Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th December 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 59, 62, 63 and 65 in the name of my noble friend Lord Colville, and Amendment 64 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, to which I added my name. I am also very much in sympathy with the other amendments in this group more broadly.

My noble friend Lord Colville set out how he is seeking to understand what the Government intend by “scientific research” and to make sure that the Bill does not offer a loophole so big that any commercial company can avoid data protections of UK citizens in the name of science.

At Second Reading, I read out a dictionary definition of science:

“The systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world through observation, experimentation, and the testing of theories against the evidence obtained”—


i.e. everything. I also ask the Minister if the following scenarios could reasonably be considered scientific. Is updating or improving a new tracking app for fitness, or a bot for an airline, scientific? Is the behavioural science of testing children’s response to persuasive design strategies in order to extend the stickiness of commercial products scientific? These are practical scenarios, and I would be grateful for an answer in order to understand what is in and out of the scope of the Bill.

When I raised Clause 67 at a briefing meeting, it was said that it was, as my noble friend Lord Colville suggested, just housekeeping. The law firm Taylor Wessing suggests that what can

“‘reasonably be described as scientific’ is arguably very wide and fairly vague, so it will be interesting to see how this is interpreted, but the assumption is that it is intended to be a very broad definition”.

Each of the 14 law firm blogs and briefings that I read over the weekend described it variously as loosening, expanding or broadening. Not one suggested that it was a tightening and not one said that it was a no-change change. As we have heard, the European Data Protection Supervisor published an opinion stating that

“scientific research is understood to apply where … the research is carried out with the aim of growing society’s collective knowledge and wellbeing, as opposed to serving primarily one or several private interests”.

When the Minister responds, perhaps she could say whether the particular scenarios I have set out fall within the definition of scientific and why the Government have failed to reflect the critical clarification of the European Data Protection Supervisor in transferring the recital into the Bill.

I turn briefly to Amendment 64, which would limit the use of children’s personal data for the purposes of research and education by making it subject to a public interest requirement and opt-in from the child or a parent. I will speak in our debate on a later grouping to amendments that would enshrine children’s right to higher protection and propose a comprehensive code of practice on the use of children’s data in education, which is an issue of increasing scandal and concern. For now, it would be good to understand whether the Government agree that education is an area of research where a public interest requirement is necessary and appropriate and that children’s data should always be used to support their right to learn, rather than to commoditise them.

During debate on the DPDI Bill, a code of practice on children’s data and scientific research was proposed; the Minister added her name to it. It is by accident rather than by design that I have failed to lay it here, but I will listen carefully to the Minister’s reply to see whether children need additional protections from scientific research as the Government now define it.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, I have in subsequent groups a number of amendments that touch on many of the issues that are raised here, so I will not detain the Committee by going through them at this stage and repeating them later. However, I feel that, although the Government have had the best intentions in bringing forward a set of proposals in this area that were to update and to bring together rather conflicting and difficult pieces of legislation that have been left because of the Brexit arrangements, they have managed to open up a gap between where we want to be and where we will be if the Bill goes forward in its present form. I say that in relation to AI, which is a subject requiring a lot more attention and a lot more detail than we have before us. I doubt very much whether the Government will have the appetite for dealing with that in time for this Bill, but I hope that at the very least—it would be a minor concession at this stage—they will commit at the Dispatch Box to seeking to resolve these issues in the legislation within a very short period because, as we have heard from the arguments made today, it is desperately needed.

More importantly, if, by bringing together documentation that is thought to represent the current situation, either inadvertently or otherwise, the Government have managed to open up a loophole that will devalue the way in which we currently treat personal data—I will come on to this when I get to my groups in relation to the NHS in particular—that would be a grievous situation. I hope that, going forward, the points that have been made here can be accommodated in a statement that will resolve them, because they need to be resolved.

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in today’s Committee proceedings. In doing so, I declare my technology interests as set out in the register, not least as adviser to Socially Recruited, an AI business.

I support the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, in his amendments and all the other amendments in this group. They were understandably popular, to the extent that when I got my pen out, there was no space left for me to co-sign them, so I was left with the oral tradition in which to reflect my support for them. Before going into the detail, I just say that we have had three data Bills in just over three years: DPDI, DISD and this Bill. Over that period, though the names have changed, much of the meat remains the same in the legislation. Yet, in that period, everything and nothing haschanged —everything in terms of what has happened with generative AI.

Considering that seismic shift that has occurred over these three Bills, could the Minister say what in this Bill specifically has changed, not least in this part, to reflect that seismic change? Regarding “nothing has changed”, nothing has changed in terms of the incredibly powerful potential of AI for positive or negative outcomes, ably demonstrated with this set of amendments.

If you went on to Main Street and polled the public, I believe that you would get a pretty clear understanding of what they considered scientific research to be. You know it. You understand why we would want to have a specified definition of scientific research and what that would mean for the researchers and for the country.

However, if we are to draw that definition as broadly as it currently is in the Bill, why would we bother to have such a definition at all? If the Government’s intention is to enable so much to come within the perimeter, let us not have the definition at all and let us allow to continue what is happening right now, not least in the reuse of scrape data or in how data is being treated in these generative AI models.

We have seen what has happened in terms of the training, but when you look at what could be called development and improvement, as the noble Viscount has rightly pointed out, all this and more could easily fit within the scientific research definition. It could even more easily fit in when lawyers are deployed to ensure that that is so. I know we are going to come on to rehearsing a number of these subjects in the next group but, for this group, I support all the amendments as set out.

I ask the Minister these two questions. First, what has changed in all the provisions that have gone through all these three iterations of the data Bill? Secondly, what is the Government’s intention when it comes to scientific research, if it is not truly to mean scientific research, if it is not to have ethics committee involvement and if it is not to feel sound and be defined as what most people on Main Street would recognise as scientific research?

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Moved by

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

70: Clause 68, page 76, leave out lines 17 and 18 and insert—
“7. For the avoidance of doubt, consent as defined here is not sufficient for the purposes of Article 6(1)(a) (lawful processing) and Article 9(2)(a) (processing of special categories of personal data).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would mitigate the lowering of the threshold for a data subject to be deemed to have given consent.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to move the amendment standing in my name and to speak to my other amendments in this group. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for signing a number of those amendments, and I am also very grateful to Foxglove Legal and other bodies that have briefed me in preparation for this.

My amendments are in a separate group, and I make no apology for that because although some of these points have indeed been covered in other amendments, my focus is entirely on NHS patient data, partly because it is the subject of a wider debate going on elsewhere about whether value can be obtained for it to help finance the National Health Service and our health in future years. This changes the nature of the relationship between research and the data it is using, and I think it is important that we focus hard on this and get some of the points that have already been made into a form where we can get reasonable answers to the questions that it leaves.

If my amendments are accepted or agreed—a faint hope—they would make it clear beyond peradventure that the consent protections in the Bill apply to the processing of data for scientific research, that a consistent definition of consent is applied and that that consistent definition is the one with which researchers and the public are already familiar and can trust going forward.

The Minister said at the end of Second Reading, in response to concerns I and others raised about research data in general and NHS data in particular, that the provisions in this Bill

“do not alter the legal obligations that apply in relation to decisions about whether to share data”.—[Official Report, 19/11/24; col. 196.]

I accept that that may be the intention, and I have discussed this with officials, who make the same point very strongly. However, Clause 68 introduces a novel and, I suggest, significantly watered-down definition of consent in the case of scientific research. Clause 71 deploys this watered-down definition of consent to winnow down the “purpose limitation” where the processing is for the purposes of scientific research in the public interest. Taken together, this means that there has been a change in the legal obligations that apply to the need to obtain consent before data is shared.

Clause 68 amends the pivotal definition of consent in Article 4(11). Instead of consent requiring something express—freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous through clear affirmative action—consent can now be imputed. A data subject’s consent is deemed to meet these strict requirements even when it does not, as long as the consent is given to the processing of personal data for the purposes of an area of scientific research; at the time the consent is sought, it is not possible to identify fully the purposes for which the personal data is to be processed; seeking consent in relation to the area of scientific research is consistent with generally recognised ethical standards relevant to the area of research; and, so far as the intended purposes of the processing allow, the data subject is given the opportunity to consent to processing for only part of the research. These all sound very laudable, but I believe they cut down the very strict existing standards of consent.

Proposed new paragraph 7, in Clause 68, then extends the application of this definition across the regulation:

“References in this Regulation to consent given for a specific purpose (however expressed) include consent described in paragraph 6.”


Thus, wherever you read “consent” in the regulation you can also have imputed consent as set out in proposed new paragraph 6 of Article 4. This means that “consent” within the meaning of proposed new paragraph 6(a)—i.e. the basis for lawful processing—can be imputed consent in the new way introduced by the Bill, so there is a new type of lawful basis for processing.

The Minister is entitled to disagree, of course; I expect him to say that when he comes to respond. I hope that, when he does, he will agree that we share a concern on the importance of giving researchers a clear framework, as it is this uncertainty about the legal framework that could inadvertently act as a barrier to the good research we all need. So my first argument today is that, as drafted, the Bill leaves too much room for different interpretations, which will lead to exactly the kind of uncertainty that the Minister—indeed, all of us—wish to avoid.

As we have heard already, as well as the risk of uncertainty among researchers, there is also the risk of distrust among the general public. The public rightly want and expect to have a say in what uses their data is put to. Past efforts to modernise how the NHS uses data, such as care.data, have been expensive failures, in part because they have failed to win the public’s trust. More than 3.3 million people have already opted out of NHS data sharing under the national data opt-out; that is nearly 8% of the adults who could have been part of surveys. We have talked about the value of our data and being the gold standard or gold attractor for researchers but, if we do not have all the people who could contribute, we are definitely devaluing and debasing that research. Although we want to respect people’s choice as to whether to participate, of course, this enormous vote against research reflects a pretty spectacular failure to win public trust—one that undermines the value and quality of the data, as I said.

So my second point is that watering down the rights of those whose data is held by the NHS will not put that data for research purposes on a sustainable, long-term footing. Surely, we want a different outcome this time. We cannot afford more opt-outs; we want people opting back in. I argue that this requires a different approach—one that wins the public’s trust and gains public consent. The Secretary of State for Health is correct to say that most of the public want to see the better use of health data to help the NHS and to improve the health of the nation. I agree, but he must accept that the figures show that the general public also have concerns about privacy and about private companies exploiting their data without them having a say in the matter. The way forward must be to build trust by genuinely addressing those concerns. There must not be even a whiff of watering down legal protections, so that those concerns can instead be turned into support.

This is also important because NHS healthcare includes some of the most intimate personal data. It cannot make sense for that data to have a lower standard of consent protection going forward if it is being used for research. Having a different definition of consent and a lower standard of consent will inevitably lead to confusion, uncertainty and mistrust. Taken together, these amendments seek to avoid uncertainty and distrust, as well as the risk of backlash, by making it abundantly clear that Article 4 GDPR consent protections apply despite the new wording introduced by this Bill. Further, these are the same protections that apply to other uses of data; they are identical to the protections already understood by researchers and by the public.

I turn now to a couple of the amendments in this group. Amendment 71 seeks to address the question of consent, but in a rather narrow way. I have argued that Clause 68 introduces a novel and significantly watered-down definition of consent in the case of scientific research; proposed new paragraph 7 deploys this watered-down definition to winnow down the purpose limitation. There are broader questions about the wisdom of this, which Amendments 70, 79 and 81 seek to address, but Amendment 71 focuses on the important case of NHS health data.

If the public are worried that their health data might be shared with private companies without their consent, we need an answer to that. We see from the large number of opt-outs that there is already a problem; we have also seen it recently in NHS England’s research on public attitudes to health data. This amendment would ensure that the Bill does not increase uncertainty or fuel patient distrust of plans for NHS data. It would help to build the trust that data-enabled transformation of the NHS requires.

The Government may well retort that they are not planning to share NHS patient data with commercial bodies without patient consent. That is fine, but it would be helpful if, when he comes to respond, the Minister could say that clearly and unambiguously at the Dispatch Box. However, I put it to him that, if he could accept these amendments, the law would in fact reflect that assurance and ensure that any future Government would need to come back to Parliament if they wanted to take a different approach.

It is becoming obvious that whether research is in the public interest will be the key issue that we need to resolve in this Bill, and Amendment 72 provides a proposal. The Bill makes welcome references to health research being in the public interest, but it does not explain how on earth we decide or how that requirement would actually bite. Who makes the assessment? Do we trust a rogue operator to make its own assessment of how its research is in the public interest? What would be examples of the kind of research that the Government expect this requirement to prevent? I look forward to hearing the answer to that, but perhaps it would be more helpful if the Minister responded in a letter. In the interim, this amendment seeks to introduce some procedural clarity about how research will be certified as being in the public interest. This would provide clarity and reassurance, and I commend it to the Minister.

Finally, Amendment 131 seeks to improve the appropriate safeguards that would apply to processing for research, archiving and scientific purposes, including a requirement that the data subject has given consent. This has already been touched on in another amendment, but it is a way of seeking to address the issues that Amendments 70, 79 and 81 are also trying to address. Perhaps the Government will continue to insist that this is addressing a non-existent problem because nothing in Clauses 69 or 71 waters down the consent or purpose limitation protections and therefore the safeguards themselves add nothing. However, as I have said, informed readers of the Bill are interpreting it differently, so spelling out this safeguard would add clarity and avoid uncertainty. Surely such clarity on such an important matter is worth a couple of lines of additional length in a 250-page Bill. If the Government are going to argue that our Amendment 131 adds something objectionable, let them explain what is objectionable about consent protections applying to data processing for these purposes. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 70 to 72, which I signed, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. I absolutely share his view about the impact of Clause 68 on the definition of consent and the potential and actual mistrust among the public about sharing of their data, particularly in the health service. It is highly significant that 3.3 million people have opted out of sharing their patient data.

I also very much share the noble Lord’s views about the need for public interest. In a sense, this takes us back to the discussion that we had on previous groups about whether we should add that in a broader sense so not purely for health data or whatever but for scientific research more broadly, as he specifies. I very much support what he had to say.

Broadly speaking, the common factor between my clause stand part and what he said is health data. Data subjects cannot make use of their data rights if they do not even know that their data is being processed. Clause 77 allows a controller reusing data under the auspices of scientific research to not notify a data subject in accordance with Article 13 and 14 rights if doing so

“is impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort”.

We on these Benches believe that Clause 77 should be removed from the Bill. The safeguards are easily circumvented. The newly articulated compatibility test in new Article 8A inserted by Clause 71 that specifies how related the new and existing purposes for data use need to be to permit reuse is essentially automatically passed if it is conducted

“for the purposes of scientific research or historical research”.

This makes it even more necessary for the definition of scientific research to be tightened to prevent abuse.

Currently, data controllers must provide individuals with information about the collection and use of their personal data. These transparency obligations generally do not require the controller to contact each data subject. Such obligations can usually be satisfied by providing privacy information using different techniques that can reach large numbers of individuals, such as relevant websites, social media, local newspapers and so on.

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[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for another thought-provoking debate on consent in scientific research. First, let me set out my staunch agreement with all noble Lords that a data subject’s consent should be respected.

Regarding Amendment 70, Clause 68 reproduces the text from the current UK GDPR recitals, enabling scientists to obtain “broad consent” for an area of research from the outset and to focus on potentially life-saving research. This has the same important limitations, including that it cannot be used if the researcher already knows its specific purpose and that consent can be revoked at any point.

I turn to Amendments 71 and 72, in the name of my noble friend Lord Stevenson, on assessments for research. Requiring all research projects to be submitted for assessments could discourage or delay researchers in their important work, as various noble Lords mentioned. However, I understand that my noble friend’s main concern is around NHS data. I assure him that, if NHS data is used for research, individual patients cannot be identified unless either a patient has specifically agreed for that data to be shared or the Health Research Authority has approved an application for this information to be used, informed by advice from the independent and expert Confidentiality Advisory Group. Research projects using confidential patient data are always subject to rigorous governance, including the approval of an ethics committee; the Minister, my noble friend Lady Jones, mentioned this earlier. There are also strict controls around who can see the data and how it is used and stored. Nothing in this clause will change that approach.

I turn to Amendments 81 and 131 on consent. I understand the motivations behind adding consent as a safeguard. However, organisations such as the Health Research Authority have advised researchers against relying on consent under the UK GDPR; for instance, an imbalance of power may mean that consent cannot truly be “freely given”.

On Amendment 79, I am happy to reassure my noble friend Lord Stevenson that references to “consent” in Clause 71 do indeed fall under the definition in Article 4.11.

Lastly, I turn to Clause 77, which covers the notification exemption; we will discuss this in our debates on upcoming groups. The Government have identified a gap in the UK GDPR that may disproportionately affect researchers. Where data is not collected from the data subject, there is an exemption from notifying them if getting in contact would mean a disproportionate amount of effort. This does not apply to data collected from the data subject. However, in certain studies, such as those of degenerative neurological conditions, it can be impossible or involve a disproportionate effort to recontact data subjects to inform them of any change in the study. The Bill will therefore provide a limited exemption with strong safeguards for data subjects.

Numerous noble Lords asked various questions. They touched on matters that we care about very much: trust in the organisation asking for data; the transparency rules; public interest; societal value; the various definitions of “consent”; and, obviously, whether we can have confidence in what is collected. I will not do noble Lords’ important questions justice if I stand here and try to give answers on the fly, so I will do more than just write a letter to them: I will also ask officials to organise a technical briefing and meeting so that we can go into everyone’s concerns in detail.

With that, I hope that I have reassured noble Lords that there are strong protections in place for data subjects, including patients; and that, as such, noble Lords will feel content to withdraw or not press their amendments.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank those who participated in this debate very much indeed. It went a little further than I had intended in drafting these amendments, but it has raised really important issues which I think we will probably come back to, if not later in Committee, certainly at Report.

At the heart of what we discussed, we recognise, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, put it, that our data held by the NHS—if that is a better way of saying it—is valuable both in financial terms and because it should and could bring better health in future. Therefore, we value it specifically among some of the other datasets that we are talking about, because it has a returning loop in it. It is of benefit not just to the individual but to the UK as a whole, and we must respect that.

However, the worry that underlies framing it in that way is that, at some point, a tempting offer will be made by a commercial body—perhaps one is already on the table—which would generate new funding for the NHS and our health more generally, but the price obtained for that will not reflect the value that we have put into it over the years and the individual data that is being collected. That lack of trust is at the heart of what we have been talking about. In a sense, these amendments are about trust, but they are also bigger. They are also about the whole question of what it is that the Government as a whole do on our behalf in holding our data and what value they will obtain for that—something which I think we will come back to on a later amendment.

I agree with much of what was said from all sides. I am very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Kamall and Lord Holmes, from the Opposition for joining in the debate and discussion, and their points also need to be considered. The Minister replied in a very sensible and coherent way; I will read very carefully what he said in Hansard and we accept his kind offer of a technical briefing on the Bill—that would be most valuable. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 70 withdrawn.

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[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I put my name to the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and will briefly support them. I state my interest as a governor of Coram, the children’s charity. One gets a strong sense of déjà vu with this Bill. It takes me back to the Online Safety Bill and the Victims and Prisoners Bill, where we spent an inordinate amount of time trying to persuade the Government that children are children and need to be treated as children, not as adults. That was hard work. They have an absolute right to be protected and to be treated differently.

I ask the Minister to spend some time, particularly when her cold is better, with some of her colleagues whom we worked alongside during the passage of those Bills in trying to persuade the then Government of the importance of children being specifically recognised and having specific safeguards. If she has time to talk to the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby, Lord Stevenson and Lord Knight, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton —when she comes out of hospital, which I hope will be soon—she will have chapter, book and verse about the arguments we used, which I hope we will not have to rehearse yet again in the passage of this Bill. I ask her please to take the time to learn from that.

As the noble Baroness said, what is fundamental is not what is hinted at or implied at the Dispatch Box, but what is actually in the Bill. When it is in the Bill, you cannot wriggle out of it—it is clearly there, stating what it is there for, and it is not open to clever legal interpretation. In a sense, we are trying to future-proof the Bill by, importantly, as she said, focusing on outcomes. If you do so, you are much nearer to future-proofing than if you focus on processes, which by their very nature will be out of date by the time you have managed to understand what they are there to do.

Amendment 135 is important because the current so-called safeguard for the Information Commissioner to look after the interests of children is woefully inadequate. One proposed new section in Clause 90 talks of

“the fact that children may be less aware of the risks and consequences associated with processing of personal data and of their rights in relation to such processing”.

It is not just children; most adults do not have a clue about any of that, so to expect children to have even the remotest idea is just a non-starter. To add insult to injury, that new section begins

“the Commissioner must have regard to such of the following”—

of which the part about children is one—

“as appear to the Commissioner to be relevant in the circumstances”.

That is about as vague and weaselly as it is possible to imagine. It is not adequate in any way, shape or form.

In all conscience, I hope that will be looked at very carefully. The idea that the commissioner might in certain circumstances deem that the status and importance of children is not relevant is staggering. I cannot imagine a circumstance in which that would be the case. Again, what is in the Bill really matters.

On Amendment 94, not exempting the provision of information regarding the processing of children’s data is self-evidently extremely important. On Amendment 82, ring-fencing children’s data from being used by a controller for a different purpose again seems a no-brainer.

Amendment 196, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, says, is a probing amendment. It seems eminently sensible when creating Acts of Parliament that in some senses overlap, particularly in the digital and online world, that the left hand should know what the right hand is doing and how two Acts may be having an effect on one another, perhaps not in ways that had been understood or foreseen when the legislation was put forward. We are looking for consistency, clarity, future-proofing and a concentration on outputs, not processes. First and foremost, we are looking for the recognition, which we fought for so hard and finally got, that children are children and need to be recognised and treated as children.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, I think we sometimes forget, because the results are often so spectacular, the hard work that has had to happen over the years to get us to where we are, particularly in relation to the Online Safety Act. It is well exemplified by the previous speaker. He put his finger on the right spot in saying that we all owe considerable respect for the work of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and others. I helped a little along the way. It is extraordinary to feel that so much of this could be washed away if the Bill goes forward in its present form. I give notice that I intend to work with my colleagues on this issue because this Bill is in serious need of revision. These amendments are part of that and may need to be amplified in later stages.

I managed to sign only two of the amendments in this group. I am sorry that I did not sign the others, because they are also important. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for not spotting them early enough to be able to do so. I will speak to the ones I have signed, Amendments 88 and 135. I hope that the Minister will give us some hope that we will be able to see some movement on this.

The noble Lord, Lord Russell, mentioned the way in which the wording on page 113 seems not only to miss the point but to devalue the possibility of seeing protections for children well placed in the legislation. New Clause 120B(e), which talks of

“the fact that children may be less aware of the risks and consequences associated with processing of personal data and of their rights in relation to such processing”,

almost says it all for me. I do not understand how that could possibly have got through the process by which this came forward, but it seems to speak to a lack of communication between parts of government that I hoped this new Government, with their energy, would have been able to overcome. It speaks to the fact that we need to keep an eye on both sides of the equation: what is happening in the online safety world and how data that is under the control of others, not necessarily those same companies, will be processed in support or otherwise of those who might wish to behave in an improper or illegal way towards children.

At the very least, what is in these amendments needs to be brought into the Bill. In fact, other additions may need to be made. I shall certainly keep my eye on it.

[Viscount Camrose (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for bringing forward amendments in what is a profoundly important group. For all that data is a cornerstone of innovation and development, as we have often argued in this Committee, we cannot lose sight of our responsibility to safeguard the rights and welfare of our children.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

To be on the safe side, I will write to the noble Baroness. We feel that other bits in the provisions of the Bill cover the other aspects but, just to be clear on it, I will write to her. On Amendment 196 and the Online Safety Act—

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt but I am slightly puzzled by the way in which that exchange just happened. I take it from what the Minister is saying that there is no dissent, in her and the Bill team’s thinking, about children’s rights having to be given the correct priority, but she feels that the current drafting is better than what is now proposed because it does not deflect from the broader issues that she has adhered to. She has fallen into the trap, which I thought she never would do, of blaming unintended consequences; I am sure that she will want to rethink that before she comes back to the Dispatch Box.

Surely the point being made here is about the absolute need to make sure that children’s rights never get taken down because of the consideration of other requirements. They are on their own, separate and not to be mixed up with those considerations that are truly right for the commissioner—and the ICO, in its new form—to take but which should never deflect from the way children are protected. If the Minister agrees with that, could she not see some way of reaching out to be a bit closer to where the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, is?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I absolutely recognise the importance of the issues being raised here, which is why I think I really should write: I want to make sure that whatever I say is properly recorded and that we can all go on to debate it further. I am not trying to duck the issue; this issue is just too important for me to give an off-the-cuff response on it. I am sure that we will have further discussions on this. As I say, let me put it in writing, and we can pick that up. Certainly, as I said at the beginning, our intention was to enhance children’s protection rather than deflect from it.

Moving on to Amendment 196, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and other noble Lords for raising this important issue and seeking clarity on how the provision relates to the categorisation of services in the Online Safety Act. These categories are, however, not directly related to Clause 122 of this Bill as a data preservation notice can be issued to any service provider regulated in the Online Safety Act, regardless of categorisation. A list of the relevant persons is provided in paragraphs (a) to (e) of Section 100(5) of the Act; it includes any user-to-user service, search service and ancillary service.

I absolutely understand noble Lords saying that these things should cross-reference in some way but, as far we are concerned, they complement each other, and that protection is currently in the Online Safety Act. As I said, I will write to noble Lords and am happy to meet if that would be helpful. In the meantime, I hope that the explanations I have given are sufficient grounds for noble Lords not to press their amendments at this stage.