(2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is an absolute pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, not just because I am going to speak thematically, alongside him, but because he speaks so wonderfully.
I thank the committee for its excellent report, and the excellent introduction by its chair, the noble Lord, Lord Hollick. I will restrict my remarks to two issues: the AI skills shortage across government and regulators, and the recommendation for a Joint Committee of both Houses to oversee digital regulation. I refer the House to my interests, in particular as adviser to the Institute for Ethics in AI at Oxford and as chair of the LSE’s Digital Futures research centre.
AI technology is not new, and nor is competition for digital expertise to support public policy. However, in recent years, we have seen a raft of digital regulation across data, competition, safety, consumer products and so on, as well as a step change in the scale at which AI is being deployed across business, public services and direct to citizens. Together, these have created an eye-watering competition for AI skills. The US and China dominate the charts of AI talent, together currently employing 75% of highly skilled workers; that is up from 58% in 2019. One sector analysis found that there are only 10,000 people in the world with the kinds of skills that new applications of AI need. I ask the House to do the maths: if the US and China have 7,500 of those people, that leaves very few for the rest of us.
What was once an issue concentrated in the tech sector, or in businesses with complex delivery or service functions, is now an issue for everyone, including the regulators. Increasingly, we hear government Ministers suggest that AI is the tool by which they will reform the NHS, justice and welfare, and that it is central to their growth agenda. This requires regulators and government itself to enter an intensely competitive market for skills in which they either pay eye-watering sums to attract talent or outsource to companies, most often headquartered outside the UK, with which they frequently make data sharing and processing arrangements that accrue long-term value disproportionately away from the UK.
There are a number of actions that government might consider, from funding graduate programmes to retraining professionals in associated fields or adding digital skills to those with domain expertise, compulsory training for civil servants and government lawyers, attractive packages for foreign nationals, and so on. But without a concerted and urgent effort, our hopes to be a centre of innovation, and for the transformation of public services and functions of government, such as drafting legislation or fulfilling oversight functions, will be blighted by a lack of access to adequate skills.
This leads neatly to my second point. The pre-legislative committee on the online harms Bill, on which I was privileged to serve, recommended a Joint Committee of both Houses to oversee digital regulation, setting out five primary functions for that committee: scrutinising digital regulators; scrutinising government drafting of legislation about digital technologies; reviewing relevant codes of practice; monitoring new developments such as the creation of emerging technologies; and publishing independent research or whistleblower testimonies. During the passage of the Online Safety Bill, the data Bill and the competition Bill, the creation of a Joint Committee was supported by Members of both Houses and from all parties, most notably championed by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, but including the Minister herself.
There is not time in this debate to go into detail about emerging gaps between the intentions of Parliament and digital regulators, the speed of regulatory codes versus the speed of technological development, the twin evils of hacking and scraping of intellectual property, commercial access to publicly held data, or the ferocious lobbying of government and regulator by the most powerful companies in the world. However, along with the issues raised by the report of conflicting objectives, inadequate expertise in government and regulator, and the habit of information overload instead of transparency, each of these things would be well served by Parliament having oversight and expertise from dedicated committee members and staff.
This is a time in which digital solutions, particularly those driven by AI, come before the House in ever greater numbers, with unprecedented impact on every area of public and private life. If we do not ourselves grasp the problem of skills, we will squander our sovereign resources and find ourselves renters of services and products that should be built in the UK. If we do not improve our oversight of digital regulation, we will squander our chance to be a rule-maker and not a rule-taker of the new world.
(2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Ofcom has a very wide-ranging and serious set of responsibilities. There is no suggestion that it is not carrying out its responsibilities in the run-up to the implementation of the Online Safety Act. We are working very closely with Ofcom and believe that it will carry out those additional functions that we have given it with proper scrutiny and to high standards. Yes, there is a case for looking at all regulators; we have a debate on this on Monday in the House, and I am looking forward to that, but that is a wider issue. For the moment, we have to give Ofcom all the support that we can in implementing a very difficult set of regulations.
My Lords, the crafting of the Online Safety Act was fraught with exceptions, exclusions and loopholes, the most egregious of which is that regulated companies get safe harbour if they comply with Ofcom’s codes, but Ofcom has provided us with codes that have huge gaps in known harms. What plans do the Government have to fulfil their election promise to strengthen the OSA by ensuring that it protects all children effectively, even the very young, and that it has adequate mechanisms to act swiftly in a crisis, or with an evolving new risk, to stop abuse being whipped up algorithmically and directed at minority groups?
My Lords, I think that we are in danger of downplaying the significance of the Online Safety Act. It is a trail-blazing Act; the noble Baroness was very much involved in it. Our priority has to be to get that Act implemented. Under it, all user-to-user services and search providers, regardless of size, will have to take swift and effective action against illegal content, including criminal online abuse and posts of a sexual nature. We should get behind Ofcom and the Online Safety Act, and we will then obviously have to keep that Act under review, but we have the tools to do that.
(8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare my interest as deputy chair of the Telegraph Media Group and my other interests as set out in the register. I will focus briefly on three crucial amendments in this group—on proportionality, the appeals standard, and the Secretary of State’s powers—echoing points that have already been made strongly in this debate.
I fully support Amendments 13 and 35 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. The amendment made to the Bill in the Commons replacing “appropriate” with “proportionate” will significantly expand the scope for SMS firms to appeal the CMA’s decision to create conduct requirements and initiate pro-competitive interventions.
As we have already heard, the Government have sought to argue that, even absent the “proportionality” wording, in most cases the SMS firms will be able to argue that their ECHR rights will be engaged, therefore allowing them to appeal on the basis of proportionality. The question arises: why then introduce the “proportionality” standard for intervention at all, particularly when the CMA has never had the scope to act disproportionately at law?
In this context, it is clear that the main potential impact of the Bill as it now stands is that a court may believe that Parliament was seeking to create a new, heightened standard of judicial review. As the Government have rightly chosen to retain judicial review as the standard of appeals for regulatory decisions in Part 1, they should ensure that this decision is not undermined by giving big tech the scope to launch expensive, lengthy legal cases. All experience suggests that that is exactly what would happen by it arguing that the Government have sought to create a new, expansive iteration of JR. I fear that, if the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, are not adopted, we may find in a few years’ time that we introduced full merits reviews by the back door, totally undermining the purpose of this Act.
Amendments 43, 44, 46, 51 and 52 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, are also concerned with ensuring that we do not allow full merits appeals to undermine the CMA’s ability to regulate fast-moving digital markets. Even though full merits are confined to penalty decisions, financial penalties are, after all, as we have heard, the ultimate incentive to comply with the CMA’s requirements. We know that the Government want this to be a collaborative regime but, without there being a real prospect of meaningful financial penalties, an SMS firm will have little reason to engage with the CMA. Therefore, there seems little logic in making it easier for SMS firms to delay and frustrate the imposition of penalties.
There is also a danger that full merits appeals of penalty decisions will bleed back into regulatory decisions. The giant tech platforms will undoubtedly seek to argue that a finding of a breach of a conduct requirement, and the CMA’s consideration that an undertaking has failed to comply with a conduct requirement when issuing a penalty, are both fundamentally concerned with the same decision: “the imposition” of a penalty, with the common factor being a finding that a conduct requirement has been breached. The cleanest way to deal with this is to reinstate the merits appeals for all digital markets decisions. That is why, if the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, presses her amendments, I will support them.
Finally, I strongly support Amendment 56 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lansley, which would ensure that the Secretary of State must approve CMA guidance within a 40-day deadline. This would allow the Government to retain oversight of the pro-competition regime’s operations, while also ensuring that the operationalisation of the regime is not unduly delayed. It will also be important in ensuring that updates to the guidance are made promptly; such updates are bound to be necessary to iron out unforeseen snags or to react to rapidly developing digital markets. Absent a deadline for approval, there is a possibility that the regulation of big tech firms will grind to a halt mid-stream. That would be a disaster for a sector in which new technologies and business models are developed almost daily. I strongly support my noble friend and will back him if he presses his amendment to a vote.
With the deadline to comply with the Digital Markets Act in Europe passing only last week, big tech’s machinations in the EU have provided us with a window into our future if we do not make this legislation watertight. As one noble Lord said in Committee—I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie—we do not need a crystal ball when we can read the book. We have the book, and we do not like what we see in it. We must ensure that firms with an incredibly valuable monopoly to defend and limitless legal budgets with which to do so are not able to evade compliance in our own pro-competition regime.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 43, 44, 46, 51 and 52, to which I have added my name, and Amendment 59. Before I do, I register my support for Amendments 13 and 35, which were brilliantly set out by my noble friend Lord Faulks and added to by others. I too shall support them if they choose to ask the opinion of the House.
I also support Amendment 56 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. I have lived experience of waiting too long for the code to come back from the Secretary of State. Even without being a bad actor, it is in the nature of Secretaries of State to have a burgeoning in-tray, and it is in the nature of codes to be on a subject that politicians have moved on from by the time they arrive. I fully support him, and 40 days seems like a modest ask given the importance of the Bill overall.
I turn to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. I look forward to her setting them out after I have supported them. They would reinstate judicial review as the appeal standard for penalty decisions. I thank the Minister for the generosity of his time; I know he spoke not only to me but to a number of noble Lords. However, the thing I have taken away from discussions with government and during Committee is the persistent drumbeat that asserts that we are giving huge new and untested powers to the CMA. Here, we can fill in as we like: full merits on penalty, countervailing benefits, proportionality, and Secretary of State powers have been introduced simply to give a little balance. I find that unacceptable given the power of the companies and the asymmetry we are trying to address.
The reality is that the powers given to the CMA, while much needed, are dwarfed by the power of the companies they seek to regulate. The resources available to the CMA, while welcome, are dwarfed by the resources available to a single brand of a single SMS. Most of all, the CMA’s experience of regulating digital companies is dwarfed by the experience of digital companies in dodging regulation. I am struggling to understand the imbalance of power that the Government are seeking to address.
I was in Brussels on Wednesday last week and there is a certain regret about the balancing that the EU allowed to the DMA in face of the tech lobby, only to see Apple, TikTok and Meta gleefully heading to the courts and snarling up the possibility of being regulated as intended for many years—or perhaps at all. This issue was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Black. Adding a full merits appeal on penalty will embolden the sector to use the threat of appeal to negotiate their position at earlier points in the process. It will undermine the regulator’s strength in coming to a decision. Very possibly, as other noble Lords have said, it could bleed backwards into areas of compliance and conduct requirements. It is, as the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, said, creating a hole for water to get in. The companies lobbied furiously for full merits on penalties. This is not an administrative point; it goes to the heart of the regime. Full merits give the regulated leverage over the regulator.
The most straightforward way of ensuring that the regulator does not abuse its new, enhanced power, as the Government appear to fear, is to make it accountable to Parliament, as the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, set out in full, repeatedly and with great eloquence. I am sorry that we will not have an opportunity to make our feelings on that issue felt today, but I strongly support her saying that we should not drop this issue just because it is inconvenient to deal with at this point in the electoral cycle.
My Lords, I have four amendments in this group. Amendments 16 and 17 relate to the conduct requirements that the CMA can impose on designated undertakings, and Amendments 20 and 25 relate to countervailing benefits in relation to that conduct. I will come to that in a minute. Let me stick for a moment with Amendments 16 and 17.
Amendment 16 was helpfully introduced, to some extent, by what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said about the activities in the run-up to the introduction of the Digital Markets Act in the European Union. There was a deadline of 7 March for that, and considerable attention has been paid to what Apple in particular has done in relation to that. The noble Lord made Apple’s position clear. It is saying, essentially, that we can either stay with our existing system, and it will charge 30% by way of fees for apps on the App Store, or we can go to this alternative which enables us to comply with the DMA, and Apple will offer an alternative but with a 17% fee for apps plus a 3% core technology fee, and, if you go beyond a million downloads, you will get a 50 cents processing charge per download. Those who fear that their app may go viral, with millions of downloads, are potentially facing enormous costs for processing them through the App Store. As far as all the potential users of the Apple App Store are concerned, this potentially restricts their opportunity for competition rather than enabling it.
My first point is to further reinforce that we have come together to design legislation in support of the Government that is more flexible than the Digital Markets Act. The DMA, in effect, puts the obligations into the originating Act. To change them will be considerably more difficult than would be the case for the Competition and Markets Authority in our regime to change the structure and the content of conduct requirements. Potentially, we have really good flexibility.
Amendment 16 is linked to whether the powers to impose conduct requirements enable the CMA to act in relation to the leveraging of market power in digital activities into other activities—the wider system of its business. Amendment 16 is absolutely about whether the conduct requirements that can be imposed under Clause 20 are sufficiently wide to enable the Competition and Markets Authority to structure them to limit activity which restricts competition in the way that these efforts are being pursued in relation to the Digital Markets Act. To that extent, Amendment 16 asks the Minister, if he would be kind enough to respond in this light, whether, if a designated undertaking were to behave in that sort of way, the CMA would have the power under the conduct requirements to respond and act, and to do so rapidly, to frustrate that kind of anti-competitive result.
Amendment 17 is slightly different, in that we discussed it in Committee. One of the European Union Digital Markets Act obligations is termed expressly to prevent others seeking to stop someone making a complaint to any public authority about non-compliance with the relevant obligations. I looked to see whether our conduct requirements, specified in Clause 20, cover a similar circumstance. In discussion in Committee, the Minister directed me to the “fair and reasonable terms” provision, which is very wide ranging but does not cover this, because these are not the terms of a contractual relationship between a designated undertaking and its users or potential users. It may not relate to that at all.
The Minister also directed me to the question of discrimination, but I do not think this is about discrimination between users; it is about preventing someone, who may be a user, a potential user or a potential competitor, from going to a public authority and saying, “This undertaking does not comply with its conduct requirements”. We know—I will not repeat the evidence that I gave in Committee—that there have, unhappily, been circumstances of intimidation of those who would complain to regulators about the conduct of organisations with significant market power. I return to this simply to say to the Minister that I am not yet convinced. Can he convince us that this kind of activity is covered by the conduct requirements? If it is not, will he undertake to ensure that the necessary changes are made to Clause 20, which the legislation would permit?
I will also speak to the amendments about counter-vailing benefits exemptions. Amendments 23 and 24 revert the Bill to its original wording, which would be better than where we are now. I have looked at Clause 29 from my point of view and I cannot find a good reason for it, so I thought it better to leave it out. If there is a conduct investigation and there are countervailing benefits, they should be presented to the CMA when it makes representations to a conduct investigation. Why would they be left to any other time or specified separately in the legislation?
I thought it better to amend Clause 27 such that, when making representations, the designated undertaking may give details of the benefits associated with its conduct to form part of that investigation. At that point, it should come forward if it is prepared to make commitments that the CMA could accept, without necessarily making a finding, to close that investigation.
All this should take place in Clause 27 on representations, because that is where the sequence lies. I do not understand why Clause 29 has been added at what appears to be a later stage in the sequence of the legislation. As it is a separate clause, it appears as though the benefits can be presented at an entirely separate point.
As I have also discussed with the Minister, there is an analogy with the exempt anti-competitive agreements under the Competition Act 1998. I was on the stand when that Bill was in Committee and this is a very different kettle of fish. The 1998 Act set out broad descriptions of agreements that would be deemed anti-competitive and therefore void, except if undertakings came to the Competition and Markets Authority; then the burden is on it to demonstrate that they have, in effect, countervailing benefits, such as to innovation, the consumer and the like, without an adverse effect on competition.
That is ex post regulation. That is agreements and obligations that are broad-ranging and apply across industry. Here, we are talking about conduct requirements that are optimised and designed in relation to that undertaking in the first place. This is ex ante regulation. You cannot compare ex post provisions in the Competition Act with ex ante regulation under this legislation. They are not the same kind of thing.
Therefore, again, I come back to the argument: let us not have exemptions. The use of “exemption” seems wholly inappropriate. We have here a very straightforward process. Conduct requirements require, in themselves, under Clause 24, for there to be a consultation. The undertaking should tell the CMA what the benefits associated with its conduct are at that stage.
There is a forward-looking process; the conduct requirement is supposed to look forward five years, but none the less, circumstances change. The CMA can review a conduct requirement, and the designated undertaking should come to the CMA if circumstances change and there are countervailing benefits and ask for the conduct requirement to be reviewed. Even if, under all these circumstances, a conduct investigation notice is issued, the undertaking should come forward and express what the benefits are at that point. Under none of these circumstances is there a requirement for the use of “exemption” or for an additional clause that offers countervailing benefits as such.
I dare say I will not press this, because there is probably more to be said for Amendment 23 and going back to the original wording, but it afforded me the opportunity, I hope, to explain why I think the whole proposition in Clause 29 seems misplaced.
My Lords, I find myself in a slightly awkward position because my name is listed in support of Amendments 23 and 24, but I find the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, incontrovertible, and maybe he should press his amendment.
On the wording, I want to put on the record the view of Which?:
“This is a legal loophole for big tech to challenge conduct requirements through lengthy, tactical, legal challenges. It would tie up CMA (i.e., taxpayer) resources and frustrate the intent of the legislation. Whilst we agree with the intent of this provision, which is to encourage innovation that will benefit consumers, it is critical that these provisions do not inadvertently give designated firms a get out of jail free card from DMU decisions”
by presenting opaque consumer benefits.
I put that on the record because it is so measured in comparison with many of the emails and representations I have had, and still is absolutely categoric that this is a get out of jail card. Like the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, I do not understand why the regulator duty to be
“proportionate, accountable, consistent, transparent and targeted”,
within the context of coming to the conduct requirements and taking up any countervailing benefits at that point, is not adequate. So I will support the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and, indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, should he change his mind in the next few minutes.
I also add my support to Amendment 60, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I am an enthusiastic supporter of international standards. They provide for soft law and, having worked with the IEEE on a number of standards over the last few years, I see how brilliantly they work to bring disparate people together and provide practical steps for those tasked with implementation. I declare an interest in relation to the IEEE, which gives some funding to 5Rights Foundation, of which I am chair.
The point I leave with the House is that, toward the end of 2022, I had two conversations with companies that will certainly be SMS about why they were now recruiting for employees to work on standards full-time. I believe the CMA should be in the standards-writing game.
(9 months, 1 week ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, as well as speaking to Amendment 80, I will say a few words about Amendment 83A in my name, which is in some ways related.
The point just made was extremely important and correct: in whose interests are these bodies acting? The answer should always be people—all of us. Commissioner Vestager, responsible for competition in Brussels, made exactly this point in evidence on several occasions and in a couple of major speeches. She is a far-sighted and bold competition Commissioner. In practice, we are all consumers, so the word “consumer” should probably catch it, but it may not convey quite as much to the public as we would like.
My amendment was triggered by an exchange that I had with the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, earlier in the scrutiny of the Bill. In response to a question of his to the Minister, I suggested that the CMA always operates under a duty to be proportionate. When I said that, I had in mind not so much the implications of the Human Rights Act for its effect on proportionality but a more general duty to respect best regulatory practice, under which specialist regulators operate, as far as I know. Usually, this is understood to mean transparency, accountability, proportionality, consistency and, where relevant, action targeted only at cases that really require it. Some people talk about efficiency and economy in the same breath. Although I have not found that in any statute, I expect that it is to be found in various statutes.
I have subsequently checked some of this out with the House of Commons Library and others. First, a duty such as I describe is written into the Water Act, the Gas Act, the Electricity Act and the Communications Act, among others, with very similar wording to that which I have just cited. In other words, Ofwat, Ofgem and Ofcom are all subject to such a duty. I have also checked that these duties are justiciable.
Secondly, I made another, unexpected, discovery. As a result of this legislation, the CMA will become an outlier among these specialist regulators. By this legislation, we are giving the CMA specific specialist responsibilities for the digital sector. In other words, it becomes a sector regulator. But, unlike with the other specialist regulators that I have just listed, no such statutory duty to adhere to the principles of best regulatory practice will be required of it. My amendment would correct that omission.
Late last week I discovered that the City of London Law Society had made roughly the same point in its submission on the Bill. The wording in my amendment is pretty much taken from that submission. At the time I tabled it, I had not discussed it with the City of London Law Society and, since then, I have had time only for a couple of minutes with it on the phone. I cannot think of a good reason for not applying this duty to the CMA, but I can think of plenty of reasons why it should be applied.
These duties on public bodies can appear to be little more than motherhood and apple pie but, as I have discovered over the years, they can influence behaviour in powerful public bodies in quite a big way, and usually for the better. I will illustrate that. Take an accounting officer who comes under pressure to do something that he or she considers inappropriate. That happens not infrequently, as those of us who have been on the inside, or on both sides, of the public body fence will know. With a statutory duty in place, the accounting officer is much better protected and placed to be able to say, “I’m not going to go ahead with that”. That is no doubt one of several reasons why these specialist regulators have these duties imposed on them: they serve as a reminder, a backstop, for securing good conduct from those at the top of organisations, particularly those with a high degree of statutory independence.
Now, the Government—on advice, no doubt—will point in response, probably in just a moment, to codes of conduct, guidelines and other documents that already require good regulatory practice. I can see the Minister smiling. I know most of these documents quite well—as a matter of fact, I contemplated reading them out myself, but I will spare the Committee that pain and leave it to him to take the flak. The department’s impact assessments should work, in principle, to provide some of the heavy lifting as well, and they are audited by the NAO. I have seen that scrutiny in action, and it does far less to improve behaviour than a statutory obligation. It is the latter that really concentrates the mind.
More and more as we examine the Bill, the absence of a general duty on the CMA seems to be of a piece with the approach taken right across the draft legislation. We are creating a body with unprecedented powers and unprecedentedly feeble avenues for the securing of accountability. We are creating ideal conditions for executive overreach. All the necessary ingredients are being put in place as we legislate here.
First, there is the long history of patchy to poor scrutiny by Parliament, particularly by the Commons, of the CMA. As I may have pointed out on more than one occasion, I was its very first chairman ever to appear before the BEIS Select Committee, and I secured my audience by request—I said that I really would like to come along—which gives you an idea of the distance between the committee and the activities of the CMA. Of course—and I do not mean this disparagingly to anybody in this House—it is the Commons Select Committee that really counts when it comes to delivering punchy cross-examination and accountability, or at least counts most.
Parliament could do a better job, which I think was the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, made on Monday, but it would be a profound mistake, even if we got the improvements that she is proposing, to rely exclusively on Parliament to do the heavy lifting.
The first reason why we need this amendment is that we do not have much parliamentary scrutiny. Secondly, we have a body with a historically weak board, with most of the important decisions already delegated to the most senior executives, mixed-quality governance at best and a history of patchy to poor non-executive challenge of executive decisions. I realise that it is concerning that an ex-chairman should feel the need to put that on record, but it is necessary. Thirdly, as things stand, we are protecting the CMA from any substantive review at all of decisions on digital, which is a discussion we had earlier with respect to JR.
A fourth reason why this amendment is needed is that it now seems that the body is to be exempted from the core duties to conform to best regulatory practice which have been considered essential for all other sector regulators that I have checked out. My amendment would rectify that problem at least. I hope that the Minister will look favourably on the suggestion.
My Lords, I support Amendment 80, to which I added my name. I will also say a few words about Amendment 83A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie.
I fear that the word “citizens” might meet the same fate as the word “workers”. The argument will be made that it extends the CMA’s remit in ways that might overburden, create a lack of focus or overlap. However, the digital world has several characteristics that support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, which would add “citizens” to “consumers”.
I am sorry to intervene a second time. When the Minister is looking for counter- examples, I would be grateful if he kept to the major sector regulators, which are the direct comparator. There are more than 500 significant quangos, and I am sure I would be able to find a few quite quickly.
Before the Minister stands up, may I ask him whether, if he cannot find a counterexample, this amendment may find some favour with the Government?
I will actively seek a counterexample and consider the implications of my results.
The CMA has a strong track record of following best regulatory practice across all its functions as an experienced regulator. The Government’s view is therefore that it makes sense to legislate only when it is necessary to do so, and that here there does not appear to be a problem that requires a legislative solution. For these reasons, I hope the noble Baroness feels able to withdraw her amendment.
(9 months, 2 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeThe noble Lord, Lord Knight, has said so much of my speech that I will be very rapid. There are two points to make here. One is that regulatory co-operation is a theme in every digital Bill. We spent a long time on it during the passage of the Online Safety Act, we will do it again in the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, and here it is again. As the noble Lord, Lord Knight, said, if the wording or the approach is not right, that does not matter, but any move to bring regulators together is a good thing.
The second point, which may come up again in amendments in a later group that looks at citizens, is that it is increasingly hard to understand what a user, a worker or a citizen is in this complicated digital system. As digital companies have both responsibilities and powers across these different themes, it is important, as I argued last week, to ensure that workers are not forgotten in this picture.
My Lords, it is with great trepidation that I rise to speak to these amendments because, I think for the first time in my brief parliamentary career, I am not complete ad idem with the noble Lord, Lord Knight, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on digital issues where normally we work together. I hope they will forgive me for not having shared some of my concerns with them in advance.
I kicked myself for not saying this last week, so I am extremely grateful that they have brought the issue back this week for a second run round. My slight concern is that history is littered with countries trying to stop innovation, whether we go back to the Elizabethans trying to stop looms for hand knitters or to German boatmen sinking the first steamboat as it went down the Rhine. We must be very careful that in the Bill we do not encourage the CMA to act in such a way that it stops the rude competition that will drive the innovation that will lead to growth and technology. I do not for a moment think that the noble Lord or the noble Baroness think that, but we have to be very cautious about it.
We also learn from history that innovation does not affect or benefit everybody equally. As we go through this enormous technology transformation, it is important that as a society we support people who do not necessarily immediately benefit or who might be considerably worse off, but I do not think that responsibility should lie with the CMA. Last week, the noble Lord, Lord Knight, challenged with, “If not in this Bill, where?” and I feel similarly about this amendment. It is right that we want regulators to co-operate more, but it is important that our regulators have very clear accountabilities. Having been a member of the Court of the Bank of England for eight years in my past life, I hate the fact that there are so many that the Bank of England must take note of in its responsibilities. We have to be very careful that we do not create a regime for the CMA whereby it has to take note of a whole set of issues that are really the broad responsibility of government. Where I come back into alignment with the noble Lord, Lord Knight, is that I think it is important that the Government address those issues, just probably not in this Bill.
My Lords, I want to support Amendment 76, to which I have added my name, with some brief remarks because the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, has put the case with great power and eloquence. I also support Amendment 77 in the name of my noble friend Lady Stowell, which is a clever solution to the issue of accountability.
I support Amendment 76 in particular, both because I do not believe the requirement is necessary and because—this is a consistent theme in our Committee debates—it builds into the legislation a completely avoidable delay and poses a very real threat to the rapid enforcement of it. Quite apart from the issues of principle, which are significant, this is also intensely practical. The CMA’s guidance on the Bill, published earlier this month, set out the expected timetable for the consultation phase on the Bill’s implementation, running through to October 2024, which could be a very busy month. It is almost certainly when we will have a general election or be in the midst of one.
It seems highly unlikely that the Secretary of State will be able to approve guidance during the purdah of an election campaign and if, after the election—whoever wins it—we have a new Secretary of State, there will inevitably be a further delay while he or she considers the guidance before approving it. The Bill therefore ought to be amended to remove the requirement for the Secretary of State’s approval, or, at the very least, set a strict timetable for it, such as the draft guidance being automatically approved after 30 days unless it is specifically rejected. That would ensure that there is not unnecessary delay, which could run into many months, before the new regime takes effect—especially if there is, as a number of noble Lords have made clear, intense lobbying of the Secretary of State behind the scenes.
My Lords, I support both amendments in this group. This seems to be fundamentally a question of what happens in private and what happens in public. I was struck by the number of exchanges in the second day in Committee last week in which noble Lords raised the asymmetry of power between the regulator and the companies that may be designated SMS. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester said,
“let us get this right so that Davids have a chance amid the Goliaths”.—[Official Report, 24/1/24; col. GC 230.]
I urge the noble Baroness to stay for the debate on the next group of amendments, in which we will talk about parliamentary accountability. I think she will find that the committee I am proposing is perhaps not quite as modest as she has just described it.
My Lords, I promise I will speak briefly to associate myself with the remarks of my noble friend Lady Stowell and support her Amendment 77 and Amendment 76 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville.
Despite the fact that there are fewer of us here than there have been in the debates on some of the other quite contentious issues, this is an extremely important amendment and a really important principle that we need to change in the Bill. To be honest, I thought that the power granted to the Secretary of State here was so egregious that it had to have been inserted as part of a cunning concession strategy to distract us from some of the other more subtle increases in powers that were included in the other place. It is extremely dangerous, both politically and technocratically, to put an individual Secretary of State in this position. I challenge any serious parliamentarian or politician to want to put themselves in that place, as my noble friend Lady Stowell said.
On its own, granting the Secretary of State this power will expose them to an enormous amount of lobbying; it is absolutely a lobbyist’s charter. This is about transparency, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said, and parliamentary scrutiny, which we will come to properly in our debate on the next group of amendments. However, it is also about reducing the risk of lobbying from the world’s most powerful institutions that are not Governments.
For those reasons, I have a slight concern. In supporting Amendment 77, I do not want the Government or my noble friend the Minister to think that establishing parliamentary scrutiny while maintaining the Secretary of State’s powers would be a happy compromise. It would be absolutely the wrong place for us to be. We need to remove the Secretary of State’s powers over guidance and establish better parliamentary scrutiny.
My Lords, I will be brief. It is an honour to follow the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and his passionate exposé about the importance of interoperability while reminding us that we should be thinking globally, not just nationally. I did not come expecting to support his amendment but, as a result of that passion, I do.
I rise to support my noble friend Lady Stowell. She set out extremely clearly why stronger parliamentary oversight of the digital regulators is so important. I speak having observed this from all possible angles. I have been the chief executive of a regulated company, I have chaired a regulator, in the form of NHS Improvement, I have been on the board of a regulator, in the form of the Bank of England and I am a member of my noble friend’s committee. I have genuinely seen this from all angles, and it is clear that we need to form a different approach in Parliament to recognise the enormous amounts of power we are passing to the different regulators. Almost all of us in Committee today talked about this when the Online Safety Bill was passing through our House, and it was clear then that we needed to look at this. We have given enormous power to Ofcom in the Online Safety Act; this Bill looks at the CMA and very soon, in this same Room, we will be looking at changing and increasing the powers of the ICO, and if we think that that is it, we have not even begun on what AI is going to do to touch a whole host of regulators. I add my voice to my noble friend’s and congratulate her on the process that she seems to be well advanced in in gathering support not just in this House but in the other place.
I also express some support for Amendment 83. I am concerned that if we are not careful, the easiest way to ensure that the CMA is not bold enough is to not resource it properly. Unlike the passage of the Online Safety Act, where we got to see how far advanced Ofcom was in bringing in genuine experts from the technology and digital sector, it has not yet been so obvious as this Bill has progressed. That may be just because of the stage we are at, but I suspect it is also because the resourcing is not yet done in the CMA. Therefore, I ask the Minister for not so much an annual update as a current update on where the CMA is in resourcing and what support the Government are giving it to ensure it is able to meet a timetable that still looks painfully slow for this Bill.
My Lords, I rise mainly to correct the record that I called the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness modest and also to celebrate the fact that I am once again back on the side of the noble Baroness, Lady Harding; it was very uncomfortable there for a moment.
I was on both committees that the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, referred to. We took evidence, and it was clear from all sorts of stakeholders that they would like to see more parliamentary engagement in the new powers we are giving to regulators. They are very broad and sometimes novel powers. However, the point I want to make at this moment is about the sheer volume of what is coming out of regulators. I spent a great deal of my Christmas holiday reading the 1,500 pages of consultation material on illegal harms for the Online Safety Act, and that was only one of three open consultations. We need to understand that we cannot have sufficient oversight unless someone is properly given that job. I challenge the department and Secretary of State to have that level of oversight and interest in things that are already passed. So, the points that the noble Baroness made about resource and capacity are essential.
My other, very particular, point is on the DRCF. I went to a meeting—it was a private meeting, so I do not want to say too much, but fundamentally people were getting together and those attending were very happy with their arrangements. They were going to publish all sorts of things to let the world know how they, in their combination, saw various matters. I asked, “Is there an inbox?” They looked a little quizzical and said, “What do you mean?” I said, “Well, are you taking information in, as a group, as well as giving it out?” The answer was no, of course, because it is not a described space or something that has rules but is a collection of very right-minded people. But here in Committee, we make the point that we need good processes, not good people. So I passionately support this group of amendments.
I briefly turn to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, in which there is an unexpected interest in that I work with the IEEE, America’s largest standards organisation, and with CEN-CENELEC, which does standards for the European Union. I also have a seat on the Broadband Commission, which is the ITU’s institute that looks after the SDGs. Creating standards is, as a representative of Google once said to me, soft power. It is truly global, and as we create and move towards standards, there are often people in their pyjamas on the other side of the world contributing because people literally work in all time zones to the same effect. It is a truly consensual, global and important way forward. Everyone who has used the wifi today has used an IEEE standard.
Just a short while ago, I decided that there was so much to say that I would say very little indeed. I completely agree with everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, said. As politicians, we should all be worried about a serious and growing problem that we are handing over huge powers to regulators on a monthly basis, and they will appear to the public to be accountable to nobody. If there is one book that is worth a good read, it is Unelected Power by Paul Tucker, who addresses exactly this set of issues with respect to finance and central banking. Come to think about it, it is a rather fat book, so, although I have read a large part of it myself, I suggest that the introduction and the conclusion will give noble Lords a good feel.
I will briefly join up a number of the debates we have just heard. On the one hand, we have been saying to ourselves, “We’ve got to empower David because David’s up against Goliath”, and on the other hand, it was said a moment ago that we have these huge overmighty regulators that must be held to account. There is an answer to that apparent clash of thoughts which s that while regulators have the capacity to wield huge power, many of them retreat into a comfort zone in which they do not do all the things they should. Rather, they do what they feel they can do relatively straightforwardly. Specifically, they do not wield the huge soft power they often have available to them.
Since I am going to give a long speech, I will digress momentarily to illustrate that point. When Covid struck, I was the chairman of the CMA. The hand sanitiser market started to be cornered at great speed by a small number of players, who then jacked up the price so that Mrs Wiggins, who wanted to go down to the corner shop to buy some at the only moment she dared go out, found that, instead of paying the correct price, which was probably £1.80, she was going to pay £12, £9 or something like that. I argued vigorously that we should do something about this, using consumer protection powers. I was told, “We don’t have a chance. We’ll be ignored. In any case, we might well lose the case. It’s all very complicated in terms of whether we have the power to intervene in a case like this. We certainly can’t assemble the evidence in time”, and so on. After a fortnight of persistence—I am pleased to say that the current head of the CMA was on the right side of this argument—I persuaded the top of the CMA to send a warning letter out. The practice ended immediately; that is why that big issue for the public agenda, which was leading newspaper coverage for several days, was taken away and a major problem for the Government was removed. Soft power is available to regulators in many ways but they often fail to address it.
The case for better scrutiny of regulators, digital or otherwise, has something to do with the need to hold regulators to account for the way in which they wield—or fail to wield—their power. That case has been made extensively elsewhere. In fact, I have written it down in places and published it, so I will not rehearse any of those arguments now.
I want to touch on two further points. If we are to do this job meaningfully, we need to have in place a number of things that, for example, the banking commission—I chaired it some time ago—found essential when assembling a technically competent team at pace to deal with the Libor scandal. A new body must have significantly greater resources and expertise than we currently provide to Select Committees. That will cost money. It is worth pointing out that the total cost of the work of the top eight regulators, which are meant to scrutinise the businesses on which they keep an eye, is in excess of £2 billion at the moment; that is the bill just to pay for the regulators. A few million pounds spent by Parliament to improve its oversight of those who are meant to be doing that scrutiny work would be money well spent.
The second thing that we must develop in Parliament is institutional memory, which is largely missing at the moment. There is very little institutional memory in our scrutiny bodies. It requires a group of officials who will stay the course for a significant time and are certainly not dispersed every time there is an election, which is what happens to a large number of Select Committee teams in both the Lords and the Commons, including the clerks and deputy clerks.
The third thing that we must do, which may seem obvious but is not always done—indeed, it is often not done—is keep good records. The body must have high-quality record-keeping. It has been a major bugbear of mine that, on the whole, records are not kept by Select Committees across Parliaments—that is, after an election, they start again as if everything is fresh. Incidentally, one of the reasons why the Treasury Committee has done better than other Select Committees in scrutinising across Parliaments is that it has one specialist adviser—I will not embarrass him by naming him—who works on monetary policy and the Bank of England and has been there for about 15 years. He loves his job and does only that job. He used to work in the Bank of England and knows a huge amount about it. That tiny fragment of institutional memory has dramatically improved the performance of the Treasury Committee over the years and does so today.
(11 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick. I declare my interest as set out in the register as adviser to the Institute for Ethics in AI at Oxford and the Digital Futures Commission at LSE, and chair of 5Rights Foundation.
Like other noble Lords, I welcome the Bill. I can claim to be an enthusiastic advocate for democratic oversight of the power of tech, corporations, their products and services and the externalities on society. While my primary focus is on the detail of the regulatory regime brought forward by the Online Safety Act and the opportunities and problems of the upcoming Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, this Bill represents an enormously important piece of the puzzle of digital regulation. I hope that the Minister has recognised the warm glow of agreement across the House, which we put to such good effect during the passage of the then Online Safety Bill, and that we will have a similar outcome during the passage of this Bill.
One aspect of working on digital regulation is that however fundamental it is to the lives and outcomes of UK citizens, its importance is often obscured by language and concepts that very few people engage with—holdover computer power, large or specialist datasets, automated decisions, synthetic information and so on. It means that debates like the one we are having today and the public discourse outside your Lordships’ House are confined to small interest groups. Yet I am often struck by the number of times somebody raises with me the feeling of being forced into using certain products; the fierce hold over small business by the app stores and search; the powerlessness of creators; or the ubiquity and damage that fake reviews do to both legitimate businesses and unsuspecting consumers. Or they simply express the idea that the deal they thought they had made is not the deal they got.
Any concentration of power is disfiguring of democratic societies and ultimately consumers come to feel that asymmetry of power, even if they cannot speak to it. The concentration of market power in the digital marketplace is no different. Here, I want to make it utterly clear that the tech lobby move to make consumer benefit the paramount criterion for exercising DMU judgment must be looked at in detail in Committee. Consumers often have long-term interests that are vastly different to the shiny, superficial, short-term consumer gains so often trumpeted by the sector.
Before the Government published their amendments on Report in the other place, I was asked what I thought of the Bill by someone rather senior. I replied, somewhat jokingly, that it depended almost entirely on how successful the tech sector lobbying over the summer had been. That is about the size of it. What the Government put forward was a thoughtful and robust legislative proposal which sought to deploy greater nuance than similar proposals in other jurisdictions. Happily, while the worst of the lobbying has not materialised in the Bill, I am afraid that it remains the case that, were the Government to hold firm and to set the final bar closer to where it was before Report, it would be rather better for it. I will quote the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, who wrote in an article in the Times—rather brilliantly:
“This is a bill the government got right the first time, it must not now second-guess itself”.
Today, I want to briefly raise a number of points that I am sure we will look at in great detail in Committee. Many of them have been raised by others, so I will try to do so quickly. Over the last decade, I have repeatedly seen regulators going toe to toe with companies with seemingly unlimited resources and falling back on “advising”, “working with” and “taking on only the winnable action”. The Bill as it stands enforces many duties on the CMA to consult and consider representations during its work. In the context of litigious companies with limitless cash, this encourages regulators fearing judicial review to consult on what the rules should be, rather than publishing their regime and inviting the sector to raise reasonable concerns. It is the perfect route for regulatory capture, and I am afraid I have seen it elsewhere. We are making the law, and the regulator, not the industry, should interpret Parliament’s intent. I wholly support, and I practise, high engagement with the sector, but a regulator must not be strung up by requirements such as those in Clauses 6, 20, 114 and others.
For the same set of reasons, I trust that the counter- vailing benefits clause, Clause 29, will get the full power of scrutiny from your Lordships’ House. It must not become a corridor by which strategic market status firms can avoid requirements set out in the Bill. It is the statutory duty of the CMA and DMU to promote competition: surely, in the digital context it is those firms that hold the most power that we most want to regulate to allow a rich environment for challenger and growing businesses, as well as consumer benefit.
I strongly support the push from publishers, including small and independent publishers and groups such as the Public Interest News Foundation, for the Bill to be amended to include citizens’ interests to be considered for a competitive, pluralistic press in this country. Such an amendment would align with the advice from the Digital Markets Taskforce, which advised the Government on the regime as the Bill was being developed. I think it would also send a strong and unequivocal signal that your Lordships’ House backs strong, independent journalism.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Fox, I have concerns about the unmet need for collective action, which is a problem across all our digital regulation. Digital is a complex area of law, it is technical to prove wrongdoing and hard for a non-expert to know which law is being broken: data, consumer, harms, IP, privacy and so on. We did not get an adequate redress system in the Online Safety Act and we will undoubtedly discuss it again during the passage of the DPDI Bill, so I ask the Minister whether he is open to discussing this in the round so that we can consider the need for the consumer to be supported across all the regimes. I am glad not to disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, because at the same time I would like to revisit the idea of a standing Joint Committee on digital regulation to provide the parliamentary oversight of independent regulation which the pre-legislative committee suggested during the passage of the Online Safety Act.
Finally, I was going to mention the full merits appeal, but I thought the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, spoke so beautifully on that, as did the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, that I shall just associate myself with their words and say that I very much look forward to working with noble Lords across the House on the Bill and that I have learned a great deal during this debate.