Environment Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness McIntosh of Pickering
Main Page: Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness McIntosh of Pickering's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI am delighted to speak to this small group of amendments. I shall speak particularly to my Amendment 77A but before I do, I would be interested in probing my noble friend on the relationship between Clause 16, on environmental principles, and Clause 45, on environmental law. I have another amendment asking that we write the Aarhus convention into the Bill, so I am interested in how the principles relate to the law in the context of this ground-breaking Bill.
My second point relates to government Amendments 80, 298 and 299. I hope he will look carefully at Amendment 80A in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and Amendment 81 from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, as there may be nuances relating to Scotland and Wales that the government amendments should consider.
In speaking to Amendment 77A, I am extremely grateful to the Bar Council for briefing me and bringing to my attention that the phrase “due regard to” is inappropriate here and should, as the amendment says, be replaced by “ensure compliance with”. The background to this is that the concept of “due regard” has come before the courts a number of times, so guidance is available on the exercise of due regard by public authorities. This is in the context of public bodies making decisions—concerning equality legislation, for example—rather than making policy, as proposed in the Bill before us.
I shall give a couple of examples. Lord Dyson’s description of “due regard” in R (Baker) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government in 2008 has been paraphrased as
“regard that is appropriate in all the particular circumstances in which the public authority concerned is carrying out its function as a public authority.”
The courts have otherwise considered those circumstances where a public body is required to have regard alone to the policy or government guidance. On the one hand, strength may be given to the terms as set out by the High Court in the case of Royal Mail Group Plc v The Postal Services Commission 2007, in which it was held in the context of a decision under the Postal Services Act 2000 to impose a penalty on the licence holder that must have regard to a policy statement, that:
“The obligation to have regard to the policy recognises that there may be circumstances when it does not have to be applied to the letter but … there must be very good reasons indeed for not applying it.”
There is another example, in the context of planning law, where a similar conclusion may be drawn—the case of Simpson v Edinburgh Corporation.
I submit to the Minister that the requirement in Clause 18 of the Environment Bill is currently for a Minister to
“have due regard to the policy statement on environmental principles”,
not simply the environmental principles, when making policy, not when making decisions. From that follow a number of qualifications to that requirement, based on the significance of any environmental benefit or the proportion or disproportion of environmental benefit from the policy itself.
I argue that the use of the term “have due regard” in Clause 18 creates a potential tension between the Government’s clear entitlement to promulgate policy and to express their policy “in unqualified terms” subject to the
“basic tests of reason and good faith”,
as was argued in SSCLG v West Berkshire, and the rule as applied in Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, which is that a statutory discretion must be deployed to promote the policy and objects of the Act and the significance of having a set of environmental principles enshrined in statute in the first place. To that end, a clearer duty to “ensure compliance with” or “ensure accordance with”, as opposed to “have regard to”, would help to avoid confusion, leave the promulgation of policy open to debate in the courts and give greater recognition to the importance of the principles.
I know that, in the context of previous Bills, we have had cause to discuss the context of “have due regard to”. I am arguing for the importance of leaving the courts with a power to impose a financial penalty, as in this case, upon an unsuccessful body—including, for example, statutory undertakings such as sewerage and water undertakers—which has been found to be in breach of environmental law. It is extremely important that, in the context of what we are asking the OEP to do in the remit of the Bill, it be given real teeth when holding public bodies to account and mirror the pre-existing power, previously exercised by the European Commission and which it is now intended that the body of the OEP should fulfil post Brexit.
The requirement that the breach be severe to justify a financial penalty is noted. It is assumed that this is to ensure that a financial penalty be the exception rather than the rule, but this would also be in the context that the OEP’s power to apply for an environmental review is already on the condition that it considers the authority’s failure to comply to be serious. To that end, it might be less open for debate as to whether it is severe or serious if the court’s discretion were wider, and therefore based upon all the circumstances of the case, but to be exercised where those circumstances are exceptional.
In the circumstances before us, “have due regard to” is not appropriate. I would like to replace it in the Bill with the words: “ensure compliance with”. That would give the OEP greater clarity and, should it be subject to judicial review, it would be easier for the courts to clarify in those circumstances. I hope that my noble friend will look sympathetically on probing Amendment 77A.
My Lords, I am delighted as always to follow the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, and well understand the points that she has made. I hope that the Minister will listen to them. I support the assertions made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, in moving Amendment 73, but my amendments relating to Wales deal with a somewhat different aspect of these policies.
There is a somewhat bizarre linking of issues in the way that they have come together in this debate. We are where we are because of how Clauses 16 to 18 are formulated and the manner in which the Government have tried to ensure that provisions relating to environmental principles do not fall foul of devolved competences in Wales. That is absolutely fair enough but it is far from clear to me, as I suspect it is to the proposers of Amendment 78, what exactly the Government are trying to do. I have tabled Amendments 79 and 81 to try to tease out exactly what their intention is, and I was grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, for highlighting Amendment 81.
As things stand, in making policy that may impact on Wales, the provision is that the Minister must not have due regard to policy statements on environmental principles to the extent that they relate to Wales, whether or not those spheres of environmental policy are devolved. If the Bill has no application whatever to Wales then, as for Scotland and Northern Ireland, Chapter 1 should be excluded from any applicability to Wales. But the Government have insisted on making Chapter 1 applicable in certain circumstances to Wales. On a superficial reading, it would seem that the Government insist that a Westminster Minister will have some powers relating to Wales, although we do not know exactly what they may be. But whatever they are, in applying those policies in Wales, the Minister shall not have regard to environmental principles, though in relation to similar responsibilities in England he will need to have regard to those principles.
The issue of environmental principles is a very important dimension of the Bill and we must be clear about the way in which it applies or does not apply to Wales. It may be that the Minister will look again at the wording of these clauses before Report and, if necessary, bring forward further amendments on the Government’s behalf to clarify the situation. I certainly look forward to hearing his response to this debate.
My Lords, given all the respect and affection in which I hold him, I am slightly dismayed that my noble friend actually played back at me that “having regard to” worked perfectly well in equalities policy. I actually quoted case law at him. If I may, I would like to submit the case law I have to him so that his legal team can look at it. But I just make a plea: we are about to come on to the office for environmental protection. We are hoping to replicate at national level, throughout the whole of the United Kingdom, very stringent penalties for infringement of environmental policy or principles, such as a chemical spillage or other contamination of water. That is why—I am sure he would agree—we want the fewest referrals possible to any court under a judicial review, we want to be absolutely clear and we need to ensure compliance and have the possibility of financial penalties being imposed, rather than just a very mealy-mouthed “have regard to”.
I thank my noble friend. I think she offered to submit other examples in case law, and I look forward to seeing what she has to say. I am also willing, if she is willing to speak to me, to talk details in due course.
My Lords, I hope I can be heard. Amendment 81A is a probing amendment, for reasons that I hope to explain. Clause 19 provides for the making of statements about Bills containing new environment law before the Bill’s Second Reading. According to paragraph 22 of the Explanatory Notes, these are to be statements setting out “the effect” of the new primary environmental law on existing levels of environmental protection provided for by environmental law, but the wording of the clause does not quite say that. All it requires is a statement by the Minister that the Bill contains a provision which, if enacted, would be environmental law and would not have the effect of reducing the level of protection provided for under existing environmental law, or that the Minister is unable to make that statement. There the matter lies. How great the reduction would be and in what respects, if he or she is unable to make the statement, is another matter, which the clause does not mention or require to be considered.
A requirement of the limited kind that this clause describes seems to be breaking new ground, although something similar is to be found in Section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires Ministers to make a statement of compatibility. That provision was seen, when the Human Rights Bill was introduced, to serve three purposes. First, it would have the salutary effect of focusing the Government’s mind on the question of whether the proposed legislation would be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. Secondly, it would provide information to Members of Parliament which might be relevant to their debates and discussions. Thirdly, it might affect the judicial interpretation of any legislation that was passed.
The third purpose was soon negatived when the Law Lords sitting in this House made it clear that it was for the courts and not a Minister to say whether the legislation would be compatible with the convention. The second does not seem to have been borne out in practice, as I cannot recall any case where the significance or otherwise of the Minister’s statement has been debated in this House. That may be because it has no legal significance. I hope that the first salutary purpose is still there, and that these statements, which appear without fail in every Bill, are not a mere formality because the matter has been considered.
So the question is: what is the purpose of the requirement in Clause 19? It cannot bind the courts, as it is for them and not the Minister to say whether the provision would be environmental law, should that issue ever arise in legal proceedings. I can see some prospect of its having the salutary effect of requiring the Government to address the question, focused on in Clause 19(3), of whether the level of environmental protection provided by existing environmental law would be reduced. That would be a good thing and very welcome, but do we need a provision in this Bill for that to happen? What would happen if, as it turns out, the statement the Minister made was wrong, if the Bill is amended in a way that might affect what the Minister said or if the Minister is unable to make the statement? The clause does not address these issues at all.
If, on the other hand, the making of a statement of the kind referred to in Clause 19(4) is to provide an opportunity for debate, what purpose would that debate have if the Government nevertheless wish the House to proceed with the Bill and will enforce their wish? The clause does not provide for any kind of sanction or remedy. It can be said that there is some value in drawing the matter to the attention of the House, but does it really add anything to what would be likely to happen anyway when the Bill came under scrutiny?
There is one other point worth mentioning. The phrase “existing environmental law” is defined in Clause 19(8), in relation to a statement under the clause, as meaning
“environmental law existing at the time that the Bill … is introduced into the House”.
However, that definition does not say what it is or where it is to be found. For that purpose, one has to go to Clause 45. The very broad definition that this clause provides is
“any legislative provision … that … is mainly concerned with environmental protection”—
which, for this purpose, includes devolved legislative provisions as well.
This is quite a package. It is unlike Section 19 of the Human Rights Act, where the convention itself and its precisely grouped surrounding case law is the point of reference. Given the extensive legislative background against which the Bill is likely to have been drafted, it may be quite difficult for a Minister to make such a statement with any conviction that everything has been turned over correctly and would stand up to scrutiny. That is why it might be wiser, to avoid any misunderstanding and any potential mishaps due to the difficulty of searching the ever-expanding reach of legislation in this field, to make it clear that the purpose of the clause is limited to what is indicated in my amendment.
In any event, it would be helpful if the Minister were to make it clear, for the assistance of all those to whose functions it is directed, what exactly the purpose is of this clause. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am delighted to support Amendment 81A, which I have co-signed. I support entirely the comments made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, in moving it.
I want to raise a very narrow point with my noble friend the Minister. It relates to the second part of Clause 19(8). Subsection (8) states:
“‘Existing environmental law’, in relation to a statement under this section, means environmental law existing at the time that the Bill to which the statement relates is introduced into the House in question, whether or not the environmental law is in force.”
This posed quite a question at the time of the withdrawal Act and the subsequent statutory instruments on retained EU law, particularly as the water framework directive was being considered and revised. Unfortunately, we had an empty-chair policy at the time, so were not at the council meetings when this was discussed, but it begs the question of which water framework directive, for example, is now enshrined in UK law. Is it the one that we previously agreed to or is it the one that was subsequently revised at the time of our departure from the European Union?
The second and last question that I have for my noble friend the Minister relates to a jolly good read which I commend to him: the 22nd and final report of the European Union Committee, Beyond Brexit: Food, Environment, Energy and Health. It was adopted by the European Union Sub-Committee, on which I was privileged to serve. In paragraph 148, the report sets out that the trade and co-operation agreement
“negotiated by the Government will affect the policy choices available to devolved administrations and legislatures in areas of devolved competence including the environment.”
That perhaps relates more to the previous amendment, Amendment 80A, but also to the amendment before us now.
The report goes on:
“There are already diverging environment and climate change goals across the UK, which could indicate challenges ahead. We urge the Government to address any concerns raised by the devolved administrations regarding the TCA’s environment and climate change provisions—via the Common Frameworks programme or other routes—as fully and promptly as possible.”
Scotland has now set up its equivalent to the office for environmental protection, the name of which escapes me completely—I think it is Environment Services Scotland—so it has an operation that is already up and running. We will not have ours in place until July. Have any issues already arisen in this regard, as we are slightly later in our programme than we would have hoped to be? Also, have any of these issues been identified and raised under the common frameworks programme? That is in addition to my earlier question about, for example, the water framework directive.
With those few remarks, I am delighted to lend my support to Amendment 81A.
My Lords, I understood that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, had withdrawn from this debate—but she is shaking her head at me, so I assume that she wishes to speak. I think I should make it clear that her name is listed as having withdrawn; however, I will call her now.
It is a great pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Cameron. Like him, I am very much a “cross”-Bencher in this case. I have been looking through the Second Reading document and would say that there are many cross Lords, all across this Chamber and wherever they are beaming in from, who also completely agree with what he says about the necessary independence of the OEP.
It is extremely chilling to read Defra’s power under Clause 24 to issue guidance on how the OEP should behave and what it should do. At the end of the day, it is the department for the environment but also agriculture and food. Those two areas make up such a massive part of the climate change agenda, how we use our land and how we will reclaim our biodiversity for the future of this whole country. The thought that advice on the levels of control should be given in that department seems quite absurd but also very sinister. Either this is really cowardly or it is an agenda that wants to conceal.
My noble friend Lord Cameron pointed out various cases in which big fines have been able to be issued. Will the Government really be able to fine themselves for transgressions relating to chemicals, the use of neonicotinoids and all the things the EU can cope with at the moment?
Earlier this afternoon I spoke about the grubbing up of trees at the barracks near Grantham. When the Minister answered us, he said that neither he nor his colleagues wanted to see any of these grubbed up. I have used the intervening time to look up the remit of Homes England. This is what its website says—it is such a good quote:
“We’re the government’s housing accelerator. We have the appetite, influence, expertise and resources to drive positive market change.”
If you scroll down to look at what it is responsible for and its priorities, there is not one mention of the word “environment”, climate change or care and attention to how we live. I wonder how this will work out if a case is brought by those children—by Callum McLelland, the 15 year-old who planted a tree when he was seven. If he decides to bring a case, will Defra say, “We don’t want this case”?
I also point out that, like my noble friend Lord Cameron, I do not doubt for a second the authenticity and sincerity of the current holders of the office, both in this Chamber and in the other place. I know they mean what they say and do their best, but this is statute that has to stand for ever. It will probably stand when we are all dead.
For instance, I would like to bring to noble Lords’ attention the situation with the recent Australian trade deal. As I understand it, Defra did not approve of it, but it was overridden by the department for trade. We will accept animals into this country such as sheep that have been subjected to the practice of mulesing. If any noble Lords do not know what that is, it is the process of ripping the skin off a lamb’s backside so that it forms scar tissue and then is not vulnerable to flies. The department for trade won.
Government is complicated and messy. There are lobbyists, and a lot of money is being thrown around. The Tory council of Horsham, where Knepp is threatened by 3,500 houses—this was in the Sunday Times eight days ago—has received £600,000 from these developers. There is much going on like this. We need an agency that can stand up to it, act quickly and with independence and that does not have to run to the Minister and say, “Is it okay if I do it?” Please support my noble friend Lord Cameron’s excellent amendment.
I am delighted to support and speak to the amendments in this group. As we are considering in detail a number of amendments relating to both the independence of the OEP and its budget, resources and staffing, I will keep my comments on this group limited to parliamentary oversight and scrutiny.
The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, and I served together on the EU Environment Sub-Committee, and I think he is the sole survivor of that committee to now be on the Environment and Climate Change Committee. He carries the candle for us all in that regard. I am grateful to him for tabling these amendments and agree entirely that we were promised oversight as near as possible equivalent to and as effective as that which pertained through our membership of the European Union, and that my right honourable friend Michael Gove, in the other place, said that it would be inappropriate for Defra to be in charge in the way that, it has now become apparent, it will be.
On balance, I prefer the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Old Scone, which would ensure that appointments would not be made without the consent of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee and the Environmental Audit Committee. On a number of occasions during my tenure as chair of the EFRA Committee, we conducted pre-appointment hearings. I do not know whether there was a pre-appointment hearing in this case, but we know that Dame Glenys Stacey is now in place. My first question to my noble friend is: was there such a pre-appointment hearing? Was it carried out by one, the other or both of those committees? I think I am right in saying that Amendment 85 breaks new ground in suggesting that the other non-executive members of the OEP would also face a pre-appointment hearing. I do not know whether that has ever happened before.
The reason why the amendments are so welcome, particularly Amendment 85, is that it gives us the opportunity to ask my noble friend to set out precisely what the parliamentary oversight of the OEP will be. I argue very forcefully not just for a pre-appointment hearing by the two committees in the other place but for opportunities to have the chair of the OEP, Dame Glenys Stacey, in annually for a full review of its work.
It is important to ask my noble friend one last question. When we were preparing the report to which I referred earlier, Beyond Brexit: Food, Environment, Energy and Health, the Secretary of State told the EU sub-committee—he is quoted at paragraph 162 of the report—the following:
“It is important to note that the chair of the OEP, Dame Glenys Stacey, has already been appointed and is in post … It is already able to receive complaints. Until it has its full legal powers, there is a limit to what it can do to act on those complaints. If the European Union wanted to have dialogue with the OEP for the purposes of that part of the agreement, which really is only about cooperating and sharing, there would be nothing to prevent that from happening in this early stage.”
I would go further and press my noble friend to ensure that there is an obligation, particularly in the early stages while the OEP is being set up and finding its feet, to have regular contacts with the European Commission to find out its exact approach. It may take a different view, but it would be helpful to have at least some background in this regard. It is my certain understanding that Environmental Standards Scotland has already had such contact. It would be highly regressive and retrograde if the OEP, representing England, did not replicate that.
I am also concerned—I hope my noble friend will put my mind at rest—that it should not be in any shape or form admissible or possible for the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to lean on the independent chair of the OEP and suggest that she not take up a complaint, were she minded to do so. According to my current understanding of the OEP’s composition and independence, the situation in that regard is by no means certain. I commend these amendments, and in particular I have great sympathy with Amendment 85.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Dillington, introduced his amendments extremely well. There is not much I can add except to say that it is widely recognised across the House that the office for environmental protection is not currently fit for purpose—it is too weak and easily ignored. It is therefore pretty much a done deal that your Lordships’ House will amend this Bill to strengthen the OEP. I hope that when we do, we can come up with the strongest possible options.
The OEP needs status as well, which the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, pointed out. The amendments would give it that status and, more importantly, they would help to ensure the independence of the office, establishing the commissioner by letters patent from the head of state, which would prevent the Government meddling. That is the sort of level of ambition that we should be setting for our environmental watchdog. Parliament is also the proper place for the OEP to be accountable to. The point made by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, about exactly how that will happen was quite useful.
My Lords, I am delighted to move Amendment 89 and speak to Amendment 90. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, for his support. I also thank the Law Society of Scotland for suggesting that this was worthy of probing by way of an amendment at this stage. It follows on from the little debate we have just had.
As my noble friend the Minister said in summing up the last group of amendments—and as Schedule 1 very clearly sets out—the appointment of a chief executive is to be by non-executive members of the OEP and the other executive members are to be appointed by the OEP. There are regrettably, and unusually, a couple of typos in the amendment on the Marshalled List. Clearly, it should not state that “he member” but “the member” has become insolvent or has been convicted of a criminal offence. I just mention that in the rare event that the Committee might want to adopt the two amendments, which—I hasten to add—I do not intend to press at this stage.
I have tabled these two amendments to introduce a definition for being unable or unfit to remain a member. This would give greater legal certainty as to the circumstances in which a person may be removed from office as a non-executive member of the OEP. As present, the Bill does not provide further detail as to the basis for determining whether a member is unable or unfit to carry out their functions. The amendment specifies that this would be the case when a member becomes insolvent or has been convicted of a criminal offence. The amendment is intended to bring greater specificity to the provisions of the Bill while still providing sufficiently wide scope to take account of other circumstances where the individual is otherwise unable or unfit to discharge the functions of a member or is unsuitable to continue as a member. I understand that there are similar appointee-removal processes in relation to other bodies, such as the Scottish Police Services Authority, set up under the Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2006, and the Scottish Legal Complaints Commission, set up under the Legal Profession and Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 2007.
On Amendment 90, where prior notice should be given for the removal of such a person, it is intended that the Secretary of State would consult with the chair of the OEP in this regard. This would impose a duty, which I understand is currently not in the Bill, on the Secretary of State to consult with the chair of the OEP prior to giving notice to remove a non-executive member from office. The reason for this is that the consultation provides for an additional layer of scrutiny; the requirement for the Secretary of State to consult with the chair of the OEP will help to ensure openness and transparency regarding the Secretary of State’s actions.
Does any procedure exist that I am not currently aware of whereby such a person deemed unfit can be disqualified from holding office in these arrangements? What procedure is intended other than what I have set out in Amendments 89 and 90? With those few words, I beg to move.
My Lords, I had thought that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, intended to speak, but she is not in her place. The noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, has withdrawn, so I call the next speaker, the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard.
I hope I went some way at least towards reassuring noble Lords about the robust process for appointing the chair, board members and non-executive directors of the OEP earlier. I would like to provide additional assurance in relation to Amendments 89 and 90 from my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering.
We have carefully designed the OEP for it to effectively deliver its functions in England and over reserved matters. We have designed the appointment and removal processes of OEP members to retain the right balance between ministerial accountability and operational independence. Should it become apparent that a non-executive member of the OEP were unable or unfit to carry out their duties as a member of the OEP board, we would expect this important development to be a subject of significant discussion between the Secretary of State and the OEP chair. As such, it is not necessary to prescribe this on the face of the Bill.
Additionally, in answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, Schedule 1 already sets out the grounds for the removal of a non-executive board member in the unlikely event of them being unable or unfit to carry out their functions. Greater detail on these matters is better dealt with in the terms of appointment for individual non-executive members rather than on the face of the Bill. Should the Secretary of State act disproportionately in the termination of a non-executive member, they will be held to account and scrutinised by Parliament.
I hope that this reassures my noble friend, and I beg her to withdraw the amendments.
My Lords, I am very grateful for the opportunity to have this little debate and to all those who have contributed. Obviously, I am disappointed that I was not clear enough for my noble friend Lord Trenchard, but I am delighted that, in some way, the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, addressed his concerns ably and effectively. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, put it very well by saying that there is a need for greater clarity, and it was a professional body—the Law Society of Scotland—that first proposed these amendments.
I take my noble friend’s point that this level of detail was perhaps never intended to be on the face of the Bill, but it would be interesting to know what sort of template there was and, for example, how “disproportionately” would be considered. Clearly, common sense will dictate what disqualifies one from office. Because of some historic misdemeanour that is not of any great consequence, it would be unfortunate to lose a person who would be a good member of the board.
I am grateful to have had the opportunity to raise this, and I am grateful to my noble friend for putting my mind at rest in summing up. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful again to have the opportunity to press and probe my noble friend further on the matter of the OEP’s budget. I have followed his advice and read the relevant paragraphs in Schedule 1, which is the relevant schedule here. I would just like to make the case for why I believe that a requirement to prepare a five-year budget, which is subject to consultation and review, is needed.
We spoke earlier of what level of parliamentary scrutiny there would be, and it would be opportune, perhaps when there is an annual hearing of the two Select Committees—the Environmental Audit Committee and the EFRA Committee—to take evidence from the chairman of the OEP. But if there was a five-year rolling budget, there would be much more meat on the bones, and it would show what direction, focus and priorities the OEP was going to have.
The reason that this is such a key part of the Bill, and why I seek to probe through Amendment 92—which Amendment 93, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Whitchurch and Lady Young of Old Scone, is not dissimilar to—is that, if the OEP is going to do its job effectively, it needs to be properly funded to carry out its role. I remember the arguments that we put passionately and consistently through the course of the Trade Bill, as it then was, that the Trade and Agriculture Commission should have a proper budget, be properly resourced and have an office and staff independent of the department. Where the Bill says that
“The Secretary of State must pay to the OEP such sums as the Secretary of State considers are reasonably sufficient”,
each of us would have a view as to what “reasonably sufficient” might be.
On the need for a wider budget, I know that research grants—for example, in other aspects of agriculture—run for some three years, and after the end of the first and second years, the whole of the next year is spent wondering whether the same level of budget will be available. I believe that a five-year period is ideal, as it is neither too short nor too long. It will help to ensure that the resource requirements are adequately met with sufficient advance notice and that the proposed funding is clearly identified and published as we go through each five-year period. It can only help Defra when we come, such as in this year, to the strategic spending review, to know precisely what the commitments will be.
The purpose of Amendment 92 is to ensure that there will be a five-year budget that is subject to consultation, and it will go some way to ensuring that the OEP is sufficiently funded and resourced to carry out the work that we all hope it will do. I beg to move.
My Lords, I very much hope so. I thank my noble friend Lady McIntosh and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, for tabling Amendments 92 and 93. I agree, of course, that it is important for the OEP to have certainty regarding its level of funding on a multi-annual basis That is why the Government have committed to providing a multi-annual indicative budget for the OEP, ring-fenced within each spending review period. For transparency, the OEP’s budget will also be given a separate line in Defra’s supply estimate, which will be laid before Parliament to allow for parliamentary scrutiny. This is, nevertheless, an administrative matter, so it is not appropriate to put it on the face of the Bill.
There is also a need to retain flexibility, both initially in light of delays to the Bill due to the Covid-19 pandemic, and should the process for allocating public body budgets ever be reformed at a future date. It is worth pointing out that other bodies with multi-annual funding commitments—the Office for Budget Responsibility, for example—do not have this set out in legislation. The Bill does provide several safeguards on OEP funding. These include a duty on the Secretary of State to fund the OEP sufficiently; in conjunction, the OEP will provide an annual assessment to Parliament of whether it has received sufficient funding. In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, the OEP has been given £8 million for its interim stage for this business year.
I hope that this reassures noble Lords and ask them to withdraw the amendment.
I am grateful to all who have spoken, and I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, for lending his support in co-signing the amendment.
I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Rooker; if you look at paragraph 12 of Schedule 1, it really is not very forthcoming. It just talks about paying
“such sums as the Secretary of State considers … reasonably sufficient to enable the OEP to carry out its functions”,
and then talks of
“subject to such conditions as the Secretary of State may determine”
if there is further assistance by way of grants or loans. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Khan, that both amendments deal with a potential revision; I think the difference in Amendment 93 is if any additional funds are required. To a certain extent, I think that is already addressed in the schedule.
The noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Bennachie, is right that we need to equip the OEP to be in a position to respond rapidly to what we are asking it to do. I am not in a position to say whether £8 million seems low. It does not seem particularly high for its first year, but it depends on whether it is for half a year, assuming that the organisation really only comes into swing properly on 1 July, this week. Perhaps my noble friend could confirm whether it is six, nine or 12 months—I think we are going to have a penalty fine for anybody whose mobile phone goes off in the Chamber, as that one has just done.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, is absolutely right. I am grateful that my noble friend confirmed that it is an indicative budget, but we do need greater clarity to enable the OEP to do its work, for all the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, gave about how out of kilter the Natural England budget is. Obviously, that has not been a blow to Tony Juniper in making these points, because he has gone from strength to strength. I do not think people should be shy of criticising the funding—not the Government themselves—where that is due.
The noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Dillington, said, both in this debate and the previous one, that it is not just the OEP and Natural England that are being kept short of funds. What worries me very much is the fact that the Environment Agency is on the record as saying that it does not have sufficient funds to inspect the rivers. If we are not inspecting the rivers, how is the OEP going to impose the penalties that we wish it to?
I believe this has been a very useful debate. We might want to consider how to address this, if it is necessary, going forward. However, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, continuing the theme of great minds thinking alike, apparently the requests for a clause stand part debate landed at exactly the same moment and there was the equivalent of tossing a coin to see whose name would appear. I am delighted to support the clause stand part debate and to go a little further in my Amendment 100.
My question to my noble friend at the outset is this: does he not accept that, for the OEP to do all that I am sure he, the Government and all of us would wish it to do, it must be seen to be independent, not just of the Government but of other organisations, such as Natural England and, to a certain extent, the Environment Agency? I am still not entirely clear what the relationship of the OEP and the Environment Agency and these other bodies will be. The question I keep asking, to which I hope one day to get an answer, is this: to who would a farmer, whether a landowner, a tenant or an owner-occupier, go to seek advice? Would it be Natural England, the Environment Agency or the OEP? That is not entirely clear.
I could never be cross with my noble friend, so I would not like to be described as a cross Back-Bencher, but I find it inappropriate that Clause 24 appears in the terms that it does. It is discretionary. It simply states that:
“The Secretary of State may issue guidance to the OEP on the matters listed in section 22(6) (OEP’s enforcement policy).”
It then goes on:
“The OEP must have regard to the guidance in … preparing its enforcement policy, and … exercising its enforcement functions.”
This reverts to the point I made earlier, when I set out my concern that it might be the case that a Secretary of State—or, heaven forfend, a junior Minister—might lean on members of the OEP to ensure that a particular enforcement does not go ahead. That would be utterly inappropriate. It then goes on to say that
“The Secretary of State may revise the guidance at any time”
but
“must lay before Parliament, and publish, the guidance (and any revised guidance).”
I am not quite sure which body would be scrutinising that in that situation. Later, it sets out the OEP’s enforcement functions.
At this point, I just say that I do not believe there is a place for Clause 24 in the Bill, and I look forward to some very strong justification or proposed changes that my noble friend might make when he sums up this little debate.
Just before I address my Amendment 100, I want to support the amendments in this group in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick. They also go to the heart of parliamentary scrutiny, which we discussed a little earlier. I endorse those amendments; they are entirely appropriate.
Amendment 100 would go a little further than just leaving out Clause 24 and would insert a new clause specifically stating that
“In performing its functions, the OEP is not subject to the direction or control of the Secretary of State or any member of Her Majesty’s Government.”
I cannot put it in any stronger terms than that it would be entirely inappropriate for that to happen. This debate is a good opportunity to cast beyond doubt the independence of the OEP, not just, as I said, from government but in its dealing with other bodies which have a role to play in the environment. We want to give it the greatest authority we possibly can. I would argue that we leave out Clause 24 but insert my wording in Amendment 100.
My Lords, it is a delight to follow the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering. I support the amendments in this group and wish to speak in particular to the amendments in my name: Amendments 117 and 118, relating to Northern Ireland.
Schedule 3 makes provision for the functions of the office of environmental protection in its activities in Northern Ireland. Along with many organisations, including Greener UK, I support the inclusion of Northern Ireland within the remit of the office of environmental protection. These provisions are broadly parallel to those in Part 1 and Schedule 1 that relate to England. I raised this specific point during Second Reading, some three weeks ago.
Extensive regulatory dysfunction and unacceptable levels of disregard for environmental law have resulted in substantial degradation of the environment in Northern Ireland, with significant economic and social costs. The independence of the OEP in Northern Ireland is therefore vital. The lack of an independent environmental regulator, despite the fact that it was first recommended in 1992 by a House of Commons Environment Select Committee report—nothing has ever happened in that regard—has meant historically weak environmental governance, which means that the OEP must have a cast-iron constitution and culture of independence from the outset. The need for independent oversight is exemplified in the case of designated sites, such as protected sites. In some cases, it is quite dismal in our areas of special scientific interest and areas of outstanding natural beauty.
In this context I have a concern about a broad power for DAERA, the department in Northern Ireland, to issue guidance to the OEP that it must have regard to when preparing its enforcement policy or exercising its enforcement functions in Northern Ireland. This will affect the OEP’s ability to perform its role independently and does not take sufficient account of the particular political circumstances and context of Northern Ireland, including the mandatory power-sharing nature of the Northern Ireland Executive—hence Amendment 117.
There is concern about the timetable for appointing the Northern Ireland member of the OEP board. There must be no further delay in appointing that member, and the appointment process should be progressed as quickly as possible. I hope the Minister will pursue that with his equivalent colleague in the Northern Ireland Executive.
Those problems concerning the guidance power for DAERA should be removed from the Bill, and Amendment 117 would do that. There are three particular areas of concern. In line with the Ministerial Code, cross-cutting and controversial matters must be brought to the Northern Ireland Executive—and guidance from the DAERA Minister to the OEP on its enforcement policy and functions would qualify as both cross-cutting and controversial. Therefore, what is the procedure for bringing this guidance to the Executive before it is issued by DAERA? As a former Minister in the Northern Ireland Executive, about 13 years ago, I knew what that meant, but I just want to clarify that.
Secondly, ministerial appointments in Northern Ireland are managed through the d’Hondt system, under which the largest parties are allocated multiple departments. What mechanisms will be put in place to minimise the risk that a current or future DAERA Minister could use the guidance power to advise the OEP in relation to enforcement or potential non-compliance on environmental law relating to either a department of a similar affiliation or one allocated to an opposing party? Given its wide scope and the lack of transparency in how it will be prepared, the guidance could in theory be used for political benefit—a risk that does not appear to be considered by Defra or DAERA in designing this power.
As a public authority, the Northern Ireland Environment Agency will fall within the remit of the OEP. If DAERA exercised its power to issue guidance in relation to enforcement matters involving the Northern Ireland Environment Agency, that would further cloud Northern Ireland’s already difficult environmental governance and could result in blurred areas of accountability.
Amendment 118 would require the appointment of the Northern Ireland board to be made with the consent of the Committee for Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs of the Northern Ireland Assembly. To engender the greatest level of stakeholder trust and buy-in to the OEP, Northern Ireland must be—and must be perceived to be—embedded within it from the start. The appointment of a dedicated Northern Ireland board member will help ensure that Northern Ireland’s nuances, including geopolitical, biogeographic and societal, are properly accounted for in the OEP’s policies and activities. It will also establish trust and credibility.
In this context, can the Minister ask DAERA to clarify the timescale for the appointment process? I note that the first interim board meeting of the OEP is expected to be held this Thursday, 1 July.