Grand Committee
Arrangement of Business
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Geddes) (Con)
My Lords, as is customary at the beginning of each Grand Committee, I advise the Committee that if there is a Division in the Chamber while we are sitting, which is unlikely, the Committee will adjourn as soon as the Division Bells are rung and resume after 10 minutes.
UK-US Co-operation on Using Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence
(4 weeks, 1 day ago)
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Lord Goldsmith
That the Grand Committee takes note of the Amendment to the Agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States of America for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes, laid before the House on 26 July.
Relevant document: 2nd Report from the International Agreements Committee
Lord Goldsmith (Lab)
My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to debate the International Agreements Committee’s two reports on the related topics of the UK-US mutual defence agreement and the AUKUS agreement. I thank the Government for making the time available for this debate.
I will start with the MDA, which entered into force in August 1958. I am looking forward to this debate, particularly because it includes some new members of the committee; I am very pleased to welcome them to the committee as well. The MDA has been amended several times since it entered into force in August 1958, most recently in 2014. It provides for the exchange of nuclear materials, technology and information relating to nuclear weapons, although it does not provide for the transfer of nuclear weapons themselves. It underpins the UK’s nuclear weapons programme, and as such is a key part of the special relationship.
Despite the MDA being described as the cornerstone of the defence nuclear relationship between the UK and the US, amendments to the agreement in 1994, 2004 and 2014 were not subject to debate in Parliament or a Select Committee report. External stakeholders such as CND and the Nuclear Information Service have raised concerns about the lack of parliamentary scrutiny of previous amendments to the MDA and have called for a debate on the most recent amendments. I am therefore very pleased that we are having this debate today.
The amending agreement should be considered in the context of key developments to the UK’s nuclear deterrent. The UK is currently in the process of modernising its nuclear capabilities and nuclear-powered submarines, aiming to replace its four Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines with the new Dreadnought class from the early 2030s. A programme to replace the UK’s nuclear warhead was also confirmed in February 2020. In March 2024, the previous Government published a new Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper, which sets out the long-term approach to investing in and developing the UK’s nuclear deterrent. The United States is also currently modernising its strategic nuclear capabilities.
The amending agreement should also be considered in the context of particular concerns. Some commentators have criticised the MDA as it risks the UK appearing to become overdependent on the US in relation to developing an independent nuclear weapons programme. However, the Ministry of Defence told us that co-operation with the US is based on the understanding that the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent remains independent.
Turning to the committee’s report, we make two main recommendations: two key conclusions, both related to the unsatisfactory arrangements for parliamentary scrutiny of the MDA. First, we welcome the expectation that ratification of the amending agreement by the US will be completed within the terms of the current Administration and Congress. But we also observe how the thorough congressional scrutiny processes contrast starkly with the inadequacy of our own arrangements.
The US began its process of ratification earlier than the UK. Under the Atomic Energy Act, Congress has the opportunity to review a nuclear co-operation agreement for two periods totalling 90 days of continuous session. That is 30 days of consultation with relevant committees and 60 days during which Congress has the opportunity to adopt a joint resolution of disapproval. The Ministry of Defence has indicated that the period for congressional review has now concluded. By contrast, under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, or CRaG, Parliament has only 21 sitting days in which to scrutinise a treaty, take evidence and report on it, and hold a debate.
Considering the MDA’s role in forming the cornerstone of the UK-US defence and security relationship, the committee particularly regretted the lack of sufficient time to take evidence on this important agreement. This is yet another example of the shortcomings of the CRaG regime. Noble Lords may be interested to know that the committee is currently considering and conducting an inquiry into how parliamentary scrutiny of treaties can be improved in future. We have commented on this in previous reports.
In our second conclusion, the committee drew attention to a specific change in the amending agreement, which will potentially reduce the already scarce opportunities for Parliament to scrutinise the MDA. This concerns Article III bis, which provides for the transfer of non-nuclear parts, enriched uranium, special nuclear material and equipment. Article III bis is time-limited and has been renewed on a 10-year cycle since the 1980s. The requirement to approve revisions to Article III bis has also provided the opportunity for both parties to make further amendments to other parts of the MDA. Article 5 of the amending agreement amends Article III bis so that its provisions are “extended indefinitely”, with no requirement for periodic renewal. Given the strategic importance of UK-US co-operation at this critical time in replacing the UK’s nuclear deterrent to maintain the country’s security, the committee is concerned at this reduction in scrutiny opportunities and calls on the Government to commit to providing a report to Parliament on the progress and operation of the MDA every 10 years. That is a critical conclusion and recommendation of this committee.
Having dealt with the MDA, I want to turn now to the committee’s report on the AUKUS agreement relating to co-operation on naval nuclear propulsion, which forms part of the broader trilateral defence and security partnership between the UK, the US and Australia. This agreement has been made under pillar 1. The first phase of the partnership focuses on supporting Australia to acquire its first conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Upon its entry into force, it will supersede the current exchange naval nuclear propulsion information agreement, which entered into force in January 2022. That agreement, which I shall call the ENNPI agreement, allowed for the exchange of information to facilitate an 18-month study into the delivery of a conventionally armed nuclear powered submarine capability to Australia. The committee reported on that agreement on 13 January 2022, drawing it to the special attention of the House, and a debate was held in Grand Committee on 17 January.
The new agreement will allow the UK and US to support Australia in acquiring its first conventionally armed nuclear powered submarine fleet from the 2030s. As well as allowing the continued exchange of naval nuclear propulsion information, it will authorise the transfer of material and equipment relating to naval nuclear propulsion, including special nuclear material in complete welded nuclear power units. That will enable UK industry to support Australia in building a trilaterally developed submarine, incorporating technology from the UK, the US and Australia.
The AUKUS nations have released a joint statement detailing the progress made since the announcement of the optimal pathway in March 2023. The specific progress includes: increased education and training of Royal Australian Navy personnel and specialised US and UK schools; increased industry training to build and sustain nuclear-powered submarines; and preparatory activities to build Australia’s capacity ahead of establishing the submarine rotational force-west by 2027—that is, the rotational presence of UK and US nuclear-powered submarines at HMAS Stirling.
The committee welcomes the significant progress made in the delivery of pillar 1 of the AUKUS partnership. Nevertheless, we must also be mindful of some risks, as well as opportunities, highlighted by some defence commentators. For example, Dr Sidharth Kaushal, writing for the Royal United Services Institute, warned against the sale of the Virginia class to Australia appearing as a diversion of capacity from the US Navy and of the need to manage design trade-offs as well as human capital. Similarly, Andrew Dowse, the director of RAND Australia, outlined risks such as public perception challenges in relation to cost, nuclear proliferation and implications for the sovereignty of an Australian submarine fleet.
I will briefly summarise the link between the MDA and AUKUS agreements and why we are debating both reports together today. The AUKUS submarine fleet will incorporate designs and technology from both the UK and US, so the MDA could have a key role in enabling the exchange of nuclear propulsion technology and information sharing between the parties. The AUKUS submarine will be based on the UK’s next-generation nuclear-powered submarine design and will include US technology based largely on the Virginia-class SSN, including nuclear propulsion technology and components, and a common vertical launch system and weapons. The Ministry of Defence, from which we took evidence, acknowledged that although they represent two separate agreements, the MDA added value to the AUKUS trilateral agreement and that, without the MDA, we would not have the ENNPIA or AUKUS pillar 1.
Before I conclude and look forward to the debate, I thank the Ministry of Defence for its co-operation in assisting our scrutiny work. I thank my colleagues on the International Agreements Committee, a number of whom are here, for their hard work and support. I also thank the officials of the committee, who have to work on what I have already identified as a very tight timetable to prepare reports, briefs and drafts for us, a feature to which we must have regard when we look, as I hope we will, at a revision of CRaG. Finally, I thank those who offered us a slot for debate in Grand Committee within the CRaG period. I beg to move.
Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, for both the meticulousness of these reports and for the unfussy, intelligible and lucid way in which he set out the recommendations. I have nothing to add on that level of detail, so I shall take a step back and ponder why these alliances among the English-speaking democracies are the basis of our security.
I take your Lordships back to 9 August 1941, a date which one or two Members of our Chamber will no doubt remember as if it were yesterday. This was the day on which President Roosevelt made the longest walk of his presidency. In a way that is now almost unimaginable, the US media contrived to hide the fact of the President’s polio from the electorate, so he was always pictured standing unaided or seated. However, on that day, walking from the decks of USS “Augusta” to those of HMS “Prince of Wales”, he decided to walk so, supported by his son on one hand and by a naval officer on the other, he made the slow progress to meet the British Prime Minister, while the band of HMS “Prince of Wales” struck up “The Stars and Stripes Forever”.
What followed was the most extraordinary demonstration of what binds the anglophone democracies together. It happened to be a Sunday, so the crews of the two vessels were mustered for a joint religious service. Churchill had chosen every detail personally and meticulously, down to the hymns and the reading that the chaplain gave from the pulpit. It came from Joshua:
“As I was with Moses, so I will be with thee: I will not fail thee, nor forsake thee. Be strong and of a good courage”.
Afterwards, exultantly, Churchill burst out, “The same language, the same hymns, the same ideals”, and when he said “the same ideals”, he was not making a general point about being the good guys. Think of the world as it stood in August 1941. The entire Eurasian landmass, from Lisbon to Vladivostok, was under one form or another of autocratic rule. Liberty was thrown back to the alliance of English-speaking peoples. We talk of universal values, but actually almost everything we mean when we say that was a precept overwhelmingly developed in the language which I am now speaking. The things that make the modern world rational, comfortable and pleasant—regular elections, uncensored newspapers, equality between men and women, the ability of different parties to contest without people being exiled or shot, habeas corpus and jury trials—were overwhelmingly the heritage of the English-speaking peoples. Imagine that the Second World War or the Cold War had ended differently. There would have been nothing universal about them then. We tend to be polite, so we gloss over the extent to which these values became universal as a series of military actions by this country and its kindred allies.
I spent 21 years in the European Parliament and was often teased by continental colleagues about this country’s supposed subordination to the United States. They would mock us: “Do you have any foreign policy of your own? Do you always just have to wait for a phone call from DC? Have you become a sort of aircraft carrier for the US?” As patiently and politely as I could, I would explain that, formed by the same history and institutions, when presented by the same problem, we tended to respond in similar ways. We had a shared indignation with injustice and a shared belief in freedom and the elevation of the individual over the collective.
All of us have lived through a period of anglosphere hegemony, where these values have been treated as universal because they have rested on victory in the Second World War and then the Cold War. But permanence is the illusion of every age. There are rival models out there. Thinking back to the debate we just had in the Chamber, I say that a lot of these rival systems have come together from no motive other than a shared hostility to us. It is very difficult to see what the religious fundamentalists of Tehran, the hermit kingdom of North Korea, the imperial and nationalist autocracy of Russia and the still notionally communist state of China have in common, beyond a hostility to western individual and property rights, free contract and all the things that go with them. History rather disproves the idea that we have an automatic advantage—that other countries will feel their way towards our values as they become richer and more educated.
The Chinese model, in particular, strikes me as a civilisational or categorical alternative to ours. Unlike the others, it is capable of export. Plenty of countries out there do not much like us but, through a combination of high technology—facial recognition and surveillance —and the use of notionally private companies such as Weibo, Tencent and Alibaba to act both as proselytisers and spies for the regime, in a peculiar way Beijing seems to have built a model that it can sell. It could say to, for example, Maduro in Venezuela, “If you don’t want to worry about any more elections, here is a way that we can build you your panopticon state, and then we won’t need to worry about having to deal with any of your successors”.
That, fundamentally, has caused our renewed interest in the Pacific and triggered the AUKUS agreement. It was about maintaining a free world based on the rule of law, rule among nations and open sea lanes, against revanchist states that challenge the established order.
I hope we will be able to build on and strengthen the AUKUS alliance. I look forward, in particular, to its expansion. I am encouraged by conversations that I have had with the Opposition in Canada, who are keen to become involved if there is a change of government. Apart from anything else, that would make it much more euphonic; “CAUKUS” works a lot better than AUKUS, which is quite difficult to say.
I feel that our interest in the Pacific region, quite apart from being in tune with our past, is reflective of the critical economic importance of that region. Just as, at some point in the 18th century, the centre of the world shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, in this century it has shifted to the Pacific. Tied as we are by habit and history, kinship and custom, language and law, many of the nations in that region do not have the option of remaining neutral.
Let us remember what we are defending. Beijing has a tendency to divide and rule. We have not really been on the receiving end of very much direct aggression, but Australia has—a complete trade embargo and immense diplomatic pressure after it called for an inquiry into the origins of Covid. I do not think that we could possibly be indifferent between an allied English-speaking democracy and an autocratic state. As long as we still have a song to sing and more to give, I hope that we remain involved in that region. Nothing lasts for ever. The day will surely come when
“all our pomp of yesterday
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!”
But I tell your Lordships what: when that day comes, we are going to miss this era through which we pass more than we currently imagine possible.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, even if I feel compelled to correct slightly some of his history. It is not the case that all this is about English-speaking people. The great meetings that took place on various bits of the Atlantic included the Governments of most of what are now continental European countries. They were of course living in exile in London, but subscribed to the same values and qualities that we applaud today. They were, funnily enough, before the establishment of the United Nations organisation in 1945, called the “united nations”.
I will cast that little blemish aside and address the two amended agreements that we are debating today within what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, correctly described as the CRaG process. They are important and deserve to be considered by Parliament; for that reason, I greatly welcome that the Government have enabled time to be made available to do so. They of course relate to Britain’s nuclear co-operation with the US, dating back to the ending of the lamentable US McMahon Act, which cut us off from any process of nuclear co-operation for a period of years after the end of the Second World War; it was very damaging. We are also debating the strategically important AUKUS agreement, which provides Australia with nuclear-propelled submarines.
Your Lordships’ committee, most ably led by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, whose introductory remarks I totally subscribe to, has found both agreements to be strategically sound and in the UK’s national interest. We also found them to be consistent with our international obligations, including under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. But—and there are a couple of quite important buts—some significant new issues have been raised, which we hope the Minister will reply to positively when he responds to the debate. Neither affects the treaty with the US, which, in a welcome way, is due to be ratified on its side before the expiry of the present Administration and present Congress.
The first of the buts relates to the CRaG process itself. The noble and learned Lord mentioned the unsatisfactory time limits within which it operates. These are, to be frank, absurdly short and do not allow your Lordships’ committee to subject treaties and agreements to proper analysis and scrutiny, nor to gather testimony. The UK-US MDA, which we are debating today, exemplifies that problem to perfection. It was triggered during the summer and conference recesses and, even though the recess days were taken into account, there was simply no time to organise evidence sessions before we drafted our report. We therefore had only one session with senior officials, for which I express my gratitude; their testimony was extremely useful. No evidence was taken from a Minister, and we had no time to get outside witnesses to come and give different opinions, perhaps, on the treaties that we were looking at. That is no way to handle the ratification of an important international treaty. I really doubt whether any properly constituted democracy permits such a cursory and inadequate ratification review—although no doubt “people’s democracies”, such as Russia and China, would do so with alacrity.
I hope, therefore, that the Minister in the new Government will consider carefully the operating procedures for CRaG documents and will enable them in future to be scrutinised rather more effectively than they are now. I do not expect a response on that point today because, as the noble and learned Lord said, the committee is proposing to put together its considerations relating to the CRaG process in a report before too long.
My second point also relates to parliamentary scrutiny. As a consequence of the decision to eliminate the 10-year review clause in the UK-US MDA—the committee is not objecting to that and the consequent prolongation of the agreement, sine die—there will now be no occasion at all for further parliamentary scrutiny of the operation of the agreement. That is perhaps inadvertent—I am being generous—but is surely a damaging step backwards. One way in which to resolve it would be if the Minister were to state without equivocation at the end of this debate that the Government of the day would bring before Parliament at 10-year intervals a report on the operation of the UK-US MDA so that it could be considered and debated. Such a report would not—I repeat, not—affect the US side, nor affect the maintenance of the amended treaty itself, sine die. It might be said that 10 years is a long way off, but infinity is a bit longer.
I hope that this debate can end in a meeting of minds between the committee and the new Government. That would surely get matters off on the best possible footing.
Lord Udny-Lister (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful that the House has provided time for an important debate that I welcome and we need to have. It is of national importance. I also thank my colleagues on the International Agreements Committee and, in particular, our chair, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who at times has the job of herding cats because it is a formidable group to try and get to agree something. For that, we all owe him a lot of thanks.
Over the past few weeks, there has been much debate over the future composition of this House and, without wanting to go off on a tangent and risk starting an entirely different debate, I feel that the Government, when they consider the future of this House, should first consider what role they believe Members should play. I make this suggestion while entirely supporting the concerns raised by the committee that the amendments proposed provide a significant risk that the UK-US MDA would no longer be subject to proper routine scrutiny. I therefore fully back the recommendations and the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, about the need for this agreement to have periodic review.
More widely than that, I put it to the Committee that, in this rather precarious and unstable world in which we live, the CRaG Act 2010 is outdated and the House should be given a greater role in the scrutiny of foreign policy and defence-related matters. I am going to leave the subject of constitutional reform well alone for the time being, but I hope that the Government will today offer the Committee some reassurance on how both the treaty on AUKUS and the amendments to the UK-US mutual defence agreement will be subject to the level of public scrutiny worthy of such matters.
I turn to the AUKUS treaty on naval nuclear propulsion. This trilateral agreement offers the opportunity for the UK to play a leading role in creating a new and much-needed frontier for security in the Indo-Pacific. As I have mentioned in previous debates, the Indo-Pacific region faces increasing tensions, for it is one of the most geographically sensitive areas in the world at this time. It is the duty of the Government to protect our newly forged trade interests in the region, such as the CPTPP and the post-Brexit bilateral free trade agreements that we hold with Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and the AUKUS treaty will go a considerable way to bolstering the defence capabilities of our allies, while advancing our own security and trade interests.
Further, AUKUS facilitates the opportunity to deepen trade relationships with Australia and the United States, which are two of the world’s most advanced and trustworthy economies. Through the bedrock of collaborative security arrangements, AUKUS will enable stronger economic ties, and there is the real potential to drive emerging industries such as AI and quantum computing.
We must view the AUKUS treaty as a necessary counterbalance in the Indo-Pacific region. It must remain a government priority that we honour the treaty fully to ensure that our allies have the partnership support needed to maintain freedom of navigation, to protect our trade routes on the high seas and to do what we in this island nation have proudly done for centuries: deferring and, when necessary, neutralising the aggressive actions of rogue players who do not conform within the international rules-based system that we must at all times continue to maintain.
We should be proud that, through AUKUS, we are part of the future. There is a real opportunity here to harness innovation and technological leadership that will not only strengthen immediately our security but potentially allow us, alongside our US and Australian partners, to lead the world in naval defence innovation. I hope that the Government will seek ways to empower and inspire young people in this country to gain the necessary skills and qualifications to drive this much-needed innovation over the years ahead.
Beyond security, AUKUS represents a major economic opportunity for the UK’s defence industries, which stand to benefit significantly from this trilateral agreement involving two G7 nations and a G10 nation. As we transfer technology and our knowledge, there will be demand in highly skilled jobs and manufacturing. It is therefore vital that the Government set out the right industrial framework to allow the UK to feel fully the benefits of this agreement. I hope that the Minister will be able to update the Committee on the Government’s commitment to work in this area.
When considering pillar 2 of AUKUS, I am really excited and pleased to see artificial intelligence listed among the eight advanced military capability areas. It is a fast-moving area and it is therefore vital that we play our part in collaborating fully through AUKUS in developing cutting-edge AI technologies, hand in hand with our partners. That said, it also highlights the pressing need for a wider debate on the use and application of AI when it comes to defence and warfare. Although I am sure that there is wide public support for the application of AI when it comes to the optimisation of military supply chains, improvements to navigation, enhancing training and simulation, while, of course, countering AI threats, Parliament must be given a voice and the opportunity, within the parameters of protecting national security, to consider how this technology is to be deployed in the future.
Over the last few years, the Ministry of Defence has been successful in trialling and perfecting laser-directed energy weapons which, with such low running costs, have huge potential to strengthen the UK’s defence capabilities. DragonFire is a symbol of the MoD’s ability to remain at the cutting edge of innovation, and I therefore wonder whether there is scope to see other areas, such as innovating around laser-directed systems, included under pillar 2 in the not-too-distant future.
The United Kingdom remains a leading military and diplomatic power and with this comes a responsibility to shape the evolution of international rules-based systems through our values, by promoting peace, encouraging stability and strengthening the rule of law. It is with this responsibility that the Government must never lose sight of the fact that AUKUS is much more than a defence pact, for it is the affirmation of this nation’s commitment to an open, free and secure world. I therefore wish the Government well in continuing the work of the previous Government in this important space and taking it further. I hope the Minister will reassure us that the next stage of AUKUS will be a key component of our national security architecture, to be more than a pact and, like Five Eyes, develop, expand and gradually bring in our partners to work together. I hope it will go beyond electoral cycles to be long lasting and there for the future.
I turn briefly to the UK-US MDA. The special relationship between the United Kingdom and US has been underpinned by the mutual defence agreement since it was first signed in 1958 and it has been a key pillar of the world-leading role that the UK and US play in promoting peace and security. The amendment and recent renewal of the MDA will ensure that our co-operation can adapt to a changing strategic, technological and legal environment. Against the challenges we face in the world today, such renewals are most welcome. We must strive to do more on joint research and development, particularly in ensuring that we have the ability to innovate so that our nuclear deterrent does not become obsolete as we face up to a future underpinned by rapid technological advance.
With war raging in Ukraine and the Middle East and tensions rising in the Indo-Pacific, the prospects of avoiding the catastrophe of global conflict continue to be strained. That is why agreements such as these must not simply be words on paper but the actions and resolve of the United Kingdom and her allies.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I welcome this debate. I support the ratification of these treaties, which I too consider to be in our national interest, as previous speakers have remarked. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the International Agreements Committee for their informative analysis of these treaties in their second and third reports.
As has been pointed out, the main amendment to the UK-US MDA is to Article III bis, a key provision in the treaty which was added in 1959. It regulates the transfer of non-nuclear components and nuclear materials from the US to the UK and from the UK to the US. This provision historically had a sunset clause, which effectively meant that a new agreement had to be concluded before the expiration of the deadline. Article 5 of the amendment agreement will remove the sunset clause.
In the debate on the strategic defence review, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said that he would explain the reasons for making this arrangement indefinite. I very much look forward to his explanation, with which I suspect to find myself in agreement because it seems to me that an indefinite agreement is appropriate in this context given the strategic importance of our alliance with the United States and in light of the commitments under the AUKUS agreement on naval nuclear propulsion. Moreover, making the arrangement indefinite is consistent with the nature of the co-operation that the MDA, in particular Article III bis, provided for.
In some ways, the sunset clause seemed rather out of place in this kind of treaty because, in reality, terminating the envisaged nuclear co-operation would always have required an agreement between the parties and a staged process. This is reflected in the terms of Article XII, which deals with duration. It provides that the treaty
“shall remain in force until terminated by agreement of both Parties”.
It does not provide for unilateral termination except in the case of one provision—Article II. I also note that Article 13 of the amendment agreement adds some important changes to Article XII on duration that provide precisely for the kind of staged process that termination would inevitably require. Removal of the sunset clause is the right decision and is also consistent with the legal architecture of this treaty. I commend the Government on securing this change.
That said, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, so clearly explained, a consequence of this change is that the MDA will not come to Parliament every 10 years or so. In light of that, I strongly support the committee’s critical conclusion that the Government should provide a report to Parliament on the progress and operation of the MDA every 10 years or so. I hope the Minister can reassure us in that regard.
I also endorse the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Udny-Lister, on the inadequacy of our ratification process, which these treaties have brought into sharp relief.
The other point that I wish to make that relates to both treaties concerns our obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. I agree with the Government that neither the MDA nor AUKUS would put us in breach of our obligations under the NPT. This is a very important subject and I am grateful to the Government for the attention they have given to it, including in the evidence that they submitted to the committee.
I was counsel for the UK 10 years ago in the case that the Marshall Islands brought against the UK concerning our obligations to negotiate towards nuclear disarmament. That case was brought before the International Court of Justice against all nuclear weapon states. Most nuclear weapon states had an easy way out of that litigation, but we did not take it, because we accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the court. We had to defend the UK’s position, which we did successfully.
Since then, it is fair to say that the international landscape of nuclear proliferation has become far more challenging. The risks of nuclear proliferation are greater, as illustrated by North Korea and Iran. Moreover, crucially, the impatience of non-nuclear weapon states towards nuclear weapon states has grown, as reflected in the conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons—the TPNW—which was adopted in 2017 and has already secured 94 signatures and 73 accessions or ratifications. For obvious reasons, the United Kingdom and the United States are not going to become parties to that treaty. The NPT is the only treaty that brings together nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, and offers us the best chance of managing the risk of nuclear proliferation. However, the NPT will not survive unless nuclear weapon states continue to engage with it. That is a position that I am sure still enjoys support across the political divide. I note that a former senior adviser in arms control in the Trump Administration, Dr Tom Grant, has recently made the case for the NPT in a book entitled Nuclear Arms Control in Peril: Why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Matters and How to Save It.
Whether we are progressive realists or realists, we need the NPT and we need to keep it relevant. For that reason, I welcome the engagement of the Government with the case made in relation to these treaties concerning our obligations under the NPT.
Lord Bilimoria (CB)
My Lords, AUKUS is of course an acronym for the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. There are two pillars of defence: first, a conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarine fleet for Australia, supported by the UK and the USA; secondly, co-operation in advanced capability, including AI.
As a trustee of Policy Exchange, I can say that we coined the term Indo-Pacific as opposed to Asia-Pacific, as it used to be referred to. With the UK’s renewed policy focus on the Indo-Pacific, that is timely. We have joined the CPTPP. We should also join the Quad, with India, the USA, Japan and Australia, making it Quad Plus, circling the world. Does the Minister agree? That would enhance our membership of NATO and Five Eyes, and our security would be greatly enhanced, but—I will come back to this later—we should spend 3% of our GDP on defence. Our Armed Forces—the Army, the Navy and the Air Force—are far too small in numbers of people; I say that as a proud honorary group captain in 601 Squadron of the RAF.
Prime Minister Rishi Sunak assured us in March 2023 that an additional £5 billion would be provided by the MoD for the AUKUS programme and that sustained funding would be provided. Can the Minister confirm that? The Government have also said that this would create thousands of jobs here in the UK and in Australia.
Gideon Rachman wrote an excellent article in the FT this February in which he said:
“China has repeatedly attacked Aukus as dangerous and confrontational. Shortly after it was launched, Boris Johnson, Britain’s prime minister at the time, gleefully lampooned the ‘raucous squawkus from the anti-Aukus caucus’”.
He concluded:
“The pact is ultimately a statement of resolve and long-term commitment. It is based on a shared perception of the growing strategic threat from China and Russia as they work together to overturn the current international order. That perception seems more pressing and valid than ever”.
He said that in February, and it is truer than ever now.
The noble Lord, Lord Risby, who led a debate on AUKUS in February this year, referred to AUKUS as a “technology accelerator”. I think that is fantastic, because there is huge potential in enhancing our security but also powering ahead with our innovation and research and development capabilities—all things that this country has always been fantastic at.
When I was president of the CBI, one of my priorities was to promote government, business and universities working together, not just in the UK but across borders. As chancellor of the University of Birmingham, I was very proud when we won two Queen’s Anniversary Prizes, one of them for Rolls-Royce and its work in aero engines. We have seen time and again that when you do cross-border collaboration between two universities—in Birmingham’s case, with Panjab University in India or with Harvard University in the United States—the field-weighted impact of collaborative research is three times higher than if the university does it on its own. Could the Government through AUKUS promote this cross-border, collaborative approach, with universities, government and business working together?
Pillar 1 of AUKUS focuses on supporting Australia to acquire its first conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarine fleet, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said in his excellent opening speech. It does not involve the transfer of nuclear weapons to Australia. Pillar 2 focuses on co-operation in eight advanced military capability areas: artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, innovation, information-sharing, cyber, undersea, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic, and electronic warfare domains.
The UK-US mutual defence agreement, which many noble Lords spoke about, was established in 1958 for co-operation on nuclear materials, technology and defence and is meant to be renewed every 10 years. This seeks to extend naval nuclear propulsion co-operation to all naval vessels, and the proposal now removes the 10-year renewal requirement for Article III bis—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, mentioned—allowing continuous co-operation. We have been assured of the Government’s commitment to transparency and parliamentary accountability within national security limits. However, there are concerns over reduced parliamentary oversight with the removal of routine reviews of Article III bis. That is worrying. Here is a fact: the MDA amendments would lessen routine parliamentary scrutiny. On the other hand, the United States Congress will conduct far more rigorous scrutiny than us over here in the UK Parliament. Do the Government feel that this is a healthy position to be in?
Pillar 1 focuses on Australia’s acquisition of a nuclear-powered submarine fleet, leveraging UK submarine design and technology, with £3 billion allocated over two years. Pillar 2 emphasises developing advanced capabilities—AI, hypersonic and quantum technology, as I said earlier—and enhances interoperability among armed forces. The UK hosted the first AUKUS AI trial in April 2023, demonstrating this military collaboration, which I will come to later.
However, concerns exist about US export regulations impacting co-operation. An open general licence was issued for AUKUS nations as of 1 September 2024, and the Minister, Luke Pollard, outlined ongoing efforts with AUKUS partners to develop undersea capabilities, including launching and recovering uncrewed underwater systems from British and American submarines, integrating this into the SSN-AUKUS design.
The traditional NATO structure was to be a deterrent to Soviet expansion, but with AUKUS members there are huge incentives: for Australia, the concerns over China’s military growth and sovereignty threats; for the UK, to deepen our ties with the United States, enhance military collaboration and expand Pacific exports; for the United States, to maintain military dominance against rising Chinese and Russian assertiveness.
On Australia’s industry capacity constraints, there is scepticism in some quarters in Australia about AUKUS that we continue to need to address. The evolution of AUKUS could yield a new form of plurilateral defence alliance, addressing collaborative military capability needs and the emphasis on flexible investments in inter- operable military capabilities to adapt to geopolitical threats. This also strengthens the UK’s position in global security and military collaboration, and opportunities for technological advancement and military exports, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.
For over 65 years, the UK and the US have co-operated on defence nuclear issues. Established as an amendment to the post-World War II US non-proliferation law, the MDA exempts allies from making significant advancements in nuclear weapons from the general ban on exchange leading to proliferation.
I will be absolutely clear about the three amendments. Article 4 makes naval nuclear propulsion co-operation reciprocal, allowing the UK to share technology and information with the US. Article 5 removes the expiry provisions of Article III bis, allowing the MDA to remain in force on an “enduring basis”, which I have spoken about, and eliminating the 10-year renewal requirement. Article 13 ensures that the information, material or equipment shared under the MDA will remain protected if terminated by either party in the future. But no one has mentioned this: a joint nuclear skills plan aims to double apprentices in the sector, enhancing the workforce. We have a Budget coming up. I hope that the Government address the huge flaws in our apprentice system. The apprenticeship levy needs to be reformed wholesale, and with regard to AUKUS. Does the Minister agree?
The review will maintain UK defence ties in the Indo-Pacific, prioritising objectives to create a deliverable defence plan supporting AUKUS. Is this a separate plan? Will it be apart from the strategic defence review or part of it?
As I mentioned earlier, we had a world first as the UK hosted the inaugural AUKUS AI and autonomy trial. This exemplified strong trilateral co-operation in AI capabilities, enhancing operational effectiveness and decision-making speed. Over 70 military and civilian defence personnel and industry contractors participated in the AUKUS AI trial, involving various air and ground vehicles. Milestones included live retraining of AI models inflight and immediate sharing of updated information among AUKUS partners, which is tremendous news.
The reforms will lift export controls, potentially covering £500 million of UK defence exports annually. The UK has issued an open general licence, easing licensing requirements for advanced defence capabilities and technical data among AUKUS partners.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, referred to this: there are discussions about expanding AUKUS to Canada, South Korea, Japan and New Zealand, but I am led to believe that these nations are not yet ready to proceed. Could the Minister confirm whether the Government are encouraging this expansion? US export regulations, particularly ITAR, hinder collaborative defence innovation, posing significant challenges for AUKUS. Could he address that issue?
In 2019, in the debate on NATO’s 70th anniversary, I said that we should spend 3% of GDP on defence. I said that five years ago, and I have been like a stuck record ever since. The MoD is facing funding challenges. Our defence budget today is £54.2 billion. Our spending on defence was higher in real terms in 2010, at £57 billion, than today. That was a golden era for our Chinese relationship and with no threat from Russia and Ukraine. There was not a huge conflict going on in the Middle East, as we have today. We are spending too little on defence.
Our full-time Armed Forces number 192,760 in total—Army, Navy and Air Force combined. I have said this time and again: my father’s army, the central army in India, was 350,000 strong. In the debate on the strategic defence review earlier this month, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, said that we have a
“shrinking and hollowing out of our Armed Forces”,—[Official Report, 9/10/24; col. GC 226.]
and the noble Lord, Lord West, said that
“money was the elephant in the room”.—[Official Report, 9/10/24; col. GC 227.]
I concluded my speech by saying that:
“The price of freedom is not free”.—[Official Report, 9/10/24; col. GC 250.]
Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, on not only the skill with which he introduced this debate but his patience and skill in presiding over the whole business of producing these agreements. I do not know whether it is realised what a cascade of international agreements and treaties pass through the hands of the committee and our excellent staff. It is enormous and seems to be growing. Some of them are gloriously minimalist, such as worrying about driving licences for British citizens in Portugal after Brexit; I know it is important, but it is very small. Some look simple, but are actually enormous and have vast hinterlands of implications behind them. The words in the treaties may be simple, but what lies behind them is enormously significant for the future of this country.
These two agreements that we are looking at—the MDA and the AUKUS agreement—are definitely both in that second category. I am not sure that that is fully appreciated or realised by the machinery which enables us to have a debate here in the Moses Room. These are giant issues that will shape the entire future of our nation and its safety and security. Neither of them has really been given anything like the adequate time needed to go into the thinking behind them and where they are heading.
As the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, eloquently said, the whole Constitutional Reform and Governance Act process—the CRaG process—really will not do any more, I am sorry to say. Some of us pressed the previous Government and are pressing the present Government on this. In this populist age, if we want our Parliament to perform, be trusted and be able to genuinely scrutinise major issues and acts of the Executive, we have to go back to that Act and reform it. I hope that will be a high priority for the new Government.
At first glance, these two treaties look quite separate from each other, but they in fact overlap, not only in not being given enough time to be examined but in that, together, they raise enormous questions about the pattern of our future war weaponry, defence equipment and entire security stance in a totally changed world in which power has changed, threats are coming from different directions from ever before and in unfamiliar forms. Many people do not seem to be geared towards this entirely new situation.
Again, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and others said, the MDA takes away the 10-year rule and the chance for Parliament to scrutinise an enormously rapidly evolving world of nuclear weaponry and technology—and, of course, civil nuclear technology as well. I am not sure that Congress in the United States or the Parliament of Australia—or, if there are any newcomers to AUKUS, the Parliament of Canada or Diet of Japan—would put up with this sort of thing. They would not tolerate a truncated, short session after which the Executive carry on as before, which is more or less what happens. This is a very unsatisfactory situation, which is very bad for Parliament and will, I hope, be changed.
As for the AUKUS naval treaty, it is all to do with nuclear marine propulsion—not to be confused with nuclear weapons, of course—for a new generation of submarine vehicles for the Australians. It looks quite small; it is mostly about pillar 1 of the two pillars of the AUKUS treaty but, if you start looking at the implications of AUKUS 1—and indeed, AUKUS 2, which will presumably be covered by the same sorts of agreements in due course—you see that it takes us into a new defence world altogether. It is a vast Aladdin’s cave of new technologies, some of which hardly ever come into the media discussion because they are not understood. Some of them are already being used: there was a gentleman here from Ukraine last week who informed some of us that the military plus semi-private enterprise organisations, which organise the battlefield planning for the Ukrainians on all their fronts, are now also in control of the direction, effects and supply of about a million drones. That covers, if you think about it, the control of their production, maybe in remote spots, their deployment, their decision to go into Russian territory and all the rest. That is beyond what any Government or any military organisation can manage alone. It now has to be managed by a whole series of fascinating new enterprises of vast complexity, all relying on the very latest technologies of every kind, including AI, to see that there is a flow and supply chain of drones, and that they go in roughly the right direction. Of course, they are not always co-ordinated at all, which produces some quite sensitive results.
Nevertheless, we are looking at is an entirely different defence world and, as I said, an Aladdin’s cave of new technology. I have just glanced through pillar 2, which is relevant to pillar 1 and the AUKUS treaty. Pillar 2 refers to advanced capabilities, the areas in which we, the British, are now implicating ourselves, not sacrificing sovereignty in a major way but nevertheless weaving our future defence plans into other people’s—America’s and Australia’s. It is welcome and good, but we should be aware of it in a way that I do not think we are.
First, “undersea capabilities” sounds innocent enough. What that is to do with is whether submarines are going to cut our north Atlantic and Atlantic cables and literally slice off the entire British economy. That is a major consideration, fear and danger. The development of proper undersea capabilities and unmanned submarines in due course, which are also on the list for discussion, is a central part of our national survival.
Quantum technology obviously comes at the centre of this, described by the previous Government as a priority of our defence development. Artificial intelligence and autonomy are obvious ones. Advanced cyber is already going ahead, and then there are hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, which are desperately needed, as the affairs in the Middle East demonstrate particularly clearly. There is all the electronic warfare and innovation of every kind, in relation to the traditional visions of defence, including tanks, rockets, soldiers, guns, warfare, battleships and so on—all that sort of thing—with electronic co-ordination, in entirely new ways. There is information-sharing, which of course is intelligence, and advanced radar, in which we were once the world leaders—but now of course the Americans have rather taken over, and the Russians as well. They are particularly well advanced in radar. These are areas that are not usually associated in people’s minds with defence, yet this is the defence of tomorrow, and this is where we are being taken by the two treaties that we are discussing today.
It is a very new area indeed. I cannot help feeling how maddened Mr Putin must be when he was talked into going into Ukraine by generals who probably did not have the slightest idea what they were heading towards—the idea that there could be 1 million drones halting all their attack advances and causing chaos, and the idea that they themselves had to invent new technologies in drones, as the Russians have done with some success. That is something that he must regret bitterly now.
Eric Schmidt, the former head of Google, was remarking in Foreign Affairs a couple of days ago that the US is unprepared for this sort of world and pattern, and he urged certain changes. Obviously, Russia was completely unprepared and has been caught hopping, and Ukraine has had to invent itself as a new force based on these new technologies, totally different from anything that we have ever known before, even though there are a few relics of the old technologies—like the Battle of the Somme and trench warfare. That goes on, but on top of it an entirely new pattern of hostilities and conflict has emerged, with autonomous weapons driven by gigantic algorithms now dominating the scene.
Putin regrets it, and America may be trying to get ready. I hope that we are ready, although you do not hear much about it, and perhaps the Minister will have a word or two to add to the debate today. I think that we are bright and resilient enough not to fall into the same trap. As long as Parliament is given a chance to speak, and the experts in Parliament—and, dare I say it, the experts in your Lordships’ House—at the right times, we shall be able to keep up with affairs. If the MDA will not allow a 10-year review automatically, so what? We can put down a few Motions and have a debate ourselves every 10 years. Actually, I think we will need one every five years, because these things are evolving so fast.
As I said, we must not fall into the old trap of fighting the last war with the last war’s weapons. It is an entirely new world, and these treaties open the gates to understanding it in a more effective way. To finish, I add—rather impertinently and cheekily, because I belong to a rather defeated party at the moment—that I hope all our new Ministers will remember that they are also parliamentarians.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford. I agree very much with his introductory remarks about the huge democratic deficit represented by the CRaG process—remarks echoed by most noble Lords taking part in this debate. Democracy? It would be a good idea; I hope most people would agree. I also agree very much with his concluding remarks that we are in a new world and we need new approaches. What we have before us looks very much like something out of the 20th century, rather than being fit for the 21st.
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the International Agreements Committee, for their hard and rapid work in preparing the report, securing this debate and introducing it so clearly.
I note that the scrutiny period for the MDA ends on 23 October, which is today, and, for the AUKUS agreement, on 29 October. I might use a hashtag that I use frequently on social media: #NoWayToRunACountry. It would be nice to have more space and time for discussion and thought.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, set out, this debate occurs as the UK prepares to spend, and is spending, an enormous amount of money on new nuclear weapons. I must put on the record the Green Party’s opposition to the huge expense and risks of the Trident replacement programme in a geopolitical environment in which the majority of the world’s countries have backed the UN treaty for a global ban on nuclear weapons. I also note the related context in which the cost of the nuclear clean-up at Sellafield has spiralled to £136 billion, about which the National Audit Office has today expressed great concern. This is on a site where there have been very serious cybersecurity concerns and on which we have yet to find any kind of long-term solution for the storage of nuclear waste.
However, I will focus in particular on the AUKUS agreement, in part because the perspective of the Green Party of England and Wales lines up very much with that of the Australian Greens. We bring a different and widely supported voice to the debate in both our nations. Both our parties are opposed to the agreement, and that gives me the opportunity to draw the Committee’s attention to some important points that should, I respectfully suggest, give the Government and all parties pause.
I note by way of background that, in 2022, the Australian Greens had by far their best ever federal election result, labelled a “greenslide” by the leader, Adam Bandt. It saw the election of the first three Green MPs in Brisbane and a significant increase in Senate numbers, and state-elected representation has continued to grow since then. We are in a time of considerable political change in the UK, the US and around the world.
I also note, as I have previously noted to this committee, that two former Australian Prime Ministers and one former Australian Foreign Minister, who are not Greens, have all opposed the AUKUS deal.
I will begin with a longue-durée view and look over more than a century of Australian and UK military co-operation, which has been marked often by strong, even slavish, support for UK and US actions from the top of the Australian Government, although that has not always been backed by, or first checked with, the Australian public.
My speech might be taken as a balance and contrast to that of the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, not for the first time. First, I refer to the First World War. ANZAC Day on 25 April now marks the contribution of all those who have served militarily in Australia, but was initially founded very much around trying to get more people to sign up to the war, as historian Martin Crotty said, between 1916 and 1918, after the British-led military disaster of Gallipoli that claimed so many young lives, The Prime Minister of Australia, Billy Hughes, tried twice to extend service for conscripts outside Australian shores to feed more lives into the horrors of the trenches. When the flow of volunteers dried up, twice, the Australian public said no, and I note in passing that the Australian Labor Party subsequently split.
On 3 September 1939, Prime Minister Robert Menzies told the Australian people that they were at war with Nazi Germany. That came just an hour after Britain had declared war. While there is no doubt that the Australian public was, and remained, behind the Government, there was considerable concern and doubt, as there had been in the then dominions of Canada and South Africa, about the Australian Prime Minister’s assumption of automaticity. The slavish abandonment of any idea of Australian sovereignty has echoes which I will come back to.
Without doing a detailed trawl through Australian history, I will just stop briefly at the Vietnam war moratorium protests, the first of which took place on the 8 May 1970. These were then the largest public demonstrations in Australia’s history and represented growing resistance from a significant number of Australians to the Government’s commitment to the Vietnam War in general and conscription in particular. On 16 February 2003, more than half a million people took part in protests across Australia against the US-led invasion of Iraq, the largest anti-war protests in Australia’s history. The Committee can see the pattern that I am drawing out here and should perhaps reflect that Australia is, however imperfectly, a democracy and there is a strong chance that public views may eventually influence political choices.
Australian officials believe, and it has been widely acknowledged, although it is extremely hard to estimate the cost of the AUKUS programme over its life, that the long-term cost of the submarine plan is likely to be about 0.15% of Australia’s entire gross domestic product per year, on average. For context, in 2023, that was put as a comparable cost to boosting the resourcing of schools across the entire nation to what was seen to be an essential minimum standard. But the objections are not just about costs. I draw noble Lords’ attention to the Australian Greens’ dissenting report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade’s report on the Defence Legislation Amendment (Naval Nuclear Propulsion) Bill 2023. The dissenting report is readily available, so I will not discuss it at length but pick out a couple of key points. First, it states:
“There are environmental, health, security and social risks associated with every facet of the nuclear industry. These risks disproportionately impact First Nations peoples and their lands.”
I note that the very much unfinished business of the treatment of First Nations in Australia has recently been strongly highlighted. The report then states,
“that the two major parties have worked together to ensure a short time frame on the reporting of this inquiry and not enabled time for public hearings … the Australian public has not been properly consulted on the AUKUS proposal”.
We can see the clear echo here at the complaints that we have heard across this Committee. The report concludes that the deal undermines Australian sovereignty and violates international nuclear safety principles, and notes that Australia’s Defence Strategic Review rejected advice from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Australian Government’s own nuclear safety advisory council, which recommended that an independent regulator have oversight of the programme.
Finally, the report notes:
“The Australian public has rejected … nuclearisation … for nearly a century”.
It might be of particular interest to the Government that the Electrical Trades Union and the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union, two prominent Australian unions, strongly oppose the development of a nuclear industry in Australia or any end to the moratorium on nuclear power. That is the political context of the AUKUS deal. Noble Lords might think that that presents considerable political risks: they would be right.
I also note that that reflects the conclusion of a report published in the last week by the US Congressional Research Service, which says of the military context that
“the costs … of Pillar 1 could reduce, perhaps significantly, funding … for other Australian military capabilities”.
Crucially, it says that no alternatives were ever considered by any of the AUKUS partners. We come back to democratic scrutiny and consideration. To repeat, this report was from the US Congressional Research Service.
Finally, the timing of this debate all too acutely highlights the geopolitical context, of which our relationship with Australia is a small if significant part. There is the approaching US election, in which there is at least an even-money chance that we will see a second Donald Trump presidency and a risk that, even if that is not the result, we will see that candidate seeking to claim the presidency. I will not get into the details of today’s row, but this is not a politically stable time in US history to be making deals such as either of these. At the CHOGM meeting in Samoa, for which our Prime Minister may just about have landed after 26 hours, he will not be joined by the leaders of India or South Africa, because they are at the BRICS meeting hosted by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, in Kazan, where the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, is also in attendance. Canada too is sending neither its Prime Minister nor Foreign Minister to CHOGM.
As I said in our debate on the defence review, the UK needs to consider far more than defence in isolation. It needs to consider its place and relationships in a world of multiple security threats—not just the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the threats that China presents with its denial of the joint declaration in Hong Kong and the threats to the democratic entity of Taiwan, but the multiple security threats of the climate emergency, the nature crisis and multiple health threats. I draw attention to an extremely disturbing report in Vanity Fair about the H5N1 virus in US dairy herds and that country’s wholly inadequate public health response.
The agreements we are debating today already look like 20th-century relics, and in future will likely look even more so, sitting dangerously, expensively and unstably in the 21st-century world. The security of our country and the world cannot afford such outdated approaches.
Lord Stevens of Birmingham (CB)
I am very pleased to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, not least because she has spurred all kinds of reactions in my mind to the “Address to the Australian Parliament” which we have just heard. It is a stretch to say that the decision to renew the strategic deterrent lacks democratic legitimacy in this country, when it was explicitly voted on by the House of Commons in 2016; when the people of this country had a choice, in 2019, whether to elect the leader of one of our principal political parties who had an obvious preference against nuclear weapons; and when, in the 2024 election, her party, under good democratic principles, put before the electorate the prospect of unilaterally abandoning our nuclear weapons and I am afraid the country did not elect a Green Government. The idea that these decisions lack democratic legitimacy is itself an illegitimate argument.
It was also surprising to hear the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, cite the US Congressional Research Service report on the AUKUS pillar 1 deal as an alternative to what is being proposed. I happen to have that report here and was just flicking through it as she was speaking. The alternative proposition that the CRS put on the table is not the absence of nuclear-powered submarines for Australia or, indeed, the downgrading of its defence expenditure so as to reinvest in other worthy projects; it is in fact to contemplate greater dependency on US basing of US-controlled Virginia-class SSNs in Australia, foregoing any sovereign oversight that the elected Australian Government of the day might have. We are here to discuss what is in Britain’s interest, not Australia’s, but I think most of us are convinced by the argument that there is a strategic need for Australia for these types of submarine services and, by pooling our technologies and resources, we will all get a better deal.
My starting point is that I accept that if we are going to have the asymmetric capability that the submarine service represents, we need to continue with our forward order book. The idea that, at some point in the late 2030s, a better, modern class of submarine will replace the A-class attack submarines that we have right now seems to me a statement of the obvious. I accept that there are legitimate debates about the affordability and management of our nuclear programme; these are not new. On 14 October, the Chancellor of the Exchequer wrote to the Prime Minister about this matter and said, “The nuclear submarine programme seems to me a very doubtful proposition. The cost is prodigious. How many of these are we likely to be able to afford? How soon can we get them? When they arrive, will they already be obsolescent?” That was on 14 October 1957 and the then Chancellor of Exchequer, Peter Thorneycroft, writing to Harold Macmillan, who fortunately ignored that ministration and the rest, as they say, is history.
So, yes, I think this makes strategic sense. However, for AUKUS pillar 1 to work, and to respond to some of political doubts that will be sowed in the minds of people in Australia, and possibly elsewhere, it is very important that the transitional elements of AUKUS, the so-called optimal pathways between now and the construction of these new submarines, also work well.
We can all use this as an opportunity to note our concerns about the pressures on the Royal Navy Submarine Service at the moment. Open-source reporting has said that some of the times at sea have almost doubled over the past three years, with a combination of difficulties of availability of submarines and retention of submariners, and we are not alone in this. The US is also experiencing difficulties in its new submarine production. Since 2022, the rate of build for the new Virginia-class subs on order has been between 1.2 and 1.4 a year, compared with the two boats a year that had been expected.
The reason this matters is because creating, as it were, the facts on the ground for AUKUS from 2027 requires rotational deployments of one of our SSNs and four of the US SSNs, so availability in the submarine services of the two countries in the here and now is very important for getting this programme under way, as of course is restarting the fuller production pipeline for Virginia-class submarines, so that they are available for the US to sell to the Australians, beginning with the three that are in play. This all needs proper scrutiny, no doubt through the strategic defence review, but it is not something that is simply a late 2030s conversation; it is something that needs careful attention, as I am sure Ministers are well aware, in the here and now.
My final point—and I declare my interest as chair of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency—is on the role that UK science and innovation in nuclear naval propulsion potentially has in the maritime civilian sector as well. There is growing interest on the part of merchant shipping and the port sector around the role that new nuclear technologies can potentially play—small modular reactors, non-enriched fuel, non-pressurised reactors for use at sea, perhaps using next-generation molten salt technology, and so forth. In the last 12 months we have seen Lloyd’s Register, Maersk and ABS all producing scoping reports for how small nuclear reactors could be used in merchant shipping, in containerisation. The reason why this matters is because, worldwide, shipping constitutes 3% of greenhouse gas emissions, about the same as aviation, but to date has received less attention in terms of what the green fuels transition will look like for shipping.
I think that it was in 1956 that we were the first country to get a civilian nuclear reactor up and going, and by the mid-1960s there were more nuclear reactors at work in civilian installations in the UK than all the rest of the world combined. As the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, said, the programme that has been set out around skills development, nuclear engineering and the broader clusters that go around this set of technologies, which are implicit in AUKUS and the agreements before us today, also have profound benefits—spillover benefits, potentially—in other applications, including at sea.
This is an area that will be entirely worthy of investment. The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, said that money was the elephant in the room. Perhaps to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, when this question is being debated with the Treasury, there is an example that he might call to mind. Apparently, when Lord Mountbatten was having this argument with a different Chancellor of the Exchequer at that point, he produced a 20-inch model of a nuclear submarine, which opened up with a little compartment. During the entirety of the Cabinet committee the Chancellor fiddled around, looking at it, and in the end said, “Okay, how much do you need?”
Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)
I am grateful to the Deputy Chairman for allowing me to speak in the gap. I had applied in proper form, but alas, there was a misunderstanding in the Government Whips’ Office. So here I am, and I am grateful.
I begin by congratulating my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith. He follows in the proud tradition of my noble friend Lady Hayter and my very good and late friend Lord Morris of Aberavon.
The report on the MDA gives some indication of the importance of the scrutiny role of the committee and, as the noble Lord, Lord Howell, and others mentioned, of the deficiencies in the current CRaG process—a point also made very well by my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith.
The agreement is absolutely fundamental to the excellent defence relationships between our two countries. The MDA provides for the exchange of nuclear material, technology and information, and the debate is also very timely, in that the UK is in the process of modernising its nuclear-powered submarine and the warheads.
This has been a unique defence and security relationship between us and the US. We have heard quite a lot of history during this debate. The McMahon Act 1946 banned the US from sharing its nuclear knowledge. That was modified in 1958, and co-operation then between the UK and the US was a precursor to the Polaris agreement of 1963.
I noted that in the presidential determination of 16 July recommending approval of the amendment, President Biden stated that it was in the interests of the US to continue to assist the UK in maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent,
“which will further improve our mutual defense posture and support our”
collective interests under NATO. It appears clear, from what we have heard as a committee, that the US will indeed shortly ratify these amendments.
As an aside, many years ago, in 1960, I joined the Foreign Office, and what struck me very forcefully at the time was the excellent personal relationships between members of the US Administration and senior members of the Foreign Office, many of whom had served in the US during the war—people such as Sir Frank Lee and Sir Arnold France—and had built up excellent personal relationships. Alas, I do not believe that those personal relationships, which inspire confidence and trust, exist in quite the same way today.
Pace the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, it may well be that, in the current context, the US might be looking not just at the UK for that special relationship but at France and possibly other countries. France was, of course, upended by the AUKUS agreement and may well be brought in now, in some subsidiary way.
Power relationships and the context of today are very different from 1958 and 1959. I hope that the Government will indicate whether they foresee a possible change if there were to be a change of government in the US following the presidential election.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede) (Lab)
I point out to my noble friend that there is a four-minute time limit to interventions in the gap.
Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)
In that case I end simply by stating—although there is plenty of time left—that there is clearly concern about parliamentary oversight. When the committee met Mr Pitt-Rashid of the MoD, he conceded that the removal of this amendment was “not a great disadvantage”. Surely we would not expect the US to be concerned about our parliamentary procedure, nor should we be concerned about the US. Its removal can be done without difficulty.
I make one point in relation to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame. The question of relying on a Minister to give an assurance is fundamentally different from having an obligation set in statute.
Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)
My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to debate AUKUS, the MDA and the work of the International Agreements Committee. It has been nothing if not a wide-ranging debate this afternoon. We have ranged through decades of history and travelled the globe, yet much of the debate has been narrowly focused on ourselves and our parliamentary role to scrutinise international treaties.
I very much welcome the opportunity for these discussions. Somewhat like the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, I will try to give a slight corrective to the noble Lord, Lord Hannan. He talked about the Anglosphere and how important it is that these treaties are with our oldest friends, those who speak English. The treaty that has not been mentioned today, either in the Chamber or here, will, I hope, be scrutinised within 21 days from when it is laid. The UK-Germany Trinity House Agreement on Defence was agreed today and will be part of a wider treaty with Germany. As the Foreign Office no longer has such close ties with our American counterparts in the State Department, I suggest that the new Government, to whom I pay tribute, have already done an incredible job at strengthening relations with some of our closest European partners.
That was an aside. However, given that today’s debate has been so wide ranging, an aside to look at another defence co-operation treaty might be appropriate.
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, for presenting not just the reports but the two agreements so clearly. They are legal documents, and his insight and expertise in presenting them to us so clearly is extremely welcome. I also put on record our thanks to the International Agreements Committee and its staff because, as we heard from many noble Lords, the agreements have to be reviewed so quickly.
It is important that we all put on record the one area of agreement, because almost every noble Lord commented on the CRaG process and expressed significant concerns. In the words that the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, used, we had an absurdly short amount of time. If we are going to look at international treaties, we need to have the right amount of time to allow the International Agreements Committee to review them and take evidence. This is not a criticism of either the present Government or indeed their predecessor. The CRaG Act clearly needs to be looked at again. Unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, I am not in any way suggesting that the Government have deliberately chosen not to give sufficient time for scrutiny, but the procedures do not work adequately. If there is one unanimous message for the Minister to take back to the usual channels, it must be that the CRaG Act needs to be looked at, and more time should be given.
From the International Agreements Committee reports and what we have heard in the Chamber, it looks as if Congress has a much better model for allowing scrutiny. Clearly, if there are treaties that need to be decided as a matter of urgency, maybe 21 working days is appropriate, and maybe even fewer days are appropriate if something is being undertaken immediately as a matter of national security. But with the two treaties or agreements that we are looking at today, some more time could have been given, which would have allowed everyone to begin to look not just at the broad parameters of the agreements but somewhat more at their specifics.
There are a few areas that perhaps could be discussed in more detail. In particular, the reports commented on two amendments to the MDA, one of which we have heard about already—the change to Article III bis, and the idea that we will no longer have to have a review of the treaty every 10 years. The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, very clearly said that it is appropriate that this should now be an indefinite treaty; we should not have to have 10-yearly reviews. But in this Grand Committee yesterday, three of us, in a very small group including the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and me, discussed the Armed Forces Act 2006 (Continuation) Order, which we have to do; under the 1688 Bill of Rights, every year, Parliament renews its commitment to our Armed Forces and agrees to their continuity. While we may not want to renew the agreement every 10 years, the opportunity of at least scrutinising our agreements and ensuring that there is the opportunity for Parliament to review agreements would seem to be appropriate.
Here again there is a question about who we are asking to ensure that there can be regular scrutiny. I am sure that, if the Minister thinks that this is an ad personam request, he will very rightly say that he will commit to do this—and he is an honourable man who would undoubtedly bring reports in the way that we would expect. But we have to accept that a Parliament in 10 years might look very different, and the Government might look very different. We may not have the luxury of having such an open Administration, so having a firm commitment would be most welcome.
One area on which we have not touched at all was another point from the IAC’s report on the MDA, on Article 4, which expanded the treaty somewhat. It was one of the few areas on which the committee was able to take some evidence. We had a slightly strange response, because we heard from the MoD official that it was just about future-proofing and they did not expect very much to happen.
If Article 4 is not going to change very much, why is it needed? Does the Minister think that very much is going to change with this change? One reason for asking now is precisely that, if we are no longer going to review the MDA every 10 years, we need to be very clear now about what we have just signed up to.
On general principles, I need to put on record that these Benches have supported the AUKUS agreement. It is also important to restate the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, made very clearly in his introductory remarks: this is about an agreement that will allow nuclear-powered but conventionally weaponed submarines. The intervention from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, seemed in some ways to elide all the nuclear questions together. While there may be arguments to have an entirely nuclear-free world, this is not about nuclear weapons. It is really important that this does not, in that sense, jeopardise the situation vis-à-vis nuclear non-proliferation.
I thought that I would nevertheless just take the opportunity of asking one question on non-proliferation, in the absence of my noble friend Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer. When we discussed the SDR a couple of weeks ago, she raised the issue of non-proliferation. I have one question for the Minister. Given that we are committed to non-proliferation, there was a period during the coalition and Conservative Governments when the NPT review conferences—the five-year reviews—seemed to keep coinciding with general elections, as in 2010 and 2015, and not very much preparation was done. Are His Majesty’s Government already thinking about the 2026 review conference and will they play a full part? However much we support these vital nuclear agreements—the MDA and nuclear propulsion agreement with Australia —and want firm agreements with our allies in Australia and the United States, it is still important, as far as possible, to look for non-proliferation and de-escalation, particularly at a time when the number of nuclear weapon states, and the threats of using nuclear weapons, seem to be on the agenda in a way that they have not been for decades.
Baroness Goldie (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and all members of the International Agreements Committee for their helpful report on the two agreements before us today. I also thank the noble and learned Lord for his very helpful introductory remarks.
I may say that I have discovered two virtues of being in opposition. One is that I am no longer sitting in the position of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, answering all these questions. The second is that, for the first time, I have been able to enjoy the full scope and implicit message of “The Judgment of Daniel”, which made me think that Daniel was a man who came upon a problem, understood the problem, addressed the problem and got on with life. That is very much the prism through which I am looking at the AUKUS agreements.
I remember, when I was a Defence Minister, the efforts that the Government made to reach agreement with the United States and the Government of Australia on the Agreement for the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information, and the significance of that agreement: I felt a frisson of excitement when it was accomplished. It was intended as a temporary measure to facilitate the sharing of information for the purposes of that early 18-month study to determine the optimal pathway. This treaty is the extension of that initial arrangement that we negotiated throughout 2021.
I welcome His Majesty’s Government’s commitment to continuing the previous Conservative Government’s efforts to advance the AUKUS partnership. This agreement therefore builds upon numerous past successes in the arena of international defence co-operation, such as the establishment of NATO and the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing arrangement, among others.
We should also note the significant progress that has been made on pillar 1 of the partnership. I strongly support such a phased approach to delivery because it sets out clear and robust targets to keep progress on track. To that end, I was delighted that in January my honourable friend the then Minister for Defence Procurement, James Cartlidge, announced that £4 billion of contracts had already been allocated to UK companies for the AUKUS submarines and that in December 2023 the first Australian personnel came to Barrow-in-Furness to improve their knowledge of the production and maintenance of nuclear-powered submarines. These are all positive steps in the right direction.
I make no apology for applauding the AUKUS alliance. It is both strategically important and an impressive reflection of strong defence relationships. The partnership between the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia demonstrates this country’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific region, helping to combat new and emerging threats. It will act as a guarantor of the defence of our interests and security and support our aim of upholding the international rules-based order.
On this point, the other agreement before us today on the amendment to the mutual defence agreement also contributes to our international defence and security aims. In many ways, as noble Lords will be aware, the MDA between the UK and the United States underpins the special relationship between our two countries. It aids the reliable maintenance of the continuous at-sea deterrent and plays a key role in enabling the necessary exchange of information and technologies required for the AUKUS partnership.
As has been mentioned, the amending agreement removes the expiry date contained within the MDA. The Explanatory Memorandum states that this makes
“the entirety of the MDA enduring, securing continuing cooperation with the US”.
Ensuring continual co-operation with the US is of paramount importance, but I understand why the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and his committee raise the issue of parliamentary scrutiny. That scrutiny matters, as eloquently articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and my noble friend Lord Howell. It would be reassuring—I choose my words carefully to try to help the Minister—and for the benefit of all noble Lords for the Government at least to register that concern and be prepared to explore updating Parliament routinely on the MDA and any related developments.
On the future of the AUKUS submarine building programme, it is appropriate for the Government to update noble Lords further on the steps they have been taking to ensure that the necessary industrial resources are in place and that continuing dialogue is undertaken with our partners to enable the timely progress of the programme.
Finally, as has been indicated, Article XIII states that the treaty on nuclear naval propulsion will extend all the way to 2075. Professor Donald Rothwell, when giving evidence to the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Treaties last week, described this as a “rather exceptional extension”. I do not think there would be much disagreement with that analysis. Given the longevity of this agreement, it may very well be necessary for additional measures to be brought forward to guarantee the flexibility of the partnership with Australia and the United States. We must make sure that these future possibilities, if they occur, are transparent and that Parliament’s scrutiny role is respected. I respectfully ask the Minister to confirm that he is cognisant of that government responsibility and that the Government will endeavour to discharge it meaningfully.
These two agreements reflect and build on the United Kingdom’s important network of defence alliances and partnerships. I look forward to continuing to support the Government as they progress these important issues, but I will rap fingers if Parliament is not kept informed about these issues.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith and Lady Goldie, for their remarks and contributions to this debate, and their general support from the Front Benches. I will deal with some of the specific questions that they asked as I go through my remarks, but I welcome their support.
Moreover, I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith for his chairmanship of the committee and the reports he has brought forward with its support. One can see how well thought of they are by the presence here of so many members of the committee. I welcome his introduction, and I am grateful for the well-made thanks he expressed to the MoD and officials. I am also grateful to him and his committee for their overall support for the two treaties before us. I welcome the reports, which I have read in great detail, including the appendices.
I will deal with the specific recommendations later in my remarks, but I take what my noble and learned friend said about his committee intending to look at the CRaG process. I have heard the remarks of different members of the committee about it, and I take the point made forcefully and correctly by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, about holding the Government to account on parliamentary scrutiny. I also take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Howell, that we are all parliamentarians, even if we are Ministers. It is an important point of principle.
I say to my noble and learned friend that, if I can help in that, by informing ministerial colleagues about the process as his work goes forward, I am very happy to do so. I cannot promise an answer, but I will certainly take it forward because that is the least that he and his colleagues on the committee should expect. I am grateful to noble Lords on the committee for their thoughtful reports, and I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to our constructive debate.
The 1958 mutual defence agreement underpins the defence nuclear relationship between the UK and the US, forming the basis for our co-operation on the safe and reliable maintenance of the UK’s nuclear deterrent. It is clear that co-operation under the MDA has been of considerable mutual benefit, supporting both countries to maintain operationally independent deterrents. It is in the national and security interests of the UK and the US to continue this long-standing agreement. The Prime Minister has been clear that the nuclear deterrent is the foundation of any plan to keep Britain safe. As our world has grown more volatile and insecure, we are reminded that the cost of our nuclear deterrent is a price worth paying.
That brings us to today. We have confirmed delivery of our triple-lock nuclear guarantee, which will upgrade our nuclear deterrent for future generations, and the crucial role that our nuclear co-operation with the United States will play. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister, who mentioned the nuclear deterrent. It remains absolutely central to our defensive posture. We are committed to the modernisation of our deterrent and to the relationship between our countries.
I cannot agree with the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, about the nuclear deterrent, but I am glad I live in a country where she can freely make those points and campaign for them. I think we all respect her for the way in which she does so. Without being patronising, I want to say that it is important that she continues to make those points and challenge those of us who do not agree with her. The democratic principle that she can make those points and be heard with respect in our Chamber is important.
Our nuclear co-operation with the US is underpinned by the mutual defence agreement, which allows us to exchange nuclear materials, technology and information. Its strategic value is self-evident. The amendment to remove the 10-year renewal provision and broaden the types of information exchanged under the agreement reflects the maturity and trust that characterises our relationship with the United States, while preserving the parties’ rights to agree amendments or terminate the agreement, in accordance with its terms. That is an important point to make.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, for his support for the change to the agreement. It is important for us to recognise that the removal of the renewal provisions associated with Article III bis represent one of the key amendments to the treaty; the other being clarification of the types of information that can be exchanged under the agreement. As noble Lords will be aware, Article III bis, with its associated renewal provision, was first introduced into the agreement in 1959. The remainder of the treaty has endured since 1958. There is no clear programmatic reason in either the UK or the US that has driven this particular renewal period, which at times has varied from five to 10 years. Both the US and the UK agreed that removal of this renewal provision was a priority for this amendment, having regard for the fact that there is no operational or other requirement for it—reflecting, of course, the maturity and trust that characterises our relationship. I will come to the point about parliamentary scrutiny later in my remarks.
Our amendments to the naval nuclear propulsion clauses will consolidate the reciprocal transfer of equipment, information and material that will benefit our fleet. The amendments to the treaty do not impose any additional financial commitments on the UK, nor do they commit us to buying any goods or services from the US. Indeed, the UK’s long-running nuclear co-operation with the US under the agreement has reduced the cost of our nuclear deterrent capability. Recognising the concerns that some noble Lords here and outside have regarding our NPT commitments, I can reassure all noble Lords that all activity under the amended mutual defence agreement will remain consistent with the UK’s obligations under the non-proliferation treaty. Again, I note the support of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, with respect to that. In particular, as other noble Lords have noted—I want to make it clear the Dispatch Box for the Government—there is no movement of nuclear weapons or new nuclear explosive devices under the mutual defence agreement. Further, the agreement does not represent an indefinite commitment to the possession of nuclear weapons by the UK.
We remain committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner, with undiminished security for all. In answer to the direct question of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, yes, we are preparing for the 2026 NPT review conference. We understand completely the concerns of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the committee, and as raised by a number of Members, regarding the periodic scrutiny of the mutual defence agreement. The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, raised the point as well. In particular, we and I have noted the committee’s recommendation to provide a report to Parliament on the progress and operation of the MDA every 10 years. In principle, we are content to explore how we can satisfy the intent of the committee and a formal government response will be provided in due course. I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and other noble Lords, that I will ensure that this happens.
The noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Howell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie raised another important point. I can reassure them, as I have said before, that any future amendments to the mutual defence agreement that fall within the scope of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny in the normal way.
I turn to the AUKUS naval nuclear propulsion agreement and note that a large number of your Lordships recognise its importance. They included the noble Lords, Lord Hannan, Lord Hannay, Lord Udny-Lister, Lord Bilimoria, Lord Stevens and Lord Howell, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett, Lady Smith and Lady Goldie, and indeed my noble friend Lord Anderson. Many others mentioned the importance of this.
This recognises the importance of the Indo-Pacific. We have a NATO-first policy as a Government, but the Indo-Pacific remains important to us, through the signing of the AUKUS agreement. I just say in passing that His Majesty’s Government’s carrier strike group will be going to the Indo-Pacific next year, with many of our international partners, as an important statement of our intention to remain relevant in that part of the world and to reinforce the international rules-based order, human rights, democracy, the laws of the sea and so on.
Pillar 1 of AUKUS, which is a trilateral arrangement and will continue as such, will deliver a nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarine capability to Australia. The phased approach of this will culminate in SSN-AUKUS, built and operated by both the UK and Australia. It is based on the UK’s next-generation design and incorporates advanced US technologies. It will bolster our national security as well as theirs, help us reduce costs and equip us with one of the most advanced submarine capabilities in the world, which I think is of immense importance.
The AUKUS naval propulsion agreement provides an essential legal footing for that co-operation. It is a key facilitator upon which we will negotiate a bilateral treaty with Australia that will govern how we collaborate to deliver Australia’s SSN-AUKUS programme. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister, and others, this should create major trade opportunities for the UK, with billions of pounds of submarine components expected to be exported from our supply chains, which will benefit us as well as Australia and others. I take the point about the need to develop a skills programme that will allow us to take full advantage of those proposals. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, alluded to this.
Pillar 1 is about Australia, the UK and the United States. Pillar 2 is incredibly important but perhaps less well understood and discussed than some of the other aspects. It deals with artificial intelligence, hypersonics, cyber and all these other technological, modern types of warfare that will take us into the 21st century and are hugely important. There are really important conversations going on, particularly with New Zealand, Canada, Japan and South Korea, about co-operation on pillar 2.
On nuclear non-proliferation, I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, in particular, that the AUKUS naval nuclear propulsion agreement is fully compatible with our national obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Australia has reaffirmed unequivocally that it does not have and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. The agreement does not permit the supply of nuclear weapons to Australia by the US or the UK. On the contrary, it restates legally binding non-proliferation obligations and is fully consistent with the AUKUS partners’ commitment to set the highest possible non-proliferation standards, which the Prime Minister reaffirmed alongside President Biden and Prime Minister Albanese in September.
I thank noble Lords for their thoughtful consideration of these two separate agreements. Our sovereign nuclear deterrent and the AUKUS partnership are two central pillars, as this debate has recognised, of our national security and defence strategies. The Government are committed to strengthening both and building on some of the work of the last Government, to be fair, in establishing AUKUS. The treaties we have discussed today will enable us to do that. The unflinching power of our nuclear deterrent and the unrivalled strength of our military alliances and partnerships are what will keep the British people safe in our more contested and unpredictable geopolitical age. Our investment in our nuclear sector will help create 40,000 new defence and civil nuclear jobs by the end of the decade—highly skilled jobs that will spread opportunity across the UK.
Today, the defence nuclear supply chain already benefits over 3,000 businesses. This is an immense investment in cutting-edge science and technology across the country. Above all, it protects our security, protects what this country and our allies stand for and looks forward to the challenges of the geopolitical age in which we live. I thank the noble and learned Lord for the committee’s reports on these two treaties. I urge the committee not only to support this but to argue the case for it, in this House and with the British public at large. It is a major step forward for our country and our alliances and we should all take credit for that.
Lord Goldsmith (Lab)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for participating in this debate. As the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, said, it has been an extraordinarily wide-ranging debate. I had not expected so much knowledge to come out about Australian politics. I do not know a lot about it, but now I know much more, thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle—but obviously noble Lords spoke about the great geopolitical questions that we are concerned with. To the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, I have to say that, with regards to matters of history, I tend to side with the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, but he may persuade me one day.
I want particularly to thank the Minister. He has made two personal commitments today for which I am very grateful. One is how we deal with the renewal question, which I shall come back to. The second is what he said about helping to educate his colleagues about the limitations of the CRaG process, which I hope will help us to pursue the amendments which I and others believe are necessary.
I have talked about this issue in the House before. Once upon a time, of course, Parliament did not have any right to look at treaties, unless a Minister chose to bring them. All treaties were made under the royal prerogative, and there was no process for parliamentary scrutiny as a matter of generality. CRaG has changed that, and that is very good, but it is limited. It is limited in terms of time, as noble Lords have said—and it is extraordinary how difficult it can be. When one says from time to time, “I pay tribute to the work of the committee staff and the officials”, it really is the case here. Our committee staff—and our clerk, Rhiannon Williams, is sitting in the Public Gallery—have to pick up these treaties, often at short notice, and find expert evidence that will help us, because we do not necessarily know all the answers, so finding people who can help the committee is very important.
We then need to get a report done in time to meet the CRaG scrutiny period, which is limited, and we depend on the Government. I do not want to be political about this, but this committee produced an important report on Rwanda, which it was actually quite important for Members in the other place to debate, because they are the ones who have the right under CRaG to say, “Don’t ratify this now”. We did not in a sense have a statutory right. But to do that, they needed to have time for a debate, and that was in the hands of the Government. There are issues about time for debates that are also important. That is why I started by thanking the Government for making time for this debate—and I repeat that thanks now. So we will continue to look at the CRaG process and we will come forward with some proposals for reform. I shall take the Minister up on his promise to talk to his colleagues about that when we have formulated precisely what we think should happen.
The second thing is the commitment that the Minister has made in relation to renewal. This was a matter that exercised the committee. On one hand, taking away the 10-year renewal—or, to use different language, the break clause—adds to our security, because it means that there is an evergreen commitment to do those things that the agreement does, and that is a good thing. But, by a sidewind, it takes away parliamentary scrutiny at the same time, which was what exercised the committee. So our proposal that the Government should none the less come forward to Parliament and tell it every 10 years, taking the same period as was in the previous arrangements, is a good way to ensure that there is still some scrutiny.
We will look at precisely what the Minister’s officials come forward with. He has made an in-principle commitment—I understand entirely why that is so. He will not be surprised to hear me say, using the same words that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, used, that we will hold him, as it were, to account—the Government to account—for making sure that there is a scrutiny which works.
I very much welcome the support for reform that we had from a number of people: the noble Lords, Lord Howell, Lord Hannay and Lord Bilimoria, and others as well, and we will follow that through.
I do not think there is anything more I need to say about this debate. It has been a great privilege. Well, there is one thing I want to say. The noble Lord, Lord Udny- Lister, referred to dealing with this committee as being like herding cats. He said it was a formidable committee, and it is, but that is because of its members’ expertise, talent and experience, not because of any feline qualities that they might have. However, it is a great privilege and a pleasure to chair this committee. It is doing important work, and the fact that we have a debate in which it is not just the members of the committee who came to speak—although it included them—is very welcome. With those words, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name.
Co-operation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Lord Goldsmith
That the Grand Committee takes note of the Agreement among the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States of America for Cooperation related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion, laid before the House on 2 September.
Relevant document: 3rd Report from the International Agreements Committee.