Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords]
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateThursday 24th April 2025
(1 day, 15 hours ago)
Commons ChamberBank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 24 April 2025 - large print - (24 Apr 2025)
14:06 - The House divided: - Ayes: 88 / Noes: 212 - Question accordingly negatived.
14:20 - The House divided: - Ayes: 89 / Noes: 230 - Question accordingly negatived.
Clive Jones (Wokingham) (LD)
The Liberal Democrats are supportive of the Bill, because the last thing taxpayers need to worry about are the consequences of an under-regulated banking sector. I have brought amendment 3 back from Committee, because the size of banks eligible for the new mechanism has been a key debate through the Bill’s passage.
The Minister has regularly set out that the Bill’s stated aim is to enhance the resolution regime, so that we can respond to the failure of small banks. However, the Bill does not restrict the regime to small or medium-sized banks. If applied to large banks, it would create high costs for banks and customers. The costs would persist for many years, adding a significant long-term burden on the banking sector and consumers. Amendment 3 would ensure that the Bill does not apply to banks that have reached the end-state minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities—put more simply, the largest UK banks. That would mean that only small and medium-sized banks could be supported by the mechanism. That would protect consumers and the banking sector from unnecessary financial burden.
Amendment 4 has also been brought back from Committee. It would place a further objective on the Bank of England to consider the competitiveness and growth of the market before directing the recapitalisation of a failing small bank through a levy on the banking sector. We believe that further consideration of the effect on the competitiveness and growth of the market is important before directing the recapitalisation of failing small banks.
To conclude, I would be grateful if the Minister could expand on the remarks made in Committee and explain how precisely the amendment would complicate the process of managing a bank failure.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Emma Reynolds)
It is always a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Cummins. I thank the hon. Members for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier) and for Wokingham (Clive Jones) for their amendments and their constructive engagement throughout the Bill’s passage. The Bill will ensure that the Bank of England remains equipped with the necessary tools to effectively manage bank failures in a way that minimises risk to the taxpayer and to UK financial stability, protecting the taxpayer.
While there may be some disagreements on the finer detail of the Bill, what we have heard today, and on Second Reading and in Committee, demonstrates that there is cross-party support for the principles and overall objectives of the Bill. I thank the hon. Member for Wyre Forest and the hon. Member for Wokingham for supporting those.
The amendments cover a broad range of issues, and I will explain the Government’s position on them in turn, but first I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (David Pinto-Duschinsky) for setting out his experience of the banking crisis and stressing that the mechanism we are seeking to provide through the Bill must allow the Bank of England, in close consultation with the Treasury and other financial services regulators, to act with speed and flexibility at times of crisis. There are hours, not days, in which to make decisions during crises, and at the forefront of our minds when discussing the Bill should be that they often happen over the weekend, as happened under the previous Government with Silicon Valley Bank. I will turn to that example shortly, but I wanted to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon for setting out his concerns about the amendments that would essentially stymie the effectiveness of the Bill.
I note that the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, raised a number of issues on new clause 3, on the Bill’s impact on credit unions. Some were not strictly relevant to the Bill, but I will come on to them. As he noted, the Government absolutely support credit unions. They play a vital role in providing saving products and affordable credit in local communities across the country. However, they are not in scope of the resolution regime that we are discussing, and therefore not in scope of the new recapitalisation payment mechanism introduced by the Bill. That is a benefit to the credit union sector. Indeed, it asked the Government to ensure that it was not included in the payment mechanism. Credit unions will therefore not be liable to pay towards the cost of a failure where the mechanism is used.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
I support wholeheartedly what the Minister has said about credit unions, because credit unions have a big role to play in Northern Ireland, as they do in other parts of the United Kingdom. My concern when it comes to crises in banks is that credit unions belong to their members, but banks have a different hierarchy—they have chief executives and directors to pay. I believe it is unfair for bankers to retain their bonuses while the pensioner who has saved his pennies all his life suffers. No matter what the crisis is, the executives still get their dividends and bonuses. I have a simple question: within this legislation and the rules we have here, can we be assured that the bankers—the ones at the top who may be responsible for the banks, or certainly act responsible for them—will find that their bonuses are not delivered to them?
Emma Reynolds
The hon. Gentleman draws me on something that is not pertinent to the amendments, but I understand why he has asked the question. When a bank fails, there is a hierarchy of creditors. I can write to him with that hierarchy, as I do not have it in my head at the moment. The hierarchy ensures that if, for example, the bank is bailed in, those who have already invested in the bank become stakeholders, although it depends on the resolution scenario and where they are in that process. The people who have deposits in the bank—in more simple language, people who have bank accounts—are protected up to £85,000. Soon that will increase in the way that the shadow Minister suggested.
Amendments 1 and 3 in the names of shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, and the hon. Member for Wokingham respectively both relate to the scope of the Bill, which has been discussed at length during the Bill’s passage through this House and in the other place. The Government’s position remains that the mechanism in the Bill is not intended to support the resolution of the largest banks. The hon. Member for Wyre Forest set that out in his speech, as did the hon. Member for Wokingham. The largest banks will continue to be required to hold MREL to self-insure against their own failure. For banks that are required to hold MREL, the Bank of England should in the first instance use those resources to recapitalise such a firm in resolution rather than resorting to the new mechanism in the Bill. It is right that shareholders and investors in the firm should bear losses before anyone else, which goes to the point made by the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon).
I return to the primary purpose of the Bill, which is to protect the taxpayer. Bank failures are by their nature highly unpredictable, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon said. In the unlikely circumstances where a top-up is needed to resolve a bank once all its MREL resources have been used, hon. Members must consider whether they want those costs to be borne by the taxpayer. It is the Government’s belief that the taxpayer should not be on the hook for those costs.
I made the point in Committee, and do so again today, that safeguards are in place to prevent inappropriate use of the mechanism. The Treasury, for example, is involved in the exercise of any resolution powers through being consulted about whether conditions for resolution have been met. It would also need to approve any resolution action with implications for public funds. If the Bank of England requested a large sum from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme that the scheme could not provide through its own resources, additional amounts would need to be borrowed from the Treasury and would therefore require the Treasury’s approval. Therefore, in practice, Treasury consent would be required if the Bank of England had requested a large sum.
The shadow Minister attempted to draw me into many different subjects related to MREL. You rightly reminded him, Madam Deputy Speaker, of the scope of the Bill and the amendments under discussion. I will always be happy to have those discussions with him—as he knows, the Bank of England recently consulted on the thresholds—and I note what he said before he was called to order. He also tried to draw me into questions about the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, which are also for a different day; as he said, there will soon be increases.
Matt Rodda (Reading Central) (Lab)
I appreciate that the Bill’s scope is limited, and the Minister is making an excellent case for the Government. I realise that bank collapses are unusual and that the Government take a range of steps to try to protect the interests of consumers, but could she write to reassure me on the related point of bank branches there were a bank collapse?
Emma Reynolds
Perhaps my hon. Friend and I could have a discussion outside the Chamber so that I can better understand his question. The mechanism in the Bill is about what happens when the resolution regime is triggered. Four different conditions have to be met for that to happen. The Bill seeks to continue the work that the Opposition started to take forward when they were in government before the election about what we do in cases like that of Silicon Valley Bank. In that case, there was not any recourse to public funds, but this is about how we protect the taxpayer in a scenario where there is. Perhaps we can have a discussion about bank branch closures, which is obviously of great concern to Members across the House.
I appreciate that amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Wokingham, aims to introduce an additional safeguard by permitting the Bank of England to use its new power on the largest banks only if the Treasury permits that through regulations. He talked about that in his speech. However, there may be risks associated with that approach, particularly if the Bank of England needed to take a decision at pace in a crisis. Indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon was in the Treasury when many such situations arose. [Interruption.] Well, let us not rake over the history. We discussed some of these issues in Committee.
As the shadow Minister suggested, we are trying to avoid a window of uncertainty during which a statutory instrument would be laid. The Bank of England, working in close partnership and consultation with the Treasury and the other financial services regulators, needs to be able to act swiftly and decisively—often over the weekend. I ask hon. Members, and the hon. Member for Wokingham in particular, to cast our minds back to the weekend when Silicon Valley Bank UK was failing. The Bill derives from the lessons learned from that event.
What we saw from that incident is how quickly the authorities—the Bank of England in consultation with the Treasury, the PRA and the FCA—must move to find a solution before markets open and resolve a failing firm in a way that protects financial stability, depositors and the taxpayer. That has to be at the forefront of our minds when we are thinking about the amendments.
Amendment 3 could add a further stage to that process, whereby the Treasury must lay regulations to enable the Bank of England to act. That may well—it is most likely that it would—hamper those efforts to implement a solution swiftly to achieve those objectives. Had Silicon Valley Bank UK been caught by such requirements, that certainly would have made achieving the solution by Monday morning, before the markets opened, much more challenging. Again, the priority is to protect the depositors and to protect financial stability.
Overall, the Government firmly believe that it is better to leave flexibility for the Bank, noting the safeguards in place that I have already mentioned. On the basis of those points, I hope that hon. Members will be persuaded to support the Government’s position on this matter; I know that it is an issue of some contention.
Amendment 4, also in the name of the hon. Member for Wokingham, is on whether the Bank of England should have a growth and competitiveness objective when exercising its new power—another topic that we have discussed previously during the Bill’s passage. Growth and competitiveness are fundamental priorities for the Government, and as I stated in Committee, a disorderly bank failure could pose a serious risk to the growth and competitiveness of the sector and to the UK economy. The Bill seeks to mitigate that risk.
Bearing that in mind, the Government do not believe that they should impose a requirement on the Bank of England to consider growth and competitiveness when it is taking urgent crisis management action in relation to an individual distressed or failing firm. At such a time, the situation that it would have to manage would be challenging enough without an additional broad objective of that kind. The resolution objectives set out in the Banking Act 2009 already provide a solid basis on which it must make its decisions, including protecting financial stability, protecting covered depositors and protecting the taxpayer. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon reminded us, the Bank of England, in close partnership with the Treasury and the other financial services regulators, needs to act with speed and flexibility to maintain financial stability. Those considerations are very different from those that the PRA and the FCA make in their policymaking roles. The Government strongly support the existence of their secondary objective on facilitating growth and competitiveness.
I note and accept that there is a broader question about how the Bank of England can support growth and competitiveness, but this is a complex matter, and one that is well beyond the scope of the Bill. We will be resisting the amendment for those reasons.
Finally—[Interruption.] I see that our debate has attracted quite a lot of discussion around the edges; if I could hear myself think, it would be nice. I turn briefly to amendment 2, tabled by the shadow Minister. First, I reiterate that the Government have made clear their strong commitment to support the mutual sector, and I reassure him that we take our commitment in the manifesto to double the size of the mutual and co-operative sector very seriously. Many hon. Members on the Government Benches who serve as Labour and Co-operative MPs have a great interest in this matter, as has been demonstrated.
I also direct the shadow Minister—to be fair, he referred to a couple of them—to the package of measures that the Chancellor set out at Mansion House, which included the consultation on the potential to reform common bonds for credit unions in Great Britain. The Chancellor asked the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority to produce a report on the mutuals landscape by the end of the year. She also welcomed the establishment of an industry-led mutual and co-operative business council, the first meeting of which I attended earlier this year.
Gareth Snell (Stoke-on-Trent Central) (Lab/Co-op)
Will the Minister give way?
Emma Reynolds
I am afraid I am being urged to wrap up. I remind Members that the Bill is fundamentally about protecting the taxpayer—
Emma Reynolds
We have not come to that yet; my hon. Friend can intervene on Third Reading. [Laughter.]
Taking what I was saying into account, although the Government appreciate the point raised by the sector and by the shadow Minister, we do not believe it is necessary to hardwire in legislation a requirement to update the code of practice on this matter. I understand, however, that the mutual sector feels strongly about this issue, and my officials and I will continue to engage with the sector on it. I commend to the House our position on the new clauses and amendments, which is to resist them.
Mark Garnier
With the leave of the House, I wish to address one or two of the points made in the debate. The hon. Member for Hendon (David Pinto-Duschinsky) is an incredibly valuable contributor to the debate because of his experience back in the days of the 2008 financial crisis. If I remember correctly, that was largely a result of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which almost compounded the problem by having a tripartite regime that looked after the banking sector at the time. If I remember rightly, the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time found it so scary that his eyebrows nearly turned white. One of the surprising things about that crisis was that just 10 years earlier we had seen the Asian banking crisis, which basically laid the groundwork for what subsequently happened in the west. Perhaps we in the west were too arrogant to believe that it could happen to us, yet it sure did.
In my role as a member of the Treasury Committee from 2010 to 2016, and on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, I looked at all these issues very extensively. It is incredibly important that we resolve the issue. As it has turned out, the Financial Services Act 2012 and the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 have worked well in respect of some of this resolution.
On the point about LDIs and the financial crisis as a result of the Budget, we dealt with the problem pretty swiftly and pretty brutally. When one of our leaders gets it wrong, we get rid of them fairly quickly. I suggest to the Labour party that if Government Front Benchers get things wrong, it is worth cauterising the problem and moving on.
On credit unions and mutuals, we absolutely recognise the point about the mutual sector. We are not asking for demutualisation to be ruled out; we are asking for the prospect of avoiding demutualisation to be part of that very swift process. That is why we will press amendment 2 to a Division. I met the credit unions yesterday, and they are keen that the principle of new clause 3 is voted on, so we will press that as well.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Emma Reynolds
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
We can hopefully do Third Reading in a more relaxed fashion. As we have discussed through the Bill’s passage, the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill will strengthen the UK’s bank resolution regime by providing the Bank of England with a more flexible toolkit for responding to the failure of banking institutions.
As volatility over recent weeks has shown, global uncertainty can have a real impact on financial markets across the world. That is why it is important that the UK remains equipped with an effective financial stability toolkit. The primary objective of the recapitalisation mechanism introduced by the Bill is to protect the taxpayer; it will provide more comprehensive protection for public funds when banks fail. I think both sides of the House can agree that this is of vital importance to ensure that our constituents are not left on the hook when a bank collapses. The Bill achieves that without placing new up-front costs on the banking sector, and therefore strikes the right balance between protecting financial stability and supporting the Government’s No. 1 priority of driving economic growth.
I would like to thank all those in this House and the other place who have contributed to the scrutiny of the Bill. In particular, I would like to thank the Opposition for their constructive engagement. As I said on Report, there is broad agreement on the primary objectives and principles of the Bill, but differing views have been expressed on the scope of the mechanism and certain finer details. I reiterate the Government’s position: it is important to learn the lessons from the case of Silicon Valley Bank UK, which demonstrates that the implications of a firm’s failure cannot always be anticipated, and things move very quickly. It is important that the legislation avoids overly restricting the Bank of England’s ability to use the mechanism in unpredictable and fast-moving failure scenarios, and can achieve its primary objective of protecting the taxpayer. I hope that those in the other place will agree with the Government’s position when the Bill returns there for their consideration.
I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), the hon. Members for Dorking and Horley (Chris Coghlan) and for Wokingham (Clive Jones), and others who were on the Committee. I thank the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), and the hon. Members for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) and for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox), for their contributions on Second Reading. I thank the Minister with responsibility for pensions, my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea West (Torsten Bell), who assisted me on Second Reading, and my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Adam Jogee) for his input. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (David Pinto-Duschinsky) for his speech on Report.
I would like to extend my gratitude to my officials in the Treasury for their hard work in developing this highly technical Bill, which could not easily be rushed, and for supporting me throughout the Bill’s passage. I am also grateful to the House staff, parliamentary counsel and all other officials involved in the passage of the Bill.
This Bill supports the UK economy’s resilience to the risks posed by bank failures. We all remember the damage caused by the financial crisis, and the Bill, alongside other measures that allow failures to be managed in an orderly way, upholds the economic and financial stability that will deliver on the Government’s growth mission. I am pleased that the Bill has received broad cross-party support in this House and the other place, and I look forward to its enactment. I commend it to the House.
