Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Baroness Butler-Sloss Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 6th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, the Israeli case to which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, referred was—I make this point first—a completely different circumstance from the provisions set out in our Bill and the accompanying treaty. I will have to revert to the noble Lord on the specific point he raised, which is whether those procedures are in place as yet, or whether they come under the context of those to which I made reference—whether they are being worked up and implemented. If the noble Lord is content with that answer, I will correspond with him. I am grateful to him for indicating assent.

As I was saying, we will ratify the treaty only once we are satisfied that all necessary implementation is in place, and the treaty will be expedited. As I was saying in relation to the noble Lord’s point a moment ago, we continue to work with the Rwandans on this. As we set out to the House on Monday—

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

If the treaty has to be agreed and the Government have to be satisfied, how can they expect us to recognise that Rwanda is at present safe?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, I think, with respect to the noble and learned Baroness, that that point has been canvassed extensively on previous occasions.

As we set out on Monday, the legislation required for Rwanda to ratify the treaty passed that country’s lower house on 28 February, and it will now go to that country’s upper house. Once ratified, the treaty will become law in Rwanda. It follows that the Government of Rwanda would then be required to give effect to the terms of the treaty in accordance with its domestic law, as well as international law. As my noble friend Lord Lilley set out on Monday, it is inconceivable that Rwanda will not implement carefully and considerately, and we continue to work at pace with the Government of Rwanda on implementation.

We therefore do not consider it necessary to make the proposed changes to Clause 4 to permit decision-makers or courts and tribunals to consider claims on the basis of Rwanda’s safety generally, or that Rwanda will or may remove persons to another state in contravention of its international obligations or permit the courts and tribunals to grant interim relief, other than where there is a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm. There are ample safeguards in the Bill, and these amendments would be contrary to the Bill’s whole purpose.

To conclude, we have made it clear that we cannot continue to allow relocations to Rwanda to be frustrated and delayed as a result of systemic challenges on its general safety. In this context, the safety of a particular country is a matter for Parliament and one in which Parliament’s view should be sovereign. The evidence that we have provided and the commitments made by the United Kingdom and the Government of Rwanda through this internationally binding treaty enable Rwanda to be deemed a safe country. The Bill will allow Parliament to confirm that it considers that it has sufficient material before it to judge that Rwanda is in general safe and makes it clear that the finding cannot be disturbed by the courts.

Before I sit down, I return in a bit more detail to the matter which the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, started with his comment and which was answered by others. As we have set out previously, the constitution of Rwanda includes a broad prohibition of discrimination and does not criminalise or discriminate against sexual orientation in law or policy. As part of the published evidence pack, the updated country information note gave careful consideration to evidence relating to the treatment of LGBT individuals in Rwanda. Rwandan legal protection for LGBT rights is, as we have heard, generally considered more progressive than that of neighbouring countries.

I will conclude my submissions with reference to the point raised earlier by my noble friend Lord Lilley when he spoke about the precedent set by the 2004 legislation and referred to the views of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, in relation to parliamentary supremacy. As my noble friend correctly quoted, it is a matter of this country enjoying parliamentary supremacy. Parliamentary supremacy is at the heart of accountability to Parliament and, through Parliament, accountability to the people about whom my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne has spoken so eloquently during the debate on this Bill.

In conclusion, I submit that the noble Baroness should not press her amendment for the reasons I have given. Were she to do so, I have no hesitation in inviting the House to reject it.

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[Baroness Neuberger (CB)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly to support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford.

I wholly agree, and I particularly want to echo what the right reverend Prelate said. Would you allow this to happen to your child or grandchild? The answer around this Chamber will be “no”—therefore it should be our answer.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I also support Amendment 34. Several years ago, I was invited by the charity Safe Passage to a drop-in centre of young people who were migrants. I talked to two young Afghans, both of whom were known to be under 18. One had a moustache and the other had a beard. How on earth could an assessment be made, if they did not have any papers, that they were not over 18? There are real problems with some countries where the children—particularly the boys—mature very quickly. That is the sort of problem that is not being met by the Bill.

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Moved by

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

42: After Clause 5, insert the following new Clause—
“Removal of victims of modern slavery and human trafficking(1) A person with a positive reasonable grounds decision from the National Referral Mechanism stating that they may be a victim of modern slavery and human trafficking must not be removed from the United Kingdom on the basis of the Rwanda Treaty until a conclusive grounds decision has been made.(2) A person with a positive conclusive grounds decision from the National Referral Mechanism that they are a victim of modern slavery and human trafficking must not be removed from the United Kingdom on the basis of the Rwanda Treaty without a decision-maker considering whether such removal would negatively affect the physical health, mental health or safety of that person, including in particular the risk of re-trafficking.(3) If the decision-maker makes a finding that any of the factors in subsection (2) apply to that person they must not be removed from the United Kingdom under the Rwanda Treaty without their consent.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to identify and protect victims of modern slavery and human trafficking from being removed to Rwanda without their consent.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I spoke to this amendment on Monday. I should like to test the opinion of the House.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Baroness Butler-Sloss Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I have given notice, with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, of my intention to oppose the Question that Clause 5 stand part of the Bill. That is because, notwithstanding the eloquence of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Howard, its provisions are in plain breach of the United Kingdom’s obligations under international law and in breach of the rule of law.

Although complications have been cited and expanded on, the reasons for this are very simply stated. Article 32 of the convention states that the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights

“extends to all matters concerning the interpretation”

and

“the application of the convention”.

Critically, in the event of

“dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall decide”.

That is an approach that is not unknown to our own law in certain circumstances. Rule 39 of the rules of the European Court of Human Rights provides for the court to make interim orders. 

In Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, referred, which was a case decided by the court in 2005, and Paladi v Moldova, decided by the same court in 2009, the European Court of Human Rights said that the failure of a member state to comply with interim measures is a breach of Article 34 of the convention. That article states that member states undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of the right of the court to receive applications from any person.

Reference has been made to a lengthy and elaborate argument in a Policy Exchange document, published in 2023 during the passage of the Illegal Migration Bill, by Professor Richard Ekins, in which he contended that the power to make interim measures was outside the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. That is the document with which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, expresses his agreement. What is clear is that Article 32 confers on the court the right to determine the extent of its jurisdiction in the event that it is disputed. That article says so in the plainest terms, and, as a member state, we have signed up to that.

What is also indisputable, and is accepted by Professor Ekins, is that since the decision of Mamatkulov in 2005, the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly upheld the binding nature of Rule 39 interim measures, and the UK Government have never once challenged before the Strasbourg court that decision and the binding nature of interim measures. Indeed, the United Kingdom has not only complied with such measures but called on other states to comply with them. It has supported resolutions and declarations that assume that Rule 39 is legally binding.

International law has, therefore, reached a settled state of practice and agreement between member states and the Strasbourg court. Whatever other course might properly be taken in the future—that could include matters concerning the way in which these orders are dealt with, about which the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, complained—it is clear that it would be a breach of international law and the rule of law for that settled agreement and practice to be peremptorily and unilaterally jettisoned by the United Kingdom acting alone. That is a basic principle of international law.

The wording of Clause 5 reflects similar, but not identical, provisions in the Illegal Migration Act. The challenge by Members of this House to those provisions in that Act were rejected by the Government and voted down in the other place. Should we then just placidly accept them now? I believe that it would be quite wrong to do so. This is yet another example of a blatant breach of the United Kingdom’s legal obligations. The other amendments in this group are worthy attempts to leave Clause 5 in the Bill but, in effect, to neuter its current intent and effect. My contention is that our constitutional role in this House impels us to reject Clause 5 in its entirety, and not provide it with any blanket of legitimacy, either in its current form or with amendments.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I was in a queue waiting to pay my bill at dinner and therefore arrived a few minutes late. I am very grateful for the Committee allowing me to speak.

I listened with particular interest to two of the most distinguished lawyers in this House: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, with whom I sat on the Court of Appeal regularly, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. There is undoubtedly a potential dispute. Without going into what it should be, Clause 5(2) and (3) exclude the English court. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, complained about the international court; ought we not to be complaining that the English court is excluded?

If there is to be a dispute with the Court of Human Rights, we might bear in mind that we are a member of the Council of Europe. If we blatantly refuse to follow the ECHR at Strasbourg, we might be turfed out, like Russia. Would we want to be the second country after Russia to be excluded from the Council of Europe? Some might not care, but others might think it would not look very good.

What I am complaining about is that Clause 5(2) and (3) will stop our domestic court making a decision. That seems a very good reason to support some, if not all, of the amendments.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, these amendments all concern the response to interim orders of the European Court of Human Rights—not a foreign court, I entirely accept, but a court of which we are a member. At Second Reading, I absolutely accepted that courts, particularly domestic courts, will need to have powers to make interim orders—to stop a child being taken from the jurisdiction, or to stop someone disposing of assets, knocking down a building or any number of different matters that ought to be ruled on immediately, rather than waiting for the worst to happen.

However, the granting of such orders, particularly if they are obtained ex parte—that is, in the absence of the other side—is always subject to stringent safeguards, and none seemed to be honoured when the court in Strasbourg determined that the Government could not remove an asylum seeker to Rwanda. We still do not know who the judge was; there is no record of his or her reasons. That is why I asked the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, whether she could enlighten us as to the reasons why the order was made. She told us that they would be made only in extremis, when an individual was likely to suffer death or something similar, but there is no explanation of the reasons or any basis on which they came to that conclusion. We do not know what the reasons were.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Baroness Butler-Sloss Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, who introduced the amendments in this group. I have signed Amendments 18, 23 and 47, but, like him, I have considerable sympathy with the others. The amendments discussed on Monday focused much on the rule of law and how the Bill sits within that. This group changes the focus to look at the most vulnerable asylum seekers, defined in our Amendments 18, 23 and 47 as unaccompanied children, victims of human trafficking or victims of modern slavery, and says that, for the purposes of this Bill, Rwanda should not be regarded as a safe country.

Noble Lords who worked on the Illegal Migration Act last year will remember that, during that Bill, these were three groups of asylum seeker where there was considerable cross-party concern about the Bill reducing their rights under domestic law and ignoring them under international law. There are amendments to follow that will go into more detail on these cases. I will not speak in detail ahead of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, but Amendments 23 and 47 would set on the face of the Bill, in Clause 2, that these groups of people should always be considered separately and not just with everybody else or as a generic group.

The first group is unaccompanied child asylum seekers. We have had many debates in the last three of four years, in the Nationality and Borders Act and Illegal Migration Act, about difficulties in assessing the age of unaccompanied children. We will come back to that detail next week. It is important to note that, on 22 January, the Guardian reported that at least 1,300 child refugees are at risk after being classified as adults, with some placed in adult jails after the Home Office wrongly assessed their ages. Others were sent to adult hotels without the right support. The Refugee Council, Helen Bamber Foundation and Humans for Rights Network report, Forced Adulthood, says that these children are exposed to “significant” harm. It reported that age assessments can be as short as 10 minutes. The consequences for these young people, if they are children, are serious. They breach international law, as well as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which this country is a signatory.

For victims of modern slavery and human trafficking —I will not go into the detail of the excellent introduction by my noble friend Lord Scriven—I share my noble friend’s concerns. I note that this Government appear to have a short memory. In the Modern Slavery Act 2015, promoted by the then Home Secretary Theresa May, an Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner was created to improve and better co-ordinate the response to modern slavery. It introduced a defence for victims of slavery and trafficking, placed a duty on the Secretary of State to produce stat guidance on victim identification and victims’ services, and enabled the Secretary of State to make regulations relating to the identification of and support for victims. That is why the simplistic processing proposed in this Bill is completely inappropriate and why the Government need to respond to these amendments, as well as those proposed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in this group. We have a duty as a nation to take care of the most vulnerable asylum seekers.

I also support Amendment 75 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, which my noble friend Lady Smith of Newnham has supported. It is unconscionable for us not to recognise the very particular circumstances of those who have supported our troops in the most difficult circumstances.

This Government used to believe in supporting asylum seekers, particularly the most vulnerable, and had processes by which they could do so, but they clearly do not anymore. Can the Minister explain to your Lordships’ Committee why this U-turn has happened and on what basis it is appropriate to disregard the rules they created less than 10 years ago?

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 70, 73 and 85. I support the other amendments in this group. I declare an interest as co-chair of the parliamentary group on modern slavery and vice-chair of the Human Trafficking Foundation. The purpose of my amendments is to draw attention to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the plight of victims of modern slavery trafficked to the United Kingdom, to ensure greater transparency and to put in place appropriate structures of due diligence and accountability.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Baroness Butler-Sloss Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, one of the groups that we are coming on to looks at the organisations and committees that are set up under the treaty. We will return to that discussion about the provisions of the treaty in respect of what my noble friend has just asked. As I say, it would not be right for the delivery of our policy, which is key to our commitment to stop the boats, to be left solely dependent on this.

Amendments 11 and 12 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, seek to ensure that individuals relocated to Rwanda must have any asylum claim determined and be treated in accordance with the UK’s international obligations. This is unnecessary in view of the comprehensive arrangements that we have in place with the Government of Rwanda. It is important to remember that Rwanda is a country that cares deeply about supporting refugees. It works already with the UNHCR and hosts more than 135,000 refugees and asylum seekers and stands ready to relocate people and help them to rebuild their lives.

We will get on to this again in a later group, but I remind the Committee that the UNHCR has signed an agreement with the Government of Rwanda and the African Union to continue the operations of the emergency transit mechanism centre in Rwanda, which the EU financially supports, having recently announced a further €22 million support package for it. Indeed, as recently as late December, the UNHCR evacuated 153 asylum seekers from Libya to Rwanda.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked about the international agreements that Rwanda has signed. That is dealt with at paragraph 25 of the policy statement. I will read it for convenience:

“Rwanda is a signatory to key international agreements protecting the rights of refugees and those in need of international protection. It acceded to the Refugee Convention, as well as the 1967 Protocol, in 1980. In 2006 it acceded to the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Conventions on the Reduction of Statelessness. Regionally, it is a signatory of the Organisation of African Unity Convention on Refugees in Africa and the 2012 Kampala Convention”.


Paragraph 26 goes on to say that:

“Rwanda’s obligations under these international agreements are embedded in its domestic legal provisions. The Rwandan constitution ensures that international agreements Rwanda has ratified become domestic law in Rwanda. Article 28 of the constitution recognises the right of refugees to seek asylum in Rwanda”.


The presumption which appears to underpin this amendment is that Rwanda is not capable of making good decisions and is somehow not committed to this partnership. I disagree. Rwandans, perhaps more than those in most countries, understand the importance of providing protection to those who need it. I remind the Committee that my noble friend Lady Verma spoke very powerfully on that subject at Second Reading.

The core of this Bill, and the Government’s priority, is to break the business model of the people smugglers. That will not happen if we undermine the central tenet of the Bill, which is the effect of these amendments, and a point that was well addressed by my noble friend Lord Howard. We are a parliamentary democracy, and that means that Parliament is sovereign. Parliament itself is truly accountable, and I therefore invite the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

Clause 1(2)(b) says that Rwanda is a safe country, so why is Clause 1(3) necessary?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Clause 1(3) is just a simple restatement of the various facts of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bishop of Lincoln]

My Lords, I rise to speak because I suspect I am in a minority as one of the very few Members of this House who have had direct contact with Rwanda, having had 10 years’ engagement with the diocese of Kigali, the capital city, and the great joy of visiting the country and seeing life outside in the countryside. One of the most moving things of my nearly 40 years of ministry was praying at the national memorial for the holocaust in Kigali with a local bishop who had lost so many members of his family. He was still so distraught that I had to find the words for our prayer together.

I put on record that I have come across so many wonderful Rwandans who would be hugely great examples to us individually of the practice of forgiveness and trying to make life beautiful again after a terrible tragedy. I can think of one instance where I met a priest; most of his family had been murdered, and in an act of forgiveness he took the murderer of his loved ones into what was left of his family, because he felt there was a requirement upon him to demonstrate and show forgiveness in this terrible situation.

It is also true, in my experience, that Rwanda has done a remarkable job in developing its economy. I was going to say it was a “tiger economy”—that is perhaps the wrong fauna for the Great Lakes region, but there have been real strides forward in their economy. Of course, people have been very eager to support their President because he has largely delivered to them peace.

It is also my direct experience, relating to what the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, said, that the institutions of civil society remain substantially undeveloped. It seems to me that, although we may agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and might want to say that Rwanda could in the future be a third-party partner in dealing with these issues, I would strongly say that that day has not yet come.

Of course, I am not in principle against the idea of third-party partnerships; it is very interesting what we hear about Italy. It seems to me that what is required is a real, dedicated commitment to a partnership among western nations in seeking to see how this could be done effectively and generously towards those whom we categorise as criminals, many of whom have suffered dreadful trauma and persecution in their homeland, which is the only reason they have taken the risk and put themselves in the hands of these dreadful criminal gangs.

It is also very important that we take account of the fact that, if we are going to even think about the prospect of sending people to a third-party country, there has to be a guarantee, as evidenced in Amendment 8, that people have a right to return and establish their claims here. If this is not allowed, it is simply a case of our throwing the problem away. That seems to me to be simply immoral, and not something that we as a nation should be contemplating.

We need to look very carefully again at putting this burden on the people of Rwanda and how we might think much better about working together with other nations in developing a pattern that will help us, in the longer term, cope with huge further migration through climate change, which we have not even contemplated yet and which will affect us very deeply.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the right reverend Prelate, with his fascinating and personal knowledge of Rwanda, and the very useful advice he has given us this evening. I have put my name to the seven amendments set out by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and I do not intend to refer in great detail to any of them, particularly at this time, because I would like to get home before midnight, if that is possible, and I am in the last group.

Shortly, the points I wanted to make are these: it is obvious that Clause 1(2)(b) is out of kilter with Clause 1(3). You only have to read Clause 1(3) to see that the Government of the Republic of Rwanda has “agreed to fulfil”—that seems to me to be partly in the present, but almost certainly partly in the future. In the treaty, which we pored over in the debate that I listened to and did not speak in—I thought enough people had spoken—the 10 requirements that we discussed are clearly not all fulfilled. The right reverend Prelate points out—and he knows; he has been there—that the structures are not all yet in place.

The noble and learned Lord the Minister made a brave effort to say that Rwanda is safe and, following discussions, will be safer. That is splendid wording, but it does not really work in this House, when we look at the fact that the Government want this House to say, despite our vote on the treaty debate, that Rwanda is safe when it patently is not. Speaking as a former lawyer as well as a fairly long-term Member of this House, I cannot believe that any Government are asking us to say that something is what it may well be—and for the sake of Rwanda, if it really wants our refugees, I hope it will be —when, quite simply, it is not there yet. Right around the Committee, we have all been saying that from the first few words, so how on earth can the Government expect the House to agree to a phrase that the,

“Act gives effect to the judgement of Parliament”—

Parliament including us—that Rwanda is safe?

I very strongly support what has been said by my noble and learned friend Lord Hope of Craighead. It seems to me that to some extent, subject to issues of modern slavery to which we will come in another group, the Bill could be partially redeemed by two points. One has been set out by the noble and learned Lord in Amendment 6, and the second is set out in the various amendments headed by my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich about an independent reviewer. If you had the twin of “will be” when it is ready, and an independent reviewer to assist the Government to say that at least the requirements in Clause 1(3) and the 10 requirements in the treaty have been met, then I have no doubt that the Government could say, “Now we can send people to Rwanda”. However, I plead with the Government: I cannot believe that they are really expecting us to say that that which is not safe is safe at this stage.

[The Earl of Kinnoull (CB)]

My Lords, I am not sure that my noble and learned friend should call herself an ex-lawyer. That was very good indeed.

At Second Reading, I said that we live in a constitution that is akin to a three-legged stool, with Parliament, the Government and the judiciary in a balance between those legs. I think it is very important to realise how key to our constitution that stool really is. Clause 1(2)(b) represents grit in the relationship between those legs: the requirement that this House enters into a judgment that many in the House feel is very wrong, a judgment which is everlasting. At Second Reading, my noble friend Lord McDonald of Salford very eloquently spoke about the political risk within Rwanda at the moment. The judgment is largely in a vacuum, because a number of questions have been fired at the Minister about where we are with safety. That is very difficult for our House to do and is grit. That represents further grit because of course it will be something that the judiciary has to take account of when it comes to determine anything under the Bill.

That is why I find the amendment package that my noble and learned friend Lord Hope has put together so very attractive. I hope the Government will look at it for the reason of logic alone and for a second reason, because the second half of my submissions at Second Reading were to do with the Salisbury/Addison convention. That is a convention about creating a smooth relationship between two of the legs of that stool. Indeed, we are here tonight because of that convention: we are working late, sitting extra late tonight, in order to speed things through because part of that convention deals with speed of consideration.

I do hope the Government will think of the convention in relation to how the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has expressed the amendments and the provisions in the Bill that represent grit in the relationship. We have a convention that is all about promoting a relationship, and we have a Bill before us that is all about putting grit in the relationship. This has to be thought of in terms of the convention.

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[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Lawlor. I will speak generally about the Bill very briefly, and the amendment, and also say why I strongly oppose the amendments in the names of my noble friend Lord Hailsham and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, which are pernicious and dangerous. I cannot believe that, when my noble friend Lord Hailsham sought election in the county constituency of Sleaford and North Hykeham in 2010, he would have told his constituents that he would seek to disregard the rights and privileges of Parliament in favour of supranational legal entities and international treaties, because I suspect that that would not have been a very popular point of view to take. But that seems to be the logical implication of the amendment he has put forward today.

The Bill does contain some important statements of principle, in that it reasserts the sovereignty of Parliament and its right to legislate to cut through the morass of alleged international norms which currently frustrate the ability of the United Kingdom to control its own borders, in Clause 1(4). The partial disapplication of aspects of the Human Rights Act—

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

Does the noble Lord realise that the Government, and previous Governments, have signed and ratified the international agreements and treaties about which we are talking?

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

Well, I will develop my argument about the tension between domestic legislation, parliamentary sovereignty and the rights and privileges of Parliament, and the international obligations and a universalist human rights regime which many noble Lords seem very content to support in preference to the former.

Illegal Migration Bill

Baroness Butler-Sloss Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 28th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I have looked through these amendments but not put my name to any of them. I have to say that they—in particular Amendment 8—drive a coach and horses through much of what this Bill stands for. Therefore, I am going to ask my noble friend to make sure he resists them.

This is important because we face some very serious challenges in our society as a result of the rapid growth in our population. I will go over this issue only briefly because we are time-constrained, but I just remind your Lordships that this is already a relatively overcrowded island. Last year, we admitted permanently 600,000; the year before last, we admitted 500,000. Stoke-on-Trent has a population of 250,000, Milton Keynes 288,000 and Derby 259,000. If we are going to house those people properly—and we certainly should —we will have to build four Milton Keynes or four Derbies over just two years. On dwellings, we all know how fiercely fought this is. In 2001, there were 21 million dwellings in this country; there are now 25 million—in 20 years, we have built 4 million dwellings.

It is not just at that very high level. The fact that we are introducing hosepipe bans in the south-east of England now is because the population is rising so fast we are running short of water. When we debated this in Committee, I took a certain amount of incoming from the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury. He said:

“everyone who has spoken so far has agreed, that we have to control migration. I do not think there is any argument about that, but does the noble Lord accept that of that 700,000 last year, or whatever the number turns out to be exactly, the Bill will cover only 45,000? The Bill is not about overall immigration”.—[Official Report, 24/5/23; col. 897.]

That is a fair point. However, the figure turned out to be 600,000 and it may well be that that 45,000 is 60,000, in which case it is 10%, not a sufficiently significant number, but the real challenge to us is that everybody thinks it is not their challenge. Everybody thinks it is somebody else’s challenge.

We have heard persuasive, dreadful, heart-rending speeches about the positions that people find themselves in—on behalf of interest groups of various sorts—and no doubt we shall hear them again. However, one group has essentially not been heard during our debates, and that is the 67.3 million people who live in this country, 18% of whom are from minority communities.

When I undertook my polling—which, as I have said to Members of the House, is freely available to anyone—I did not want it to be said that it was going to be old white Brexiteers living in the country, as opposed to young trendy hipsters living in the towns. In response to the question “The UK is overcrowded”, between 60% and 70% of people polled, across all social classes, all regions of the country and all age groups, felt that was the case. Every interest group, including those that are seeking to blunt the effect of the legislation before us, has to play its part in reducing the number. Unless we are seen to be responding to between 60% and 70% of our fellow citizens, uglier and nastier voices will emerge to capture that. We need to be conscious of that.

In my view, the amendments would punch holes in the bucket. How much water would flow out I do not know, but I hope the Minister will think very carefully before allowing the bucket to lose too much water because that way difficulties lie for us, for our communities and for generations ahead.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, in Committee I tabled a similar amendment to Amendment 10, so I will not say much now because I said it then. I listened with interest to what the noble Lord has just said, and I recognise that we do not want illegal migration. However, there are broader and more important issues.

Children have rights. A child who is unaccompanied comes to this country, sometimes quite young, and is settled here in local authority care, placed perhaps in a foster family or a residential home. They go to an English school and become fluent in English but then, at the age of 18, are then removed either to Rwanda—the only country with which there is an agreement apart from Albania, and Albanian children are unlikely to be in this group—or to some other country or home that they have fled. Quite simply, to uproot children at 18 is, as I said in Committee, cruel.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, I am afraid I have dropped my notes.

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Tabled by

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

10: Clause 3, page 5, line 14, at end insert—
“(6A) An unaccompanied child who reaches the age of 18 must not be removed unless it is in their best interest to do so.”

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

With great regret, because I know that I do not have sufficient support from the House, I will not move my amendment.

Amendment 10 not moved.

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[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, my name is on this amendment and the others that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, has tabled. He, like the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has given us an admirable example of brevity, and I do not think one needs to repeat what was said in Committee.

As somebody who wrote a biography of William Wilberforce, my parliamentary hero, in 1983 to mark the 150th anniversary of his death and the abolition of slavery, I was particularly proud when it was a Conservative Home Secretary who took through the other place the Modern Slavery Act. I was very glad indeed to be able to give that support. It was in the very best cross-party spirit of your Lordships’ House, and we all of us are genuinely proud—I particularly that it was a Conservative achievement but with support from friends and colleagues in all parts. This Bill before us is going to undermine an international achievement of far-reaching importance. To quote another famous Conservative, this is something up with which we should not put.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I have also put my name to most of these amendments. I agree with every word that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has said, and I do not propose to say anything more about them, this being Report. I just want to make two extra points.

As noble Lords know, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and I got back from Warsaw today. I was chairing 14 countries discussing how Ukraine could be helped against exploitation and modern slavery. I had to deal with questions from so many other countries among the 14 as to what on earth the United Kingdom was doing in the Illegal Migration Bill. To my shame—and I admit that I was ashamed of what is happening— I could not for one moment support the Bill to those MPs from other countries; because this was a parliamentary meeting, everyone was an MP. It was really very distressing for me to stand up unable to support my own country.

The other point is that not only will victims not leave traffickers—the traffickers will say, with perfect truth, “Either you stay with us or you go to Rwanda. Which is worse? We suggest you stay with us”—but it will have a marked effect on prosecutions. There are already far too few prosecutions, and I think the impact on prosecutions of perpetrators and the extent to which modern slavery will increase over the years as a result of this Bill will be enormous.

[Lord Griffiths of Burry Port (Lab)]

My Lords, I spent the whole of last week in Strasbourg, where there was a very similar response from the 47 nations of the Council of Europe towards what we are doing here, with bewildered questions about it put in debate. I simply add that to what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said about her experience in Warsaw.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Order! Secondly, I suggest that the material figures are those in detention. It is a fundamental part of the scheme that people will be detained and removed. We can see from the figures that those in detention have been utilising NRM claims; you can see the increase from the statistics I gave a moment ago. On the noble Lord’s final point, those are all published statistics, and I can confirm that the 65% figure is in paragraph 143 of the impact assessment.

I remind noble Lords that the application of the public order disqualification is firmly grounded in the provisions of the European convention against trafficking, or ECAT. Article 13(3) of ECAT clearly provides that states are not bound to provide a recovery and reflection period on the grounds of public order. It is again worth stressing that these provisions are time-limited. We recognise their exceptional nature, and the Bill expressly provides for Clauses 21 to 24 to cease to apply after two years unless both Houses agree to extend their operation for no more than 12 months at a time.

For the reasons I have set out, we consider that this sunsetting provision is more appropriate than the sunrise provision proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, in his Amendment 113A.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I wonder whether the Minister could help me on this. On the figure of over 500 days in the NRM, from beginning to end, is that entirely due to Home Office officials not getting through it in a timely way, or is there any other reason why it is taking so long?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The NRM process requires the gathering of evidence and input from the party, so it is not down entirely to Home Office resourcing issues.

The appointment of the new Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner is at an advanced stage, and I am sure that once appointed they will want to monitor closely the impact of these provisions.

In relation to my noble friend’s amendments, I repeat the assurance that my right honourable friend the Immigration Minister made in the other place: namely that we will consider additional protections through statutory guidance for those who have experienced exploitation in the United Kingdom. We are continuing to develop such guidance and in doing so will adopt an appropriate balance between protecting victims of modern slavery and delivering the intent of this Bill.

As regards Amendment 103, the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, quite properly raises the issue of how the modern slavery provisions in the Bill sit with the continued operation of the relevant EU directives in Northern Ireland. As I have said in earlier debates in Committee, the provisions in the Bill are compatible with the Windsor Framework. In particular, in the context of this amendment we do not consider that the 2011 anti-trafficking directive falls within the scope of Article 2 of the Windsor Framework.

Amendments 96, 102 and 105, tabled respectively by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, the noble Baroness, Lady Bryan, and the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, relate to the presumption that it is not necessary for a person to remain in the United Kingdom to co-operate with an investigation. As I outlined to the Committee, remote participation is now the norm in the workplace, and the criminal justice system is no different. It is simply no longer the case that a victim of crime needs to be in face-to-face contact with the police or others to assist with an investigation. In some cases, victims may even feel safer providing virtual or video-recorded evidence. I assure noble Lords that we are working to ensure that the relevant technology, interpreters and intermediaries are available where needed.

We have provided for statutory guidance to support decision-making by caseworkers when determining if there are compelling circumstances why the presumption should be set aside in a particular case, but there is no evidence as to why, in the majority of cases, such co-operation cannot continue by email, messaging and video conferencing. The presumption in Clauses 21(5), 23(5) and 24(5) is therefore perfectly proper and should be retained.

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[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak in support of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord German, to which I have added my name, and in strong support of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs.

The noble Lord, Lord German, spoke of limbo, which is exactly what we will create here if we do not pass Amendment 15. These people will be detained indefinitely, in the dark about when they will be sent somewhere and in the dark about where they will be sent. That simply is out of keeping with the traditions of the society in which we are proud to live.

The Government will no doubt say that the possibility that a case might be allowed to start in the asylum process would significantly weaken deterrence. That seems to be the principal argument against today’s amendments—even, astonishingly, against the modern slavery amendment a few moments ago. The Government should perhaps read their own impact assessment, in which paragraph 31 says:

“The academic consensus is that there is little to no evidence suggesting changes in a destination country’s policies have an impact on deterring people from leaving their countries of origin or travelling without valid permission, whether in search of refuge or for other reasons. Non-policy drivers of behaviour (for example diaspora, shared language or culture, and family ties) are also known to be strong factors influencing the choice of final destination”.


I believe that that is the case.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, spoke powerfully in reaction to the noble Lords, Lord Clarke and Lord Howard, about the importance for the rule of law domestically and respect for international law of allowing the due process of hearing an asylum claim to take place. We all know that it needs to be streamlined and to have more resources put into it, but, basically, it is a sane system. The idea of limbo is insane, immoral and illegal, and, as the noble Lord, Lord German, pointed out, would be costly. The case for Amendments 14 and 15 is rock-solid.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I have put my name to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, which I strongly support, as noble Lords can imagine. I agree with everything that was said in support of Amendment 14, and I will add only two short points.

The first is that, over the years that I have been in this House, the Government have spoken again and again about the welfare and best interests of children. In the Bill, it is notable how the best interests and the welfare of children are totally ignored. Secondly, I visited Calais and met a number of young people, under 18, who were determined to come to this country. There was no question of them being pushed by any adults— I never saw an adult in any of the areas of Calais that I visited. They are determined to come, and they have good reasons to have fled their country. I heard harrowing stories of why they wanted to get away. Quite simply, this amendment would put back what they are entitled to and what is in their best interests. It should be supported.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I will make two brief points in support of Amendment 14. Before that I repeat the question I posed earlier: where is the child rights impact assessment that we were promised? It is now Report, and we really ought to have it.

My first point is that, in Committee, I quoted from the previous Lords Minister and from Home Office guidance that unaccompanied young children are

“not suitable for the inadmissibility processes”.

I asked the Minister to explain why, given these recent statements, they are considered suitable now, and on what evidence this policy volte-face is based. I did not get a reply, so I would welcome one now, please.

Secondly, last week, I attended Barnardo’s launch of its report A Warm Welcome: A Blueprint for Supporting Displaced Children Seeking Protection in the UK. We were given a booklet about a comic book for children seeking safety, co-designed by children and young people with lived experience of the asylum journey. It ended with a letter to the children who follow in their footsteps, which said:

“I know when you came to the UK you had a difficult time. I know this because I did too. So don’t worry, everything is going to be ok … You have been through a difficult time but you are safe now … You can forget the past because you are safe and you can look to the future and start your life here”.


I was close to tears reading this poignant letter because, if the Bill goes through in its present form, the children who follow will no longer be able to start a life here. The booklet was called Journeys of Hope; the Bill destroys that hope. This amendment would at least give back some hope to unaccompanied children who reach the UK through irregular routes.

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Moved by

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

19: Clause 5, page 8, line 23, at end insert “and the Secretary of State is satisfied in relation to the proposed country of removal that it is a safe third State as defined in section 80B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, and others in the name of Lord Carlile of Berriew, seek to ensure that asylum seekers can only be removed to third countries or territories listed in Schedule 1 if those countries are places where they will be protected from onward refoulement in breach of the Refugee Convention and be able to be recognised as a refugee and receive protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention (if so recognised).

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has asked me to speak on his behalf to this series of amendments. My name is on Amendment 33, and I strongly support the noble Lord’s amendments. As we all know, the refugee convention was signed by the British Government. These amendments look at a major concern about safe countries.

It is extraordinary that the Government have put 150 countries in Schedule 1, as I referred to in Committee, given that we know that only two on the list support this. We are told that, even with the additional number that the Minister has told us about, there is no agreement with the majority of countries and that some of the countries with which there are agreements, notably India, have not signed the refugee convention. How can the Government expect to send migrants and refugees to a country that has not signed it? It seems quite extraordinary. The Minister then tells us that it is such a good thing that these countries have joined. It is not only India, but I raise it as an important example.

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[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, I repeat the point. The Government retain discretion to enter into agreements and discretion in relation to the level of detail to be shared.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I am so sorry to interrupt the Minister again, but could I ask a straightforward question? What is the view of the Government about countries they are referring to that have not joined, or have not signed up to, the refugee convention?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

The straightforward answer to the noble and learned Baroness’s question is that we are content to treat with countries that have not signed up to the refugee convention.

On Amendments 29 to 36, the Secretary of State may add a country to Schedule 1 by regulations only if satisfied that there is in general in that country or part of it no serious risk of persecution and will not in general contravene the United Kingdom’s obligations under the human rights convention. In so doing, the Secretary of State must have regard to information from any appropriate source, including member states and international organisations. The views expressed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on a particular country, among other sources of information, will therefore be considered before a country is added to Schedule 1.

In response to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, our contention is that, when considering adding a country to the list in Schedule 1, we need to consider the position in the round. We do not live in a perfect world, so it is reasonable to assess a country on the basis that they are generally safe and to consider the possibility of adding to the list only a part of a country.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, raised the matter of Rwanda. In relation to protections for LGBTQ+ persons in that country, the constitution of Rwanda includes a broad prohibition on discrimination. Rwanda does not criminalise or discriminate against sexual orientation in law, policy or practice.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

My Lords, as I stated at the outset, the position is that the provisions for the ability of people to bring applications for serious harm suspensive claims allow for scrutiny of the safety of any location to which a person would be sent.

I was on the point of saying that, although we will not be voting this evening, I none the less urge the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and other noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has spoken on this group. In relation to Amendment 19, it is not proposed to test the opinion of the House.

Amendment 19 withdrawn.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Baroness Butler-Sloss Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th February 2022 Lords Chamber

I could not agree more with the Government in their own guidance—why do they not follow it themselves? Clauses 57 and 58 are a serious undermining of the current provisions in an Act we are all proud of, and the Government should think again.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interests in the register. I was much involved with the Modern Slavery Act and the review led by the noble Lord, Lord Field, so I feel I have some knowledge of this. I do not know whether the Minister, who is not at the Home Office, realises the extent to which all the non-governmental organisations of this country—including the Salvation Army, which works for the Government on modern slavery, together with the anti- slavery commissioner—deplore this part of the Bill without exception. This Minister may not know that but, goodness me, the Home Office does.

I am very concerned about children, but I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, so I propose to refer specifically to Clause 58. Again, because he is not at the Home Office, the Minister may not have read the statutory guidance on the Modern Slavery Act. I have it with me—it was published this month. I wonder whether the Home Office’s right hand does not know what the left hand is doing, because the requirement to be timely in providing the information needed is totally contrary to the entire work set out by the statutory guidance.

I do not want to bore the Committee, but I must refer very briefly to one or two points so the Minister can know. Under “Introduction to modern slavery”, the guidance says:

“It is important for professionals to understand the specific vulnerability of victims of modern slavery and utilise practical, trauma-informed methods of working which are based upon fundamental principles of dignity, compassion and respect.”


For goodness’ sake, does Clause 58 have anything to do with that? The guidance sets out how you should deal with identifying potential victims of modern slavery. In particular, paragraph 3.6 on page 35 states:

“In practice it is not easy to identify a potential victim—there are many different physical and psychological elements to be considered as detailed below. For a variety of reasons, potential victims of modern slavery may also … be reluctant to come forward with information … not recognise themselves as having been trafficked or enslaved”


and, most importantly, may

“tell their stories with obvious errors and/or omissions”.

One important aspect—which the Home Office on the one hand states in the statutory guidance and yet is clearly totally unaware of in relation to the Bill—is that a lot of victims who come to this country are given a story by the traffickers. That is the story they tell first, and it will not be the truth. Just think what will happen to them consequently under Clause 58. They will be treated as liars who have not given accurate information. Through the NRM—imperfect though it is—they will probably have got to reasonable grounds, but then they will get this appalling notice and find themselves not treated as victims. This is totally contrary to the Modern Slavery Act. It is totally contrary to the best of all that has happened in this country, in the House of Commons and this House, which will be ruined by this part of the Bill.

Having worked in this sector since about 2006, I am absolutely appalled that the Government think they are doing a good thing in putting this part of the Bill forward. For goodness’ sake, will they for once listen and get rid of it?

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 153 and 155 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. Before I do so, I fully associate myself with the powerful words of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. The only correction I will make to the noble Lord is that the Modern Slavery Act originated in the coalition Government, and we had a Liberal Democrat Minister in the Home Office in the person of my noble friend Lady Featherstone, who was here earlier.

Group 1 covers amendments and proposed deletions to very objectionable clauses, as we have heard. Clause 57 shifts the onus from the state to the potential victim to identify themselves and possess the relevant expertise to know what information is relevant to a slavery and human-trafficking determination. There is no provision for the specified date for supplying the information to be reasonable, or for whether and how an extension could be granted. Can the Minister say whether there will be guidance on these matters? As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked, will notices be served on all asylum applicants or only on some? There would be potential for these notices to be discriminatory, in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, if they were served only on certain categories of people. What criteria will be used if only certain people will get these notices?

There is no clarity or guidance as to what might be considered good reasons for why information has arrived late. Vulnerable or traumatised victims might take time opening up; they might well be unfamiliar with the legal process, or they might not realise that a particular detail was relevant until later. There at least needs to be guidance on what constitutes good reasons to improve legal clarity and certainty, otherwise Amendment 154 from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, needs to be accepted.

On Clause 58, the Court of Appeal in a 2008 case said that the word “potentially” should be included if the decision-making authority were required to assess late supply of information as damaging to credibility. Hence, Amendment 153, inspired by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, changes “must take account” to “may take account” as potentially damaging to credibility. Amendment 155 would amend Clause 58 so that it does not apply to child victims or victims of sexual exploitation, similar to Amendments 151D and 152 from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker.

The bottom line is that Clauses 57 and 58 should not be in this Bill and, as has been said, Part 5 as a whole should not be in this Bill. They are arguably in breach of both the European Convention on Human Rights and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.

I think that my noble friend Lord Paddick will refer to the worries of the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner—we are all very conscious of this matter. Indeed, Dame Sara Thornton has a comment article in the Times today, to which I shall refer in a later group. She has been very active, not least in briefing the JCHR and outlining her extreme worries, and we have heard from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. The whole of the sector believes that this tightening up, to the disadvantage of vulnerable and traumatised victims of human trafficking and slavery, is wholly inappropriate.

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[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

There were two questions there. Why now? I was going to come to that, because that is a point that the noble Lord made earlier. As to listening to your Lordships’ House, the Government always listen to what goes on in this House. They always listen but they may not always agree.

The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, I think with some sympathy, referred to me as the “poor Minister” responsible for responding. I am poor in the sense that you do not take this job for the money, I can say that. I also cannot promise the meeting with the Home Secretary. What I can promise is that I will pass on what the noble Baroness said to the relevant people in the home department.

We have heard a number of arguments for removing Clauses 57 and 58 from the Bill. I will deal with those first, because I think that is really the head-on charge that has been put to me. I suggest that these clauses are important provisions to encourage disclosure of information at the earliest stage so we can identify victims and provide them with direct support as early as possible. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, moving the amendment, asked why the provisions were necessary and quoted the former Prime Minister asking why artificial deadlines were required. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol suggested that the clauses would stop people coming forward. Far from deterring victims, these clauses are intended to encourage genuine victims to come forward and get protection and support on the earliest possible occasion.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but how does he see what he is saying as compatible with the statutory guidance issued only this month?

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[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I declare an interest because, in my work on sustainability in the business that I chair, we of course help companies to deal with modern slavery. That is why I wish to rise. It does mean we know a bit about it, and I have to say to the Government that everybody who knows a bit about it does not agree with the Government. That is why we have to say this very clearly.

The problem with modern slavery is that people who are involved in it hardly know where they are and what it is all about. That is the difficulty because, whatever we do, access to whatever we do is always going to be the problem. We have to find ways of ensuring that as many people as possible can enter into the beginnings of a conversation which will, in the end, reach the position in which they will be released from modern slavery—and it is that beginning moment that is most important and delicate.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Alton, that what is being proposed in this part of the Bill should not be here at all, simply because, in this context, it makes a comment which it should not make. In this context, it comments that this is something to do with nationality, borders and immigration. But it is nothing to do with any of those except accidentally—and I use that word in the technical sense.

We ought to be immensely proud of this legislation. I sit as the independent chairman of the Climate Change Committee, so I do not often mention the fact that I have been a Conservative for many years. I am not quite sure of the situation in certain circumstances, but that is the position in which I find myself, and I will say that I think it is one of the great statements of the Conservative Party that it was at the centre of passing this legislation. It shows that we have a real understanding of the responsibility of those who have to those who have not. That is why the intervention of the right reverend Prelate is absolutely appropriate, because this about the attitude to human beings that we should have if we are people of faith.

Anything that detracts from a triumph should be opposed, above all, by those who have been proud of it in the past. That is why I do not want this particular debate to go on without somebody from these Benches making the points. It is wrong to make it more difficult for people to get into the system. The moment you move away from “suspect but cannot prove”, you make it more difficult, and I hope that this House will not allow the Government to do this. Above all, I hope that the Government will think again about why they want to do this. They have presented no proof that there is any widespread misuse of this. Even if they did, I put it to the Minister that that is a price we have to pay. They have not proved it; there is no evidence for it; but, even if there were, one has to accept that the nature of the people we are dealing with means that we have to reach out further than we would in other circumstances.

At the moment, I fear that the Government are like the Levite rather than the Good Samaritan, and I wish them to return to their proper place, which is to cross the road to find out what is happening.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, for the reasons given by other speakers—particularly the last speaker, with whom I profoundly agree—I support these amendments. However, I want to raise a slightly different point on Clause 59. It appears to apply to children. I have had, over the years, numerous meetings with the Home Office, and I thought we had got to the position where the Home Office agreed that the NRM was not the right place for children to go, because anyone under the age of 18 becomes immediately, on arrival in this country, the responsibility of a local authority under Part 3 of the Children Act 1989. Consequently, local authorities take over these children.

As the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, pointed out, there are these independent guardians—advocates, who act as guardians—but the children are supposed to be cared for by a local authority with an independent guardian and should not be going through the NRM. What disturbs me about Clause 59, in addition to the points that have already been so ably made, is whether it is really intended that the Government want children to go through the NRM. Should not they in fact all be dealt with entirely through local authorities, with the help of the advocate?

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my name is to Amendment 157. This is a rhetorical question, but is not it interesting that the noble Lord, Lord Deben, who, if I am right, was not able to be here for the first group of amendments, has made points that were not rehearsed in his presence but are exactly the same points, as he says, from the point of view of the best traditions of Conservatism?

Clause 59 again prompts the question: why, and what is the problem? What is the evidence for what the Government perceive as a problem? Are there too many people claiming to be victims? Like other noble Lords, I thought the problem was that we do not know how many there are. We try to identify them, but we know that we do not manage to identify them all—but we know that all the indicators are that modern slavery goes wide and deep. The problem is that we do not identify everyone that we want to support. What underlines the Modern Slavery Act is getting people to the situation in which they can be supported.

Under Amendment 157, the Member’s explanatory statement actually refers to “current statutory guidance”, a point that was very well made in the previous debate.

I want to say a word about Amendment 173, on navigators. I am quite intrigued by this—guardians for adults, is that what is intended? Some police forces have a much better understanding of how to deal with victims, or possible victims, of slavery. I am not sure whether I have the name of this right, but I think that there was a transformation unit; the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, may remember. The police did a lot of work at one time. Can we hear about that from the Minister?

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I may be able to help the noble Baroness—it was at Exmouth. I went to see it.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

Indeed, it was excellent. That is why I raised it—because I wonder what has happened to it. As I say, I find the suggestion made in Amendment 173 intriguing, and I hope that it will be taken very seriously.

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[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for that, and I beg the pardon of the noble and learned Baroness for not addressing her question directly. If she is content, I will have that expressed in writing to her.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

Certainly.

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)]

I am obliged.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope we will take it in our vote on Report. That is a very powerful warning, I think, from the anti-slavery commissioner and I hope the Minister will tell me how seriously he takes it.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I support all these amendments but I will speak to Amendment 169, to which I have put my name. I will deal with two other people apart from the anti-slavery commissioner who said that her gravest concern lies with Clause 62 above all the other clauses in this part of the Bill.

The United Nations rapporteur said:

“We are concerned that Clause 62(3) would be in violation of the State’s obligation to ensure non-punishment of victims of … forms of slavery for any unlawful acts … that are a direct consequence of trafficking.”


That, of course, is exactly what the Modern Slavery Act says in relation to people who commit offences if they are done in the course of being a trafficked person. So far as children are concerned, if they are under 18, they cannot be responsible for acts that they have done under the coercion of being a trafficking victim.

Perhaps of more significance to the Government is the issue of prosecution. Caroline Haughey QC, who advises the Government and regularly prosecutes traffickers—with great success I am glad to say—has described this Bill as catastrophic. She is a very successful QC. She is very measured and “catastrophic”, to my mind, is the most unusual word for a sensible prosecuting QC to use. She goes on to warn of the risks of losing witnesses for prosecutions because they have been guilty of offences themselves. We do not have enough prosecutions. It is an extremely serious matter that we do not have enough, and this clause is certain, if it is left in its original state, to reduce the number of prosecutions that Caroline Haughey and other QCs are trying to do in the criminal justice system.

I think again the Government ought to bear in mind why so many people who are victims have criminal records. It is perfectly obvious—they are much easier to identify and traffic, children as well as adults. They are the sort of people the traffickers go for because they know they are much less likely to come voluntarily to the public eye. They need protection against having been trafficked just as much as anybody who has a clear record. I implore the Government to think very carefully about this effect on prosecutions and the fact that criminals are very likely to be trafficked people.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I am delighted to follow the noble and learned Baroness. The Committee has benefited greatly from her insightful comments on the background. This is a particularly murky world about which we are talking. People are in an extremely vulnerable and unfortunate position, and they may well be preyed on and further exploited by the very people I applaud the Government for trying to target.

I will speak briefly to Amendments 160 and 163 in my name. Amendment 160 is the key amendment; again, it is a concern raised by the Law Society of Scotland, which is keen to ensure that these provisions be brought to account only in exceptional circumstances. The reasoning for this—which follows very well from the discussion we have heard in this debate—is that Clause 62 excludes from the national referral mechanism persons who have committed criminal offences as well as other offences relating to terrorism. It excludes those who have claimed to be victims of terrorism in bad faith. However, it appears to divide victims into the worthy and the unworthy. Surely the Government must explain their reasoning behind this. In my view, and that of the Law Society of Scotland, no one should be disqualified from being a victim of one crime because they have been a perpetrator of another—precisely for the reasons that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, gave us. Victims of trafficking could be criminalised for conduct relating to their trafficking. This is in breach of Article 26 of the Council of Europe trafficking convention. I cannot believe for a minute that this is the intention of the Minister or the Government in this regard.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, referred to a recent court case; I do not know if it is the same one to which I will refer. A violation of Article 4 of the ECHR was recently found against the United Kingdom, in this regard, by the European Court of Human Rights in VCL and AN v the United Kingdom. For those who would like to research this further, the reference is application numbers 77587/12 and 74603/12.

I conclude with a question to the Minister. Does he not share my concern that the clause, as it stands and without reference to exceptional circumstances, introduces a high risk of a double punishment for those victims who have received convictions? Moreover, disqualifying certain victims from protection increases the prospect that they will be further exploited by organised criminal groups as they will be unable to access protection from the state.

Divorce

Baroness Butler-Sloss Excerpts

Wednesday 6th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lord is correct to identify the family hubs as a principal part of the Government’s intention to join up government family support as part of the backdrop to implementing no-fault divorce. Ministers and officials from the Ministry of Justice are working closely with their counterparts in the Department for Education and a number of other government departments to share a cross-government agenda for strengthening families. Family hubs are a vital element of this agenda, and work is continuing to further develop the family hub model to ensure that they improve outcomes for children and families with children. This will include those at risk of separating or who have separated, equipping them with the skills to manage issues and decisions independently and effectively so that they do not need to rely on family courts. In addition, and as previously stated in this House, the Government will use the opportunity of revising the online divorce application process to improve the signposting of relevant support services.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB) [V]]

My Lords, will the Minister ensure that the Government give sufficient support, especially to children suffering from the separation of their parents, including better funding for CAMHS?

[Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con) [V]]

I am very sorry; may I ask the noble and learned Baroness to repeat the question? I am trying to communicate by telephone, and it is not particularly easy.

Royal Commission on Criminal Justice

Baroness Butler-Sloss Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The criminal justice system faces challenges, which is why this royal commission is so important.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, will the royal commission membership include judges, barristers and solicitors?

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [HL]

Baroness Butler-Sloss Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 17th March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Howe of Idlicote (CB)]

My Lords, I am pleased to support Amendment 1, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McColl. I continue to be concerned about the lack of regard for the respondent demonstrated in this legislation.

In the first instance, respondents lose their right to contest the divorce and thus, in an important sense, their voice. In the second instance, as the noble Lord has already said, respondents are severely disadvantaged in a no-fault context when compared with respondents in the same position under the current law, because the two to five-year warning of a statement of irretrievable breakdown is taken from them; they are exposed to a potential statement of irretrievable breakdown without any warning. In the third instance, respondents are not even afforded security about enjoying access to a 20-week reflection period. It is thus entirely possible that they will not be told about the divorce until the end of that period, and thus be confronted with not only a potentially out-of-the-blue statement of irretrievable breakdown but the possibility of being divorced in just seven weeks from first hearing about the divorce.

In the context of this assault on the rights and dignity of the respondent, Amendment 1 helps in two ways. First, rather than requiring the divorce process to begin with a statement of irretrievable breakdown, which makes it very hard for the respondent to respond because the petitioner is saying very emphatically “It is all over”, the initial statement proposed by Amendment 1 would create a context in which there can be a conversation and the respondent’s voice can be heard. Of course, this does not mean that the respondent will be able to change the mind of the petitioner should they wish to try to persuade them that their marriage is savable, but at least it provides them with a credible opportunity for doing so.

Secondly, the initial statement proposed by the amendment does not condemn the reflection period to likely failure by commencing with a statement that suggests, with great finality, that there is no way the marriage can be saved. It might be necessary to start a divorce process on the basis of a statement of irretrievable breakdown within a fault-based system, but if we are to realise the objectives set out by the family test assessment to use the no-fault system to create a basis from which one can foster conditions that better promote reconciliation, this is a terrible missed opportunity. It also misses out on the opportunity highlighted on page 164 of the Nuffield Foundation report that notification in a non-fault-based system

“would be more facilitative of reconciliation.”

I hope that the Government will support the amendment or come back with an alternative means of restoring dignity to the respondent and making the most of the new opportunities in a no-fault system to promote reconciliation.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I spent 50 years in family law and I have some experience of dealing with parents who are at odds with each other. I have seen the impact on their children. I am very relieved to hear that the noble Lord, Lord McColl, for whom I have the greatest respect, does not wish to test the opinion of the House. I respect and understand his good intentions and those of others putting forward amendments today, but if they passed they would hinder rather than enhance the process of this excellent Bill.

Amendment 1 is opposed by family lawyers, many of whom have great experience of dealing in family cases. It assumes incorrectly that when the existing divorce process was not completed in some 50-odd cases out of about 300 it was due to reconciliation. I think we were told in Committee that only one of those was an attempted reconciliation. The others were procedural problems. There is no evidence to support the view that a period of reflection, suggested by the noble Lord, Lord McColl, would in fact create more reconciliation than starting with the application, as put forward by the Government.

For most divorcing spouses the petition does not come at the beginning of something going wrong. My experience certainly is that it comes towards the end, when efforts have been made on both sides to have reconciliation. It is a very serious step and one that is not taken lightly. I also have to say that it is very unlikely that the respondent is taken by surprise. He or she is almost certain to know that the marriage is not going well. I find it inconceivable that a speculative application could be made by somebody right out of the blue when the marriage appears to the other spouse to be working perfectly well.

If irretrievable breakdown is the ground of divorce, as, indeed, the Bill requires, the proposed amendment is entirely inconsistent with it, because that is the way the application would come before the court. Whatever you have to call it, the application is for a divorce at some point. The three-stage process would make it much more complicated and would probably be confusing for many people.

One particular group of people is not in fact taken into account, if the noble Lord, Lord McColl, will forgive me for saying so: spouses escaping abusive marriages. If there has to be this period before you can even apply for a divorce, the opportunities for intimidation, coercion and other behaviours against the escaping spouse—unless they go to a refuge—would mean that this measure would make life infinitely worse for them. The noble Lord has not referred to that group. Again, according to the research done by Exeter University and the Nuffield Foundation, people have said that it is time that the state respected and did not second-guess the decisions of parties to a failed marriage.

I am also quite surprised that the noble Lord did not refer to civil partnerships. Since civil partnerships now follow exactly the same rules as marriage under current legislation, this measure would put marriage in a completely different situation to civil partnerships. That must be unsatisfactory so I strongly oppose the amendment, but I am relieved to know that it will not go to a vote.

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Christians like me are not trying to hijack any debate; we are simply trying to have a debate. Such a discriminatory and pejorative statement hardly breeds confidence in the impartiality of the author of this influential report. We are enjoined before the start of every day’s proceedings to put aside partial affections. I urge the lawyers in this House to look more widely at this issue and not to think just about the immediate process their clients go through. Many divorce applicants will never see a lawyer. I also urge the Government to think again about the wider social ramifications of plans which do not have public support and on which they were not elected. I beg to move.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I entirely understand the best intentions of the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, in putting forward this amendment, but my heart sinks to hear it. It is really an effort to rewrite the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which we are trying very hard to get away from. I do not know whether the noble Lord understands—I hope he will forgive me for saying it like this—just what a farce the current divorce situation is. The majority of divorces are now completed on fault, and the fault has to be something that is important enough for the judge to sign off. Some judges sign off something which is very limited indeed, but if it is actually a fault of any significance, it upsets the respondent, and the respondent very often finds that he or she is being accused of things that have really not arisen during the marriage but are necessary for the current farcical situation to create a divorce. The exacerbation of the respondent inevitably has a marked effect on the children.

I have to say that Professor Liz Trinder, whom I know, is entirely independent. The report Finding Fault? is in line with lots of earlier research. In its comments on children, it is undoubtedly in line with the very strong evidence of endless consultant child and adolescent psychiatrists—and I know many of them. Over the years they have become increasingly concerned about the negative impact on children of the allegations of unreasonable behaviour that are to be found in the current legislation.

I am a patron of the Marriage Foundation, and the foundation is extremely keen that people should be reconciled. I have to say that I share that view; I must tell the House that I have been married for 61 years and I find it extremely sad when I meet members of my own family and other people I know who are divorcing. That for me is a tragedy. However, there is no shortage of people who wish to end their marriage. That is part of our English and Welsh law, and we have to go along with it.

Still, we must recognise that if this amendment were passed and only one party wanted to bring divorce proceedings, we would be back in the old situation, which is deplorable for children, and that would exacerbate the emotional trauma of the divorce process. I have to tell the House that it makes reconciliation very much less likely when allegations of behaviour are raised. Where they are not raised, it is a lot easier for people to talk to each other, but, if they are, it creates a very serious situation. I am very concerned that children should be protected from the behaviour of their parents. Children should be protected from the sort of allegations that could only seriously exacerbate the tragic situation for them when their parents separate.

[Baroness Burt of Solihull]

My Lords, these amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, would add a number of conditions or barriers that would mean that a statement of irretrievable breakdown would not be accepted unless the couple had lived apart for a specific time or there was a citation of unreasonable behaviour. The conditions look suspiciously like the existing damaging conditions that the Bill is trying to get away from—a point echoed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in much more eloquent terms than I can manage. It sounds harsh to say this, and I have every respect for the noble Lord, but it is hard to conclude anything other than that these are wrecking amendments. This party supports the Bill and so we will not be supporting them.

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[Baroness Meyer (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 3 is tabled in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Curry, who is following government advice by staying at home today.

The amendments in this group would tie the start of proceedings to service in the case of a sole petition divorce. Amendment 3 relates to marriages and Amendment 9A to civil partnerships. My noble friend Lord Farmer tabled a similar amendment in Committee. I am returning to the issue today because I believe the compromise offered by the Government does not go far enough. Proposed new Section 1(5) stipulates that 20 weeks must elapse between application and conditional order. This period gives couples a chance to reflect on the serious matter of divorce, plan for the future and consider whether their marriage can be saved.

As a nice aside, I must express my surprise at hearing several noble Lords imply in Committee that once the divorce process has started, there is no point attempting to save the marriage. I also gently remind the Minister that the government press release of 7 January said that the 20-week period is to

“provide a meaningful period of reflection and the chance to turn back”.

For the 20-week period to work, it is vital that both parties are aware that divorce proceedings have been initiated, but the wording of proposed new Section 1(5) leaves room for the respondent to be deliberately kept in the dark by the applicant. It ties the beginning of the 20-week notice period to “the start of proceedings”—that is, when notice is given to the court.

It is all too easy for a sole petitioner to avoid his or her obligation to give notice to the respondent by, for example, giving an out-of-date address or deliberately choosing a moment when the respondent is unreachable, maybe abroad. The question of whether the respondent is aware of the application becomes live only when the applicant asks the court to make the conditional order at the end of the 20 weeks. This means the respondent could be left unaware that the notice period has started, and the clock is running. They may not find out that the 20-week period has almost expired. That would surely defeat the entire purpose of the notice period: to encourage reflection. It could leave the respondent at a huge disadvantage.

It is more than possible that the applicant could start proceedings then leave the country with the children, in effect committing international parental child abduction. As noble Lords know, this subject is close to my heart. If the applicant flees to Germany, for example, it is possible to change the children’s place of residence in a matter of weeks, taking them out of the UK jurisdiction and into a foreign jurisdiction. Even if this does not happen, possession is nine-tenths of the law—as noble Lords are surely aware. Only 15% of abducted children are returned to their country of habitual residence under the terms of the Hague convention 1980. I raise this scenario because the Bill gives an unscrupulous applicant a great deal of power over the respondent. To summarise: on the eve of a conditional order, a respondent could find himself or herself confronted with a double fait accompli: divorce and the loss of the children.

The point was underlined last year by family law specialist David Hodson, in an article for a legal journal. He wrote:

“The intention of Parliament of divorce by notice over 26 weeks actually applies only to the applicant for the divorce. The recipient respondent will have less, perhaps much less and possibly even only a few weeks and yet have no opportunity to object. Any idea that there would be reflection and consideration—”

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

I wonder whether the noble Baroness would allow me to make the point that in Amendment 3, proposed new subsection (5B) talks about

“evidence that the respondent has engaged in deliberate evasion of service or other steps to delay materially the service of the application”.

Nothing in this amendment deals with the applicant misbehaving.

[Baroness Meyer]

Maybe it is a failing in the amendment. It could be detrimental to both sides, but I am coming on to the other side as well. Mr Hodson described the current wording of the Bill as

“discriminatory, arbitrary and unfair. A process in law which means some parties to proceedings will have a dramatically different notice period than other respondents.”

The simple solution to the problem is to make the start of proceedings in the case of single applicants for divorce the date on which the application is served on the other party, rather than the date it is made by the petitioner. This was recommended in the Law Society briefing paper, which states:

“It is proper that a respondent to a divorce is given the full 26-week period of notice … If the notice period runs from the start of proceedings rather than the date of service, the respondent may receive the notice long after the start of proceedings, whether due to court delays, interference from the petitioner in delaying receipt by the respondent, the simple length of time of delivery if abroad, or other administrative reasons …We would recommend the Bill is amended to ensure that the notice period in applications by one party to a marriage only, would start from when the notice was received by the other party to the marriage. We believe it is vital that both parties each have a minimum of 26 weeks for the divorce to proceed under.”


In Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said that this would hand

“too much power to a respondent party who wishes to frustrate the divorce proceedings by avoiding or disputing service or delaying the entire process.”—[Official Report, 3/3/20; col. 582.]

He suggested that new rules and definitions of service should be explored by the Family Procedure Rule Committee, but there are two concerns about this approach. First, the principle is so important, and the potential for injustice so profound, that we cannot risk the Bill coming into force without this problem being solved first. To delegate this to the Family Procedure Rule Committee is to neglect the responsibility of this House to scrutinise and improve legislation. Secondly, on the point of a respondent who wishes to avoid or frustrate the divorce process, we accept the concerns of noble Lords. That is why these amendments give the court power to abridge and shorten the 20-week period if it arises that a respondent is attempting to frustrate the process.

I hope that, despite my bad reading, this demonstrates that concern about unco-operative respondents can be addressed, but we must also address the issue of unco-operative applicants. I beg to move.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, before I speak to Amendments 3 and 9A, I should tell your Lordships—in the unusual circumstances—that I certainly have a cough. I have had it since before Christmas; I have been to see my general practitioner, who says that I have a virus, but it is not “the virus”. I hope that noble Lords can be assured that I am not going to spread the coronavirus. I saw my GP and a consultant last week and have been checked out. I am sorry about my cough, but I cannot get rid of it.

What the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, has spoken about happens already, either by petitioners who give a false address or by respondents who make it impossible for the petition to continue. This goes on; I have heard from judges that they know it is going on. Sometimes divorces are completed without the respondent knowing. In other cases, there are divorces that cannot conclude because the respondent will not support it and just refuses to answer any questions or do anything that is relevant to the outcome of a divorce. I hope this is something that the Government will discuss with the President of the Family Division and the Family Procedure Rule Committee, because it is a serious matter. However, I do not think that it will be managed by this amendment.

I interrupted the noble Baroness, because I wanted her to realise that she has to deal with what is actually in the amendment: 26 weeks is not referred to in the amendment, and it deals only with respondents and not applicants. For all those reasons, I suggest to noble Lords that this amendment is flawed and cannot be supported.

[Lord Harries of Pentregarth]

Even if it is the case that the wording of the amendment is not quite right, would the noble and learned Baroness in principle support this amendment? It seems to deal precisely with the situation which she outlined so eloquently, where both sides sometimes try to evade service. Would it not be important to have on the statute book a way of dealing with this issue?

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

I understand what the noble and right reverend Lord says. The trouble is that I do not think having it in primary legislation will make it any easier for this issue to be resolved. This seems a matter for the Family Division to get on with, to see what it can do to try to deal with this. The Family Procedure Rules have to be obeyed; when I was a family judge, they were as important to me as primary legislation. I understand the point, but I do not think that it will make people behave any better if this is in primary legislation rather than in the rules.

[Baroness Shackleton of Belgravia]

To answer the question on the problem about service, this is regularly done when somebody is trying to evade service. You can go to the court and ask for an order for deemed service. There does not seem to be any problem in that; you just have to produce evidence that you have made your best endeavours to serve somebody, and if the court is satisfied that that has happened, service is deemed and the divorce can proceed.

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[Lord Browne of Belmont (DUP)]

My Lords, the social science evidence is very clear that divorce has a negative—sometimes profoundly negative—impact on child development. Of course, there are occasions when divorce is absolutely in the best interests of children: when they need to be liberated from an abusive environment. In developing public policy, however, we must be careful that situations where divorce is the best outcome do not cause us to lose sight of the fact that, in most cases, it is best for children to remain living in an intact family home.

Under the current law, if someone is unfaithful to their spouse, they know that they will be at risk of receiving divorce papers. There is a sense in which the law is there to protect the faithful spouse from being abused by an unfaithful spouse. The new framework, however, seems to turn things on its head. A feckless husband and father, rather than being challenged by the law in his selfishness, is actually empowered by it, and in a way that enables him to demonstrate a cruel lack of regard for his spouse and children. He can have an affair and use the law to help him fulfil his objective of liberating himself from the family unit that constrains him, in order to pursue others. The law allows him to issue a statement of irretrievable breakdown with the option of being out of the marriage in six months.

What does this Bill do for the faithful spouse, the respondent, and, more importantly, their children? It means that people who have committed no fault, but who are being divorced, will lose the warning that they currently benefit from through the requirement for prior separation in the absence of fault. They will instead receive, out of the blue, a statement of irretrievable breakdown, a breakdown that is in no sense their fault, and find that marriage will end in six months, or significantly less if the petitioner sabotages the 20-week reflection period by not telling her that a petition has been lodged until part way through or at the end of the period.

The lack of actual regard for the respondent and children in the proposed law is concerning. I know that in 2011, when David Cameron, as Prime Minister, called for feckless runaway fathers to be shamed, he was not necessarily saying that couples should not divorce. His point was that fathers should take their responsibilities seriously. As well as challenging fathers not thoughtlessly and selfishly to walk out of marriages, he was challenging fathers not to turn their backs on their responsibilities after divorce. Notwithstanding that, however, it is very difficult to square the way that this legislation empowers a feckless father to walk out of his marriage on the basis that his decision is an autonomous one, without regard for the best interests of the children until after the decision to divorce has been made. In this context, at the very least we must think more about asking parents to process the divorce decision in the context of an awareness of what the social science evidence says about the best interests of their children.

In this regard, I set before your Lordships’ House two considerations. In the first instance, a divorce decision is not an autonomous decision, because it impacts both the spouse and the children. We should be encouraging not an autonomous decision but a responsible decision, one that has regard for the impact on others, especially the children.

In the second instance, the decision to divorce is located, to some significant degree, in the legal process of divorce, and is not a foregone conclusion from the outset. As the Government’s consultation, Reducing Family Conflict, makes plain on page 31, initiating the petition amounts to something that

“puts the marriage on notice”.

The application for the conditional order for the divorce is not actually made until after the 20-week period. This is called a reflection period, for the very good reason that it is a time for reflection, to aid the decision-making process in the context of which The Family Impact Test says:

“The legal process for divorce should seek to reduce acrimony and conflict, thereby helping couples and parents to look to the future rather than providing a mechanism that facilitates and encourages the attribution of blame for past events. We want to create conditions for couples and parents to reconcile if they can – and to move on as constructively as possible in the event that this is not possible.”


In other words, the Government are saying that the decision-making process is still taking place in the legal process of divorce during the reflection period. In this context, it seems absolutely right that, rather than encouraging people to make autonomous decisions about divorce in the legal process of divorce, we should be encouraging them to make responsible decisions about divorce—decisions that do not think just about themselves but about their children.

I believe that this amendment is eminently sensible. It does not block couples seeking divorce; it entitles couples to receive information. Quite what couples decide to do with the information is up to them. Perhaps it will make them resolve to work harder at their marriage and step back from divorce. Perhaps it will not change their decision at all, but it will impact the way in which they approach it and make them more alive to the need to provide special support for their children going forward.

The state, having played a role in recognising the marriage commitment through the law and conscious of the significant public policy benefits of marriage, has a responsibility, particularly to the children of the marriage, to make sure that it cannot be exited without reflection on the implications of doing so in the best interests of the children. I am therefore pleased to support the Amendment 5.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, I start by reassuring the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, that if the President of the Family Division has said he will do something, he will do it.

Turning to these two amendments, I have the greatest possible sympathy with the proposals in each of them, but I do not think it appropriate that either should be in primary legislation. I would like to see, side by side with the application online, a requirement for the applicant to read advice about dealing with the issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries; and equally, if not more important, to read something about what the children say about divorce’s impact on them. About 20 years ago, Michigan had the most wonderful video of children ranging from about six to 18. They talked about the impact of divorce on them, such as: guilt—wondering whether it was their fault; anger at one parent or sometimes both; frustration because they did not know what was going on; and so on. Children need to be informed about what is happening; they have a right to know. They are people, not just packages.

It is extremely important that this sort of information, together with the information the noble Baroness and the right reverend Prelate have set out today, be provided, along with asking whether the parents realise that the children generally love both of them—it is very rare that they do not—and that the impact will include their feeling that they are responsible for what has happened, for example. I would like an undertaking from the Minister that this information, which has to be easily available, will be provided. A link is not good enough, because people do not have to look at it. It should be side by side with the application and should be provided to any applicant with children; however, it is not an appropriate provision for primary legislation.

[Baroness Meyer]

My Lords, I fully support what the noble and learned Baroness says. Before I speak in support of the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, I shall make one thing clear: I have never said that I would be in favour of forcing people to stay together if they have decided that the best way forward is to separate and divorce. On the contrary, as I said in my previous speech, I fully support the new clause which allows for divorce by mutual decision through a joint application. The problem lies elsewhere: in what are, for the moment, called “contested cases”.

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [HL]

Baroness Butler-Sloss Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 3rd March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Howe of Idlicote (CB)]

My Lords, I am pleased to speak in support of Amendment 1 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McColl, which I very much hope the Minister accepts. This amendment has two important virtues.

First, as has been noted, it creates an environment for the 20-week period during which there is a chance for genuine reconciliation. The divorces between 2003 to 2016 tell their own very important story. It must be right not to condemn the process to failure from the start by encouraging a statement of irretrievable breakdown without the need for any prior warning. Under the current law, the only way to move to irretrievable breakdown in the absence of unreasonable behaviour, such as adultery, is through a prolonged period of separation, such that a formal notice of divorce cannot come as a surprise. By contrast, under this Bill, being presented with a statement of irretrievable breakdown could be the first you know of a difficulty. How did such an extraordinary proposal get past the family test? I rather suspect that we are still waiting for the family test to take place.

The second virtue of this arrangement is that it treats the respondent with greater respect. One of the things that disturbs me most about this Bill is that it seems to have been fashioned with the interests of one party in mind—the petitioner—and demonstrates little or no regard for the respondent, or any children who might be caught up in the divorce process. It currently stands as a petitioner’s charter. The Bill gives the petitioner the power to suddenly announce that the marriage has broken down irretrievably, from which point there is absolutely nothing that the respondent can do to get any kind of fair hearing if they disagree. While this amendment does not completely reverse the shift in power from the respondent to the petitioner, it will at least give the respondent the opportunity to have a voice and express their perspective during the reflection period in the limited but important sense that the termination of the relationship is, for that time, not a foregone conclusion. The petitioner has made a statement that they think the relationship may have broken down but there is, in this statement, something of a question and an opportunity for the respondent to engage: they are not being presented with a fait accompli.

It may be that at the end of the 20-week period the response of the respondent has not resulted in the petitioner feeling that the marriage can continue. It may have brought them both to a place where they conclude that they need to make a statement of irretrievable breakdown but, crucially, the respondent will have been given a period of time during which they will be fully aware that the future of their marriage is in the balance and during which they can take steps, if they wish to do so, to see whether the relationship can be saved.

As our law, in providing the option of marriage, gives a couple the opportunity to make a lifelong commitment, something would be very wrong if that same law allowed one party to make without any prior warning a statement of irretrievable breakdown, from which point the other party would have no kind of credible voice to express a contrary view. This cannot be right, which is why I strongly support Amendment 1.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I was a family judge for 35 years and spent a great deal, if not most, of my time dealing with families who were divorcing. This is an excellent Bill and few of the amendments ought to go through, except for those of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, on the Henry VIII clauses, which require consideration.

The view that I take about this Bill is strongly supported by Exeter University and the Nuffield Foundation’s detailed research, led by Professor Liz Trinder at Exeter, and by Resolution, which has 6,500 family solicitor members who care deeply about looking after their clients, as I know as an honorary member. I am sorry to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord McColl, and what has just been said, but the evidence from the research is that the majority of people know perfectly well when a marriage has irretrievably broken down. A respondent to whom such a matter comes as a complete surprise would be very much the exception.

The research shows that the current system, and any system that takes a long time, is likely to be adverse for the children. Children are extremely important and play an important part in the background to the Bill. One of its purposes is to get the divorce over so that children suffer less. There are various ways in which we could help the children more than we do, particularly through information. Parents who are deciding to divorce—the petitioner and the respondent—should be given an information pack which would explain the impact on the children of disagreements between the parents. Perhaps the most important thing I learned as a judge is that in almost every case the children love both parents, and if parents are seriously at odds with each other, they do not realise that the children love the other parent as much as they love them. Such an information pack would be extremely helpful.

The way in which the noble Lord, Lord McColl, wants to delay this is contrary to the current detailed research and earlier research in the 1980s and 1990s. All these amendments will not be helpful—other than, as I have said, the two amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—and I hope your Lordships will think that the Bill should go through largely unopposed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, I absolutely disagree that this is a petitioner’s charter. It is a way of bringing a failed marriage to an end. If noble Lords think about it, if one member of a couple says, “This marriage is at an end; in my view it has irretrievably broken down,” what on earth can you do about it? I am not sure whether noble Lords who have been speaking are expecting a couple who cannot get on to go on living together. If one side says that it is at an end, there is no longer a consensual marriage. Having been happily married for many, many years—

[Lord Framlingham]

Is the noble and learned Baroness actually saying that there is no possibility of that person changing their mind?

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

Of course there are wonderful situations where reasonable couples talk it through and decide not to do it, whether for themselves or for their children. In some cases, that works and in some cases it does not. But there is no doubt that there are many, many people who seek to bring a marriage to an end because, from the point of view of that person, their marriage is no longer one that that they can endure. A lot of people leave. In the famous Owens divorce case that went to the Supreme Court, the couple are still married because five years is not up and there was no consent by the husband. The wife did not stay: she is not living with the husband who would not allow a divorce; she has moved out. There they are living separately, but not divorcing. Is that a happy situation?

The Bill is not a petitioner’s charter; it is an opportunity taken by the Government—and I congratulate them—to deal with the very important research that shows that unhappy marriages are not good for children. I do not understand how, if a couple do not get on, or if it is a case of domestic abuse—and we know how serious domestic abuse is—and the victim of the abuse wants to bring it to an end, they should not be allowed to do so. I cannot believe what is happening to the children while she—it is usually a she, but not always—remains in the house with the children and the domestic abuser. There is a great deal of evidence about that.

Fortunately, most parents, when they bring their marriage to an end, are civilised about it and about the children. The important thing about this Bill is that it is dealing with the issue of divorce and leaving the two extremely important issues—the most important issues of all—of what happens to the children and the financial outcome to be dealt with, I hope, in further legislation. The issue of children does not have to be dealt with in further legislation; the various Children Acts have dealt with that, whether they are the children of those who are married or of those who are not. Finance desperately needs changing—I suspect that the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, will say more about that today. It absolutely needs to be looked at, and I hope that the Government will go for a consultation paper on how we can improve legislation that dates back to as long ago as 1973, and which certainly needs an update. However, that is not a reason not to have the Bill.

[Baroness Shackleton of Belgravia]

This is not about the finances. When the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, brought in the Children Act, it took away the stigma of custody. That Act as been a godsend to all of us, as we do not have to identify which party has care and control—custody. It has been the most enormous success, for which everybody who practises in this field is eternally grateful. I suspect that it was considered very novel at the time.

People forget that most responsible solicitors, when somebody who wants a divorce comes to see them, go through with their clients the possibility of not getting a divorce. I believe passionately in marriage—I am a patron of the Marriage Foundation, which supports the Bill—but by the time somebody wants out, they want out. I cannot tell your Lordships how many people are shocked when I say to them, “Are you sure you really want this? It’s not necessarily greener on the other side.” They say, “Do you really think I saved up the courage to come and see you to be told to go back and try a bit harder?” Once the game is up and the marriage is over—once it is dead—clinging on to it is not in the children’s interest at all. People need to move on. You cannot make somebody who is unhappy happy. It takes one person to make the marriage unhappy and two people to make it happy. The Bill goes some way towards addressing that problem.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

I will just finish with the two further points I wanted to make.

On the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, with which, as noble Lords may have gathered, I do not agree, I cannot see how a court can adequately assess whether the children will be better off if the parents, one of whom wants a divorce, are still together or separated. There will be a difficult balancing act for the judge, and it will take a long time, because the family courts are seriously overburdened. How on earth will you find time to do this, and between a couple who will not be represented? As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, there is no legal aid for couples who divorce, so the judge will have two people at odds with each other, with one or perhaps both determined to be divorced, and the children in the middle. The children ought to be informed of what is going on, but very often they are not. They need help at that time from parents who do not realise that they need help, and they particularly need information. But how on earth is the judge—or the magistrates, but in particular the judge—to say to the couple, “What is going to happen if you’re together or if you’re parted? How on earth am I to find out which way the children would want it to be?”? Particularly in cases where there is domestic abuse, the sooner that couple is parted, the better. So I am very concerned about this proposal.

Of course, we should be very careful about what we do regarding the welfare of children. However, research from the University of Exeter and the Nuffield Foundation found that where the parents cannot agree, very often the children would be better off by having them separate, and what their future ought to be can then be dealt with under the Children Acts.

[Baroness Burt of Solihull]

My Lords, I can see the sentiment behind considering the interests of the children in this matter. We will all have been moved by the testimony of the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, about the terrible experience that she and her children underwent, but this amendment would hand the court the impossible task of deciding what is in the children’s interests without the mechanisms to do so, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, just said.

How would you implement a judgment forcing parents to stay together in the children’s interests? You cannot force a couple to stay together any more than you can order warring parents to create a loving environment. I hope that we are past the stage where parents stay together for the sake of the children—unless it is a mutual voluntary agreement—because, on the whole, that has been shown to do more harm than good. Children may fare better from having two loving parents who live in different places, often with different families of all kinds. Love and the secure knowledge that they are loved are what matters, no matter who makes up their family. Research has shown that parents are usually the best judge of what is in their children’s interests. Where this is not feasible, the family courts are there to help.

I am afraid that we will not support the amendment from these Benches.