available funds from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme via the new mechanism could be taken into account when calculating the shortfall amount and, as a consequence, how much of a firm’s resources would need to be bailed in when the new mechanism is used alongside the bail-in tool.

This change to Section 12AA is important as there are some circumstances where bail-in may be the preferred tool for the Bank of England to use as a precursor to transfer of the firm to a bridge bank or private sector purchaser, even if the bank is small. This is because the bail-in tool permits the writing down of subordinated debt or other liabilities, to which mandatory reduction under the bridge bank or private sector purchaser tools does not apply. There may be circumstances in which it is appropriate to write down the subordinated debt or other liabilities of a small bank. The intention is therefore for the bail-in tool to be available alongside use of the new mechanism.

In such circumstances, this amendment would preclude the Bank of England, when calculating the shortfall amount, from being able to take into account any funds that were available from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme under the new mechanism. As a consequence, when determining how much of the firm’s subordinated debt and other liabilities should be bailed in, the Bank of England would be obliged not to factor in those external funds and would have to write down more of the firm’s resources than it needed to. In certain circumstances this would be undesirable and could undermine the wider goals of a resolution process. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, suggested worked examples. We will of course take that idea away for further consideration ahead of Report.

I hope that these explanations have been helpful and that I have provided some reassurance on these points. I will of course write where I have indicated that I will do so. In the circumstances, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I briefly add my support to what the noble Baronesses have said. This is drafted extraordinarily widely. The words

“another person has incurred or might incur in connection with the recapitalisation”

could theoretically include the legal costs of the shareholders of the bank that is going bust, for example. We have to find some way of reducing that scope. I had attempted to deal with this in Amendment 12 on reporting, but having heard what the noble Baroness said I do not think that does it. We need to find some way of narrowing it.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for tabling this amendment and I added my name to it. I am also grateful for the comments made by my noble friend Lord Moylan. He is not in his place but he raised this issue during Second Reading and set people thinking about it.

I do not have a huge amount to add. I agree with the comments made by my noble friend Lady Noakes, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, but I would also say that this will have to be a double-edged attack. Not only must we potentially do something on this but the reporting of it will have to be clear and go into great detail.

When it comes to expenses, all noble Lords will be aware that the costs of financial lawyers and other professional financial advisers are not de minimis. The total cost of expenses may well exceed the cost of the recapitalisation of the bank, so it is important that we ensure that there are some guard-rails around this, recognising as ever that these costs will end up falling not on the banks but on the people who bank with the banks.

Does the Minister have any view as to roughly how large an expense bill might be? I do not even want to guess, because I hope that he will be able to give me some idea of what we are looking at.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, mentioned the expenses incurred by another person. I think that all noble Lords who have spoken so far agree that that is extraordinarily broad, and we will need to consider what we might do about that. Potentially, one could put something in the code of practice but, again, is that sufficient? We might also protect ourselves by requiring Treasury consent—who knows? Again, we might want to think about that. Going back to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, it is tempting to think about these things as a single event, and we might be talking about £10 million-worth of expenses, but if a whole bunch of such events happened at the same time, we could very soon be talking about real money. We need to get to the bottom of this. I look forward to the comments from the Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I rise only to celebrate the fact that my noble friend Lady Noakes had so much time during recess in which to draft all these marvellous amendments because they certainly get the little grey cells going. I appreciate her eloquent explanation of her amendment and the very practical example of what could happen that was provided by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. This goes back to a topic that was raised earlier about there being a certain feeling of a blank cheque in terms of certain elements of the scheme and wanting to ensure that there are appropriate guard-rails.

I will not go much further; I will come on to my observations about the sharing of powers and responsibilities between Ministers and regulators in due course. I look forward to hearing from the Minister.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I note that this amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is one of several concerning whether Treasury consent is needed when the Bank of England is exercising its powers—in this case, when the mechanism is used more than once for a particular institution.

Addressing the specific case of the amendment, although I think we can agree that it would usually be desirable to have to use the mechanism only once in respect of a particular institution, this may not always be the case. As an example, if a failed bank is transferred to a bridge bank, there is a risk of further deterioration in its balance sheet over time. It is foreseeable that, if that were the case, the Bank of England may need to use the mechanism again in order to recapitalise the institution; this would allow the Bank of England to maintain confidence in the firm, promoting financial stability.

The Government believe that it is important for the Bank of England to have reasonable flexibility to do so, reflecting that the full implications of a bank failure are hard to anticipate in advance. In addition, if further approvals are required, this may undermine market confidence in the original resolution action given that such approvals cannot be presumed in advance.

However, I note a few important pieces of context to this broader position. First, as required by statute, the Treasury is always consulted as part of the Bank of England’s formal assessment of the resolution conditions assessment. In practice, there is also frequent and ongoing dialogue between the authorities. Therefore, the Government are confident that there are proper and robust channels by which it could raise concerns if it had any.

Secondly, given that the new mechanism is ultimately funded by industry, we would expect the Bank of England to consult the Prudential Regulation Authority on any additional request to use the new mechanism. This is important as the Prudential Regulation Authority determines what is considered affordable to be levied on the sector in any given year.

Finally, if additional use of the mechanism had implications for public funds, such as requiring use of the National Loans Fund, provision of this additional funding would be subject to Treasury consent. Overall, the Government believe that this strikes the right balance in preserving the Bank of England’s freedom of action while ensuring the appropriate level of Treasury input into decision-making.

I hope that this provides some comfort to the noble Baroness and respectfully ask that she withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I rise briefly to build on the comments made by previous speakers. This is an important issue. Again, it is worth recalling that this will not just be the recapitalisation funding; there might also be associated expenses. I note the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, about the Basel accord and it being a subsidiary et cetera, but it strikes me that this is of a different level of political salience than a purely domestic collapse might be, where one has established structures. It could get incredibly uncomfortable for the Government if we do not have a better and fuller understanding of what safeguards exist already to make sure that banks are appropriately capitalised by their parents abroad and of how we avoid the perception of the Bank of England acting in interests which are not necessarily aligned with those of Daily Mail readers—let us put it that way. It is not that they have to align with Daily Mail readers, but one might imagine that this could be very problematic.

I would like some reassurance about what we would do if it were to be a significant amount rather than the very small amount for Silicon Valley Bank and how we would seek to address the concerns that would inevitably arise from the general public.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, in response to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I hope I can provide some clarification on how the resolution regime operates currently with respect to subsidiaries of international banks, and therefore how the Government have approached the design of the new mechanism with respect to those banks.

One of the strengths of the UK’s banking sector is that a number of international banks seek to operate within the UK, including by setting up subsidiaries. These are often providers of critical banking services, such as current accounts, business accounts and sources of working capital to businesses. It is therefore important that a robust system of regulation is in place to ensure that such subsidiaries can operate safely within the UK. This includes ensuring that in the event of their failure they can be managed in an orderly way. The resolution regime does not currently make a distinction between domestic UK banks and subsidiaries of international banks in terms of which authority is responsible for taking resolution action in the UK. In all cases, this responsibility falls to the Bank of England, except where there are implications for public funds. The Government continue to believe this is appropriate.

While the failure of banks is rare, the most recent example, and the genesis of this Bill, was Silicon Valley Bank UK, itself a subsidiary of an international bank. The Government consider that there were two key lessons from that event. First, it is critical that the Bank of England has the flexibility to move decisively during a crisis. Secondly, it is important to introduce the new mechanism delivered by the Bill in those cases where there is not a willing buyer. The Government do not therefore believe that there is a strong justification for treating subsidiaries differently from domestic UK banks and requiring a further set of approvals. To do so would create additional obstacles to efficient resolution decisions, which recent experience suggests can be necessary.

The noble Baroness asked whether the Bank would have used the mechanism on SVB. I cannot comment on an individual case or decision that it may have taken, but the case showed the usefulness of the option of having a mechanism provided to the Bank.

The noble Baroness also asked whether this issue will be covered in the code. The code updates will cover a broad range of issues following the Bill’s passage. We will progress and publish that code swiftly.

The noble Baroness further asked whether a parent company should be able to support the failure of a subsidiary. While the parent company may be able to recapitalise its subsidiary outside of resolution, there may be circumstances where that is not possible, as was the case with SVB UK. It is important that the Bank of England has the necessary tools to deal with a failing firm regardless of its home jurisdiction. In practice, the mechanism uses the Bank of England’s transfer and writedown powers, so the parent company would suffer losses on its investment in a subsidiary.

I therefore respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I rise to move Amendment 6. Noble Lords will be pleased to know that I get a bit of a break after this one.

This amendment would require the Bank of England to obtain Treasury consent before it uses the recapitalisation power. When I introduced my last two amendments, which contained a requirement for Treasury consent, I explained that they were a device to probe issues about the use of the recapitalisation payment power. In this amendment, my use of Treasury consent is not a probing device and I am focusing on the role of the Treasury in the broader context of accountability.

The Minister is a newcomer as far as the passage of financial services legislation in your Lordships’ House is concerned; some of us are older hands at it. When the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 went through this House, accountability was one of the key themes which was debated on and off throughout its passage. This amendment and a later amendment return to that theme of accountability.

The Bank of England has been given huge powers by successive Governments, which we debated at length in passing the 2023 Act, but, like many other bodies which have accumulated in the public sector, it has relatively weak accountability. The governor may need to turn up to the Treasury Select Committee for an uncomfortable couple of hours from time to time, but that is just about it. One great outcome from the 2023 Act has been the creation of the Financial Services Regulation Committee in your Lordships’ House, which is chaired by my noble friend Lord Forsyth of Drumlean and on which several noble Lords on this Committee sit. I hope that our new committee will add significantly to parliamentary scrutiny of financial services quangos, but neither House of Parliament has any real powers in relation to these public sector bodies that have been given very significant powers.

This problem is not confined to the Bank of England or to financial services. The Industry and Regulators Committee of your Lordships’ House produced a report earlier this year, Who Watches the Watchdogs?, which will be debated in this House next week. One of its findings was that regulators, as a particular kind of public sector body

“exercise substantial powers on behalf of Parliament and the public, but are not subject to the same forms of accountability as ministers; to quote one witness, ‘the people can replace their elected representatives, but they can’t vote out bad regulators’”.

That applies, mutatis mutandis, to many other forms of public sector body.

The report noted that there was a

“widespread perception … that regulators’ accountability to Parliament is insufficient”.

It went on to recommend that there should be a new independent statutory body to support Parliament in holding regulators to account. All of this will sound familiar to those of us who took part in debates on the 2023 financial services Bill, because my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley tabled amendments trying to set up something similar for the main public sector bodies in financial services—the PRA, the Bank of England, the FCA and so on. I hardly ever support setting up new public sector bodies, so I did not support my noble friend last year, and I would not support the Industry and Regulators Committee’s recommendation either. It does not form an approach that I think is the right one, but I wholeheartedly agree with the analysis that accountability is a real issue for these public sector bodies.

By enjoining the Treasury in any decisions as to the use of the recapitalisation power, Parliament gains the additional ability to question Treasury Ministers about the use of the power and the circumstances that surround the use of it. At the moment, it is easy for the Treasury Minister to say, “Nothing to do with me; it’s all down to that lot up in Threadneedle Street”. We have had many frustrating exchanges with Treasury Ministers along these lines, including when SVB UK was given away to HSBC. Treasury consent would be an important enhancement of the process of parliamentary accountability.

As I said in the earlier group, I do not believe that getting Treasury consent is necessarily an onerous part of the process, but it would be a small price to pay for an increase in accountability, so I regard this as a modest addition to the framework created by the Bill. Obviously, I have drafted this in connection with a specific power in the Bill, but it is a principle which could be applied to many uses of significant powers by the Bank of England, the PRA and the FCA.

The use of the power by the Bank of England could be entirely straightforward, in which case it is unlikely to engage the interest of Parliament, but there are likely to be some cases where the use of the power is controversial or where there are questions to be asked about whether bank failure is associated with some form of regulatory failure. Parliament should be very much engaged in cases of this nature, and my amendment would provide the platform for such engagement.

I know that the Minister will be briefed by his officials to resist this amendment, and I am sure that it suits the Treasury to be able to operate behind the scenes with the Bank of England but in a largely deniable way. I appeal to the Minister’s instincts, which I am sure are sound, about the need for effective parliamentary accountability. I beg to move.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I am incredibly grateful for all the amendments from my noble friend Lady Noakes, but particularly this one. It gives the Committee the opportunity to consider the overarching balance of power and I think it is right that we start to do so—or continue to do so, as my noble friend pointed out.

I am the poacher turned gamekeeper. I am no longer a Treasury Minister. I have just spent many glorious months at the Treasury and prior to that I spent eight years as a Minister in government. I was in the Department for Transport for a long time and a Lords Whip, which many noble Lords will know puts one in touch with all sorts of government departments and various people giving you briefings and all sorts of things. One learns quite a lot about things and it is all very interesting. I am grateful for the opportunity to touch on the bigger picture, which my noble friend has allowed us to do.

The scrutiny and accountability of regulators is somewhat lacking. It was possibly the biggest surprise that I had as a Minister over the years. Having said that, each regulator is very different, and I have worked with a wide variety of them. Each wears the independence cloak in a different manner: some regulators, despite claiming independence, will actually work very closely with and listen to the Minister; other regulators, when I tried to ask them a question, literally slammed the door. It is really not on. Something needs to change.

It is entirely natural that operational decisions, based on a set of detailed regulations, should sit with regulators. Of course they should; that is unarguable. Ministers do not really have the time or the knowledge. They could do it, because they could have the knowledge as Ministers can be briefed, but they would not have the time to do it and it would gum up the system. That is fine. However, the balance between who takes the operational decisions and the broader operations of regulators is somewhat awry, in my view.

We have handed over a large amount of policy-development, policy-making, regulation-drafting, code of practice-drafting and consultation-issuing activities to regulators, over which Ministers have no insight. I know that officials from the Treasury will recall some issues that happened under the last Government fairly recently, when one of the regulators just took off on a path. I asked, “Why are you going down that path? That’s not a path you should be on. Come back”. They replied, “But we’re independent”.

How are we going to fix this? I have a niggling feeling that the Bill continues a trend to which I see no end. Fairly broad-brush powers are being given to a regulator or regulators that are then subject to interpretation and implementation. Often that interpretation and implementation cause the problems. There is mission creep. The regulators add another team of officials; the Minister never sees these officials and does not know what they do. They interpret the policy slightly differently, because they were not involved in its original development and so on. All this happens with little or no oversight.

I used to sit on the other side and would happily stand up to say—my goodness—the best thing that a Minister can say: “I’m sorry; I cannot comment on that. Regulators are independent”. It is really easy. The second thing I would say, if that did not wash, is that, “Ministers are accountable to Select Committees in Parliament”. Are they really? No, they are not really. I have appeared before Select Committees and it can be a bit uncomfortable for a while. They might ask you a couple of difficult questions, but it is not going to cause you to lose more than a couple of nights’ sleep.

Quite often, by the time you get to a Select Committee appearance by AN Other head of a regulator, it is too little, too late. The policies have already been devised, developed and put in place. The damage has already been done.

Furthermore, there seems to be no mechanism by which recommendations from these accountability sessions in Parliament are mandated for action by the relevant regulator. Many regulators can be told or asked by the Select Committee, “Please can you do X, Y and Z”, but they can basically take no insight from that at all.

I feel this quite personally, having recently lived through it, because throughout my time as a Minister I had the fear that if things go horribly wrong—sadly, sometimes they do—it is not the regulator that feels the heat. It is the Minister. One cannot go to the media and say, “The regulator is independent. I had nothing to do with it”. That does not wash with the public. Now that we have broken the connection between Ministers and regulators, we are in a very difficult situation. The Minister has no power—and that is why the fear exists—to make sure that things cannot go horribly wrong, even if they spot things that need to be improved.

This is but one amendment in a whole series. Yes, it was a useful device for getting amendments down for other elements for debate, but this is serious. My noble friend Lady Noakes is trying to take back control from the regulators and rebalance the system to enable Ministers to input at an appropriate point. She has a point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked why I allowed my amendment to be grouped in this way. I was simply trying to expedite matters for us and I thought we did not need another whole group, which would get the Minister up and down again. I agree with the other amendments and everything that has been said on this group. They deal with issues around conflicts and so on, and transparency is one of the best weapons we have that presumably will be allowed or in scope.

My amendment is one of those that do not read as I originally wrote it, because again we came into scope issues. I could not get the exact amendment that I wanted, so this was the best that I could do. Obviously, it is a companion to the amendments in the first group, which were saying that the majority of us want to limit to a threshold equal to MREL. If you therefore want to resolve banks that are a little bigger, you would have to shift MREL. I am not going to cry over that; I will cheer.

That may be an improper tactic but we do not have any other tactics to try to focus the PRA on the damage being done to the growth of smaller banks by putting MREL where it was not intended to be. We are out of line internationally and we do not really have any good justification for that. If there is a division between those banks that can be resolved and those that cannot, I still think that it goes there and the Bank will therefore have to give its view as to why. Perhaps it wants an extension in some way, so that it can get at bigger banks. What do we get back from that? That is the thought process that lies behind my amendment.

I support all these amendments. If they are knocked into a format that is suitable for Report, they would be very good additions to the Bill.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and to my noble friend Lady Noakes for thinking carefully about reporting and tabling amendments accordingly. I had to support one of these amendments and I am afraid that I picked the noble Lord’s on this occasion. This is not favouritism; I was purely trying to spread the love a little. But as we approach Report, we might want to go back and check that whatever we end up putting into the Bill is future-proofed.

Sometimes one can put in too much detail, then people can slide round the edges by saying, “Oh, you didn’t tell us to do that”. Alternatively, there is being too broad, when people slide round another edge by not putting in the detail that you want to see. There is a balance, but this is certainly worth taking forward and looking at. Obviously, the accountability element is key here.

Another thought I had around this was on timing. Again, sometimes one can go too far and have a report too far in the distance, so by the time it comes out no one remembers what the problem was in the first place. The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, says “three months”; I was thinking “as soon as practical” or, in any event, within six months. I do not know, but in very complicated and complex circumstances there might still be issues and context to resolve to produce a report that is relevant in timing terms, but also incorporates everything that stakeholders wish to see.

When I was a Minister, my heart would sink when an amendment was put down about producing a report. I would think, “Another report—are we really going to read it?” To me, the question is: we might produce a timely report in a good fashion and with the right amount of detail, et cetera, but how do we then ensure the scrutiny of that report? It goes back to the issue of expenses which, as we agreed, could be quite significant. But who is going to look at those expenses and suck their teeth? Will they look at the legal fees of firm XYZ and say, “Do you know what? That’s too much”. Who is going to do that? Is there any body at all—not anybody—which would be able to look at it and do that? It has been suggested to me that the National Audit Office might occasionally pay attention to this sort of thing. This is about trying to get us beyond “Just produce a report”. Well, just produce a report and then somebody can look at it. I am sure that these are going to be great reports, but even so it is a concern.

I am looking forward to the response of the Minister. I believe that this should be our last group today, fingers crossed, but I am not sure that many of us want to go outside, given the weather.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I fully understand the substantial focus on the reporting requirements that will apply when the new mechanism is used. I shall start by addressing Amendment 12 on this point, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.

The Government agree that, should the new mechanism be used, it is right for there to be a reporting mechanism to hold the Bank of England to account for its decisions, and that this should encompass estimates of the costs of different options. However, the Government intend to achieve the principles of scrutiny and transparency in a different way; namely, through the existing requirements placed on the Bank of England under the Banking Act 2009. As set out in their response to the consultation, it is the Government’s intention to use these existing reporting mechanisms to ensure that the Bank of England is subject to appropriate scrutiny when using the mechanism. The Government have committed to updating their code of practice to provide further details on how these reporting requirements will apply when the mechanism is used; I can re-confirm that the Government intend to include in the code confirmation that, after the new mechanism has been used, the Bank of England will be required to disclose the estimated costs that were considered as part of these reports.

The Government consider that using the code of practice is an appropriate approach to hold the Bank of England to account for its actions, rather than putting these requirements in the Bill. The Bank of England is legally required to have regard to the code and the Government are required to consult the Banking Liaison Panel, made up of regulatory and industry stakeholders, when updating it. Using the code will therefore ensure that a full and thorough consultation is taken on the approach. Given the complex and potentially fast-moving nature of bank failures, this is important to ensure that any approach is sufficiently nuanced to account for the range of possible outcomes under insolvency or through the use of other resolution tools. The Government believe that amendments to the code of practice are more likely to be successful in achieving this outcome. As I committed at Second Reading, the Government will share drafts of these updates to the code of practice as soon as is practicable and will provide sufficient opportunity for industry stakeholders to be consulted on them.

I acknowledge the further amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—Amendment 24—which would make such reports available to Parliament when the new mechanism was used to facilitate a transfer to another buyer. It is the Government’s clear intention that any such reports required under the Banking Act, following the use of the mechanism, will be made public and laid before Parliament. The Government would not make reports public only if there were clear public interest grounds not to do so, such as commercial confidentiality reasons. This may particularly be the case when exercising the power to sell a failing bank to a commercial buyer. While such cases would hopefully be limited, it is important that they are allowed for.

I appreciate the intent of Amendment 14 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which would require the Bank of England to report to the Treasury more swiftly than under the current requirements. The use of resolution powers is complex; in some cases, the Bank of England may be executing a resolution over a long period, particularly when placing a firm into a bridge bank. It is therefore sensible for the Bank of England to report a reasonable period of time after exercising its powers, ensuring that its report provides a full and meaningful assessment. On reporting more broadly, I repeat the points made in response to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.

Finally, Amendment 25 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would require the Chancellor to assess in the light of the Bill the appropriateness of the thresholds used by the Bank of England to determine which firms are required to hold additional loss-absorbing resources, known as MREL. As before, I should start by noting that the Government recognise the important role played by smaller and specialist banks in supporting the UK economy. I appreciate the concerns raised by the noble Baroness at Second Reading.

The Government have carefully considered the perspective of such banks in developing the mechanism in the Bill, which is intended to be a proportionate solution. On MREL, the Bank of England is responsible for determining MREL requirements for individual firms within a framework set out in legislation; that is an important principle, as the resolution authority, the Bank of England, is ultimately best placed to judge what resources banks should hold so that they can fail safely. I point out to the noble Baroness that, as set out in the Government’s consultation response, the Bank of England has committed to consider the potential case for changes to its indicative thresholds. Specifically, it has noted that it will consider whether any changes are appropriate in light of this Bill and other wider developments.

I hope that these points provide reassurance to noble Lords. On that basis, I respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Finance (No. 2) Bill

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

2nd reading & Committee negatived & 3rd reading
Friday 24th May 2024 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton]

That the Bill be now read a second time.

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to open this debate on the Finance Bill on the final sitting day of this Parliament. The Bill follows on from the Budget set out by the Chancellor in March and puts in place many of the measures announced at that time. I look forward to the contributions from all noble Lords, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, who has chosen this debate for her maiden speech.

As I explained in the Budget debate, the fundamental economic picture has improved—and that trend has continued since then. As many noble Lords will know, since the beginning of 2023, we have been working on five priorities, three of which are economic: to halve inflation, grow the economy and reduce the national debt. A year on from when we set out those priorities, I am pleased to report that there has been significant progress. Inflation has now fallen to 2.3%, reaching the Prime Minister’s goal of halving inflation, and real wages are rising faster than inflation. This week, the International Monetary Fund upgraded its forecast for UK growth in 2024, and in April it said that the UK is expected to see the fastest cumulative growth of any major European economy over the next six years. Finally, our national debt is on track to fall as a share of the economy.

The work is not yet done, and I recognise that times are still too tough for too many. However, we should also recognise that we are making real progress. We are seeing robust evidence that the economy is improving, which is why we need to stick to our plan, so that we can deliver the long-term change that our country needs to deliver a brighter future. The Finance Bill builds on those improvements through four key pillars: rewarding work, encouraging investment in the economy, boosting home ownership and improving our tax system. The Bill covers 24 different measures; I do not intend to go through each today, but I will outline some of the more substantive elements.

First, the Bill rewards work. A simple truth that the Government adhere to is that work should pay. That approach benefits not only individuals and families but overall growth and the UK economy. A key measure in the Bill is to increase the high-income child benefit charge threshold from £50,000 to £60,000. The rate of the charge will also be halved, meaning that child benefit will not be repaid in full until you earn £80,000. That will take 170,000 families out of paying this tax charge. Overall, we estimate that 485,000 families will gain an average of £1,260 in child benefit in this tax year. The OBR estimates that these policies will result in the economy gaining additional hours worked equivalent to around 10,000 full-time individuals by 2028-29.

Secondly, the Bill will drive investment in the economy. Our creative industries, for example, contributed £126 billion in gross value added in 2022 and supported 2 million jobs. By announcing £1 billion of new reliefs for the UK’s world-leading creative industries in the Spring Budget, we have signalled our commitment to ensuring the sector’s continued growth. We will make current tax reliefs for theatres, orchestras, and museums and galleries permanent, at a rate of 45% for touring theatres and for museum and gallery touring productions, 40% for non-touring productions and 45% for orchestras.

We will also further support the UK’s independent film sector through a new UK independent film tax credit at a rate of 53% for films with a budget of up to £15 million. Our support does not stop there. We are also legislating for an energy profits levy price floor, which will, in effect, repeal the energy profits levy if the six-month average for both oil and gas is at or below a set threshold. Doing so was the sector’s major ask at Spring Budget 2024 and will unlock billions of pounds of investment.

Thirdly, I turn to the property package in the Bill. These measures will not only encourage more transactions in the housing market but boost supply and opportunities for home ownership for first-time buyers, as well as making the property tax system fairer. Cutting the higher rate of capital gains tax on property from 28% to 24% will encourage landlords and second home owners to sell their properties. However, we need to make sure that the tax system is fair, which is why we are abolishing multiple dwellings relief. External evaluations have shown no strong evidence that it was meeting its original objective and there were clear instances of abuse. We are also amending rules so that individuals buying a leasehold residential property through a nominee or bare trustee will be able to claim first-time buyers’ relief on their stamp duty land tax bill. That change will ensure that victims of domestic abuse are not unfairly penalised if they wish to buy their first homes anonymously.

Finally, I turn to the tax system. We want a simple and modern tax system, and we need to close loopholes where they exist. We are amending two primary VAT interest provisions in legislation, to ensure that they apply to all cases intended by the policy. We are also closing a loophole that allows individuals to avoid tax by moving assets abroad via a company.

This Finance Bill boosts our vital industries, rewards hard work, drives forward home ownership and continues to build a fairer, simpler and more modern tax system. It reinforces this Government’s commitment to prioritise economic growth, and, in turn, it will help deliver a brighter future for this country. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I am enormously grateful for the contributions of noble Lords in this relatively short debate, and for the kind words of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Livermore. It has been an extraordinary seven and a half years as a Minister in your Lordships’ House. I have enjoyed almost every minute of it and I hope for many more.

I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika; her maiden speech showed warmth, wisdom and wit. She has yet to discover that it can indeed rain inside your Lordships’ House, despite the best efforts of our maintenance teams. She was introduced just two weeks ago—I know that because I was a supporter at somebody else’s introduction on the same day. This maiden speech is a worthy down payment on many more to come, and I am sure that we will all welcome her insightful and interesting interventions.

I will be relatively brief in my response, because I am well aware that there is much to get through today, but it is worth reflecting on a couple of points that were raised. Many noble Lords talked about the cost of living and living standards. As I said in my opening remarks, we recognise that things are still too tough for too many and we are very focused on improving that. However, again, we must remember that, over this Parliament in particular, the economy has faced an unprecedented series of shocks—shocks the like of which have not been seen for a generation—so it is also worth looking at the longer view. The OBR forecast from March 2024 states that real household disposable income per capita, a measure of living standards adjusted for inflation, is estimated at £1,700 higher in 2023-24 than it was when we came to power in 2009-10. It is the case that income has risen. I accept that the unprecedented challenges that have happened over this Parliament have put a dampener on things, but the forecasts now show that real household disposable income will increase. We also know that real wages are rising faster than inflation.

We remain very sympathetic to all the pressures felt by people, families and communities across the country. That is why all noble Lords will welcome the movement of the energy price cap today. It is worth reflecting on the input that the Government have had over the last few years: £94 billion in help with the cost of living is worth an average £3,300 per household across 2022-23 to 2023-24. That built on the support that the Government put in place, at very short notice, to ensure that millions of people had sufficient money to get them through the pandemic and that hundreds of thousands of companies could come out of the pandemic in a strong fashion.

I have noted before, and will again, that all these interventions were supported by the Front Benches opposite. In many cases, those Benches asked for much more money. Guess what? More money costs. The noble Lord, Lord Livermore, says that taxes should be lower—of course they should be lower; I agree 100% and cannot complain about that. But you can have lower taxes only if you control spending. Demanding much more money will not lead to lower taxes, and I suspect the country will realise that too.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, noted the impact of changing the income tax thresholds. Following the NICs cuts announced in the Autumn Statement and the spring Budget, plus the above-average increases to thresholds since 2010, an average worker on £35,400 will pay over £1,500 less in personal taxes this tax year than they would otherwise have done. A UK employee can earn more money before paying income tax and social security contributions than an employee in any other G7 country. We still have a relatively low-tax system compared to other major economies, but we would like that tax to fall further and we have a plan in place to do that. We have said that we will do it as we can afford to do it. It will have absolutely no impact on pensions. No doubt we will hear that a lot in the general election, but I cannot quite get my head around where that suggestion came from, because it is not the case.

I warmly welcomed the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. My officials and I will take back his comments on the terminology. On what Clause 24 does, I am advised that the Pension Schemes Act 2021 introduced legislation to allow these schemes to operate in the UK, but this clause resolves tax issues related to transferring survivor benefits in these schemes to ensure that these transfers are authorised and do not incur tax charges. I think that is fair. It will ensure that the Royal Mail Group, which was one of the first providers of these schemes, is able to launch its scheme as planned. We are taking more regulation-making powers, because the Government’s policy intention has always been that payments made from a collective money purchase pension scheme and wind-up should be treated as authorised payments, and there were various powers available.

As I said in my opening remarks, this Bill ensures that hard work is rewarded, encourages investment in our economy and improves the outlook for prospective home owners. Its measures will deliver the long-term economic future that I know all noble Lords want for this country and provide stability in uncertain times.

Bill read a second time. Committee negatived. Standing Order 44 having been dispensed with, the Bill was read a third time and passed.

Defence Funding

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

Thursday 16th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie]

To ask His Majesty’s Government whether they intend to replicate the approach of the Green Savings Bonds to provide incremental resource to fund the defence capability by issuing a defence bond.

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, the Prime Minister recently set out our pledge to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2030. That increase starts today, will rise each year and will see defence spending rise to £87 billion a year by 2030-31. This is the biggest strengthening of our defence since the Cold War. The commitment will be fully funded, with no increases in borrowing or debt. Therefore, we have no plans to issue defence bonds.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that response. I of course welcome the Prime Minister’s commitment, which is reassuring and provides a clarity that is much needed. My Question is designed to explore innovative ways of augmenting defence spending and thereby assist the Treasury. The Government vigorously promoted green gilts and green investment bonds to fund green expenditure. If that is an acceptable funding principle for the environment, why is it not for our national security?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

As I have outlined, the Government will use existing resources to fund this increase in defence spending, but my noble friend makes an important point: our superb defence industry needs investment. Although the Government are the main customer of the defence industry, as are exports, these are of course private companies and they do need investment. There are some reports that defence is being excluded on ESG grounds. The Government have confirmed and are absolutely committed to the fact that investment in good, high-quality, well-run defence companies is compatible with ESG considerations.

[Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, with the green savings bonds success in mind, would not it be appropriate, while considering the benefits and viability of a defence bond, to complement its introduction with the issue of a peace bond: a bond that invests in NGOs that promote conflict resolution, peace initiatives, international understanding, political exchange and sensitive and constructive media intervention overseas; a bond that funds a fostering of links and exchange with more problematic parts of the world; a bond that tempers the slide to conflict and war?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, as I have already set out, the Government are not about to start a plethora of different bonds for different measures, but the noble Lord is right that the green bonds have been successful. The funds raised from those bonds have been invested in things such as cycling and walking, electric vehicle home-charging, plug-in grants for cars and vans, and the Nature for Climate Fund.

[Lord Stirrup (CB)]

My Lords, in the Prime Minister’s speech he highlighted perils that some of us have been warning about, to little avail, for more than a decade now. The Government’s response seems to be to increase the defence budget in six years’ time to a level that, allowing for accounting changes, will still be below where it stood in 2010. In light of the Prime Minister’s speech and in line with the Question from the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, is it not high time the Treasury addressed itself to the question of how we can, rather than why we cannot?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble and gallant Lord for his intervention, but the Government have committed to increase NATO-qualifying defence spending to 2.5% of GDP. That will make us the biggest defence power in Europe, and second only to the US in NATO. If all other NATO members were to increase their spending to the same levels, that would mean an additional £140 billion to be spent by allied nations.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, the UK’s green gilts have been justified as necessary to promote London as a global centre for green finance, and they have been successful, but defence bonds would bring no such advantage and surely should be funded from core taxation. What would be the impact of defence gilts on general gilts issuances, on the national debt, on our annual interest payments and on funds for other public services?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

Of course, I do not have the answer to those questions because the Government are not intending to issue defence bonds. However, the noble Baroness mentioned one of the rationales for issuing green gilts—ensuring that the City of London is a global financial centre—and she is absolutely right. Indeed, we are the No. 1 financial centre for green finance.

[Lord Naseby (Con)]

Is my noble friend aware that investment in good defence companies is entirely compatible with ESG? Will she ensure that our fund managers in the City take a copy of what she has stated today?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I am very happy to reiterate what I said about the Government’s commitment to the defence industry, ensuring that it receives the amount of private sector investment it needs. My noble friend may have seen that, to that end, there was a joint government/ Investment Association statement to fund managers that gave exactly the clarity he seeks.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, notwithstanding that the 2.5% by 2030 is welcome in comparison with where we have been, was not my noble and gallant friend right to remind the Minister and the House of that fact—not least in the context of the International Relations and Defence Committee report two years ago, which urged urgency in addressing the multiple threats from dictators in Russia, China, North Korea and Iran? Is not the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, who has huge experience in this area, right to look at innovative and different ways of adding to what we can do in a more urgent manner? To that end, will the Minister consider a private round table discussion here in the House to explore that idea further, so that some of the figures that have just been mentioned might be laid before us?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

The noble Lord seems to imply that this is a timing issue. The Government have heard all the messages coming from various quarters about the urgency and the threats we face. We do understand them, but the funds we are now going to put into the system are timed such that they can be most effective. For example, we will be spending on firing up the UK industrial base, but that cannot happen overnight. Our defence companies need multiyear certainty, which, of course, we get from the £10 billion commitment to a new munitions strategy, for example. Again, that does not happen overnight. We are content that the timing is right. As I say, we do not intend to issue defence bonds.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, now that I have heard about the Minister’s initiative, I am less personally concerned about the scale and esoteric source of the defence uplift. Like many, my prime emotion is relief, not jubilation. My concern is that the uplift is well spent. On behalf of government, can the Minister reassure the House that the priorities for the uplift will be keeping Ukraine in the fight this year and then re-establishing the credibility of conventional deterrence in Europe?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I can absolutely give that reassurance. In addition to firing up the UK industrial base and the £10 billion on the new munitions strategy, the third key area that the additional funds will be spent on is guaranteeing for as long as it takes support for Ukraine. Obviously, that will build on the billions of pounds in military support we have already committed to Ukraine, as well as the extra £0.5 billion announced by the Prime Minister alongside the funding uplift.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, the Labour Party is fully committed to increasing defence spending to 2.5% of GDP, a level that was last met 14 years ago, when Labour was in office, so we welcome the Government’s recent commitment to this target. In her first Answer, the Minister stated that the commitment was fully funded. However, it was not included in the March Budget, and it is not clear how they intend to fund it within their fiscal rules. In the event that there is another fiscal review this autumn, can she guarantee that it will be included and submitted to the OBR to ensure that it is openly costed and independently validated?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

The Government have published figures in accordance with the OBR forecasting period, which sets out exactly how this uplift will be met. The OBR forecast goes out to 2028-29, and obviously the uplift goes out further than that. For example, in 2028-29 there will be an extra £4.5 billion, which will be met through an increase of £1.6 billion in R&D spending and £2.9 billion from reducing headcount in the Civil Service to the pre-pandemic levels of 2019.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

Can the Minister reassure us that it is the Treasury’s view that an increase in defence expenditure to 2.5% of GDP is compatible with the promise of further tax cuts, without further cuts in other public spending areas?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I can assure the noble Lord that this has no impact on our ambition to further cut taxes in future. We want to end the unfairness of double taxation of work—we have cut employees’ national insurance contributions by a third—so we do not see that this is incompatible.

Building Societies Act 1986 (Amendment) Bill

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 10th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, on introducing this important Bill to your Lordships’ House. It will help to support the future growth and success of the mutual sector. The Bill has been warmly welcomed by the building societies sector and has cross-party support. It was a veritable highlight in the day of my noble friend Lord Naseby, and he is of course right.

My remarks will be relatively brief, covering two main elements. First, I will look at the detail of the Bill, although many noble Lords have already set it out very clearly. Secondly, I will set out further insight on the Government’s support for the mutual sector. It has been a widespread message from across all Benches in your Lordships’ House today that the mutual sector plays an important role in the UK economy.

Building societies are one of the best-known types of mutual organisations. There are 42 building societies providing mortgage and savings products to around 26 million members. When considering the future of these important institutions, it is right that we reflect on their uniquely British origins.

As the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, noted, the global building society movement began nearly 250 years ago, in Birmingham, when Richard Ketley established Ketley’s Building Society. It had a very clear purpose: to combine resources from its members, and build a shared fund from those resources that members could draw from to purchase land and construct a home. Like all effective movements, it was much greater than the sum of its parts. As a result of its success, throughout the 19th and 20th centuries more building societies formed across the nations and regions of the United Kingdom. Today, the 42 UK building societies hold total assets of over £500 billion.

The mutual ownership model improves the financial resilience and inclusion of individuals by rooting these businesses in their local communities. The Bill will help to support the prosperity of the building society sector so that it can continue to anchor those roots and to grow.

On the substance of the Bill, the Government support the vision set out by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. We agree that the Bill will enable building societies to compete more effectively with retail banks and to better support their members. There are three key measures. First, the Bill will exclude three key sources of funding from counting towards the building society wholesale funding limits; I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for providing a little more insight into what exactly the funds are. Under the Building Societies Act 1986, building societies are required to obtain at least 50% of their funding from individual retail deposits, and that will continue. All that is happening is that some of the funds will be excluded from the calculation, meaning that the ownership model will not be diluted. This will enable building societies to raise additional wholesale funds.

The second element, as highlighted particularly well by the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, is that building societies will be able to continue to develop their use of technology. The second part speaks to enabling real-time virtual participation at building societies’ meetings. It will make meetings more accessible to members and might therefore encourage greater support and participation from the membership. It also brings building societies more in line with retail banks.

Thirdly, the Bill will provide building societies with greater flexibilities regarding their funding and corporate governance requirements in relation to common seals and the execution of documents, aligning them with changes made to company law. It will support them in their work serving their members, as well as providing diversity to the UK’s financial services industry.

It is important to note that the changes are supported by industry. As my noble friend Lord Naseby stated, it has been quite a long journey, though not too long as the consultation for the changes occurred from December 2021 to February 2022. There were five responses, with most building societies responding through a single response from the Building Societies Association. All responses welcomed the amendments that will be delivered through the Bill. There are other amendments that were consulted on and are not included in the Bill; the Government are currently progressing these through secondary legislation.

My noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond asked when the secondary legislation set out in the Bill will be brought before Parliament. I am afraid I can go no further than to say that it will be following the Bill’s Royal Assent and when parliamentary time allows.

To reassure my noble friend Lord Holmes, I will now say a few words on the wider mutuals sector and confirm that the Government are absolutely behind the mutuals sector. There are 9,000 mutuals operating across many sectors in the UK. They are rooted in their local communities and they want to serve their members and work towards a better society. However, despite their social mission, mutuals are not charities. They are thriving businesses with a combined revenue of £88 billion in 2022, employing over 433,000 people. So it is indeed not a minority matter, as my noble friend Lord Holmes noted.

It is due to their economic and social significance that the Government have been and continue to be fully committed to providing an array of support for the whole of the mutuals sector. For example, we are funding the Law Commission to conduct reviews of the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014 and the Friendly Societies Act 1992. These pieces of legislation underpin the co-operative movement and friendly societies sector respectively in the UK. These reviews will set us up for the most comprehensive modernisation of the sector for a generation.

Last year, the Government supported the Co-Operatives, Mutuals and Friendly Societies Act, which achieved Royal Assent in June 2023. This enables the Treasury to provide co-operatives, mutual insurers and friendly societies with greater flexibility in deciding what to do with their surplus capital. The Government will consider the regulatory options to enact this legislation. However, in the first instance we are directing resources to the Law Commission review, to examine existing legislation. Finally, through changes that the Government have made via the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, credit unions in Great Britain can now offer a greater range of products and services. This includes hire purchase agreements, conditional sale agreements and insurance distribution services.

My noble friend Lord Holmes asked whether the Post Office might be mutualised. I am aware that the trade body Co-operatives UK recently met with postmasters, postmistresses and the Department for Business and Trade to discuss what potential there is for mutualisation of the Post Office. So I welcome the views of my noble friend Lord Holmes and note that discussions are taking place. One does not know where they will end, but it is certainly an option that is on the table. The Government continue to seek opportunities to support the mutuals sector and those who might wish to join the mutuals sector in this country.

In conclusion, I have today outlined both the Government’s support for the mutuals sector and how this Bill will support the future success of UK building societies. I note again the support for the Bill from across your Lordships’ House and reiterate the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that any amendments to the Bill would probably cause the Bill to fail, which is not in the interests of the sector and not I think the will of your Lordships’ House. This is a worthwhile and necessary Bill. It updates the law in relation to building societies’ funding and corporate governance. Again, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for introducing this Bill to your Lordships’ House and hope that Members across the House will recognise its merits.

Bank of England (Economic Affairs Committee Report)

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

Thursday 2nd May 2024 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, what an outstanding debate. I particularly thank my noble friend Lord Bridges for so skilfully opening it, and the Economic Affairs Committee. So many of its members have spoken today, and I thank them for their contributions, for the thoughtful and detailed way in which they carried out the inquiry and the report on the Bank of England, and for the breadth of witnesses they chose to interview. I am delighted that my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea chose a Treasury debate in which to make his maiden speech—of course, I am not surprised. He will make a great contribution to your Lordships’ House for many years to come, and we look forward to it.

Price stability is essential for a strong economy and, consequently, strong public finances. It is widely recognised that an operationally independent central bank is the best way to achieve price stability. That is why the UK enshrines the Bank of England’s operational independence in law, with price stability as the primary objective of the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee. The Treasury and the Government remain committed to not only independence but the objective of price stability, and I am delighted that I therefore agree wholeheartedly with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Livermore—not a frequent occurrence in my life—with both Front Benches also wishing to retain the independence of the Bank of England.

My right honourable friend the Chancellor wrote to the chair of the EAC in January this year. It is worth briefly summarising some of the commitments that he made in his letter. At the outset he noted the operationally independent monetary policy, which is so important within the broader macroeconomic framework, and indeed the importance of the separation of fiscal and monetary policy in the effective delivery of monetary policy. The Chancellor noted the negative impacts of inflation on so many elements of society and our economy when it is greater or lower than 2%, and he again resolved not to change the definition of price stability. This aligns with the view of the EAC, but it should also be noted that the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank have the same inflation targets. The Chancellor also noted the Government’s previous review of the monetary policy framework in 2013, which drew the same conclusions.

The Chancellor went on to note the Government’s commitment to ensuring that fiscal and monetary policy remain aligned to support the Bank’s efforts to return inflation sustainably to 2%. This is in agreement with the conclusions of the committee. This has meant reducing the level of government borrowing in a way that gradually withdraws support from the economy, as demonstrated by the declining path for the cyclically adjusted primary deficit.

On the relationship between the Bank and the Debt Management Office—the DMO, which many noble Lords have mentioned today—the Chancellor noted that monetary policy and debt management are distinct areas with separate mandates and decision-making processes. Given the institutional separation of monetary and debt management policy, in addition to existing public documents clarifying the relevant governance structure, the Government do not consider that an additional memorandum of understanding between the two organisations is necessary to clarify their relationship further.

On the committee’s call—and indeed that of many noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, and the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos—for the Government to publish the deed of indemnity, the Chancellor reiterated in his response that the Government would not. The deed contains operationally sensitive information relating to government cash management practices. It is not government practice to release information of this kind, and nor is it in the public interest. However, crucially, the Government are confident that this does not undermine the transparency of these arrangements, given the publication of other relevant reports and accounts, in addition to public comment and costings from the Office for Budget Responsibility, or OBR, on this topic.

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

Can my noble friend explain why, then, the Governor of the Bank of England told our committee that the publication of the deed of indemnity would not excite people?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I cannot comment on what the Governor of the Bank of England thinks other people will think about a document that has not been published. If I can get any more information, or encourage the Bank of England to provide more clarity on that, I will—but it remains the position of the Government, and indeed the Chancellor in his response to the committee, that the document will not be published.

I turn to the remits of the Monetary and Financial Policy Committees, which also attracted an enormous amount of attention during the debate. I will come on to them further after this opening section on the Chancellor’s views in response to the committee. The secondary objectives are clearly framed as being subject to the delivery of their primary objectives of price and financial stability. However, the Government have taken steps to simplify and clarify the FPC’s remit to make sure that its role in supporting the Government’s economic policy is absolutely clear.

I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, said about his party wanting to expand the remit letters once again. I believe that would be unhelpful. I will go on to state exactly why climate remains within the remit letters and the rationale for that. I believe that greater clarity is essential and is something that the Government will continue to focus on in future remit letters.

The report recommends that the Bank’s management structure be streamlined; however, the Chancellor affirmed that the current structure is appropriate. Finally, on the committee report’s recommendation that the Treasury and the Bank commission an independent review of appointments to the Bank, the Chancellor noted that the Government have no plans to commission such a review. However, he did highlight the Treasury’s interventions in relation to ensuring diversity, in its broadest sense, in public appointments.

As part of our support for the principle of the Bank’s independence, the Government do not comment on the conduct or effectiveness of monetary policy, but I reassure all noble Lords that I welcome the many insights I have heard today with regard to monetary policy and the Bank’s performance relating to it. I am sure that those who are responsible for monetary policy and the operation of the Bank of England will reflect on them, too—but I will go no further in my response.

It is the case that we have been living through a period of high inflation. It is too high. In the 20 years prior to independence, inflation averaged over 6%: in the 20 years subsequent to independence, inflation averaged closer to 2% and certainly volatility also declined. But, since May 2021, we have seen a period of particularly high inflation and I am very pleased that, due to the actions of the Bank of England, supported by the Government, it was at 3.2% in March.

I will now elaborate on a few key areas that I believe almost all contributors to the debate focused on: the MPC/FPC remit letters; appointments to the Bank of England; the accountability of the Bank of England; and forecasting. On other matters, I will probably write, because time is always the enemy of the Minister at the Dispatch Box.

Returning to the issue of the FPC and MPC remit letters, which was mentioned at the outset by my noble friend Lord Bridges, but also by my noble friend Lord Moynihan, both the MPC and FPC have complex roles—that is clear—and it is right that their remits reflect this complexity. But that does not necessarily mean that the remits therefore have to be complex in themselves. It is important that the committees’ secondary objectives, on supporting this Government’s economic strategy, are clearly defined, so that they are achievable. Clearly defining secondary objectives does not detract from the hierarchy of objectives for either committee, where the secondary objectives are framed as being subject to the primary objectives of price or financial stability. Moreover, the remit letters provide guidance on how the committees should consider instances where there are trade-offs between their objectives and how their assessment of any trade-offs should be publicly communicated so that they can be scrutinised.

The changes introduced in the 2023 FPC remit letter have improved its clarity and focus, with clearer relevance to the FPC’s specific responsibilities and toolkit. It is more streamlined. I accept that it is not as streamlined as many noble Lords would like, but it is 20% shorter compared with that in 2022. There is, of course, a balance to be struck. For example, it is important that home ownership is listed as a priority, so that the FPC is mindful of wider public policy aims when it is considering policy relating to the mortgage market. A further example is climate change, mentioned of course by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, but also by many other noble Lords. It is widely accepted that climate change poses systemic risks to the financial system. As such, the remit continues to emphasise the relevance of climate change to the primary financial stability objective. Delivering net zero is also referenced as a key component of the Government’s economic policy, which the committee has a secondary objective to support.

It is also important to consider the changes to the remit letter in the context of the Government’s wider work to ensure that the regulators are considering the impacts of climate change. For example, through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, both the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority are required to have regard to the need to contribute, where relevant, to the Government’s progress towards complying with the Climate Change Act 2008 and the Environment Act 2021.

The climate and environmental components of this apply from August 2023 and January 2025 respectively. So it is not the case that, somehow, climate has been downgraded. The wording has changed but the legal obligation to get to our net-zero targets remains, and we must ensure that the financial system gets there—and that includes the Bank of England. However, the primary objectives of the two committees are very well set out in the remit letter.

In the MPC remit letter, the primary objective, set out in law, is maintaining price stability, defined as a 2% inflation target. The MPC’s remit includes the goal of increasing long-term energy security and delivering net zero. If that is not clear, I am not sure what would be. Specifying the Government’s economic strategy gives the Bank’s policy committees important information on the broader economic policy landscape, given their role in the UK’s macroeconomic framework.

Turning to appointments to the Bank of England and then to accountability, the Government recognise that, to be effective, public bodies need to have the broadest possible mix of skills, experience and backgrounds: diversity in its broadest sense. All appointments are made on merit and follow a fair and open competition process.

The Treasury has taken steps to ensure that a diverse range of candidates are considered for appointments to the Bank of England. To do this, the Treasury promotes vacancies to a wide group of people and, to improve the reach of an advert or opportunity, sometimes uses recruitment consultants.

The Government believe that there is a diversity of thought on the MPC and FPC, although the skill of hindsight remains elusive. The Governor of the Bank of England recently said that, in the last two years, about 25% of the MPC’s meetings have had a split vote among the executive members. I suggest that this demonstrates the intellectual and analytical diversity requested by my noble friends Lord Frost and of course Lord Effingham. The Governor noted that there is a larger proportion of external members of the Bank of England than in other central banks around the world. While the FPC makes decisions by consensus, the diversity of views expressed in the committee’s meetings is captured in published records.

As I have noted, the Bank of England has a unique arrangement compared with other central banks, as it has internal members and a greater proportion of external members on its policy committees. The external members are appointed by the Chancellor, and internal members who are on the Court of the Bank of England are Crown appointments.

Focusing on the MPC, each member has expertise in the field of economics and monetary policy. Members are independent and do not represent particular groups or interests. The MPC’s decisions are made on the basis of one person, one vote, and each member of the committee votes in a way that he or she believes is consistent with the MPC’s remit. A non-voting representative from the Treasury also attends the committee’s policy meetings.

The Chancellor is assisted in his decision-making on appointments by advisory assessment panels, which include internal members from the Treasury and the Bank, but also an independent external panel member. It is for the Chancellor to choose the person they wish to appoint and make a recommendation to the Prime Minister. The Treasury is committed to enabling proper parliamentary scrutiny of the appointments that it makes to public bodies, which is a valuable and important part of the process. The Treasury Select Committee conducts pre-commencement hearings before a successful candidate is appointed to the Bank to start their role.

All noble Lords—far too many to namecheck—have spoken about the accountability of the Bank of England. It is worth discussing this in further detail now, and I am sure there will be opportunities to do so again in the future. I am particularly grateful for the forensic opening remarks of my noble friend Lord Bridges, and of course for the reflections of the noble Lord, Lord Gadhia, who sits on the Court although speaks today in a personal capacity.

The Bank is held to account both by Parliament and by the Treasury. A key role of the Treasury and elected Treasury Ministers is to legislate for and maintain the overall regulatory architecture in a way that allows the Bank to meet its objectives. There are many ways in which Parliament, stakeholders and the public can scrutinise the performance of the Bank of England. Key publications include the Bank’s Financial Stability Reports, which are published biannually, and the Monetary Policy Reports, which are published quarterly. Indeed, a Monetary Policy Report is due to be published this time next week. Executive and external members of both the MPC and FPC typically appear before the Treasury Select Committee following the publication of those reports. The governor also appears in front of the EAC, as he did in February this year.

The Government implemented reforms through the Bank of England and Financial Services Act 2016 to increase the accountability of the Bank and to improve the scrutiny of the Bank in terms of financial stability. Those reforms were made once the expansions in the Bank’s remit had time to bed in properly after the financial crisis. Measures introduced in the 2016 Act included making the FPC a full policy committee of the Bank and creating a clear accountability line to the Bank’s Court of Directors. It also implemented the recommendations of the Warsh review, published in 2014, including to increase the transparency of the MPC’s decision-making by publishing a detailed policy statement as soon as practicable after each policy meeting.

The Bank’s remit letters were commented on frequently in today’s debate. They are published online and laid before Parliament, typically as part of a fiscal event. After a fiscal event, parliamentarians have the opportunity to debate it—it happens in your Lordships’ House and in the House of Commons. Parliamentarians can and do raise concerns about the remit letters during those debates. The issues are then considered as part of the process to update the remit letter the following year. Parliamentary committees offer further scrutiny of the remits by calling bank executives, committee members and government Ministers to appear before them—the EAC’s inquiry is an excellent example of parliamentary scrutiny in action. Given the frequency with which the remits are updated and that there is the opportunity to provide input, the Government do not intend to publish draft letters. However, on many of the report’s other recommendations on accountability, it is for Parliament to decide whether to conduct a review of the remit, and indeed the operations of the Bank outside of existing processes, or to create a standing committee.

The Treasury meets with the Bank of England regularly to discuss its assessment of the economy and financial services. That includes regular meetings between the Chancellor and the Governor of the Bank of England. The Chancellor and governor are also legally required to discuss the FPC’s Financial Stability Report.

Finally on accountability, the Court of Directors is a key element for keeping the Bank’s performance under review and for looking at the way that the Bank exercises its statutory functions.

I note that many noble Lords have made requests for the Government to intervene in the operation of the Bank, particularly on the allocation of resources. Obviously, the Government will not do that to an independent Bank of England, but I am confident that the suggestions and points raised in today’s debate may well be heard by those who are responsible.

I have been given a one-minute warning, so I will try to speak on forecasting and Bernanke within the time limit, because many noble Lords raised this incredibly important issue. All of us who have ever worked in finance—including me—know that forecasting is sometimes a mug’s game, but sometimes it can be incredibly helpful. The review led by Dr Ben Bernanke is incredibly helpful to highlight the areas in which the Bank needs to improve. I think that the Bank is welcoming it, and I note that I will do a full report on its response to the Bernanke review by the end of the year.

As ever, I will write on many of the remaining points that I have not been able to cover. I am again enormously grateful to my noble friend Lord Bridges and his committee for all their contributions, not only to the report but to today’s debate. The Government will continue to support the independence of the Bank of England and will ensure that its remit and the framework in which it operates, including through fiscal policy, create an environment in which it can carry out its duties efficiently.

Road Pricing

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

Monday 29th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Cookham]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what consideration they have given to replacing excise duty on fuel with road pricing.

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government have no plans to consider road pricing. As set out in the letter to the Transport Select Committee in January 2023, the Government are focusing on delivering their core priorities.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, road pricing clearly touches a raw nerve in the body politic. The OBR has recently said of the Government’s policy on electric vehicles that it is

“rapidly eroding the £39 billion”

a year

“revenues from petrol and diesel”

taxes. That will leave a large hole in the Budget. The Transport Select Committee in the other place, with a government majority, said that work on road pricing should start straightaway. When I was Transport Secretary 30 years ago, I floated the idea, which is now much more feasible because of technological progress. If taxes made through the fuel duty are not replaced with something else, public transport will become much more expensive, undermining a sustainable transport policy. Should the Treasury be quite so hostile?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

The Treasury sees that there are many options going forward for the fuel duty and many broader motoring taxes—and indeed for all taxes. As we transition to net zero, the Government will need to ensure that the tax system encourages more EV uptake and that revenue from motoring taxes keeps pace while remaining affordable.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

Does the Minister agree that the introduction of road pricing with modern technology would mean that vehicles could be priced on the basis of their consumption of fuels and that differentiation could be made between goods vehicles and passenger vehicles, so that it would be a much fairer system? Does she also agree that road pricing would enable the police very much more easily to detect vehicle crime, particularly on motorways, which has raised car insurance premiums so much recently?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I recognise what the noble Lord says. Many think tanks and other groups have done a lot of work on road pricing. Jurisdictions around the world are looking at it; however, as yet, very few have managed to introduce it successfully. From the Treasury’s perspective, we welcome work from external stakeholders on road pricing and all other taxes.

[Lord Oates (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister has done good job of telling us what the Government are against but a less good job of telling us what they are in favour of. In light of the reduction in fuel duty revenues that will arise from the UK’s ambitions to shift to electric vehicles, can she tell us what concrete plans the Treasury has to replace those losses in a way that is positive for the environment and fair to rural communities?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

At the moment, fuel duty raises around £25 billion annually. That is forecast to increase in nominal terms to £30.5 billion over the scorecard period to 2029. The change in fuel duty is a medium-term to long-term problem which will allow everybody who has an interest in this to have their say—including taking into account the shift to electric vehicles—and an appropriate solution will be found.

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, many of our motorists feel badly done by, with the extra cost of motoring all the time and the extra cost of insurance for motorists. If the Government have any idea of road pricing, would it not be fairer to look at all those who use our roads apart from those who merely pay the vehicle excise duty?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My noble friend raises an important point about the cost of motoring. That really is top of mind for the Government. It is why we have frozen fuel duty since 2011 and had a 5p cut on fuel duty since March 2022. We recognise that for many people—particularly those in rural communities—using their car is essential, and it can be quite costly.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, will the Minister assure the House that, were the Government ever minded to introduce road pricing, rural communities and those who drive on rural roads—particularly in North Yorkshire, where we have the longest transit routes for people on their way to work or pleasure—would be protected?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

As I said at the outset, the Government have no plans to consider road pricing. Therefore, I cannot give my noble friend that assurance, because it would be purely hypothetical.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, the state of Britain’s roads has been described as being at breaking point. A recent survey suggests that local roads are in their worst condition for more than 30 years, and the backlog for repairs has risen to a record high. The AA estimates that pothole damage is costing Britain’s drivers nearly £500 million every year. Is the Minister aware of figures compiled by the LGA that show that Labour councils invest 83% more per head on road maintenance than Conservative councils?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

What I can say is that this Government have invested significantly in local highway networks. For example, since 2015, we have invested £11 billion and, as part of Network North, £8.3 billion has been earmarked for local road maintenance over the next 11 years.

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

My Lords, I refer noble Lords to my interests as set out in the register. Many economists like road pricing because it relies on the principle of “polluter pays”. As we shift from polluting vehicles to EVs, hydrogen, et cetera—more environmentally friendly vehicles—we might move from “polluter pays” to the principle that those who contribute to the wear and tear of our national infrastructure have to pay as drivers. I know that the Government have ruled it out at this stage, but in the longer term, have they done any planning on how we pay for upkeep of the roads? Perhaps those who contribute to wear and tear could make a contribution.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I am not aware of any work in that area, but, of course, my noble friend raises a very important point. There is the issue of wear and tear on the roads, which all vehicles contribute to, but what is sometimes overlooked is the impact of particulates that come from tyres. That might be from an internal combustion engine vehicle or from an electric vehicle—it is another source of pollution.

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, over the years, Ministers frequently say that they have no plans to do anything, and then, within a short period, they change their minds. This may well be one of those instances. Does the Minister agree that road pricing would have another benefit, in that it could be used to ease congestion on motorways? There would be different charges for peak times and for off-peak times. Would that not be helpful?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

As I said in my opening remarks, the Government have no plans to consider road pricing. I really cannot say more than that.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I find it difficult to fault the analysis of my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham, because he points to an inescapable gap in revenue receipts for the Treasury from fuel duty receipts. I have a difficulty in understanding the Treasury’s opaqueness in responding to this analysis, for which I do not blame my noble friend the Minister. Is that opaqueness attributable to fiscal timidity or dogmatic blindness?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, it is not opacity. What is going on here is simply that a number of options can be taken forward as taxes shift and change over time. All taxes shift and change over time with regard to the amount of money they bring into the Exchequer. The Government have forecasts as to what will happen to fuel duty and are considering all sorts of ideas as to how that would be plugged. For example, noble Lords will have seen that electric vehicles will start to pay VED from April 2025. It will not be at the same level as for an ICE vehicle, but it is right that EVs start to pay their way.

[Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford (Con)]

My Lords, putting aside road pricing for a second, average car insurance costs in the UK have neared £1,000 after prices rose by 58% this year. Does the Treasury intend to look into whether these increases are justifiable?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

It is concerning to see such large rises in insurance. Officials are monitoring it. The Treasury is unlikely to intervene in what is a private market. However, I will write to my noble friend, because there are various helplines and advisers who can sometimes help people to find cheaper car insurance.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister is impressive in her attempts to explain away the huge fiscal holes that this Government are digging for themselves and for future Governments. Can she comment on the rather strange leaflet that many residents of London have received, apparently from the Conservative mayoral candidate, purporting to be a penalty notice for a road pricing scheme that does not exist and is not planned by the current Mayor of London? Given that the Government are so opposed to this, does the Conservative mayoral candidate in London not know what Conservative policy is, or is it that she has enormous faith in the ability of the London government to deliver something that the Minister has said is incredibly complicated?

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[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I am seeking out the question in all that, but I think that all noble Lords will be aware that transport in London is devolved. Whether the current mayor will introduce road pricing within the Greater London area has been a matter of speculation for some time. If there was a Conservative mayor, the current candidate would certainly rule it out and ensure that the extension to ULEZ was rolled back, because that is causing significant hardship towards the outer boroughs of London.