UK-US Co-operation on Using Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence
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Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)
I am grateful to the Deputy Chairman for allowing me to speak in the gap. I had applied in proper form, but alas, there was a misunderstanding in the Government Whips’ Office. So here I am, and I am grateful.
I begin by congratulating my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith. He follows in the proud tradition of my noble friend Lady Hayter and my very good and late friend Lord Morris of Aberavon.
The report on the MDA gives some indication of the importance of the scrutiny role of the committee and, as the noble Lord, Lord Howell, and others mentioned, of the deficiencies in the current CRaG process—a point also made very well by my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith.
The agreement is absolutely fundamental to the excellent defence relationships between our two countries. The MDA provides for the exchange of nuclear material, technology and information, and the debate is also very timely, in that the UK is in the process of modernising its nuclear-powered submarine and the warheads.
This has been a unique defence and security relationship between us and the US. We have heard quite a lot of history during this debate. The McMahon Act 1946 banned the US from sharing its nuclear knowledge. That was modified in 1958, and co-operation then between the UK and the US was a precursor to the Polaris agreement of 1963.
I noted that in the presidential determination of 16 July recommending approval of the amendment, President Biden stated that it was in the interests of the US to continue to assist the UK in maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent,
“which will further improve our mutual defense posture and support our”
collective interests under NATO. It appears clear, from what we have heard as a committee, that the US will indeed shortly ratify these amendments.
As an aside, many years ago, in 1960, I joined the Foreign Office, and what struck me very forcefully at the time was the excellent personal relationships between members of the US Administration and senior members of the Foreign Office, many of whom had served in the US during the war—people such as Sir Frank Lee and Sir Arnold France—and had built up excellent personal relationships. Alas, I do not believe that those personal relationships, which inspire confidence and trust, exist in quite the same way today.
Pace the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, it may well be that, in the current context, the US might be looking not just at the UK for that special relationship but at France and possibly other countries. France was, of course, upended by the AUKUS agreement and may well be brought in now, in some subsidiary way.
Power relationships and the context of today are very different from 1958 and 1959. I hope that the Government will indicate whether they foresee a possible change if there were to be a change of government in the US following the presidential election.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede) (Lab)
I point out to my noble friend that there is a four-minute time limit to interventions in the gap.
Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)
In that case I end simply by stating—although there is plenty of time left—that there is clearly concern about parliamentary oversight. When the committee met Mr Pitt-Rashid of the MoD, he conceded that the removal of this amendment was “not a great disadvantage”. Surely we would not expect the US to be concerned about our parliamentary procedure, nor should we be concerned about the US. Its removal can be done without difficulty.
I make one point in relation to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame. The question of relying on a Minister to give an assurance is fundamentally different from having an obligation set in statute.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith and Lady Goldie, for their remarks and contributions to this debate, and their general support from the Front Benches. I will deal with some of the specific questions that they asked as I go through my remarks, but I welcome their support.
Moreover, I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith for his chairmanship of the committee and the reports he has brought forward with its support. One can see how well thought of they are by the presence here of so many members of the committee. I welcome his introduction, and I am grateful for the well-made thanks he expressed to the MoD and officials. I am also grateful to him and his committee for their overall support for the two treaties before us. I welcome the reports, which I have read in great detail, including the appendices.
I will deal with the specific recommendations later in my remarks, but I take what my noble and learned friend said about his committee intending to look at the CRaG process. I have heard the remarks of different members of the committee about it, and I take the point made forcefully and correctly by the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, about holding the Government to account on parliamentary scrutiny. I also take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Howell, that we are all parliamentarians, even if we are Ministers. It is an important point of principle.
I say to my noble and learned friend that, if I can help in that, by informing ministerial colleagues about the process as his work goes forward, I am very happy to do so. I cannot promise an answer, but I will certainly take it forward because that is the least that he and his colleagues on the committee should expect. I am grateful to noble Lords on the committee for their thoughtful reports, and I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to our constructive debate.
The 1958 mutual defence agreement underpins the defence nuclear relationship between the UK and the US, forming the basis for our co-operation on the safe and reliable maintenance of the UK’s nuclear deterrent. It is clear that co-operation under the MDA has been of considerable mutual benefit, supporting both countries to maintain operationally independent deterrents. It is in the national and security interests of the UK and the US to continue this long-standing agreement. The Prime Minister has been clear that the nuclear deterrent is the foundation of any plan to keep Britain safe. As our world has grown more volatile and insecure, we are reminded that the cost of our nuclear deterrent is a price worth paying.
That brings us to today. We have confirmed delivery of our triple-lock nuclear guarantee, which will upgrade our nuclear deterrent for future generations, and the crucial role that our nuclear co-operation with the United States will play. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister, who mentioned the nuclear deterrent. It remains absolutely central to our defensive posture. We are committed to the modernisation of our deterrent and to the relationship between our countries.
I cannot agree with the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, about the nuclear deterrent, but I am glad I live in a country where she can freely make those points and campaign for them. I think we all respect her for the way in which she does so. Without being patronising, I want to say that it is important that she continues to make those points and challenge those of us who do not agree with her. The democratic principle that she can make those points and be heard with respect in our Chamber is important.
Our nuclear co-operation with the US is underpinned by the mutual defence agreement, which allows us to exchange nuclear materials, technology and information. Its strategic value is self-evident. The amendment to remove the 10-year renewal provision and broaden the types of information exchanged under the agreement reflects the maturity and trust that characterises our relationship with the United States, while preserving the parties’ rights to agree amendments or terminate the agreement, in accordance with its terms. That is an important point to make.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, for his support for the change to the agreement. It is important for us to recognise that the removal of the renewal provisions associated with Article III bis represent one of the key amendments to the treaty; the other being clarification of the types of information that can be exchanged under the agreement. As noble Lords will be aware, Article III bis, with its associated renewal provision, was first introduced into the agreement in 1959. The remainder of the treaty has endured since 1958. There is no clear programmatic reason in either the UK or the US that has driven this particular renewal period, which at times has varied from five to 10 years. Both the US and the UK agreed that removal of this renewal provision was a priority for this amendment, having regard for the fact that there is no operational or other requirement for it—reflecting, of course, the maturity and trust that characterises our relationship. I will come to the point about parliamentary scrutiny later in my remarks.
Our amendments to the naval nuclear propulsion clauses will consolidate the reciprocal transfer of equipment, information and material that will benefit our fleet. The amendments to the treaty do not impose any additional financial commitments on the UK, nor do they commit us to buying any goods or services from the US. Indeed, the UK’s long-running nuclear co-operation with the US under the agreement has reduced the cost of our nuclear deterrent capability. Recognising the concerns that some noble Lords here and outside have regarding our NPT commitments, I can reassure all noble Lords that all activity under the amended mutual defence agreement will remain consistent with the UK’s obligations under the non-proliferation treaty. Again, I note the support of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, with respect to that. In particular, as other noble Lords have noted—I want to make it clear the Dispatch Box for the Government—there is no movement of nuclear weapons or new nuclear explosive devices under the mutual defence agreement. Further, the agreement does not represent an indefinite commitment to the possession of nuclear weapons by the UK.
We remain committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner, with undiminished security for all. In answer to the direct question of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, yes, we are preparing for the 2026 NPT review conference. We understand completely the concerns of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the committee, and as raised by a number of Members, regarding the periodic scrutiny of the mutual defence agreement. The noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, raised the point as well. In particular, we and I have noted the committee’s recommendation to provide a report to Parliament on the progress and operation of the MDA every 10 years. In principle, we are content to explore how we can satisfy the intent of the committee and a formal government response will be provided in due course. I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and other noble Lords, that I will ensure that this happens.
The noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Howell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie raised another important point. I can reassure them, as I have said before, that any future amendments to the mutual defence agreement that fall within the scope of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny in the normal way.
I turn to the AUKUS naval nuclear propulsion agreement and note that a large number of your Lordships recognise its importance. They included the noble Lords, Lord Hannan, Lord Hannay, Lord Udny-Lister, Lord Bilimoria, Lord Stevens and Lord Howell, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett, Lady Smith and Lady Goldie, and indeed my noble friend Lord Anderson. Many others mentioned the importance of this.
This recognises the importance of the Indo-Pacific. We have a NATO-first policy as a Government, but the Indo-Pacific remains important to us, through the signing of the AUKUS agreement. I just say in passing that His Majesty’s Government’s carrier strike group will be going to the Indo-Pacific next year, with many of our international partners, as an important statement of our intention to remain relevant in that part of the world and to reinforce the international rules-based order, human rights, democracy, the laws of the sea and so on.
Pillar 1 of AUKUS, which is a trilateral arrangement and will continue as such, will deliver a nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarine capability to Australia. The phased approach of this will culminate in SSN-AUKUS, built and operated by both the UK and Australia. It is based on the UK’s next-generation design and incorporates advanced US technologies. It will bolster our national security as well as theirs, help us reduce costs and equip us with one of the most advanced submarine capabilities in the world, which I think is of immense importance.
The AUKUS naval propulsion agreement provides an essential legal footing for that co-operation. It is a key facilitator upon which we will negotiate a bilateral treaty with Australia that will govern how we collaborate to deliver Australia’s SSN-AUKUS programme. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister, and others, this should create major trade opportunities for the UK, with billions of pounds of submarine components expected to be exported from our supply chains, which will benefit us as well as Australia and others. I take the point about the need to develop a skills programme that will allow us to take full advantage of those proposals. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, alluded to this.
Pillar 1 is about Australia, the UK and the United States. Pillar 2 is incredibly important but perhaps less well understood and discussed than some of the other aspects. It deals with artificial intelligence, hypersonics, cyber and all these other technological, modern types of warfare that will take us into the 21st century and are hugely important. There are really important conversations going on, particularly with New Zealand, Canada, Japan and South Korea, about co-operation on pillar 2.
On nuclear non-proliferation, I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, in particular, that the AUKUS naval nuclear propulsion agreement is fully compatible with our national obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Australia has reaffirmed unequivocally that it does not have and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. The agreement does not permit the supply of nuclear weapons to Australia by the US or the UK. On the contrary, it restates legally binding non-proliferation obligations and is fully consistent with the AUKUS partners’ commitment to set the highest possible non-proliferation standards, which the Prime Minister reaffirmed alongside President Biden and Prime Minister Albanese in September.
I thank noble Lords for their thoughtful consideration of these two separate agreements. Our sovereign nuclear deterrent and the AUKUS partnership are two central pillars, as this debate has recognised, of our national security and defence strategies. The Government are committed to strengthening both and building on some of the work of the last Government, to be fair, in establishing AUKUS. The treaties we have discussed today will enable us to do that. The unflinching power of our nuclear deterrent and the unrivalled strength of our military alliances and partnerships are what will keep the British people safe in our more contested and unpredictable geopolitical age. Our investment in our nuclear sector will help create 40,000 new defence and civil nuclear jobs by the end of the decade—highly skilled jobs that will spread opportunity across the UK.
Today, the defence nuclear supply chain already benefits over 3,000 businesses. This is an immense investment in cutting-edge science and technology across the country. Above all, it protects our security, protects what this country and our allies stand for and looks forward to the challenges of the geopolitical age in which we live. I thank the noble and learned Lord for the committee’s reports on these two treaties. I urge the committee not only to support this but to argue the case for it, in this House and with the British public at large. It is a major step forward for our country and our alliances and we should all take credit for that.