Lord Stewart of Dirleton
Main Page: Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Stewart of Dirleton's debates with the Scotland Office
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I can be relatively brief in explaining these government amendments. In short, they either respond to recommendations by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee or make minor drafting or technical refinements to the Bill. I turn first to the amendments responding to the DPRRC report.
Clause 3(7) confers a power on the Secretary of State to make exceptions from the removal duty under Clause 2. The Bill on introduction provided for such regulations to be subject to the negative procedure. The DPRRC suggested that the affirmative procedure would be more appropriate. Amendment 11 provides for the “made affirmative” procedure to apply, given the need to make regulations quickly, including ahead of implementation of the duty to remove.
The DPRRC similarly recommended that regulations made under Clause 10 setting out the circumstances in which unaccompanied children may be detained should also be subject to the affirmative procedure. Again, we have accepted the committee’s recommendation, and Amendments 54, 60 and 62 make the “made affirmative” procedure apply on the first exercise of the power—again with a view to early implementation of the Bill—but thereafter the draft affirmative procedure will apply.
Amendments 129 and 169 relate to the power to amend the definition of a “working day” in Clause 37(8). This definition applies for the purpose of various time limits for appeals under Clauses 47 and 48. The DPRRC argued that the power was inappropriate in enabling changes to be made to the meaning of “working day” in relation to actions to be taken by persons bringing an appeal. Having considered carefully the committee’s report, we have concluded that the power is not required, and Amendments 129 and 169 remove it from the Bill.
Amendment 18 is a drafting amendment and simply ensures that Clause 5(3) and (4) dovetail in referring to a country or territory.
Amendments 38 to 41 are also drafting amendments. They simply supplement the reference to the Secretary of State in Clause 7(8) and (9)—which relate to the removal powers—with reference to an immigration officer; this is done for consistency with other provisions in Clause 7.
Finally, Amendments 81 to 84 and Amendment 86 relate to the definition of an “appropriate adult” in Schedule 2. Under Schedule 2, any search of a person under 18 in which that person is required to remove any clothing other than an outer coat, jacket or glove must be in the presence of an appropriate adult. These amendments ensure that the definition of an “appropriate adult” works across the United Kingdom. I beg to move.
My Lords, we are happy to support the Government’s amendments. The Bill currently contains extensive secondary instruments that would limit Parliament’s ability to provide ongoing scrutiny. However, these changes still relegate decision-making to secondary legislation rather than being in the Bill. The Government may market these changes as a concession to this House, but we regard them more as a bare minimum.
My Lords, these amendments go to the issue of whether it is safe to remove a person to a country listed in Schedule 1. It remains the Government’s view that these amendments are not necessary. I will briefly set out why that is the case.
It is not the case that anyone who meets the conditions in Clause 2 can be sent to any of the countries listed in Schedule 1 without further ado. In the case of a national of a non-Section 80AA country, were they to make a protection claim or human rights claim they could not be returned to their home country. In speaking to his amendment the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, itemised a number of the countries with which he has particular concern. For the sake of brevity, I will answer by reference to a single example, but that example covers the list: a Gambian LGBT person fearing persecution if they were returned to Gambia would not be so returned if they make an asylum claim.
The point was taken up by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. The noble Lord, Lord Cashman, spoke with power and made specific reference to an individual example, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, returned to the point when summing up. However, I reiterate that an LGBT person fearing persecution if they were returned to their own country would not be so returned if they make an asylum claim.
In the case of a national of a Section 80AA country, the fact that they have raised a protection or human rights claim against their country of nationality would not be a bar to their removal to their home country, unless the Secretary of State considers that there are exceptional circumstances why they cannot be removed there. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in summing up from the Opposition Benches, drew our attention to the concern that that might lay open this serious matter to the idiosyncrasies of a particular Home Secretary, but I urge your Lordships to consider that the countries with which we are dealing here are EU and EEA countries, plus Switzerland and Albania, all of which, we maintain, are clearly safe. That said, if it was considered that there were exceptional circumstances, they would not be removed there and would instead be removed—
I have listened intently to the argument that was presented, particularly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and I just make a very simple proposition. Would it not be much safer to adopt Amendment 37, rather than leaving it to individuals as to whether they make an asylum claim and in what circumstances? That is why I ask the Minister to think again about this.
My Lords, the Government Front Bench will reflect, as your Lordships would expect, on submissions made on the Floor of the House at this stage. With respect to the noble Lord, I will defer my consideration of that point until later in my submission and will take matters in a different order. I will return to that point.
My Lords, I accept the principle of non-refoulement to a country—a Ugandan going back to Uganda—but there is the wider issue of a gay Ugandan being sent to a country such as Gambia or Kenya. I seek reassurances on that.
I hope to be able to provide that reassurance. Again, with reference to the important point that the noble Lord takes up, which is fully appreciated by the Government Front Bench, I will refer to that in the course of my submission to your Lordships.
I repeat: if it was considered that there were exceptional circumstances, a person would not be removed to his home country. Coming as quickly as I may to the point just raised in an intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, the country to which they return would be a country considered to be a safe one. A person would not be removed to their home country but at the same time would not be removed to a country where they would be exposed to the same level of risk as they would by dint of their sexual orientation.
If we were to seek to remove a third country’s national to any of the countries listed under Schedule 1 and that country were prepared to admit them, those persons would have the opportunity to make a serious harm suspensive claim. Clause 38 makes it clear that persecution and onward refoulement are examples of harm that constitute serious and irreversible harm for the purposes of such a suspensive claim. Such an individual would not be removed to that country if their claim was accepted by the Home Office or upheld by the Upper Tribunal on appeal. So I submit respectfully to the House that the Bill already provides for individual assessments—the very individuality for which the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, called in his powerful submission on these important matters. The Bill already provides for that degree of consideration of individual facts and circumstances for which the noble Lord, among others, has called. As such, I consider that Amendment 20, advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, is unnecessary.
The Minister might be able to help me. Where does the Bill outline the process for that individual review of the individual circumstances?
My Lords, in the making of the serious harm suspensive claim, those individual circumstances would be outlined.
My Lords, the claim can be made only after the notice is provided, but the Minister just told us that there would be an individual process before the notice was provided. Is that correct?
My Lords, I do not think I did. The point I am making is that the serious harm suspensive claim in connection with Clause 38 makes it clear that persecution and onward refoulement are examples of harm that constitute serious and irreversible harm for the purposes of such a suspensive claim. Hence there is consideration of individual facts and circumstances.
On Amendments 19, 21, 24 to 28 and 37, I make an observation, namely that much in Clauses 5 and 6 and Schedule 1 draws on existing immigration law dating back some 20 years. To that extent, the provisions contained therein are not new; they provide necessary clarity as to the country to which a person may be removed.
As regards the consideration of the status of countries as places to which persons can be removed safely and which are on the safe list, that list has been added to over the years. It is instructive that some of the countries added to the safe list in terms of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 were added during the period when the party opposite was in power: in 2003 Albania and Brazil; in 2005 India, Ghana for men and Nigeria for men; in 2007 Gambia for men, Kenya for men, Malawi for men, Mali for men, Mauritius, Montenegro and Sierra Leone for men—I merely exemplify. I reiterate that these are not novel provisions. They provide the necessary clarity as to the country to which a person may be removed.
The noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, raised a matter concerning the nature of the—
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his assistance. I refer him to the equality impact assessment we have published, which in short order answers his question. Again, I am grateful to him for helping me out in my difficulty there.
After today’s debate, before we reach group 17 and my Amendment 163, which is on safe routes but which also incorporates this idea of using protected characteristics as contained in the Equality Act 2010, perhaps the Minister can give some further consideration as to whether that might be a useful criterion to use as and when the Government decide on the formula that we use for safe routes.
My Lords, in the face of that characteristically thoughtful and constructive suggestion, I am happy to assure the noble Lord that we will consider that between now and the point he refers to in relation to his forthcoming amendment.
On Amendment 37, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, I know that he has had the opportunity to discuss this amendment with the Attorney-General, my learned friend in the other place. Following that discussion, I will make one further point that I hope will reassure the noble and learned Lord. If the open expression of a person’s sexual orientation would prevent them living in a specified third country without being at real risk of serious and irreversible harm, they would meet the threshold for a serious harm suspensive claim as outlined in Clause 39, and the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in the case of HJ (Iran) would be upheld.
I am grateful for what the Minister just said in relation to the ability of an openly gay, lesbian, transgender or bisexual person to live in a particular country. If, acting in that open way, they had a well-founded fear of persecution, as I understand it the Minister is saying that that would satisfy serious and irreversible harm. That is not apparent in the Bill, and to make that clear would itself require an amendment to Clause 38, which we will come to in due course.
But I am left, I am sorry to say, somewhat perplexed by the Minister’s analysis of the application of Article 7 proceedings against a particular country. In asking this question of the Minister, I can deal with the point from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. There are two different situations under the Bill under which the issue of removal arises. The first, which is found at Clause 5(4), is where the person
“is a national of a country listed in section 80AA(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.”
That renders inadmissible certain asylum and human rights claims because they are deemed to be safe states.
My first question is: does the Minister not agree that that is quite different from the case that the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, raised, where a person is not from a country listed in Section 80AA(1) but from another country? There is a separate provision for that in relation to removal to a Schedule 1 country. Does the Minster not agree that, although Clause 5(5) deals with the Section 80AA point, there is no equivalent to that exception in relation to a situation where somebody comes from a non-EU country that is a non-safe place and the consideration is now to move that person to a Schedule 1 country? What my amendment is dealing with is not the Section 80AA situation but the situation categorised by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, where a person from a non-safe European state comes here and is threatened to be removed to a Schedule 1 country. All I said—and I am asking the Minister to acknowledge this—is that there should be a similar provision for that situation, for the exclusion of those countries that are facing proceedings under Article 7. That is it.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, of course, for his intervention. It seems to me that the point he raises is one that calls for a degree of interpretative scrutiny that I do not think I am in a position to give at this stage from the Dispatch Box. I wonder if he would be content were I to undertake to write to him on the point that he raises.
I am grateful for the Minister writing, but at the moment it seems to me that the Minister has not really addressed my point about the need for such a provision and the exclusion of such countries. On that basis, I would be minded to press the amendment.
My Lords, I suspect that nothing I could say from the Dispatch Box will alter the fixed purpose of the noble and learned Lord in any event, but I do repeat my undertaking to write to him on the topic.
I was about to address the matter raised by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, in relation to secret agreements. The Government must retain, I submit, the ultimate discretion over the amount and detail of any information shared with Parliament, but the Government remain committed to principles of transparency and positive engagement. This is considered on a case-by-case basis, finding a balance proportionate to the level of public interest.
If that is the case, by definition, these agreements will not be treaties, and these agreements will not have gone through the CRaG process, and therefore they will not be binding.
My Lords, I repeat the point. The Government retain discretion to enter into agreements and discretion in relation to the level of detail to be shared.
I am so sorry to interrupt the Minister again, but could I ask a straightforward question? What is the view of the Government about countries they are referring to that have not joined, or have not signed up to, the refugee convention?
The straightforward answer to the noble and learned Baroness’s question is that we are content to treat with countries that have not signed up to the refugee convention.
On Amendments 29 to 36, the Secretary of State may add a country to Schedule 1 by regulations only if satisfied that there is in general in that country or part of it no serious risk of persecution and will not in general contravene the United Kingdom’s obligations under the human rights convention. In so doing, the Secretary of State must have regard to information from any appropriate source, including member states and international organisations. The views expressed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on a particular country, among other sources of information, will therefore be considered before a country is added to Schedule 1.
In response to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, our contention is that, when considering adding a country to the list in Schedule 1, we need to consider the position in the round. We do not live in a perfect world, so it is reasonable to assess a country on the basis that they are generally safe and to consider the possibility of adding to the list only a part of a country.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, raised the matter of Rwanda. In relation to protections for LGBTQ+ persons in that country, the constitution of Rwanda includes a broad prohibition on discrimination. Rwanda does not criminalise or discriminate against sexual orientation in law, policy or practice.
My Lords, where does the Minister get the evidence to say that, in practice, as opposed to what is written in the constitution, there is no persecution? There are numerous independent reports and newspaper reports, as well as the Foreign Office’s own advice, to indicate that there is a real risk of persecution in Rwanda, especially for trans women.
As the noble and learned Lord will be aware, the Rwanda litigation found it to be the case that Rwanda was safe. Beyond that, in relation to the sources of information, the Government operate on the basis of information gathered by their officials, discussed with Ministers and considered in relation to legislation to be put forward.
On that point, can the Minister tell the House whether we should take any notice of guidance from the Foreign Office on whether countries are safe to visit?
The guidance furnished by the Foreign Office to British citizens for travelling is a separate matter from the guidance upon which the Government are relying in the present case. I can see that that clearly has not impressed the noble Baroness, but none the less it is the position.
Why would the Minister tell me, and others who identify as LGBT, that it is not safe to go to a country because we would be in fear of our safety, yet deport to that country an LGBT national from another country having decided that they would be safe and not in fear of persecution? What is the difference?
The Government are acting on the basis of information in the context of these provisions.
Can the Minister give clarification? The context is that one is a British citizen and the others are not British citizens, and therefore their standards are different. That must be the interpretation: that the Government have a benchmark for British citizens but a completely different benchmark for those who are not British citizens. Can the Minister please explain this much lower benchmark?
In setting the benchmark for countries that are safe for persons to be sent to, the Government are looking at it from the point of view of the objectives of the Bill. We are not looking at it from the point of view of British citizens travelling abroad.
The Bill already includes adequate safeguards to protect those in fear of persecution based on their sexual orientation, gender identity or other protected characteristics, or those who are fearful of onward refoulement. I say again that these amendments are unnecessary, and therefore invite the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to withdraw Amendment 19. Although we will not be voting tonight, for reasons explained, I urge the noble and learned Lord and other noble Lords—
Can the Minister give clarification on the point I raised that he has not replied to—the interaction not with Section 80AA of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which will be amended by this Bill, but with the definitions of a safe third state under Section 80B of that Act? How will they interact? The asylum claims by persons with a connection to a safe state has the definition, as I referred to, of a safe third state under the 2002 Act. That is not being amended by this Bill. The definition of a safe third state in the 2002 Act, which will still be on the statute book, unamended by this Bill, states that the safety is defined if they will receive protection in accordance with the refugee convention. How will they interact? We have the 2002 Act still on the statute book, where a state that is not a signatory to the refugee convention is defined as a non-safe state, but, as the Minister has told us, under this Bill the same is not being applied.
My Lords, as I stated at the outset, the position is that the provisions for the ability of people to bring applications for serious harm suspensive claims allow for scrutiny of the safety of any location to which a person would be sent.
I was on the point of saying that, although we will not be voting this evening, I none the less urge the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and other noble Lords not to press their amendments.
My Lords, I thank everyone who has spoken on this group. In relation to Amendment 19, it is not proposed to test the opinion of the House.