Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Doocey]

421: After Clause 151, insert the following new Clause—
“Removal of Chief Constables(1) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 is amended as follows.(2) In section 38 (Appointment, suspension and removal of chief constables), after subsection (4) insert—“(4A) Before exercising the power under subsection (3), the police and crime commissioner must consult with His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, or relevant successor inspectorate.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires a Police and Crime Commissioner to consult with His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services before calling upon a Chief Constable to resign or retire.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 421 is now a hot topic. The West Midlands Police chief constable has resigned, and the Government are pledging to restore the Home Secretary’s power to dismiss chiefs who “fail their communities”. Last week’s events bring the motivation behind this amendment into sharp focus, underlining the need to shield operational policing from political interference.

Contrary to some recent reporting, police and crime commissioners are not required by law to consult the police inspectorate before sacking a chief constable. Although they are expected to seek its advice, it is not a statutory duty. Amendment 421 would put that safeguard clearly into primary legislation, requiring HMICFRS to be consulted before a chief constable is removed.

When PCCs were created, they were given the power to hire and fire the chief officer, but concentrating that power in one pair of hands has had damaging consequences. Across England and Wales, around a quarter of forces now lose their chief constable every year—an astonishing level of churn for such a senior role. That is both wasteful of talent and destabilising for forces. Too often, these departures are driven not by incompetence or misconduct but by political disagreement, with some PCCs permanently in election mode and prioritising their own political agenda rather than responding impartially to the real policing challenges on the ground.

We must never reach a point where a chief constable fears upsetting the Home Secretary, or where any politician can bully a police leader to serve their own political ends. That would take us dangerously close to the American model of political control over policing. In the British tradition, officers swear allegiance to the Crown, not to any politician, and they are expected to act independently without fear or favour. It is a model that has stood the test of time, commands public confidence and deserves to be preserved. Although PCCs have used the formal Section 38 removal process only twice, several more have threatened to invoke proceedings, usually starting with suspension. In all these cases, this has resulted in the chief constable choosing to retire or resign rather than fight a public battle they are unlikely to win.

The Government now propose to move responsibility from PCCs to elected mayors, with council leaders taking the lead elsewhere through new policing and crime boards. On these Benches, we fear that this simply repeats the same mistakes in a different guise. The mayoral route in particular concentrates even more power in a single individual, often elected on a low turnout and with limited day-to-day scrutiny. What replaces PCCs must be better, not just different, and for the Liberal Democrats that means local police boards drawn from councillors and community representatives. Moving powers from one underscrutinised politician to another is not a solution.

Amendment 438EC would allow the Home Secretary to instruct a PCC to begin the dismissal process, effectively giving central government the power to fire chief constables. No individual, whether a PCC, mayor, council leader or Home Secretary, should hold unilateral power to dismiss a chief constable. Dismissal must remain possible where justified, but only through a fair and transparent process, with mandatory independent scrutiny.

That is the role of HMICFRS—to provide an external check, ensuring that decisions are based on competence, conduct and the public interest, not political convenience. I welcome the fact that the Home Secretary sought the inspectorate’s view in the West Midlands case, but that essential safeguard is missing from Amendment 438EC, which allows appointment of a person outside government or policing with too much scope for political influence, and only after the Home Secretary has already decided, making the process look uncomfortably like a rubber stamp. That is what Amendment 421 is designed to prevent.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for her amendment, which concerns the process by which police and crime commissioners may call on a chief constable to resign or retire. As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, has mentioned, the Government’s intention is to replace police and crime commissioners with a mayoral model or, in some cases in which the mayoral model is inappropriate, with a policing board made up of local councillors, and that will be brought forward in due course. Further details will be set out again in the policing White Paper. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, asked me when that would be produced. I say again to him the time-honoured phrase of “shortly”, but by shortly I do mean shortly; I hope he will not have too long to wait for the report be published as a White Paper. Self-evidently, it is a very complex document with lots of discussion items in it. Again, any legislative proposals in it will be brought forward when parliamentary time allows. I am not trying to short-change him, but we will give that detail in the near future.

As the noble Baroness has explained, the purpose of her amendment is to ensure that, before taking steps to dismiss a chief constable, a police and crime commissioner must first seek the views of HMICFRS. I agree that this is a desirable approach, and I am pleased to tell your Lordships that this is already in place as a requirement. The noble Baroness should know, and I hope that it is helpful to her, that under Section 38(3) of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, PCCs may call upon the relevant chief constable to resign or retire. Before exercising this power, and under regulation 11A of the Police Regulations 2003, police and crime commissioners are required to seek the views of HM inspectorate in writing and provide them to the chief constable and the relevant police and crime panel, alongside their rationale for why the PCC is proposing to call for retirement or resignation. I appreciate that it is a confusing landscape to have regulations under the Act and under police regulations. However, the position currently is there in black and white, and what her amendment seeks to do is already enshrined in law.

The noble Lord, Lord Walney, is not in his place so I will not say too much now, if anything, about Amendment 438EC. However, because it was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, I want to place on record for the Committee the fact that the Home Secretary has already announced the Government’s intention to reintroduce the Home Secretary’s power to remove chief constables. It has been a difficult few weeks in the West Midlands and, following the changes that were mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, it has highlighted the absence of such a power allowing the Home Secretary to act. We believe that action is needed, and I can assure your Lordships that this is high on the Government’s agenda. The White Paper is due in very short order. It will set out exactly the Government’s intentions in this regard and will be followed by legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows, because we need to make changes on a range of matters, not least the abolition of PCCs. I look forward to debating this with noble Lords across the House. However, if the noble Baroness accepts that, difficult though they are to find, the regulations and the requirement are there, I hope she will be able to withdraw her amendment for the moment. I look forward to further discussion when the other matters come before the House at some future point.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

In view of what the Minister has just said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 421 withdrawn.

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[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, forgive me, if I can beg your indulgence. In order for there not to be any confusion, I neglected to advise the Committee that my brother is a serving Metropolitan Police officer. I should have mentioned that earlier.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, these three amendments raise a difficult but important question: how should the law treat the use of lethal force by authorised firearms officers so as to protect both the public and those officers who act in good faith in dangerous situations?

Amendment 422 would make it clear in the Police (Conduct) Regulations that when an officer uses force based on a mistaken belief, that belief must be both honestly held and objectively reasonable. This reflects the Supreme Court’s decision in W80 and would give bereaved families, and communities that often feel over-policed, greater clarity and confidence in the system.

Amendment 423A would update Section 76 of the 2008 Act so that force used by an authorised firearms officer could never be treated as reasonable if it was grossly disproportionate to the situation as they saw it. That would set a clear upper limit on what can count as lawful force, drawing a boundary beyond which self-defence cannot reach, however real the threat appears.

From these Benches, we understand the intentions behind both amendments: the first writes the W80 test into disciplinary rules; the second provides clearer statutory guidance in firearms cases.

Amendment 423 goes further. It proposes that if an authorised firearms officer kills someone while acting under an honest but mistaken belief that the force used was necessary and reasonable, the conviction should be manslaughter rather than murder. We are concerned that this would, in effect, create a special route from murder to manslaughter for authorised firearms officers, one not available to others who also face life-and-death decisions.

When police use potentially unlawful lethal force, there must be full investigation, prosecution where appropriate, and robust disciplinary proceedings. The central question, then, is whether these amendments strike the right balance between public accountability and fair protection for officers who must make split-second decisions in life-threatening situations.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 422 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, has had a detailed introduction, and I would like to abbreviate my remarks as a result.

The issue under consideration in that case was whether, in police disciplinary proceedings, a police officer could have a finding of misconduct against them if their use of force was found to be honest and mistaken but unreasonable. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that the appropriate test was the civil law test and that an honest but mistaken belief that the use of force is necessary is justification for that use of force only if the belief is objectively reasonable.

Amendment 422 would place that judgment into statute. Regardless of the merits or otherwise of the Supreme Court’s ruling on whether the criminal or civil test should be applicable, I am not convinced that it needs to be codified into statute, because there now exists relevant case law at the highest level which can be applied by the IOPC and the courts in the future. It is not clear to me what benefit there would be in placing this into the regulations.

I would like to concentrate my remarks on Amendment 423 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, because I want to express my strong support for it. I believe firmly that we must support our armed police officers who regularly put themselves in danger. This amendment presents an opportunity to do that. It would create a defence to a charge of murder for authorised firearms officers who used lethal force in the honest but mistaken belief that such force was necessary and reasonable and convert a conviction for murder into manslaughter.