Mental Health Bill [HL]

Baroness Murphy Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th January 2025 Lords Chamber

So the need for identifying a deficit in communication, in various areas, and the need for therapists to address this issue are obviously important. The Bill goes some of the way, certainly in the Explanatory Notes, but I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, that it needs to go further. I hope the Minister will be receptive to that idea, either in the Bill or certainly in the code of practice.

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 49 on this issue. I do not disagree with anything that has been said about the vital need for communication and to ensure that the patient understands what is happening and has access to specialist help. But I particularly want to comment on the proposal that speech and language therapists should become responsible clinicians.

The role of responsible clinician under the Mental Health Act is really quite onerous. Of the 50,000 or so clinicians who take on the role and are appointed the responsible clinician when somebody is detained, the vast majority are consultant doctors. Fewer than 100—0.002%—have been psychologists or nurses. The appetite for taking on this role is low and, of all the members of the team who could take it on, it would be appropriate only in a very small minority of cases for it to be speech and language therapists. I do not want to rule them out because I know how valuable these people are, but we must see that, in practice, this will probably not fly very far. It is important that we concentrate on how we get proper communications, but this particular amendment would probably not find favour. I do not think that profession is yet trained to the full extent of what would be required for that role. Although I hope that it will be one day, this Bill is maybe too early for it.

[Lord Patel (CB)]

My Lords, with the greatest respect to the noble Baroness, I did not suggest—and I did not hear any other noble Lord suggest—for a minute that language and speech therapists would become clinicians in their own respect. I said that they would be part of a team that would help to establish appropriate communication. As doctors, we are not the best people for that—so I do not see how the amendment cannot fly, when there is a need for such people.

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

I entirely agree with the noble Lord. However, the reality is that the responsible clinician, as mentioned in Amendment 49 to Clause 10, has a wide range of roles. It is very onerous and specific, so this is not likely to be a good idea for a speech and language therapist. I agree with the rest of what everybody has said.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as an honorary fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, but without any qualifications, unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. For the reasons that have already been given, I entirely agree with the whole group of amendments, which have been proposed so much better than I could do—so I do not propose to say any more.

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[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

Can I just add to what the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, just said? I have never before sat through a Committee where the Minister has been restricted in going beyond any advisory time. She should say what she darn well likes. She may have to respond to an awful lot of complicated spots in this; there is no reason at all why she should not carry on, in my view—and that of everyone else in the Committee, I think.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness for helping me out there.

I referred to my invitation to the royal college. Given this commitment to pursue these changes, that will be subject to agreement with the royal college. I hope that will be of assistance to noble Lords.

I turn now to Amendment 52 in the name of my noble friend Lady Whitaker, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and my noble friend Lord Bradley. It seeks to ensure that clinicians consider a patient’s communication needs and make reasonable adjustments as part of the new clinical checklist; this requires clinicians to consider a number of matters when deciding on a patient’s treatment, with the aim of making treatment more patient-centred.

We share the goals of this amendment. However, the checklist already requires the clinician to take steps to assist and encourage the patient to participate as fully as possible in the decision-making process. We consider assistance to include making reasonable adjustments to account for a patient’s communication needs, which is something that noble Lords have rightly raised as being of concern. We very much intend to make this clear in the code of practice, which will already provide specific guidance on the need to make reasonable adjustments under the Equality Act. For example, the clinician should provide information in an accessible form, perhaps by involving an interpreter, a signer or someone who can communicate via the person’s preferred communication method.

My noble friend Lady Whitaker has also tabled Amendment 60, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and my noble friend Lord Bradley. It seeks to ensure that the new statutory care and treatment plan introduced by the Bill covers

“information about a patient’s communication disability, difficulty, or difference”,

and how these might be identified and supported. The Bill makes it clear that a statutory care and treatment plan is a plan made in accordance with regulations, so we intend to set out in regulations that a patient’s plan must include, among other things, information that is important for the treating clinical team to be made aware of during the patient’s detention. This is to encourage the treating clinician, as noble Lords have spoken about, to consider the individual needs of patients—including communication needs—so that the appropriate reasonable adjustments can be made. A record of how their needs will be supported should be evident throughout their plan, which should, as far as possible, be developed in consultation with the patient and others, such as their family members.

Regarding the identification of any communication needs, as already set out in the Mental Health Act code of practice under the Equality Act, mental health professionals should already be identifying and making any reasonable adjustments to account for a person’s communication needs. Where applicable, a patient’s care (education) and treatment review may also identify and make recommendations about a patient’s communication needs. We intend to set out in regulations that these recommendations must be attached to the patient’s statutory care and treatment plan, so that they can inform planning and delivery of care. I hope that this will reassure noble Lords that the patient’s statutory care and treatment plan should cover any communication needs and how they will be met, but in reflecting on this debate I will ensure that the actions we are proposing take account of this.

Amendments 112 and 114, tabled by my noble friend Lady Whitaker, would require managers of hospitals or registered establishments to provide information in an accessible format when discharging duties under Clauses 39 and 41 to give information on complaints to detained and conditionally discharged patients. I agree that it is important that all patients can access information about their detention, including the complaints process, and in a format that is accessible to them. However, the clauses are already drafted with the overriding obligation that the patient is helped in whatever manner is practical to understand the information being given to them. Therefore, it is unnecessary to add the words in the amendment proposed by my noble friend. Additionally, hospital managers have an existing duty under the Equality Act to make reasonable adjustments based on disability, which is the legal basis for ensuring that information for patients is accessible.

I reiterate that I understand that communication needs will not always be related to the letter of the Equality Act. There is already guidance in the mental health code of practice on how a patient’s communication needs should be considered when providing information on complaints. When we come to revise the code, we will engage with stakeholders to explore whether further guidance on the complaints process, including how information on complaints should be provided, is required.

Amendment 118 in the name of my noble friend, supported by my noble friend Lord Bradley and the noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Bourne, seeks to ensure that the advance choice document template is available in a format that the service user can understand. We strongly agree with the principles of this amendment and are committed to mitigating any barriers that people may face to creating an advance choice document or making their wishes and feelings known in advance. Where a person wishes to make an advance choice document, our intention is that they are given a standard template to complete, alongside supporting guidance and, where the individual wishes to receive it, the support of mental health practitioners. The template should prompt the individual to think about the sort of things they may wish to consider and decide in advance of becoming unwell. We will work to develop these resources.

We also plan to set out in guidance to health commissioners that these resources and the support provided by mental health practitioners must be delivered in a way that is accessible to individuals and that responds to their needs. That will be in line with the Equality Act and the public sector equality duty. Of course, if a person wishes to create a record of their wishes and feelings in another format that is easier, they absolutely may do so. We have purposefully made it that individuals do not need to complete a prescribed form in order for their advance wishes and feelings to be considered at a later stage. I agree with the need and hope that this will provide maximum accessibility and increase patient voice and autonomy.

Finally, Amendments 119 and 126, tabled by my noble friend Lady Whitaker and supported by my noble friend Lord Bradley and the noble Lord, Lord Patel, seek to ensure that the support provided to people to create an advance choice document is responsive to the needs of people with a

“communication disability, difficulty or difference”.

I agree that is important. To achieve this, it is important that support and information around advance choice documents respond to people’s needs individually, so that no one is unfairly disadvantaged. That includes communication needs.

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[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

I pay tribute to the work that the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, has done in relation to this matter. This is a matter that we considered in great detail in the Joint Committee. I am grateful that that gives us the opportunity to discuss in the round the legal basis on which people are detained. The independent review did not recommend what is currently in the Bill, which is the removal of learning disabilities and autism from the Act. The Joint Committee’s report quotes it saying,

“the risk of completely removing learning disabilities and autism from the Act is too high”.

The noble Baroness, Lady Browning, outlined one of the reasons for that, which is that if you remove the legal basis for detention under the Mental Health Act, then the bucket that these individuals and patients would fall into without Amendment 5 would be the Mental Capacity Act.

In the consideration by the Joint Committee, there is the other danger that—when there is no co-occurring mental health condition—you end up with people coming through the criminal justice system, instead of being detained under the Mental Health Act. That is the worst of all the evils we could be discussing here today and would be completely inappropriate.

I would be grateful if the Minister will ensure two things when we know that these are dangers: first, an increase in diagnoses of co-occurring mental health conditions to use the Mental Health Act; and, secondly, an increase in the use of the Part III criminal justice provisions. It is important that we know the exact statistics for the group with learning disabilities and autism before implementation of the Act. Then we would know whether the Act has caused an increase in diagnoses of co-occurring mental health disorders and an increase in the use of the criminal justice system.

I believe that currently 39% of people detained with learning disabilities and autism are detained under Part III of the Act. I see the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, nodding. It is important that we remember that New Zealand tried this, removing learning disabilities and autism from its mental health legislation. I cannot remember whether it had the co-occurring mental health diagnosis provision, but, only a few years later, it had to amend the law, as it had caused an increased number of learning disabilities and autism patients to come in through the criminal justice system.

What would be the position if the Bill were amended in accordance with Amendment 5? The evidence that we received in Joint Committee was that there would be no patients—that community facilities would be at a level where they could not think of anybody who would need to be detained. I wish the world were thus, but the ideal world portrayed in that way does not exist. Even with the community facilities that we all wish to exist, it seems clear to me that there would be circumstances in which there would still be a need to detain.

I recognise that, in reality, we may see that increase in diagnoses of co-occurring disorders. Physicians may reach for that to protect someone—to detain them to get them treatment. However, it was made clear to us that 28 days is a relatively short time. You can be detained for assessment, but it can take many days to get the level of distress down—I do not want or like to use the word “meltdown”—to assess the mental health of the person and whether there is a co-occurring disorder.

The Joint Committee came up with a special exceptional tribunal that would still allow the Mental Health Act to be used in that small number of cases—once community facilities are as we would like them to be—to continue detention. Why? For the reasons outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning: the protections under the Mental Health Act are much greater. You have the nominated person, you can go to the Mental Health Act tribunal, and—ker-ching—you get Section 117 aftercare, which, of course, is not available under the Mental Capacity Act.

If Amendment 5 were accepted, we would have no Mental Health Act, no co-occurring diagnoses, no criminal justice system—I hope—and no Mental Capacity Act to refer to. If a clinician is in that circumstance where someone is so distressed and they do not have that diagnosis in the 28 days, where is the law? We are not talking about the practicalities here. Where is the law?

In any event, the Mental Capacity Act does not apply to under-16s. So the risk would be an increased use of what we now know as High Court DoLS. These are not DoLS under the Mental Capacity Act. They are DoLS under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. They are a most unsatisfactory way of restraining the liberty of under-16s.

Only two or three weeks ago, the Children’s Commissioner issued a report outlining the problem, and outlining that, already, some children with learning disabilities and autism are under a High Court DoLS. It is a matter that your Lordships’ House needs to consider. Nearly a thousand children are detained under a High Court DoLS.

Obviously, the Mental Capacity Act would have applied to 16 and 17 year-olds and adults so where does that leave those vulnerable adults? Where is there a power to detain them? The Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act will both have gone. If clinicians are in that circumstance where there is no co-occurring mental health disorder, there is a vacuum which may end up being filled by the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court using vulnerable adults. We will have created another little bucket of people. I accept the criticism made by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, about DoLS under the Mental Capacity Act. They are supposed to be replaced by protection of liberty safeguards, but those are not in force yet.

If we accept Amendment 5, are we going to create more work for the High Court with clinicians in that situation because the law will not have provided any means for them to detain? I recognise and repeat that the practicality will probably be a co-occurring mental health disorder but, as far as I understand it, that is where the law will be left if Amendment 5 is accepted.

Although the Mental Capacity Act is far from ideal, I hope the Minister can help us understand what the situation would be if we were to accept the amendment. As I say, for the under-16s it would be more cases under High Court DoLS, as far I understand it.

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

My Lords, I have an amendment in this group but I want to speak particularly to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, for her good sense. I agree with every word she has said.

I had earlier tabled amendments to Clause 3 and Schedule 1 to give effect to opposing any change in the definition of mental disorder for the meaning of the Act in the same way as Sir Simon Wessely’s committee recommended and I withdrew them in favour of a compromise amendment because I was not sure, to be honest, that I would get here at all today. I have. I am not quite sure how many more I will be able to get to but for the moment I am here so I will speak to this one.

I want to make it clear right from the start that if we had changed our legislation to be a hybrid Bill that was a fusion of a mental capacity and a mental health Bill we would not be in this pickle because we would have capacity-based legislation and therefore we could have proceeded without any of these silly criteria for what is this diagnosis and what is another. As the legislation is at the moment, I believe the move to remove autism and learning disabilities from what is a mental disorder is frankly bizarre, akin to having Parliament establish that for the purposes of legislation, the earth is flat and the sun goes round the earth. Galileo had the same problem. I want to ensure that Hansard will record that not everyone is in agreement with the notion that autism and learning disabilities are somehow separate and different from other mental disorders.

Neurodiversity, which, of course, exists, is the term used to describe statistical outliers from the norm and, of course, as for many other mental states, there can be many positive and interesting aspects of alternative ways of thinking about and responding emotionally to the world that enrich society. I understand that many people with autism and learning disabilities do just that and that is where neurodiversity has been so supported by people who want to ensure that they are recognised as individuals and citizens just as the rest of us are. But that does not change the fundamentals.

I know noble Lords know that I was a professor of psychiatry for many years at the University of London but I ought to mention at this point that I also have a special interest in mental health legislation because I was for six years vice-chair of the Mental Health Act Commission. I co-authored this now much revered code of practice for the 1983 Act. It is actually my only bestseller—if only it did not say Secretary of State on it—and I know first-hand how the Acts and codes are used. That is why I do not get involved in the principles of where this should be. The code does have statutory effect, by the way—I am sorry that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has left, because I can reassure her it does have statutory force. I was also UK advisor to the WHO on mental health and older people and was exposed to the developments in mental health legislation in other jurisdictions, not only in the UK, with the Scottish and Northern Ireland Acts as they were being developed, but in the Republic of Ireland when it introduced its new Act, and abroad in English-speaking legislatures.

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[Baroness Browning (Con)]

The noble Baroness asked me a question. Was it rhetorical? I wonder whether she could accept that autism is different. From the time that Kanner first identified autism, which is what a lot of psychiatric bases are based on—we then had Asperger and others, and the very good, more recent documentation from Lorna Wing, with whom I am sure she is familiar—autism has been different. If people doubt that, it is important to note that, apart from the Mental Health Act, the only other condition, however you label it, to have its own Act of Parliament is autism. In the Autism Act 2009, this Parliament unanimously agreed—in both Houses—that autism is different and deserved its own Act of Parliament.

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

I would say that all mental disorders are different but that they cannot all have their own Acts of Parliament. I do not accept that autism is different. Of course, it is different in the way that it manifests—

[Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)]

I will make a slightly cheeky intervention, if I may, on the noble Baroness. I am not weighing into the debate that is taking place but simply make this point. Does she accept that the fact that a condition is listed in the DSM or the ICD is not itself definitive? Until 1973, homosexuality was listed as a psychiatric condition in the DSM and until 1990 it was, I believe, included as a psychiatric diagnosis in the ICD. Therefore, that is not the strongest evidential basis for her claims.

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

I agree with the noble Lord, but the reality is that we use DSM-3 and ICD-11 in the international classification of disorders. If we in Britain are to go outside that, for reasons of our own, then we had better have some pretty good ideas why that should be. I am not so sure that we have them.

The Wessely review rejected the notion because, as the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, said, it carried serious risks that individuals would be extruded and neglected, the opposite of what is intended. Similar anxieties were expressed in the development and creation of other Acts—I am sorry that I am going to go on longer than the advisory—so as not to exclude anybody from this group, because we want mental disorder to be an inclusive thing and not to exclude whole groups of people. Their protections are gone if we exclude them.

I accept that almost all the developments for autism and learning disabilities in the Bill are very positive. They will really improve the way that people think about autism and will have an extremely beneficial effect on trying to develop services and improve training, but there is no evidence that changing the criteria under the Act will do anything to improve it. Getting money into services and service design is what we need and not a change in the legislation for criteria. As the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ group of specialists in learning disabilities have pointed out, the vast majority of them do not want this change in legislation. We should think very carefully before we submit people to something when we do not know what will be unleashed as a result.

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I accept that there is a gap, but I do not believe it is best filled by detaining people or assuming that detention is the first step. I look forward to the Minister exploring with the Committee exactly what the Government’s intention will be if this provision in the Bill is enacted and what provision will be put in place to ensure that there is not a backdoor and that people with learning disabilities and autism who are clearly at the end of the 28 days would have appropriate provision for their needs to be met. It is absolutely vital to understand this in Committee to determine exactly how we go forward without detention being the automatic assumption of what is required when this gap needs to be filled.

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

What does the noble Lord think will happen to the people in the gap?

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

As I said, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, pointed out what happens internationally, in Trieste in Italy, for example, and I therefore suggest that good international comparisons and practice could be enacted in legislation to ensure that the needs of as many people as possible are met in the community, rather than them being held in detention because the provision is not there. That is exactly what will happen unless this gap is dealt with by looking at what is required rather than looking at the gap and continuing detention.

[Lord Hardie (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise that I did not speak at Second Reading, but I have been listening to this interesting debate and it seems to me that Clause 5 is introducing the concept of detention in extreme cases, where there is a risk of serious harm to the health or safety of the patient or another person unless the patient is detained. That is the reason for the detention: to protect the patient from serious harm to himself or herself, or to protect others from serious harm.

As I read the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, it simply seeks to suggest, or to put on the statute book, that someone suffering from autism or a learning disability would not satisfy the test in Clause 5. But the amendment permits the admission to hospital of someone with a learning disability for the purpose of assessing whether he or she has a mental disorder. I am not sure that this amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, would result in people slipping through the net.

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

I wrote the amendment in a terrible hurry as a compromise amendment when I could not table the amendment that I really wished to table, which was seeking to get back to having clarity about the diagnostic criteria. I apologise if that was not the provision that the noble Lord wanted in the Bill—I am not sure that I want it very much either. I do not have any great devotion to the proposed new clause; it was just a way of trying to address this leaving of the gap. We used to do that, by the way. After the 1983 Act, noble Lords will remember that we dropped alcohol addictions and drug misuse from the Act, saying that we could not detain people for those reasons alone. What happened was that there was total neglect for the next 20 years until voluntary organisations and local authorities got moving and said, “This won’t do—we must do something”.

Noble Lords should remember that that is what happens. If you leave somebody out of protective legislation, they will not be included; they will be neglected and they will end up in prison. That is what Sir Simon Wessely thought and it is what the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, has been talking about. I can guarantee that nobody will be interested in autistic meltdowns if there is no way in which to intervene to save a family from having that person with them, seven days a week and 24 hours a day, during the period of this terrible disturbance.

Community services are great. I urge noble Lords to visit Trieste, as it has brilliant services in a tiny area; it is one of the very few in Italy, and it continues to work very well. It is cited all over the world, and that is very good. But this is Britain, with 80 million people and massively underfunded services, and it ain’t going to happen. I want to know what will happen to those people noble Lords would like to see neglected until such time as the Government produce some alternative provision.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I do not think that I or anybody else who has a different opinion from the noble Baroness wants to see those people being neglected. We have a different view. The issue I have with her stance is that the evidence is that putting people with learning disabilities and autism in a psychiatric hospital—and that is where they will go if there is no provision, because that is where they go at present—is damaging. It is not the correct provision. I believe that what she is arguing for—to continue the neglect of provision by putting them somewhere—is significantly not in their best interests and causes damage.

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[Baroness Barker (LD)]

I have not spoken in this debate so far, but I have listened intently to everything that everybody has said, including the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. Members of the Select Committee will remember—they could not forget—the evidence given to us by particular witnesses who have autism and have been through the trauma of being detained. They made to us, unforgettably, the point that there are some people with autism and learning disabilities for whom detention is an aggravating factor.

I happen not to agree completely with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, that there should be an end to all detention, although I have some sympathy with her arguments. I believe there are people for whom detention is necessary—both for them and for the safety of others—but they should be held in mental health facilities and not the criminal justice system.

I listened intently to the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. I understand that it may be absolutely correct to define people with autism and learning disabilities as having a disorder, but we have moved on over 20 or 30 years to understanding that their manifestations and treatment are different from those of other mental health conditions. There is therefore a problem in having the diagnosis and treatment carried out by the same people. I hoped that she would explain, but she did not, why keeping people within the definition would improve their care.

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

Does the noble Baroness accept that, in talking about treatment, we are talking about care, education and training in social circumstances? Treatment is not about medication, which may be totally inappropriate, but about looking at the individual’s developmental needs as a whole, which include a whole raft of things. I agree that it is not just about psychiatrists or psychologists; it can be about teachers, people with a special understanding of speech and language, and so on. I would never deny that you have to encompass the whole thing—I would promote it.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

I am sure that the noble Baroness would. Does she accept that for some people, particularly those with autism and learning disabilities, being held in conditions that are noisy, filled with light and full of people they do not know—in which they are made to feel completely powerless and do not know what will happen to them next—will be a contributory factor to their illness? I make that point to the noble Baroness, Lady Merron. She talks about choice, but what increased protections are there in this Bill for people with autism or learning disabilities who find themselves in detention, which is an aggravating factor causing them to be wrongly diagnosed?

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Baroness Murphy Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 25th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

My Lords, this is a long-overdue Bill, as many have said, and I hope it will progress through the House as quickly as possible. Quite why it has taken six years for Sir Simon Wessely’s report to be acted on, I am not sure, but I am particularly pleased that we have got advance directives in, even if in a slightly watered-down form.

However, there are some rather troubling changes that have been squeezed in recently for reasons that are difficult to understand, and I shall want to explore those in Committee. There are differences between the criteria for Parts 2 and 3 of the Bill, for example, which is bizarre, and I am scared that the changes in relation to learning difficulties and autism, in spite of all the good intentions, will be extremely difficult to implement. Throughout the Bill, there is an assumption that if you change the legislation, it happens, but we know very well that it does not—it takes years to implement—so I am concerned about that overall. Having said that, I will remain on the theme that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, picked up. We will leave the rest until Committee, where we are going to have very detailed debates.

It is now 20 years since I came into this House with the certainty of the optimistic new girl that we would see a new mental health Bill that addressed the deeply flawed legislation that we had been living with since 1959, but I am pretty sure now that I shall leave the House having seen no fundamental change. I am ashamed that in England and Wales we are falling so far behind many other countries, when we used to be in the advance in devising mental health law that was fit for purpose. Scotland is 20 years ahead, as is Northern Ireland.

I was told back in 2017 by Simon Wessely and others that it would take 10 years to develop a unified mental health and capacity Bill. If we had started then, we would be almost there by now. We tinkered with the 1959 Act in order to produce the1983 Act. We added a new Mental Capacity Act in 2005 that cut across mental health legislation. Then we added the ludicrously undeliverable deprivation of liberty safeguards and added tiers of bureaucracy to an already overburdened system, all reducing the time for clinical and social care professionals to spend with patients as they had to spend more time filling in forms. The new Bill makes no attempt to address the complicated relationship between the 1983 and 2005 Acts or how they are meant to be used for individuals, and this is particularly difficult for patients with learning disability and mental disorders and also older people with dementia where people are tossing up which Bill is going to be used. It is clinically ridiculous.

I would have liked to see a Bill that addressed all mental health and capacity issues, putting capacity for decision-making at its heart, consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which we currently contravene and have done since its implementation by the UN in 2008. The human rights implications of the current Bill are profound. It does not address the fundamental rights of thousands of mentally ill people, primarily because of the absence of having decision-making capacity at its heart. We accept that patients with physical disorders can make decisions that may be seriously detrimental to their health or safety. In contrast to this, in mental health law capacity plays little or no role in decisions to initiate psychiatric treatment against a patient’s wishes. The criteria for the involuntary treatment of mental disorders fails to respect the autonomy of the patients. The key considerations are the presence of a mental disorder and risks to the patient’s health or safety. For persons with physical disorders, their personal values are given dominion. Those with mental disorders are not accorded this privilege in this Bill, even though we make such a meal of it in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. There is an underlying assumption that mental disorder necessarily entails an inability to make sound or rational judgments, but even among the most ill patients—those admitted to acute psychiatric wards—40% to 60% retain capacity.

People with mental disorders are unusual in being liable to detention, usually in hospital, because they are assessed as presenting a risk of harm to others before they have actually committed an offence. This constitutes a form of preventive detention that is selective. We spent some time in this Chamber a couple of weeks ago debating indeterminate sentences for people in prison thought to pose a continuing risk in the community. There was widespread agreement here that it was an iniquitous thing. And yet mental health law allows the detention of those with mental disorder on the basis of risk alone. How can that be justified? There is no evidence that risk is easier to assess in those with mental disorder or that violence is more predictable in this group, and it is an expression of the prejudicial stereotype that people with mental disorder are intrinsically dangerous, contrary to research evidence.

This does not mean that people’s dangerousness is unimportant. If it is reliably linked to an individual’s mental disorder, then, if the person lacks capacity, involuntary treatment may be justified, but if the patient has capacity, protection of the public becomes the sole interest. I do not deny there are problems with a capacity-based regime. Many people think you have to fudge the decision, but I would say it was because they do not understand the fundamental ways to assess capacity and the full influences on it.

One of the aims of this Bill is to reduce sections. The number of new sections, as we know, has rocketed again. Last year, there were over 52,000 sections, a further 5,000 or so placed on a community treatment order, and 140,00 people on mental capacity deprivation of liberty safeguards. If the aim of the new Act is to reduce detentions, I cannot see how. The discharge rate from tribunals has reduced from 25% in the mid-1980s to about 6% today. How is it going to happen exactly under this legislation?

I do not see how the overrepresentation of black people in the detained population is to be addressed by this Bill. We need a completely different new way of assessing people and allowing people to get access to services that are sensitive to their needs, providing something that they want to access. I cannot think that there is anything new in this Bill which reflects new thinking that is going on about how you encourage people to access services when they first begin to feel ill.

The Bill has nothing to say about restraint and seclusion. It does not address the hundreds of people in the prison system and their non-consensual treatment except to speed up those that are suitable for transfer. The majority of the mentally unwell will never even be considered for transfer, but they have terrible problems which impact on the prison system tremendously.

Finally, it is now 14 years since the Mental Health Act Commission was abolished and replaced first with the mental health commissioner and now by the totally inadequate low-profile CQC, which has no legally qualified members and no mental health representation at executive board level. Whereas the former chair and vice-chair of the commission had direct access to the Secretary of State for Health, as I am sure the noble Baroness, Lady Bottomley, will remember—she got tired of seeing us, I should think—mental health does not now appear to have the same direct influence. Perhaps it is not surprising that mental health appears only on the government agenda when there is some crisis that has been brewing for years or, as now, after meandering for years through our scrutiny and committee systems.

I have had my say. I am not going to raise this issue again. I felt I had to say it once. I will throw myself into Committee with enthusiasm and hope we can get this Bill through, but I do hope that one day we will get the mental health and capacity legislation that we really need.

NHS: Long-term Sustainability

Baroness Murphy Excerpts

Thursday 18th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, this morning I was reminiscing about the number of NHS debates I have taken part in since I came here 20 years ago. It is at least one a year—I gave up counting when I got to 20—and the tenor of those debates has got more and more depressing. We have had words of wisdom that I have heard several times before—I mention in particular the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, who always gives a characteristic, brilliant overview of what needs to be done. I disagree with him and the noble Lord, Lord Reid, about the Blair years’ injection of money and reforms. They certainly improved things for a short while but they were never continued, neither during the Blair years themselves nor afterwards. One of the problems with central government control, which we have had, is that you have no history. Nobody remembers. The next Department of Health enthusiasms come along, and no history is remembered by one set of Ministers after another.

I find it utterly heartbreaking to witness what has happened over the last 20 to 30 years, having been first employed in the NHS when I was 17 as a healthcare assistant, having been through the whole gamut of levels of interest and having worked alongside the NHS. No amount of money thrown at the NHS will do anything to improve productivity, generate a workforce proud to belong to the NHS, or produce a quality of care to rival the best in the world that we aspire to, nor change the chronic defensive culture, which is disastrous. We have the skills and the talented people, and we waste them by profoundly inefficient human and capital infrastructure.

The NHS is dying. Dentistry has died in the NHS, more or less, and the NHS is also dying, bit by bit. I was shocked when I was admitted as an emergency last year to a district general hospital in East Anglia. The quality of care and the ongoing support provided were appalling, and that is not a badly rated hospital. I understand that now up to a quarter of young people in London aged 19 to 24 cannot bear to be treated as they are by trying to get a GP appointment, so they go online and pay £39 for an online GP appointment. They are seen on video instantly and they get a prescription the same day. That will happen more and more unless we do something.

Of course, the last 13 years of organisational muddle, with no one able to make any serious decisions and endless time-wasting, has made things a lot worse. We still have this centralised system, which has not changed since 1948 and which gets worse from time to time.

In March there was a Question—I think the noble Lord, Lord Markham, answered it—about the decision to concentrate children’s cancer services at the Evelina rather than the Royal Marsden. I have no axe to grind—I do not know either of those institutions—but my overwhelming sense was that the noble Lord, Lord Markham, should not have called that in for another decision or looked at it again. He should have said, “Let the NHS managers who have made this decision get on with it”. The sooner we get our hospital providers out from under central control, the better. The model where we have everybody in the provider system and everybody in the funding system controlled by central government works only in very small countries. Luxembourg and Iceland both have our system, and it works quite well. After many years of having a more sensible system, the Canadians adopted our system and their health service has gone steadily downhill, with increased waiting lists and people not getting the central funding from federal government that they need. It does not work. When will we accept that we need to develop a model where the providers and purchasers are separate?

I have run out of time so I will just end with my hope that the next Government, whatever colour they are, will get to grips with the need for profound reform, and of course include social care as well in the necessary reform.

Care Home Staffing

Baroness Murphy Excerpts

Thursday 18th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Markham (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for the question. The whole point of trying to develop the career structure that we talk about is to make sure that it is a career that people want to go into across the board, be it in urban or rural areas. Part of that is putting in place about 100,000 training places—this is the first place in the world that has been set up—to try to set up a real career structure. We are starting to see early signs of it working. The number of beds blocked has decreased by 10% in the last few months. It is early days, but it is beginning to work.

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

My Lords, does the Minister not agree that, while the increase of 70,000 people is very welcome, it is in the context of a turnover of nearly 400,000 every year in care because of the poor career structure? I understand and appreciate that £70 million has been put into training and a care workforce pathway, but does he not agree that it is profoundly inadequate compared with the £11 million a day that is put into NHS nurse training?

[Lord Markham (Con)]

The 70,000 increase is a net increase, so it takes into account the turnover of staff, many of whom rejoin somewhere else in a social care setting. Notwithstanding that, I agree with the noble Baroness that a turnover rate of around 28% is too high in any sector. For about 20% of employers the turnover is only 10%, so clearly some know how to develop a career structure and have motivated staff who will stay there. The intention behind the programme and the career pathway we are trying to set up is to try to get more of that across the system, because retention is key.

Dementia

Baroness Murphy Excerpts

Thursday 18th January 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, I am proud to be an ambassador for the Alzheimer’s Society. I spent my entire working life as a psychiatrist, working with older people who mostly had dementia and depression.

The situation has got a lot worse in both health and social care since I started working in it. The situation in the health service is appalling, in that they have no training with dementia, and that has not improved. In fact, most people in the health service have no idea what social care is. Indeed, if you asked most of the ladies and gentlemen in our main House, they would not have a very good grasp of what social care is either.

First, we need a total rethink around how we educate the general public about what this disease is about and how it imposes costs on society. The phrase “parity of esteem” is all very well and I like it—it started as a funding phrase in the United States—but almost all the real costs of dementia in this country fall on social care services and on families. At the moment, the estimated cost is £27 billion. Of that, a good 80% is spent by families and social care.

It is not the severity of dementia that demands care; it is the activities of daily life. There was a lovely, elegant piece of research in Denmark looking at what factors of dementia require care from others, and they are always the activities of daily life. That is what social care is and where we should put most of our money.

I do not agree that more MRI and PET scanners would make a jot of difference to diagnoses because a diagnosis is usually made by the family or home carers before they get anywhere near. I know it is nice that we can now diagnose; I had a lecture called “150 Types of Dementia”, which went down a bundle at Queen Square I can tell you. The reality is that half a dozen are interesting, and there are some more that we are starting to understand better, but that is not the issue. It is about very basic care. The drugs will not be around for a long time yet. The ones we have now are nowhere near fruition in terms of clinical service to all the patients who need them.

I back up what my noble friend Lord Warner said about the need to fund both organisations—health and social care need to be integrated to deliver this service—but we are a hell of a long way off.

Neurological Conditions

Baroness Murphy Excerpts

Thursday 9th June 2022 Grand Committee

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

My Lords, I am so pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, raised this issue. One is always humbled in speaking in a debate where so many participants either can bear witness to the personal impact of a life-changing disorder or have been close enough to have supported people throughout.

I share with the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, the notion that we want not only neurologists. She referred to what I call the “hit-and-run brigade”: you go, you see them, you are diagnosed and you are off. That is it; you might get a follow-up appointment if you are lucky. I know because I have been there: I have been one of those people. I know how difficult and frustrating it is to provide a service. I trained for two years at what was then called the National Hospital for Nervous Diseases in Queen Square and its outpost, a delightful hospital at Maida Vale. It was one of the most fulfilling expenses of my life. It was very lovely. They used to bring us junior doctors a little silver teapot every afternoon for afternoon tea. Those were the days, when the NHS was a little different if you were at a posh hospital, which that was. In the end, I retreated to my first love, psychiatry, but I have obviously seen a lot of neurological conditions since then.

The problem is that we are down to one neurologist per 170,000. France has one per 50,000. Italy has one per 5,000 head of population. They are very well-trained neurologists, who are almost all dually trained in psychiatry. That makes a phenomenal difference to access and to the importance of the specialty in the general bargaining power.

Some very welcome changes have happened. National clinical directors are to be appointed in neurology, neurosurgery and spinal surgery. They will be crucial, because the commissioning of these neuroscience services will be devolved rather than done centrally. Those appointments will be utterly crucial for making an impact. Noble Lords might ask what difference they will make, but I remind them about getting the right person in the right place. When I was at Queen Square, stroke disease was not a neurological condition, even though it is the commonest neurological condition there is. It took a neurologist, Charles Warlow, in Edinburgh and his colleagues saying, “No, important physicians and neurologists should be interested in this as a core business.” In part, we need that focus again around these very disabling, chronic disorders.

I have a special interest in one range of disorders: that spectrum that goes from Parkinson’s disease through Lewy body dementia through Alzheimer’s disease. They are similar, but if you treat one with the wrong medication you get adverse reactions. They are highly disturbing and very disabling conditions. It is a very sad way to end your life with any of these conditions when they become very serious. Because we do not have access to neurology or specialist neuropsychiatrists, we have a situation where access to diagnosis and to the right kind of support and care just does not happen. People fight for months to try to get a diagnosis; it goes on for years. People get one diagnosis after another, and shoved from pillar to post. Sometimes it is only five to 10 years later that people actually get the right diagnosis.

It is crucial that we get some kind of agreement about who should care for these people and how we should get them channelled. The number is increasing as the population ages; naturally, the prevalence is rising in the older population. I give major support to the notion that we should have a neurological task force to look at the increasing demands of these serious and disabling disorders.

Health and Care Bill

Baroness Murphy Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 7th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

My Lords, I am an NHS recidivist, like many in this House today, but, after 40 or 50 years of employment in it, I am not necessarily a great fan.

Somebody mentioned 20 reorganisations; I can think of nine that I was personally involved in, some of which I was very enthusiastic about at the time. Looking back, I see that none of them addressed the NHS problems of chronic low productivity and some very poor outcomes—the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, mentioned some relating to cancer. I know some of the data is difficult and not easily comparable, but we are consistently producing poorer outcomes than we should be getting for the resources we are putting in, particularly resources going into those who are employed in the NHS.

The third great problem is, as always, the attitudes—the hangover—which are particularly marked in some parts of the country. Certainly, there are the attitudes of the NHS to its patients and to our feeling that we are supplicants asking for help when we should be receiving a service as of right. These attitudes have not really shifted and have, in many ways, got worse.

I understand why we might be having a reorganisation now. After all, the direction of travel that we have been moving in for so long has come to a bit of a standstill because of the difficulties of foundation trusts not being able to exercise any powers because they are in debt. The direction of travel seems to have come to a full stop. Everyone is asking for better integration between health and social care. We must deliver that. The difficulty is that, if you look at where integrated social care works, it does not work because of senior management only. We have had integrated care boards in Northern Ireland since 1973. I have visited and seen them enthusiastically in action. In fact, at senior level, they work quite well, and some interesting programmes have come out of them. However, when you look at them on the ground, you see that health and social care staff are not necessarily working together. They must be collocated in teams that are jointly managed to make a real difference to individual patients and their carers.

This Bill is a little part of the start of a system that could work but there are some great big holes. For example, I would like to know to whom the integrated care partnerships are accountable. Certainly, we cannot see any way that their strategic plans might be necessarily taken over by the integrated care boards. Do we have some guarantee that they will take notice of what the integrated care partnerships want?

The other problem is the great white shark of the NHS swimming alongside a shoal of sardines, including local authorities, care providers and independent sector care provision. I have seen it time and again: the shark always gobbles up the resources. We saw it again in the recent care Bill. I want to know how that will be addressed. Can the Minister guarantee that we will get mental health as an equal partner on the integrated care boards? That seems utterly essential. Public health must also be in there. Can the Minister reassure us that that will be in statute?

Another problem with this Bill is the clawing back to centre of powers. Again, I understand the frustrations that Ministers see. I remember watching Sir Edward Heath hold up the closure of a rather second-rate neurosurgical unit for 10 years because it was in his constituency. I watched Sir Frank Dobson being seduced by consultants at Barts and the London and ending up with a profoundly expensive two-site system that was quite unnecessary for east London. I want to know how—I hope that the Minister will be able to reassure us on this—those doing the detail on this Bill will somehow constrain ministerial meddling.

Eating Disorders: Provision of Care

Baroness Murphy Excerpts

Tuesday 4th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

My Lords, I think that it was Wallis Simpson who famously said that you cannot be too rich or too thin. We never in this House debate being too rich, but we occasionally debate the problems of those who aspire to be too thin. Wallis Simpson, famously, ate almost nothing and was probably mildly anorexic.

The noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, has outlined the terrible situation that families find themselves in when they have a child or young person suffering from this terrible disorder, whether or not it is anorexia nervosa, obesity or bulimia—bulimia in particular is very difficult to treat, as is anorexia.

While I was driving down from Norfolk this morning, I listened to an excellent edition of “Woman’s Hour”, on which a young woman called Hannah described her own anorexia and how it felt to her. She had been waiting for treatment in the Greater Manchester area for 18 months, and she was offered just one of a group of services that were available in the area, with no thought as to whether it was appropriate for her. Even then, it was a great time coming. Dr Agnes Ayton, chair of the eating disorders faculty at the Royal College of Psychiatrists, made many of the points, brilliantly and articulately, about the difficulties that people have in accessing services, saying that while we have invested in young people’s and children’s services through child and adolescent mental health services, we have left young adults far behind in their ability to gain access.

Having re-read the debate instigated by the noble Lord, Lord Giddens, back in 2013, it strikes me that we have repeated this evening exactly what was said during that debate: that there has been very little improvement—and, of course, the numbers have gone up. As to why the numbers have gone up, the noble Lord’s own specialty has told us: they have perhaps been rising since the 1960s. We are very keen to say that it is not a lifestyle choice, but it is lifestyle factors that have made people want to go down this route in the first place. Biological triggers turn a normal seeking of a slim, elegant, beautiful figure into something much more pathological. That is the thing that we really do not understand.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, said, the report by the NHS ombudsman on how patients are failed was truly shocking. Since then, we have had much better guidance in commissioning, but those documents are often ambitious, noble but pie in the sky and are not widely taken up, for all the reasons which have been articulated. Eating disorders are more common than people realise. Some 80% of people who have them never go to a doctor, and many episodes are managed in families with no access to specialist services. Such services may not be needed, because, within a few weeks or months, the child or young woman has tackled the disorder themselves and has been able to get to grips with what has become a pathological desire to be thin without flipping over into something that does not get better. It is important to remember that, because those who are referred are therefore often in great need of specialist care, and that is the thing that is so difficult.

Eating disorders are of course prevalent in young men as well, particularly those with a gender disorder of some kind or who are troubled by their sexuality. I have treated at least two young men with anorexia nervosa and found them quite as difficult as young women to reach and help through their disorder. It is also common—and getting commoner—in older people. My Aunt Florence never recovered, and died when she was in her 90s. She was slim, but healthily so, all her life until she was in her 80s, when she started to adopt strategies identical to those of a much younger woman. This was similarly pathological, and she starved herself almost to death. Elderly people who get these disorders are often inappropriately investigated, because of the link between physical ill-health in old age and loss of appetite. Perhaps “inappropriately investigated” is not fair, but these things are much commoner in later life than one might imagine.

We have had the commissioning help after the ombudsman’s report and we got the extra £30 million put into young people’s services, but it has simply not touched adult services. Other noble Lords have already mentioned the mortality rate, so I will not stress that.

Historically, such disorders were a lot commoner than we think. There is a description of an illness suffered by Mary Queen of Scots which is a classic eating disorder. There are explicit medical descriptions from about 1670. In the 19th century an awful lot of young women had a condition called chlorosis. People turned slightly green because they had iron deficiency, but it is also thought that this was largely caused by anorexia. There were pressures on young women then which they too addressed in that way.

Treatment is extremely difficult. Evidence-based treatments are few and far between. What we try to do is keep people alive and at a healthy weight long enough for them to get a grip on it and recover for themselves. That is true not just for anorexia nervosa but for many other mental health disorders, for which we do not have the specific treatments we have for psychoses. People need a lot of help, support and psychotherapeutic approaches. The ones that are good for some people may not be for others. The commissioning document makes it clear how important it is for people to be given choices.

My time is up. I stress that we need more investment in a choice of services which are readily accessible for people locally, so that they do not have to just accept what their local service provides. That is the major thing the Government should be doing. What are they intending to do?

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Murphy Excerpts

Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 24th April 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Commons Amendment 1C, which was agreed in lieu of Amendment 1B, which I moved in this House before the Recess. I start by thanking the Minister and the Bill team for the discussions it was possible to have in the latter stages of the Bill, which helped get us to a position that we now feel, particularly in relation to the definition, is pragmatic and one that we can live with.

First, I welcome the Government’s decision to drop what has been termed the “exclusionary definition” proposed earlier. It had a whole raft of problems but I have no intention of going into them again now. It is important to acknowledge that the Government took on board the views expressed by Peers and others in the wider sector on that definition. The outcome of those discussions—that there should be no statutory definition in the Bill—is a sensible and pragmatic compromise after a rather long and tortuous journey. Those of us involved in putting forward different definitions had all received legal advice, which said that our definitions were fully compliant with Article 5 and so on. However, we were never going to resolve that; they just came from different lawyers with different opinions. We had to find a way forward and we did. The fact that we will now be using the code of practice to set out—clearly, I hope—where deprivation of liberty is and is not occurring and that it can reflect existing and evolving case law is important.

I took the opportunity to listen to the debate on the Commons amendments in the other place on 2 April and found it very illuminating. I was particularly pleased to hear the Minister for Health and Social Care, Caroline Dinenage, say:

“We will set out the meaning of a deprivation of liberty in a positive”—


I emphasise “positive”—

“framing and in a way that is clearer for people and practitioners”.

That was the very nub of my concerns when I put forward my definition: it was not clear; it was all framed in a negative way; and it was very difficult for the families affected and, indeed, for some practitioners to understand. This is a real step forward.

We are now to have a code of practice and a definition set out there. I was also pleased to hear the Minister say, when asked about the timescale for producing the code of practice, that it,

“is being worked on as we speak … Once we are all content that the code of practice is robust and fully covers everything that we want it to it will then be presented to both Houses of Parliament”.—[Official Report, Commons, 2/4/19; cols. 964-5.]

That is very positive. However, can the Minister update us on the timing for the code of practice? When will this House see the guidance? It is absolutely critical that what it says in the guidance—what we have been talking about—does not mean that we have kicked the can down the road in terms of some of the problems associated with the definition. When I see what is in the code of the practice and the guidance contained in it, my acid test will still be whether it is easy for the lay person—I include myself as a lay person here—to understand, not full of double negatives or pages and pages of rather confusing case studies. I would be grateful if the Minister could update us on the timing of that.

Secondly, I was extremely pleased to hear that the definition will be considered and reviewed regularly—and kept up to date, as I have said, with evolving case law—and that there will be a report of that review laid before Parliament within three years of the measures coming into force. That will be another opportunity for this House to scrutinise how it is working in practice. I am very grateful to the Government for listening to my representations on the need for a review and for a report to come before both Houses.

Could the Minister give some commitment that, when the review is published—and this House has had a commitment to look at that review—the code of practice will be regularly updated? A review is important; our having an opportunity to scrutinise it is important; but most important of all is that the code of practice be regularly updated. I contend that some of the problems this whole Bill is designed to address, such as the backlog of deprivation of liberties cases, were in part caused by the fact that the code of practice was not amended as circumstances changed and as more and more cases such as Cheshire West were brought into the scope of the Bill.

I would very much welcome assurances from the Minister on those two points, and thank her for being as helpful as she has been. I thank colleagues on all Benches, because I feel that we have worked very collegiately and co-operatively. I hope and feel that that has helped improve the Bill.

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

My Lords, I do not really share the enthusiasm or optimism of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, although I often shared her views on what needed to be done at earlier stages. We are all rather tired of this Bill and I see nothing to be gained from hindering its passage, but I cannot let it pass without expressing my profound misgivings. We—the Members of this House—have failed to do what we were supposed to do. Our task was to make the deprivation of liberty safeguards—now the “liberty protection safeguards”—more practical, more focused on those at risk, more cost-effective and safer, and we have allowed the Bill to disintegrate into a sprawling, all-encompassing bit of a nightmare. The procedures may be simpler—we have cut out one layer of bureaucracy—but we have allowed these provisions to be extended even further than Cheshire West, even pursuing people in their own homes in a way which I do not think many families will appreciate.

The one thing everyone, including the JCHR, was hoping we would do was to introduce a realistic definition of a deprivation of liberty. In the end, we in this House just copped out. We could not agree; we got into a mess; the lawyers could not agree either; so we have just said, “No, let us put it all in a code of practice”. As many noble Lords will know, I wrote some of the early codes of practice for the Mental Health Acts, and I know that codes of practice suffer from mission creep—they get more and more stuff in which is quite difficult for people outside in practice who will implement it, and do not get updated very regularly because it is difficult to do so. Indeed, if there is no clause in statute, which most codes are fixed around—and there will not be, of course, as is intended—it will have to be arranged around Article 5. That will leave a situation in which the lawyers will have a field day, and in which we will still be waiting for case law to give us some guidance.

Meanwhile, the numbers are going up. My latest count was 140,000—I think the official number a couple of months ago was 125,000. There will be a lot more soon. About a third—it may be even more than that—will be waiting for over a year, and 75% of them are elderly people with dementia, who will probably die before they get their rights looked at. Will it make any difference to them? Generally, it will not make one whit of difference. If we had done our job properly, the numbers would have gone down, and there is a chance that those at greatest risk—for example, people with severe dementia who are kept in locked units, who never see the light of day, and people with severe disabilities in residential care—would have been seen sooner and would have had their care plans addressed in respect of their freedoms.

Meanwhile, these last three years have seen an industry grow up around the implementation of DoLS. It is now called DoLS by everybody out there—I am not sure that most people know what that means. A costly public service has developed which has a life of its own, and which, as we have seen, takes money directly out of care budgets. When Staffordshire quite sensibly tried to call a halt and said, “Hang on a minute, let’s go for the worst cases: those most at risk, those with the most profound disabilities or where there is a disagreement”, somebody complained, and they were told in no uncertain terms by the Local Government Ombudsman to get on with it and to get back to doing everybody. So the waiting list grew yet again. Of course, many other county councils and metropolitan councils were making similar decisions, but they have all had to go back to compiling the waiting list, which grows and grows.

The other people who will love the Bill are the lawyers. Just imagine how you will be able to debate the nuances of Article 5 meanings when the code of practice fails to live up to expectations.

This Bill should be a lesson to us all. It is legislation which arose from a Supreme Court judgment—an impeccable theoretical case, made without any thought to the practicalities that would affect 2 million people. The Law Commission was as tied up in knots as everyone else and could not see a way through. My goodness, it worked long and hard on it in an admirable way, but it could not get beyond the problems of having to satisfy Cheshire West and the Supreme Court’s judgment. This House’s inability to grasp the Bill will not provide any more than a hit-and-run assessment of one patient’s disabilities and whether they are deprived of their liberty. It will not provide any more care for people, and it will be a bit of a disaster.

I have been as guilty as everyone here because I was not here for Report, when perhaps I should have been here to say this more clearly—I am sure that my colleagues quite often feel cross with me when I am not here, and I apologise for that. However, I am not blaming the Ministers either, who have, unfortunately, changed during the passage of the Bill, which has taken a lot longer than it should have done. They have struggled as best they can with a complex, technical Bill; nor am I blaming the team at the Department of Health, because Sharon Egan and her team have been squashed between the lawyers, the DoLS industry, the obvious need to make things viable and less depleting of care budgets, and the impossibility of satisfying everyone.

The only flexibility left—because we will pass the Bill—is that before the Bill is commenced, the Government should pause and do a few more sums; otherwise, we shall be back here in another three years, looking at how we can make this legislation more viable. Many more millions of hours of care staff time will have been wasted in failing to improve the care of mentally incapacitated people. Their rights need protecting, but this Bill will not do it.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, I have taken a slightly different view. I declare my interest as chair of the National Mental Capacity Forum, and I am grateful to my leadership group in that forum for their comments, constant advice and constructive criticism. I am also most grateful to the Bill team, the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, and the Minister for having listened. We have certainly given the Bill what we could term a bumpy ride. I think that needed to happen and do not apologise for it at all. From what I understand, the way the code of practice is now being developed will result in a far better situation.

Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Murphy Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 11th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

My Lords, I support this amendment. It is well thought through and I am glad that the Government have brought it forward. However, like my noble friends Lady Hollins and Lady Meacher, I have some very serious doubts about the continuance of this Bill as it goes to the Commons. We have already raised our anxieties about how it fits in with the Wessely review, and we have come to the end of our deliberations—when the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and the noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, normally congratulate each other on the process that we have gone through—but in fact we are leaving this Bill with the very same problems with which it came to this House.

The Bill came before Parliament because of the totally unviable nature of the current legislation. However, we do not have a statutory definition of deprivation of liberty for the purposes of this legislation and we now intend, as the Bill goes to the Commons, still to intrude on people living in their own homes. We are talking about a Bill that affects about 1 million people. It is currently projected to cost £2 billion a year but, with our amendments that introduce some improvements, it will cost considerably more.

Will the Commons really tackle the key issues? We have not seen the wood for the trees—that is the problem. We have tackled some really important minor issues but not the major issues that will make the legislation implementable in the care system. Can the Minister tell us what will happen next?

[Baroness Jolly (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the amendment and declare my interests as set out in the register.

I too would like to talk about the application to adults with learning disabilities, autism or dementia who also have a mental health diagnosis, and I would also like to talk about what other noble Lords have mentioned—the interface between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act. As the Minister will have seen, Sir Simon’s review redraws the dividing line between when a person should be detained under the Mental Health Act and when they might fall under the Mental Capacity Act.

Given that the proposed new dividing line is “objection” —in other words, those not objecting fall under the Mental Capacity Act—the role of the advocate in articulating the wishes of the individual becomes paramount in ensuring that the individual is treated under the appropriate legislation. With that in mind, I have a couple of questions for the Minister. Does he agree that advocates will need to receive sufficient support and training to understand this new dividing line, as and when it comes into being? Can he also clarify who will be responsible for ensuring that the training takes place and from whose budget the funding for it will come?