Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Monday 15th October 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Barker]

17: Schedule 1, page 11, line 9, after second “a” insert “written”

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I move Amendment 17 and will speak also to Amendments 19, 54 and 57, which are in my name. Like other noble Lords, I thank the Minister for statements he made earlier about having listened to concerns over the duty to consult with the person and over the inclusion of 16 and 17 year-olds. He will appreciate that a number of amendments tabled by noble Lords stemmed from that deep concern about the lack of a statement on the Bill that the person being cared for should be seen by the person arranging for their assessment.

On a matter of form and detail, I do not like the term “cared-for person”. I prefer the scheme used under the Mental Capacity Act, where the person is referred to as P. They are considered as a person in their own right; they are subject to the legislation as a whole person. It is a stylistic matter. We got there with “unsound mind”; perhaps if we keep going, we might be on a roll—you never know—so I throw that in.

These amendments dig at some of the same concerns as those at which the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was getting on a previous set of amendments. As noble Lords will know, under the DoLS legislation there is a duty to ensure that not only does the cared-for person know what their rights are and have access to justice, but the people who care for them also know that what is proposed is the least restrictive option. There is a real question under the liberty protection scheme, as laid out, as to how somebody who lacks capacity or the people who look after them would know that. Furthermore, there have been concerns—assuming the care home manager was responsible for much of the assessment—over how they too would know that what was proposed was a least restrictive option. These amendments are about seeking to establish a duty to ensure that people are fully informed.

That takes us to another basic criticism of the Bill, which is about what I would say was an overreliance on the code of practice. Noble Lords have many years’ happy experience—some of it on the other side of the Dispatch Box—arguing about the importance of codes of practice as opposed to law. There has to be a statement in the Bill for anything in a code of practice to have force. As the Minister will know, practitioners need only have regard to the code of practice; effectively, they may not have regard to it. It matters more towards the back-end of the Bill, where much of the Mental Capacity Act is amended.

Put simply, nowhere in the Bill does there seem to be a duty to provide this information to the cared-for person or to the people who care for them. In the coming set of amendments the Minister will no doubt make much of the new requirements to consult, but that is something slightly different. We felt it was important to restate this and back up what is already the intention under the best interests of the Mental Capacity Act, but that we felt had been ignored in this Bill. I beg to move.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, I added my name to Amendment 17 because I think it is important that things be written down clearly, particularly for the cared-for person—which is the term we are using—if they have fluctuating capacity or need to absorb things very slowly but want to understand. Also, their families and those concerned about them will not necessarily be there when someone comes in to assess them or formulate a care plan, but they will certainly have concerns and they may have a very good idea about wishes and feelings that could have been overlooked—not maliciously, but because people did not know about them. A written record will provide evidence for everybody about what is happening.

The way the consultation is conducted should therefore, I agree, demonstrate that restrictions have been proportionate and necessary, and that alternatives have been considered—and the reason they have been discounted should be given. I would like us to give people much more access to all their clinical records; the caring family, in particular, should have access to the records. Often, information held by family members and others close to the person is effectively like gold dust when it comes to planning their care, and would benefit from being shared.

Where someone’s condition deteriorates, if this has all been written down clearly you have a baseline against which you can measure changes. If they improve, the baseline shows the reason that things were put in place as restrictions, which could then be lifted. Again, that gives a benchmark against which to measure, which would make care more personalised. I hope this concept will be well received. I am unsure as to whether it should go in the Bill or in the code—it is easy to put lots into the Bill—but the principle is important.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Lord O'Shaughnessy) (Con)]

Well, I shall see whether I can lift the gloom from the noble Lord. I think that there was a slight mischaracterisation, in that the Government are listening. Indeed, we have responded and made changes. I hope that in responding to these amendments I will be able to show further that we are taking a positive and constructive view on improving the Bill, making sure not that it removes rights but quite the opposite—that it provides access to liberty-protection safeguards for people who do not currently enjoy them.

I begin by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for leading the debate and I also thank other noble Lords. I shall go directly to her Amendment 17. Of course she is right, as are other noble Lords, about the arrangements for the cared-for person—person P—being written. I am very happy to confirm to all noble Lords that that is our intention and that we will make sure that the Bill reflects it.

With regard to other amendments, the entire thrust of policy across government, whether in health and care or anything to do with data, is about providing more people with the information that the state holds about them. I can give the absolute commitment to noble Lords that that is what we intend to do in the Bill and in changes that we make to the Bill going forward. It is essential that cared-for persons, their families, appropriate persons, IMCAs and so on are given full information about their authorisation and their relevant rights, including their rights to review and appeal. I can tell noble Lords that that will be set out fully in the code of practice.

On the code of practice—I can see the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, grimace—I will say two things. First, it is a statutory code of practice involving a consultation arrangement and a laying before Parliament—noble Lords know how these things work. The noble Baroness asked about the force of the code of practice and it is true that the Bill says “have regard to”. But case law confirms—I am happy to write to noble Lords with this opinion—that the code of practice must be followed unless there are cogent reasons not to do so. That means that there will be some occasions when the code is not practised, but those not following it will have to justify, potentially in court, why they did so in the interests of a person’s care. So the code of practice is statutory and it has very great force. It is worth pointing that out, not least because on this group and future groups we will be talking about information or an instruction that will be within the code of practice. I will take the opportunity to make that clear at this point.

[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister for that. This is a very important part of our discussion. I have two questions which I am absolutely certain he will not be in a position to answer, but I hope that he will write to me. First, how many cases of a failure to follow the code of practice rather than a failure to follow the law have gone to the Court of Protection? Secondly, can the Minister confirm that the original Mental Capacity Act code of practice was never reviewed and that it is not possible to make individual amendments to a code of practice: it has to be changed in its entirety? I shall not put the Minister on the spot now but we need to return to those matters in a further discussion because they are really important.

[Lord O'Shaughnessy]

The noble Baroness is quite right: I do not have the answers to those questions, but they are very good questions and I will make sure that we answer them for noble Lords in a communication following this debate.

On the point about access to information, I think that two other aspects are worth considering. One is that under the general data protection regulation, which came in on 25 May this year, the cared-for person or their family, IMCA or somebody holding a lasting power of attorney—that is, somebody acting on their behalf—will, and indeed does, have access to their authorisation record. I believe, although I will clarify, that that has to be done free of charge. I know that that is certainly the case with medical records and GPs. In terms of access to information, that is an important advance.

Again, I want to get further clarification on exactly what is involved, but the NHS and the LGA have created a programme of local health and care record exemplars. It happens in a few parts of the country and it is about creating a single health and care record that contains all the information about a person’s health and care. Obviously it spans both health and care settings. That will be available not only to inform the care carried out by a clinician or someone in a caring role but information to that person and those with responsibility for them.

That obviously has huge implications for improving joined-up care. It is an important programme by which we set a lot of store. What I will take away from this discussion is the need to ensure that what we are describing here, around access to information by the cared-for person or by those caring for them, ensures that they will have access to the local health and care record, which would contain the kind of information we are talking about. If it does, we have a vehicle; if it does not, we need to think about what the right vehicle is.

The amendments in this group also support the IMCA to help the cared-for person understand their rights under liberty protection safeguards. I can confirm that this will be a key role for the IMCA. It will be defined in their job description and, again, contained in the code of practice.

Once again, we have already made changes, and are committing to changes in the Bill, that will deal with the questions raised about access to information. I absolutely concur with the sentiment behind the questions. There is good reason to believe that expanding programmes and mechanisms in the system will give us the opportunity to do that, and in a much more thorough way than is done now. I want to continue to work with noble Lords to make sure that we get that right as we move towards Report, so that it is properly reflected in the Bill. I hope that, on the basis of my comments and reassurances, the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, will feel a little less despairing and the noble Baroness will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Barker]

I thank the Minister for his comments. I hear what he says about GDPR, but if he could send Members a small briefing note, that would be extraordinarily helpful. Clearly, there has been a significant change. I and other noble Lords will remember times in the past when individuals were not able to access historic care records because they contained information about a third party. A whole series of cases had to go through the European courts to establish exactly what the rights of access to care records were.

I will study what the Minister said. However, we need to be absolutely certain that the spirit of these amendments is reflected. Perhaps we may come back to this at a later stage with a simple amendment introducing a requirement in the Bill to provide information. How that is done can be set out at considerable length in a code of practice, but the requirement to do it needs to be in the Bill. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 17 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, on again introducing this discussion on a difficult topic. I do not share her pessimism that it is impossible to find a definition. It would be quite simple to have a definition in the Bill which would enable us to distinguish between those who are and are not being deprived of their liberty.

The fact that people are deprived of their liberty, in reality, by their condition is an irrelevance. We have to stick with what is happening to people; what we, the state or the carer are doing to the individual. We would not find it too difficult to decide what is or is not a restriction. You can compare the living accommodation of a person in a care situation to that of someone who is living in the same place without those restrictions. Care home managers would not have too much difficulty in saying who was and who was not restricted.

We should not give up trying to have some kind of definition that lists those conditions. People might be receiving sedative medication so that they cannot move around and others might be restricted physically—there are still people being restricted physically—in dreadful chairs and so on who cannot move about. We could define fairly well what the conditions are. I hope we will come back on Report with some clarification of what they are so that we can put something in the Bill. I worry that if they are in the code of practice it will be so flexible that it will result in a postcode lottery, with one area’s policy different from another’s. That would be a disaster.

We should be able to get something in the Bill. I hope that we will not give up at this stage.

[Baroness Barker]

Following on from the observation made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, one of the most common restrictions of liberty is medication and medication reviews. We often think of it as being physical but it is not. New medicines often come online and create change. I take her point and hope we will be able to work towards a definition.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I will not add much more because the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has done us all a favour by putting forward great questions exploring the Cheshire West ruling. The Joint Committee on Human Rights agrees that a definition needs to be found, otherwise—the noble Baroness is right—we will be back in a situation where things have not gone right and we end up in court again. We all need to put our minds to this. We should be able to find a definition and I look forward to the Minister leading that particular discursive discussion across the Committee.

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Moved by

[Baroness Barker]

21: Schedule 1, page 11, line 41, after first “person,” insert “based on evidence,”

[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, again I preface my remarks by saying that these amendments were drafted when the role of the care home manager was less clear than perhaps it is now. Nevertheless, they take us to the important point about determinations on mental capacity and the requirement to make sure that they are evidence based. In the Bill as it stands, a huge amount of discretion is given to care home managers and people involved in care to determine whether someone has capacity. We do not believe that that is right. Determining whether someone has capacity is difficult to do and something for which a great deal of training and experience is required. We keep coming back to what would be acceptable levels of training and qualifications to exercise that determination.

Amendment 21 seeks to provide that there should be an evidence base and that those making the capacity assessment should go through it and be ready to justify their decisions accordingly. I will go back to a point and reiterate it, although it must be rather boring: a DoLS assessment is different from a care assessment, and whoever makes and records such assessments should know that they are challengeable in court, which is a big responsibility.

Amendment 22 again endeavours to make sure that the person carrying out the assessment of capacity should be properly qualified, a point I have made before. I do not think that the Bill as it stands is sufficiently robust about the level of professional training needed and therefore this is a matter to which we should return.

Amendment 25 in a way follows on from our previous discussion. With this Bill we will move into a new position where the assessment of capacity is not as clearly specific to the situation as it is under the Mental Capacity Act. We are also moving towards a position in which assessments can be rolled over for longer periods. I am not saying that that should not happen and I take absolutely the point that a number of the assessments being required under DoLS are unnecessary. When someone has had a diagnosis of dementia, for example, their capacity to make decisions may not fluctuate or change, but we need to be altogether a lot more precise in the terminology being used in the Bill. It is not just a change in someone’s condition but may also be a change in their circumstances which has led to the deprivation of liberty. We are bringing in a new test to show that things are necessary and proportionate. I do not think that it is that clear or that it will clarify the decisions which are going to have to be made. This is an attempt on our part to move away from what we believe to be a position where the subjective judgment of care providers would have been given too much weight in the determination of capacity. The amendments on that issue are probing in nature and I beg to move.

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to lend my support to Amendment 21 tabled in the name of my noble friend Lady Barker and to speak to Amendment 22, which is tabled in my name. Amendment 22 is essentially about who should be able to determine whether an individual is, as it currently states in the Bill, “of unsound mind”. That is the terminology being used, but I would prefer to see terms like a “disorder” or a “disability” of the mind. That is one of the three key authorisation conditions. Perhaps I may say again how very pleased I am that the Minister has indicated his willingness to look at some new language so that we do not use the term “unsound mind”, which in my view is stigmatising and has no place in today’s society.

I return to Amendment 22. Currently, the authorisation arrangements in this part of the Bill state that a medical assessment has to be made but do not state who has to make it. It is likely that most people would assume—indeed, it may well be that the Government are assuming it and no doubt the Minister can reassure us on the point in his response—that a medical assessment needs to be carried out by a registered medical practitioner. However, it would be helpful and reassuring to have that made clear in the Bill. The report published earlier this year by the Joint Committee on Human Rights is clear that, in order to comply with human rights law, any deprivation of liberty under Article 5 requires,

“objective medical evidence of a true mental disorder of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement, which persists throughout the period of detention”.

Given the requirement for “objective medical evidence”, my contention is that there needs to be a guarantee in the Bill that only a registered medical practitioner with appropriate training has the power to determine whether someone has an unsound mind or mental disorder, depending on which language is going to be used.

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[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who took part in this debate. It has clarified some matters to a certain extent. I very much welcome the Minister’s suggestion that we should meet further. There is agreement on the part of everybody that we want to cut down the number of unnecessary repetitions of assessment, but to do that we need to be quite clear that the assessments are done correctly and by the correct person.

The Minister talked about qualifications changing and wishing to move towards a competency-based arrangement, but the parallel with Mental Health Act and approved mental health practitioners is a good one. All sorts of people from different disciplines and backgrounds are approved mental health practitioners. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, illuminated, a whole number of people from different professional backgrounds could be AMCPs. The important thing is that they have demonstrable expertise in this legislation. I yet again make the point to him that he talks about using different assessments, but assessments under this legislation are not the same as care assessments. They are particular ones. We have not had the discussion about the implications for the changes to Care Act assessments if this Bill goes through, but we need to because we need consistency between the two.

Nevertheless, I am heartened by the Minister’s response. We are not quite there yet on this. We need to do a number of different things to make sure there is consistency and clarity across the range of professionals engaged in doing these assessments, and that the people who are being cared for and their families, and care home managers, can have a reasonable expectation that these crucial assessments—it is assessment of someone’s capacity; it is a really important one—are done consistently under the Act. It is when assessments are done badly that these things start to unravel. I very much thank the Minister for his response and at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 21 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Barker]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group, Amendments 60 and 62, to which I shall speak briefly. To reiterate, the responsibility for this law lies and remains with the responsible bodies, and not with the care providers. If things go wrong, it is they who will end up in court. Consequently, and rather like the bodies under the Mental Health Act, they retain responsibility for ensuring enough sufficiently trained people are available to ensure that the law is applied properly.

Part of the reason for all noble Lords having such an interest in this issue is that we know from the review of the Mental Capacity Act that availability of trained staff is one of the biggest reasons why the Act failed to be properly implemented. Furthermore, we have statistics on the patchy nature of implementation by local authorities and some in the health service. Some authorities absolutely get this and implement it properly, but a lot just do not. It is an almost random distribution, which has a knock-on effect.

The other reason for noble Lords wanting to talk about these issues is the impact assessment. We have not really talked about the impact assessment for this Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, used some particularly strong words, but she let them off very lightly, because I do not see how that impact assessment stacks up. Perhaps I may ask the Minister about one of the many assumptions made in the impact assessment. My understanding is that it assumes that training under this Bill will be needed for 10% of doctors and 10% of social workers. Can the Minister explain—if not now, then perhaps at a different juncture—that assumption and how it has come to be? I would be really surprised if the figure for social workers was 10%. Ten per cent for doctors is possible, but a figure of 10% for social workers needing to be trained under this Bill seems very low. My amendments were designed to enable us to have this sort of probing debate.

[Baroness Murphy]

I support the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, on some of the training issues. Like many people here, I suspect, I have spent a great number of years training junior doctors in how to use mental health legislation, as well as social workers and occupational therapists. One of the most difficult things is to convey the culture of what we are trying to achieve in legislation of this kind. We all refer to the European court and the agreements, but what we are trying to achieve for individuals and why is difficult for many people to grasp when they have grown up in a very didactic, academic environment, where these things are not necessarily considered.

A key aspect of that cultural shift which is so required is the problems that arise between relatives, carers and professionals over what should happen to an individual. All the way through this Bill, I have been scratching my head and thinking, “Will this solve the Bournewood problem?” All the cases from Bournewood onwards have arisen because of a cavalier approach or attitude by professionals to discussing with relatives and carers what the individual wanted, needed or was used to. If we do not get those things right, we will not solve the problem and there will be another case because it will all be up again for grabs where the professional training has not been accurate.

I note that there are some very specific proposals about care home managers. There are some very specific difficulties about what training care home managers currently have, and it is absolutely basic and rudimentary. It is largely about keeping the accounts right. We need to find a way to get the culture of what we are trying to achieve for individuals and families into this Bill. Exploring those training options is crucial if we are to avoid another Bournewood.