UK-US Co-operation on Using Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence

Lord Verdirame Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd October 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I welcome this debate. I support the ratification of these treaties, which I too consider to be in our national interest, as previous speakers have remarked. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the International Agreements Committee for their informative analysis of these treaties in their second and third reports.

As has been pointed out, the main amendment to the UK-US MDA is to Article III bis, a key provision in the treaty which was added in 1959. It regulates the transfer of non-nuclear components and nuclear materials from the US to the UK and from the UK to the US. This provision historically had a sunset clause, which effectively meant that a new agreement had to be concluded before the expiration of the deadline. Article 5 of the amendment agreement will remove the sunset clause.

In the debate on the strategic defence review, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said that he would explain the reasons for making this arrangement indefinite. I very much look forward to his explanation, with which I suspect to find myself in agreement because it seems to me that an indefinite agreement is appropriate in this context given the strategic importance of our alliance with the United States and in light of the commitments under the AUKUS agreement on naval nuclear propulsion. Moreover, making the arrangement indefinite is consistent with the nature of the co-operation that the MDA, in particular Article III bis, provided for.

In some ways, the sunset clause seemed rather out of place in this kind of treaty because, in reality, terminating the envisaged nuclear co-operation would always have required an agreement between the parties and a staged process. This is reflected in the terms of Article XII, which deals with duration. It provides that the treaty

“shall remain in force until terminated by agreement of both Parties”.

It does not provide for unilateral termination except in the case of one provision—Article II. I also note that Article 13 of the amendment agreement adds some important changes to Article XII on duration that provide precisely for the kind of staged process that termination would inevitably require. Removal of the sunset clause is the right decision and is also consistent with the legal architecture of this treaty. I commend the Government on securing this change.

That said, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, so clearly explained, a consequence of this change is that the MDA will not come to Parliament every 10 years or so. In light of that, I strongly support the committee’s critical conclusion that the Government should provide a report to Parliament on the progress and operation of the MDA every 10 years or so. I hope the Minister can reassure us in that regard.

I also endorse the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and the noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Udny-Lister, on the inadequacy of our ratification process, which these treaties have brought into sharp relief.

The other point that I wish to make that relates to both treaties concerns our obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. I agree with the Government that neither the MDA nor AUKUS would put us in breach of our obligations under the NPT. This is a very important subject and I am grateful to the Government for the attention they have given to it, including in the evidence that they submitted to the committee.

I was counsel for the UK 10 years ago in the case that the Marshall Islands brought against the UK concerning our obligations to negotiate towards nuclear disarmament. That case was brought before the International Court of Justice against all nuclear weapon states. Most nuclear weapon states had an easy way out of that litigation, but we did not take it, because we accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the court. We had to defend the UK’s position, which we did successfully.

Since then, it is fair to say that the international landscape of nuclear proliferation has become far more challenging. The risks of nuclear proliferation are greater, as illustrated by North Korea and Iran. Moreover, crucially, the impatience of non-nuclear weapon states towards nuclear weapon states has grown, as reflected in the conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons—the TPNW—which was adopted in 2017 and has already secured 94 signatures and 73 accessions or ratifications. For obvious reasons, the United Kingdom and the United States are not going to become parties to that treaty. The NPT is the only treaty that brings together nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, and offers us the best chance of managing the risk of nuclear proliferation. However, the NPT will not survive unless nuclear weapon states continue to engage with it. That is a position that I am sure still enjoys support across the political divide. I note that a former senior adviser in arms control in the Trump Administration, Dr Tom Grant, has recently made the case for the NPT in a book entitled Nuclear Arms Control in Peril: Why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Matters and How to Save It.

Whether we are progressive realists or realists, we need the NPT and we need to keep it relevant. For that reason, I welcome the engagement of the Government with the case made in relation to these treaties concerning our obligations under the NPT.