National Security (State Threats) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Alton of Liverpool

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Foster, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton, who has other relevant amendments in this group. Amendment 1 is a probing amendment that enables the Minister to clarify the exact breadth of the intention in the Bill—a Bill that I welcome, and I regret I was not able to be here at Second Reading to say so. The Bill is designed to address the threat posed by foreign state-linked organisations that operate here in the UK.

My amendment relates in particular to the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, whose office manager, Bill Yuen, was recently convicted and sentenced to eight years in prison under the National Security Act 2023 for helping to run a CCP surveillance operation from its premises. The existence of this office dates back to the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office Act 1996, passed on the premise that Hong Kong was meaningfully autonomous from Beijing. “One country, two systems” was meant to mean that separate legal, economic and administrative systems would be permitted in Hong Kong, albeit as part of China. Any such pre-1997 autonomy or even post-1997 freedoms are clearly no longer the case, yet somehow the office survives, supposedly independent of the Chinese embassy but with at least one of its staff acting on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party.

This has involved surveillance of some of our own citizens and of Hong Kong dissidents resident in the UK. Indeed, Regina Ip, former convenor of Hong Kong’s Executive Council, even claimed that it was legal for the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office to gather intelligence on activists. Both sorts of surveillance are surely intolerable.

Perhaps it is possible to describe activity against UK citizens as activity involving a threat by a foreign state and therefore a threat to the safety or interests of the UK as defined in the Bill, but what about similar actions affecting Hong Kong citizens? Would they be covered if some foreign policy threat activity included espionage, given that surveillance of UK residents would be reported back to China? I assume it would count as espionage, especially as the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office funded Bill Yuen’s legal costs and its salaried staff attended most of the trial at the Old Bailey to show support for him, even while the office enjoyed the privilege confirmed by Parliament in the hopeful days of 1996.

The Bill is to deal with the threat posed by foreign state-linked organisations operating in the UK. The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office is a foreign state-linked organisation and is operating here in London. We should protect our citizens from its activities but also protect UK residents who are classified as dissident activists by the Chinese state, some of whom have bounties on their heads. I hope, in response, my noble friend the Minister can provide some assurance that this body and its nefarious activities would be in scope of the Bill’s intent. I beg to move.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. This builds on the Private Notice Question which she placed before your Lordships’ House and indeed on our Second Reading debate last week where the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, which, as the noble Baroness has rightly said, is a relic of the past, became the centre of our interest because of some of those who worked there being convicted of being involved in espionage on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party regime in Beijing. That is why it is entirely relevant to this Bill and why it is good that the noble Baroness has placed Amendment 1, this probing amendment, before your Lordships’ Committee.

I have a few points I would like to make on that amendment before turning to my own Amendments 3 and 4, which deal with slightly different questions but are also linked to the malign activities of the Chinese Communist Party regime in the UK. Amendment 3 deals with transnational repression, and Amendment 4 deals with the activities of the United Front, which is not a state but works in line with the wishes and ideology of the Chinese Communist Party. That is why it is problematic in terms of the definitions in the Bill and why I have sought further clarification through my amendments.

I have a few pointers on the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office case, which might be helpful to your Lordships. In May 2024, law enforcement initially arrested 11 individuals across the UK. Only three of those were heavily linked to state funding via the London Hong Kong office referred to by the noble Baroness. Only three were prosecuted under the National Security Act 2023. Two have since been convicted and—as the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, was quite right to remind us during Second Reading last week—were subjected to very lengthy prison sentences. The remaining eight individuals suspected of acting as part of the vigilante team in contact with entities in Hong Kong and targeting an individual on British soil were released without charge.

This case highlights a common practice whereby Chinese and Hong Kong authorities blend private civil disputes, corporate debt collection and local organised crime groups—a point that I heard more about recently at a meeting organised by Tom Tugendhat MP, our former Security Minister, which pointed to the activities of organised crime linked to some of these groups promoting a political ideology. All of those are involved in the execution of transnational repression and jurisdiction overseas while evading national security prosecution.

I have four questions I would like to put the Minister on Amendment 1 before turning to those other two amendments. I am sorry they have been grouped together, but I think it is for the convenience of the House. I hope the House will therefore forgive me if I spend a bit of time speaking to the other two amendments, but here are my questions to build on what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has said already.

First, of the 11 individuals initially arrested by counterterrorism police in connection with the hostile tracking of a Hong Kong resident in Yorkshire, eight were subsequently released without trial. Can the Minister inform the House how many of those eight have since left the United Kingdom and whether any have returned to the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China or the Hong Kong special administrative region, thereby placing themselves beyond the reach of British justice?

Secondly, is the Minister confident that counterterrorism and the Crown Prosecution Service—the CPS—possess the immediate capacity to process massive backlogs of foreign language evidence quickly enough to meet custody time limits? That has been an issue relevant to these prosecutions. Specifically, was a lack of rapid security-vetted translation capacity a contributing factor in the decision to release the other eight suspects without pressing charges?

Thirdly, is the Minister satisfied that our law enforcement agencies, including the NCA—the National Crime Agency—and regional special branches have the required resources to effectively monitor and map the nexus between Chinese state authorities, overseas proxy organisations and private contractors operating inside the United Kingdom?

Fourthly, what steps are the Government taking to bolster the China capabilities of UK law enforcement? Specifically, are we investing in the recruitment and training of security-vetted interpreters, fluent not just in Mandarin and Cantonese but in crucial dialects such as Hokkien and Fuzhou dialects, to effectively monitor and respond to issues related to transnational state repression and organised crime? This was referred to during the meeting that Tom Tugendhat MP organised in the House Commons recently and which, as I say, I was able to attend.

Let me turn to Amendment 3. I do not want to go on too much about this amendment, because I was able to have a very helpful and constructive meeting with the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, yesterday. I say at the outset that I will not press your Lordships to divide on this amendment, in the light of the very helpful assurances which he gave me yesterday. But I will just recap. On 26 February, I initiated a debate on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I have the privilege to chair, about our report on transnational repression. It was a thorough debate and the Minister replied in his courteous manner. However, his reply did not meet all of the questions which we raised in that debate, or indeed in the report. I returned to it on 21 May, during the King’s Speech debate, and subsequently in a balloted debate that I won, which was secured for 4 June and which dealt with atrocity crimes. This is also an amendment which Alicia Kearns, Member of Parliament, raised in the House of Commons during its six-hour consideration of the Bill.

Without dwelling too much on procedural issues, I think all of us who have been around this place and have had the privilege to serve in both Houses know that to give the House of Commons only six hours of debate on a major Bill of this importance, and then to come to your Lordships and do all the remaining stages in one day flat, as we are doing today—Committee, Report and Third Reading—is clearly absurd, given that this is based on Jonathan Hall’s excellent report of 11 months ago, as is the idea that we have not had time during that period to debate some of these questions. Furthermore, it cannot be right that the Home Affairs Select Committee was unable to take evidence on the Bill, even though it requested it, or that my own committee, which wanted to scrutinise the Bill, was left to just write a letter to the Minister. The Minister has responded to that in his usual courteous way, and I am grateful, but how much better it would have been to have pre-legislative scrutiny and proper consideration of the Bill in the normal way. There are some questions that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has asked and I am asking, and I know that colleagues from the Conservative Opposition Benches, the Liberal Democrat Benches and elsewhere on the Cross Benches have legitimate questions to ask about the Bill.

Consumer Rights Bill

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Alton of Liverpool

Wednesday 26th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Alton of Liverpool]

My Lords, I second the amendment and support the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Birmingham in moving it. My name is on the Marshalled List in support of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Truro, who tabled the amendment. I will keep my remarks brief because we exhausted many of the arguments in the previous amendment.

One figure that struck me very much is the £8.3 billion estimate of the social costs of debt problems. Putting aside such staggering figures, which are quite hard sometimes to understand, I think about the families I have met over the years who have seen their family life, community life and whole neighbourhoods broken as a consequence of indebtedness and the debt culture. The time that your Lordships spent when this Parliament was first convened considering the crisis we were facing because of the national debt is being replicated in the area of personal debt. Sometimes we overlook the latter because we are concentrating so much, rightly, on the former. However, many families are deeply immersed in debt, which is incredibly destructive of their family life. I suspect that one of the major factors in the breakdown of family life is people taking out all sorts of commitments and debts that they did not fully understand, when they entered into them, they would not be able to honour and meet. It ultimately leads to friction, disagreement, inability to pay and, then, catastrophic results. Anyone who read the front-page report in the Times newspaper this week about the effects of the breakdown of family life in this country on outcomes, particularly for young people, should surely be troubled by these things.

All of us will have experienced high-pressured, targeting salesmanship. It is incredibly frustrating to pick up the telephone and find people trying to sell you yet something else that you do not need, but many of us can easily be susceptible to it. This is a good amendment and one that I hope the Government will feel able to accept today. I am very happy to support the right reverend Prelate.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, if noble Lords in this House are already quite fed up with these calls, how much more so it must be for those at home all day, or those without mobile phones, who are almost afraid to answer their landline for fear that it is going to be someone out to con them.

I will broaden this beyond callers offering high-cost credit to all those others who keep phoning us: claims management companies making offers about non-existent car crashes or mis-sold PPI and those making the blatant illegal fishing calls trying to obtain credit card details under the guise of doing marketing. We know that seven in 10 landline customers receive live marketing calls, which add up to 7.8 billion calls a year. These are unwanted calls. The Information Commissioner’s Office receives about 160,000 complaints a year about unsolicited calls and texts. MPs tell us that it fills their postbag. It is the number one complaint for Ofcom, which gets over 3,000 complaints a month. Furthermore, Ofcom’s own research shows—perhaps this is no surprise—that it is vulnerable people who are especially at risk, with a quarter of them getting as many as 10 calls a week that they know to be scams. I am even more worried by those who do not think that they are getting scam calls, because they probably are getting them but think that they are genuine, which really is frightening.

We are wondering how much longer we have to wait for action, but these two amendments are a useful first step. It has taken some time to launch the consultation for the Information Commissioner’s Office to be able to lower the bar before it can take action. Our amendment would allow us to look at who is actually doing the calling and try to stop it at that stage. The first thing that has to happen is for people to know who is calling them. If people can see the telephone number, that will help them to know whether to lift the phone. However, more importantly, in terms of helping to stamp out the practice, having the telephone number would enable complaints to be made and action to be taken. At the moment, more than half of nuisance calls arrive without caller line identification, so you do not know who is phoning you. A large number of those calls, maybe a quarter, may be from abroad. Even if the caller line identification simply said it was an international number, you would probably know that it is one that you do not want to pick up—unless you happen to have a child going round the world and phoning you up from time to time for money, which I gather happens quite a lot. Other calls say simply “number withheld”, which is what we want to put an end to.

Amendment 50A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Stevenson and me, would mandate caller line identification for non-domestic callers, with telephone operators making the facility to read that free to subscribers. When I was young, we used to have to buy a telephone answering machine, but that is now built into our telephones; so should this be, so that we can see who is phoning us. The Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee in the other place supported prohibiting the withholding of numbers for marketing calls and so did the all-party group. In moving a debate on a 10-minute rule Bill in the other House, Alun Cairns said that he supposed that this,

“could be compared to someone knocking at the door wearing a mask or a balaclava. Would we answer the door”,

in those circumstances? He then said:

“Of course we would not. Why, then, do we allow the same thing to happen over the telephone?”.—[Official Report, Commons, 28/2/13; col. 158WH.]