Budget Responsibility Bill

2nd reading & Committee negatived & 3rd reading
Monday 9th September 2024 Lords Chamber

Second Reading (and remaining stages)

16:29

Moved by

[Lord Livermore]

That the Bill be now read a second time.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

My Lords, at the general election, our manifesto made it clear that sustained economic growth is the only route to improving the prosperity of our country, raising living standards, and sustainably funding public services. That is why it is our central economic mission.

On her first day in the Treasury, the Chancellor received new economic analysis from Treasury officials on the lost growth of the past 14 years. This analysis showed that, had the UK economy grown at the average rate of other OECD economies, it would now be over £140 billion larger. This could have brought an additional £58 billion in tax revenues in the last year alone—money that could have revitalised our schools, hospitals and other public services. We have therefore urgently begun the work to deliver on the mandate for change delivered by the British people at the election to fix the foundations of our economy, rebuild Britain and make every part of our country better off.

Our approach to growth rests on three pillars: stability, investment and reform. We have set out ambitious reforms, most importantly to the planning system, the single biggest obstacle to our country’s economic success. We have ended the ban on onshore wind and set out reforms to the skills system. With regard to investment, we have established the national wealth fund, committed to an industrial strategy council, and begun the creation of GB Energy. But the first, and most critical pillar, is economic stability—it is the rock on which all else must be built and the essential precondition for growth.

Over the last 14 years, with five Prime Ministers and seven Chancellors, instability has deterred investment, undermined family finances and, most importantly, held back growth. Many of the crises we faced during that time were of course global in origin—pandemic, war and an energy shock—but other countries faced those same shocks. The reason why we in the UK were hit harder than other comparable countries can be explained only by the choices made by the previous Government here at home: austerity, which choked off investment; a rushed and ill-conceived Brexit deal; and the disastrous Liz Truss mini-Budget, which crashed the economy and sent mortgage rates spiralling.

We believe that stability must begin with respect for our economic institutions. For much of the UK’s history, the strength of our economic institutions has bestowed credibility in international markets and underpinned our economic success. Politicians who seek to undermine those strengths, as we saw in the last Parliament, play a dangerous game. Under this Government, the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee will continue to have operational independence in the pursuit of its primary objective of price stability, and, in line with our manifesto, we will support and strengthen the Office for Budget Responsibility, hence the Bill we are debating today.

The OBR was, of course, introduced by a Conservative Chancellor to deal with a lack of independence in forecasting and the problems that had caused. It was a commendable move, bringing greater transparency and independent scrutiny to fiscal policy. But while the previous Government then went on to undermine it—Liz Truss notoriously saying that she wanted to

“see the back of the OBR”—

the Labour Party continued to support it. Now, in government, we will strengthen it.

This Bill therefore fulfils a simple but important step to help restore economic stability: it brings transparency and independent scrutiny into law by ensuring that every fiscal event that makes significant changes to taxation or spending will be subject to an independent report from the OBR. In doing so, it delivers on a manifesto commitment.

Let us be clear about why this Bill is needed. While the existing fiscal framework requires at least two OBR forecasts a year, there is currently no requirement on the Treasury to subject announcements on all fiscally significant measures to independent OBR scrutiny. In effect, that means there are times when the Government can make fiscally significant announcements while opting out of both transparency and scrutiny. This was a key factor in the disastrous Liz Truss mini-Budget, which did so much damage to our economy and to households, who are still paying the price for it today.

The previous Government knew the measures they were taking were unfunded and unaffordable, but as they were not bound to a forecast, they wilfully prevented one from taking place. This absence of scrutiny was a key factor in the adverse market reaction that followed. As the now shadow Chancellor said at the time, the mini-Budget damage was in part

“caused by the lack of a forecast””.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/10/22; col. 395.]

This cannot be allowed to happen again, so this Budget Responsibility Bill takes five important steps.

First, the Bill requires that, before the Government make any fiscally significant announcement in Parliament, the Treasury must ask the OBR to prepare a report which takes that announcement into account. This builds on the existing process whereby the Chancellor commissions the OBR for an economic and fiscal forecast to accompany a fiscal event. It guarantees in law that, from now on, every fiscally significant change to tax and spending will be subject to independent scrutiny from the OBR.

Secondly, the Bill gives the OBR new powers independently to decide to produce a report if it judges the measures in a fiscal event to be fiscally significant. If a fiscally significant announcement is made without the Treasury having previously requested a forecast from the OBR, the OBR is required to inform the Treasury Committee in the House of Commons of its opinion, and then prepare a report as soon as is practicable.

Thirdly, the Bill defines a measure, or combination of measures, as “fiscally significant” if they exceed a specified percentage of GDP. The Charter for Budget Responsibility will then set the precise threshold. Setting the threshold in this way provides clarity for the OBR and external stakeholders about what constitutes a fiscally significant announcement and ensures that the Government can set it at the right level going forward, recognising economic conditions. The Treasury has published a draft of the updated charter. This notes that the threshold level will be set at announcements of at least 1% of nominal GDP in the latest OBR forecast.

Fourthly, the Bill ensures that these arrangements do not apply to Governments responding to emergencies. The Bill does this by not applying in respect of measures that are intended to have a temporary effect and which are in response to an emergency. The charter will define “temporary” as any measure that is intended to end within two years. This recognises that it is sometimes reasonable, as it was during the pandemic, for the Government to act quickly and decisively without an OBR report, if that is needed in response to a shock. Of course, in emergencies it may be appropriate for the Chancellor to commission a forecast from the OBR to follow measures that need to be announced or implemented rapidly, and that would happen in the usual way. Alongside any such announcement, the Treasury will be required to make clear why it considers the situation to be an emergency. As set out in the updated charter, the OBR will have the discretion to prepare a report if it reasonably disagrees.

Fifthly and finally, the Bill requires the Government to publish any updates to the detail of these arrangements, such as the threshold level at which they are triggered, in draft form at least 28 days before the updated charter is laid before the House of Commons. This is an essential safeguard in the Bill, preventing any future Government from choosing to ignore these arrangements by updating the charter without clear parliamentary consent. In line with this Bill, and as the Chancellor announced in July, she has commissioned a full forecast to accompany the Budget on 30 October, following the important principle that significant fiscal policy decisions should be made at a fiscal event and accompanied by an independent OBR report.

In the Chancellor’s July Statement to Parliament, and in light of the scale of the overspend left by the previous Government, of which the OBR has confirmed it had not been informed, she also announced additional measures to strengthen the fiscal framework. These require the Treasury to share with the OBR its own assessment of immediate public spending pressures, enshrining that rule in the Charter for Budget Responsibility and establishing that spending reviews will take place every two years, with a minimum planning horizon of three years, to avoid uncertainty for departments and to bring stability to our public finances.

The changes introduced in this Bill are an important step in bringing much-needed stability to our economy. By empowering the OBR and ensuring that an independent report will accompany all fiscally significant announcements, it will improve transparency and accountability. Economic stability is central to economic growth—objectives that I hope will be shared across your Lordships’ House. I beg to move.

16:37

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, we thank the Minister for bringing forward this important Bill. Perhaps we should also thank the OBR for its very good work over these past 14 years. We in Parliament have been concerned about the supervision of financial regulators, and we did a lot of work last year on strengthening the supervision of other financial regulators in the Financial Services and Markets Act. Separately this afternoon, the Industry and Regulators Committee has been looking at a whole range of independent agency regulators with a very mixed performance.

It is worth pausing for a moment on the Office for Budget Responsibility itself, which is widely admired across government, in Parliament and, as the Minister says, by the current Government. It is to its credit that it managed to find a way to work closely with government, but independently and transparently. We should mark this with respect, given how stressed the government finances are.

A core objective of the OBR is, of course, the sustainability of the public finances. Perhaps we should look at how that has been since it was set up, following the 2011 Act. In 2012, public sector debt to GDP was 74%. One way or another—by spending the fiscal headroom across various Governments, and following the different issues that arose—we are now at 98%, which is a rise of around 2% per year in debt to GDP. This kind of budget responsibility is becoming almost unaffordable to the public exchequer, and things will have to change.

They will have to change because the scale of public spending—to the tune of £1 trillion a year—requires very good forecasting, and some of the forecasting that underpins this tight nexus between the Treasury, the OBR and their own reviews has been challenged. The OBR substantially missed the inflation change; lots of other agencies missed it—less in the private sector than in the public sector—and that is a problem because it hints at a closeness between the OBR and the Treasury because it was agencies of government that all missed the inflationary change. The OBR reviews its own forecasting very carefully, so when it reviews that error, it will tend to look at supply shocks in Ukraine and downplay quantitative easing and rates. That is one area of weakness, but there are others that will affect this concept of the fiscal announcement.

The OBR has struggled with basic numbers around population. It tended to underestimate population and is now scrambling to increase population in its model, which currently has a population of 57 million adults in the UK in 2029. This number is extraordinarily sensitive, obviously, for estimates of average wages and welfare spending. The OBR says that modelling those kinds of assumptions is very difficult because they are modelled off much lower levels of immigration than we are currently seeing, and these are the kind of numbers that would trigger enormously different fiscal outcomes in the Treasury/OBR model. There are other numbers in the forecast which are very sensitive, and the OBR itself mentioned this, but it is important that we reflect on this as we think about how this kind of fiscal brake might work. The OBR is modelling the expected tax take out of the economy to reach 37% of GDP in 2029. It is essential, of course, that it does reach that kind of level, but it is unknowable whether the economy can really sustain that level of taxation. It is a modelled outcome—we must all collectively hope it can work, but it might not, and therefore inherent in the actual forecasts are very significant fiscal risks.

One other area to mention in the OBR numbers that will underpin the Budget in October is the huge variable of accounting for the economics between the Treasury and the Bank of England. This is an extraordinarily enigmatic subject, not particularly well explained by the OBR itself, whereby the Bank can, at its discretion, impose costs on the Treasury which themselves could become very significant in these fiscal numbers. My question to the Minister is: what should we expect the costs of the asset purchase scheme to be between the Treasury and the Bank of England for this year? Will that be an area in which the Treasury can balance the numbers that it believes are a black hole? The kind of scale of adjustment is easily that big—for example, the Bank of England could easily stop issuing gilts for the coming months, seemingly at its discretion—so maybe the Minister could clarify that.

I end with the Chekhov question. Chekhov used to say that when you see a revolver on the mantelpiece in the first act, it will always be fired before the final curtain. I ask the Minister whether we can expect the fiscal announcement, beautifully described in Clause 1 as the “section 4(3) report”, to take place in this Parliament.

16:43

[Lord Macpherson of Earl’s Court (CB)]

My Lords, this is a sensible Bill to strengthen a sensible institution. The creation of the Office for Budget Responsibility, together with the granting of operational independence to the Bank of England, has transformed macroeconomic policy-making in the UK, and it is no coincidence that the premium the UK has had to pay on its debt, relative to its G7 partners, has declined over the last 25 years.

Economic forecasting is a thankless task. Forecasts are invariably wrong. The late Denis Healey’s commented that he would like to do for economic forecasters what the Boston Strangler did for the reputation of door-to-door salesmen. In an ideal world, forecasts would not be necessary. However, Governments have to plan public spending and the taxes necessary to pay for it. They need to do so over the medium term to better understand the implications for borrowing and the debt market. Somebody has to make the projections on which the decisions that determine the well-being of the nation are based.

Over my career at the Treasury, I worked on well over 60 fiscal events. For over 50, the Chancellor determined the forecast. It is fair to say that, on the vast majority of those occasions, the Chancellor did not seek to interfere with the forecast that Treasury officials presented to him. Even then, he often had to resist pressure from the First Lord of the Treasury to raise the growth rate just a little to make tax cuts or public spending increases more “affordable”—I emphasise the inverted commas surrounding the word affordable.

Whether or not Prime Ministers or Chancellors interfered, the perception of the markets was that they did. The result was that the forecast’s credibility was always called into question and that the taxpayer had to fund an interest rate on government debt that was slightly higher than it needed to be. Two years ago, that term came to be known as the “moron premium”. I emphasise that the OBR is no better at forecasting than other institutions; the importance is that its forecasts are perceived to be unbiased, and this is borne out by the evidence.

On the detail of the Bill, I welcome the Government putting a number on what constitutes fiscally significant. It may be a little on the high side—most fiscal events over the last 30 years have made a fiscal adjustment of less than 1% of GDP—but I see the problem in setting it too low and triggering an endless round of forecasts.

I also welcome the Government’s determination to improve the credibility of public spending projections. We should be in no doubt that an incredible spending forecast is the source of the problem with which the Government are now wrestling. Had the previous Government been required to populate their spending plans with policy decisions, I rather doubt that they would have announced successive cuts in national insurance contributions.

The measures set out in the Chancellor’s letter to Richard Hughes of 29 July are a big step forward: in particular, a clear timetable for spending reviews and a requirement for the Treasury regularly to update the OBR on emerging spending pressures. Allowing the OBR to publish, in effect, corrected spending plans will improve decision-making, even if it makes life more difficult for the Chancellor in the run-up to an election.

As the Government consider further reforms to the OBR framework, I encourage the Treasury to focus on another issue that also muddies the waters in the run-up to an election: the costing of opposition policies. Every four or five years, we have to go through the absurd theatre of the Chancellor of the day publishing, to great fanfare, official costings of their opponents’ policies. Of course, they are not official costings, since the assumptions are determined by Ministers and their special advisers. The Opposition are always rightly indignant at the time, claiming that the process is terribly unfair. I had to field unhappy telephone calls from shadow Chancellors from both main parties. But, once in government, parties have an uncanny knack of forgetting about the unfairness.

While the present Government are still in their early days of missionary zeal, I encourage them to resuscitate the 2015 proposal of the then shadow Chancellor, Ed Balls, to put opposition costings in the hands of the OBR, as happens in countries such as Holland. I ask the Financial Secretary to raise this issue with the Chancellor when he returns to the Treasury.

16:48

[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, the OBR was created by George Osborne to

“remove the temptation to fiddle the figures”.

An entirely non-political evaluation of major fiscal measures was certainly a good idea; unfortunately, it has not yet been achieved. The failure to attain political independence may be attributed to two elements that are not dealt with in the Bill yet are essential to its purpose.

First, key inputs to the OBR’s work are the estimates of future spending provided by the Government. We now know that these can be politically manipulated to ensure that fiscal targets seem to be met. As the Institute for Government commented at the time of the Conservative Budget this Spring,

“the figures that Hunt announced … are based on entirely fictitious future spending plans”.

Since the election, we have learned that not only were the Conservatives fiddling the figures that they provided to the OBR, but they were concealing spending plans too. In the light of post-election findings, Mr Hughes confirmed that the OBR was made aware of the extent of pressures on departmental budgets only in late July. Happily, the Financial Secretary has just outlined the measures that are to be taken to verify the data supplied by the Government. These measures are most welcome.

The second key political element undermining the value of the OBR’s current assessments is the current formulation of the charter. The current charter embodies three targets that the OBR is required to assess; unfortunately, none of them is based on sound economics.

First, there is the objective to have public sector net debt—excluding the Bank of England—as a percentage of GDP falling by the fifth year of the rolling forecast period. As the noble Lord on the Opposition Front Bench just pointed out, this means that whenever the Bank of England sells part of its stock of government debt to the private sector, it automatically tightens the noose around government spending. An important part of monetary policy has damaging consequences for fiscal policy—how foolish is that?

More importantly, the objective treats all government expenditure as having the same economic relevance. A crazy unfunded tax cut is assigned the same economic impact as investment in industrial infrastructure. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer argued in her Mais Lecture while still the shadow Chancellor,

“our fiscal rules differ from the government’s. Their borrowing rule, which targets the overall deficit rather than the current deficit, creates a clear incentive to cut investment that will have long-run benefits … I reject that approach”.

Unfortunately, the next objective, to ensure that public sector net borrowing does not exceed 3% of GDP by the fifth year of the rolling forecast period, is simply a dynamic version of the first objective and is, therefore, subject to the same rejection that the Chancellor has made.

The third and final objective is to ensure that expenditure on welfare is contained within a predetermined cap. One of the important operational aspects of economic policy is the value of the automatic stabilisers in the economy: when the economy booms, welfare spending automatically goes down; in a slump, welfare spending automatically goes up. The notion of a cap would emasculate the automatic stabilisers—again, a silly thing to do.

In short, none of the current objectives in the charter makes sound economic sense. It forces the OBR to make forecasts that are simply not relevant for the Government’s stability and growth objectives. It is imperative that the charter is revised prior to the Budget on 30 October. Given the requirement that revisions of the charter must be presented to Parliament 28 days before coming into effect, will the Minister tell us whether we can expect a revised charter to be presented before 1 October?

To conclude, the OBR is a very good idea, as is this Bill, but major operational aspects need urgent correction. I look forward to hearing from the Financial Secretary how these deficiencies are to be dealt with.

16:53

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have a number of regrets about the Bill. My first regret is that it is a money Bill. It is customary that this House does not challenge the decision of the Speaker in the other place, and I will not do so. It is not, however, a Bill that has any direct fiscal impact, but it makes changes to a body that has become an integral part of the country’s economic management. I believe the Bill would have benefited from a normal Committee, where we could have scrutinised it in detail. For example, noble Lords might recall that when income tax was first introduced in 1799, it was labelled a temporary tax, which raises interesting questions about this Bill’s exclusion of temporary measures from the OBR’s new powers.

Secondly, I regret that the Government have not taken the opportunity to ensure that the OBR’s forecasting is fit for purpose. My noble friend Lord Altrincham raised several of the issues here. On its own internal assessment, the OBR is not particularly good at forecasting. It claims, with no sense of irony, that its performance is in line with that of the Bank of England. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, from whom we have just heard, pointed out in his speech on the gracious Speech in July that the OBR was set up to reinforce austerity and is ill-suited to underpin the Government’s growth ambitions. In the same debate, I argued a similar point: the OBR does not use dynamic modelling, so growth measures will struggle for a full evaluation in the OBR’s calculations. These areas would have been a better target for the Government’s reforming zeal.

Thirdly, I regret that the Bill does not ensure that the OBR operates to high standards of governance. I cannot think of another public sector body which has an executive chairman and does not have a majority of non-executive directors. Like most independent quangos, its external accountability arrangements are weak. It is quite simply dangerous to allow a public body, which can exert great influence on the Government’s fiscal policies, to exist with weak internal governance alongside weak external accountability.

Lastly, I regret that the Government have used this Bill to peddle untruths for political purposes. At Second Reading in the other place, the Chief Secretary said:

“The country cannot afford a repeat of the calamitous mini-Budget of September 2022, when Liz Truss and Kwasi Kwarteng’s reckless plans unleashed economic turmoil that has loaded hundreds of pounds on to people’s mortgages and rents”.—[Official Report, Commons, 30/7/24; col. 1211.]


The Minister repeated the substance of that in his opening remarks. The fact is that interest rates were already on the way up in the fight against inflation, and they remain high for the same reason. They did spike immediately after the mini-Budget, but the Bank of England’s own internal analysis shows that two-thirds of the 103 basis points spike in the 16 days after the mini-Budget was due to the Bank’s own mismanagement of the risks inherent in LDI strategies. Furthermore, the Bank had already unsettled financial markets by failing to raise interest rates in line with the US and with market expectations. It does not reflect well on either of the Chancellors who succeeded Kwasi Kwarteng that they have turned a blind eye to these truths.

It was political opportunism that led to the creation of the OBR, and it is the same motivation driving this Bill. This is a poor foundation for legislation.

16:58

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, two years ago the Tory faithful showed that they had no firmer grip on reality than Liz Truss by choosing a Prime Minister who engineered her own downfall and now blames absolutely everybody else. The infamous Truss mini-Budget provoked a crisis of confidence in Britain’s public finances by sidestepping the Office for Budget Responsibility, and this Bill will ensure that cannot happen again. The financial turmoil around the Truss mini-Budget, with its reckless £46 billion package of unfunded tax cuts and cavalier attitude to government borrowing, added to the economic chaos that seven successive Tory Chancellors caused over 14 years in office since 2010, dumping an appalling legacy in Labour’s lap.

First, they left office with real household incomes lower than when they came into government and working people with the highest tax burden for 70 years. The main reason was appallingly slow economic growth, due in large part to investment being significantly lower than in other G7 economies. Had the UK economy grown as fast as the OECD average over the past 13 years, UK GDP would have been more than £140 billion bigger, providing some £50 billion of extra tax revenue for public services and lower borrowing.

Secondly, the Tories gave up their seals of office on the 76th anniversary of the NHS’s launch with more than 7.6 million patients waiting for hospital treatment in England.

Thirdly, national debt, which stood at 65% of GDP in 2010 even after the financial crisis, is now touching 100%. The Tories have also bequeathed to Labour a huge £22 billion budgetary black hole about which Tory Ministers deliberately kept quiet and with which the Chancellor is now having to wrestle. She is right to stress that 14 years of damage cannot be reversed in one Budget. The OBR estimates that the decade of fiscal austerity imposed by George Osborne and Philip Hammond added up to nearly 9% of GDP—82% by cuts to public spending and 18% cent by tax increases—equivalent in today’s terms to some £200 billion of public spending cuts.

Do not forget that things could have been even worse. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, admitted in his memoirs that, had he stayed in office after 2016, he would have pursued even more public spending cuts. George Osborne’s last Budget in March 2016 revealed plans for another £60 billion of public spending cuts, which would have brought total Tory cuts to £260 billion. Fortunately, Liz Truss lost office before she could attempt similar economic and social vandalism—but then, in this summer’s election, Rishi Sunak’s dishonest promise of national insurance cuts of £13 billion and defence spending rises of £7 billion per year would have doubled the black hole that the Chancellor discovered.

When critics claim that the Chancellor has embarked on George Osborne-type austerity, she is absolutely right to insist that giving public sector workers their first real-terms pay increase in 10 years is certainly not that. Osborne’s first Budget announced a two-year public sector pay freeze. Jeremy Hunt now claims:

“Labour have inherited a growing and resilient economy”.


He says that because UK GDP grew in the first half of this year, yet GDP shrank in the second half of last year as the economy sank into recession. We may have stopped going backwards but we are not yet any further forward than we were an economically destructive and financially irresponsible Conservative year ago. The Bank of England now expects growth to slow, not speed up, in the third and fourth quarters of this year—another sign of Tory failure and nothing like the rapid turnaround that we experienced under the last Labour Chancellor in 2009 as the economy recovered from the terrible global financial crisis.

This Bill is designed to block any repeat of such Tory antics and to establish a future under Labour of economic growth and stability. It will not be easy, but thank goodness we have grown-ups running the country again.

17:03

[Lord Frost (Con)]

My Lords, I find this a peculiar Bill. There are a number of odd things about it.

First, as my noble friend Lady Noakes mentioned, it seems odd that this is a money Bill. I do not challenge the decision, obviously, but it does not seem to affect the Government’s powers to raise taxes or spend in any way. I cannot help but notice that, as far as I can tell, the original Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act, which created the OBR, was not a money Bill, so it is odd that this one is. I do not question the decisions on this point but it does seem odd; I agree that it would have benefited from more scrutiny.

This feels more a constitutional Bill in some ways, but it is weak there too. The Minister billed it as a lock on government actions, and others have described it as such, but it does not actually stop the Government doing anything; it only requires the OBR to write a report if they do so, so it seems misconceived in those terms too. One has to ask what the point of the Bill is. It is, of course, a process Bill, but it is also a political Bill. It is written entirely to give an opportunity for the Government and the Labour Party to contrast their activity with the Liz Truss mini-Budget and the decisions taken in 2022. We have heard plenty of that already in this House today.

I think Labour will find two problems with that. First, as my noble friend Lady Noakes has already mentioned, the Bank itself says that two-thirds of the problem was its own mishandling of the LDI crisis. It is hard to see how, if this Bill had been in force and a report had been required, it would have had any effect on that aspect of the autumn 2022 problems. The other problem that the Government will find is that the world does move on. Their own so-called fiscal black hole, which they have already spent a large time creating, is where attention will move. They may regret this Bill before long, to judge by the Niagara Falls of public money that seems likely to pour out of the Treasury in the months and years to come.

I do not think that we are meant to take this Bill seriously. Outsiders recognise that; the IFS itself says that the proposal is “largely performative”. Even the Resolution Foundation describes its impact as “relatively small”. The real impact of the Bill will be to reinforce the position of the OBR in the constitution, but I am doubtful about that for two reasons.

First, for some of the reasons that have been said, the OBR is not a particularly effective institution. It clearly reinforces the Treasury view of the world. It has a poor record, as others have said and as it itself acknowledges. It is negative about Brexit and it repeats the zombie 4%-cut-to-GDP figure that was produced six years ago on the basis of reports put together before we even left the EU. It is doubtful about incentives and what makes a free economy tick. Forecasting is difficult—people bring their priors to it—but the answer is not to do it better or do more forecasts; the answer is to remove the privileged status of the OBR and the forecasts it gives in our economic decision-making. That is the first reason.

The second is that this Bill forms part of the tendency over the past 20 to 25 years to tie down elected Governments with Platonic guardians who think they know better than Governments. This is an intellectual error that began, reasonably enough, with Bank independence in 1997, but it cannot be extended to every single situation. Just because it is good for running monetary policy does not necessarily make it desirable to have independent controls on fiscal policy, to give independence to one regulator after another or to give independence to institutions with wider economic policy effects, such as the Climate Change Committee and many others. These are very different things. You cannot solve the problems that the country faces by constantly giving further independence to unelected institutions and bureaucratic processes.

I am afraid that this error has time to run yet. It is sapping democracy and will make it more difficult to deal with new economic challenges. I hope that, one day, we will reverse this trend and look at this panoply of constraints on government action with a much more sceptical eye.

17:08

[Baroness Wheatcroft (CB)]

My Lords, I welcome this Bill, short though it may be. We have already heard different views of the Liz Truss mini-Budget. I would merely say that it does seem advisable to try to thwart cavalier, determined efforts to avoid scrutiny by the OBR; it makes one slightly suspicious. However, the OBR can only be as effective as the information with which it is provided. It should be a cause of concern that the OBR chairman, Richard Hughes, has intimated that he was not kept fully in the picture towards the end of the previous Administration. We need to be very wary about a repeat of that.

I believe the whole basis of government accounting is flawed. It focuses solely on the short term, to the detriment of the country’s longer-term interests. Take the current controversy over the winter fuel payment. I will not enter into the rights and wrongs of that decision—we have already heard about those today, and will hear a lot more—although it seems to be a very costly exercise in terms of political capital, for very little financial gain.

However, the £22 billion black hole that we keep hearing about that the Government intend to fill, in part with the proceeds of cutting the winter fuel allowance, is actually more of a bottomless pit, for a major contributor to that £22 billion is the pay rise for public sector workers. That pay rise brings with it huge ongoing costs that do not feature because public sector pensions are not provided for. That is a massive obligation which is simply swept under government carpets. According to the whole of government accounts, public service pensions are the largest single liability on the Government’s balance sheet. In 2021-22 they were calculated at £2.6 trillion—greater than the national debt.

The idiocy of this system of accounting was highlighted in a recent article by John Crompton, a former investment banker who has also done three stints at the Treasury. He suggests that the latest public sector pay awards, cited as contributing £9.4 billion to that black hole, could also bring unfunded liabilities of between £3.5 billion and £4 billion every year. Crompton calls this treatment of government liabilities “downright misleading”, and I am afraid it is. The short-term saving from cuts such as the winter fuel allowance will be wiped out year after year by numbers that do not appear in the accounting at superficial levels.

So, while I welcome the Bill as a minor improvement, I ask the Minister whether he agrees that the time has come for a much more radical rethink of government accounting. Yes, cash flow is important, but, as every household knows, concentrating solely on income and expenditure is not the way to build a healthy economy. Major infrastructure projects, such as those cited by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, are essential. Cancelling them because of a short-term need to cut expenditure, as this Government have done, may be foolhardy. A proper net worth finances method of accounting, dealing with government expenditure over the longer term, would enable a much more effective long-term view to be taken of the costs and benefits of investment. A change to a more sensible fiscal framework would make for much healthier, better management of public finances, and it would contribute to the growth that we absolutely need.

The Minister explained that the Government have three aims as far as the Bill and the economy are concerned: stability, investment and reform. I ask him to really be serious about reform.

17:13

[Viscount Chandos (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a short Bill, which, as it is—in my view, rightly—designated as a money Bill, your Lordships’ House cannot amend. I propose to speak briefly. I add my voice in support of the Bill and of the persuasive reasoning set out by my noble friend the Minister in his opening remarks.

More unusually, I find myself in a position of agreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Frost. Yes, there is a political aspect to the Bill’s introduction. Ben Zaranko from the Institute for Fiscal Studies wrote that it

“is broadly sensible but largely performative … rather theatrical … some future Chancellor determined to misbehave”—

this sounds familiar—

“could almost certainly find a way to get around it”.

He concludes, however,

“but it nonetheless serves as a welcome commitment to fiscal transparency”.

That commitment should not have needed to be codified but the reasons that it is in fact necessary and welcome lie not just in the debacle of the Truss-Kwarteng fiscal event—that mini-budget, self-immolation or whatever—but in the persistent indifference, arguably contempt, shown by the last four Conservative Governments towards the principles of good governance and towards the institutions of the state, old and new.

Restoration of confidence in the professionalism of government and the stability of the UK economy is needed; this Bill is a useful contribution to that. Forecasting, to paraphrase Professor Niels Bohr—or Yogi Berra—is difficult, particularly about the future. Criticisms from some quarters of the OBR’s track record are not, however, well founded, so not a reason for dismissing the validity and importance of its assessment of any proposed large fiscal event.

The Bill increases fiscal transparency, rather than delegating decision-making to an unelected body. Extraordinarily, the shadow Exchequer Secretary, traumatised perhaps by his membership of the previous Government, lamented in the House of Commons in July that

“nowhere in the Bill … is the OBR empowered to prevent a Government from taking fiscally significant action of any kind”.—[Official Report, Commons, 30/7/24; col. 1215.]

The newly elected Labour Government face many challenges in the direction of the UK economy, arising from both the legacy of the Conservative Governments and geopolitical, demographic and technological trends. They are not abdicating responsibility for those decisions but seeking to ensure that those decisions are taken—and can be judged—in the context of the best possible independent analysis. This Bill is an important symbol and insurer of this, and I look forward to its passing all stages in this House and receiving Royal Assent—the first Bill to be enacted by this Government.

17:17

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, in introducing this Bill the Minister said that

“economic stability is … the rock on which all else must be built”.

I respectfully suggest that that is a reflection of what has been described as “Treasury brain”, a subject that the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson, and I have previously had some discussions on. I would posit that the rocks on which our society depends are the health, energy, talents and skills of its people; the state of its environment; and the capacity of its infrastructure and services, from the quality of the housing to the facilities of our NHS. I pick up here the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft.

There is also the question: what is the economy for? The economy is there to meet the needs of the people and to care for our environment. We are not all here to work for the economy; I fear that is all too often forgotten. Also too often forgotten is the fact that the economy is a complete subset of our physical and natural world, and the understanding that we cannot have infinite growth on a finite planet. The UK is now using its share of the resources of more than three planets. We have to go back to one-planet living fast and that is the frame in which we always have to think about the economy.

Mainstream economic thinking has a phrase that it is very attached to: “ceteris paribus”. That is the Latin for “all other things being unchanged or constant”. I welcome the fact that the Office for Budget Responsibility has been showing increasing awareness of the fact that things are not staying the same in terms of the environment, physical and human, that the economy is operating in. I note that, since 2017 it has been producing the Fiscal Risks and Sustainability report, the last of which was presented to Parliament in July 2023. That report now lists 57 risks, some of which may be described as purely economic, but many of which relate to the state of the physical and human world. The OBR is picking up on some of the risks we are facing.

I particularly draw to the attention of noble Lords in this House who like to question spending towards the country reaching net zero, that the OBR says that there is the risk of a

“delayed transition to net zero raising … fiscal cost”.

I also note that four risks have been added to this latest report:

“persistent and high inflation, rising global trade tensions, global security threats, and cyber-attacks”.

At least the first three of those are very much related to the climate emergency. We are seeing the impact that the climate emergency is having, for example, on food prices—which, I am afraid, is only going to keep getting worse. “Ceteris paribus” certainly does not apply to the state of our world; the old economic verities will not hold, if, indeed, they ever did.

It is also worth noting that the OBR report talks about one of the unchanged continuing risks being

“the risks of financial crises and … non-payment of taxes”.

I note that, in your Lordships’ House, with backing from the now-Government and now-Opposition, we recently passed the Financial Services and Markets Act. That contains a push to grow the financial sector, which the OBR has identified as a significant risk to all of our futures.

Picking up the point on climate spending, the OBR said that if we do not act and invest now, the

“public investments needed to support the decarbonisation of power, buildings, and industry could reach £17 billion a year”

by 2030. As our own independent Climate Change Committee has been making clear, if we invest now, we save ourselves—or if you want to phrase it that way we save “the economy” —very significant costs and risks in future.

Finally, I particularly note the OBR’s reference to the number of people of working age not being in paid employment. The figure in the 2023 report is 2.6 million people of working age not in the labour force for health reasons. That figure reached 2.83 million in April. If we are going to look at our economic future, we have to think about investing in a healthier society. The OBR says that, although there is much talk about people being on NHS waiting lists, it is only a small part of the problem. We have a deeply unhealthy society, and that is something the Treasury and Government need to be thinking about when looking at their spending plans.

17:22

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his exposition of the Bill. I declare a special interest, having worked on and published a number of independent analyses of the fiscal, monetary and regulatory problems of the UK economy as director of Politeia, the think tank at which I am now research director.

No one with the public finances at heart can fail to support a measure that strengthens transparency and a rules-based approach to the UK’s public finances. I am a devotee of fiscal stability and the need for rules, written or, as in previous times, understood. As the German economist Ludger Schuknecht has explained, many serious problems arise not because of bad rules, but because of the failure to implement the rules by using tools such as medium-term budgetary frameworks, spending reviews, financial risk analysis and independent fiscal councils to help achieve these aims.

But are the Bill and the structures—including the OBR, which it relies on—the way to ensure sustainable public finances and tighter fiscal discipline? I am unsure, and I have the following questions. First, is the Bill requiring an OBR assessment for financially significant measures or empowering the OBR to offer such an analysis, should it deem a measure such, enough to control unsustainable public spending and public debt? Is there any obligation on the Government to change their spending or debt policy if an OBR analysis predicts potentially dire consequences for the economy? If not, there is no fiscal lock, contrary to the Government’s suggestion, but simply fiscal advice. If so, that raises constitutional questions about unelected bodies and the power they exercise.

Secondly, the Government want to allow a higher ceiling for debt as a proportion of GDP by the fifth year of the cycle, from 1% to 1.2% of GDP, made public in advance of the Budget. Should we expect a further relaxation of the three previous rules for fiscal discipline and, if so, which will be relaxed, which will be changed and which will become less transparent? Will further changes be assessed by those who, like me, are sceptical of lax fiscal discipline?

Thirdly, no single forecasting institution can, or should be expected to, take the burden of advising a Government on tax and spending alone. We have heard today of some of the problems with the OBR which it has the modesty to recognise. Will the Government be open and invite other forecasters and assessments, equally independent of the Treasury and the OBR, to be sure to have other views?

Fourthly, what public spending will count as fiscally significant? I know the 1% of GDP measure has been provided, but here are two sorts of public spending that may be open-ended and not fall within the threshold, although they will eventually. The first is public sector pay rises. Rises of 5% or 6% for the 3.5 million public sector workers have been announced, adding to the potential for pay inflation, with other rises reported to be in the offing, including 22% mooted for doctors. Will the Minister agree that such pay rises should prompt an OBR report, particularly if they will likely continue to increase and reach the high threshold?

The second is the costs of immigration. According to Home Office figures, quite apart from legal migration—which is nearer to 1 million this year, net migration being lower—illegal migration via channel crossings amounted to 9,000 illegal immigrants crossing to the UK in July, August and the first week of September. Since no scheme in place is likely to deter these crossings, will the Minister confirm whether the additional management, administrative and legal costs—these have been itemised by previous Governments—for processing individual cases and providing public services, including housing and subsistence, will be averaged in an annual figure and considered as significant in order for an assessment by the OBR?

17:28

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I support the Bill—after all, it is in the manifesto—but it has faced some criticism. The comments of Ben Zaranko have already been mentioned. It ill becomes a Member of the Opposition to criticise legislation as performative, since that is practically all they did over the last five years.

The legislation is not performative but declaratory—it is setting out a declaration of intent, and it is to be welcomed for that. But—and there is always a but—I see in the Bill potential weaknesses, which arise from the exceptions in new subsection (4), and this issue of what counts as “temporary”. After all, the freeze in fuel duty each year is temporary, but it is now apparently part of our constitution. But I am more concerned about the term “emergency”. Is it a term of art? Who is going to determine what counts as an emergency? It is not defined in the Bill, and it has not been used in the charter. Ultimately, there is no track record of how it is interpreted in this context or who is going to decide.

We have an interesting case study here. Of course, we had a fiscal event on 29 July. I shall steer away from talking about winter fuel payments again. My assumption is that it was not large enough to trigger the size test, but did it trigger the emergency or the temporary test? I shall be interested in hearing my noble friend’s comments on how that undoubtedly fiscal event fitted in with the requirements of this legislation.

I was going to speak at more length on that but, inevitably, I was diverted by the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, who came up with the perennial saw that there was some sense in including liabilities for future unfunded public service pensions in the national accounts. The whole point about unfunded pensions is that they are unfunded, and it makes no sense at all to treat them as though they were funded. However, if you are going to do the sums—or I could do them for you—and say what the current value of the future liabilities of these schemes will be, logically you should also have a figure for the future revenues that are going to meet those liabilities. It is not funded, so the future payments are exactly matched by the future taxation revenue that will pay those liabilities. You have to include both figures if you are going to account for them, and they are equal and opposite by definition. Including them in the national accounts makes no sense.

17:33

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I always think that legislation, of which this is not the only example, which arises in reaction to a single event is almost certain to be foolish, pointless and dangerous and to lead us astray. That is particularly so when reflection has shown that the initial understanding of that event—in this case, I am talking about the mini-Budget—was flawed, and that in fact it was not the mini-Budget and its fiscal measures that caused the market volatility.

It is now accepted—even by the Bank of England, I believe, in a recent paper—that about two-thirds of the volatility was caused by the Bank of England’s own misregulation of some dodgy LDI schemes in pension funds, which I do not claim to understand. Possibly the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, would understand them, given his background. They were happening in something like the equivalent of the darknet of the pensions industry, and they were what caused most of the problem. Perhaps we would be better off having a Bill that penalised the Bank of England for misregulating pension funds and other financial institutions within its purview, which might actually keep it on its toes.

My second point has already been made to some extent by my noble friends Lord Frost and Lady Lawlor. This Bill is a further step in the de-democratisation of our governmental decision-making. It is the transfer, in effect, of power from elected Ministers, who are accountable to the electorate, to unaccountable institutions on the basis of the claim that they are somehow independent. They simply have a view as to how certain changes in taxation and expenditure are going to affect the economy. It is perfectly possible for somebody else to have a different view—in fact, it is perfectly possible for a Chancellor of the Exchequer to have a different view. The noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, tried to persuade us that that was not in fact so, but of course the whole point of the Bill is to trammel and put handcuffs on the Chancellor of the Exchequer—and, of course, the first people who will be penalised by this and come to regret this legislation will no doubt be the current Chancellor of the Exchequer and her successors, if she has any, over the next few years. But that is the whole purpose of the Bill beyond its performative measure.

My third and final point was simply to say that I wanted to follow up on the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft. She said something to the effect that we were looking at our public accounts the wrong way. I agree with her to some extent but I want to make a different point. We have this enormous focus on the fiscal rules, which are essentially about the level of debt that the Government can carry—but that is a secondary matter.

The really crucial matter is what level of national income the Government should dispose of. To some extent, that is a political question, because inevitably the Labour Party will take the view that the Government should dispose of a larger sum and the Conservatives would probably take the view—I hope—that they should dispose of a smaller sum. It is not quite clear where the Liberal Democrats would stand on that crucial question. But that is the essential point that should drive all our politics. However, it is not simply a political matter; it can also be considered with regard to the effectiveness of that spending and whether that spending, as it increases, achieves a proportional improvement in the outcome of public services or whether it runs into what might be described as diminishing returns. I would say that the evidence is clear that at a certain point increased public expenditure starts to run into the problem of diminished returns when you measure the outputs that the Government actually achieve. Spending more money on the health service might produce more hospitals but does it produce better health outcomes? Are death rates from certain illnesses improving, and so forth? When you measure those things, it is clear from the evidence that simply spending more money does not produce proportionate outcomes.

The Government really need to focus on questions of that character, because the question of how you fund that expenditure, whether through debt or taxation, is an important one but essentially secondary.

17:38

[Lord Murphy of Torfaen (Lab)]

My Lords, I very much support the Bill. The debate has been extremely interesting, although noble Lords seem to want to rewrite recent history. The purpose of the Bill is to reflect on what happened when Liz Truss was Prime Minister. There is a revisionist view going around that she was not so bad after all. The idea that you can have £46 billion of unfunded tax cuts everybody knew was bonkers, which of course was why she did not involve the Office for Budget Responsibility and why she sacked an eminent civil servant, the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, because he disagreed with her.

It is ironic that the Office for Budget Responsibility was brought in by the Government of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron. It was not a Labour proposal. We have had all this business about how it is not democratic and how we have to go to the people and all the rest of it—but it was brought in by a Conservative Government, apparently in response to what they regarded as the profligacy of the Labour Government of which I happened to be a member. At the very end of that Government, in 2008, 2009 and 2010, when we were facing the international financial crisis, and I was a member of the National Economic Council, the problems that we faced were global. Over the past number of months, the Conservatives have argued, rightly, that many of the problems that they faced in government were global, with Covid and the war in Ukraine, as well as the problem with energy supply.

Of course, the truth lies somewhere in the middle, but there is no doubt in my mind that if Gordon Brown had not tackled the financial crisis as he did, it would have been much worse not just for our country but for the whole of the western world. I recall having to meet the Prime Ministers of Canada and Japan because he had called together the leaders of all the major economies in the world to resolve this matter.

Having formed the OBR, the Conservatives, having used what they regarded as the profligacy argument, embarked on a terrible period of austerity which effectively eroded our public services to the extent that they are at rock bottom. It has been 14 years of austerity and now we are told that, in the last year of that, there was no comprehensive spending review, no effective management of revenue spending in the departments and no funding for policies announced during the last six or seven months, and the result of all that is that it is all the more important for there to be an Office for Budget Responsibility to give an independent and transparent account, analysis and assessment of where we are in our economy.

The noble Lord, Lord Frost, said we should not have these bodies; they should be elected and we should rely on the good sense of the British people to assess and make a judgment on the economic mess in which we now find ourselves. Well, they did. They gave the Labour Party a majority of nearly 170 and virtually destroyed the Conservative Party in the House of Commons. They did give a verdict on the Liz Truss mini-Budget and that is why we have a Labour Government and why the Conservative Party will be out of office for a very long time.

17:42

[Lord Bilimoria (CB)]

My Lords, Rachel Reeves said:

“This Government’s defining mission is to deliver economic growth. However, growth can only come through economic stability and a commitment to sound public money so never again can a government play fast and loose with the public finances. This new law is part of our plan to fix the foundation of our economy so we can rebuild Britain”.


The decision by Labour gives the OBR the most power it has ever had since the Chancellor at the time, George Osborne, set it up in 2010. Of course, we know that forecasts can be wrong. The noble Lord, Lord Macpherson, said that they are invariably wrong, but he made an interesting point: what about opposition forecasts? Will the Minister respond to that?

The noble Lord, Lord Macpherson, also said very clearly that forecasts are based on assumptions. I know that. We in business continually make assumptions on all our forecasts and they are not always correct. Laith Khalaf, head of investment analysis at AJ Bell, said:

“Ironically Liz Truss and Kwasi Kwarteng did more to burnish the credentials of the OBR than any politicians since its inception. As things stand, the OBR is now more commanding than ever”.


The Bill will mean that the OBR, which monitors and checks the UK Government’s financial plans, has the power to make an assessment on announcements over the course of a financial year that make permanent tax or spending commitments worth more than 1% of the UK economy. That 1% is just over £2 trillion—just over £20 billion. My noble friend Lady Wheatcroft spoke about the black hole of £22 billion. This number keeps getting bandied around: it is not even 1% of GDP, yet it is made out to be the only reason why taxes need to be put up. If taxes are put up in the Budget coming forward—taxes such as CGT equated to income tax—it will be so damaging to the country and its economy and to investment.

The OBR provides independent analysis. It is meant to be absolutely independent. The Chancellor must request the OBR to produce forecasts at least twice a year. The initial Cabinet Office briefing note stated that the Bill’s purpose was

“to capture and prevent those announcements that could resemble the disastrous Liz Truss ‘mini-budget’”.

The briefing was republished with the reference to Ms Truss removed. Will the Minister confirm that? The absence of public OBR analysis is considered to be a factor in the negative reaction of the financial markets that followed. After Kwasi Kwarteng’s Statement, as we know, market volatility led to increased government borrowing costs and the devaluation of the pound against other international currencies. My friend Sir Anthony Seldon has just released his new book, Truss at 10: How not to be Prime Minister.

The fiscal mandate is a Government’s guiding fiscal objective, so tax and spending policy decisions should be made with this in mind. It is to ensure that public sector net borrowing does not exceed 3% of GDP by the fifth year of the rolling forecast period. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, made a very good point that I ask the Minister to respond to: what is the effect of this on automatic stabilisers? According to the Treasury, the effect of Kwasi Kwarteng’s and Liz Truss’s mini-Budget, which would have reduced income tax by around £45 billion, would have been to reach a trend rate of growth of 2.5%—that was a noble objective. It was reported that the OBR had provided the Chancellor with a draft forecast, but this was not made public. Opposition parties and the Conservative chair of the House of Commons Treasury Committee urged the Chancellor to publish the forecast, and the lack of that OBR analysis has been cited as the major factor that contributed to the negative reaction to the mini-Budget in the financial markets.

We can go into the analysis—by the BBC, for example—of key aspects and consequences of the mini-Budget: unfunded tax cuts, a funding shortfall, market reaction, an impact on interest rates and pension funds, Bank of England intervention, loss of market confidence, political and economic repercussions, reform and an emphasis on credibility. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made a very important point: why is this a money Bill? This means we have a limited influence on the Bill; I do not think that this should have been a money Bill.

To conclude, the Bill has received support from many quarters, including from the CBI, of which I was president for two years, from June 2020 to June 2022. Louise Hellem, chief economist at the CBI, said:

“Market stability is a key foundation to enabling economic growth and business investment. Ensuring large changes in tax and spending policy are always subject to an independent assessment by the Office for Budget Responsibility will give businesses and investors additional confidence in the stability of the public finances”.

17:47

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, this Bill produces comfort for Chancellors, even though the OBR acknowledges that there are shortcomings in its work. Right at the outset, can the Minister explain why the Bill does not permit the OBR to publish forecasts at its own volition or at the request of parliamentary committees? Why that particular restraint? The OBR’s reports are promoted as apolitical, but that does not mean that it is free from institutional biases. Neither the Treasury nor the OBR makes a distinction between capital and revenue expenditure. Both are lumped together to produce a forecast of government spending and debt, which is of little use in charting the long-term course of the economy. Does the Minister agree that these items should be separated?

The OBR forecasts government debt, but asks no questions about the composition of the debt. For example, government debt includes Treasury bills and gilts held by the Bank of England’s asset purchase facility, which amount to £643 billion. It is really a hangover from the quantitative easing period and should not be part of the government debt. The left hand of the government creates the money, then the right hand buys the Treasury bills with it, and, somehow, £643 billion turns up as a government debt. I cannot see any economic logic to this, and it really constrains the Government’s policy options. I hope the Minister can explain why the Government are content for this overstatement of their debt: it ought to be looked at.

The OBR asks few searching questions and rarely steps beyond the conventional. With apologies to the philosopher Bertrand Russell, I am reminded of the story of the inductivist turkey that became famous for its forecasting abilities. It collected daily data, noting the times when the flock was fed and watered. Soon, it began to predict when the daily feeding and watering events would occur. Everybody was in awe and it became a celebrity.

The OBR of the turkey world checked the calculations and confirmed that the predictions were accurate, but some had different questions. They wanted to know why they were fed and watered every day; why they were weighed every day; why they were caged; and why it was that some were taken out and never seen again. Such questions were not the flavour of the day, and the critics were whipped into silence. The rulers decided that the inductivist turkey should receive a specially minted gold medal. The next day, it was Christmas.

So it is here: key assumptions and wisdom are not questioned by either the OBR or the Treasury because they are all intoxicated with getting the forecasts right. The entire life of the OBR has been accompanied by policy failures: the flatlining of the economy; cuts in real wages; falling living standards; investment strike by the state; crumbling infrastructure; and people dying while awaiting a hospital appointment. The OBR never looks at the multiplier effect of the Treasury assumptions or the composition of the government debt but Chancellors are still comforted because, somehow, the OBR has said that everything is okay.

If the authentication of financial forecasts by so-called independent parties is so desirable, why do the Government not apply the same logic to other arenas, such as pensioner poverty, child poverty, income and wealth inequalities, mental health and social care targets? Perhaps, when he is replying, the Minister can explain the political indifference to the social squalor created by relying on forecasts.

17:51

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the Minister on his appointment, if it is not too late to do so. I was delighted to learn from his interview with the Financial Times that he is working on breaking down

“very big obstacles to inward investment”.

This Bill is intended to contribute to financial stability; I imagine that the Government think that periods of relative financial instability have constrained foreign direct investment. That may or may not be true, but is it not also the case that foreign investors are more likely to invest in countries with relatively low rates of tax and relatively light and proportionate regulatory regimes?

The Government also make much of their democratic credentials but the effect of this Bill is to transfer power away from the democratically elected Government and the Chancellor of the Exchequer—accountable to the House of Commons—to an independent body that is, however well regarded it may be as a fount of prudential wisdom and the most formidable number cruncher bar none, still a quango. There are too many quangos and they have too much power, which has been relentlessly but steadily drawn away from Ministers. Most new substantive Acts of Parliament create a separate independent quango with its own offices, board of directors and substantial costs that are met by either taxpayers or consumers.

I was rather sceptical about the OBR when it was created by George Osborne. I did not believe that there was any chance that it would be a more accurate predictor of the consequences of any fiscal changes on the economy than the Treasury. Graham Stringer, speaking in another place last Wednesday, suggested that George Osborne created the OBR in order to trap an incoming Labour Government, restrict them and slow them down; he described it as

“an odd thing that we see this quango being gilded ”.—[Official Report, Commons, 4/9/24; col. 340.]

Is it not obvious that, as is reported in the media, the existence of the fiscal rules as adjudicated by the OBR severely limits the Government’s choices? Does the Minister agree that these limitations were behind the Chancellor’s decision to cancel infrastructure spending to meet public sector pay demands?

I am not sure that having the OBR really protects us at all from financial instability. I am pretty sure that the average voter does not have a clue what it is or what it does—but we have it, and we should make sure that it is as cost-effective as possible. I am sympathetic to the attempt made by my honourable friend in another place, Nigel Huddleston, who sought to amend the Bill to ensure that any changes in the fiscal rules would trigger a requirement for the OBR to issue a report. As the Government have committed to reduce the national debt, it is also critical that we understand the definition of debt in connection with the application of the fiscal rules. Without certainty in respect of these two points, it is hard to accept that the fiscal lock will be effective.

As was discussed in another place last week, it is also unclear what happens when a fiscal measure intended to be temporary—I understand that this means up to two years—runs on beyond that time limit. The example of income tax was given; it was introduced as a temporary measure in 1799 by Pitt the Younger. I ask the Minister whether there should be constraints on Ministers taking significant decisions on other measures that are not fiscal ones if it is considered that, severally or cumulatively, they may have an effect on GDP of over 1%.

Does the Minister not agree that it would be much better if the revisions to the Charter for Budget Responsibility had been published already? I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, on this. Can the Minister tell your Lordships whether there will be an opportunity to debate the changes to be made to the charter in due course? The separation of the charter revisions from the Bill itself gives the impression of undue haste. I am tempted to agree with those who think that the Bill is not necessary and is as much concerned with political theatre as with making changes that will have any real positive effect on the operations of the OBR.

17:56

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

My Lords, I strongly support this Bill and congratulate the Financial Secretary on the very able speech with which he introduced it. I do not see how an attempt to prevent a repeat of Liz Truss can be regarded as performative. Surely everybody would want to see that consequence.

My worry is that this Bill does not go far enough. In the past two years, we have seen a real failure of fiscal responsibility in the way in which Rishi Sunak and Jeremy Hunt justified big cuts in national insurance on the basis of public spending forecasts that were, as the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson hinted, completely unrealistic. This has now landed us in a very difficult position. When they made their public spending forecasts, they did not take account of public sector pay, which is part of Chancellor Reeves’ black hole of £22 billion. They did not take account of the need for social care reform, without which, as Wes Streeting has said, there cannot be any wider reform of the NHS.

In an excellent report published just today by Unison, we learn that local councils are at risk of going bust. There is also a crisis in our courts and prison system. The Conservatives committed themselves to a defence target of 2.5%, which they seriously said could be achieved by “efficiency savings”. These were completely unrealistic public spending forecasts on which tax decisions were taken. Worst of all, in order to finance them, the Government pencilled in a cut in public investment from about 2.6% of GDP to 1.9%, which is actually the reverse of what the country needs: a big increase in investment.

So, we have a big structural deficit on our current account that we have to correct. We can try efficiency savings, benefit freezes or putting off change and reform in the hope that growth will naturally increase, but I argue that tax will have to be part of the solution to this, because the public were misled by the last Government. However, when I say “tax”, I do not believe some people from our own side, who seem to think that we can deal with this problem by simply taxing the top 1%. Yes, the broadest back should bear the heaviest burden, but it should be broader than that to work without economic damage.

We need tons of investment to launch a new nuclear energy programme, invest in our railway infrastructure, reconfigure the national grid, apply AI to public services, build new towns which have adequate social housing and fund the modern industrial strategy based on promoting a new wave of entrepreneurialism from our excellent science base. I believe that we need tough fiscal rules; we have to plan for current spending and revenue to be brought quickly into balance. But at the same time, I agree with my noble friend Lord Eatwell that the rules have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate worthwhile, spend-to-save measures in public services and invest-to-grow measures for the wider economy. I believe that, although fiscal rules matter, a convincing growth strategy matters even more to the financial markets, and the bond markets will back our ambitions as long as our investment plans are well conceived.

Labour has a unique or huge opportunity ahead of it. We certainly need prudence and certainly need to be disciplined, but we also need radicalism—a radicalism from what I would describe as the politics of the centre ground.

18:01

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am pleased to welcome the Bill. My colleagues in 2010 were very closely involved in the creation of the OBR in order to provide an independent analysis of the UK economy free from party politics. The noble Lord, Lord Macpherson, talked about the importance of the absence of political bias, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen, echoed that same set of thoughts. We on these Benches believe that the OBR serves Parliament and the nation well.

A report from the OBR is not an examination judgment such as a “Good”, “Outstanding” or “Failing” from Ofsted. It is an analysis with which one can agree or disagree, but it enables policy and decisions to be made with deeper insight and challenged with greater insight. Obviously, forecasts must be part of that or the analysis is near meaningless.

Many noble Lords speaking today have suggested that there need to be further reforms, whether it is of fiscal rules, accounting rules or methodologies, and all that is worth looking at. We heard from the noble Lords, Lord Eatwell, Lord Altrincham, Lord Sikka and Lord Liddle, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes, Lady Wheatcroft and Lady Lawlor. I have to say that I have a particular sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, but it was also suggested by someone else—the name has escaped me—who challenged the current arrangement whereby the Treasury lays down the future spending plans that will be part of the OBR’s forecast. I would see much more scope for challenge there.

None of this is perfect, but to me it seems important that the OBR’s view does not dictate what policy or decisions will be. I say to the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble Lords, Lord Moylan and Lord Sikka, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, who came at this issue from many different angles, that any politician or Chancellor with some backbone can accept or reject the conclusions that will come from the OBR, but presumably they will then have to explain in some detail why, and that process of challenge is crucially important.

A modern economy and a modern Government are so complex that, frankly, except for a small handful of institutions that have very extensive resources, it is extremely difficult to try to understand the primary elements of economic performance. It is really like trying to unravel a bowl of spaghetti if you come at it with the kind of tools, for example, that I would or many of my colleagues would have. But it is not just those outside of government that can use the OBR analysis; it is also data either to agree with or to challenge. I know from my very brief period inside government that the OBR view at least does something to check some of the groupthink that almost inevitably grows up inside government and which is a constant risk. Here is one of the opportunities to challenge that groupthink.

Frankly, I was stunned in 2022 when the then Prime Minister Liz Truss and her Chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng suddenly announced a mini-Budget with the biggest tax cuts in 50 years and soaring borrowing with no OBR analysis or economic forecast attached. The Bank of England, which also had no advance warning, had to step in to prevent financial meltdown as the markets went into shock, both from the content of the mini-Budget but also from the manner of its doing. I will not dwell on the consequences, because, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said, the country gave its verdict at the last election, except to say that to this day ordinary people are still hurting, and hurting badly, from the consequences of that Budget and the manner of its introduction.

Why did the Truss Government turn their back on the OBR? They could easily have requested a draft forecast, and indeed one was offered by the OBR. I think it was because we had a series of Tory Governments which found economic truth at best “inconvenient”, and especially the consequences of Brexit—I heard that in some of the speeches today—and the permanent scarring of the economy that followed. Ministers would talk about the 2008 financial crash, Covid and the energy crisis arising from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, from on high or through self-denying ordinance, the B-word was banned, despite being far more damaging and a far more permanent blow. We heard speech after speech, month after month and year after year, in which there was omertà on that particular set of issues. As far as I can see, the OBR has never hesitated to name both the problem and the causes of a problem and to lay out its rationale. It can be challenged, but it has not flinched.

I very much hope that this new Government would never behave in the same way as Liz Truss—or any other Government, quite frankly; I hope that lessons have been learned. But the problem is that the horse has bolted. Financial markets will always suspect that a British Government are capable of the arrogance, self-interest and ideology to produce sweeping fiscal policy without any kind of unbiased or objective analysis—I think the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, made that point. That indeed is the value of this piece of legislation.

This is a money Bill, so I cannot propose amendments. Were it not so, it would indeed be nice to be able to go through a process of probing amendments at the very least to try to understand more about some of the terminology, to understand what a “fiscally significant” event is and more about the issues of “temporary” and “emergency”. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, raised similar points on trying to get greater clarity on this issue. I join others—I think the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, was the last to mention this—on wanting to understand how change can happen through the Charter for Budget Responsibility. We are going to be notified 28 days in advance, but I would love to have seen, at least from a Minister, some commitment to bring such issues to the Floor of the House for debate, which is where they belong—and remember that the Charter for Budget Responsibility was set up under the umbrella of primary legislation that started in this House. However, we are where we are, and when it comes indeed to the heart of the issue, do we support the Bill or do we not? We do.

18:09

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate with thoughtful contributions from all sides of your Lordships’ House.

From these Benches, we believe that information about the public finances should be open and transparent so that the public can hold the Government to account over decisions they make when it comes to spending taxpayers’ money. That is why the Conservative Government created the Office for Budget Responsibility in 2010, to ensure value for taxpayers’ money and that the Government of the day were making responsible decisions with the public finances. We therefore welcome the opportunity to ensure that this remains the case, but sadly that opportunity is not before your Lordships’ House this evening.

The Bill is so narrow in scope and effect that it can be assessed only for what it is; a naked opportunity to play political games and engage in a bit of political theatre, using a rushed and ill-thought-through Bill to fill a bit of parliamentary time. Its publication back in July was accompanied by an astonishingly overtly political statement from the Cabinet Office, as was noted by the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria; this statement had to be swiftly withdrawn. This is clear evidence that the Bill is the Government playing political games, as was also noted by my noble friend Lord Frost. To my mind, the Government are not taking the issues of transparency and accountability seriously when it comes to public finances, and this hastily assembled Bill reflects that.

The furore around the statements made on the publication of the Bill was one of the first missteps from this Government, missteps that have continued and intensified. Later this week, the disastrous decision to cut the winter fuel payment will be debated in your Lordships’ House. The Government have decided to buy off the train drivers—with no strings attached—from the pockets of pensioners. The impact of this cut is clearly significant, not only on pensioners themselves but on the public services that support them. But there is no impact assessment accompanying the cut, and certainly no report from the OBR. The timing of the cut could only be described charitably as ill conceived—out of the blue, with no notice, as we head into the winter period. It is all beginning to look a little ragged, and the Government have been in place for only just over two months.

I return to the Bill: what does it actually do? Not much. To summarise, I say that it sets a rather high and woolly trigger threshold for a tax and spending change above which a third-party body, the OBR, would have to write a report. There is no brake, no lock, no stop. It does not stop anybody from doing anything—much as, I hear from many noble Lords, they would like it to do so.

The Minister in his opening remarks rehashed quite a large quantity of doom-and-gloom, “Oh my goodness, we didn’t know what we were getting into” lines about the nation’s finances, echoed by the noble Lords, Lord Hain and Lord Liddle. I struggle to follow the relevance when it comes to this legislation. Many noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Moylan, pointed to the 2022 fiscal event as the single and only driver for this legislation.

The measures in the Bill are described by the Minister and the Treasury as a “fiscal lock”, which sounds very decisive. I have been trying to figure out who or what is being locked, fiscally or otherwise. It is not a lock. It is another example of the Government taking a very well-understood English word and simply redefining it to mean something else for political expedience. As my noble friend Lady Lawlor noted, it is merely fiscal advice—a report. The Bill does not create a lock. It does not empower the OBR to stop, to brake, or to prevent the Government taking fiscally significant action of any kind. I do not think that it was a lamentation by the Exchequer Secretary in the House of Commons, as noted by the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, when he mentioned that it did it not do that; it was simply a statement of fact. This Bill is so riddled with holes and high thresholds that I cannot see it having much effect at all, other than to use up a bit of parliamentary time while other more contentious Bills are being argued about with the unions and other stakeholders behind the scenes.

Yet there was an opportunity to improve this frankly underwhelming Bill. As noted by my noble friend Lord Trenchard, my opposition colleagues in the Commons tabled a helpful amendment which would have improved transparency and accountability. The amendment laid in the Commons would have required the OBR to publish a report not only when there are significant and permanent tax and spending changes but when fiscal rules, including the metrics used, are changed. Fiscal rules are important. They set the boundaries within which the Government have committed to operate tax and spending decisions. Fiscal rules are an important pillar, contributing to economic stability. It must be right that the Government should not be able to change their fiscal rules and the underlying metrics without some analysis and assessment of the impacts to enable scrutiny. As noted by my noble friend Lord Trenchard, changing the metric for the debt rule would allow for billions of pounds of higher borrowing, which would be funded by working people and other taxpayers. If large ad hoc tax and spending changes are to be subject to OBR analysis, surely ad hoc changes to the fiscal rules should also apply. These are, after all, very significant fiscal decisions and, as I said, contribute to economic stability. Sadly, the Government declined to accept the amendment.

This Government are beginning to show signs of fiscal incontinence, and I fear that they will seek to conjure up headroom by tinkering with the fiscal rules. Right on cue, only today the Trades Union Congress voted in favour of reforming the

“unnecessarily restrictive and arbitrary fiscal rules”,

citing a £500 billion public investment deficit. That is a pretty big increase. Is that the sort of quantum that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, has in mind? It is going to need quite a shift in the fiscal rules and quite some jiggery-pokery with tax rates. Rather than playing the hand that the Government have been dealt from the current pack, they may seek to simply swerve the difficult decisions and magic up a bigger pack of cards. Will the Minister confirm that, despite extreme pressure from the TUC, individual unions and the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, the Chancellor will stick to the current fiscal rules and metrics which guided the difficult decisions made by the last Government? Or will she make her difficult decisions substantially easier by changing the debt rule and piling the burden on to working people?

It is worth commenting on how the Bill works in practice, and I will turn to triggering the lock—or, in other words, exceeding the rather high and woolly threshold at which a third-party body must write a report. There are at least two elements to be considered by the OBR when deciding whether to write this report. The first is the size and nature of the tax and spending change. In the text of the draft Charter for Budgetary Responsibility, the Government state that “fiscally significant” is equivalent to 1% of nominal GDP in any single financial year in the forecast period. This is quite a substantial amount: just under £30 billion.

I accept that public sector spending is around £1.2 trillion and, as a percentage of that total, this is actually quite small. But realistically, discretionary spending is far less than that. Therefore, the Bill is setting a threshold which would be a massive change over and above what might be considered basal. It is so high as to be substantially meaningless—which possibly reverts to the rationale for the Bill in the first place being that single event. Furthermore, the impact must be in a single year, not the discounted value of the impact in the years in the forecasted period. Again, a carefully crafted but significant change could fall equally over many years and therefore escape scrutiny.

As importantly, how is the costing of the change decided? Who defines what is and is not a fiscal measure—a measure with a potential impact on the GDP of this country? I agree with the comments made by my noble friend Lady Lawlor, who also questioned the scope of what might be considered significant. Is the Minister able to give your Lordships’ House additional context about how that figure was arrived at and what will be in and out of scope? Might there be a temptation for a Chancellor to make one, two or more announcements totalling just under £30 billion, or 1% of GDP, over several years, and in doing so still substantially change the fiscal picture of our nation?

The second factor is that the change is excluded if it is temporary—if it will unwind within two years and is in response to an emergency. The world of the Treasury is littered with tax and spend decisions which were “temporary” and “emergency” at the time yet still became a permanent part of the fiscal picture. Many noble Lords mentioned income tax, which of course is one of the most famous, but I am sure there are many others—I think fuel duty was also mentioned.

This stipulation that temporary emergency measures be excluded puts the OBR in a difficult position. The OBR must decide what counts as a spending emergency and what does not—the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. The OBR is not part of decision-making within government, and it is reasonable to assume that the OBR will not have all the information available with which to reach a rather rapid judgment about whether something is an emergency.

If the OBR disagrees with Ministers, the process by which it would do so, and the consequences, are unclear. Would the OBR notify the Treasury of its decision, and would the Treasury then delay the announcement, or not? Would the OBR continue its work and produce a report, and over what timeframe? Would the OBR have full access to all the information relating to a temporary emergency measure? What impact would all this have on the markets?

I hope the Minister agrees that, in the haste to get this Bill into the current legislative gap, there are still significant questions to be answered. Has he considered whether the OBR should be under the same obligations when temporary emergency measures are announced but given the latitude to produce the report after the announcement has been made?

I have some questions around OBR decision-making, assuming that the measure is in scope of the arrangements currently in the Bill. How much notice will the OBR get that a fiscally significant announcement is planned? How much time will the OBR have to prepare and present its assessment, and how detailed will that assessment be? Is it the Minister’s expectation that a fiscally significant announcement will be accompanied by an assessment or a statement from the OBR setting out the reasons why one is not appropriate? There is a big grey area there in which I am sure the markets will show great interest. Will the OBR publish a summary of the information that it used to reach its determination one way or the other?

I note that the information in the draft Charter for Budget Responsibility text published on 18 July was quite limited. I would be grateful if the Minister could let your Lordships’ House know whether there will be any further guidance for the OBR around this, because I see pitfalls everywhere—where it may be charged with being too political when politics should not be part of what it does.

I listened with great interest to the wise words of many noble Lords when it came to the OBR’s governance and operations, particularly those of my noble friend Lady Noakes and, of course, my colleague and noble friend Lord Altrincham. The OBR cannot itself be beyond scrutiny, and I hope that the Minister will consider their words, alongside wider input into how we measure and present our public finances from the noble Lords, Lord Eatwell, Lord Davies of Brixton and Lord Sikka and the noble Baronesses, Lady Wheatcroft and Lady Bennett. There is an opportunity to continue to debate how public finances appear in front of the public, and it is incredibly important.

To conclude, the Bill before your Lordships’ House can be described only as a disappointment. It is with sorrow that I reflect on the political theatre accompanying it in political statements from the Cabinet Office and in contributions in the Commons and, to a lesser extent, your Lordships’ House. When he took office, the new Prime Minister seemed to imply that this Government would occupy the highest pedestal and would be above petty and theatrical politics. It is clear now that this is not the case. This Bill will be the first to receive Royal Assent under the new Labour Government; part of me thinks that is oddly appropriate. This Bill cannot be amended in your Lordships’ House, so to the statute book it will go.

18:24

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to close this debate on the Bill. I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions and questions.

As promised in our manifesto, we will support and strengthen the Office for Budget Responsibility. This Bill delivers on that simple but important step to help restore economic stability by bringing transparency and independent scrutiny into law, ensuring that every fiscal event which makes significant changes to taxation or spending will be subject to an independent report by the OBR.

Let us remind ourselves why this Bill is needed. Although the existing fiscal framework requires at least two OBR forecasts a year, there is currently no requirement on the Treasury to subject announcements on all fiscally significant measures to independent OBR scrutiny. In effect, that means that there are times when the Government can make fiscally significant announcements while opting out of both transparency and scrutiny. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said, this was a key factor in the disastrous Liz Truss mini-Budget, which did so much damage to our economy and to households, which are still paying the price for it today.

The previous Government knew that the measures they were taking were both unfunded and unaffordable but, as they were not bound by a forecast, they wilfully prevented one from taking place. That cannot be allowed to happen again. This Bill takes five important steps, which, in combination, will deliver on that commitment.

First, it requires that, before the Government make any fiscally significant announcement to Parliament, the Treasury must ask the OBR to prepare a report which takes the announcement into account. This guarantees in law that, from now on, every fiscally significant change to tax and spending will be subject to independent scrutiny from the OBR. The noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, suggested that certain announcements should have been accompanied by such a forecast under these arrangements, a question also raised by my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton and the noble Baroness, Lady Vere of Norbiton.

I will look first at the Chancellor’s July Statement. It did not represent a change to the funding allocated to departments or to borrowing plans. This Bill is aimed at ensuring independent scrutiny of significant fiscal announcements that would represent risks to macroeconomic stability. The threshold is set at 1% of GDP or more in any year. None of the policy announcements mentioned by the noble Baroness would qualify as fiscally significant within the definition of the Bill. However, that 1% is of course cumulative, and, unlike the previous Government at the time of the disastrous mini-Budget, when they wilfully prevented a forecast from taking place, the Chancellor has commissioned the OBR to deliver a full economic and fiscal forecast, which will be presented alongside the Budget on 30 October. This is when the Government will set out their fiscal plans, including how they meet our fiscal rules, in the usual way.

My noble friend Lord Eatwell spoke about those fiscal rules, as did the noble Baronesses, Lady Wheatcroft, Lady Lawlor and Lady Vere, my noble friends Lord Sikka and Lord Liddle and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. The Government’s manifesto set out robust fiscal rules which will ensure that the current budget moves into balance, so that day-to-day costs are met by revenues, and debt must be falling as a share of the economy by the fifth year of the forecast. The Chancellor will set out the Government’s full fiscal plan, including the precise details of those fiscal rules, in the usual way: at the Budget in October, alongside an economic and fiscal forecast produced by the OBR. A revised OBR charter will be published at that point.

To further address the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, I point out that the Chancellor said, in her Mais Lecture earlier this year, that she

“will report on wider measures of public sector assets and liabilities at fiscal events, showing how the health of the public balance sheet is bolstered by good investment decisions”.

The noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, asked about the costs of the asset purchase scheme. The OBR provides detailed projections of the underlying cost arising from QT and the impact on different fiscal metrics. The latest OBR forecast for the financial year 2024-25 put HMT transfers to the APF at £34.5 billion. The separation of fiscal and monetary policy is essential, so the Government do not comment on the conduct or effectiveness of monetary policy.

Secondly, the Bill gives the OBR the power to decide independently to produce a report, if it judges the measures in a fiscal event to be fiscally significant. The noble Lord, Lord Frost, raised the question of how much impact this Bill will have, a point also made by the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble Baroness, Lady Vere. As my noble friend Lord Liddle said, we need look back only at the disastrous Liz Truss mini-Budget and at the current cost of the average mortgage—£300 a month higher than before that mini-Budget—to see how serious the impact of sidelining the OBR can be.

Of course, the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, is correct to say that the problems with that mini-Budget went much wider than just the absence of a forecast. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said, the announcement of £46 billion of unfunded tax cuts led to an unprecedented increase in borrowing costs. As a result, the value of sterling fell to a record low against the dollar, with a near collapse in the pension market. As my noble friend Lord Murphy rightly said, explicitly sidelining the OBR meant that no one knew how any of this would be paid for or how it would impact on the then Government’s fiscal rules. There is no doubt that this contributed to uncertainty in the markets. As the now Shadow Chancellor said at the time, the mini-Budget damage was, in part,

“caused by the lack of a forecast”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/10/22; col. 395.]

The noble Baroness, Lady Vere, described this Bill as political theatre. However, what is particularly notable is the lack of an apology to the British people from the noble Baroness in her speech this evening for the damage that the Liz Truss mini-Budget did to family finances. I know that they are determined not to apologise, but I am not sure that is a wise strategy. As long as they refuse to do so, they may well continue to pay the electoral price for it.

To address the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, and my noble friend Lord Sikka, this Bill will prevent the sidelining of the OBR by giving it the power to start an assessment if the Government announce fiscally significant policies without one. This means that the mini-Budget, and any other fiscally significant announcements like it, would have been subjected to the scrutiny of an independent OBR report. This Bill ultimately is about transparency and scrutiny.

The noble Lords, Lord Frost and Lord Moylan, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, whom I thank for his kind words, criticised some independent regulators. I respectfully disagree. This Bill ensures transparency and accountability. It does not give the OBR policy-making powers. As my noble friend Lord Sikka and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, rightly said, policy is very much for the elected Government. By adding a further level of scrutiny to fiscally significant announcements, this Bill takes nothing away from the power of this Parliament—in fact, greater transparency surely increases accountability. This Bill requires that policy-making is subject to proper scrutiny. Independent scrutiny of the public finances promotes greater accountability to the public, provides certainty for the markets and investors, and supports economic stability. We have seen what happens when the OBR is sidelined—higher interest rates and mortgage misery for millions.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes and Lady Vere, raised the question of the OBR’s accountability. The OBR is accountable to Parliament. The Treasury Committee in the Commons can call in the chair and other OBR members, and both oral and written evidence submitted by the OBR are available on the Parliament website. It must also consent to the appointment of the OBR chair. In addition, a full update to the charter will be published on 30 October alongside the Budget, on which Members in the other place will vote in the usual way.

The noble Lord, Lord Macpherson, and my noble friends Lord Eatwell and Lord Liddle, noted that the Chancellor’s Statement in July set out robust reforms to further increase transparency in the public finances. In the light of the scale of the overspend left by the previous Government, mentioned by my noble friends Lord Hain and Lord Murphy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, about which the OBR had not been informed, the Chancellor also announced additional measures to strengthen the fiscal framework. These require the Treasury to share with the OBR its own assessment of immediate public spending pressures, enshrining that rule in the Charter for Budget Responsibility and establishing that spending reviews will take place every two years, with a minimum planning horizon of three years to avoid uncertainty for departments and to bring stability to our public finances. The noble Lord, Lord Macpherson, asked about further reforms to the OBR, and I will of course look at his suggestions.

The noble Lords, Lord Altrincham and Lord Frost, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, questioned the OBR’s forecasting record and some of the assumptions that the OBR makes. As my noble friend Lord Chandos said, this Bill concerns the scrutiny and transparency around fiscally significant announcements. However, I note that the IMF has said that the OBR’s analysis

“can be considered as best-practice, and could be used as a benchmark by other advanced countries”.

Meanwhile, the OECD has described the OBR as a

“model independent fiscal institution”.

The OBR’s forecasts for GDP and the public finances have typically been more accurate than the previous forecasts made by the Treasury. As the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, said, the OBR is required by primary legislation to publish an annual assessment of the accuracy of its forecasts. All previous forecast evaluation reports are available on the OBR’s website.

The third element of this Bill is to define a measure or combination of measures as “fiscally significant” if they exceed a specified percentage of GDP, with the OBR charter then setting the precise threshold at 1% of GDP. The noble Lords, Lord Macpherson and Lord Bilimoria, and the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, discussed the setting of the 1% threshold. The purpose of the legislation is to ensure that large-scale fiscal announcements that could undermine macroeconomic stability cannot take place without independent scrutiny. This requires a threshold that is targeted at fiscally significant announcements. The current threshold will ensure that the provisions are triggered only when appropriate to support macroeconomic stability.

To answer the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, the 1% of GDP threshold is cumulative and treats savings and costs separately. This means that announcements made by government to Parliament in any financial year in the forecast period can be added together and trigger these arrangements. It will not be possible to simply announce savings to offset costs to avoid it. The Treasury will keep track of announcements as they are made over time and share these with the OBR as requested. This is an important part of how these arrangements will hold the Government to account on spending commitments.

Fourthly, this Bill ensures that measures do not apply to responses to emergencies. The Bill does this by not applying in respect of measures that are intended to have a temporary effect and which are in respect of an emergency. The OBR charter will define “temporary” as any measure that is intended to end within two years. In an emergency—for example, during a pandemic such as Covid-19—it may be necessary for the Government to take rapid action. In these cases, it would not be appropriate to hold back the response to the emergency until such time as a forecast could be produced.

My noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton and the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Vere, sought clarity on the definition of “emergency”. Given the unexpected and unpredictable nature of events, it is not possible to set out a precise definition of an emergency in legislation. However, the Bill contains clear limitations to ensure that no Government can inappropriately avoid independent scrutiny on its significant fiscal announcements.

The first of these limitations is that the updated Charter for Budget Responsibility notes that, when the Treasury believes something is an emergency, it would need to make it clear why it considers the situation to be an emergency. Secondly, this can be relevant only for temporary measures which are intended to end within two years. Thirdly, as set out in the updated charter, this will not simply be for the Treasury to decide. The OBR will have the discretion to prepare a report if it reasonably disagrees on whether the situation in question is an emergency. If it were to reasonably disagree, the OBR would be required to notify the Treasury Committee in the House of Commons of its opinion. I repeat that, in emergencies, it may be appropriate for the Chancellor to commission a forecast from the OBR to follow measures that need to be announced or implemented rapidly. That would happen in the usual way.

Finally, the Bill requires the Government to publish any updates to the detail of these arrangements, such as the threshold level at which they are triggered, in draft form, at least 28 days before the charter is laid before the House of Commons. This is a key safeguard in the Bill, preventing any future Government from choosing to ignore these arrangements by updating the charter without clear parliamentary consent.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lords, Lord Moylan and Lord Bilimoria, raised the question of scrutiny of this Bill in your Lordships’ House. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Frost, noted, this is for the Speaker in the House of Commons to determine under the Parliament Act 1911. This Bill focuses on the scrutiny of fiscally significant announcements—tax and spend—which is the remit of the other place. To reassure the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, the House of Commons will debate and approve the updated charter.

The changes introduced in this Bill are an important step in bringing much-needed stability to our economy, so that we never again see a repeat of the disastrous Liz Truss mini-Budget and the damage that it did to family finances. By empowering the OBR and ensuring that an independent assessment will accompany all fiscally significant announcements, it will improve transparency and accountability. Economic stability is the rock upon which all else must be built; it is the essential prerequisite for growth. This Bill is an important step as we fix the foundations of our economy, rebuild Britain and make every part of our country better off.

Bill read a second time. Committee negatived. Standing Order 44 having been dispensed with, the Bill was read a third time and passed.